10000 From: Robert Epstein Date: Fri Dec 14, 2001 10:18pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) Dear Suan, Sorry to take so long to get back to you on this good subcommentary. My remarks are dispersed below: --- abhidhammika wrote: > > Dear Dhamma Friends > > The following is the second part of Parinibbana Subcommentary written > in response to the questions and statements of Upasaka Howard, Robert > Epstein, and Mike Neace. In this second part of the subcommentary, I > directly address the statements of Robert Epstein. Here, I also > include the meaning of the last mind, which partly satisfies > Howard's desire to know the exact meaning of consciousness. > > > 1. PARINIBBANA COMMENTARY PALI > > "Parinibbutaa naama arahattapattito patthaaya kilesavattassa > khepitattaa sa-upaadisesena, carimacittanirodhena khandhavattassa > khepitattaa anupaadisesena caati dviihi parinibbaanehi > parinibbutaa, anupaadaano viya padiipo apannattikabhaavaam gataati > attho." > > "`Parinibbutaa' is the ultimate cool by means of two-way complete > extinguishments, one with the existential residues emptied of > defilement machinery ever since attainment of Arahatta awakening, and > the other without the existential residues emptied of psychophysical > machinery by termination of the last mind (the dying consciousness). > It has the meaning of reaching the state of the undefined reality > like the lamp without fuel." > > > Carimacittanirodho – termination of the last mind > Apannattikabhaavo - the state of undefined reality > > > 2. PARINIBBANA SUBCOMMENTARY Part Two > > > Robert Epstein wrote: > > "Well, I don't know about anyone else, but reaching the state of > the > undefined > reality to me means that he has reached a state in which his reality > is undefined > by any remaining fragment of distinguishing consciousness, but that > he is still > in a state of existence in which his reality is undefined. This does > not mean that > there is no existent of any kind, only that all consciousness has > been cooled > and is no longer present. The idea of an underlying beingness or > awareness that is > however totally disengaged from any experience does not seem to me to > be ruled > out here. > > What puzzles me in the above paragraph is Robert's addition of > the statement: > > "…but that he is still in a state of existence in which his > reality is undefined." > > Buddhaghosa's explanation of `parinibbutaa' includes the > unmistakable expression `carimacittanirodhena – by termination of the > last mind' on the death of an Arahant. Let me say from the beginning here, Suan, that you are invoking the termination of the 'last mind' as evidence that there is no remaining experience. Later on you say that there is a 'nullity of sensual existence'. Now to me, experience and 'sensual existence' are not synonymous. So let's start by totally agreeing that there is no 'sensual existence' or 'sensory experience' of any kind in parinibbana. On this I think it is absolutely clear. If there is *any kind* of existence in parinibbana, it would not be one that is connected to the body or the mind. So the existence of any such experience would indeed be a mystical state. It would be quite beyond anything that relates to this world, to this body, mind or personality. now the problem that arises when i try to get into this kind of possibility, of such a state existing fro the arahant, is that anyone who hears that assumes that this means there must be some kind of soul, or mind or entity that is there. I try to say that if it is existent, this parinibbanic existence would have to be a kind of pure presence, field or aware quality, disassociated from any individuation or subject-object differentiation. But most don't accept the possibility that such a state can exist without the false positing of some kind of 'self'. I myself think that such an impersonal existence of awareness is a possibility, but I understand if you cannot take the Buddha's words to imply that. I think that Howard, up to a point, agrees with me on this, and that it is possible that Kenneth O. would also see this as a possibility. So to an extent it seems to divide among those who have or have had some sympathy for the ideas of Mahayana Buddhism and those who are strictly reading according to a Theravadin interpretation. But I am trying to restrict myself to that which can be seen in the actually words of the Buddha, as expressed in the Theravadin Suttas and commentaries. So that is just to be forthright about my orientation. So I would not propose this possibility if I did not see it in the actual verses, and in fact, in this case, in your very noble translation of the verses, which have a nice sense of freshness and literal immediacy about them, and for which I thank you. I truly enjoy feeling that I have gotten a bit closer to the living word of the Buddha, even if our interpretations may diverge after that. So you are talking about the 'last mind' or 'sensual reality' being finally cooled and coming to an end. First of all, I find the idea of these things being 'finally cooled' a wonderful translation. Nowhere does the Buddha talk about destruction or eradication when it comes to the final coming to rest of the experiential mechanism. Second of all, what you do not account for in this second sub-commentary and which is the sole evidence for my view that there may be a state of 'non-sensual' awareness in the parinibbanic state, is that the Buddha says that the Arahant's final reality is 'undefined'. For myself, Suan, I can see absolutely no reason why the Buddha would use this enignmatic and provisional term, 'undefined' if it were not for a very specific purpose. Why couldn't he simply say 'it is ended and there is nothing left'. But he does not say that, he says that the Arahant is 'without the existential residues emptied of psychophysical machinery by termination of the last mind'. As absolute as this sounds, he does not say this leaves *nothing* which is what it should mean if it is a true obliteration of all experience. He says it leaves the Arahant in a state of 'undefined reality', a truly enigmatic term. Now we all agree that the Buddha didn't mince words and that he could be clear as a bell, decisive in fact. So why would he not say 'the experiencing consciousness and any possibility of any remaining awareness are totally destroyed leaving absolutely no experience of any kind in its wake'? Or something to that effect. Instead he talks of the 'undefined reality'. For the life of me, this does not sound anything like the total abolition of existence to me. It sounds like the total obliteration of *worldly* subject/object existence, but not of existence per se. And since we all agree that the Buddha chose his words wisely, why we have to account for all that he said and try to make some kind of sense out of it. We can't just ignore an expression like 'undefined reality' without a sense of what it implies about his other statements which aree right next to each other. So that is my sticking point, just as he says in the other Sutta we talked about, the one about the 'luminous mind which is freed from defilements from within'. You see there is a certain consistency here, in which the Buddha seems to point at a 'higher' reality, rather than 'no reality' at all in the Nibbanic state. Finally, he uses as his metaphor for this state of undefined reality 'the lamp without fuel' which can no longer burn. This again points to the end of 'sensual experience' but not to 'no existence of any kind'. Why do I say this? He says the lamp is gone out, but whenever he uses this metaphor he never says the lamp is gone or destroyed. The lamp is always left sitting there in its state of 'ultimate cool' with no more fuel to burn. So the flame of suffering and sensual experience, which are intimately tied together, are finished. No more subject/object experience, no more objects of craving or aversion, just the ultimately cooled lamp. So what is that lamp? It is the base of being or existence without any discernable activity. It is just like a lamp that does not burn, like awareness that has returned to itself and no longer goes outward to seek any object. Although there is absolutely no activity in this lamp, in this awareness, that does not mean it is obliterated. If it was, I believe that Buddhism would reduce inevitably to Nihilism. If one posits an absolute nullity, one has no choice but to put one's stock in annihilation. I do not believe that complete annihilation of experience is what the Buddha taught. I do believe he taught the end of suffering as the complete cessation of sensory activity and subject/object separation. For practical purposes, this distinction may be splitting hairs, but in the sense of what it means for the ground of being, what we really are or arent' in the final analysis, it has enormous implications. One who believes in total and final obliteration of all awareness can take no stock in the human quality of awakeness or awareness. It is merely a tool to get to obliteration of suffering, and in that sense one turns away from even the inmost content of one's own mind. Even the cittas are a source of suffering and there is nothing beyond them. For one who believes in the final rest of awareness itself as something that can become enlightened by returning to itself, rather than being extinguished, there is an inherently positive quality in the entire path, a seed of truth that exists now in the human being, but is obscured by delusion and unwholesome tendencies. I believe this difference makes an enormous difference in orientation, and that we have at least two examples of where the Buddha hints strongly, without turning it into an object or entity, of this posssibility of light at the end of the tunnel, rather than a final darkness. And I take strong stock in those statements. I think they mean something that needs to be investigated and discerned. And thank you for such a stimulating discussion of these important issues. I am very interested in hearing your response. Best, Robert Ep. ==================================== > The last mind in a lifetime is the dying consciousness (cuticittam), > which is, by the way, the finish line of `bhavanga cittam – > the life-cause consciousness.' > > The term `bhavanga' is made up of two words `bhava+anga'. Bhava means > life or sentient existence. Anga means component or cause. Thus, > bhavanga means life-cause or life-component, or the cause of sentient > existence. Bhavanga cittam is the consciousness that makes the > sentient existence possible. It causes and perpetuates sentient > existence. > > On the death of a sentient being who hasn't attained Arahatta > awakening, the linking consciousness (patisandhi cittam) immediately > follows the dying consciousness for a rebirth. Why immediately? It is > because we can't suspend the bhavanga cittam in a limbo state. > The linking consciousness is the start line of the life-cause > consciousness (bhavanga cittam) in a lifetime. > > In other words, the difference between an Arahant and a non-Arahant > is the termination of the life-cause consciousness for the Arahant > and the perpetuation of the life-cause consciousness for the non- > Arahant. > > An Arahant terminates the life-cause consciousness while ordinary > sentient beings perpetuate the life-cause consciousnesses. > > The death of an Arahant is the termination of bhavanga cittam, the > life-cause consciousness. In other words, the Parinibbaana of an > Arahant is the end of the sentient existence. > > Robert Epstein also wrote: > > "The idea of an underlying beingness or awareness that is however > totally disengaged from any experience does not seem to me to be > ruled out here." > > > Robert's idea of an underlying beingness or awareness looks > rather like an interpretation of the bhavanga cittam, the life-cause > consciousness. > > If Robert meant to refer to the bhavanga cittam as an underlying > beingness or awareness, and regarded it as something that would > survive in parinibbaana after the death of an Arahant, he has my > sympathy, and I would not blame him. Why not? > > Bhavanga cittam is the cool-down, resting state of the mind, so it is > very tempting to equate nibbaana with a kind of perpetual bhavanga > cittam. > > However, as we have analysed earlier above, the expression > `carimacittanirodhena – by termination of the last mind', > did not help to indicate the survival of the bhavanga cittam in > parinibbaana on the death of an Arahant. > > Contrary to Robert Epstein's ideas, termination of the bhavanga > cittam has ruled out any underlying beingness or awareness, I am > afraid. > > Howard also wrote: > > "Certainly, taken at face value, this commentary suggests > parinibbana as a kind of nullity." > > The commentary suggests parinibbaana as nullity of sentient existence. > > > PARINIBBANA SUBCOMMENTARY Part Two Ends Here. > > > With regards, > > Suan Lu Zaw > > http://www.bodhiology.org > > > > > PREVIOUSLY ON THIS LIST > > 1. PARINIBBANA COMMENTARY PALI > > "Parinibbutaa naama arahattapattito patthaaya kilesavattassa > khepitattaa sa-upaadisesena, carimacittanirodhena khandhavattassa > khepitattaa anupaadisesena caati dviihi parinibbaanehi > parinibbutaa, anupaadaano viya padiipo apannattikabhaavaam gataati > attho." > > "`Parinibbutaa' is the ultimate cool by means of two-way complete > extinguishments, one with the existential residues emptied of > defilement machinery ever since attainment of Arahatta awakening, and > the other without the existential residues emptied of psychophysical > machinery by termination of the last mind (the dying consciousness). > It has the meaning of reaching the state of the undefined reality > like the lamp without fuel." > > Parinibbaana - complete extinguishment > Kilesavatta - defilement machinery (vatta is literally circle, cycle, > or round. We have `vicious circle' in English.) > Khandhavatta - psychophysical machinery > Upaadisesa - existential residues (upaadi is merely another name of > pancakkhadhaa). Upaadi means phenomena taken strongly by craving or > attachment (tanhaa). > > Carimacittanirodho – termination of the last mind > Apannattikabhaavo - the state of undefined reality > > > 2. PARINIBBANA SUBCOMMENTARY > > Howard wrote: > > "Certainly, taken at face value, this commentary suggests > parinibbana > as a kind of nullity. A couple matters remain: (1) The exact meaning > of Apannattikabhaavaam - the state of undefined reality, and the > exact meaning of vi~n~nana, which I take as the dualistic operation > of separating out an individualized object from the potential field > of awareness, a special type of knowing/~nana." > > > The expression `apannattikabhaavo - the state of undefined > reality' > has given both Howard and Robert Epstein an opportunity to undergo > profound contemplation, as it would everybody else. > > Therefore, this unique expression has become a suitable topic for > further analysis and elucidation as Buddhaghosa did not elaborate on > it, at least on this occasion. > > The expression `Apannattikabhaavo' can be broken up > as `a+pannatti+ika+bhaavo'. > > The term `pannatti' has the same meaning as > `paññatti'. Therefore, > pannatti means a name, a convention, or a verbalization as > `paññatti' > would. We all know that a name can refer to either an existent > phenomenon or a non-existent category such as God the Creator. No > offense to theists amid the Buddhists! > > In Pali texts, the term that describes the opposite of a non-existent > category is `paramattho – a reality'. Examples of > realities are > matter and mind. No offense to extremist Mahayanists amid the > Theravadis and scientists! > > Now, let us look at the combination `a+pannatti'. The prefix > `a' > in `apannatti' means `not' or `no' just like > the prefix `a' in the > words `amoral' and `amorphous' giving the opposite > meanings > of `moral' and `morphous'. > > Thus, we get `not + name (or convention, or verbalization)'. > > And, what about the bit `ika'? The suffix `ika' means > `having or > doing something that the preceding term indicates.' > > Thus, the combination `pannatti+ika' means `having + name > (or > convention, or verbalization).' > > Now, when we add both the prefix and the suffix to the > term `pannatti', we get the `apannattika – something > not having a > name, something not of convention, something not of verbalization, or > something undefined. > > The word `bhaava' denotes a state. Therefore, the > expression `apannattikabhaavo' refers to the state of > something > unconventional, unverbalizable, or undefinable. > > As we mentioned earlier above, the antonym of the term > `paññatti' in > the Pali texts, is the term `paramattho – a reality'. > Therefore, the > expression `apannattikabhaavo' means the state of something > existent, > something real, but not subject to verbalization, or > conventionalization. > > The above analysis should satisfy Howard's request for the exact > meaning of apannattikabhaavo – the state of undefined reality. > > Now, I will try to answer why Buddhaghosa described parinibbutaa as > the state of undefined reality. > > By using the espression `apannattikabhaavo - the state of > undefined > reality', Buddhaghosa has killed two birds with one stone. We > could > toy with the idea of using the term `paramattho – a > reality' instead > of `apannatti'. But, that could deprive us of the ability to > convey > the meanings of unverbalizableness and undefinableness. Not only that > handicap, paramattho could refer to other types of realities as well, > which we can also verbalize and define easily. Therefore, it is a > very clever choice of word that Buddhaghosa described parinibbutaa > as `apannattikabhaavo - the state of undefined reality'. > > Now, what is the meaning of undefinableness or unverbalizableness? > Why did Buddhaghosa regarded parinibbutaa as being undefinable? > > The world is programmed to think only in terms of stereotypes and > stereotyping. It is programmed to verbalize only in terms of ready > expressions and convenient vocabulary. > > Our linguistic stereotypes include both existent and non-existent > categories. But, all our verbalizable catagories refer only to either > mind and mental (associates and) products, or matter and material > things. > > In short, we are programmed to define things and beings only in the > terminology of mind and matter, the two main existential realities. > This two-reality existential programming has conditioned us to regard > anything outside psychophysical givens as nullity. > > The Arahatta awakening that Gotama the Buddha has discovered is > capable of demolishing our existential programming and allowing us to > realize the third reality outside mind and matter. Here, the > term `mind' includes mental associates (cetasikas) as well. > Because > this third reality is outside mind and matter, we cannot verbalize it > in terms of psychophysical existences. Yet, this third reality exists > as parinibbutaa, the ultimate cool. As Buddhaghosa has done, we can > describe parinibbutaa only as complete extinguishment of defilements > and psychophysical existence. > > Therefore, the meaning of undefinableness in the expression `the > state of undefined reality' is that parinibbaana is an existence > that > we cannot define in terms of mind and matter. > > > PARINIBBANA SUBCOMMENTARY Part One Ends Here. > > > With regards > > Suan Lu Zaw > > http://www.bodhiology.org > 10001 From: Victor Yu Date: Fri Dec 14, 2001 10:22pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts) Hello Robert, Please reflect on what the Buddha taught in Samyutta Nikaya XXII.59, Anatta-lakkhana Sutta, The Discourse on the Not-self Characteristic http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/samyutta/sn22-059.html especially on the question-answer dialogue between the Buddha and the monks. Also, please see the equivalence of meaning between the statement "Consciousness is not self" and the statement "Consciousness is to be seen as it actually is with right discernment thus: 'This is not mine. This I am not. This is not my self.'" Regards, Victor ----- Original Message ----- From: "Robert Epstein" To: Sent: Saturday, December 15, 2001 12:44 AM Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts) > > --- Victor Yu wrote: > > Hello Jon and Rob, > > > > I am not sure what the moment of direct perception is. But direct > > perception is impermanent. What is impermanent is unsatisfactory/dukkha. > > What is impermanent, unsatisfactory/dukkha, subject to change is to be seen > > as it actually is with right discernment thus: "This is not mine. This I > > am not. This is not my self." > > > > Regards, > > Victor > > > > This may sound extremely redundant or simplistic, but can you explain what the > logical link is between recognizing that something is subject to anicca, anatta > and dukkha, and leaping from there to the recognition that it is 'not mine, not > me, not my self.' How does one necessitate the other? > > Thanks, > Robert Ep. > 10002 From: Robert Epstein Date: Fri Dec 14, 2001 10:27pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts) Thanks, Howard. That makes sense, and was exactly what I was trying to check. It leaves open the possibility, if one interprets it that way, that Buddha was redefining what would be rightly called one's 'self', and what the status was of the 'ordinary self', rather than saying there was 'no true self'. Does one say of Nibbana that is is 'not mine, not me, not my self?' I'd be curious if the Buddha makes the same statement about the only object or state that is not provisional. Robert Ep. ====================================== --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Rob - > > In a message dated 12/15/01 12:45:17 AM Eastern Standard Time, > epsteinrob@Y... writes: > > > > This may sound extremely redundant or simplistic, but can you explain what > > the > > logical link is between recognizing that something is subject to anicca, > > anatta > > and dukkha, and leaping from there to the recognition that it is 'not mine, > > not > > me, not my self.' How does one necessitate the other? > > > > Thanks, > > Robert Ep. > > > ======================== > I think that for Indian philosophic thought, a 'self' is permanent (it > remains) and it is an agent of control for whatever belongs to it, > determining its status. That being so, whatever is owned by a self is fully > controllable by it and, thus, would not be a source of dissatisfaction. On > that basis, anything which is impermanent and unsatisfying would not be a > self (not me), and would not be mine. Them's my thoughts. ;-)) > > With metta, > Howard > > /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble > in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a > phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) > 10003 From: Robert Epstein Date: Fri Dec 14, 2001 10:30pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts) --- Victor Yu wrote: > Hello Robert, > > Please reflect on what the Buddha taught in > Samyutta Nikaya XXII.59, Anatta-lakkhana Sutta, The Discourse on the > Not-self Characteristic > http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/samyutta/sn22-059.html > especially on the question-answer dialogue between the Buddha and the monks. > > Also, please see the equivalence of meaning between the statement > "Consciousness is not self" and the statement "Consciousness is to be seen > as it actually is with right discernment thus: 'This is not mine. This I am > not. This is not my self.'" > > Regards, > Victor I will certainly look at the sutta in question, Victor and thanks for that. You are also right that anatta does provide the logical link to something not being 'my self'. For some reason, I hadn't looked at it that way. I think that looking into the Buddha's definition of not-self would be a good next step. Robert Ep. 10004 From: Victor Yu Date: Fri Dec 14, 2001 10:30pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts) Hello Howard, I am not sure if the Buddha was using the term "self" in the statement "Consciousness is not self" in the philosophical sense that you have described. Regards, Victor ----- Original Message ----- From: To: Sent: Saturday, December 15, 2001 1:08 AM Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts) > Hi, Rob - > > In a message dated 12/15/01 12:45:17 AM Eastern Standard Time, > epsteinrob@Y... writes: > > > > This may sound extremely redundant or simplistic, but can you explain what > > the > > logical link is between recognizing that something is subject to anicca, > > anatta > > and dukkha, and leaping from there to the recognition that it is 'not mine, > > not > > me, not my self.' How does one necessitate the other? > > > > Thanks, > > Robert Ep. > > > ======================== > I think that for Indian philosophic thought, a 'self' is permanent (it > remains) and it is an agent of control for whatever belongs to it, > determining its status. That being so, whatever is owned by a self is fully > controllable by it and, thus, would not be a source of dissatisfaction. On > that basis, anything which is impermanent and unsatisfying would not be a > self (not me), and would not be mine. Them's my thoughts. ;-)) > > With metta, > Howard > > /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble > in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a > phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) > 10005 From: Robert Epstein Date: Fri Dec 14, 2001 10:37pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts) Dear Victor, I have read the Sutta excerpt that you indicated, and found it quite clear and satisfying. Here is the concluding paragraph: "Any consciousness whatsoever that is past, future, or present; internal or external; blatant or subtle; common or sublime; far or near: every consciousness is to be seen as it actually is with right discernment as: 'This is not mine. This is not my self. This is not what I am.' "Seeing thus, the well-instructed disciple of the noble ones grows disenchanted with the body, disenchanted with feeling, disenchanted with perception, disenchanted with fabrications, disenchanted with consciousness. Disenchanted, he becomes dispassionate. Through dispassion, he is fully released. With full release, there is the knowledge, 'Fully released.' He discerns that 'Birth is depleted, the holy life fulfilled, the task done. There is nothing further for this world.'" With a little help from you and Howard, I see that Buddha defined 'not self' as anything that one did not have control over or would not accord to one's wishes. In other words, if one could not say, 'make the body thus' or 'make the consciousness thus' and it would not do that, that this body or consciousness was therefore 'not one's self'. As usual, this opens more doors for me than it closes. It indicates two possiblities: either Buddha was attempting to show that there is nothing in this world that is the self, or he was attempting to show that there is no self, and that nothing on heaven or earth or in the realm of consciousness or awareness or anywhere would ever meet this definition, that in fact it was nothing but a false concept. On the other hand, one would surely say that the Buddha could say: let my body be thus and that his perfect body would accord, no? Or say 'let consciousness be thus' and that he would produce the consciousness in question, no?' If this is not so, then the Buddha had limitations as regards this world and the kandhas. That would be interesting to note. If it is so, then there is a state in which those conditions are met, namely Nibbana, and that, as Anders always insisted, would qualify as the true self. Best, Robert Ep. ============================ --- Victor Yu wrote: > Hello Robert, > > Please reflect on what the Buddha taught in > Samyutta Nikaya XXII.59, Anatta-lakkhana Sutta, The Discourse on the > Not-self Characteristic > http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/samyutta/sn22-059.html > especially on the question-answer dialogue between the Buddha and the monks. > > Also, please see the equivalence of meaning between the statement > "Consciousness is not self" and the statement "Consciousness is to be seen > as it actually is with right discernment thus: 'This is not mine. This I am > not. This is not my self.'" > > Regards, > Victor > 10006 From: Victor Yu Date: Fri Dec 14, 2001 10:48pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts) Hello Robert, Please see how the term "self" is used in Dhammapada 12, The Self http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/khuddaka/dhp1/12.html Nibbana is not self. Nibbana is to be seen as it actually is with right discernment thus: "This is not mine. This I am not. This is not my self." Regards, Victor ----- Original Message ----- From: "Robert Epstein" To: Sent: Saturday, December 15, 2001 1:27 AM Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts) > Thanks, Howard. That makes sense, and was exactly what I was trying to check. It > leaves open the possibility, if one interprets it that way, that Buddha was > redefining what would be rightly called one's 'self', and what the status was of > the 'ordinary self', rather than saying there was 'no true self'. > > Does one say of Nibbana that is is 'not mine, not me, not my self?' I'd be > curious if the Buddha makes the same statement about the only object or state that > is not provisional. > > Robert Ep. > > ====================================== > > --- upasaka@a... wrote: > > Hi, Rob - 10007 From: Date: Fri Dec 14, 2001 6:05pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) Hi, Rob (and Suan) - As you suggest below, Rob, I am sympathetic to the view you express. I do not accept that parinibbana is a cessation of experience in *every possible sense* of the term 'experience'. I would see that as a form of annihilationism. However, I am also not at all certain that the cessation of the khandhas which is parinibbana ushers in an amorphous, contentless awareness either. Certainly there is no discernment of separate objects "there" - for there really are no completely separate objects, neither of sight, sound, taste, touch, smell, or mind. (There *might* still be, one could surmise, an "experience" which is a kind of flowing, vibrant, interconnected, luminous suchness without any subject-object duality. But any notion along such lines is *mere* speculation and without any genuine basis for belief. Moreover, it is surely (ultimately) wrong, being so influenced, as it is, by our samsaric experience. Without the direct experience of nibbana, we really haven't a clue as to what we are talking about!) But whatever nibbana beyond the death of the body is, I would doubt three things: (1) that it is identical with the pre-death state of the arahant, (2) that it is an absolute nothingness, and (3) that it is an amorphous, contentless awareness. Of course, what that leaves is something totally beyond our current experience, and really quite beyond our wildest dreams. However, what I think we can feel assured of, given that we believe the Buddha - and I do - is that nibbana, before and beyond death, is the ultimate happiness, is real, and is perfect peace without defect, lacking nothing. With metta, Howard In a message dated 12/15/01 1:19:52 AM Eastern Standard Time, epsteinrob@Y... writes: > Dear Suan, > Sorry to take so long to get back to you on this good subcommentary. > My remarks are dispersed below: > > --- abhidhammika wrote: > > > > Dear Dhamma Friends > > > > The following is the second part of Parinibbana Subcommentary written > > in response to the questions and statements of Upasaka Howard, Robert > > Epstein, and Mike Neace. In this second part of the subcommentary, I > > directly address the statements of Robert Epstein. Here, I also > > include the meaning of the last mind, which partly satisfies > > Howard's desire to know the exact meaning of consciousness. > > > > > > 1. PARINIBBANA COMMENTARY PALI > > > > "Parinibbutaa naama arahattapattito patthaaya kilesavattassa > > khepitattaa sa-upaadisesena, carimacittanirodhena khandhavattassa > > khepitattaa anupaadisesena caati dviihi parinibbaanehi > > parinibbutaa, anupaadaano viya padiipo apannattikabhaavaam gataati > > attho." > > > > "`Parinibbutaa' is the ultimate cool by means of two-way complete > > extinguishments, one with the existential residues emptied of > > defilement machinery ever since attainment of Arahatta awakening, and > > the other without the existential residues emptied of psychophysical > > machinery by termination of the last mind (the dying consciousness). > > It has the meaning of reaching the state of the undefined reality > > like the lamp without fuel." > > > > > > Carimacittanirodho – termination of the last mind > > Apannattikabhaavo - the state of undefined reality > > > > > > 2. PARINIBBANA SUBCOMMENTARY Part Two > > > > > > Robert Epstein wrote: > > > > "Well, I don't know about anyone else, but reaching the state of > > the > > undefined > > reality to me means that he has reached a state in which his reality > > is undefined > > by any remaining fragment of distinguishing consciousness, but that > > he is still > > in a state of existence in which his reality is undefined. This does > > not mean that > > there is no existent of any kind, only that all consciousness has > > been cooled > > and is no longer present. The idea of an underlying beingness or > > awareness that is > > however totally disengaged from any experience does not seem to me to > > be ruled > > out here. > > > > What puzzles me in the above paragraph is Robert's addition of > > the statement: > > > > "…but that he is still in a state of existence in which his > > reality is undefined." > > > > Buddhaghosa's explanation of `parinibbutaa' includes the > > unmistakable expression `carimacittanirodhena – by termination of the > > last mind' on the death of an Arahant. > > Let me say from the beginning here, Suan, that you are invoking the > termination of > the 'last mind' as evidence that there is no remaining experience. Later > on you > say that there is a 'nullity of sensual existence'. Now to me, experience > and > 'sensual existence' are not synonymous. So let's start by totally agreeing > that > there is no 'sensual existence' or 'sensory experience' of any kind in > parinibbana. On this I think it is absolutely clear. > > If there is *any kind* of existence in parinibbana, it would not be one > that is > connected to the body or the mind. So the existence of any such experience > would > indeed be a mystical state. It would be quite beyond anything that relates > to > this world, to this body, mind or personality. > > now the problem that arises when i try to get into this kind of > possibility, of > such a state existing fro the arahant, is that anyone who hears that > assumes that > this means there must be some kind of soul, or mind or entity that is > there. I > try to say that if it is existent, this parinibbanic existence would have > to be a > kind of pure presence, field or aware quality, disassociated from any > individuation or subject-object differentiation. But most don't accept the > possibility that such a state can exist without the false positing of some > kind of > 'self'. I myself think that such an impersonal existence of awareness is a > possibility, but I understand if you cannot take the Buddha's words to > imply that. > I think that Howard, up to a point, agrees with me on this, and that it is > possible that Kenneth O. would also see this as a possibility. So to an > extent it > seems to divide among those who have or have had some sympathy for the > ideas of > Mahayana Buddhism and those who are strictly reading according to a > Theravadin > interpretation. > > But I am trying to restrict myself to that which can be seen in the > actually words > of the Buddha, as expressed in the Theravadin Suttas and commentaries. > > So that is just to be forthright about my orientation. So I would not > propose > this possibility if I did not see it in the actual verses, and in fact, in > this > case, in your very noble translation of the verses, which have a nice sense > of > freshness and literal immediacy about them, and for which I thank you. I > truly > enjoy feeling that I have gotten a bit closer to the living word of the > Buddha, > even if our interpretations may diverge after that. > > So you are talking about the 'last mind' or 'sensual reality' being finally > cooled > and coming to an end. > > First of all, I find the idea of these things being 'finally cooled' a > wonderful > translation. Nowhere does the Buddha talk about destruction or eradication > when > it comes to the final coming to rest of the experiential mechanism. > > Second of all, what you do not account for in this second sub-commentary an > d which > is the sole evidence for my view that there may be a state of 'non-sensual' > awareness in the parinibbanic state, is that the Buddha says that the > Arahant's > final reality is 'undefined'. > > For myself, Suan, I can see absolutely no reason why the Buddha would use > this > enignmatic and provisional term, 'undefined' if it were not for a very > specific > purpose. Why couldn't he simply say 'it is ended and there is nothing > left'. But > he does not say that, he says that the Arahant is 'without the existential > residues emptied of psychophysical machinery by termination of the last > mind'. As > absolute as this sounds, he does not say this leaves *nothing* which is > what it > should mean if it is a true obliteration of all experience. He says it > leaves the > Arahant in a state of 'undefined reality', a truly enigmatic term. > > Now we all agree that the Buddha didn't mince words and that he could be > clear as > a bell, decisive in fact. So why would he not say 'the experiencing > consciousness > and any possibility of any remaining awareness are totally destroyed > leaving > absolutely no experience of any kind in its wake'? Or something to that > effect. > Instead he talks of the 'undefined reality'. For the life of me, this does > not > sound anything like the total abolition of existence to me. It sounds like > the > total obliteration of *worldly* subject/object existence, but not of > existence per > se. And since we all agree that the Buddha chose his words wisely, why we > have to > account for all that he said and try to make some kind of sense out of it. > We > can't just ignore an expression like 'undefined reality' without a sense of > what > it implies about his other statements which aree right next to each other. > So > that is my sticking point, just as he says in the other Sutta we talked > about, the > one about the 'luminous mind which is freed from defilements from within'. > You > see there is a certain consistency here, in which the Buddha seems to point > at a > 'higher' reality, rather than 'no reality' at all in the Nibbanic state. > > Finally, he uses as his metaphor for this state of undefined reality 'the > lamp > without fuel' which can no longer burn. This again points to the end of > 'sensual > experience' but not to 'no existence of any kind'. Why do I say this? He > says > the lamp is gone out, but whenever he uses this metaphor he never says the > lamp is > gone or destroyed. The lamp is always left sitting there in its state of > 'ultimate cool' with no more fuel to burn. So the flame of suffering and > sensual > experience, which are intimately tied together, are finished. No more > subject/object experience, no more objects of craving or aversion, just the > ultimately cooled lamp. So what is that lamp? It is the base of being or > existence without any discernable activity. It is just like a lamp that > does not > burn, like awareness that has returned to itself and no longer goes outward > to > seek any object. Although there is absolutely no activity in this lamp, in > this > awareness, that does not mean it is obliterated. If it was, I believe that > Buddhism would reduce inevitably to Nihilism. If one posits an absolute > nullity, > one has no choice but to put one's stock in annihilation. I do not believe > that > complete annihilation of experience is what the Buddha taught. I do > believe he > taught the end of suffering as the complete cessation of sensory activity > and > subject/object separation. > > For practical purposes, this distinction may be splitting hairs, but in the > sense > of what it means for the ground of being, what we really are or arent' in > the > final analysis, it has enormous implications. One who believes in total > and final > obliteration of all awareness can take no stock in the human quality of > awakeness > or awareness. It is merely a tool to get to obliteration of suffering, and > in > that sense one turns away from even the inmost content of one's own mind. > Even > the cittas are a source of suffering and there is nothing beyond them. For > one > who believes in the final rest of awareness itself as something that can > become > enlightened by returning to itself, rather than being extinguished, there > is an > inherently positive quality in the entire path, a seed of truth that exists > now in > the human being, but is obscured by delusion and unwholesome tendencies. I > believe this difference makes an enormous difference in orientation, and > that we > have at least two examples of where the Buddha hints strongly, without > turning it > into an object or entity, of this posssibility of light at the end of the > tunnel, > rather than a final darkness. And I take strong stock in those statements. > I > think they mean something that needs to be investigated and discerned. > > And thank you for such a stimulating discussion of these important issues. > I am > very interested in hearing your response. > > Best, > Robert Ep. > /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 10008 From: Date: Fri Dec 14, 2001 6:09pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts) Hi, Victor - In a message dated 12/15/01 1:31:46 AM Eastern Standard Time, victoryu@s... writes: > Hello Howard, > > I am not sure if the Buddha was using the term "self" in the statement > "Consciousness is not self" in the philosophical sense that you have > described. > > Regards, > Victor > =========================== So, what do *you* think he meant by self? With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 10009 From: Victor Yu Date: Fri Dec 14, 2001 11:21pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts) Hello Robert, I am not sure if the Buddha is defining "not self" as anything that one did not have control over or would not accord to one's wishes. The Buddha was demonstrating the absurdity of, for instance, consciousness being self. If consciousness were self, this consciousness would not lend itself to dis-ease. But consciousness does lend itself to dis-ease, The assumption that consciousness is self leads to a contradiction. Why does consciousness lend itself to dis-ease? Precisely because consciousness is not self. Please note that consciousness is not self does not imply whether one has control over consciousness or not, and whether one has control over consciousness or not does not imply that consciousness is not self. Regards, Victor ----- Original Message ----- From: "Robert Epstein" To: Sent: Saturday, December 15, 2001 1:37 AM Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts) > Dear Victor, > I have read the Sutta excerpt that you indicated, and found it quite clear and > satisfying. Here is the concluding paragraph: > > "Any consciousness whatsoever that is past, future, or present; internal or > external; blatant or subtle; common or sublime; far or near: > every consciousness is to be seen as it actually is with right discernment as: > 'This is not mine. This is not my self. This is not what I am.' > > "Seeing thus, the well-instructed disciple of the noble ones grows disenchanted > with the body, disenchanted with feeling, disenchanted with > perception, disenchanted with fabrications, disenchanted with consciousness. > Disenchanted, he becomes dispassionate. Through dispassion, > he is fully released. With full release, there is the knowledge, 'Fully released.' > He discerns that 'Birth is depleted, the holy life fulfilled, the > task done. There is nothing further for this world.'" > > With a little help from you and Howard, I see that Buddha defined 'not self' as > anything that one did not have control over or would not accord to one's wishes. > In other words, if one could not say, 'make the body thus' or 'make the > consciousness thus' and it would not do that, that this body or consciousness was > therefore 'not one's self'. > > As usual, this opens more doors for me than it closes. It indicates two > possiblities: either Buddha was attempting to show that there is nothing in this > world that is the self, or he was attempting to show that there is no self, and > that nothing on heaven or earth or in the realm of consciousness or awareness or > anywhere would ever meet this definition, that in fact it was nothing but a false > concept. > > On the other hand, one would surely say that the Buddha could say: let my body be > thus and that his perfect body would accord, no? Or say 'let consciousness be > thus' and that he would produce the consciousness in question, no?' If this is > not so, then the Buddha had limitations as regards this world and the kandhas. > That would be interesting to note. If it is so, then there is a state in which > those conditions are met, namely Nibbana, and that, as Anders always insisted, > would qualify as the true self. > > Best, > Robert Ep. > > ============================ > > --- Victor Yu wrote: > > Hello Robert, > > > > Please reflect on what the Buddha taught in > > Samyutta Nikaya XXII.59, Anatta-lakkhana Sutta, The Discourse on the > > Not-self Characteristic > > http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/samyutta/sn22-059.html > > especially on the question-answer dialogue between the Buddha and the monks. > > > > Also, please see the equivalence of meaning between the statement > > "Consciousness is not self" and the statement "Consciousness is to be seen > > as it actually is with right discernment thus: 'This is not mine. This I am > > not. This is not my self.'" > > > > Regards, > > Victor > > > > ----- Original Message ----- > > From: "Robert Epstein" > > To: > > Sent: Saturday, December 15, 2001 12:44 AM > > Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts) > > > > > > > > > > --- Victor Yu wrote: > > > > Hello Jon and Rob, > > > > > > > > I am not sure what the moment of direct perception is. But direct > > > > perception is impermanent. What is impermanent is > > unsatisfactory/dukkha. > > > > What is impermanent, unsatisfactory/dukkha, subject to change is to be > > seen > > > > as it actually is with right discernment thus: "This is not mine. This > > I > > > > am not. This is not my self." > > > > > > > > Regards, > > > > Victor > > > > > > > > > > This may sound extremely redundant or simplistic, but can you explain what > > the > > > logical link is between recognizing that something is subject to anicca, > > anatta > > > and dukkha, and leaping from there to the recognition that it is 'not > > mine, not > > > me, not my self.' How does one necessitate the other? > > > > > > Thanks, > > > Robert Ep. > > > > > > ================================== > > > > > > > [snip] > > > > > > Provisionally though, I would say that direct perception of the > > current > > > > > > reality as > > > > > > what it actually is should be exempt from suffering. Why? Because > > > > > > there is no > > > > > > expectation that it will last longer than a moment, therefore there > > is > > > > > > no > > > > > > discomfort or dissatisfaction at its impermanence. > > > > > > > > > > Except that, as someone (I think Victor) has already pointed out, the > > > > > moment of 'direct perception' shares the same characteristics of > > > > > impermanence, unsatisfactoriness and not-self as the reality that is > > its > > > > > object. So is it any less unsatisfactory than any other moment of > > > > > consciousness? > > > > [snip] 10010 From: Victor Yu Date: Fri Dec 14, 2001 11:28pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts) Hello Howard, Please see how the term "self" is used in Dhammapada 12, The Self http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/khuddaka/dhp1/12.html Regards, Victor ----- Original Message ----- From: To: Sent: Saturday, December 15, 2001 2:09 AM Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts) > Hi, Victor - > > In a message dated 12/15/01 1:31:46 AM Eastern Standard Time, > victoryu@s... writes: > > > > Hello Howard, > > > > I am not sure if the Buddha was using the term "self" in the statement > > "Consciousness is not self" in the philosophical sense that you have > > described. > > > > Regards, > > Victor > > > =========================== > So, what do *you* think he meant by self? > > With metta, > Howard > 10011 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Fri Dec 14, 2001 11:38pm Subject: Re: [dsg] 'Self' as object of discernment (and khandhas) Rob Ep --- Robert Epstein wrote: > > > To summarise, I see the understanding of 'not-self' as being directly > > linked to the teaching on satipatthana, and not realisable by other > means. > > > > Hope this answers your question. > > > > Jon > > Hi Jon, > Thanks for your answer. > > The Buddha does, however, include seeing Mind as Mind, and the objects > of Mind as > objects of Mind as part of the path of discernment. If 'concepts', > including > self-concept, is not an eligible 'object of Mind', what do the objects > of Mind > include that are eligible for satipatthana? I think you are referring here to the Satipatthana Sutta? Of the 4 sections or ‘establishments’ (anupassana), the 2 you mention are the consciousness section (cittanupassana) and the 'mind objects/mental objects' section (dhammanupassana). The objects of awareness under the Satipatthana Sutta are dhammas (realities), not concepts. The consciousness/mind section refers to the dhamma that is the moment of consciousness. The mind objects/mental objects section refers to the dhammas (realities) that can be the object of a moment of consciousness, and this in turn means any and all realities (including those covered by the other 3 sections of the sutta). To give an example. At a moment of seeing there is contact between the consciousness that sees and visible object. That visible object is a reality and also, at that precise moment, a mind object (it is the object of seeing consciousness). So the visible object at that moment falls under both the ‘rupas’ section and the ‘mind object’ section of the 4 satipatthanas. This helps remind us that the 4 sections in the sutta are merely ways of classifying realities and are not in themselves absolutes. Only dhammas (realties) can be the object of satipatthana, because only something that has its own characteristic that is capable of being experienced is considered to be a ‘dhamma’; anything that does not, is not. In the Satipatthana Sutta itself, the 'eligible' mind-objects are described in different ways. One of these ways is as the 5 khandhas (Aggregates), and these 5 khandhas encompass all dhammas (other than Nibbana). I have pasted below the passage from ‘The Way of Mindfulness’ Jon Section on Mental Objects 2. The Aggregates "And, further, O bhikkhus, a bhikkhu lives contemplating mental object in the mental objects of the five aggregates of clinging. "How, O bhikkhus, does a bhikkhu live contemplating mental objects in the mental objects of the five aggregates of clinging? "Here, O bhikkhus, a bhikkhu thinks: 'Thus is material form [rupa]; thus is the arising of material form; and thus is the disappearance of material form. Thus is feeling [vedana]; thus is the arising of feeling; and thus is the disappearance of feeling. Thus is perception [sanna]; thus is the arising of perception; and thus is the disappearance of perception. Thus are the formations [sankhara]; thus is the arising of the formations; and thus is the disappearance of the formations. Thus is consciousness [vinnana]; thus is the arising of consciousness; and thus is the disappearance of consciousness.' Thus he lives contemplating mental objects in mental objects, internally ... and clings to naught in the world. "Thus, indeed, O bhikkhus, a bhikkhu lives contemplating mental object in the mental objects of the five aggregates of clinging." [ends] 10012 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Fri Dec 14, 2001 11:49pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Ultimate realities (and khandhas) Rob Ep This post, the previous one and the next 1 or 2 all deal with 'khandhas'. Must be that khandha day. --- Robert Epstein wrote: > A question or two, Jon. > Is there a difference between a dhamma and a rupa? What is their > relationship? The term ‘dhamma’ is used in different ways in the texts, one of which is to refer to the ‘realities’ of which this life and world as we know it are composed. This is the meaning here. In this sense it is a collective term, and virtual synonym, for: - the 5 khandhas (in the suttas) - namas and rupas (in the abhidhamma) - citta, cetasika and rupa (abhidhamma) (Note: Nibbana is a dhamma, classified as a nama, but is not one of the 5 khandhas) So a rupa can be considered as a kind of dhamma or, if you like, as a subset of dhammas. > In either case, is the conclusion I am reaching correct, that according > to the > Abhidhamma commentaries, physical objects as they actually exist and > appear in the > moment are the the only things that are real, and that can be referred > to as > 'entities'? Rupas are not the same as physical objects. ‘Physical objects’ are not dhammas in any sense, but are the terms in which we think about particular agglomerations of rupas. That point aside, however, neither rupas nor physical objects are referred to in the texts as ‘entities’, as far as I am aware. Each dhamma does have an *individual, distinct characteristic* that can be observed (this refers to the factor that distinguishes the dhamma from any other dhamma). This aspect of an individual, distinct characteristic (sabhava) is sometimes called the ‘individual essence’, but this in no way implies any sense of ‘entitiness’. ‘Entitiness’ would seem to me to be an aspect of ‘self’ view (or, to use a Howard term, reification). > If that is the case, as it seems, how can one account for the momentary > [anicca] > nature of dhammas in terms of their 'entity' status. My understanding > is that > anything that is temporary [partaking of annica] does not partake of > entity in the > sense that it is constantly changing and does not last for more than the > moment in > any given form? And how does one account then for the fact that cittas > are also > momentary, yet do not rate entity status merely because they are not > physical? > > What is the basis for this, if true? I think what you are saying here is that rupas are said to have an ‘entitiness’ or 'entity status' of some kind that is not shared by other dhammas (ie., namas - citta and cetasika). I don’t think I’ve seen any such distinction made. The main difference between the 2 kinds of dhammas is that one (ie., the nama) has the nature of being a reality that experiences an object, while the other (the rupa) has the nature of being a reality that does not experience an object. Beyond that they each have in common the 3 general characteristics (anicca, dukkha and anatta) and of course each particular nama and rupa has its own individual characteristic (sabhava) as noted above. I am not aware of any other major distinction between the 2. This of course is all ‘from the book’, but unless we are absolutely clear about these aspects the practice cannot be correct, because we will confuse different realities, or take concepts for realities. Jon PS Found the following comments on the khandhas as ‘entities’ in the khandhas entry in Buddhist Dictionary. Thought it might be of interest-- “Some writers on Buddhism who have not understood that the five khandha are just classificatory groupings, have conceived them as compact entities ('heaps', 'bundles'), while actually, as stated above, the groups never exist as such, i.e. they never occur in a simultaneous totality of all their constituents. Also those single constituents of a group which are present in any given body- and -mind process, are of an evanescent nature, and so also their varying combinations. Feeling, perception and mental formations are only different aspects and functions of a single unit of consciousness.” 10013 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Sat Dec 15, 2001 0:29am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The Two Truths (for Howard) Howard --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Jon - > > Yes, except I think that in any discussion of the "hardness > experience" we > > should be seeking to make clear the distinction between the dhamma > that is > > the *hardness being experienced* and the dhamma that is the > *experiencing > > of that hardness*, since they are totally separate dhammas, although > not > > normally perceived as such. > > > --------------------------------------------------------------- > Howard: > I'm in basic agreement here, though I would formulate it > differently. > I am more inclined to describe the hardness experienced and the > experiencing > of the hardness as two inter-related and mutually dependent aspects of > the > same experiencing-event. They are distinguishable as are the inside and > the > outside of a hollow sphere, but they co-occur, are mutually dependent, > and, > thus are not "totally separate". (In fact, no things are totally > separate, > though some are more "remote" from each other than dyads. Jon: A matter of emphasis, perhaps. I was trying to emphasise the difference between the 2 kinds of reality, and perhaps ‘totally different’ would have been a better choice of words. I agree that they are mutually dependent at the moment of co-arising, and this describes an aspect of the relationship between the 2 realities. These relationships are described in detail in the teaching on conditions. To my way of thinking, a clearer understanding of the difference between realities that we tend to ‘mix together’ is the means to a clearer understanding of the relationship between those different realities. Jon 10014 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Sat Dec 15, 2001 0:02am Subject: Re: [dsg] Held-to views (and khandhas) Rob Ep --- Robert Epstein wrote: > > --- Jonothan Abbott wrote: > > The point I find really interesting myself is the one I have mentioned > > above, namely that the 'undoing' of one's wrong views occurs not from > > 'straightening out' the views nor from confronting them head-on (the > > conventional belief) but from the much more indirect way of > understanding > > more about dhammas, something which, at first glance, appears to have > > little or nothing to do with the problem. > > > > Jon > > I think this is very interesting. To understand your proposal better, > could you > give your current definition of 'dhamma'. I'm not sure if you mean it > mainly as > 'rupas' or whether you are including a larger set of objects of > consciousness. > > What qualifies as a 'reality' to be truly discerned? Same answer ;-). In other words, nama and rupa, aka citta, cetasika and rupa, aka the 5 khandhas (leaving out nibbana for the moment). See the extract pasted below. Rupas may seem ‘more real’ than namas, but according to the teaching this is not so. So perhaps we’ve got something wrong ;-)). Jon ‘Buddhist Dictionary’ Khandha: The 5 'groups (of existence)' or 'groups of clinging' (upádánakkhandha). Alternative renderings: aggregates, categories of clinging's objects. These are the 5 aspects in which the Buddha has summed up all the physical and mental phenomena of existence, and which appear to the ignorant man as his ego, or personality, to wit: (1) the corporeality group (rúpa-kkhandha), (2) the feeling group (vedaná-kkhandha), (3) the perception group (saññá-kkhandha), (4) the mental-formation group (sankhára-kkhandha), (5) the consciousness-group (viññána-kkhandha). Another division is that into the 2 groups of náma and rúpa: - mind (khandhas 2-5 above) and corporeality (kh 1 above) whilst in Dhamma Sanganí, the first book of the Abhidhamma, all the phenomena are treated by way of 3 groups of citta, cetasika and rúpa: - consciousness (kh 5), mental factors (khs 2-4), corporeality (kh 1). [ends] 10015 From: Robert Epstein Date: Sat Dec 15, 2001 0:31am Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts) --- Victor Yu wrote: > Hello Robert, > > Please see how the term "self" is used in Dhammapada 12, The Self > http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/khuddaka/dhp1/12.html > > Nibbana is not self. Nibbana is to be seen as it actually is with right > discernment thus: "This is not mine. This I am not. This is not my self." > > Regards, > Victor Dear Victor, With respect, there is no definition of the self in the section that you have here indicated, and in fact one is admonished to control and purify oneself, using a conventional meaning of 'self'. One is admonished to abstain from harmful acts and not to forsake 'oneself' for the sake of another. I fail to see how this addresses the question of the proper usage of the word 'self'. Furthermore, there is no mention of Nibbana and its relation to the self in this passage. I await any references you would like to make that either asserts or refutes the possibility of Nibbana being the true self, or anything along these lines. I am not necessarily arguing for the word 'self' to be in the same sentence as Nibbana, but since Nibbana is the only unconditioned object or state, depending on how you look at it, it is the only candidate for a state of being that would not be conditioned and subject to the conditioning of the khandas. Best, Robert Ep. ============ > ----- Original Message ----- > From: "Robert Epstein" > To: > Sent: Saturday, December 15, 2001 1:27 AM > Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts) > > > > Thanks, Howard. That makes sense, and was exactly what I was trying to > check. It > > leaves open the possibility, if one interprets it that way, that Buddha > was > > redefining what would be rightly called one's 'self', and what the status > was of > > the 'ordinary self', rather than saying there was 'no true self'. > > > > Does one say of Nibbana that is is 'not mine, not me, not my self?' I'd > be > > curious if the Buddha makes the same statement about the only object or > state that > > is not provisional. > > > > Robert Ep. > > > > ====================================== > > > > --- upasaka@a... wrote: > > > Hi, Rob - > > > > > > In a message dated 12/15/01 12:45:17 AM Eastern Standard Time, > > > epsteinrob@Y... writes: > > > > > > > > > > This may sound extremely redundant or simplistic, but can you explain > what > > > > the > > > > logical link is between recognizing that something is subject to > anicca, > > > > anatta > > > > and dukkha, and leaping from there to the recognition that it is 'not > mine, > > > > not > > > > me, not my self.' How does one necessitate the other? > > > > > > > > Thanks, > > > > Robert Ep. > > > > > > > ======================== > > > I think that for Indian philosophic thought, a 'self' is > permanent (it > > > remains) and it is an agent of control for whatever belongs to it, > > > determining its status. That being so, whatever is owned by a self is > fully > > > controllable by it and, thus, would not be a source of dissatisfaction. > On > > > that basis, anything which is impermanent and unsatisfying would not be > a > > > self (not me), and would not be mine. Them's my thoughts. ;-)) > > > > > > With metta, > > > Howard 10016 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Sat Dec 15, 2001 0:34am Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts) Victor Thanks for coming in on this thread. --- Victor Yu wrote: > Hello Jon and Rob, > > I am not sure what the moment of direct perception is. But direct > perception is impermanent. What is impermanent is > unsatisfactory/dukkha. > What is impermanent, unsatisfactory/dukkha, subject to change is to be > seen > as it actually is with right discernment thus: "This is not mine. This > I > am not. This is not my self." 'Direct perception' suggests to me a moment of consciousness that is accompanied by a level of awareness and understading of the characteristic of a reality. Like all other mundane realities, such consciousness is impermanent, unsatisfactory and not-self, according to the teachings. These things are hard to realise for ourselves, though. Would you agree? Jon > Regards, > Victor > > [snip] > > > Provisionally though, I would say that direct perception of the > current > > > reality as > > > what it actually is should be exempt from suffering. Why? Because > > > there is no > > > expectation that it will last longer than a moment, therefore there > is > > > no > > > discomfort or dissatisfaction at its impermanence. > > > > Except that, as someone (I think Victor) has already pointed out, the > > moment of 'direct perception' shares the same characteristics of > > impermanence, unsatisfactoriness and not-self as the reality that is > its > > object. So is it any less unsatisfactory than any other moment of > > consciousness? > [snip] 10017 From: Robert Epstein Date: Sat Dec 15, 2001 0:34am Subject: Re: [dsg] Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Rob (and Suan) - > > As you suggest below, Rob, I am sympathetic to the view you express. I > do not accept that parinibbana is a cessation of experience in *every > possible sense* of the term 'experience'. I would see that as a form of > annihilationism. > However, I am also not at all certain that the cessation of the > khandhas which is parinibbana ushers in an amorphous, contentless awareness > either. Certainly there is no discernment of separate objects "there" - for > there really are no completely separate objects, neither of sight, sound, > taste, touch, smell, or mind. (There *might* still be, one could surmise, an > "experience" which is a kind of flowing, vibrant, interconnected, luminous > suchness without any subject-object duality. But any notion along such lines > is *mere* speculation and without any genuine basis for belief. Moreover, it > is surely (ultimately) wrong, being so influenced, as it is, by our samsaric > experience. Without the direct experience of nibbana, we really haven't a > clue as to what we are talking about!) hence, 'undefined reality', certainly from our standpoint. But in that sense, wouldn't a view of complete annihilation of experience be equally speculative? And if both are speculative, then what is 'right view'? But whatever nibbana beyond the death > of the body is, I would doubt three things: (1) that it is identical with the > pre-death state of the arahant, (2) that it is an absolute nothingness, and > (3) that it is an amorphous, contentless awareness. Of course, what that > leaves is something totally beyond our current experience, and really quite > beyond our wildest dreams. However, what I think we can feel assured of, > given that we believe the Buddha - and I do - is that nibbana, before and > beyond death, is the ultimate happiness, is real, and is perfect peace > without defect, lacking nothing. And this would have to be something other than mere annihilation. Best, Robert Ep. 10018 From: Robert Epstein Date: Sat Dec 15, 2001 0:38am Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts) Dear Victor, In the Sutta you referred me to, the Buddha says that if consciousness were the self, one could say 'have this consciousness be like this' and it would do so. Since it does not, it is clearly not self. He says that if this body were self it would likewise accord with our wishes, but since it does not, it is not self. Hence my reference to that which cannot be controlled not being self. In the second sutta you referred me to, he says: 'One must be the controller of oneself; who else would be the controller?' making a definite reference to one being able to develop control over one's own activities. If this does not imply a true self who is able to establish this control, then what does it mean? Best, Robert Ep. ======== --- Victor Yu wrote: > Hello Robert, > > I am not sure if the Buddha is defining "not self" as anything that one did > not have control over or would not accord to one's wishes. > > The Buddha was demonstrating the absurdity of, for instance, consciousness > being self. If consciousness were self, this consciousness would not lend > itself to dis-ease. But consciousness does lend itself to dis-ease, The > assumption that consciousness is self leads to a contradiction. Why does > consciousness lend itself to dis-ease? Precisely because consciousness is > not self. > > Please note that consciousness is not self does not imply whether one has > control over consciousness or not, and whether one has control over > consciousness or not does not imply that consciousness is not self. > > Regards, > Victor > > > ----- Original Message ----- > From: "Robert Epstein" > To: > Sent: Saturday, December 15, 2001 1:37 AM > Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts) > > > > Dear Victor, > > I have read the Sutta excerpt that you indicated, and found it quite clear > and > > satisfying. Here is the concluding paragraph: > > > > "Any consciousness whatsoever that is past, future, or present; internal > or > > external; blatant or subtle; common or sublime; far or near: > > every consciousness is to be seen as it actually is with right discernment > as: > > 'This is not mine. This is not my self. This is not what I am.' > > > > "Seeing thus, the well-instructed disciple of the noble ones grows > disenchanted > > with the body, disenchanted with feeling, disenchanted with > > perception, disenchanted with fabrications, disenchanted with > consciousness. > > Disenchanted, he becomes dispassionate. Through dispassion, > > he is fully released. With full release, there is the knowledge, 'Fully > released.' > > He discerns that 'Birth is depleted, the holy life fulfilled, the > > task done. There is nothing further for this world.'" > > > > With a little help from you and Howard, I see that Buddha defined 'not > self' as > > anything that one did not have control over or would not accord to one's > wishes. > > In other words, if one could not say, 'make the body thus' or 'make the > > consciousness thus' and it would not do that, that this body or > consciousness was > > therefore 'not one's self'. > > > > As usual, this opens more doors for me than it closes. It indicates two > > possiblities: either Buddha was attempting to show that there is nothing > in this > > world that is the self, or he was attempting to show that there is no > self, and > > that nothing on heaven or earth or in the realm of consciousness or > awareness or > > anywhere would ever meet this definition, that in fact it was nothing but > a false > > concept. > > > > On the other hand, one would surely say that the Buddha could say: let my > body be > > thus and that his perfect body would accord, no? Or say 'let > consciousness be > > thus' and that he would produce the consciousness in question, no?' If > this is > > not so, then the Buddha had limitations as regards this world and the > kandhas. > > That would be interesting to note. If it is so, then there is a state in > which > > those conditions are met, namely Nibbana, and that, as Anders always > insisted, > > would qualify as the true self. > > > > Best, > > Robert Ep. > > > > ============================ > > > > --- Victor Yu wrote: > > > Hello Robert, > > > > > > Please reflect on what the Buddha taught in > > > Samyutta Nikaya XXII.59, Anatta-lakkhana Sutta, The Discourse on the > > > Not-self Characteristic > > > http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/samyutta/sn22-059.html > > > especially on the question-answer dialogue between the Buddha and the > monks. > > > > > > Also, please see the equivalence of meaning between the statement > > > "Consciousness is not self" and the statement "Consciousness is to be > seen > > > as it actually is with right discernment thus: 'This is not mine. This > I am > > > not. This is not my self.'" > > > > > > Regards, > > > Victor > > > > > > ----- Original Message ----- > > > From: "Robert Epstein" > > > To: > > > Sent: Saturday, December 15, 2001 12:44 AM > > > Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts) > > > > > > > > > > > > > > --- Victor Yu wrote: > > > > > Hello Jon and Rob, > > > > > > > > > > I am not sure what the moment of direct perception is. But direct > > > > > perception is impermanent. What is impermanent is > > > unsatisfactory/dukkha. > > > > > What is impermanent, unsatisfactory/dukkha, subject to change is to > be > > > seen > > > > > as it actually is with right discernment thus: "This is not mine. > This > > > I > > > > > am not. This is not my self." > > > > > > > > > > Regards, > > > > > Victor > > > > > > > > > > > > > This may sound extremely redundant or simplistic, but can you explain > what > > > the > > > > logical link is between recognizing that something is subject to > anicca, > > > anatta > > > > and dukkha, and leaping from there to the recognition that it is 'not > > > mine, not > > > > me, not my self.' How does one necessitate the other? > > > > > > > > Thanks, > > > > Robert Ep. > > > > 10019 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Fri Dec 14, 2001 11:55pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (and khandhas) Rob Ep --- Robert Epstein wrote: > So I take it that the answer is that rupas are also a cause of > suffering. This > confuses me since the rupas are supposed to be the 'absolute realities'. > If the > absolutel realities are also cause of suffering, then what is > distinctive about > them? Is it just to say that they are what they are, while other > perceptions are > illusions, but that they still cause suffering equally? Yes, rupas are ‘realities’ (dhammas) and they are also ‘suffering’ (dukkha). This is because, although ‘real’ in the sense of having an individual characteristic (sabhava), they are also conditioned (sankhara – the same term as the 4th khandha, but used in a slightly different sense here). The same applies to all other dhammas (ie., namas or, more particularly, citta and cetasika), with the single exception of nibbana. The conditioned nature of dhammas is a very important aspect. It is because dhammas are conditioned that they are impermanent, beyond our control and hence dukkha. Nibbana is the only dhamma that is not conditioned (it is ‘asankhara’) and hence is not ‘suffering’ (dukkha). But it is still ‘not-self’. Hence the well-known passage-- All ‘sankharas’ [dhammas other than nibbana] are impermanent (anicca) All ‘sankharas’ [dhammas other than nibbana] are suffering (dukkha) All ‘dhammas’ [including nibbana] are not-self (anatta) > Also, you may acccuse me of being a semantical demon, but every example > below says > that the khandas 'as objects of clinging' are all causes of suffering. > Is there a > quote that says that the khandas ' cannot occur except as objects of > clinging?' > It occurs to me that it is the clinging that is the problem, not the > objects. If > the problem is not with the objects of clinging but with the clinging, > can there > be kandhas without clinging? It sounds like a possibility depending on > the state > of he who either clings or has gained the wisdom not to cling to the > kandhas. > Would this define an arahant? A fair observation, Rob. (And anyway, who would I be to call anyone a semantical demon?) The khandas are sometimes referred to as ‘upadana-kkhandhas’, which translates as ‘aggregates that are objects of clinging’, and at other times as plain old ‘khandas’ (aggregates). As far as I know, no difference is intended between the 2 terms. The former is simply a more descriptive version of the latter, conveying something of their nature. The khandhas of the arahant can of course be the object of (another’s) clinging, or aversion. JOn From Nyanatiloka’s ‘Buddhist Dictionary’ Khandha: The 5 'groups (of existence)' or 'groups of clinging' (upádánakkhandha). Alternative renderings: aggregates, categories of clinging's objects. Upádána-kkhandha: The 5 'groups of clinging', or more clearly stated in accordance with Vis.M., 'the 5 groups of existence which form the objects of clinging'. Cf. M. 44 10020 From: Robert Epstein Date: Sat Dec 15, 2001 0:58am Subject: Re: [dsg] Ultimate realities (and khandhas) Dear Jon, Thank you very much for helping to clarify some of these terms and how they fit together. The idea that dhammas include namas and rupas, and that cittas and Nibbana are also included, is very helpful. Now here is where I got confused: if dhammas are the 'ultimate realities' I derived from this that they were 'real', meaning that they had a status as 'entities'. This is obviously not what is meant by 'real' at all. I now take it that what is meant by 'real' and 'ultimate' is merely that: a/ they are being discerned as they actually are, in their fleeting, momentary occurence as an aspect of physical or mental reality, ie, rupas or namas. b/ they are irreducible to anything other or smaller. No combined or aggregate arisings, such as the complex concept of an object existing independently, would be considered real or ultimate. They are like the prime numbers of experience. Is this correct? And so in a sense by saying they are 'real', one is saying that they are 'not real' in the conventional sense, but only momentary and fleeting, not lasting beyond the moment. In this sense they are accurately seen as what they are in the moment without any conceptual attributions of entity, lasting quality or satisfaction arising with them, and then they would be seen correctly. Does that accord with your meaning? Thanks again, and I think I may be starting to get the concept as it is described. Best, Robert Ep. ========================= --- Jonothan Abbott wrote: > Rob Ep > > This post, the previous one and the next 1 or 2 all deal with 'khandhas'. > Must be that khandha day. > > --- Robert Epstein wrote: > A question or two, > Jon. > > Is there a difference between a dhamma and a rupa? What is their > > relationship? > > The term ‘dhamma’ is used in different ways in the texts, one of which is > to refer to the ‘realities’ of which this life and world as we know it are > composed. This is the meaning here. > > In this sense it is a collective term, and virtual synonym, for: > - the 5 khandhas (in the suttas) > - namas and rupas (in the abhidhamma) > - citta, cetasika and rupa (abhidhamma) > (Note: Nibbana is a dhamma, classified as a nama, but is not one of the 5 > khandhas) > > So a rupa can be considered as a kind of dhamma or, if you like, as a > subset of dhammas. > > > In either case, is the conclusion I am reaching correct, that according > > to the > > Abhidhamma commentaries, physical objects as they actually exist and > > appear in the > > moment are the the only things that are real, and that can be referred > > to as > > 'entities'? > > Rupas are not the same as physical objects. ‘Physical objects’ are not > dhammas in any sense, but are the terms in which we think about particular > agglomerations of rupas. > > That point aside, however, neither rupas nor physical objects are referred > to in the texts as ‘entities’, as far as I am aware. > > Each dhamma does have an *individual, distinct characteristic* that can be > observed (this refers to the factor that distinguishes the dhamma from any > other dhamma). This aspect of an individual, distinct characteristic > (sabhava) is sometimes called the ‘individual essence’, but this in no way > implies any sense of ‘entitiness’. > > ‘Entitiness’ would seem to me to be an aspect of ‘self’ view (or, to use a > Howard term, reification). > > > If that is the case, as it seems, how can one account for the momentary > > [anicca] > > nature of dhammas in terms of their 'entity' status. My understanding > > is that > > anything that is temporary [partaking of annica] does not partake of > > entity in the > > sense that it is constantly changing and does not last for more than the > > moment in > > any given form? And how does one account then for the fact that cittas > > are also > > momentary, yet do not rate entity status merely because they are not > > physical? > > > > What is the basis for this, if true? > > I think what you are saying here is that rupas are said to have an > ‘entitiness’ or 'entity status' of some kind that is not shared by other > dhammas (ie., namas - citta and cetasika). > > I don’t think I’ve seen any such distinction made. The main difference > between the 2 kinds of dhammas is that one (ie., the nama) has the nature > of being a reality that experiences an object, while the other (the rupa) > has the nature of being a reality that does not experience an object. > > Beyond that they each have in common the 3 general characteristics > (anicca, dukkha and anatta) and of course each particular nama and rupa > has its own individual characteristic (sabhava) as noted above. I am not > aware of any other major distinction between the 2. > > This of course is all ‘from the book’, but unless we are absolutely clear > about these aspects the practice cannot be correct, because we will > confuse different realities, or take concepts for realities. > > Jon > > PS Found the following comments on the khandhas as ‘entities’ in the > khandhas entry in Buddhist Dictionary. Thought it might be of interest-- > > “Some writers on Buddhism who have not understood that the five khandha > are just classificatory groupings, have conceived them as compact entities > ('heaps', 'bundles'), while actually, as stated above, the groups never > exist as such, i.e. they never occur in a simultaneous totality of all > their constituents. > Also those single constituents of a group which are present in any given > body- and -mind process, are of an evanescent nature, and so also their > varying combinations. Feeling, perception and mental formations are only > different aspects and functions of a single unit of consciousness.” 10021 From: Robert Epstein Date: Sat Dec 15, 2001 1:04am Subject: Re: [dsg] 'Self' as object of discernment (and khandhas) Thanks, Jon. Can you please explain to me within the scheme described below, what exactly is a concept, and where is it classified? And why is it not a dhamma? It would seem to me that a thought, image, idea or concept would also have a particular content that would identify it. If I imagine or think of a rupa, is that considered completely different than actually mentally apprehending one at the moment of seeing? Is this the distinction? Thanks, Robert Ep. =========================== --- Jonothan Abbott wrote: > Rob Ep > > --- Robert Epstein wrote: > > > > > To summarise, I see the understanding of 'not-self' as being directly > > > linked to the teaching on satipatthana, and not realisable by other > > means. > > > > > > Hope this answers your question. > > > > > > Jon > > > > Hi Jon, > > Thanks for your answer. > > > > The Buddha does, however, include seeing Mind as Mind, and the objects > > of Mind as > > objects of Mind as part of the path of discernment. If 'concepts', > > including > > self-concept, is not an eligible 'object of Mind', what do the objects > > of Mind > > include that are eligible for satipatthana? > > I think you are referring here to the Satipatthana Sutta? Of the 4 > sections or ‘establishments’ (anupassana), the 2 you mention are the > consciousness section (cittanupassana) and the 'mind objects/mental > objects' section (dhammanupassana). > > The objects of awareness under the Satipatthana Sutta are dhammas > (realities), not concepts. The consciousness/mind section refers to the > dhamma that is the moment of consciousness. The mind objects/mental > objects section refers to the dhammas (realities) that can be the object > of a moment of consciousness, and this in turn means any and all realities > (including those covered by the other 3 sections of the sutta). > > To give an example. At a moment of seeing there is contact between the > consciousness that sees and visible object. That visible object is a > reality and also, at that precise moment, a mind object (it is the object > of seeing consciousness). > > So the visible object at that moment falls under both the ‘rupas’ section > and the ‘mind object’ section of the 4 satipatthanas. This helps remind > us that the 4 sections in the sutta are merely ways of classifying > realities and are not in themselves absolutes. > > Only dhammas (realties) can be the object of satipatthana, because only > something that has its own characteristic that is capable of being > experienced is considered to be a ‘dhamma’; anything that does not, is > not. > > In the Satipatthana Sutta itself, the 'eligible' mind-objects are > described in different ways. One of these ways is as the 5 khandhas > (Aggregates), and these 5 khandhas encompass all dhammas (other than > Nibbana). I have pasted below the passage from ‘The Way of Mindfulness’ > > Jon > > Section on Mental Objects > 2. The Aggregates > > "And, further, O bhikkhus, a bhikkhu lives contemplating mental object in > the mental objects of the five aggregates of clinging. > > "How, O bhikkhus, does a bhikkhu live contemplating mental objects in the > mental objects of the five aggregates of clinging? > > "Here, O bhikkhus, a bhikkhu thinks: > 'Thus is material form [rupa]; thus is the arising of material form; and > thus is the disappearance of material form. > Thus is feeling [vedana]; thus is the arising of feeling; and thus is the > disappearance of feeling. > Thus is perception [sanna]; thus is the arising of perception; and thus is > the disappearance of perception. > Thus are the formations [sankhara]; thus is the arising of the formations; > and thus is the disappearance of the formations. > Thus is consciousness [vinnana]; thus is the arising of consciousness; and > thus is the disappearance of consciousness.' > > Thus he lives contemplating mental objects in mental objects, internally > ... and clings to naught in the world. > > "Thus, indeed, O bhikkhus, a bhikkhu lives contemplating mental object in > the mental objects of the five aggregates of clinging." [ends] 10022 From: robertkirkpatrick.rm Date: Sat Dec 15, 2001 4:51am Subject: Fwd: Re: Dying moments --- In dhamma-list@y..., "robertkirkpatrick.rm" wrote: --- Dear Christine, My message was a little pithy, but you were able to comprend just why it is that ""learning to see that every moment is really uncontrollable > and conditioned, be so reassuring as to no longer scare you"". The reason is exactly:"Or is it more an acceptance > of 'that's the way it is whether I like it or not'"" That is it! If it is just a feeling of resignation then this is akusala but it can be 180degrees different and kusala. For myself it changed gradually and I accepted that it may be that a kamma arises at death that leads to a lower realm BUT that that was not going to stop me doing kusala now. And when there is kusala(even a tiny amount) it is always detached (a little) and so fearlessness accumulates. I well know that my understanding is tiny and that the illdeeds done in this life alone would be enormous - and so I accept the worst, that a sojourn in hell might be in store at some time. I figure it is a minor matter compared to learning a little of what the Buddha truly taught. The accumulations we make are not lost, even if we spend a long time in the lower realms they will come to the surface in future lives. And also ALL our fear comes from the conceit and view of self (oh God NO, "I" am going to die and be reborn in hell!). This matter of death can become the whetstone that sharpens wisdom, because whenever there is fear the trouble that self view causes shows itself very clearly. This can be an encouragement to let go a little more of the clinging to self. Then the contemplation on death (maranasati) becomes our good friend. Another point on your earlier post. Only kammapattha (completed kamma) is of sufficient strength to give result leading to rebirth. If we are in a coma the kamma done then, while dreaming or whatever, could not give a rebirth result. It would have to be from a past time. Nor can a feeling of nervousness about rebirth alone be strong enough to give such a result: it is akusala but by itself is not completed kamma. I think your posts would be of interest to many, Christine. They are always useful. best wishes robert In dhamma-list@y..., "christine_forsyth" wrote: > Dear Robert, > Thank you for this post. As usual, it lead me to more questions. :- ) > Why would learning to see that every moment is really uncontrollable > and conditioned, be so reassuring as to no longer scare you? (That > idea scares me more).....Wouldn't understanding reality in that way > induce 'resignation' or 'hopelessness'? Or is it more an acceptance > of 'that's the way it is whether I like it or not', and doing merit > is the only way of influencing the future? > I always appreciate your responses Robert - it would be wonderful if > an answer could be heard once and permanently understood instead of > this constant asking again and again....I know it must try peoples' > patience... > > metta, > Christine > > --- In dhamma-list@y..., "robertkirkpatrick.rm" > wrote: > > --- > > Dear Christine, > > You ask the best questions. This matter used to scare me like > nothing > > else: until I learnt enough to see that every moment is really > > uncontrollable and conditioned. The death moment is no different > from > > now and the kamma that conditions rebirth can be one of several > > types. > > It might be from years past or it might be not from this life but > one > > done in last life or even a thousand lives ago. OR it could be one > > done near to death and that is why it is good to do merit as much > as > > possible close to ones death. And the wise person knows that death > > can occur next moment and so the mind turns toward merit at all > times. > > If this happens there can be a growing confidence that whatever > state > > one dies in, even in a coma, that the conditioning kamma will be > > wholesome. > > robert --- End forwarded message --- 10023 From: Victor Yu Date: Sat Dec 15, 2001 5:40am Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts) Hello Robert, Please understand that any definition, any delineation on what self is is speculative self-view. Please note that he term "self" or its variation "oneself" is used as a pronoun in Dhammapa 12 without speculation on what self is. Please also see that the term "self" is used as a pronoun in Samyutta Nikaya XXII.59, Anatta-lakkhana Sutta, The Discourse on the Not-self Characteristic, http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/samyutta/sn22-059.html Please consider this question: Is it fitting to see Nibbana as: "This is mine. This I am. This is my self."? Regards, Victor ----- Original Message ----- From: "Robert Epstein" To: Sent: Saturday, December 15, 2001 3:31 AM Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts) > > --- Victor Yu wrote: > > Hello Robert, > > > > Please see how the term "self" is used in Dhammapada 12, The Self > > http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/khuddaka/dhp1/12.html > > > > Nibbana is not self. Nibbana is to be seen as it actually is with right > > discernment thus: "This is not mine. This I am not. This is not my self." > > > > Regards, > > Victor > > Dear Victor, > With respect, there is no definition of the self in the section that you have here > indicated, and in fact one is admonished to control and purify oneself, using a > conventional meaning of 'self'. One is admonished to abstain from harmful acts > and not to forsake 'oneself' for the sake of another. I fail to see how this > addresses the question of the proper usage of the word 'self'. > > Furthermore, there is no mention of Nibbana and its relation to the self in this > passage. I await any references you would like to make that either asserts or > refutes the possibility of Nibbana being the true self, or anything along these > lines. I am not necessarily arguing for the word 'self' to be in the same > sentence as Nibbana, but since Nibbana is the only unconditioned object or state, > depending on how you look at it, it is the only candidate for a state of being > that would not be conditioned and subject to the conditioning of the khandas. > > Best, > Robert Ep. > > ============ 10024 From: Victor Yu Date: Sat Dec 15, 2001 6:09am Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts) Hello Robert, Yes, one can control oneself. If form were self, it would be possible for FORM to say 'Let this form be thus. Let this form not be thus.' However, precisely because form is not self, it is not possible for FORM to say 'Let this form be thus. Let this form not be thus.' Please note that form is not self does not imply whether it is possible or not for ONE to say 'Let this form be thus. Let this form not be thus.' Regards, Victor ----- Original Message ----- From: "Robert Epstein" To: Sent: Saturday, December 15, 2001 3:38 AM Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts) > Dear Victor, > In the Sutta you referred me to, the Buddha says that if consciousness were the > self, one could say 'have this consciousness be like this' and it would do so. > Since it does not, it is clearly not self. > > He says that if this body were self it would likewise accord with our wishes, but > since it does not, it is not self. > > Hence my reference to that which cannot be controlled not being self. > > In the second sutta you referred me to, he says: 'One must be the controller of > oneself; who else would be the controller?' making a definite reference to one > being able to develop control over one's own activities. If this does not imply a > true self who is able to establish this control, then what does it mean? > > Best, > Robert Ep. > > ======== > > --- Victor Yu wrote: > > Hello Robert, > > > > I am not sure if the Buddha is defining "not self" as anything that one did > > not have control over or would not accord to one's wishes. > > > > The Buddha was demonstrating the absurdity of, for instance, consciousness > > being self. If consciousness were self, this consciousness would not lend > > itself to dis-ease. But consciousness does lend itself to dis-ease, The > > assumption that consciousness is self leads to a contradiction. Why does > > consciousness lend itself to dis-ease? Precisely because consciousness is > > not self. > > > > Please note that consciousness is not self does not imply whether one has > > control over consciousness or not, and whether one has control over > > consciousness or not does not imply that consciousness is not self. > > > > Regards, > > Victor > > > > 10025 From: Victor Yu Date: Sat Dec 15, 2001 6:53am Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts) Hello Jon, Thank you. Whether it is hard to realize or not, conditioned phenomenon such as consciousness or perception is impermanent, is unsatisfactory/dukkha, is to be seen as it actually is with right discernment thus: "This is not mine. This I am not. This is not my self." Regards, Victor ----- Original Message ----- From: "Jonothan Abbott" To: Sent: Saturday, December 15, 2001 3:34 AM Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts) > Victor > > Thanks for coming in on this thread. > > --- Victor Yu wrote: > Hello Jon and Rob, > > > > I am not sure what the moment of direct perception is. But direct > > perception is impermanent. What is impermanent is > > unsatisfactory/dukkha. 10026 From: Date: Sat Dec 15, 2001 3:09am Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts) Hi, Victor - In a message dated 12/15/01 2:32:06 AM Eastern Standard Time, victoryu@s... writes: > > Hello Howard, > > Please see how the term "self" is used in Dhammapada 12, The Self > http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/khuddaka/dhp1/12.html > > Regards, > Victor > ============================= Yes, I checked that reference after you gave it in a previous post. That sutta has for years been a favorite of those who dearly wanted to believe that the Buddha accepted the existence of a self. But it is clear to me, and to many commentators, that the Buddha is merely using convemtional speech in that sutta, in the same way (using an example I gave once before) that one might say that a sprout has the power to grow into a plant, but no one would ask where in the sprout that power is located! It is the same conventional usage as the Buddha adopted in referring to *anything*. He referred to trees, to mountains, to people - all without attributing true, separate existence there. He referred to Ananda, to Sariputta, to Moggalana - all without accepting the notion of a "true person" to be found among or outside of the khandhas. This conventional use of nouns, and especially 'self', all the while not attributing more than conventional status to such usage, is common to Theravada and to Mahayana, and began with the Buddha himself. With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 10027 From: Date: Sat Dec 15, 2001 3:15am Subject: Re: [dsg] Ultimate realities (and khandhas) Hi, Jon - In a message dated 12/15/01 2:50:58 AM Eastern Standard Time, jonoabb@y... writes: > > This post, the previous one and the next 1 or 2 all deal with 'khandhas'. > Must be that khandha day. > ============================== Argh!! I now insist that you, as list owner, commence monitoring your own posts so that there be no further abuse of this sort!! ;-)) With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 10028 From: Date: Sat Dec 15, 2001 3:29am Subject: Re: [dsg] Ultimate realities (and khandhas) Hi, Jon - In a message dated 12/15/01 2:50:58 AM Eastern Standard Time, jonoabb@y... writes: > Rupas are not the same as physical objects. ‘Physical objects’ are not > dhammas in any sense, but are the terms in which we think about particular > agglomerations of rupas. > ============================= I think this is an important matter. "Physical objects" are the imagined external entities that are referenced by those mental constructs, conglomerations of rupas, which *I* mean by concepts. The physical objects have only conventional existence, though they are based on genuine observation of rupas and relations among rupas. Imagined external entities, of course, can not be directly examined, by wisdom or anything else. However, those *thoughts* which I call concepts, *are* directly observable. It seems to me that you (and Nina and Khun Sujin) use the term 'concept' to refer to the *referents* of constructed thought, whereas I use the term 'concept' to refer to the thought, itself, something which I think *does* fall under the 4th foundation of mindfulness. With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 10029 From: Date: Sat Dec 15, 2001 3:34am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The Two Truths (for Howard) Hi, Jon - In a message dated 12/15/01 3:30:05 AM Eastern Standard Time, jonoabb@y... writes: > Howard: > > I'm in basic agreement here, though I would formulate it > > differently. > > I am more inclined to describe the hardness experienced and the > > experiencing > > of the hardness as two inter-related and mutually dependent aspects of > > the > > same experiencing-event. They are distinguishable as are the inside and > > the > > outside of a hollow sphere, but they co-occur, are mutually dependent, > > and, > > thus are not "totally separate". (In fact, no things are totally > > separate, > > though some are more "remote" from each other than dyads. > > Jon: > > A matter of emphasis, perhaps. I was trying to emphasise the difference > between the 2 kinds of reality, and perhaps ‘totally different’ would have > been a better choice of words. > > I agree that they are mutually dependent at the moment of co-arising, and > this describes an aspect of the relationship between the 2 realities. > These relationships are described in detail in the teaching on conditions. > > To my way of thinking, a clearer understanding of the difference between > realities that we tend to ‘mix together’ is the means to a clearer > understanding of the relationship between those different realities. > > Jon > ============================ I understand your point, and I agree that clear understanding is important, both of differences in characteristic and of interdependence. If either is given short shrift, our understanding is incomplete. With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 10030 From: Date: Sat Dec 15, 2001 3:40am Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts) Hi, Rob - In a message dated 12/15/01 3:40:03 AM Eastern Standard Time, epsteinrob@Y... writes: > In the second sutta you referred me to, he says: 'One must be the > controller of > oneself; who else would be the controller?' making a definite reference to > one > being able to develop control over one's own activities. If this does not > imply a > true self who is able to establish this control, then what does it mean? > > ============================== It's just a manner of speaking, Rob, much like telling somebody: "Get yourself in hand; no one else can do that for you!" With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 10031 From: Victor Yu Date: Sat Dec 15, 2001 9:11am Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts) Hello Howard, From what I understand reading the discourse, the Buddha was using right speech that is truthful, beneficial, clear, not obscure, and not esoteric. How we express ourselves often reflects the views we have. And regarding views, I would like to include a metaphor: View is like direction. Having right view is like going in the right direction, which will lead to the destination. Having wrong view is like going in the wrong direction, which will not lead to the destination,. Having view such "self exists" or "self does not exist" is like going around in a circle. Having the view "self exists" is like going around in a circle in one direction. Having the view "self does not exist" is like going around in a circle in opposite direction. One will not reach the destination going around in a circle, clockwise or counter-clockwise. Thank you for replying. Regards, Victor ----- Original Message ----- From: To: Sent: Saturday, December 15, 2001 11:09 AM Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts) > Hi, Victor - > > In a message dated 12/15/01 2:32:06 AM Eastern Standard Time, > victoryu@s... writes: > > > > > > Hello Howard, > > > > Please see how the term "self" is used in Dhammapada 12, The Self > > http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/khuddaka/dhp1/12.html > > > > Regards, > > Victor > > > ============================= > Yes, I checked that reference after you gave it in a previous post. > That sutta has for years been a favorite of those who dearly wanted to > believe that the Buddha accepted the existence of a self. But it is clear to > me, and to many commentators, that the Buddha is merely using convemtional > speech in that sutta, in the same way (using an example I gave once before) > that one might say that a sprout has the power to grow into a plant, but no > one would ask where in the sprout that power is located! It is the same > conventional usage as the Buddha adopted in referring to *anything*. He > referred to trees, to mountains, to people - all without attributing true, > separate existence there. He referred to Ananda, to Sariputta, to Moggalana - > all without accepting the notion of a "true person" to be found among or > outside of the khandhas. This conventional use of nouns, and especially > 'self', all the while not attributing more than conventional status to such > usage, is common to Theravada and to Mahayana, and began with the Buddha > himself. > > With metta, > Howard 10032 From: Date: Sat Dec 15, 2001 4:40am Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts) Hi, Victor - In a message dated 12/15/01 12:14:29 PM Eastern Standard Time, victoryu@s... writes: > > Hello Howard, > > From what I understand reading the discourse, the Buddha was using right > speech that is truthful, beneficial, clear, not obscure, and not esoteric. > > How we express ourselves often reflects the views we have. And regarding > views, I would like to include a metaphor: > View is like direction. Having right view is like going in the right > direction, which will lead to the destination. Having wrong view is like > going in the wrong direction, which will not lead to the destination,. > Having view such "self exists" or "self does not exist" is like going > around > in a circle. Having the view "self exists" is like going around in a > circle > in one direction. Having the view "self does not exist" is like going > around in a circle in opposite direction. > > One will not reach the destination going around in a circle, clockwise or > counter-clockwise. > > Thank you for replying. > > Regards, > Victor > ============================ As I see it, any view is inadequate, and clinging to a view is harmful. However, between the views "There is a self" and "There is not a self", the latter is preferable, not only in its effect, but also because a positive claim calls for evidence, and wherever the Buddha has us look we only see something that is not self. With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 10033 From: Victor Yu Date: Sat Dec 15, 2001 10:56am Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts) Hello Howard and all, If one sees that any view is inadequate, then I am not sure how one would see the Right View in the Noble Eightfold Path. Regards, Victor ----- Original Message ----- From: To: Sent: Saturday, December 15, 2001 12:40 PM Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts) > Hi, Victor - > > In a message dated 12/15/01 12:14:29 PM Eastern Standard Time, > victoryu@s... writes: > > > > > > Hello Howard, > > > > From what I understand reading the discourse, the Buddha was using right > > speech that is truthful, beneficial, clear, not obscure, and not esoteric. > > > > How we express ourselves often reflects the views we have. And regarding > > views, I would like to include a metaphor: > > View is like direction. Having right view is like going in the right > > direction, which will lead to the destination. Having wrong view is like > > going in the wrong direction, which will not lead to the destination,. > > Having view such "self exists" or "self does not exist" is like going > > around > > in a circle. Having the view "self exists" is like going around in a > > circle > > in one direction. Having the view "self does not exist" is like going > > around in a circle in opposite direction. > > > > One will not reach the destination going around in a circle, clockwise or > > counter-clockwise. > > > > Thank you for replying. > > > > Regards, > > Victor > > > ============================ > As I see it, any view is inadequate, and clinging to a view is > harmful. However, between the views "There is a self" and "There is not a > self", the latter is preferable, not only in its effect, but also because a > positive claim calls for evidence, and wherever the Buddha has us look we > only see something that is not self. > > With metta, > Howard 10034 From: Robert Epstein Date: Sat Dec 15, 2001 11:50am Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts) --- Victor Yu wrote: > Hello Robert, > > Please understand that any definition, any delineation on what self is is > speculative self-view. Please note that he term "self" or its variation > "oneself" is used as a pronoun in Dhammapa 12 without speculation on what > self is. Please also see that the term "self" is used as a pronoun in > Samyutta Nikaya XXII.59, Anatta-lakkhana Sutta, The Discourse on the > Not-self Characteristic, > http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/samyutta/sn22-059.html > > Please consider this question: > Is it fitting to see Nibbana as: "This is mine. This I am. This is my > self."? > > Regards, > Victor I'd like to see what the Suttas say about Nibbana and oneself. But my inclination would certainly not be to make any of the statements as you put them above. Regards, Robert Ep. 10035 From: Robert Epstein Date: Sat Dec 15, 2001 11:52am Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts) --- Victor Yu wrote: > Hello Robert, > > Yes, one can control oneself. > > If form were self, it would be possible for FORM to say 'Let this form be > thus. Let this form not be thus.' However, precisely because form is not > self, it is not possible for FORM to say 'Let this form be thus. Let this > form not be thus.' > > Please note that form is not self does not imply whether it is possible or > not for ONE to say 'Let this form be thus. Let this form not be thus.' > > Regards, > Victor Dear Victor, Well, then, if ONE were to say 'Let this form be thus' and it would accord, then would ONE be the self? If self can control any dhammas, it would not fall into the category of being impermanent and unsatisfactory. One would have defeated dukkha. So I would say that one can provisional exercise self-control, but that perhaps the idea that ONE is doing this is an illusion. Best, Robert Ep. 10036 From: Robert Epstein Date: Sat Dec 15, 2001 11:54am Subject: Re: [dsg] Ultimate realities (and khandhas) --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Jon - > > In a message dated 12/15/01 2:50:58 AM Eastern Standard Time, > jonoabb@y... writes: > > > > Rupas are not the same as physical objects. ‘Physical objects’ are not > > dhammas in any sense, but are the terms in which we think about particular > > agglomerations of rupas. > > > ============================= > I think this is an important matter. "Physical objects" are the > imagined external entities that are referenced by those mental constructs, > conglomerations of rupas, which *I* mean by concepts. The physical objects > have only conventional existence, though they are based on genuine > observation of rupas and relations among rupas. Imagined external entities, > of course, can not be directly examined, by wisdom or anything else. However, > those *thoughts* which I call concepts, *are* directly observable. It seems > to me that you (and Nina and Khun Sujin) use the term 'concept' to refer to > the *referents* of constructed thought, whereas I use the term 'concept' to > refer to the thought, itself, something which I think *does* fall under the > 4th foundation of mindfulness. I await the response to this point, which is equally important to me, and which you have said more clearly, with eager anticipation. Robert Ep. 10037 From: Robert Epstein Date: Sat Dec 15, 2001 11:59am Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts) --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Rob - > > In a message dated 12/15/01 3:40:03 AM Eastern Standard Time, > epsteinrob@Y... writes: > > > > In the second sutta you referred me to, he says: 'One must be the > > controller of > > oneself; who else would be the controller?' making a definite reference to > > one > > being able to develop control over one's own activities. If this does not > > imply a > > true self who is able to establish this control, then what does it mean? > > > > > ============================== > It's just a manner of speaking, Rob, much like telling somebody: "Get > yourself in hand; no one else can do that for you!" That may be so, Howard, but I believe that there are several of our friends here who have said that Buddha never actually made conventional statements and that they should not be take as prescriptions. So it's a bit of puzzle how else one would see this. If they are not conventional statements, which would be meaningless if one were not able to do anything about them, since we have no control, then it also seems to me that it is saying more than this, and referring to will in some way. To say one is the controller of oneself points to a sort of mechanism that accomplishes things through intention. Why would the Buddha say this if it would cause no possible result? Best, Robert Ep. 10038 From: Date: Sat Dec 15, 2001 7:25am Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts) Hi, Victor - In a message dated 12/15/01 1:58:30 PM Eastern Standard Time, victoryu@s... writes: > > Hello Howard and all, > > If one sees that any view is inadequate, then I am not sure how one would > see the Right View in the Noble Eightfold Path. > > Regards, > Victor > ========================= As I see it, even right view is inadequate compared to direct *knowing*, to wisdom. With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 10039 From: lpjoe Date: Sat Dec 15, 2001 2:58pm Subject: [dsg] Re: The noble nine fold path - Erik --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Sarah wrote: > Dear Erik, > > I'm sorry if I've ever given the impression of pretending to have any knowledge > or wisdom other than that of the most basic beginner level. I merely read, > study and listen to Tipitaka texts and explanations according to the Pali Canon > and slowly find more and more comprehension and confidence in what they > contain. That's all. > > In this light, I'll just make very brief comments on the suttas you raise= : > > 1) Uraga Sutta (The worn Out Skin) > > I mentioned before that until Dan posted Nyanaponika's helpful notes, I was at > somewhat of a loss. The cross-references to the same ideas in Salayatana > Samyutta, `the World' and `The All' and later the reference to Itivuttaka 41 > which contains a detailed explanation about the 2 kinds of view to explain the > `goes too far nor lags behind' helped clarify the points we were discussing. > The explanations are in these Suttas as I read them. > (sorry, I've lost the link as I was using my dusty old book;-) > > 2) Phena Sutta (A Lump of Foam) > > A favourite sutta of mine;-) let me take theis excuse to quote some extra > commentary notes: > > B.Bodhi adds the commentary note to the passage about the bubble you quote: > > note 190: "Spk: a bubble (bubbu.la) is feeble and cannot be grasped, for it > breaks up as soon as it is seized; so too feeling is feeble and cannot be > grasped as permanent and stable. As a bubble arises and ceases in a drop of > water and does not last long, so too with feeling: 100,000 `ko.tis' of > feelings arise and cease in the time of a fingersnap (one ko.ti = 10 million). > As a bubble arises in dependence on conditions, so feeling arises in dependence > on a sense base, an object, the defilements, and contact." > > "Spk: Perception is like a mirage (marikaa) in the sense that it is > insubstantial, for one cannot grasp a mirage to drink or bathe or fill a > pitcher. As a mirage deceives the multitude, so does perception, which entices > people with th idea that the colourful object is beautiful, pleasurable, = and > permanent." > > Does this mean feelings, perceptions and other paramatha dhammas (realities) > don't have lakhana (characteristics) or sabhava (nature) or that they don't > exist momentarily in their different `activities'? No. > > "Spk: As a plaintain trunk (kadalikkhandha) is an assemblage of many sheaths, > each with its own characteristic, so the aggregate of volitional formations is > an assemblage of many phenomena, each with its own characteristic." > > "Spk: Consciousness is like a magical illusion (maayaa) in the sense that it is > insubstantial and cannot be grasped. Consciousness is even more transient and > fleeting than a magical illusion. For it gives the impression that a person > comes and goes, stands and sits, with the same mind, but the mind is different > in each of these activities. Consciousness deceives the multitude like a= > magical illusion." > > 3) Satipatthana Sutta > > I believe I've answered all your questions or points pertaining to the > Satipatthana Sutta at length before. As it's getting late, if you don't mind > I'll just re-post my last one (which I don't believe you replied to) it after > signing off . > > Best wishes always, > > Sarah > > Message 8231 of 9967 > From: Sarah > Date: Sun Sep 23, 2001 5:17 am > Subject: Re: [DhammaStudyGroup] Re: Sabhava or 'essence'- Erik > > Hi Erik, > > > S:> > Erik, the third object of mindfulness is consciousness: > > > E:> Right, though I am also concerned with the other three, namely, the > > body, the feelings, and mental qualities. It is called the "Four > > Foundations of Mindfulness" after all. :) > > Good, we're all agreed here. > > S:> > What is meant by consciousness (citta or vi~n~naana) is seeing, > > hearing, > > > smelling, tasting, touching (through the body-sense) and mind- door > > > experiencing. > > > E:> I don't quite take away this interpretation from the Maha- > > Satipatthana Sutta: > > S:Hopefully my posts to Rob E have clarified;-) ` citte > cittaanupassi....viharati' - he lives contemplating consciousness in > consciousness. I've personally found it really helps to consider any sutta in > the light of other suttas, the abhidhamma and commentary notes, but I know this > is all controversial;-)) > > > > "And how does a monk remain focused on the mind in & of itself? There > > is the case where a monk, when the mind has passion, discerns that > > the mind has passion. When the mind is without passion, he discerns > > that the mind is without passion. When the mind has aversion, he > > discerns that the mind has aversion. When the mind is without > > aversion, he discerns that the mind is without aversion. When the > > mind has delusion, he discerns that the mind has delusion. When the > > mind is without delusion, he discerns that the mind is without > > delusion. > > > > > S: > > One doesn't go about anything, > > > E:> Not even "remaining focused" as the Buddha enjoined? Do you mean we > > just sit here like lumps? > > S:The translation for this section by Soma Thera starts: > > "And how, O bhikkhus, does a bhikkhu live contemplating consciousness in > conciousness?" > " Here, o bhikkhus, a bhikkhu understands the consciousness with lust; the > conciousness without lust, as without lust; the consciousness with hate, as > with hate............" > > By contemplating consciousness (cittanupassanaa) is meant sati (awareness) of > the cittas discussed. There is no self to remain focussed or to sit like = a lump > except in the world of pa~n~natti (concepts). > > > S:> > but at this moment there is the experiencing of visible object in > > front of us. > > > E:> Agreed, but how, specifically, does merely knowing this fact engender > > mindfulness and concentration to the degree we can penetrate the > > characteristics of what we're seeing? > > S:Again, we don't penetrate anything. It may seem, like you were saying to Dan, > that we're arguing about semantics, but like he expressed so clearly, these are > very important distinctions. By beginning to understand more precisely the > difference between concepts and realities now, by knowing more and more what > the objects of sati (awareness) are, by realizing there is nothing at all= to be > done by you or me, no method to follow at all, sati can and will begin to be > aware of these same realities and panna (understanding) will begin to know or > penetrate the characteristics. If there is doubt about this (or anything = else) > or attachment to results (or anything else), these are also realities which can > be known as they arise now. > > E:> I agree that knowing how things are not "self" is critical, and the > > bare beginning point in discerning realities as they are. Unless we > > understand this fact we are liable to interpret what we see as > > permanent, or desirable, for example. But this is only the barest > > beginning point as I understand it. There has to be more, because I > > cannot see how merely knowing this fact (like knowing that the birth > > and death of an self-entity are ultimately illusory) does anything to > > help terminate birth and death. If it were this simple, I am sure > > we'd all be arahats by now. > > S:I think it's simple and not simple. It's simple in that nothing has to = be > done > or changed. Realities are already arising and falling away and when awareness > begins to be aware of them, it's not a matter of changing them or leading a > different lifestyle at all. It's not simple because although we repeat th= at > these realities are not self and so on, there is no understanding at all = of > what this means if there isn't any understanding now of the reality appearing, > whether it is seeing, visible object, doubt or attachment . > > > S:> > I can't find any contradiction. By states or objects are meant > > these same > > > realities found in the Satipatthana Sutta (and all the other > > suttas) such > > as > > > seeing, visible object, hearing, sound and so on. > > > E:> Where are these items mentioned specifically in the Satipatthana > > Sutta and "all the other suttas" other than by implication? Again, > > the objects I see mentioned in the Satipatthana Sutta include > > specific parts of the body, specific feelings, specific > > characteristics of the mind, specific mental qualities with reference > > (does "Frame of Reference" have any bearing here?) to the five > > hindrances, the five aggregates, the six sense-bases, the seven > > factors of awakening, the Four Noble Truths. > > S:Let me know if this still isn't clear after my posts to Rob E. All realities > are included at least twice over as I read it. The same realities are > discussed over and over in the suttas. In the Samyutta Nikaya (Kindred > Sayings), Salayatana-vagga, there are many suttas which discuss the `6 worlds' > and the 'All'. In First Fifty, Ch 111, par 25 we read: > > `The eye, monks, must be abandoned by fully knowing, by fully comprehending it. > Objects..eye-consciousness..eye-contact..that pleasant feeling, unpleasant > feeling or neutral feeling..that also must be abandoned by fully knowing , by > fully comprehending it. > > The mind..mind-states..that pleasant feeling, unpleasant feeling or neutral > feeling..that also must be abandoned by fully knowing it, by comprehending it.' > > > E:> Other than merely knowing that what we observe arises is not self, it > > doesn't follow that merely being aware of this in theory has any > > bearing on seeing deeply enough into the true nature of things that > > this bringe about the end of suffering. There have to be objects to > > apply this understanding to, so that we come to directly see the > > characteristics of these objects as impermanent, suffering, and not- > > self. > > S:Exactly so, and this is why your questions here about the objects of > satipatthana are exactly the questions many of us have been waiting quite a > long time for you to ask;-)) > > E:> I have not forgotten, but that is not what I am driving at. Again, I = > > question how merely knowing this factually is conducive of the sort > > of concentration needed to penetrate the characteristics of these > > things at all. Again, without an object, there is nothing for sati to > > focus on. And the most important factor in mindfulness is remaining > > focused. This is the basis for sampajana (clear comprehension) and > > sati (mindfulness). Without this deliberate concentration (at least > > at first, until it is so well-established it becomes automatic), the > > mind will never be concentrated enough to penetrate the > > characteristics of anything, because it won't have any object to in > > which it sees these characteristics reflected, being so scattered and > > heedless it flits from one thing to another without ever "sinking in" > > deeply enough to know what it is perceiving with clarity and > > discernment. > > S:I'd say, forget about this deliberate concentration, `sinking in' and > focussing. They are all accompanied by a subtle idea of self `trying to do'. > Understanding is the key. If there is minding about the object, it shows the > attachment rather than the understanding. Concentration (ekaggata cetasika) as > we've discussed before, will in any case arise with every citta and when there > is a wholesome citta, concentration will be wholesome anyway, assisting the > other cetasikas and citta by being one-pointed on the object or 'welding > together the co-existent states' at that moment. As the citta falls away = in an > instant (right now), concentration falls away with it. It doesn't make it= last > longer. > > > E:> and it takes enormous discipline to practice to > > develop awareness and clear comprehension to the point they remain > > focused for extended periods of time--which is the prerequisite for > > penetrating the characteristics of any object being noted. > > S:Does it? Is it? > > > E:> Mindfulness can only be aware of one object at a time. > > S:True. It lasts for an instant and then gone! > > E:It may get > > more refined and be able to switch very quickly between different > > objects the more developed it is, but it is not possible for the mind > > to focus on more than one thing at a time, which is why the exercises > > in the Satipatthana Sutta detail various objects and how they are > > best investigated. What is again unclear from your presentation is > > how this degree of focus is established in the first place. > > S:I don't find any exercises in the Sutta and I think it's more interesting to > understand what awareness is and what the objects are rather than focussing. > > > E:> Right, but it doesn't just happen just from studying texts, but by > > deliberately noting specific feelings arising and passing away. > > S:Being aware rather than deliberately noting with attachment. > > E:> Knowing what these objects of investigation are is the first step, > > the barest beginning, as I see it. > > S:YES! > > > Sarah > 10040 From: lpjoe Date: Sat Dec 15, 2001 3:04pm Subject: [dsg] Re: The noble nine fold path - Erik Sarah & Erik I've been following your volley with interest, while reading some short works by Upasika Kee Nanayon (1902-1978), one of the most respected women dhamma teachers in Thailand. I was wondering if the following excerpts from Upasika's LOOKING INWARD: Observations on the Art of Meditation, bear on the discussion at all. I may have accidentally posted this msg twice - my apologies if so. Joe THE PURE PRESENT We have to catch sight of the sensation of knowing when the mind gains knowledge of anything and yet isn't aware of itself, to see how it latches onto things -- physical form, feeling, perceptions, thought-formations, and consciousness. We have to probe on in and look on our own. We can't use the teachings we've memorized to catch sight of these things. That won't get us anywhere at all. We may remember, "The body is inconstant," but even though we can say it, we can't see it. We have to focus on in to see exactly //how// the body is inconstant, to see how it changes. And we have to focus on feelings -- pleasant, painful, and neutral -- to see how they change. The same holds true with perceptions, thought-formations, and so forth: We have to focus on them, investigate them, contemplate them to see their characteristics //as they actually are//. Even if you can see these things for only a moment, it'll do you a world of good. You'll be able to catch yourself: The things you thought you knew, you didn't really know at all....This is why the knowledge we gain in the practice has to keep changing through many, many levels. It doesn't stay on just one level. So even when you're able to know arising and disbanding with every moment right in the present: If your contemplation isn't continuous, it won't be very clear. You have to know how to contemplate the bare sensation of arising and disbanding, simply arising and disbanding, without any labels of "good" or "bad." Just keep with the pure sensation of arising and disbanding. When you do this, other things will come to intrude -- but no matter how they intrude, it's still a matter of arising and disbanding, so you can keep your stance with arising and disbanding in this way. If you start labeling things, it gets confusing. All you need to do is keep looking at the right spot: the bare sensation of arising and disbanding. Simply make sure you really keep watch of it. Whether there's awareness of sights, sounds, smells, tastes, or tactile sensations, just stay with the sensation of arising and disbanding. Don't go labeling the sight, sound, smell, taste, or tactile sensation. If you can keep watch in this way, you're with the pure present -- and there won't be any issues. When you keep watch in this way, you're keeping watch on inconstancy, on change, as it actually occurs -- because even the arising and disbanding changes. It's not the same thing arising and disbanding all the time. First this sort of sensation arises and disbands, then that sort arises and disbands. If you keep watch on bare arising and disbanding like this, you're sure to arrive at insight. But if you keep watch with labels -- "That's the sound of a cow," "That's the bark of a dog" -- you won't be watching the bare sensation of sound, the bare sensation of arising and disbanding. As soon as there's labeling, thought-formations come along with it. Your senses of touch, sight, hearing, and so forth will continue their bare arising and disbanding, but you won't know it. Instead, you'll label everything: sights, sounds, etc., and then there will be attachments, feelings of pleasure and displeasure, and you won't know the truth. The truth keeps going along on its own. Sensations keep arising and then disbanding. If we focus right here -- at the consciousness of the bare sensation of sights, sounds, smells, tastes, and tactile sensations, then we'll be able to gain insight quickly.... If we know how to observe things in this way, we'll be able to see easily when the mind is provoked by passion or greed, and even more easily when it's provoked by anger. As for delusion, that's something more subtle...something you have to take a great interest in and investigate carefully. You'll come to see all sorts of hidden things -- how the mind is covered with many, many layers of film. It's really fascinating. But then that's what insight meditation is for -- to open our eyes so that we can know and see, so that we can destroy our delusion and ignorance. June 3, 1964 ------------ One night I was sitting in meditation outside in the open air -- my back straight as an arrow -- firmly determined to make the mind quiet, but even after a long time it wouldn't settle down. So I thought, "I've been working at this for many days now, and yet my mind won't settle down at all. It's time to stop being so determined and to simply be aware of the mind." I started to take my hands and feet out of the meditation posture, but at the moment I had unfolded one leg but had yet to unfold the other, I could see that my mind was like a pendulum swinging more and more slowly, more and more slowly -- until it stopped. Then there arose an awareness that was sustained by itself. Slowly I put my legs and hands back into position. At the same time, the mind was in a state of awareness absolutely and solidly still, seeing clearly into the elementary phenomena of existence as they arose and disbanded, changing in line with their nature -- and also seeing a separate condition inside, with no arising, disbanding, or changing, a condition beyond birth and death: something very difficult to put clearly into words, because it was a realization of the elementary phenomena of nature, completely internal and individual. After a while I slowly got up and lay down to rest. This state of mind remained there as a stillness that sustained itself deep down inside. Eventually the mind came out of this state and gradually returned to normal. From this I was able to observe how practice consisting of nothing but fierce desire simply upsets the mind and keeps it from being still. But when one's awareness of the mind is just right, an inner awareness will arise naturally of its own accord. Because of this clear inner awareness, I was able to continue knowing the facts of what's true and false, right and wrong from that point on, and it enabled me to know that the moment when the mind let go of everything was a clear awareness of the elementary phenomena of nature, because it was an awareness that knew within and saw within of its own accord -- not something you can know or see by wanting. For this reason the Buddha's teaching, //"Sabbe dhamma anatta// -- All phenomena are not-self," tells us not to latch onto //any// of the phenomena of nature, whether conditioned or unconditioned. From that point on I was able to understand things and let go of attachments step by step. --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Sarah wrote: > Dear Erik, > > I'm sorry if I've ever given the impression of pretending to have any knowledge > or wisdom other than that of the most basic beginner level. I merely read, > study and listen to Tipitaka texts and explanations according to the Pali Canon > and slowly find more and more comprehension and confidence in what they > contain. That's all. > > In this light, I'll just make very brief comments on the suttas you raise= : > > 1) Uraga Sutta (The worn Out Skin) > > I mentioned before that until Dan posted Nyanaponika's helpful notes, I was at > somewhat of a loss. The cross-references to the same ideas in Salayatana > Samyutta, `the World' and `The All' and later the reference to Itivuttaka 41 > which contains a detailed explanation about the 2 kinds of view to explain the > `goes too far nor lags behind' helped clarify the points we were discussing. > The explanations are in these Suttas as I read them. > (sorry, I've lost the link as I was using my dusty old book;-) > > 2) Phena Sutta (A Lump of Foam) > > A favourite sutta of mine;-) let me take theis excuse to quote some extra > commentary notes: > > B.Bodhi adds the commentary note to the passage about the bubble you quote: > > note 190: "Spk: a bubble (bubbu.la) is feeble and cannot be grasped, for it > breaks up as soon as it is seized; so too feeling is feeble and cannot be > grasped as permanent and stable. As a bubble arises and ceases in a drop of > water and does not last long, so too with feeling: 100,000 `ko.tis' of > feelings arise and cease in the time of a fingersnap (one ko.ti = 10 million). > As a bubble arises in dependence on conditions, so feeling arises in dependence > on a sense base, an object, the defilements, and contact." > > "Spk: Perception is like a mirage (marikaa) in the sense that it is > insubstantial, for one cannot grasp a mirage to drink or bathe or fill a > pitcher. As a mirage deceives the multitude, so does perception, which entices > people with th idea that the colourful object is beautiful, pleasurable, = and > permanent." > > Does this mean feelings, perceptions and other paramatha dhammas (realities) > don't have lakhana (characteristics) or sabhava (nature) or that they don't > exist momentarily in their different `activities'? No. > > "Spk: As a plaintain trunk (kadalikkhandha) is an assemblage of many sheaths, > each with its own characteristic, so the aggregate of volitional formations is > an assemblage of many phenomena, each with its own characteristic." > > "Spk: Consciousness is like a magical illusion (maayaa) in the sense that it is > insubstantial and cannot be grasped. Consciousness is even more transient and > fleeting than a magical illusion. For it gives the impression that a person > comes and goes, stands and sits, with the same mind, but the mind is different > in each of these activities. Consciousness deceives the multitude like a= > magical illusion." > > 3) Satipatthana Sutta > > I believe I've answered all your questions or points pertaining to the > Satipatthana Sutta at length before. As it's getting late, if you don't mind > I'll just re-post my last one (which I don't believe you replied to) it after > signing off . > > Best wishes always, > > Sarah > > Message 8231 of 9967 > From: Sarah > Date: Sun Sep 23, 2001 5:17 am > Subject: Re: [DhammaStudyGroup] Re: Sabhava or 'essence'- Erik > > Hi Erik, > > > S:> > Erik, the third object of mindfulness is consciousness: > > > E:> Right, though I am also concerned with the other three, namely, the > > body, the feelings, and mental qualities. It is called the "Four > > Foundations of Mindfulness" after all. :) > > Good, we're all agreed here. > > S:> > What is meant by consciousness (citta or vi~n~naana) is seeing, > > hearing, > > > smelling, tasting, touching (through the body-sense) and mind- door > > > experiencing. > > > E:> I don't quite take away this interpretation from the Maha- > > Satipatthana Sutta: > > S:Hopefully my posts to Rob E have clarified;-) ` citte > cittaanupassi....viharati' - he lives contemplating consciousness in > consciousness. I've personally found it really helps to consider any sutta in > the light of other suttas, the abhidhamma and commentary notes, but I know this > is all controversial;-)) > > > > "And how does a monk remain focused on the mind in & of itself? There > > is the case where a monk, when the mind has passion, discerns that > > the mind has passion. When the mind is without passion, he discerns > > that the mind is without passion. When the mind has aversion, he > > discerns that the mind has aversion. When the mind is without > > aversion, he discerns that the mind is without aversion. When the > > mind has delusion, he discerns that the mind has delusion. When the > > mind is without delusion, he discerns that the mind is without > > delusion. > > > > > S: > > One doesn't go about anything, > > > E:> Not even "remaining focused" as the Buddha enjoined? Do you mean we > > just sit here like lumps? > > S:The translation for this section by Soma Thera starts: > > "And how, O bhikkhus, does a bhikkhu live contemplating consciousness in > conciousness?" > " Here, o bhikkhus, a bhikkhu understands the consciousness with lust; the > conciousness without lust, as without lust; the consciousness with hate, as > with hate............" > > By contemplating consciousness (cittanupassanaa) is meant sati (awareness) of > the cittas discussed. There is no self to remain focussed or to sit like = a lump > except in the world of pa~n~natti (concepts). > > > S:> > but at this moment there is the experiencing of visible object in > > front of us. > > > E:> Agreed, but how, specifically, does merely knowing this fact engender > > mindfulness and concentration to the degree we can penetrate the > > characteristics of what we're seeing? > > S:Again, we don't penetrate anything. It may seem, like you were saying to Dan, > that we're arguing about semantics, but like he expressed so clearly, these are > very important distinctions. By beginning to understand more precisely the > difference between concepts and realities now, by knowing more and more what > the objects of sati (awareness) are, by realizing there is nothing at all= to be > done by you or me, no method to follow at all, sati can and will begin to be > aware of these same realities and panna (understanding) will begin to know or > penetrate the characteristics. If there is doubt about this (or anything = else) > or attachment to results (or anything else), these are also realities which can > be known as they arise now. > > E:> I agree that knowing how things are not "self" is critical, and the > > bare beginning point in discerning realities as they are. Unless we > > understand this fact we are liable to interpret what we see as > > permanent, or desirable, for example. But this is only the barest > > beginning point as I understand it. There has to be more, because I > > cannot see how merely knowing this fact (like knowing that the birth > > and death of an self-entity are ultimately illusory) does anything to > > help terminate birth and death. If it were this simple, I am sure > > we'd all be arahats by now. > > S:I think it's simple and not simple. It's simple in that nothing has to = be > done > or changed. Realities are already arising and falling away and when awareness > begins to be aware of them, it's not a matter of changing them or leading a > different lifestyle at all. It's not simple because although we repeat th= at > these realities are not self and so on, there is no understanding at all = of > what this means if there isn't any understanding now of the reality appearing, > whether it is seeing, visible object, doubt or attachment . > > > S:> > I can't find any contradiction. By states or objects are meant > > these same > > > realities found in the Satipatthana Sutta (and all the other > > suttas) such > > as > > > seeing, visible object, hearing, sound and so on. > > > E:> Where are these items mentioned specifically in the Satipatthana > > Sutta and "all the other suttas" other than by implication? Again, > > the objects I see mentioned in the Satipatthana Sutta include > > specific parts of the body, specific feelings, specific > > characteristics of the mind, specific mental qualities with reference > > (does "Frame of Reference" have any bearing here?) to the five > > hindrances, the five aggregates, the six sense-bases, the seven > > factors of awakening, the Four Noble Truths. > > S:Let me know if this still isn't clear after my posts to Rob E. All realities > are included at least twice over as I read it. The same realities are > discussed over and over in the suttas. In the Samyutta Nikaya (Kindred > Sayings), Salayatana-vagga, there are many suttas which discuss the `6 worlds' > and the 'All'. In First Fifty, Ch 111, par 25 we read: > > `The eye, monks, must be abandoned by fully knowing, by fully comprehending it. > Objects..eye-consciousness..eye-contact..that pleasant feeling, unpleasant > feeling or neutral feeling..that also must be abandoned by fully knowing , by > fully comprehending it. > > The mind..mind-states..that pleasant feeling, unpleasant feeling or neutral > feeling..that also must be abandoned by fully knowing it, by comprehending it.' > > > E:> Other than merely knowing that what we observe arises is not self, it > > doesn't follow that merely being aware of this in theory has any > > bearing on seeing deeply enough into the true nature of things that > > this bringe about the end of suffering. There have to be objects to > > apply this understanding to, so that we come to directly see the > > characteristics of these objects as impermanent, suffering, and not- > > self. > > S:Exactly so, and this is why your questions here about the objects of > satipatthana are exactly the questions many of us have been waiting quite a > long time for you to ask;-)) > > E:> I have not forgotten, but that is not what I am driving at. Again, I = > > question how merely knowing this factually is conducive of the sort > > of concentration needed to penetrate the characteristics of these > > things at all. Again, without an object, there is nothing for sati to > > focus on. And the most important factor in mindfulness is remaining > > focused. This is the basis for sampajana (clear comprehension) and > > sati (mindfulness). Without this deliberate concentration (at least > > at first, until it is so well-established it becomes automatic), the > > mind will never be concentrated enough to penetrate the > > characteristics of anything, because it won't have any object to in > > which it sees these characteristics reflected, being so scattered and > > heedless it flits from one thing to another without ever "sinking in" > > deeply enough to know what it is perceiving with clarity and > > discernment. > > S:I'd say, forget about this deliberate concentration, `sinking in' and > focussing. They are all accompanied by a subtle idea of self `trying to do'. > Understanding is the key. If there is minding about the object, it shows the > attachment rather than the understanding. Concentration (ekaggata cetasika) as > we've discussed before, will in any case arise with every citta and when there > is a wholesome citta, concentration will be wholesome anyway, assisting the > other cetasikas and citta by being one-pointed on the object or 'welding > together the co-existent states' at that moment. As the citta falls away = in an > instant (right now), concentration falls away with it. It doesn't make it= last > longer. > > > E:> and it takes enormous discipline to practice to > > develop awareness and clear comprehension to the point they remain > > focused for extended periods of time--which is the prerequisite for > > penetrating the characteristics of any object being noted. > > S:Does it? Is it? > > > E:> Mindfulness can only be aware of one object at a time. > > S:True. It lasts for an instant and then gone! > > E:It may get > > more refined and be able to switch very quickly between different > > objects the more developed it is, but it is not possible for the mind > > to focus on more than one thing at a time, which is why the exercises > > in the Satipatthana Sutta detail various objects and how they are > > best investigated. What is again unclear from your presentation is > > how this degree of focus is established in the first place. > > S:I don't find any exercises in the Sutta and I think it's more interesting to > understand what awareness is and what the objects are rather than focussing. > > > E:> Right, but it doesn't just happen just from studying texts, but by > > deliberately noting specific feelings arising and passing away. > > S:Being aware rather than deliberately noting with attachment. > > E:> Knowing what these objects of investigation are is the first step, > > the barest beginning, as I see it. > > S:YES! > > > Sarah 10041 From: m. nease Date: Sat Dec 15, 2001 3:21pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Ultimate realities (and khandhas) Jon, I must agree with Howard--I see no pu×~n~na in this sort of thing whatever. mike --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Jon - > > In a message dated 12/15/01 2:50:58 AM Eastern > Standard Time, > jonoabb@y... writes: > > > > > > This post, the previous one and the next 1 or 2 > all deal with 'khandhas'. > > Must be that khandha day. > > > ============================== > Argh!! I now insist that you, as list owner, > commence monitoring your > own posts so that there be no further abuse of this > sort!! ;-)) > > With metta, > Howard > 10042 From: m. nease Date: Sat Dec 15, 2001 3:39pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Ultimate realities (and khandhas) Hi Howard, --- upasaka@a... wrote: > jonoabb@y... writes: > > > Rupas are not the same as physical objects. > "Physical objects" are not > > dhammas in any sense, but are the terms in which > we think about particular > > agglomerations of rupas. > > > ============================= > I think this is an important matter. > "Physical objects" are the > imagined external entities that are referenced by > those mental constructs, > conglomerations of rupas, which *I* mean by > concepts. The physical objects > have only conventional existence, though they are > based on genuine > observation of rupas and relations among rupas. > Imagined external entities, > of course, can not be directly examined, by wisdom > or anything else. However, > those *thoughts* which I call concepts, *are* > directly observable. It seems > to me that you (and Nina and Khun Sujin) use the > term 'concept' to refer to > the *referents* of constructed thought, whereas I > use the term 'concept' to > refer to the thought, itself, something which I > think *does* fall under the > 4th foundation of mindfulness. I agree that this is important. I'm not very clear myself on the differences between vitakka, vicaara and pa.n.natti. As I understand it, the two former are (naama) dhammas, each with its particular sabhaava, and as such can be satipa.t.thaanas; where as the latter is not considered a dhamma because it doesn't 'possess' sabhaava, doesn't arise and subside in the same sense that a dhamma does and cannot be satipa.t.thaana. So a 'thought' does fall under the 4th foundation, if by ' thought', 'vitakka' or' vicaara' is meant--that is (as I understand it) a moment of initial or sustained thought. A concept or idea though, doesn't. This is similar, I think, to the way that a ruupadhamma does fall under the 1st foundation while 'body' (a concept) doesn't. Make sense to you? mike 10043 From: Date: Sat Dec 15, 2001 10:39am Subject: What is Concentration Actually? Hi, all - Some more thoughts on another topic. When meditating, whether for samatha bhavana or vipassana bhavana, part of the process is the development of (increased) concentration. I have been wondering exactly what concentration *is* from the Abhidhamma perspective. It seems that in the course of our experience there is a constant arising (and ceasing) of arammanas, varying arammanas through the same and through differing sense doors, occurring, I should think, in a kind of time-sharing fashion, with the mind shuttling back and forth among the various objects. Would concentration then consist in a reduction of that shuttling, a reduction of the number of differing objects observed, the limit of such being the reduction to a single arammana? With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 10044 From: Date: Sat Dec 15, 2001 10:46am Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts) Hi, Robert - In a message dated 12/15/01 3:00:35 PM Eastern Standard Time, epsteinrob@Y... writes: > > --- upasaka@a... wrote: > > Hi, Rob - > > > > In a message dated 12/15/01 3:40:03 AM Eastern Standard Time, > > epsteinrob@Y... writes: > > > > > > > In the second sutta you referred me to, he says: 'One must be the > > > controller of > > > oneself; who else would be the controller?' making a definite reference > to > > > one > > > being able to develop control over one's own activities. If this does > not > > > imply a > > > true self who is able to establish this control, then what does it > mean? > > > > > > > > ============================== > > It's just a manner of speaking, Rob, much like telling somebody: > "Get > > yourself in hand; no one else can do that for you!" > > That may be so, Howard, but I believe that there are several of our friends > here > who have said that Buddha never actually made conventional statements and > that > they should not be take as prescriptions. So it's a bit of puzzle how else > one > would see this. > > If they are not conventional statements, which would be meaningless if one > were > not able to do anything about them, since we have no control, then it also > seems > to me that it is saying more than this, and referring to will in some way. > To say > one is the controller of oneself points to a sort of mechanism that > accomplishes > things through intention. Why would the Buddha say this if it would cause > no > possible result? > > Best, > Robert Ep. > > ================================ Well, regardless of what may be the opinion of some in this regard, it is obvious to me that the Buddha spoke conventionally *most* of the time. And this is especially so when he used terms like 'oneself'. I suppose you are writing here what you are writing in an attempt to show that, in fact, the Buddha did speak conventionally much of the time. But, for me, that is crystal clear and really requires little proof. ;-) With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 10045 From: Victor Yu Date: Sat Dec 15, 2001 3:52pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts) Hello Robert, Please note that both the term "one" and the term "self" are used as pronouns. Please consider Argument A: Premise A1: If form is not self, then it is not possible for form to say 'Let this form be thus. Let this form not be thus.' Premise A2: Form is not self. Conclusion: Therefore, it is not possible for form to say 'Let this form be thus. Let this form not be thus.' Given p: form is not self. q: it is not possible for form to say 'Let this form be thus. Let this form not be thus.' If p, then q. p. Therefore, q. Argument A is a valid argument. Please consider Argument B Premise B1. If form is self, then it is possible for form to say 'Let this form be thus. Let this form not be thus.' Premise B2. It is not possible for form to say ''Let this form be thus. Let this form not be thus." Conclusion: Therefore, form is not self. Given p: form is self. q: it is possible for form to say 'Let this form be thus. Let this form not be thus.' If p, then q. not q. Therefore, not p. Argument B is also a valid argument. Let's examine Argument C: Premise C1. If form is self, then it is possible for form to say 'Let this form be thus. Let this form not be thus.' Premise C2. It is not possible for one to say ''Let this form be thus. Let this form not be thus." Conclusion: Therefore, form is not self. Given p: form is self. q: it is possible for form to say 'Let this form be thus. Let this form not be thus.' r: it is possible for one to say ''Let this form be thus. Let this form not be thus." If p, then q. not r. Therefore, not p. Argument C is an invalid argument. Please note how similar statement q and statement r is. Regards, Victor ----- Original Message ----- From: "Robert Epstein" To: Sent: Saturday, December 15, 2001 2:52 PM Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts) > > --- Victor Yu wrote: > > Hello Robert, > > > > Yes, one can control oneself. > > > > If form were self, it would be possible for FORM to say 'Let this form be > > thus. Let this form not be thus.' However, precisely because form is not > > self, it is not possible for FORM to say 'Let this form be thus. Let this > > form not be thus.' > > > > Please note that form is not self does not imply whether it is possible or > > not for ONE to say 'Let this form be thus. Let this form not be thus.' > > > > Regards, > > Victor > > Dear Victor, > Well, then, if ONE were to say 'Let this form be thus' and it would accord, then > would ONE be the self? If self can control any dhammas, it would not fall into > the category of being impermanent and unsatisfactory. One would have defeated > dukkha. So I would say that one can provisional exercise self-control, but that > perhaps the idea that ONE is doing this is an illusion. > > Best, > Robert Ep. > 10046 From: Victor Yu Date: Sat Dec 15, 2001 3:59pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts) Hello Howard, I would not say that Right View in the Noble Eightfold Path is inadequate. Regards, Victor ----- Original Message ----- From: To: Sent: Saturday, December 15, 2001 3:25 PM Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts) > Hi, Victor - > > In a message dated 12/15/01 1:58:30 PM Eastern Standard Time, > victoryu@s... writes: > > > > > > Hello Howard and all, > > > > If one sees that any view is inadequate, then I am not sure how one would > > see the Right View in the Noble Eightfold Path. > > > > Regards, > > Victor > > > ========================= > As I see it, even right view is inadequate compared to direct > *knowing*, to wisdom. > > With metta, > Howard > 10047 From: Date: Sat Dec 15, 2001 11:28am Subject: Re: [dsg] Ultimate realities (and khandhas) Hi, Mike - In a message dated 12/15/01 6:40:42 PM Eastern Standard Time, mlnease@y... writes: > So a 'thought' does fall under the 4th foundation, if > by > ' thought', 'vitakka' or' vicaara' is meant--that is > (as I understand it) a moment of initial or sustained > thought. A concept or idea though, doesn't. This is > similar, I think, to the way that a ruupadhamma does > fall under the 1st foundation while 'body' (a concept) > doesn't. > > Make sense to you? > > mike > > ============================== Makes great sense to me. With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 10048 From: Date: Sat Dec 15, 2001 11:37am Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts) Hi, Victor - In a message dated 12/15/01 7:01:33 PM Eastern Standard Time, victoryu@s... writes: > Hello Howard, > > I would not say that Right View in the Noble Eightfold Path is inadequate. > > Regards, > Victor > ============================ If Right View = wisdom (or *direct knowing* of the way things are), I agree. But if Right View = correct opinion, I disagree. Perhaps if we agree on terminology, we might also agree on content. With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 10049 From: Ven. Bhikkhu Dhammapiyo Date: Sat Dec 15, 2001 1:42pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts) It takes practice! The intellect is not wholly capable of realizing the benefits. Without Right Understanding put into practice there is no right view to be garnered as an experience! ----- Original Message ----- From: "Victor Yu" To: Sent: Saturday, December 15, 2001 1:56 PM Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts) > Hello Howard and all, > > If one sees that any view is inadequate, then I am not sure how one would > see the Right View in the Noble Eightfold Path. > > Regards, > Victor > > 10050 From: rikpa21 Date: Sat Dec 15, 2001 6:38pm Subject: Re: What is Concentration Actually? --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, all - > > Some more thoughts on another topic. When meditating, whether for > samatha bhavana or vipassana bhavana, part of the process is the development > of (increased) concentration. I have been wondering exactly what > concentration *is* from the Abhidhamma perspective. It seems that in the > course of our experience there is a constant arising (and ceasing) of > arammanas, varying arammanas through the same and through differing sense > doors, occurring, I should think, in a kind of time-sharing fashion, with the > mind shuttling back and forth among the various objects. Would concentration > then consist in a reduction of that shuttling, a reduction of the number of > differing objects observed, the limit of such being the reduction to a single > arammana? Speaking as perhaps the lone samatha-yanika meditator here, I can say from experience that the diferrence between the sort of concentration needed to fulfill Right Concentration as I understand it (and it tool a LOT of practice to get to the point to where concentration was firmly established in the sense that the mind remained fixed on an arammana and apanna arose) and the normal sort of samadhi that (may) arise in day-to-day life through concentrating on random object arising through thes sense-doors to be as big as the difference distance between Heaven and Earth. 10051 From: rikpa21 Date: Sat Dec 15, 2001 7:04pm Subject: [dsg] Re: The noble nine fold path - Erik Hi Joe, > One night I was sitting in meditation outside in the open air -- > my back straight as an arrow -- firmly determined to make the mind > quiet, Ho! Ho! Ho! :) :) :) I RESOLVE TOP STOP MAKING MY MIND WANDER! (hee hee hee)! Sorry, couldn't resist chuckling at that one! :) I know, I've been there, I call it the the Gritting the Teeth approach. > but even after a long time it wouldn't settle down. So I > thought, "I've been working at this for many days now, and yet my > mind > won't settle down at all. It's time to stop being so determined and to > simply be aware of the mind." Aaah. You know what the trick was for me? I recalled one meditation instrutor once telling me "it's as easy as falling of a log!" (I'm thinking BUT BUT BUT, I've TRIED all this time and NOTHING!). Okay then. No big deal. The mind wanders, let it go. Oh, it wandered, okay, bring it back. There it goes again, off into the forest, swinging vine-to-vine, no big deal. And you know what? The mind just amazingly settled down, RIGHT THERE. As easy as falling off a log! > Then there arose an awareness that was sustained by itself. Indeed. In my case, that awareness became brighter and brighter, more and more powerful. All of a sudden this struggling meditator was sitting in equipoise and the mind locked effortlessly onto the breath and its arising and passing away. It was a watershed moment in my meditation! All that striving, gritting the teeth trying to FORCE the mind to concengratate, and yet this simple letting go of all expectation just brought it all together. Go figure! > Slowly I put my legs and hands back into position. At the same time, > the mind was in a state of awareness absolutely and solidly still, > seeing clearly into the elementary phenomena of existence as they > arose and disbanded, changing in line with their nature -- and also > seeing a separate condition inside, with no arising, disbanding, or > changing, a condition beyond birth and death: something very difficult > to put clearly into words, because it was a realization of the > elementary phenomena of nature, completely internal and individual. This is as is should be. > > After a while I slowly got up and lay down to rest. This state of > mind remained there as a stillness that sustained itself deep down > inside. Eventually the mind came out of this state and gradually > returned to normal. Now do this every day for at least one hour without missing a day and the mind will never return to "normal." Of ourse I say this in total hypocrisy since I haven't meditated like this for quite some time now, being focused instead of learning to endure what is difficult to endure and maintain equanimity in the face of trouble outside of meditation (though I am sure an hour a day would help immensely, and my wife insists we meditatate an hour together each so I have to take her up on it). > From this I was able to observe how practice consisting of > nothing but fierce desire simply upsets the mind and keeps it from > being still. And yet, there must be a fierce, unshakeable reseolve all the same. It's a different sort of determination, but the desire you mention sounds like a desire for *results* in meditation, not the desire that compels one to sit on the cushion each and every day, without fail. Big difference between the two. But when one's awareness of the mind is just right, an > inner awareness will arise naturally of its own accord. Indeed, indeed! :) That lute-string analogy again. Cheers, Erik 10052 From: Victor Yu Date: Sat Dec 15, 2001 10:41pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts) Hello Howard, I don't see Right View in the Noble Eightfold Path as inadequate, and I wouldn't say it is inadequate. Regards, Victor ----- Original Message ----- From: To: Sent: Saturday, December 15, 2001 7:37 PM Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts) > Hi, Victor - > > In a message dated 12/15/01 7:01:33 PM Eastern Standard Time, > victoryu@s... writes: > > > > Hello Howard, > > > > I would not say that Right View in the Noble Eightfold Path is inadequate. > > > > Regards, > > Victor > > > ============================ > If Right View = wisdom (or *direct knowing* of the way things are), I > agree. But if Right View = correct opinion, I disagree. Perhaps if we agree > on terminology, we might also agree on content. > > With metta, > Howard 10053 From: Robert Epstein Date: Sat Dec 15, 2001 11:48pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The noble nine fold path - Erik great! Robert Ep. ====== --- lpjoe wrote: > Sarah & Erik > > I've been following your volley with interest, while reading some short > works by Upasika Kee Nanayon (1902-1978), one of the most respected > women dhamma teachers in Thailand. I was wondering if the following > excerpts from Upasika's LOOKING INWARD: Observations on the Art of > Meditation, bear on the discussion at all. > > I may have accidentally posted this msg twice - my apologies if so. > > Joe > > THE PURE PRESENT > > We have to catch sight of the sensation of knowing when the mind > gains knowledge of anything and yet isn't aware of itself, to see how > it latches onto things -- physical form, feeling, perceptions, > thought-formations, and consciousness. We have to probe on in and > look > on our own. We can't use the teachings we've memorized to catch > sight > of these things. That won't get us anywhere at all. We may remember, > "The body is inconstant," but even though we can say it, we can't see > it. > > We have to focus on in to see exactly //how// the body is > inconstant, to see how it changes. And we have to focus on feelings -- > pleasant, painful, and neutral -- to see how they change. The same > holds true with perceptions, thought-formations, and so forth: We have > to focus on them, investigate them, contemplate them to see their > characteristics //as they actually are//. Even if you can see these > things for only a moment, it'll do you a world of good. You'll be able > to catch yourself: The things you thought you knew, you didn't really > know at all....This is why the knowledge we gain in the practice has > to keep changing through many, many levels. It doesn't stay on just > one level. > > So even when you're able to know arising and disbanding with > every moment right in the present: If your contemplation isn't > continuous, it won't be very clear. > > You have to know how to contemplate the bare sensation of arising > and disbanding, simply arising and disbanding, without any labels of > "good" or "bad." Just keep with the pure sensation of arising and > disbanding. When you do this, other things will come to intrude -- but > no matter how they intrude, it's still a matter of arising and > disbanding, so you can keep your stance with arising and disbanding in > this way. > > If you start labeling things, it gets confusing. All you need to > do is keep looking at the right spot: the bare sensation of arising > and disbanding. Simply make sure you really keep watch of it. Whether > there's awareness of sights, sounds, smells, tastes, or tactile > sensations, just stay with the sensation of arising and disbanding. > Don't go labeling the sight, sound, smell, taste, or tactile > sensation. If you can keep watch in this way, you're with the pure > present -- and there won't be any issues. > > When you keep watch in this way, you're keeping watch on > inconstancy, on change, as it actually occurs -- because even the > arising and disbanding changes. It's not the same thing arising and > disbanding all the time. First this sort of sensation arises and > disbands, then that sort arises and disbands. If you keep watch on > bare arising and disbanding like this, you're sure to arrive at > insight. But if you keep watch with labels -- "That's the sound of a > cow," "That's the bark of a dog" -- you won't be watching the bare > sensation of sound, the bare sensation of arising and disbanding. As > soon as there's labeling, thought-formations come along with it. Your > senses of touch, sight, hearing, and so forth will continue their bare > arising and disbanding, but you won't know it. Instead, you'll label > everything: sights, sounds, etc., and then there will be attachments, > feelings of pleasure and displeasure, and you won't know the truth. > > The truth keeps going along on its own. Sensations keep arising > and then disbanding. If we focus right here -- at the consciousness of > the bare sensation of sights, sounds, smells, tastes, and tactile > sensations, then we'll be able to gain insight quickly.... > > If we know how to observe things in this way, we'll be able to > see easily when the mind is provoked by passion or greed, and even > more easily when it's provoked by anger. As for delusion, that's > something more subtle...something you have to take a great interest in > and investigate carefully. You'll come to see all sorts of hidden > things -- how the mind is covered with many, many layers of film. It's > really fascinating. But then that's what insight meditation is for -- > to open our eyes so that we can know and see, so that we can destroy > our delusion and ignorance. > > June 3, 1964 > > ------------ > > One night I was sitting in meditation outside in the open air -- > my back straight as an arrow -- firmly determined to make the mind > quiet, but even after a long time it wouldn't settle down. So I > thought, "I've been working at this for many days now, and yet my > mind > won't settle down at all. It's time to stop being so determined and to > simply be aware of the mind." I started to take my hands and feet out > of the meditation posture, but at the moment I had unfolded one leg > but had yet to unfold the other, I could see that my mind was like a > pendulum swinging more and more slowly, more and more slowly -- > until > it stopped. > > Then there arose an awareness that was sustained by itself. > Slowly I put my legs and hands back into position. At the same time, > the mind was in a state of awareness absolutely and solidly still, > seeing clearly into the elementary phenomena of existence as they > arose and disbanded, changing in line with their nature -- and also > seeing a separate condition inside, with no arising, disbanding, or > changing, a condition beyond birth and death: something very difficult > to put clearly into words, because it was a realization of the > elementary phenomena of nature, completely internal and individual. > > After a while I slowly got up and lay down to rest. This state of > mind remained there as a stillness that sustained itself deep down > inside. Eventually the mind came out of this state and gradually > returned to normal. > > From this I was able to observe how practice consisting of > nothing but fierce desire simply upsets the mind and keeps it from > being still. But when one's awareness of the mind is just right, an > inner awareness will arise naturally of its own accord. Because of > this clear inner awareness, I was able to continue knowing the facts > of what's true and false, right and wrong from that point on, and it > enabled me to know that the moment when the mind let go of > everything > was a clear awareness of the elementary phenomena of nature, > because > it was an awareness that knew within and saw within of its own accord > -- not something you can know or see by wanting. > > For this reason the Buddha's teaching, //"Sabbe dhamma anatta// > -- All phenomena are not-self," tells us not to latch onto //any// of > the phenomena of nature, whether conditioned or unconditioned. From > that point on I was able to understand things and let go of > attachments step by step. 10054 From: Robert Epstein Date: Sat Dec 15, 2001 11:55pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts) --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Robert - > > In a message dated 12/15/01 3:00:35 PM Eastern Standard Time, > epsteinrob@Y... writes: > > > > > > --- upasaka@a... wrote: > > > Hi, Rob - > > > > > > In a message dated 12/15/01 3:40:03 AM Eastern Standard Time, > > > epsteinrob@Y... writes: > > > > > > > > > > In the second sutta you referred me to, he says: 'One must be the > > > > controller of > > > > oneself; who else would be the controller?' making a definite reference > > to > > > > one > > > > being able to develop control over one's own activities. If this does > > not > > > > imply a > > > > true self who is able to establish this control, then what does it > > mean? > > > > > > > > > > > ============================== > > > It's just a manner of speaking, Rob, much like telling somebody: > > "Get > > > yourself in hand; no one else can do that for you!" > > > > That may be so, Howard, but I believe that there are several of our friends > > here > > who have said that Buddha never actually made conventional statements and > > that > > they should not be take as prescriptions. So it's a bit of puzzle how else > > one > > would see this. > > > > If they are not conventional statements, which would be meaningless if one > > were > > not able to do anything about them, since we have no control, then it also > > seems > > to me that it is saying more than this, and referring to will in some way. > > To say > > one is the controller of oneself points to a sort of mechanism that > > accomplishes > > things through intention. Why would the Buddha say this if it would cause > > no > > possible result? > > > > Best, > > Robert Ep. > > > > > ================================ > Well, regardless of what may be the opinion of some in this regard, it > is obvious to me that the Buddha spoke conventionally *most* of the time. And > this is especially so when he used terms like 'oneself'. > I suppose you are writing here what you are writing in an attempt to > show that, in fact, the Buddha did speak conventionally much of the time. > But, for me, that is crystal clear and really requires little proof. ;-) Hi Howard. One assumes that 'oneself' must be used conventionally, since we assume that Buddha would not invoke the existence of a personal 'self'. It is clear that 'oneself' must mean something, therefore it must be conventional use or else must be the invocation of a personal self. I agree that it is most likely conventional speech, but if that is the case, he is basically giving prescriptions for behavior or pep talks for practitioners of a certain level. This seems to me to undercut the notion that conventional effort and exercise of will has no effect on the practitioner. Best, Robert Ep. 10055 From: Robert Epstein Date: Sat Dec 15, 2001 11:59pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The noble nine fold path - Erik Dear Joe and Eric, Thank you both for a wonderful discourse. Robert Ep. ======== --- rikpa21 wrote: > Hi Joe, > > > One night I was sitting in meditation outside in the open air -- > > my back straight as an arrow -- firmly determined to make the > mind > > quiet, > > Ho! Ho! Ho! :) :) :) I RESOLVE TOP STOP MAKING MY MIND WANDER! (hee > hee hee)! Sorry, couldn't resist chuckling at that one! :) I know, > I've been there, I call it the the Gritting the Teeth approach. > > > but even after a long time it wouldn't settle down. So I > > thought, "I've been working at this for many days now, and yet > my > > mind > > won't settle down at all. It's time to stop being so determined > and to > > simply be aware of the mind." > > Aaah. You know what the trick was for me? I recalled one meditation > instrutor once telling me "it's as easy as falling of a log!" (I'm > thinking BUT BUT BUT, I've TRIED all this time and NOTHING!). > > Okay then. No big deal. The mind wanders, let it go. Oh, it > wandered, okay, bring it back. There it goes again, off into the > forest, swinging vine-to-vine, no big deal. And you know what? The > mind just amazingly settled down, RIGHT THERE. As easy as falling > off a log! > > > Then there arose an awareness that was sustained by itself. > > Indeed. In my case, that awareness became brighter and brighter, > more and more powerful. All of a sudden this struggling meditator > was sitting in equipoise and the mind locked effortlessly onto the > breath and its arising and passing away. It was a watershed moment > in my meditation! All that striving, gritting the teeth trying to > FORCE the mind to concengratate, and yet this simple letting go of > all expectation just brought it all together. Go figure! > > > Slowly I put my legs and hands back into position. At the same > time, > > the mind was in a state of awareness absolutely and solidly > still, > > seeing clearly into the elementary phenomena of existence as > they > > arose and disbanded, changing in line with their nature -- and > also > > seeing a separate condition inside, with no arising, disbanding, > or > > changing, a condition beyond birth and death: something very > difficult > > to put clearly into words, because it was a realization of the > > elementary phenomena of nature, completely internal and > individual. > > This is as is should be. > > > > > After a while I slowly got up and lay down to rest. This > state of > > mind remained there as a stillness that sustained itself deep > down > > inside. Eventually the mind came out of this state and gradually > > returned to normal. > > Now do this every day for at least one hour without missing a day > and the mind will never return to "normal." Of ourse I say this in > total hypocrisy since I haven't meditated like this for quite some > time now, being focused instead of learning to endure what is > difficult to endure and maintain equanimity in the face of trouble > outside of meditation (though I am sure an hour a day would help > immensely, and my wife insists we meditatate an hour together each > so I have to take her up on it). > > > From this I was able to observe how practice consisting of > > nothing but fierce desire simply upsets the mind and keeps it > from > > being still. > > And yet, there must be a fierce, unshakeable reseolve all the same. > It's a different sort of determination, but the desire you mention > sounds like a desire for *results* in meditation, not the desire > that compels one to sit on the cushion each and every day, without > fail. Big difference between the two. > > But when one's awareness of the mind is just right, an > > inner awareness will arise naturally of its own accord. > > Indeed, indeed! :) That lute-string analogy again. > > Cheers, > Erik 10056 From: Victor Yu Date: Sun Dec 16, 2001 0:00am Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts) Hello Robert, Howard, and all, If the Buddha used two kinds of speeches, conventional and non-conventional, I would be interested in knowing some examples of non-conventional speech that the Buddha used. Thank you in advance. Regards, Victor > > Well, regardless of what may be the opinion of some in this regard, it > > is obvious to me that the Buddha spoke conventionally *most* of the time. And > > this is especially so when he used terms like 'oneself'. > > I suppose you are writing here what you are writing in an attempt to > > show that, in fact, the Buddha did speak conventionally much of the time. > > But, for me, that is crystal clear and really requires little proof. ;-) > > Hi Howard. > One assumes that 'oneself' must be used conventionally, since we assume that > Buddha would not invoke the existence of a personal 'self'. It is clear that > 'oneself' must mean something, therefore it must be conventional use or else must > be the invocation of a personal self. > > I agree that it is most likely conventional speech, but if that is the case, he is > basically giving prescriptions for behavior or pep talks for practitioners of a > certain level. This seems to me to undercut the notion that conventional effort > and exercise of will has no effect on the practitioner. > > Best, > Robert Ep. 10057 From: egberdina Date: Sun Dec 16, 2001 3:07am Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts) Dear Victor, If I understand you correctly, than these are the axioms on which your rejection of the application of self/ not-self to anything at all is based: Self is permanent. and Self is it's own object. If this is how you define self, then I agree with you. Nothing fits the bill. Empty set. I am sure that defining non-existing things and then saying that these things don't exist has been a pleasant pastime for thousands of millenia :-). All the best Herman --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "Victor Yu" wrote: > Hello Robert, > > Please note that both the term "one" and the term "self" are used as > pronouns. > > Please consider Argument A: > Premise A1: If form is not self, then it is not possible for form to say > 'Let this form be thus. Let this form not be thus.' > Premise A2: Form is not self. > Conclusion: Therefore, it is not possible for form to say 'Let this form be > thus. Let this form not be thus.' > > Given > p: form is not self. > q: it is not possible for form to say 'Let this form be thus. Let this form > not be thus.' > > If p, then q. > p. > Therefore, q. > > Argument A is a valid argument. > > > Please consider Argument B > Premise B1. If form is self, then it is possible for form to say 'Let this > form be thus. Let this form not be thus.' > Premise B2. It is not possible for form to say ''Let this form be thus. Let > this form not be thus." > Conclusion: Therefore, form is not self. > > Given > p: form is self. > q: it is possible for form to say 'Let this form be thus. Let this form not > be thus.' > > If p, then q. > not q. > Therefore, not p. > > Argument B is also a valid argument. > > > Let's examine Argument C: > Premise C1. If form is self, then it is possible for form to say 'Let this > form be thus. Let this form not be thus.' > Premise C2. It is not possible for one to say ''Let this form be thus. Let > this form not be thus." > Conclusion: Therefore, form is not self. > > Given > p: form is self. > q: it is possible for form to say 'Let this form be thus. Let this form not > be thus.' > r: it is possible for one to say ''Let this form be thus. Let this form not > be thus." > > If p, then q. > not r. > Therefore, not p. > > Argument C is an invalid argument. Please note how similar statement q and > statement r is. > > > Regards, > Victor 10058 From: jonoabb Date: Sun Dec 16, 2001 5:14am Subject: Re: [dsg] Eightfold Path (esp. right view) Hi All First, a clarification of the reference to 'CMA' in my earlier post. 'CMA' here is a reference to the Bhikkhu Bodhi translation of the Abhidhammattha Sangaha titled 'A Comprehensive Manual of Abhidhamma' and published by the BPS. (The 'Guide' sections are compiled from, but are not a direct translation of, the main commentaries to the A-S.) My apologies for not including these details in the original post. Secondly, a follow-up. The passage from CMA continues with a useful description of the difference between mundane jhana moments (i.e. jhana consciousness resulting from the development of samatha) and Eightfold Path moments (i.e. the supramundane consciousness arising at a moment of enlightenment). This follows the comment in the earlier passage that for every attainer to the Eightfold Path, whether 'bare insight' attainer (i.e. without mundane jhana) or otherwise, all supramundane path moments are considered types of jhana consciousness "because they occur in the mode of closely contemplating their object with full absorption, like the mundane jhanas, and because they possess the jhana factors with an intensity corresponding to their counterparts in the mundane jhanas". I find interesting the differences that are noted in the passage, which I have pasted below. To me they certainly do not suggest any *necessary* connection between mundane jhana and the moment of path consciousness. Jon CMA Ch. I, Guide to ##30-31 The supramundane jhanas of the paths and fruits differ from the mundane jhanas in several important respects. [5] First, whereas the mundane jhanas take as their object some concept, such as the sign of the kasina, the supramundane jhanas take as their object Nibbana, the unconditioned reality. [5.1] Second, whereas the mundane jhanas merely suppress the defilements while leaving their underlying seeds intact, the supramundane jhanas of the path eradicate defilements so that they can never again arise. [5.2] Third, while the mundane jhanas lead to rebirth in the fine material world and thus sustain existence in the round of rebirths, the jhanas of the path cut off the fetters binding one to the cycle and thus issue in liberation from the round of birth and death. [5.3] Finally, whereas the role of wisdom in the mundane jhanas is subordinate to that of concentration, in the supramundane jhanas wisdom and concentration are well balanced, with concentration fixing the mind on the unconditioned element and wisdom fathoming the deep significance of the Four Noble Truths. [5.4] [Jon's notes:] 5. There are 4 important differences between jhana citta and the path citta – 5.1. The object of jhana citta is a concept , while the object of the moment of path citta is Nibbana. 5.2. Jhana cittas merely suppress kilesa, while magga citta eradicates kilesa. 5.3. Jhana cittas are a condition for future rebirth, whereas magga cittas result in liberation from the cycle of birth and death. 5.4. The primary attribute of a moment of jhana citta is the degree of concentration on the object at that moment, whereas the attribute of a moment of magga citta is the wisdom that pierces the Truths. --------------------------------------- > CMA Ch. I, Guide (ie. summary of commentary) to ##30-31 > > "All meditators reach the supramundane paths and fruits through the > development of wisdom (panna) – insight into the three characteristics of > impermanence, suffering, and non-self. [1] However, they differ among > themselves in the degree of their development of concentration (samadhi). > > "Those who develop insight without a basis of jhana are called > practitioners of bare insight (sukkhavipassaka). [2] When they reach the > path and fruit, their path and fruition cittas occur at a level > corresponding to the first jhana. [3] > > "Those who develop insight on the basis of jhana attain a path and fruit > which corresponds to the level of jhana they had attained before reaching > the path... > > "For bare insight meditator and jhana meditator alike, all path and > fruition cittas are considered types of jhana consciousness. They are so > considered because they occur in the mode of closely contemplating their > object with full absorption, like the mundane jhanas, and because they > possess the jhana factors with an intensity corresponding to their > counterparts in the mundane jhanas." [4] > [ends] > =================================== > > Jon's notes: > 1. It is the development of understanding of the characteristics of > reality, rather than any other factor, that brings the attainment of the > path/enlightenment/8-fold path citta (magga citta). > 2. Magga citta can be attained without the previus development of > concentration to the level of mundane jhana. > 3. However, even for the sukkhavipassaka the concentration accompanying > the moment of path citta *`corresponds to'* the first level of jhana. > 4. The concentration accompanying magga citta is said to `correspond to' > jhana because the magga citta experiences its object with same full > absorption and intensity of other factors as the jhana citta. 10059 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Sun Dec 16, 2001 5:19am Subject: Re: [dsg] Eightfold Path (esp. right effort) Rob Ep --- Robert Epstein wrote: > > Okay, I know you've talked about this many times before, but perhaps > this would be > a good time for a summary of the following, a small outline maybe: > > 1/ How does reading and understanding the suttas lead to mundane Right > View/Understanding. I liked Nina’s recent post to Herman (message #9954) on a similar question, so I won’t cover the same ground again. Suffice it to say that listening to and considering the teachings is an indispensable condition to any understanding. The reason for this, it seems to me, has as much to do with avoiding wrong understanding as ‘getting’ the right understanding. The teaching on the development of understanding is extremely subtle. > 2/ How does mundane Right View/Understanding lay the groundwork for the > Supramundane Path Factors to arise. Every moment of mundane Right View (i.e. panna of the level of satipatthana) is accompanied by other mundane factors of the Eightfold Path. These mundane path factors are accumulated and grow in strength. This is how, on my reading of the teachings, the conditions for supramundane consciousness are developed. Jon 10060 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Sun Dec 16, 2001 5:29am Subject: Re: [dsg] Commentaries (was, Cetana (volition, intention)) Rob Ep --- Robert Epstein wrote: > > To follow the process you have outlined, which seems very worthwhile, > you would: > 1/ study the texts. > 2/ attempt to ascertain as surely as possible what is actually being > said, and > what path is being mapped out with the help of commentaries and > qualified teachers > 3/ assess what we have understood via our own experience and > understanding > 4/ apply the understanding gained by the previous steps to the faithful > discernment of the moment I would like to fine-tune your 4 factors a little. I would state them as follows: 1/ The study of the texts 2/ Ascertaining as surely as possible the intended meaning of the texts (and this I believe requires association with someone who understands them correctly) 3/ Considering and reflecting on what has been read and heard 4/ Understanding how that relates to the experience of the present moment More important, however, in my view is the understanding that there is no 'process to be followed'. No, I am not trying to be a 'semantic devil' here(!), but to convey something that is very difficult to 'get' (and also that I find difficult to explain -- due no doubt to my limited grasp). Consider the difference between these 2 statements: (1) If you do A, B and C, then you will experience D. (2) D can only be experienced if factors A, B and C have been developed. The difference between the 2, which I'm sure you can appreciate, Rob, is an important one. It is my attempt at distinguishing between the factors being seen as 'things-to-do' and the same factors being regarded as things of value in their own right, worth developing, and about which we have confidence that, properly developed, will lead us in the right direction but the fruit of which will only become apparent as and when conditions that are peculiar to us allow. What I am trying to say is that there is no *perceptible, immediately obvious* connection between the necessary factors properly developed and the understanding for which these factors are an indispensible pre-condition (but then who said it was a '4-steps-to-understanding' kind of thing?). The simile given in the suttas is that of the grip marks that gradually get worn into the wooden handle of a carpenter's tool: no wearing away is ever apparent at the time, only over time and after continued use (this is the 'adze handle' simile). This lack of immediate feedback by which 'progress' can be seen and 'practice' thereby verified makes it all the more important that we have a proper understanding in the first place of what the path is as taught. Jon 10061 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Sun Dec 16, 2001 5:37am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The Two Truths (for Howard) Rob Ep --- Robert Epstein wrote: > > No, I think you're right. It suddenly seems very interesting to try to > distinguish 'looking' at the problem that is really seeing it in terms > of a > current reality, as opposed to making up a conceptual example, even > though it > imitates a reality. in our hardness discussion, I was 'imagining' an > experience > of hardness rather than actually, say, touching a table and reporting > back, and > failed to distinguish between these very different enterprises. They > seem the > same to the mind, but are not. Yes, one is purely conceptual and always so; the other may be experiential (with or without awareness, of course). The root cause of our problems is not our wrong conceptual grasp of things, but our incorrect understanding of realities. Jon 10062 From: Victor Yu Date: Sun Dec 16, 2001 5:56am Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts) Hello Herman, I was not defining nor characterizing what self is. I was not giving any axiom. I was showing two valid arguments and an invalid argument regarding how certain conclusions are reached. To reiterate the point in the previous message, please consider again this invalid argument: Premise 1: If form is self, then it is possible for form to say 'Let this form be thus. Let this form not be thus.' Premise 2: It is not possible for one to say ''Let this form be thus. Let this form not be thus." Conclusion: Therefore, form is not self. In other words, given p: form is self. q: it is possible for form to say 'Let this form be thus. Let this form not be thus.' r: it is possible for one to say ''Let this form be thus. Let this form not be thus." If p, then q. not r. Therefore, not p. In the argument above, a fallacious assumption is used, namely, (not r). This fallacious assumption (not r), which is very similar to the true premise (not q), makes the argument invalid. I am not sure what it means by rejection of the application of self/not-self to anything at all is based. I am not sure what is the purpose of defining non-existent things. Regards, Victor ----- Original Message ----- From: "egberdina" To: Sent: Sunday, December 16, 2001 6:07 AM Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts) > Dear Victor, > > If I understand you correctly, than these are the axioms on which > your rejection of the application of self/ not-self to anything at > all is based: > > Self is permanent. and > Self is it's own object. > > If this is how you define self, then I agree with you. Nothing fits > the bill. Empty set. > > I am sure that defining non-existing things and then saying that > these things don't exist has been a pleasant pastime for thousands of > millenia :-). > > All the best > > > Herman > > > > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "Victor Yu" wrote: > > Hello Robert, > > > > Please note that both the term "one" and the term "self" are used as > > pronouns. > > > > Please consider Argument A: > > Premise A1: If form is not self, then it is not possible for form > to say > > 'Let this form be thus. Let this form not be thus.' > > Premise A2: Form is not self. > > Conclusion: Therefore, it is not possible for form to say 'Let this > form be > > thus. Let this form not be thus.' > > > > Given > > p: form is not self. > > q: it is not possible for form to say 'Let this form be thus. Let > this form > > not be thus.' > > > > If p, then q. > > p. > > Therefore, q. > > > > Argument A is a valid argument. > > > > > > Please consider Argument B > > Premise B1. If form is self, then it is possible for form to > say 'Let this > > form be thus. Let this form not be thus.' > > Premise B2. It is not possible for form to say ''Let this form be > thus. Let > > this form not be thus." > > Conclusion: Therefore, form is not self. > > > > Given > > p: form is self. > > q: it is possible for form to say 'Let this form be thus. Let this > form not > > be thus.' > > > > If p, then q. > > not q. > > Therefore, not p. > > > > Argument B is also a valid argument. > > > > > > Let's examine Argument C: > > Premise C1. If form is self, then it is possible for form to > say 'Let this > > form be thus. Let this form not be thus.' > > Premise C2. It is not possible for one to say ''Let this form be > thus. Let > > this form not be thus." > > Conclusion: Therefore, form is not self. > > > > Given > > p: form is self. > > q: it is possible for form to say 'Let this form be thus. Let this > form not > > be thus.' > > r: it is possible for one to say ''Let this form be thus. Let this > form not > > be thus." > > > > If p, then q. > > not r. > > Therefore, not p. > > > > Argument C is an invalid argument. Please note how similar > statement q and > > statement r is. > > > > > > Regards, > > Victor 10063 From: abhidhammika Date: Sun Dec 16, 2001 7:10am Subject: Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein Dear Robert How are you? Thank you for your reply message. I had a chance to read your reply just now. I missed my Internet sessions previous night due to technical problems in my ISP's servers. You wrote: "Later on you say that there is a 'nullity of sensual existence'. Now to me, experience and 'sensual existence' are not synonymous." Could you please check the spelling "sensual existence"? In my post, I wrote "nullity of sentient existence", (not sensual existence). So, if your arguments in the present post were based on "nullity of sensual existence", you now may need to rewrite your arguments based on "nullity of sentient existence." I will read the rest of your present post, and other posts later. I am very sleepy now (2 a.m in Canberra). With regards, Suan --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Robert Epstein wrote: > Dear Suan, > Sorry to take so long to get back to you on this good subcommentary. > My remarks are dispersed below: > > --- abhidhammika wrote: > > > > Dear Dhamma Friends > > > > The following is the second part of Parinibbana Subcommentary written > > in response to the questions and statements of Upasaka Howard, Robert > > Epstein, and Mike Neace. In this second part of the subcommentary, I > > directly address the statements of Robert Epstein. Here, I also > > include the meaning of the last mind, which partly satisfies > > Howard's desire to know the exact meaning of consciousness. > > > > > > 1. PARINIBBANA COMMENTARY PALI > > > > "Parinibbutaa naama arahattapattito patthaaya kilesavattassa > > khepitattaa sa-upaadisesena, carimacittanirodhena khandhavattassa > > khepitattaa anupaadisesena caati dviihi parinibbaanehi > > parinibbutaa, anupaadaano viya padiipo apannattikabhaavaam gataati > > attho." > > > > "`Parinibbutaa' is the ultimate cool by means of two-way complete > > extinguishments, one with the existential residues emptied of > > defilement machinery ever since attainment of Arahatta awakening, and > > the other without the existential residues emptied of psychophysical > > machinery by termination of the last mind (the dying consciousness). > > It has the meaning of reaching the state of the undefined reality > > like the lamp without fuel." > > > > > > Carimacittanirodho – termination of the last mind > > Apannattikabhaavo - the state of undefined reality > > > > > > 2. PARINIBBANA SUBCOMMENTARY Part Two > > > > > > Robert Epstein wrote: > > > > "Well, I don't know about anyone else, but reaching the state of > > the > > undefined > > reality to me means that he has reached a state in which his reality > > is undefined > > by any remaining fragment of distinguishing consciousness, but that > > he is still > > in a state of existence in which his reality is undefined. This does > > not mean that > > there is no existent of any kind, only that all consciousness has > > been cooled > > and is no longer present. The idea of an underlying beingness or > > awareness that is > > however totally disengaged from any experience does not seem to me to > > be ruled > > out here. > > > > What puzzles me in the above paragraph is Robert's addition of > > the statement: > > > > "…but that he is still in a state of existence in which his > > reality is undefined." > > > > Buddhaghosa's explanation of `parinibbutaa' includes the > > unmistakable expression `carimacittanirodhena – by termination of the > > last mind' on the death of an Arahant. > > Let me say from the beginning here, Suan, that you are invoking the termination of > the 'last mind' as evidence that there is no remaining experience. Later on you > say that there is a 'nullity of sensual existence'. Now to me, experience and > 'sensual existence' are not synonymous. So let's start by totally agreeing that > there is no 'sensual existence' or 'sensory experience' of any kind in > parinibbana. On this I think it is absolutely clear. > > If there is *any kind* of existence in parinibbana, it would not be one that is > connected to the body or the mind. So the existence of any such experience would > indeed be a mystical state. It would be quite beyond anything that relates to > this world, to this body, mind or personality. > > now the problem that arises when i try to get into this kind of possibility, of > such a state existing fro the arahant, is that anyone who hears that assumes that > this means there must be some kind of soul, or mind or entity that is there. I > try to say that if it is existent, this parinibbanic existence would have to be a > kind of pure presence, field or aware quality, disassociated from any > individuation or subject-object differentiation. But most don't accept the > possibility that such a state can exist without the false positing of some kind of > 'self'. I myself think that such an impersonal existence of awareness is a > possibility, but I understand if you cannot take the Buddha's words to imply that. > I think that Howard, up to a point, agrees with me on this, and that it is > possible that Kenneth O. would also see this as a possibility. So to an extent it > seems to divide among those who have or have had some sympathy for the ideas of > Mahayana Buddhism and those who are strictly reading according to a Theravadin > interpretation. > > But I am trying to restrict myself to that which can be seen in the actually words > of the Buddha, as expressed in the Theravadin Suttas and commentaries. > > So that is just to be forthright about my orientation. So I would not propose > this possibility if I did not see it in the actual verses, and in fact, in this > case, in your very noble translation of the verses, which have a nice sense of > freshness and literal immediacy about them, and for which I thank you. I truly > enjoy feeling that I have gotten a bit closer to the living word of the Buddha, > even if our interpretations may diverge after that. > > So you are talking about the 'last mind' or 'sensual reality' being finally cooled > and coming to an end. > > First of all, I find the idea of these things being 'finally cooled' a wonderful > translation. Nowhere does the Buddha talk about destruction or eradication when > it comes to the final coming to rest of the experiential mechanism. > > Second of all, what you do not account for in this second sub- commentary and which > is the sole evidence for my view that there may be a state of 'non- sensual' > awareness in the parinibbanic state, is that the Buddha says that the Arahant's > final reality is 'undefined'. > > For myself, Suan, I can see absolutely no reason why the Buddha would use this > enignmatic and provisional term, 'undefined' if it were not for a very specific > purpose. Why couldn't he simply say 'it is ended and there is nothing left'. But > he does not say that, he says that the Arahant is 'without the existential > residues emptied of psychophysical machinery by termination of the last mind'. As > absolute as this sounds, he does not say this leaves *nothing* which is what it > should mean if it is a true obliteration of all experience. He says it leaves the > Arahant in a state of 'undefined reality', a truly enigmatic term. > > Now we all agree that the Buddha didn't mince words and that he could be clear as > a bell, decisive in fact. So why would he not say 'the experiencing consciousness > and any possibility of any remaining awareness are totally destroyed leaving > absolutely no experience of any kind in its wake'? Or something to that effect. > Instead he talks of the 'undefined reality'. For the life of me, this does not > sound anything like the total abolition of existence to me. It sounds like the > total obliteration of *worldly* subject/object existence, but not of existence per > se. And since we all agree that the Buddha chose his words wisely, why we have to > account for all that he said and try to make some kind of sense out of it. We > can't just ignore an expression like 'undefined reality' without a sense of what > it implies about his other statements which aree right next to each other. So > that is my sticking point, just as he says in the other Sutta we talked about, the > one about the 'luminous mind which is freed from defilements from within'. You > see there is a certain consistency here, in which the Buddha seems to point at a > 'higher' reality, rather than 'no reality' at all in the Nibbanic state. > > Finally, he uses as his metaphor for this state of undefined reality 'the lamp > without fuel' which can no longer burn. This again points to the end of 'sensual > experience' but not to 'no existence of any kind'. Why do I say this? He says > the lamp is gone out, but whenever he uses this metaphor he never says the lamp is > gone or destroyed. The lamp is always left sitting there in its state of > 'ultimate cool' with no more fuel to burn. So the flame of suffering and sensual > experience, which are intimately tied together, are finished. No more > subject/object experience, no more objects of craving or aversion, just the > ultimately cooled lamp. So what is that lamp? It is the base of being or > existence without any discernable activity. It is just like a lamp that does not > burn, like awareness that has returned to itself and no longer goes outward to > seek any object. Although there is absolutely no activity in this lamp, in this > awareness, that does not mean it is obliterated. If it was, I believe that > Buddhism would reduce inevitably to Nihilism. If one posits an absolute nullity, > one has no choice but to put one's stock in annihilation. I do not believe that > complete annihilation of experience is what the Buddha taught. I do believe he > taught the end of suffering as the complete cessation of sensory activity and > subject/object separation. > > For practical purposes, this distinction may be splitting hairs, but in the sense > of what it means for the ground of being, what we really are or arent' in the > final analysis, it has enormous implications. One who believes in total and final > obliteration of all awareness can take no stock in the human quality of awakeness > or awareness. It is merely a tool to get to obliteration of suffering, and in > that sense one turns away from even the inmost content of one's own mind. Even > the cittas are a source of suffering and there is nothing beyond them. For one > who believes in the final rest of awareness itself as something that can become > enlightened by returning to itself, rather than being extinguished, there is an > inherently positive quality in the entire path, a seed of truth that exists now in > the human being, but is obscured by delusion and unwholesome tendencies. I > believe this difference makes an enormous difference in orientation, and that we > have at least two examples of where the Buddha hints strongly, without turning it > into an object or entity, of this posssibility of light at the end of the tunnel, > rather than a final darkness. And I take strong stock in those statements. I > think they mean something that needs to be investigated and discerned. > > And thank you for such a stimulating discussion of these important issues. I am > very interested in hearing your response. > > Best, > Robert Ep. > > ==================================== > > > The last mind in a lifetime is the dying consciousness (cuticittam), > > which is, by the way, the finish line of `bhavanga cittam – > > the life-cause consciousness.' > > > > The term `bhavanga' is made up of two words `bhava+anga'. Bhava means > > life or sentient existence. Anga means component or cause. Thus, > > bhavanga means life-cause or life-component, or the cause of sentient > > existence. Bhavanga cittam is the consciousness that makes the > > sentient existence possible. It causes and perpetuates sentient > > existence. > > > > On the death of a sentient being who hasn't attained Arahatta > > awakening, the linking consciousness (patisandhi cittam) immediately > > follows the dying consciousness for a rebirth. Why immediately? It is > > because we can't suspend the bhavanga cittam in a limbo state. > > The linking consciousness is the start line of the life-cause > > consciousness (bhavanga cittam) in a lifetime. > > > > In other words, the difference between an Arahant and a non- Arahant > > is the termination of the life-cause consciousness for the Arahant > > and the perpetuation of the life-cause consciousness for the non- > > Arahant. > > > > An Arahant terminates the life-cause consciousness while ordinary > > sentient beings perpetuate the life-cause consciousnesses. > > > > The death of an Arahant is the termination of bhavanga cittam, the > > life-cause consciousness. In other words, the Parinibbaana of an > > Arahant is the end of the sentient existence. > > > > Robert Epstein also wrote: > > > > "The idea of an underlying beingness or awareness that is however > > totally disengaged from any experience does not seem to me to be > > ruled out here." > > > > > > Robert's idea of an underlying beingness or awareness looks > > rather like an interpretation of the bhavanga cittam, the life- cause > > consciousness. > > > > If Robert meant to refer to the bhavanga cittam as an underlying > > beingness or awareness, and regarded it as something that would > > survive in parinibbaana after the death of an Arahant, he has my > > sympathy, and I would not blame him. Why not? > > > > Bhavanga cittam is the cool-down, resting state of the mind, so it is > > very tempting to equate nibbaana with a kind of perpetual bhavanga > > cittam. > > > > However, as we have analysed earlier above, the expression > > `carimacittanirodhena – by termination of the last mind', > > did not help to indicate the survival of the bhavanga cittam in > > parinibbaana on the death of an Arahant. > > > > Contrary to Robert Epstein's ideas, termination of the bhavanga > > cittam has ruled out any underlying beingness or awareness, I am > > afraid. > > > > Howard also wrote: > > > > "Certainly, taken at face value, this commentary suggests > > parinibbana as a kind of nullity." > > > > The commentary suggests parinibbaana as nullity of sentient existence. > > > > > > PARINIBBANA SUBCOMMENTARY Part Two Ends Here. > > > > > > With regards, > > > > Suan Lu Zaw > > > > http://www.bodhiology.org > > > > > > > > > > PREVIOUSLY ON THIS LIST > > > > 1. PARINIBBANA COMMENTARY PALI > > > > "Parinibbutaa naama arahattapattito patthaaya kilesavattassa > > khepitattaa sa-upaadisesena, carimacittanirodhena khandhavattassa > > khepitattaa anupaadisesena caati dviihi parinibbaanehi > > parinibbutaa, anupaadaano viya padiipo apannattikabhaavaam gataati > > attho." > > > > "`Parinibbutaa' is the ultimate cool by means of two-way complete > > extinguishments, one with the existential residues emptied of > > defilement machinery ever since attainment of Arahatta awakening, and > > the other without the existential residues emptied of psychophysical > > machinery by termination of the last mind (the dying consciousness). > > It has the meaning of reaching the state of the undefined reality > > like the lamp without fuel." > > > > Parinibbaana - complete extinguishment > > Kilesavatta - defilement machinery (vatta is literally circle, cycle, > > or round. We have `vicious circle' in English.) > > Khandhavatta - psychophysical machinery > > Upaadisesa - existential residues (upaadi is merely another name of > > pancakkhadhaa). Upaadi means phenomena taken strongly by craving or > > attachment (tanhaa). > > > > Carimacittanirodho – termination of the last mind > > Apannattikabhaavo - the state of undefined reality > > > > > > 2. PARINIBBANA SUBCOMMENTARY > > > > Howard wrote: > > > > "Certainly, taken at face value, this commentary suggests > > parinibbana > > as a kind of nullity. A couple matters remain: (1) The exact meaning > > of Apannattikabhaavaam - the state of undefined reality, and the > > exact meaning of vi~n~nana, which I take as the dualistic operation > > of separating out an individualized object from the potential field > > of awareness, a special type of knowing/~nana." > > > > > > The expression `apannattikabhaavo - the state of undefined > > reality' > > has given both Howard and Robert Epstein an opportunity to undergo > > profound contemplation, as it would everybody else. > > > > Therefore, this unique expression has become a suitable topic for > > further analysis and elucidation as Buddhaghosa did not elaborate on > > it, at least on this occasion. > > > > The expression `Apannattikabhaavo' can be broken up > > as `a+pannatti+ika+bhaavo'. > > > > The term `pannatti' has the same meaning as > > `paññatti'. Therefore, > > pannatti means a name, a convention, or a verbalization as > > `paññatti' > > would. We all know that a name can refer to either an existent > > phenomenon or a non-existent category such as God the Creator. No > > offense to theists amid the Buddhists! > > > > In Pali texts, the term that describes the opposite of a non- existent > > category is `paramattho – a reality'. Examples of > > realities are > > matter and mind. No offense to extremist Mahayanists amid the > > Theravadis and scientists! > > > > Now, let us look at the combination `a+pannatti'. The prefix > > `a' > > in `apannatti' means `not' or `no' just like > > the prefix `a' in the > > words `amoral' and `amorphous' giving the opposite > > meanings > > of `moral' and `morphous'. > > > > Thus, we get `not + name (or convention, or verbalization)'. > > > > And, what about the bit `ika'? The suffix `ika' means > > `having or > > doing something that the preceding term indicates.' > > > > Thus, the combination `pannatti+ika' means `having + name > > (or > > convention, or verbalization).' > > > > Now, when we add both the prefix and the suffix to the > > term `pannatti', we get the `apannattika – something > > not having a > > name, something not of convention, something not of verbalization, or > > something undefined. > > > > The word `bhaava' denotes a state. Therefore, the > > expression `apannattikabhaavo' refers to the state of > > something > > unconventional, unverbalizable, or undefinable. > > > > As we mentioned earlier above, the antonym of the term > > `paññatti' in > > the Pali texts, is the term `paramattho – a reality'. > > Therefore, the > > expression `apannattikabhaavo' means the state of something > > existent, > > something real, but not subject to verbalization, or > > conventionalization. > > > > The above analysis should satisfy Howard's request for the exact > > meaning of apannattikabhaavo – the state of undefined reality. > > > > Now, I will try to answer why Buddhaghosa described parinibbutaa as > > the state of undefined reality. > > > > By using the espression `apannattikabhaavo - the state of > > undefined > > reality', Buddhaghosa has killed two birds with one stone. We > > could > > toy with the idea of using the term `paramattho – a > > reality' instead > > of `apannatti'. But, that could deprive us of the ability to > > convey > > the meanings of unverbalizableness and undefinableness. Not only that > > handicap, paramattho could refer to other types of realities as well, > > which we can also verbalize and define easily. Therefore, it is a > > very clever choice of word that Buddhaghosa described parinibbutaa > > as `apannattikabhaavo - the state of undefined reality'. > > > > Now, what is the meaning of undefinableness or unverbalizableness? > > Why did Buddhaghosa regarded parinibbutaa as being undefinable? > > > > The world is programmed to think only in terms of stereotypes and > > stereotyping. It is programmed to verbalize only in terms of ready > > expressions and convenient vocabulary. > > > > Our linguistic stereotypes include both existent and non-existent > > categories. But, all our verbalizable catagories refer only to either > > mind and mental (associates and) products, or matter and material > > things. > > > > In short, we are programmed to define things and beings only in the > > terminology of mind and matter, the two main existential realities. > > This two-reality existential programming has conditioned us to regard > > anything outside psychophysical givens as nullity. > > > > The Arahatta awakening that Gotama the Buddha has discovered is > > capable of demolishing our existential programming and allowing us to > > realize the third reality outside mind and matter. Here, the > > term `mind' includes mental associates (cetasikas) as well. > > Because > > this third reality is outside mind and matter, we cannot verbalize it > > in terms of psychophysical existences. Yet, this third reality exists > > as parinibbutaa, the ultimate cool. As Buddhaghosa has done, we can > > describe parinibbutaa only as complete extinguishment of defilements > > and psychophysical existence. > > > > Therefore, the meaning of undefinableness in the expression `the > > state of undefined reality' is that parinibbaana is an existence > > that > > we cannot define in terms of mind and matter. > > > > > > PARINIBBANA SUBCOMMENTARY Part One Ends Here. > > > > > > With regards > > > > Suan Lu Zaw > > > > http://www.bodhiology.org > > > 10064 From: Date: Sun Dec 16, 2001 3:21am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: What is Concentration Actually? Hi, Erik - In a message dated 12/15/01 9:39:22 PM Eastern Standard Time, rikpa21@y... writes: > Speaking as perhaps the lone samatha-yanika meditator here, I can > say from experience that the diferrence between the sort of > concentration needed to fulfill Right Concentration as I understand > it (and it tool a LOT of practice to get to the point to where > concentration was firmly established in the sense that the mind > remained fixed on an arammana and apanna arose) and the normal sort > of samadhi that (may) arise in day-to-day life through concentrating > on random object arising through thes sense-doors to be as big as > the difference distance between Heaven and Earth. > > ============================== I've had a drop of experience in samatha bhavana, involving concentration practice focusing the mind on a single meditation subject, and also some practice in vipassana bhavana, involving what is sometimes called moment-to-moment concentration practice. In my experience these types of concentration are different, but, in their different ways, equally powerful. In either of these cases, the concentration is, as you say, radically different from "the normal sort of samadhi that (may) arise in day-to-day life through concentrating on random object arising through thes sense-doors". The point of my post, however, was to inquire into the technical question of what is actually occurring, at a microscopic level of detail, when concentration has increased. My conjecture was that the switching back and forth among various (instances of) objects from citta to citta to citta typical of ordinary experience is reduced, in the extreme case to a single object (or near-replicates identified as "the same object") which is the arammana in mental process after mental process. Now, it seems almost certain to me that such a curtailing of the diversity of objects of awareness, such focusing and stabilization, is due to some functional characteristic or cetasika within each mindstate becoming strengthened, in which case that cetasika, itself, might be called "concentration". I am asking those who are well versed in Abhidhamma what their understanding of the Abhidhamma "take" is on this subject. With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 10065 From: Date: Sun Dec 16, 2001 3:45am Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts) Hi, Robert - In a message dated 12/16/01 2:55:46 AM Eastern Standard Time, epsteinrob@Y... writes: > Hi Howard. > One assumes that 'oneself' must be used conventionally, since we assume > that > Buddha would not invoke the existence of a personal 'self'. It is clear > that > 'oneself' must mean something, therefore it must be conventional use or > else must > be the invocation of a personal self. > > I agree that it is most likely conventional speech, but if that is the > case, he is > basically giving prescriptions for behavior or pep talks for practitioners > of a > certain level. This seems to me to undercut the notion that conventional > effort > and exercise of will has no effect on the practitioner. > > Best, > Robert Ep. > ============================= While I cannot give you the reference, I recall with certainty that the Buddha stated in a sutta that he uses conventional language! If I can find it, I will give you the reference. (I will bet the Robert K can provide it.) With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 10066 From: Date: Sun Dec 16, 2001 4:31am Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts) Hi, Victor - In a message dated 12/16/01 3:02:49 AM Eastern Standard Time, victoryu@s... writes: > Hello Robert, Howard, and all, > > If the Buddha used two kinds of speeches, conventional and > non-conventional, > I would be interested in knowing some examples of non-conventional speech > that the Buddha used. > > Thank you in advance. > > Regards, > Victor > =========================== ALL speech is conventional in the sense that it is a complex convention tacitly agreed upon by people to use patterns of sounds in certain ways. Moreover, built into those speech conventions are functionalities which express our tendency towards reification, naming things as though they had independent existence, and expressing a substantive subject-object dichotomy. However, it is possible to use speech in a way to *point* to the way things actually are. When the Buddha did so, speaking of impermanence and emptiness and nibbana, his speech can be called "non-conventional". Others, such as Zen masters, have used speech in unconventional ways, often poetic, to sidestep the reificationist core of language use, to point beyond our concepts, and towards reality. But the only *truly* non-conventional grasp of matters is done directly, and not through speech or concept. With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 10067 From: Victor Yu Date: Sun Dec 16, 2001 9:40am Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts) Hello all, Another invalid argument that is used to support the views on control / no control goes like this Premise 1: If form is not self, then it is not possible for form to say 'Let this form be thus. Let this form not be thus.' Premise 2: Form is not self. Conclusion: Therefore, it is not possible for one to say 'Let this form be thus. Let this form not be thus.' In other words, given p: form is not self. q: it is not possible for form to say 'Let this form be thus. Let this form not be thus.' r: it is not possible for one to say 'Let this form be thus. Let this form not be thus.' If p, then q. p. Therefore, r. Both premises are true; however, the conclusion simply doesn't follow from the premises. Again, please note how similar statement q and statement r are. Regards, Victor 10068 From: Date: Sun Dec 16, 2001 5:25am Subject: Memory, Objects, and Continuity Hi, all - At any time (from the Abhidhamma perspective) there is a unique citta functioning, along with all the associated cetasikas, and a unique arammana. All previous cittas are nonexistent, and no future cittas have arisen. Moreover, there is no "observer" in the backgound watching the flow of cittas as an audience member watches the film frames on a screen. Yet, there is the sense of continuity, flow, and change. It seems to me that this can only be due to the function of *memory*.There is then the question of whether the content of a memory is considered to be an arammana or not. In order for the experience of continuity to occur, it is necessary, it seems to me, for the memories of past cittas to occur simultaneously with the current citta (else such memories are already gone). In that case, it becomes important whether or not the content of a memory is considered an arammana, for if it is, then there is more than one arammana per citta. Side question: Does the principle of one arammana per citta occur in the Abhidhamma, itself, or only in the commentaries? With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 10069 From: m. nease Date: Sun Dec 16, 2001 3:07pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Eightfold Path (esp. right view) Jon, Thanks for this great excerpt--hope you'll add it to the files. Where you write: --- jonoabb wrote: > Finally, whereas the role of wisdom in the mundane > jhanas is > subordinate to that of concentration, in the > supramundane > jhanas wisdom and concentration are well balanced, > with > concentration fixing the mind on the unconditioned > element and > wisdom fathoming the deep significance of the Four > Noble > Truths. [5.4] > > [Jon's notes:] > 5.4. The primary attribute of a moment of jhana > citta is the > degree of concentration on the object at that > moment, whereas > the attribute of a moment of magga citta is the > wisdom that > pierces the Truths. Do you mean, "The primary attribute of a moment of [mundane] jhana citta is the degree of concentration on the object at that moment, whereas the attribute of a moment of magga citta is the wisdom that pierces the Truths [in balance with concentration (as well as the other path-factors)]? Or have I missed or misunderstood something here? Thanks in advance, mike 10070 From: m. nease Date: Sun Dec 16, 2001 3:53pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Memory, Objects, and Continuity Hi Howard, --- upasaka@a... wrote: > At any time (from the Abhidhamma perspective) > there is a unique citta > functioning, along with all the associated > cetasikas, and a unique arammana. > All previous cittas are nonexistent, and no future > cittas have arisen. > Moreover, there is no "observer" in the backgound > watching the flow of cittas > as an audience member watches the film frames on a > screen. Yet, there is the > sense of continuity, flow, and change. It seems to > me that this can only be > due to the function of *memory*.There is then the > question of whether the > content of a memory is considered to be an arammana > or not. In order for the > experience of continuity to occur, it is necessary, > it seems to me, for the > memories of past cittas to occur simultaneously with > the current citta (else > such memories are already gone). As I understand it, when a citta takes a memory as an aarammana, sa~n~naa remembers the aaramma.na (this citta is manovi~n~naa.na, which can take a concept as an aaramma.na). > In that case, it > becomes important whether > or not the content of a memory is considered an > aramma.na, for if it is, then > there is more than one aramma.na per citta. Not sure if I understand you here. If a concept (memory) is aarammana for manovi~n~naa.na, what other aarammana is present? > Side > question: Does the principle > of one arammana per citta occur in the Abhidhamma, > itself, or only in the > commentaries? Not sure about this, but I believe that the Theravaada considers some of the commentaries (those recited at the First Council) to be part of the Abhidhamma. I don't know if this idea occurs in the Abhidhamma outside the commentaries or not, though... mike 10071 From: Robert Epstein Date: Sun Dec 16, 2001 7:54pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts) Still a little confusing Victor. One and self are used synomously, but one, self and 'form' are not. It is not only whether the candidate 'form' can control 'form' or not, but whether oneself can control form. Oneself may = self, but the identity of 'oneself' [or what the self consists of] is never identified. Form is excluded as being 'self', but this does not settle the question of what 'oneself', which remains undefined, refers to. Therefore I assume it is a conventional expression, referring to the generally accepted concept of a 'person' for the sake of discussion. Best, Robert Ep. ==================== --- Victor Yu wrote: > Hello Robert, > > Please note that both the term "one" and the term "self" are used as > pronouns. > > Please consider Argument A: > Premise A1: If form is not self, then it is not possible for form to say > 'Let this form be thus. Let this form not be thus.' > Premise A2: Form is not self. > Conclusion: Therefore, it is not possible for form to say 'Let this form be > thus. Let this form not be thus.' > > Given > p: form is not self. > q: it is not possible for form to say 'Let this form be thus. Let this form > not be thus.' > > If p, then q. > p. > Therefore, q. > > Argument A is a valid argument. > > > Please consider Argument B > Premise B1. If form is self, then it is possible for form to say 'Let this > form be thus. Let this form not be thus.' > Premise B2. It is not possible for form to say ''Let this form be thus. Let > this form not be thus." > Conclusion: Therefore, form is not self. > > Given > p: form is self. > q: it is possible for form to say 'Let this form be thus. Let this form not > be thus.' > > If p, then q. > not q. > Therefore, not p. > > Argument B is also a valid argument. > > > Let's examine Argument C: > Premise C1. If form is self, then it is possible for form to say 'Let this > form be thus. Let this form not be thus.' > Premise C2. It is not possible for one to say ''Let this form be thus. Let > this form not be thus." > Conclusion: Therefore, form is not self. > > Given > p: form is self. > q: it is possible for form to say 'Let this form be thus. Let this form not > be thus.' > r: it is possible for one to say ''Let this form be thus. Let this form not > be thus." > > If p, then q. > not r. > Therefore, not p. > > Argument C is an invalid argument. Please note how similar statement q and > statement r is. > > > Regards, > Victor > > > ----- Original Message ----- > From: "Robert Epstein" > To: > Sent: Saturday, December 15, 2001 2:52 PM > Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts) > > > > > > --- Victor Yu wrote: > > > Hello Robert, > > > > > > Yes, one can control oneself. > > > > > > If form were self, it would be possible for FORM to say 'Let this form > be > > > thus. Let this form not be thus.' However, precisely because form is > not > > > self, it is not possible for FORM to say 'Let this form be thus. Let > this > > > form not be thus.' > > > > > > Please note that form is not self does not imply whether it is possible > or > > > not for ONE to say 'Let this form be thus. Let this form not be thus.' > > > > > > Regards, > > > Victor > > > > Dear Victor, > > Well, then, if ONE were to say 'Let this form be thus' and it would > accord, then > > would ONE be the self? If self can control any dhammas, it would not fall > into > > the category of being impermanent and unsatisfactory. One would have > defeated > > dukkha. So I would say that one can provisional exercise self-control, > but that > > perhaps the idea that ONE is doing this is an illusion. > > > > Best, > > Robert Ep. > > > > > > > > > ----- Original Message ----- > > > From: "Robert Epstein" > > > To: > > > Sent: Saturday, December 15, 2001 3:38 AM > > > Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts) > > > > > > > > > > Dear Victor, > > > > In the Sutta you referred me to, the Buddha says that if consciousness > > > were the > > > > self, one could say 'have this consciousness be like this' and it > would do > > > so. > > > > Since it does not, it is clearly not self. > > > > > > > > He says that if this body were self it would likewise accord with our > > > wishes, but > > > > since it does not, it is not self. > > > > > > > > Hence my reference to that which cannot be controlled not being self. > > > > > > > > In the second sutta you referred me to, he says: 'One must be the > > > controller of > > > > oneself; who else would be the controller?' making a definite > reference to > > > one > > > > being able to develop control over one's own activities. If this does > not > > > imply a > > > > true self who is able to establish this control, then what does it > mean? > > > > > > > > Best, > > > > Robert Ep. > > > > > > > > ======== 10072 From: Robert Epstein Date: Sun Dec 16, 2001 8:29pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Eightfold Path (esp. right effort) --- Jonothan Abbott wrote: > Rob Ep > > --- Robert Epstein wrote: > > > > Okay, I know you've talked about this many times before, but perhaps > > this would be > > a good time for a summary of the following, a small outline maybe: > > > > 1/ How does reading and understanding the suttas lead to mundane Right > > View/Understanding. > > I liked Nina’s recent post to Herman (message #9954) on a similar > question, so I won’t cover the same ground again. Suffice it to say that > listening to and considering the teachings is an indispensable condition > to any understanding. The reason for this, it seems to me, has as much to > do with avoiding wrong understanding as ‘getting’ the right understanding. > The teaching on the development of understanding is extremely subtle. > > > 2/ How does mundane Right View/Understanding lay the groundwork for the > > Supramundane Path Factors to arise. > > Every moment of mundane Right View (i.e. panna of the level of > satipatthana) is accompanied by other mundane factors of the Eightfold > Path. These mundane path factors are accumulated and grow in strength. > This is how, on my reading of the teachings, the conditions for > supramundane consciousness are developed. > > Jon So a single citta can accumulate and pass on any path factors that it has experienced? And they, in accumulation, lead to the arising of the others? Robert Ep. 10073 From: Robert Epstein Date: Sun Dec 16, 2001 8:33pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Commentaries (was, Cetana (volition, intention)) thanks, Jon. very well stated, all the way down the line, and very helpful. Robert Ep. =================== --- Jonothan Abbott wrote: > Rob Ep > > --- Robert Epstein wrote: > > > To follow the process you have outlined, which seems very worthwhile, > > you would: > > 1/ study the texts. > > 2/ attempt to ascertain as surely as possible what is actually being > > said, and > > what path is being mapped out with the help of commentaries and > > qualified teachers > > 3/ assess what we have understood via our own experience and > > understanding > > 4/ apply the understanding gained by the previous steps to the faithful > > discernment of the moment > > I would like to fine-tune your 4 factors a little. I would state them as > follows: > 1/ The study of the texts > 2/ Ascertaining as surely as possible the intended meaning of the texts > (and this I believe requires association with someone who understands them > correctly) > 3/ Considering and reflecting on what has been read and heard > 4/ Understanding how that relates to the experience of the present moment > > More important, however, in my view is the understanding that there is no > 'process to be followed'. No, I am not trying to be a 'semantic devil' > here(!), but to convey something that is very difficult to 'get' (and also > that I find difficult to explain -- due no doubt to my limited grasp). > > Consider the difference between these 2 statements: > (1) If you do A, B and C, then you will experience D. > (2) D can only be experienced if factors A, B and C have been developed. > > The difference between the 2, which I'm sure you can appreciate, Rob, is > an important one. It is my attempt at distinguishing between the factors > being seen as 'things-to-do' and the same factors being regarded as things > of value in their own right, worth developing, and about which we have > confidence that, properly developed, will lead us in the right direction > but the fruit of which will only become apparent as and when conditions > that are peculiar to us allow. > > What I am trying to say is that there is no *perceptible, immediately > obvious* connection between the necessary factors properly developed and > the understanding for which these factors are an indispensible > pre-condition (but then who said it was a '4-steps-to-understanding' kind > of thing?). The simile given in the suttas is that of the grip marks that > gradually get worn into the wooden handle of a carpenter's tool: no > wearing away is ever apparent at the time, only over time and after > continued use (this is the 'adze handle' simile). > > This lack of immediate feedback by which 'progress' can be seen and > 'practice' thereby verified makes it all the more important that we have a > proper understanding in the first place of what the path is as taught. > > Jon 10074 From: Robert Epstein Date: Sun Dec 16, 2001 8:35pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The Two Truths (for Howard) --- Jonothan Abbott wrote: > Rob Ep > > --- Robert Epstein wrote: > > > > No, I think you're right. It suddenly seems very interesting to try to > > distinguish 'looking' at the problem that is really seeing it in terms > > of a > > current reality, as opposed to making up a conceptual example, even > > though it > > imitates a reality. in our hardness discussion, I was 'imagining' an > > experience > > of hardness rather than actually, say, touching a table and reporting > > back, and > > failed to distinguish between these very different enterprises. They > > seem the > > same to the mind, but are not. > > Yes, one is purely conceptual and always so; the other may be experiential > (with or without awareness, of course). > > The root cause of our problems is not our wrong conceptual grasp of > things, but our incorrect understanding of realities. > > Jon Can I take it that this last sentence could be finished: "...our incorrect understanding of realities as they arise.' ? Robert Ep. 10075 From: Robert Epstein Date: Sun Dec 16, 2001 9:07pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein Dear Suan, I did misread your comments to say 'sensual' rather than 'sensory' existence, which is very strange, because when I *read* it [I thought] I thought to myself 'well that is slightly odd, I'm sure he means the same as *sentient* existence, but in fact you didn't even write that. In any case, I assumed it meant something similar. Here is the dictionary on sentient: Having a faculty, or faculties, of sensation and perception. and as a noun: One who has the faculty of perception; a sentient being. In this context, that is what I assumed was meant by 'sensual', so in fact, my meaning in the argument below is exactly the same. However, I apologize for misreading the word. And I look forward to your response when you have the chance. Best, Robert Ep. =================== --- abhidhammika wrote: > > > > Dear Robert > > How are you? Thank you for your reply message. > > I had a chance to read your reply just now. I missed my Internet > sessions previous night due to technical problems in my ISP's servers. > > You wrote: > > "Later on you say that there is a 'nullity of sensual existence'. Now > to me, experience and 'sensual existence' are not synonymous." > > Could you please check the spelling "sensual existence"? > > In my post, I wrote "nullity of sentient existence", (not sensual > existence). > > So, if your arguments in the present post were based on "nullity of > sensual existence", you now may need to rewrite your arguments based > on "nullity of sentient existence." > > I will read the rest of your present post, and other posts later. I > am very sleepy now (2 a.m in Canberra). > > With regards, > > Suan > > > > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Robert Epstein wrote: > > Dear Suan, > > Sorry to take so long to get back to you on this good subcommentary. > > My remarks are dispersed below: > > > > --- abhidhammika wrote: > > > > > > Dear Dhamma Friends > > > > > > The following is the second part of Parinibbana Subcommentary > written > > > in response to the questions and statements of Upasaka Howard, > Robert > > > Epstein, and Mike Neace. In this second part of the > subcommentary, I > > > directly address the statements of Robert Epstein. Here, I also > > > include the meaning of the last mind, which partly satisfies > > > Howard's desire to know the exact meaning of consciousness. > > > > > > > > > 1. PARINIBBANA COMMENTARY PALI > > > > > > "Parinibbutaa naama arahattapattito patthaaya kilesavattassa > > > khepitattaa sa-upaadisesena, carimacittanirodhena > khandhavattassa > > > khepitattaa anupaadisesena caati dviihi parinibbaanehi > > > parinibbutaa, anupaadaano viya padiipo apannattikabhaavaam > gataati > > > attho." > > > > > > "`Parinibbutaa' is the ultimate cool by means of two-way complete > > > extinguishments, one with the existential residues emptied of > > > defilement machinery ever since attainment of Arahatta awakening, > and > > > the other without the existential residues emptied of > psychophysical > > > machinery by termination of the last mind (the dying > consciousness). > > > It has the meaning of reaching the state of the undefined reality > > > like the lamp without fuel." > > > > > > > > > Carimacittanirodho – termination of the last mind > > > Apannattikabhaavo - the state of undefined reality > > > > > > > > > 2. PARINIBBANA SUBCOMMENTARY Part Two > > > > > > > > > Robert Epstein wrote: > > > > > > "Well, I don't know about anyone else, but reaching the state of > > > the > > > undefined > > > reality to me means that he has reached a state in which his > reality > > > is undefined > > > by any remaining fragment of distinguishing consciousness, but > that > > > he is still > > > in a state of existence in which his reality is undefined. This > does > > > not mean that > > > there is no existent of any kind, only that all consciousness has > > > been cooled > > > and is no longer present. The idea of an underlying beingness or > > > awareness that is > > > however totally disengaged from any experience does not seem to > me to > > > be ruled > > > out here. > > > > > > What puzzles me in the above paragraph is Robert's addition of > > > the statement: > > > > > > "…but that he is still in a state of existence in which his > > > reality is undefined." > > > > > > Buddhaghosa's explanation of `parinibbutaa' includes the > > > unmistakable expression `carimacittanirodhena – by termination of > the > > > last mind' on the death of an Arahant. > > > > Let me say from the beginning here, Suan, that you are invoking the > termination of > > the 'last mind' as evidence that there is no remaining experience. > Later on you > > say that there is a 'nullity of sensual existence'. Now to me, > experience and > > 'sensual existence' are not synonymous. So let's start by totally > agreeing that > > there is no 'sensual existence' or 'sensory experience' of any kind > in > > parinibbana. On this I think it is absolutely clear. > > > > If there is *any kind* of existence in parinibbana, it would not be > one that is > > connected to the body or the mind. So the existence of any such > experience would > > indeed be a mystical state. It would be quite beyond anything that > relates to > > this world, to this body, mind or personality. > > > > now the problem that arises when i try to get into this kind of > possibility, of > > such a state existing fro the arahant, is that anyone who hears > that assumes that > > this means there must be some kind of soul, or mind or entity that > is there. I > > try to say that if it is existent, this parinibbanic existence > would have to be a > > kind of pure presence, field or aware quality, disassociated from > any > > individuation or subject-object differentiation. But most don't > accept the > > possibility that such a state can exist without the false positing > of some kind of > > 'self'. I myself think that such an impersonal existence of > awareness is a > > possibility, but I understand if you cannot take the Buddha's words > to imply that. > > I think that Howard, up to a point, agrees with me on this, and > that it is > > possible that Kenneth O. would also see this as a possibility. So > to an extent it > > seems to divide among those who have or have had some sympathy for > the ideas of > > Mahayana Buddhism and those who are strictly reading according to a > Theravadin > > interpretation. > > > > But I am trying to restrict myself to that which can be seen in the > actually words > > of the Buddha, as expressed in the Theravadin Suttas and > commentaries. > > > > So that is just to be forthright about my orientation. So I would > not propose > > this possibility if I did not see it in the actual verses, and in > fact, in this > > case, in your very noble translation of the verses, which have a > nice sense of > > freshness and literal immediacy about them, and for which I thank > you. I truly > > enjoy feeling that I have gotten a bit closer to the living word of > the Buddha, > > even if our interpretations may diverge after that. > > > > So you are talking about the 'last mind' or 'sensual reality' being > finally cooled > > and coming to an end. > > > > First of all, I find the idea of these things being 'finally > cooled' a wonderful > > translation. Nowhere does the Buddha talk about destruction or > eradication when > > it comes to the final coming to rest of the experiential mechanism. > > > > Second of all, what you do not account for in this second sub- > commentary and which > > is the sole evidence for my view that there may be a state of 'non- > sensual' > > awareness in the parinibbanic state, is that the Buddha says that > the Arahant's > > final reality is 'undefined'. > > > > For myself, Suan, I can see absolutely no reason why the Buddha > would use this > > enignmatic and provisional term, 'undefined' if it were not for a > very specific > > purpose. Why couldn't he simply say 'it is ended and there is > nothing left'. But > > he does not say that, he says that the Arahant is 'without the > existential > > residues emptied of psychophysical machinery by termination of the > last mind'. As > > absolute as this sounds, he does not say this leaves *nothing* > which is what it > > should mean if it is a true obliteration of all experience. He > says it leaves the > > Arahant in a state of 'undefined reality', a truly enigmatic term. > > > > Now we all agree that the Buddha didn't mince words and that he > could be clear as > > a bell, decisive in fact. So why would he not say 'the > experiencing consciousness > > and any possibility of any remaining awareness are totally > destroyed leaving > > absolutely no experience of any kind in its wake'? Or something to > that effect. > > Instead he talks of the 'undefined reality'. For the life of me, > this does not > > sound anything like the total abolition of existence to me. It > sounds like the > > total obliteration of *worldly* subject/object existence, but not > of existence per > > se. And since we all agree that the Buddha chose his words wisely, > why we have to > > account for all that he said and try to make some kind of sense out > of it. We > > can't just ignore an expression like 'undefined reality' without a > sense of what > > it implies about his other statements which aree right next to each > other. So > > that is my sticking point, just as he says in the other Sutta we > talked about, the > > one about the 'luminous mind which is freed from defilements from > within'. You > > see there is a certain consistency here, in which the Buddha seems > to point at a > > 'higher' reality, rather than 'no reality' at all in the Nibbanic > state. > > > > Finally, he uses as his metaphor for this state of undefined > reality 'the lamp > > without fuel' which can no longer burn. This again points to the > end of 'sensual > > experience' but not to 'no existence of any kind'. Why do I say > this? He says > > the lamp is gone out, but whenever he uses this metaphor he never > says the lamp is > > gone or destroyed. The lamp is always left sitting there in its > state of > > 'ultimate cool' with no more fuel to burn. So the flame of > suffering and sensual > > experience, which are intimately tied together, are finished. No > more > > subject/object experience, no more objects of craving or aversion, > just the > > ultimately cooled lamp. So what is that lamp? It is the base of > being or > > existence without any discernable activity. It is just like a lamp > that does not > > burn, like awareness that has returned to itself and no longer goes > outward to > > seek any object. Although there is absolutely no activity in this > lamp, in this > > awareness, that does not mean it is obliterated. If it was, I > believe that > > Buddhism would reduce inevitably to Nihilism. If one posits an > absolute nullity, > > one has no choice but to put one's stock in annihilation. I do not > believe that > > complete annihilation of experience is what the Buddha taught. I > do believe he > > taught the end of suffering as the complete cessation of sensory > activity and > > subject/object separation. > > > > For practical purposes, this distinction may be splitting hairs, > but in the sense > > of what it means for the ground of being, what we really are or > arent' in the > > final analysis, it has enormous implications. One who believes in > total and final > > obliteration of all awareness can take no stock in the human > quality of awakeness > > or awareness. It is merely a tool to get to obliteration of > suffering, and in > > that sense one turns away from even the inmost content of one's own > mind. Even > > the cittas are a source of suffering and there is nothing beyond > them. For one > > who believes in the final rest of awareness itself as something > that can become > > enlightened by returning to itself, rather than being extinguished, > there is an > > inherently positive quality in the entire path, a seed of truth > that exists now in > > the human being, but is obscured by delusion and unwholesome > tendencies. I > > believe this difference makes an enormous difference in > orientation, and that we > > have at least two examples of where the Buddha hints strongly, > without turning it > > into an object or entity, of this posssibility of light at the end > of the tunnel, > > rather than a final darkness. And I take strong stock in those > statements. I > > think they mean something that needs to be investigated and > discerned. > > > > And thank you for such a stimulating discussion of these important > issues. I am > > very interested in hearing your response. > > > > Best, > > Robert Ep. > > > > ==================================== > > > > > The last mind in a lifetime is the dying consciousness > (cuticittam), > > > which is, by the way, the finish line of `bhavanga cittam – > > > the life-cause consciousness.' > > > > > > The term `bhavanga' is made up of two words `bhava+anga'. Bhava > means > > > life or sentient existence. Anga means component or cause. Thus, > > > bhavanga means life-cause or life-component, or the cause of > sentient > > > existence. Bhavanga cittam is the consciousness that makes the > > > sentient existence possible. It causes and perpetuates sentient > > > existence. > > > > > > On the death of a sentient being who hasn't attained Arahatta > > > awakening, the linking consciousness (patisandhi cittam) > immediately > > > follows the dying consciousness for a rebirth. Why immediately? > It is > > > because we can't suspend the bhavanga cittam in a limbo state. > > > The linking consciousness is the start line of the life-cause > > > consciousness (bhavanga cittam) in a lifetime. > > > > > > In other words, the difference between an Arahant and a non- > Arahant > > > is the termination of the life-cause consciousness for the > Arahant > > > and the perpetuation of the life-cause consciousness for the non- > > > Arahant. > > > > > > An Arahant terminates the life-cause consciousness while ordinary > > > sentient beings perpetuate the life-cause consciousnesses. > > > > > > The death of an Arahant is the termination of bhavanga cittam, > the > > > life-cause consciousness. In other words, the Parinibbaana of an > > > Arahant is the end of the sentient existence. > > > > > > Robert Epstein also wrote: > > > > > > "The idea of an underlying beingness or awareness that is however > > > totally disengaged from any experience does not seem to me to be > > > ruled out here." > > > > > > > > > Robert's idea of an underlying beingness or awareness looks > > > rather like an interpretation of the bhavanga cittam, the life- > cause > > > consciousness. > > > > > > If Robert meant to refer to the bhavanga cittam as an underlying > > > beingness or awareness, and regarded it as something that would > > > survive in parinibbaana after the death of an Arahant, he has my > > > sympathy, and I would not blame him. Why not? > > > > > > Bhavanga cittam is the cool-down, resting state of the mind, so > it is > > > very tempting to equate nibbaana with a kind of perpetual > bhavanga > > > cittam. > > > > > > However, as we have analysed earlier above, the expression > > > `carimacittanirodhena – by termination of the last mind', > > > did not help to indicate the survival of the bhavanga cittam in > > > parinibbaana on the death of an Arahant. > > > > > > Contrary to Robert Epstein's ideas, termination of the bhavanga > > > cittam has ruled out any underlying beingness or awareness, I am > > > afraid. > > > > > > Howard also wrote: > > > > > > "Certainly, taken at face value, this commentary suggests > > > parinibbana as a kind of nullity." > > > > > > The commentary suggests parinibbaana as nullity of sentient > existence. > > > > > > > > > PARINIBBANA SUBCOMMENTARY Part Two Ends Here. > > > > > > > > > With regards, > > > > > > Suan Lu Zaw > > > > > > http://www.bodhiology.org > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > PREVIOUSLY ON THIS LIST 10076 From: Robert Epstein Date: Sun Dec 16, 2001 9:09pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts) --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Robert - > > In a message dated 12/16/01 2:55:46 AM Eastern Standard Time, > epsteinrob@Y... writes: > > > > Hi Howard. > > One assumes that 'oneself' must be used conventionally, since we assume > > that > > Buddha would not invoke the existence of a personal 'self'. It is clear > > that > > 'oneself' must mean something, therefore it must be conventional use or > > else must > > be the invocation of a personal self. > > > > I agree that it is most likely conventional speech, but if that is the > > case, he is > > basically giving prescriptions for behavior or pep talks for practitioners > > of a > > certain level. This seems to me to undercut the notion that conventional > > effort > > and exercise of will has no effect on the practitioner. > > > > Best, > > Robert Ep. > > > ============================= > While I cannot give you the reference, I recall with certainty that > the Buddha stated in a sutta that he uses conventional language! If I can > find it, I will give you the reference. (I will bet the Robert K can provide > it.) > > With metta, > Howard I don't doubt it. The reference would be interesting. Robert Ep. 10077 From: Victor Yu Date: Sun Dec 16, 2001 9:52pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts) Hello Robert, It is confusing, and there is a very subtle point that you probably have noticed. Let's consider: Premise A1: If form is not self, then it is not possible for form to say 'Let this form be thus. Let this form not be thus.' and Premise A1': If form is not self, then it is not possible for one to say 'Let this form be thus. Let this form not be thus.' Premise A2: Form is not self. Conclusion A1: Therefore, it is not possible for form to say 'Let this form be thus. Let this form not be thus.' Conclusion A1': Therefore, it is not possible for one to say 'Let this form be thus. Let this form not be thus.' With Premise A1 and Premise A2, we have Conclusion A1. With Premise A1' and Premise A2, we have Conclusion A1'. Conclusion A1' is basically saying that one can not control form. Premise A1 is true. Premise A1' seems to be true. However, Premise A1' has a very subtle, implicit assumption that form is self. (what do we replace in Premise A1 to make Premise A1'?) Let's consider another set of premises and conclusions. Premise B1: If form is self, then it is possible for form to say 'Let this form be thus. Let this form not be thus.' Premise B1': If form is self, then it is possible for one to say 'Let this form be thus. Let this form not be thus.' Premise B2: It is not possible for form to say ''Let this form be thus. Let this form not be thus." Premise B2': It is not possible for one to say ''Let this form be thus. Let this form not be thus." Conclusion B: Therefore, form is not self. We can reach Conclusion B with Premise B1 and Premise B2, or we can reach the same Conclusion B with Premise B1' and Premise B2'. Premise B1 is true. Premise B1' seems to be very true. However, Premise B1' has the same subtle, implicit assumption as Premise A1' does, that form is self. This implicit assumption is what we would make in addition to the explicit assumption "form is self" in Premise B1'. Premise B2 is nothing more than Conclusion A1. Premise B2' is nothing more than Conclusion A1'. It seems that we can "prove" that form is not self in Conclusion B with Premise B1 and Premise B2, or with Premise B1' and Premise B2'. However, what we do is nothing more than restating Premise A2 in Conclusion B. Both Premise B1' and Premise B2' have the implicit assumption that form is self. The pronoun "oneself" is a variation of the pronoun "self." Regards, Victor ----- Original Message ----- From: "Robert Epstein" To: Sent: Sunday, December 16, 2001 10:54 PM Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts) > Still a little confusing Victor. One and self are used synomously, but one, self > and 'form' are not. It is not only whether the candidate 'form' can control > 'form' or not, but whether oneself can control form. > > Oneself may = self, but the identity of 'oneself' [or what the self consists of] > is never identified. Form is excluded as being 'self', but this does not settle > the question of what 'oneself', which remains undefined, refers to. > > Therefore I assume it is a conventional expression, referring to the generally > accepted concept of a 'person' for the sake of discussion. > > Best, > Robert Ep. > > ==================== > > > --- Victor Yu wrote: > > Hello Robert, > > > > Please note that both the term "one" and the term "self" are used as > > pronouns. > > > > Please consider Argument A: > > Premise A1: If form is not self, then it is not possible for form to say > > 'Let this form be thus. Let this form not be thus.' > > Premise A2: Form is not self. > > Conclusion: Therefore, it is not possible for form to say 'Let this form be > > thus. Let this form not be thus.' > > > > Given > > p: form is not self. > > q: it is not possible for form to say 'Let this form be thus. Let this form > > not be thus.' > > > > If p, then q. > > p. > > Therefore, q. > > > > Argument A is a valid argument. > > > > > > Please consider Argument B > > Premise B1. If form is self, then it is possible for form to say 'Let this > > form be thus. Let this form not be thus.' > > Premise B2. It is not possible for form to say ''Let this form be thus. Let > > this form not be thus." > > Conclusion: Therefore, form is not self. > > > > Given > > p: form is self. > > q: it is possible for form to say 'Let this form be thus. Let this form not > > be thus.' > > > > If p, then q. > > not q. > > Therefore, not p. > > > > Argument B is also a valid argument. > > > > > > Let's examine Argument C: > > Premise C1. If form is self, then it is possible for form to say 'Let this > > form be thus. Let this form not be thus.' > > Premise C2. It is not possible for one to say ''Let this form be thus. Let > > this form not be thus." > > Conclusion: Therefore, form is not self. > > > > Given > > p: form is self. > > q: it is possible for form to say 'Let this form be thus. Let this form not > > be thus.' > > r: it is possible for one to say ''Let this form be thus. Let this form not > > be thus." > > > > If p, then q. > > not r. > > Therefore, not p. > > > > Argument C is an invalid argument. Please note how similar statement q and > > statement r is. > > > > > > Regards, > > Victor > > > > > 10078 From: Robert Epstein Date: Sun Dec 16, 2001 10:29pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts) Victor, I more or less understand your logic here, but I don't see how it leads to the conclusion that form is being posited as self. I think the 'oneself' in the statement is an undisclosed identity. Which is what makes it conventional speech. In any case, if you were right, and 'oneself' was really being implied to be the same form that is being disqualified from being self, you would be saying that the Buddha is making the equation, Self[Form] = Not-Self[Form]. I assume you are not claiming this. Or X(Y) = -X(Y), or X = -X. Robert ============= --- Victor Yu wrote: > Hello Robert, > > It is confusing, and there is a very subtle point that you probably have > noticed. > > Let's consider: > Premise A1: If form is not self, then it is not possible for form to say > 'Let this form be thus. Let this form not be thus.' > > and > > Premise A1': If form is not self, then it is not possible for one to say > 'Let this form be thus. Let this form not be thus.' > > Premise A2: Form is not self. > > Conclusion A1: Therefore, it is not possible for form to say 'Let this form > be thus. Let this form not be thus.' > > Conclusion A1': Therefore, it is not possible for one to say 'Let this form > be thus. Let this form not be thus.' > > With Premise A1 and Premise A2, we have Conclusion A1. > With Premise A1' and Premise A2, we have Conclusion A1'. > > Conclusion A1' is basically saying that one can not control form. > Premise A1 is true. Premise A1' seems to be true. However, Premise A1' has > a very subtle, implicit assumption that form is self. (what do we replace > in Premise A1 to make Premise A1'?) > > > Let's consider another set of premises and conclusions. > Premise B1: If form is self, then it is possible for form to say 'Let this > form be thus. Let this form not be thus.' > Premise B1': If form is self, then it is possible for one to say 'Let this > form be thus. Let this form not be thus.' > > Premise B2: It is not possible for form to say ''Let this form be thus. Let > this form not be thus." > Premise B2': It is not possible for one to say ''Let this form be thus. Let > this form not be thus." > > Conclusion B: Therefore, form is not self. > > We can reach Conclusion B with Premise B1 and Premise B2, or we can reach > the same Conclusion B with Premise B1' and Premise B2'. > > Premise B1 is true. Premise B1' seems to be very true. However, Premise > B1' has the same subtle, implicit assumption as Premise A1' does, that form > is self. This implicit assumption is what we would make in addition to the > explicit assumption "form is self" in Premise B1'. > > Premise B2 is nothing more than Conclusion A1. Premise B2' is nothing more > than Conclusion A1'. > > It seems that we can "prove" that form is not self in Conclusion B with > Premise B1 and Premise B2, or with Premise B1' and Premise B2'. However, > what we do is nothing more than restating Premise A2 in Conclusion B. Both > Premise B1' and Premise B2' have the implicit assumption that form is self. > > The pronoun "oneself" is a variation of the pronoun "self." > > Regards, > Victor > > > > ----- Original Message ----- > From: "Robert Epstein" > To: > Sent: Sunday, December 16, 2001 10:54 PM > Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts) > > > > Still a little confusing Victor. One and self are used synomously, but > one, self > > and 'form' are not. It is not only whether the candidate 'form' can > control > > 'form' or not, but whether oneself can control form. > > > > Oneself may = self, but the identity of 'oneself' [or what the self > consists of] > > is never identified. Form is excluded as being 'self', but this does not > settle > > the question of what 'oneself', which remains undefined, refers to. > > > > Therefore I assume it is a conventional expression, referring to the > generally > > accepted concept of a 'person' for the sake of discussion. > > > > Best, > > Robert Ep. > > > > ==================== > > > > > > --- Victor Yu wrote: > > > Hello Robert, > > > > > > Please note that both the term "one" and the term "self" are used as > > > pronouns. > > > > > > Please consider Argument A: > > > Premise A1: If form is not self, then it is not possible for form to say > > > 'Let this form be thus. Let this form not be thus.' > > > Premise A2: Form is not self. > > > Conclusion: Therefore, it is not possible for form to say 'Let this form > be > > > thus. Let this form not be thus.' > > > > > > Given > > > p: form is not self. > > > q: it is not possible for form to say 'Let this form be thus. Let this > form > > > not be thus.' > > > > > > If p, then q. > > > p. > > > Therefore, q. > > > > > > Argument A is a valid argument. > > > > > > > > > Please consider Argument B > > > Premise B1. If form is self, then it is possible for form to say 'Let > this > > > form be thus. Let this form not be thus.' > > > Premise B2. It is not possible for form to say ''Let this form be thus. > Let > > > this form not be thus." > > > Conclusion: Therefore, form is not self. > > > > > > Given > > > p: form is self. > > > q: it is possible for form to say 'Let this form be thus. Let this form > not > > > be thus.' > > > > > > If p, then q. > > > not q. > > > Therefore, not p. > > > > > > Argument B is also a valid argument. > > > > > > > > > Let's examine Argument C: > > > Premise C1. If form is self, then it is possible for form to say 'Let > this > > > form be thus. Let this form not be thus.' > > > Premise C2. It is not possible for one to say ''Let this form be thus. > Let > > > this form not be thus." > > > Conclusion: Therefore, form is not self. > > > > > > Given > > > p: form is self. > > > q: it is possible for form to say 'Let this form be thus. Let this form > not > > > be thus.' > > > r: it is possible for one to say ''Let this form be thus. Let this form > not > > > be thus." > > > > > > If p, then q. > > > not r. > > > Therefore, not p. > > > > > > Argument C is an invalid argument. Please note how similar statement q > and > > > statement r is. > > > > > > > > > Regards, > > > Victor 10079 From: Sarah Date: Sun Dec 16, 2001 10:41pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Memory, Objects, and Continuity Dear Howard, I have print-outs of several of your posts in front of me and firstly I’d like to say how much I enjoy all your refelctions. There are several I’ve wished to comment on, but this last week has been really hectic. Yesterday I caught up on some-much needed sleep after my last full day’s teaching on Saturday. After today’s class, I may even be celebrating;-) Anyway, I’ll just make a start (in a random order), maybe cut and paste and see how it goes on this ‘Howard day’;-) --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, all - > > At any time (from the Abhidhamma perspective) there is a unique citta > functioning, along with all the associated cetasikas, and a unique arammana. > All previous cittas are nonexistent, and no future cittas have arisen. > Moreover, there is no "observer" in the backgound watching the flow of cittas > > as an audience member watches the film frames on a screen. Yet, there is the > sense of continuity, flow, and change. All very well put, too. >It seems to me that this can only be > due to the function of *memory*. Memory (sa~n~na and thinking) are very important, but so are many other phenomena in this process too, I think. (seeing, visible object, conctact, concentration, attention and so on and so on and of course the 24 conditions.) >There is then the question of whether the > content of a memory is considered to be an arammana or not. In order for the > experience of continuity to occur, it is necessary, it seems to me, for the > memories of past cittas to occur simultaneously with the current citta (else > such memories are already gone). In that case, it becomes important whether > or not the content of a memory is considered an arammana, for if it is, then > there is more than one arammana per citta. As I understand arammana (object), besides the 5 sense objects (visible object and so on) this can also be dhammaaramma.na (mind-object) which can be a concept or a reality (nama or rupa), past, present or future....For example, at the moment of thinking, the thinking is real, but it thinks about a concept as arammana. As you suggest, it’ll depend on memory (and other conditions) what the story or concept is at any given moment and of course sanna is doing its job of marking with every citta. Still, there is only one arammana at any moment as object of any citta, regardless of whether it is visible object or concept as object of thinking. Of course, as we know, awareness can only be aware of realities and not of concepts, so there can be awareness of thinking or visible object say, but not of the concept. >Side question: Does the principle > of one arammana per citta occur in the Abhidhamma, itself, or only in the > commentaries? I believe both....Let me try to give a quote direct about object condition from the Pa.t.thaana (Conditional Relations) book of Abhidhamma (though I’d much rather have given one from the Comentaries;-): “ (i) visible object-base is related to eye-consciousness element and its associated states by object condition. (and so on for sound, odour etc... associated states will refer to cetasikas, I’m pretty sure,S.) “ (viii) Taking any state as object, these states, consciousness and mental factors, arise; those (former) states are related to those (latter) states by object condition.” PTS conditional Relations, p2 > From U Narada’s Guide to conditional Relations, it says under the 6th cognizable object that it consists of: “......the remaining twenty-one states of materiality, 89 consciousness, 53 mental factors, Nibbana and concept. Of these latter objectd, materiality, consciousness and mental factors are either of the past, present or future but Nibbana and concept are time-freed. So int this object condition there is no state that cannot be an object of consciousness and mental factors. This object condition pervades the teaching in the pali Canon.....” Time to move on, Sarah 10080 From: Sarah Date: Sun Dec 16, 2001 10:57pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Some Thoughts on Continuity, Blurs, and Cittas Dear Howard, I thought there were many fine reflections and perceptive comments in your excellent post below (retained in full as you posted it a while ago now). I'd just a couple of 'modifications'...: 1.You refer in the middle to cittas and cetasikas (or mindstates) as 'complex events'.....Doesn't 'event' suggest more than phenomena or momentary namas..? 2. At the end you suggest the theory about cittas and so on is only of use to 'the very advanced practitioner...' May I suggest, as others have, that again it is not the labels in themselves that are important, but the beginning to directly comprehend that what we take for self are these same cittas, cetaskas and rupas, in other words the phenomena (I'm trying hard to avoid realities for you, Howard;-) that experience an arammana and those phenomena which do not experience an arammana. Whatever language we use, if there is no direct understanding of these phenomena, then higher levels of wisdom which comprehend the impermanence and passing nature of phenomena cannot be developed. in other words, the path has to start 'right' from the very beginning. 3. I'm not so sure what the 'vast dynamic emptiness' in your last line is. As mentioned in my last post, awareness can only be aware of specific phenomena with characteristics. Surely, the above term is a concept rather than a citta, cetasika or rupa? Thanks for all the excellent points nonetheless;-)) Sarah --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, all - > > Some things have just occurred to me. Let's for the moment forget > about all the proposed details of cittas and cetasikas, and simply proceed > with informally accepting the general notion of cittas and cetasikas. > There is no observing self. At any moment, there is just the knowing > which is the function of the current citta, conditioned by all its cetasikas; > > and the citta and all its accompaniments are conditioned by previous cittas > and their characteristics. This means that whatever is the current cognitive > state is a carrying forward of an infinite history of acts of cognition, of > cognitive events, with much of the transmitted information in the form of > "accumulations" or "seeds", at a subliminal level. Whatever seeming of > continuity there may be is held within each moment of knowing, and there is a > > regular, lawful passing on of information, inclinations, and "flavors" from > mindstate to mindstate. These mindstates are not "things" in the substance > sense; they are complex events whose components are interdependently related > and all arising together in dependence on previous events, thus lacking in > independent existence or essence/core. > What am I saying here? What I'm saying is that the citta theory, if > not interpreted in a substantialist/annihilationist manner is not > *necessarily* off the mark, and that there may be good reason for me to look > a bit more carefully at it; not so much at all of the specific details > necessarily, but definitely at the general thrust of the matter. Will I still > > have problems with specifics, and especially with what I see as > substantialist and annihilationist tendencies? You bet I will! But I do find > myself a bit more accepting of the general framework than previously. > A separate question is to what extent such a theory is useful or > necessary for Buddhist practice. I tend to think that given that the theory > is more than just theory, it will become useful only to the very advanced > practitioner whose insight is already well developed. What is most important > at all stages of the path, it seems to me, is not a microscopic, analytic > observation of various phenomena, let alone a mere intellectual encyclopedic > detailing of them, but rather, a direct knowing of all dhammas *as* > impermanent, unsatisfactory, impersonal, and without core. We need to *see > through* and let go of the world of apparently independent, self-existing > things, and awaken to a direct seeing of that vast dynamic emptiness which is > > the way things are. > > With metta, > Howard > > /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble > in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a > phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 10081 From: Sarah Date: Sun Dec 16, 2001 11:00pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts) Hi Howard, Really well-put here below.....thanks in full agreement;-) (that was easy;-) S. > =========================== > ALL speech is conventional in the sense that it is a complex > convention tacitly agreed upon by people to use patterns of sounds in certain > > ways. Moreover, built into those speech conventions are functionalities which > > express our tendency towards reification, naming things as though they had > independent existence, and expressing a substantive subject-object dichotomy. > > > However, it is possible to use speech in a way to *point* to the way > things actually are. When the Buddha did so, speaking of impermanence and > emptiness and nibbana, his speech can be called "non-conventional". Others, > such as Zen masters, have used speech in unconventional ways, often poetic, > to sidestep the reificationist core of language use, to point beyond our > concepts, and towards reality. But the only *truly* non-conventional grasp of > > matters is done directly, and not through speech or concept. > > With metta, > Howard > > > /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble > in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a > phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 10082 From: Sarah Date: Sun Dec 16, 2001 11:36pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: What is Concentration Actually? Hi, Howard, (still me, I’m afraid ;-) --- upasaka@a... wrote:> ============================== > I've had a drop of experience in samatha bhavana, involving > concentration practice focusing the mind on a single meditation subject, and > also some practice in vipassana bhavana, involving what is sometimes called > moment-to-moment concentration practice. In my experience these types of > concentration are different, but, in their different ways, equally powerful. > In either of these cases, the concentration is, as you say, radically > different from "the normal sort of samadhi that (may) arise in day-to-day > life through concentrating on random object arising through thes > sense-doors". These are interesting comments and a lot more challenging for me to respond to than your last post;-) Firstly, as most people here know, ekaggata cetasika (one-pointedness, concentration) arises at every moment with each citta. If it arises with a wholesome citta, then it is also wholesome, but most of the time it is arising with unwholesome cittas (with ignorance, attachment or aversion) or with vipaka cittas (result of kamma). At each wholesome moment, whether it is sila, dana or bhavana, we can say it is a moment of samatha in that the consciousness is calm and free from unwholesomeness. However, for it to be a moment of samatha or vipassana bhavana, the consciousness must not only be wholesome but there must also be panna (rt understanding) at the respective level which knows what the object is. As I was trying to suggest in the ‘metta’ thread, when there is concentration on a single object or what you describe as ‘moment-to-moment concentration practice’ is there not a ‘wish to concentrate’ and an attachment to a certain result at these times? In other words, can we be sure the citta is really wholesome at these moments? Is this really the way that samatha and vipassana bhavana are developed? d > The point of my post, however, was to inquire into the technical > question of what is actually occurring, at a microscopic level of detail, > when concentration has increased. My conjecture was that the switching back > and forth among various (instances of) objects from citta to citta to citta > typical of ordinary experience is reduced, in the extreme case to a single > object (or near-replicates identified as "the same object") which is the > arammana in mental process after mental process. Howard, I understand very well what you are mentioning and also understand your experience on the Goenka retreat (I had a similar experience on a Goenka retreat in India in the early 1970s). Again, let me suggest that concentration can be of different levels and can have any object. It is usually unwholesome, but occasionally accompanies a wholesome citta. Whenever there is desire or intent to focus on a particular object to get a certain result, I don’t believe it is skilful. The Goenka experience and what I consider now to be the ‘unblocking of energy flows’ from a more Chinese perspective is rather similar to a kind of ‘sweeping’ experienced in Tai Chi or after Tai Chi practice or whilst having acupuncture which also works to ‘unblock’ the chi. I think it’s very, very useful, but with all due respect I seriously question whether it has anything to do with the development of right concentration as taught by the Buddha. Actually, it may seem at these times that there is a ‘single arammana’ of citta after citta, but I think this is only because there is so little awareness of other objects being experienced at these times such as the attachment or aversion, the heat or cold, sounds and so on. >Now, it seems almost certain > to me that such a curtailing of the diversity of objects of awareness, such > focusing and stabilization, is due to some functional characteristic or > cetasika within each mindstate becoming strengthened, in which case that > cetasika, itself, might be called "concentration". I am asking those who are > well versed in Abhidhamma what their understanding of the Abhidhamma "take" > is on this subject. I’m not at all confident of qualifying here, but until someone more qualified responds, my question would be why one would want to curtail ‘the diversity of objects of awareness’? Isn’t this still a wish to find a short-cut and an idea of self that can find one? As i understand it, the development of both samatha and vipassana is the develpment of detachment and understanding. So while, what you describe above, may include ‘strengthened’ concentration or certain objects being more likely to be taken as arammana, my question would be whether this is ‘right’ concentration at either level. OK, I’ll try to find one of your posts to agree with next, I think;-) Sarah p.s Nina has a helpful chapter on concentration in 'Cetasikas', but I'm sure you've read this and were not asking to have it re-quoted. 10083 From: Sarah Date: Sun Dec 16, 2001 11:40pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts) Howard, a real Howard day..but I'm running out of time now:--- upasaka@a... wrote: > ============================= > While I cannot give you the reference, I recall with certainty that > the Buddha stated in a sutta that he uses conventional language! If I can > find it, I will give you the reference. (I will bet the Robert K can provide > it.) DN9 recently quoted: "These are merely names, expressions, turns of speech, designations in common use in the world, which the Perfect One uses without misapprehending them." See also S.1.25 S. 10084 From: Sarah Date: Mon Dec 17, 2001 0:02am Subject: Re: [dsg] Beginnings, Endings, Sati, and Pa~n~na OK Howard, last one you'll be glad to hear;-) --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, all - > > Just a couple comments on some more musings of mine: As mindfulness > practice starts to bear fruit, one (they say! ;-) becomes quite aware of > beginnings and endings of mindstates, along with the observed object and the > accompanying cetasikas. Who says, I wonder?(no, not a pand q question, Victor, this time;-) I would say, as panna and sati begin to develop, characteristics of realities (sorry, but I'm speeding, Howard, so forgive any lack of niceties here) begin to be apparent, one at a time and just occasionally in between all the usual moha and the other 'junk'. In other words, as the practice starts to bear fruit, there isn't any awareness of beginnings and endings of mindstates, as I understand. What one takes for an understanding of impermanence is merely thinking and intellectual understanding. In other words, when someone knows a painful sensation starts or finishes, this isn't sati of satipatthana which is aware of a characteristic as a nama or rupa at that moment. The changing sensations in Tai Chi (which don't need a Buddha to explain) are not the highly developed panna as he taught, either. >Again, the question occurs as to *how* the beginnings > > and endings are observed, because there is no observer standing back watching > > the flow - each mindstate *is* "the observer". It occurs to me that the > answer lies in the meaning of 'sati', which literally means 'memory'. It > seems to me that via sati, each citta, besides observing its object, also has > > a more or less clear memory of just-passed cittas. The presence of such fresh > > memory together with the other content of the current citta constitutes a > "seeing" of change. This, then conditions subsequent cittas which involve > clear comprehension of that change, an instance of pa~n~na. It seems to me > that the memory aspect of sati is critical in all this. Thoughts, anyone? OK, I agree that sati and panna are the key. The reason that it is taught (in the Vism and texts) that the first stage is namarupa pariccheda-~nana ) is because first panna and sati have to know different namas and rupas very very precisely over and over again as those realities experiencing objects (seeing, hearing, thinking and mental factors) and those realities which are only ever experienced (sounds, tastes and so on). All are known as they are, as conditioned phenomena and there is no confusion with concepts which cannot be directly known. Only by understanding these phenomena, can the higher levels of panna develop to know the arammana more deeply, more precisely and more about the characteristics of them, such as the arising, 'staying' and falling away of each. Of course, memory is crucial in both right and wrong understanding, right and wrong 'marking' and in making it possible to reflect on any understanding that has or hasn't taken place. This is rather (read very) rushed, so please let me know if it sounds garbled and I'll try to do better later in the week. Speak soon, Sarah 10085 From: Robert Epstein Date: Mon Dec 17, 2001 0:23am Subject: Re: [dsg] Beginnings, Endings, Sati, and Pa~n~na --- Sarah wrote: > OK Howard, > > last one you'll be glad to hear;-) > > --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, all - > > > > Just a couple comments on some more musings of mine: As mindfulness > > practice starts to bear fruit, one (they say! ;-) becomes quite aware of > > beginnings and endings of mindstates, along with the observed object and the > > accompanying cetasikas. > > Who says, I wonder?(no, not a pand q question, Victor, this time;-) > > I would say, as panna and sati begin to develop, characteristics of realities > (sorry, but I'm speeding, Howard, so forgive any lack of niceties here) begin > to be apparent, one at a time and just occasionally in between all the usual > moha and the other 'junk'. > > In other words, as the practice starts to bear fruit, there isn't any awareness > of beginnings and endings of mindstates, as I understand. What one takes for an > understanding of impermanence is merely thinking and intellectual > understanding. In other words, when someone knows a painful sensation starts > or finishes, this isn't sati of satipatthana which is aware of a characteristic > as a nama or rupa at that moment. The changing sensations in Tai Chi (which > don't need a Buddha to explain) are not the highly developed panna as he > taught, either. > > >Again, the question occurs as to *how* the beginnings > > > > and endings are observed, because there is no observer standing back watching > > > > the flow - each mindstate *is* "the observer". It occurs to me that the > > answer lies in the meaning of 'sati', which literally means 'memory'. It > > seems to me that via sati, each citta, besides observing its object, also has > > > > a more or less clear memory of just-passed cittas. The presence of such fresh > > > > memory together with the other content of the current citta constitutes a > > "seeing" of change. This, then conditions subsequent cittas which involve > > clear comprehension of that change, an instance of pa~n~na. It seems to me > > that the memory aspect of sati is critical in all this. Thoughts, anyone? > > OK, I agree that sati and panna are the key. The reason that it is taught (in > the Vism and texts) that the first stage is namarupa pariccheda-~nana ) is > because first panna and sati have to know different namas and rupas very very > precisely over and over again as those realities experiencing objects (seeing, > hearing, thinking and mental factors) and those realities which are only ever > experienced (sounds, tastes and so on). All are known as they are, as > conditioned phenomena and there is no confusion with concepts which cannot be > directly known. Only by understanding these phenomena, can the higher levels of > panna develop to know the arammana more deeply, more precisely and more about > the characteristics of them, such as the arising, 'staying' and falling away of > each. > > Of course, memory is crucial in both right and wrong understanding, right and > wrong 'marking' and in making it possible to reflect on any understanding that > has or hasn't taken place. > > This is rather (read very) rushed, so please let me know if it sounds garbled > and I'll try to do better later in the week. > > Speak soon, > Sarah Hi Sarah. Well I liked it! And, yes, I am typing in my sleep. [It's after 3 am here. See you at 8! ] Best, Robert Ep. 10086 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Mon Dec 17, 2001 3:02am Subject: Re: [dsg] Ultimate realities (and khandhas) Howard --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Jon - > > In a message dated 12/15/01 2:50:58 AM Eastern Standard Time, > jonoabb@y... writes: > > > > > > This post, the previous one and the next 1 or 2 all deal with > 'khandhas'. > > Must be that khandha day. > > > ============================== > Argh!! I now insist that you, as list owner, commence monitoring > your > own posts so that there be no further abuse of this sort!! ;-)) I thought to myself at the time, if anyone gets it, Howard will (same pitiful standard!!). Good advice. I'll see to it. Jon 10087 From: egberdina Date: Mon Dec 17, 2001 3:03am Subject: A rupee for your rupa Hi all, When I think I am having a moment of awareness, I am not aware of phenomena as they are, but I am aware of phenomena as they are not. When the penny drops, I understand , this is not real. What I mean by that is: When the penny drops, I understand, that what I thought I was seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, feeling (note five, not six senses) is not what is out there, in reality, but in here , as recreated by a complex series of interdependant processes, including stimuli from very real, but very unknowable rupas. What exactly is a mental representation of a physical object but a mental object? What is my point? Rupas are not known as rupas, they are known as namas. Awareness can only be restricted to the content of the mind, the outside world is always an interpreted representation. I read an interesting line the other day : "We live in a three pound universe, the brain". If anyone doubts it, a visit to a mental hospital or clinic for brain-injured people would be enlightening. All the best Herman 10088 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Mon Dec 17, 2001 3:16am Subject: Re: [dsg] Ultimate realities (and khandhas) Mike --- "m. nease" wrote: > Jon, > > I must agree with Howard--I see no pu*~n~na in this > sort of thing whatever. No pa~n~na, i think you mean Mike (and no merit either, for that matter!). Jon > --- upasaka@a... wrote: > > Hi, Jon - > > > > In a message dated 12/15/01 2:50:58 AM Eastern > > Standard Time, > > jonoabb@y... writes: > > > > > > > > > > This post, the previous one and the next 1 or 2 > > all deal with 'khandhas'. > > > Must be that khandha day. > > > > > ============================== > > Argh!! I now insist that you, as list owner, > > commence monitoring your > > own posts so that there be no further abuse of this > > sort!! ;-)) > > > > With metta, > > Howard 10089 From: Victor Yu Date: Mon Dec 17, 2001 3:54am Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts) Hello Robert, Please read Conclusion B carefully. I am not sure if you understand the logic here. I am not sure what you mean by "Self[Form] = Not-Self[Form]." Regards, Victor ----- Original Message ----- From: "Robert Epstein" To: Sent: Monday, December 17, 2001 1:29 AM Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts) > Victor, > I more or less understand your logic here, but I don't see how it leads to the > conclusion that form is being posited as self. I think the 'oneself' in the > statement is an undisclosed identity. Which is what makes it conventional speech. > > In any case, if you were right, and 'oneself' was really being implied to be the > same form that is being disqualified from being self, you would be saying that the > Buddha is making the equation, Self[Form] = Not-Self[Form]. I assume you are not > claiming this. Or X(Y) = -X(Y), or X = -X. > > Robert > > ============= > > --- Victor Yu wrote: > > Hello Robert, > > > > It is confusing, and there is a very subtle point that you probably have > > noticed. > > > > Let's consider: > > Premise A1: If form is not self, then it is not possible for form to say > > 'Let this form be thus. Let this form not be thus.' > > > > and > > > > Premise A1': If form is not self, then it is not possible for one to say > > 'Let this form be thus. Let this form not be thus.' > > > > Premise A2: Form is not self. > > > > Conclusion A1: Therefore, it is not possible for form to say 'Let this form > > be thus. Let this form not be thus.' > > > > Conclusion A1': Therefore, it is not possible for one to say 'Let this form > > be thus. Let this form not be thus.' > > > > With Premise A1 and Premise A2, we have Conclusion A1. > > With Premise A1' and Premise A2, we have Conclusion A1'. > > > > Conclusion A1' is basically saying that one can not control form. > > Premise A1 is true. Premise A1' seems to be true. However, Premise A1' has > > a very subtle, implicit assumption that form is self. (what do we replace > > in Premise A1 to make Premise A1'?) > > > > > > Let's consider another set of premises and conclusions. > > Premise B1: If form is self, then it is possible for form to say 'Let this > > form be thus. Let this form not be thus.' > > Premise B1': If form is self, then it is possible for one to say 'Let this > > form be thus. Let this form not be thus.' > > > > Premise B2: It is not possible for form to say ''Let this form be thus. Let > > this form not be thus." > > Premise B2': It is not possible for one to say ''Let this form be thus. Let > > this form not be thus." > > > > Conclusion B: Therefore, form is not self. > > > > We can reach Conclusion B with Premise B1 and Premise B2, or we can reach > > the same Conclusion B with Premise B1' and Premise B2'. > > > > Premise B1 is true. Premise B1' seems to be very true. However, Premise > > B1' has the same subtle, implicit assumption as Premise A1' does, that form > > is self. This implicit assumption is what we would make in addition to the > > explicit assumption "form is self" in Premise B1'. > > > > Premise B2 is nothing more than Conclusion A1. Premise B2' is nothing more > > than Conclusion A1'. > > > > It seems that we can "prove" that form is not self in Conclusion B with > > Premise B1 and Premise B2, or with Premise B1' and Premise B2'. However, > > what we do is nothing more than restating Premise A2 in Conclusion B. Both > > Premise B1' and Premise B2' have the implicit assumption that form is self. > > > > The pronoun "oneself" is a variation of the pronoun "self." > > > > Regards, > > Victor > > > > > > > > ----- Original Message ----- > > From: "Robert Epstein" > > To: > > Sent: Sunday, December 16, 2001 10:54 PM > > Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts) > > > > > > > Still a little confusing Victor. One and self are used synomously, but > > one, self > > > and 'form' are not. It is not only whether the candidate 'form' can > > control > > > 'form' or not, but whether oneself can control form. > > > > > > Oneself may = self, but the identity of 'oneself' [or what the self > > consists of] > > > is never identified. Form is excluded as being 'self', but this does not > > settle > > > the question of what 'oneself', which remains undefined, refers to. > > > > > > Therefore I assume it is a conventional expression, referring to the > > generally > > > accepted concept of a 'person' for the sake of discussion. > > > > > > Best, > > > Robert Ep. > > > > > > ==================== 10090 From: yuzhonghao Date: Mon Dec 17, 2001 5:14am Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts) Hello Robert, The terms "one", "oneself", "self" are all pronouns for designation. To make it more clearer, I will just use the term "self" in place of "one" Please consider the questions: Comparing Premise A1 and Premise A1', what is the difference between this two premises? In Premise A1', what is being replaced from Premise A1? Premise A1: If form is not self, then it is not possible for form to say 'Let this form be thus. Let this form not be thus.' Premise A1': If form is not self, then it is not possible for self to say 'Let this form be thus. Let this form not be thus.' How did you get the idea that I am claiming the Buddha is making the equation Self[Form] = Not-Self[Form] or I am claiming X(Y) = -X(Y), or X = -X? Regards, Victor --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Robert Epstein wrote: > Victor, > I more or less understand your logic here, but I don't see how it leads to the > conclusion that form is being posited as self. I think the 'oneself' in the > statement is an undisclosed identity. Which is what makes it conventional speech. > > In any case, if you were right, and 'oneself' was really being implied to be the > same form that is being disqualified from being self, you would be saying that the > Buddha is making the equation, Self[Form] = Not-Self[Form]. I assume you are not > claiming this. Or X(Y) = -X(Y), or X = -X. > > Robert > > ============= > > --- Victor Yu wrote: > > Hello Robert, > > > > It is confusing, and there is a very subtle point that you probably have > > noticed. > > > > Let's consider: > > Premise A1: If form is not self, then it is not possible for form to say > > 'Let this form be thus. Let this form not be thus.' > > > > and > > > > Premise A1': If form is not self, then it is not possible for one to say > > 'Let this form be thus. Let this form not be thus.' > > > > Premise A2: Form is not self. > > > > Conclusion A1: Therefore, it is not possible for form to say 'Let this form > > be thus. Let this form not be thus.' > > > > Conclusion A1': Therefore, it is not possible for one to say 'Let this form > > be thus. Let this form not be thus.' > > > > With Premise A1 and Premise A2, we have Conclusion A1. > > With Premise A1' and Premise A2, we have Conclusion A1'. > > > > Conclusion A1' is basically saying that one can not control form. > > Premise A1 is true. Premise A1' seems to be true. However, Premise A1' has > > a very subtle, implicit assumption that form is self. (what do we replace > > in Premise A1 to make Premise A1'?) > > > > > > Let's consider another set of premises and conclusions. > > Premise B1: If form is self, then it is possible for form to say 'Let this > > form be thus. Let this form not be thus.' > > Premise B1': If form is self, then it is possible for one to say 'Let this > > form be thus. Let this form not be thus.' > > > > Premise B2: It is not possible for form to say ''Let this form be thus. Let > > this form not be thus." > > Premise B2': It is not possible for one to say ''Let this form be thus. Let > > this form not be thus." > > > > Conclusion B: Therefore, form is not self. > > > > We can reach Conclusion B with Premise B1 and Premise B2, or we can reach > > the same Conclusion B with Premise B1' and Premise B2'. > > > > Premise B1 is true. Premise B1' seems to be very true. However, Premise > > B1' has the same subtle, implicit assumption as Premise A1' does, that form > > is self. This implicit assumption is what we would make in addition to the > > explicit assumption "form is self" in Premise B1'. > > > > Premise B2 is nothing more than Conclusion A1. Premise B2' is nothing more > > than Conclusion A1'. > > > > It seems that we can "prove" that form is not self in Conclusion B with > > Premise B1 and Premise B2, or with Premise B1' and Premise B2'. However, > > what we do is nothing more than restating Premise A2 in Conclusion B. Both > > Premise B1' and Premise B2' have the implicit assumption that form is self. > > > > The pronoun "oneself" is a variation of the pronoun "self." > > > > Regards, > > Victor 10091 From: abhidhammika Date: Mon Dec 17, 2001 6:58am Subject: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein Dear Robert How are you? Thank you for your clarification on your understanding of the term "sentient". However, I happened, and will continue, to use the term "sentient" and the expression "sentient existence" to mean any living organism, or a life form, which would be an equivalent Pali term "satta" or Vedic Sanskrit term "sattva". Pali Text Society's Pali-English Dictionary defines the term "Satta" as a living being, creature, a sentient & rational being, a person. Please see column 1, page 673 in the dictionary. I also used the term "sentient existence" as the equivalent Pali term "bhava" or life. I wrote the following in my Parinibbaana Subcommentary (Part Two): "The term `bhavanga' is made up of two words `bhava+anga'. Bhava means life or sentient existence. Anga means component or cause. Thus, bhavanga means life-cause or life-component, or the cause of sentient existence. Bhavanga cittam is the consciousness that makes the sentient existence possible. It causes and perpetuates sentient existence." Therefore, the meaning of the term "sentient" in my subcommentary is not limited to the five sensory consciousnesses only. In the language of abhidhamma, the expression "sentient existence" covers both the five sensory consciousnesses (pancadvaara viññaana) and the mental consciousness (manodvaara viññaana). Thus, when I wrote "The commentary suggests parinibbaana as nullity of sentient existence." in my subcommentary, I meant that parinibbaana is free from any state of living being or any underlying beingness or awareness as you proposed. Therefore, your arguments still need to take into consideration the meaning of the term "sentient existence" as used in my subcommentary in line with Pali Text Society's Pali-English Dictionary. Of course, I will consider your argumemts written from the perspective of the narrower limited meaning of the term "sentient" as sensory. I will also look forward to your arguments based on wider meaning of the term "sentient" covering both sensory and mental consciousnesses. If I haven't answered them in my previous two parts of the subcommentary, I will respond to them in my subsequent subcommentaries. With regards, Suan --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Robert Epstein wrote: > Dear Suan, > I did misread your comments to say 'sensual' rather than 'sensory' existence, > which is very strange, because when I *read* it [I thought] I thought to myself > 'well that is slightly odd, I'm sure he means the same as *sentient* existence, > but in fact you didn't even write that. In any case, I assumed it meant something > similar. Here is the dictionary on sentient: > > Having a faculty, or faculties, of sensation and perception. > > and as a noun: > > One who has the faculty of perception; a sentient being. > > In this context, that is what I assumed was meant by 'sensual', so in fact, my > meaning in the argument below is exactly the same. > > However, I apologize for misreading the word. And I look forward to your response > when you have the chance. > > Best, > Robert Ep. > > =================== > > --- abhidhammika wrote: > > > > > > > > Dear Robert > > > > How are you? Thank you for your reply message. > > > > I had a chance to read your reply just now. I missed my Internet > > sessions previous night due to technical problems in my ISP's servers. > > > > You wrote: > > > > "Later on you say that there is a 'nullity of sensual existence'. Now > > to me, experience and 'sensual existence' are not synonymous." > > > > Could you please check the spelling "sensual existence"? > > > > In my post, I wrote "nullity of sentient existence", (not sensual > > existence). > > > > So, if your arguments in the present post were based on "nullity of > > sensual existence", you now may need to rewrite your arguments based > > on "nullity of sentient existence." > > > > I will read the rest of your present post, and other posts later. I > > am very sleepy now (2 a.m in Canberra). > > > > With regards, > > > > Suan > > > > > > > > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Robert Epstein wrote: > > > Dear Suan, > > > Sorry to take so long to get back to you on this good subcommentary. > > > My remarks are dispersed below: > > > > > > --- abhidhammika wrote: > > > > > > > > Dear Dhamma Friends > > > > > > > > The following is the second part of Parinibbana Subcommentary > > written > > > > in response to the questions and statements of Upasaka Howard, > > Robert > > > > Epstein, and Mike Neace. In this second part of the > > subcommentary, I > > > > directly address the statements of Robert Epstein. Here, I also > > > > include the meaning of the last mind, which partly satisfies > > > > Howard's desire to know the exact meaning of consciousness. > > > > > > > > > > > > 1. PARINIBBANA COMMENTARY PALI > > > > > > > > "Parinibbutaa naama arahattapattito patthaaya kilesavattassa > > > > khepitattaa sa-upaadisesena, carimacittanirodhena > > khandhavattassa > > > > khepitattaa anupaadisesena caati dviihi parinibbaanehi > > > > parinibbutaa, anupaadaano viya padiipo apannattikabhaavaam > > gataati > > > > attho." > > > > > > > > "`Parinibbutaa' is the ultimate cool by means of two-way complete > > > > extinguishments, one with the existential residues emptied of > > > > defilement machinery ever since attainment of Arahatta awakening, > > and > > > > the other without the existential residues emptied of > > psychophysical > > > > machinery by termination of the last mind (the dying > > consciousness). > > > > It has the meaning of reaching the state of the undefined reality > > > > like the lamp without fuel." > > > > > > > > > > > > Carimacittanirodho – termination of the last mind > > > > Apannattikabhaavo - the state of undefined reality > > > > > > > > > > > > 2. PARINIBBANA SUBCOMMENTARY Part Two 10092 From: Date: Mon Dec 17, 2001 3:47am Subject: Re: [dsg] Memory, Objects, and Continuity Hi, Mike - In the following you inquire, first quoting me: > In that case, it > becomes important whether > or not the content of a memory is considered an > aramma.na, for if it is, then > there is more than one aramma.na per citta. Not sure if I understand you here. If a concept (memory) is aarammana for manovi~n~naa.na, what other aarammana is present? ============================== My point was the following: Any time there is the "seeing" of the current object as a continuation of a previous one, or, for that matter, as different from a previous one, it requires a comparison of the current object with the previous one (presumably via memory, i.e., via sa~n~na and/or sati), and that requires the current object and the remembered object to both be "present". If that is so - and to me it seems unavoidable, and if the remembered object is considered an arammana, then there are two arammanas present, the remembered one and the current one. Unless they are both present in mind, there is no way to compare. If both the previous object and its memory are gone, then the current citta does not know of that object! Incidentally, subsequent to writing the post you quote below, I looked at Nyanaponika's little book on Abhidhamma. In an appendix on memory, he also raises the need for memories of objects to co-occur with the discernment of an object in a given citta. He makes the very same point as I am making here. (So, I'm not in bad company! ;-)) He doesn't raise the issue, however, of how that effects the notion of one arammana per citta. I have just re-thought the "unavoidablility" of the co-occurrence of the remembered object and the current. It *may* be avoidable after all, although I'm not at all certain on this issue. (Sorry to be doing my thinking "out loud", as it were.) One possibility that just occured to me is based on the time-sharing model: Object A is discerned by citta A, then object B is discerned by citta B, and the occurrence of these two cittas serves as condition for the later arising of citta C whose object is the "knowing" of the transition from object A to object B. This seems possible to me, thiugh a trifle weak. The co-ocurrence of an object of memory with another currently observed object seems much simpler. However, what *is* the case is not always simpler than what one might imagine could be the case. Just a clarification here with regard to my purpose in all this: I am neither trying to disprove nor vindicate Abhidhammic notions, but rather to understand them and their implications, to grasp the explanatory capability of Abhidhamma. The Buddha did say to accept something only after examining it and seeing that it accords with direct experience, and part of doing that is to see how it accounts for actual experience, not in a hand-waiving manner and not just by much use of Pali terms, but by really digging in and seeing what the implications are. With metta, Howard In a message dated 12/16/01 6:54:37 PM Eastern Standard Time, mlnease@y... writes: > > Hi Howard, > > --- upasaka@a... wrote: > > > At any time (from the Abhidhamma perspective) > > there is a unique citta > > functioning, along with all the associated > > cetasikas, and a unique arammana. > > All previous cittas are nonexistent, and no future > > cittas have arisen. > > Moreover, there is no "observer" in the backgound > > watching the flow of cittas > > as an audience member watches the film frames on a > > screen. Yet, there is the > > sense of continuity, flow, and change. It seems to > > me that this can only be > > due to the function of *memory*.There is then the > > question of whether the > > content of a memory is considered to be an arammana > > or not. In order for the > > experience of continuity to occur, it is necessary, > > it seems to me, for the > > memories of past cittas to occur simultaneously with > > the current citta (else > > such memories are already gone). > > As I understand it, when a citta takes a memory as an > aarammana, sa~n~naa remembers the aaramma.na (this > citta is manovi~n~naa.na, which can take a concept as > an aaramma.na). > > > In that case, it > > becomes important whether > > or not the content of a memory is considered an > > aramma.na, for if it is, then > > there is more than one aramma.na per citta. > > Not sure if I understand you here. If a concept > (memory) is aarammana for manovi~n~naa.na, what other > aarammana is present? > > > Side > > question: Does the principle > > of one arammana per citta occur in the Abhidhamma, > > itself, or only in the > > commentaries? > > Not sure about this, but I believe that the Theravaada > considers some of the commentaries (those recited at > the First Council) to be part of the Abhidhamma. I > don't know if this idea occurs in the Abhidhamma > outside the commentaries or not, though... > > mike > /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 10093 From: Date: Mon Dec 17, 2001 4:12am Subject: Re: [dsg] Memory, Objects, and Continuity Hi, Sarah - Thanks for the following. I don't see, however, where this implies only one object per citta. Where does it say that the object-relation is one-to-one? With metta, Howard In a message dated 12/17/01 1:42:08 AM Eastern Standard Time, sarahdhhk@y... writes: > >Side question: Does the principle > > of one arammana per citta occur in the Abhidhamma, itself, or only in the > > > commentaries? > > I believe both....Let me try to give a quote direct about object condition > from > the Pa.t.thaana (Conditional Relations) book of Abhidhamma (though I’d much > rather have given one from the Comentaries;-): > > “ (i) visible object-base is related to eye-consciousness element and its > associated states by object condition. > > (and so on for sound, odour etc... associated states will refer to > cetasikas, > I’m pretty sure,S.) > > “ (viii) Taking any state as object, these states, consciousness and mental > factors, arise; those (former) states are related to those (latter) states > by > object condition.â€? PTS conditional Relations, p2 > > > From U Narada’s Guide to conditional Relations, it says under the 6th > cognizable object that it consists of: > > “......the remaining twenty-one states of materiality, 89 consciousness, 53 > mental factors, Nibbana and concept. Of these latter objectd, materiality, > consciousness and mental factors are either of the past, present or future > but > Nibbana and concept are time-freed. > So int this object condition there is no state that cannot be an object of > consciousness and mental factors. This object condition pervades the > teaching > in the pali Canon.....â€? > /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 10094 From: Date: Mon Dec 17, 2001 4:24am Subject: Re: [dsg] Some Thoughts on Continuity, Blurs, and Cittas Hi, Sarah - In a message dated 12/17/01 1:57:44 AM Eastern Standard Time, sarahdhhk@y... writes: > Dear Howard, > > I thought there were many fine reflections and perceptive comments in your > excellent post below (retained in full as you posted it a while ago now). > > I'd just a couple of 'modifications'...: > > 1.You refer in the middle to cittas and cetasikas (or mindstates) as > 'complex > events'.....Doesn't 'event' suggest more than phenomena or momentary > namas..? > ------------------------------------------------ Howard: Well, I don't know. I should think that the discerning of an object constitutes an event. ------------------------------------------------- > > 2. At the end you suggest the theory about cittas and so on is only of use > to > 'the very advanced practitioner...' May I suggest, as others have, that > again > it is not the labels in themselves that are important, but the beginning to > directly comprehend that what we take for self are these same cittas, > cetaskas > and rupas, in other words the phenomena (I'm trying hard to avoid realities > for > you, Howard;-) that experience an arammana and those phenomena which do not > experience an arammana. > > Whatever language we use, if there is no direct understanding of these > phenomena, then higher levels of wisdom which comprehend the impermanence > and > passing nature of phenomena cannot be developed. in other words, the path > has > to start 'right' from the very beginning. > ------------------------------------------------- Howard: My point was that given that the Abhidhammic notions are correct, they only become particularly useful when one's vipassana bhavana has proceeded to the level at which there can be direct experiencing of the phenomena detailed in Abhidhamma. Then it serves as a guidebook or map, but before that it is just interesting theory. ------------------------------------------------- > > 3. I'm not so sure what the 'vast dynamic emptiness' in your last line is. > As > mentioned in my last post, awareness can only be aware of specific > phenomena > with characteristics. Surely, the above term is a concept rather than a > citta, > cetasika or rupa? > ------------------------------------------------------ Howard: Consider my words to be a feeble attempt to guess at the mind of an arahant. ----------------------------------------------------- > > Thanks for all the excellent points nonetheless;-)) > > Sarah ============================= With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 10095 From: Date: Mon Dec 17, 2001 5:12am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: What is Concentration Actually? Hi, Sarah - In a message dated 12/17/01 2:38:11 AM Eastern Standard Time, sarahdhhk@y... writes: > Hi, Howard, > > (still me, I’m afraid ;-) -------------------------------------------------- Howard: Always a pleasure, Sarah. :-) -------------------------------------------------- > > --- upasaka@a... wrote:> > ============================== > > I've had a drop of experience in samatha bhavana, involving > > concentration practice focusing the mind on a single meditation subject, > and > > also some practice in vipassana bhavana, involving what is sometimes > called > > moment-to-moment concentration practice. In my experience these types of > > concentration are different, but, in their different ways, equally > powerful. > > In either of these cases, the concentration is, as you say, radically > > different from "the normal sort of samadhi that (may) arise in day-to-day > > > life through concentrating on random object arising through thes > > sense-doors". > > These are interesting comments and a lot more challenging for me to respond > to > than your last post;-) > > Firstly, as most people here know, ekaggata cetasika (one-pointedness, > concentration) arises at every moment with each citta. If it arises with a > wholesome citta, then it is also wholesome, but most of the time it is > arising > with unwholesome cittas (with ignorance, attachment or aversion) or with > vipaka > cittas (result of kamma). > > At each wholesome moment, whether it is sila, dana or bhavana, we can say > it is > a moment of samatha in that the consciousness is calm and free from > unwholesomeness. However, for it to be a moment of samatha or vipassana > bhavana, the consciousness must not only be wholesome but there must also > be > panna (rt understanding) at the respective level which knows what the > object > is. > > As I was trying to suggest in the ‘metta’ thread, when there is > concentration > on a single object or what you describe as ‘moment-to-moment concentration > practice’ is there not a ‘wish to concentrate’ and an attachment to a > certain > result at these times? ---------------------------------------------------------- Howard: There are virtually always wishes for one thing or another. If we wait for no wishes we will wait forever! ---------------------------------------------------------- In other words, can we be sure the citta is really> > wholesome at these moments? --------------------------------------------------------- Howard: We can rarely be much sure of anything! The more carefully we look, with mindfulness and concentration, the greater the chance of having some certainty. --------------------------------------------------------- Is this really the way that samatha and vipassana> > bhavana are developed? --------------------------------------------------------- Howard: Calm created by observing sila supports concentration. Concentration is cultivated by concentrating. The more concentration (on an appropriate object), the more calm, and the more calm, the less craving and the greater concentration. These all feed into each other. I know this by having done it. Insight comes from clear seeing. Calm and concentration support the cultivation of insight, and insight supports calm and concentration. Again, I have directly seen this. --------------------------------------------------------- > > d > The point of my post, however, was to inquire into the technical > > > question of what is actually occurring, at a microscopic level of detail, > > > when concentration has increased. My conjecture was that the switching > back > > and forth among various (instances of) objects from citta to citta to > citta > > typical of ordinary experience is reduced, in the extreme case to a > single > > object (or near-replicates identified as "the same object") which is the > > arammana in mental process after mental process. > > Howard, I understand very well what you are mentioning and also understand > your > experience on the Goenka retreat (I had a similar experience on a Goenka > retreat in India in the early 1970s). > > Again, let me suggest that concentration can be of different levels and can > have any object. It is usually unwholesome, but occasionally accompanies a > wholesome citta. Whenever there is desire or intent to focus on a > particular > object to get a certain result, I don’t believe it is skilful. > ------------------------------------------------------------ Howard: If one gets hung up on results while meditating, there won't be any. But the reason for meditating to begin with is the DESIRE to purify the mind. We begin where we are, not where we might *like* to be. ------------------------------------------------------------ The Goenka> > experience and what I consider now to be the ‘unblocking of energy flows’ > from > a more Chinese perspective is rather similar to a kind of ‘sweeping’ > experienced in Tai Chi or after Tai Chi practice or whilst having > acupuncture > which also works to ‘unblock’ the chi. I think it’s very, very useful, > but > with all due respect I seriously question whether it has anything to do > with > the development of right concentration as taught by the Buddha. > --------------------------------------------------------- Howard: Well, when engaged in such meditation, one is being mindful of the body and of sensation, as well as reactions (sankhara) and thoughts, and ones mindfulness, calm, and concentration become *very* strong. That doesn't strike me as half bad! ;-)) Incidentally, I have had "fallout" from my Goenka retreat, in terms of insight and in terms of dealing with adversity, that has been of *inestimable* value! ------------------------------------------------------------ > > Actually, it may seem at these times that there is a ‘single arammana’ of > citta > after citta, but I think this is only because there is so little awareness > of > other objects being experienced at these times such as the attachment or > aversion, the heat or cold, sounds and so on. > ------------------------------------------------------------- Howard: Well, I think that reduction to a *single* arammana in citta after citta is an extreme of concentration. It occurs, if things go well, in samatha meditation, but not in vipassana meditation. I think that, most generally, concentration consists of a *reduction* of the number of different arammanas. It is a focussing of some degree. BTW, it is my experience that during a period of really deep concentration, both craving and aversion are suppressed - are temporarily inactive. --------------------------------------------------------------- > > >Now, it seems almost certain > > to me that such a curtailing of the diversity of objects of awareness, > such > > focusing and stabilization, is due to some functional characteristic or > > cetasika within each mindstate becoming strengthened, in which case that > > cetasika, itself, might be called "concentration". I am asking those who > are > > well versed in Abhidhamma what their understanding of the Abhidhamma > "take" > > is on this subject. > > I’m not at all confident of qualifying here, but until someone more > qualified > responds, my question would be why one would want to curtail ‘the diversity > of > objects of awareness’? Isn’t this still a wish to find a short-cut and an > idea > of self that can find one? As i understand it, the development of both > samatha > and vipassana is the develpment of detachment and understanding. So while, > what > you describe above, may include ‘strengthened’ concentration or certain > objects > being more likely to be taken as arammana, my question would be whether > this is > ‘right’ concentration at either level. > ------------------------------------------------------------- Howard: Concentration, right or wrong, is a focussing. Such focussing on one object, or on a small number of objects, when relatively free of hindrances, leads to calm and increased clarity, it and also makes investigation easier. Without such focussing, the mind is distracted. ------------------------------------------------------------- > > OK, I’ll try to find one of your posts to agree with next, I think;-) > > Sarah > > p.s Nina has a helpful chapter on concentration in 'Cetasikas', but I'm > sure > you've read this and were not asking to have it re-quoted. =============================== Thanks for your reply, Sarah. With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 10096 From: Date: Mon Dec 17, 2001 5:15am Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts) Hi, Sarah - In a message dated 12/17/01 2:41:31 AM Eastern Standard Time, sarahdhhk@y... writes: > > Howard, > > a real Howard day..but I'm running out of time now:--- upasaka@a... > wrote: > > ============================= > > While I cannot give you the reference, I recall with certainty > that > > the Buddha stated in a sutta that he uses conventional language! If I can > > > find it, I will give you the reference. (I will bet the Robert K can > provide > > it.) > > DN9 recently quoted: > > "These are merely names, expressions, turns of speech, designations in > common > use in the world, which the Perfect One uses without misapprehending them." > See > also S.1.25 > > S. > ============================= Thank you! YES!! This is exactly what I had in mind! With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 10097 From: Date: Mon Dec 17, 2001 5:24am Subject: Re: [dsg] Beginnings, Endings, Sati, and Pa~n~na Hi, Sarah - In part of the following you write: > In other words, as the practice starts to bear fruit, there isn't any > awareness > of beginnings and endings of mindstates, as I understand. What one takes > for an > understanding of impermanence is merely thinking and intellectual > understanding. ========================= This I DO NOT GET! As I understand it, the essence of wisdom (short of path and fruition consciousness) is the direct apprehension of the three characteristics of anicca, dukkha, and anatta. With metta, Howard In a message dated 12/17/01 3:02:28 AM Eastern Standard Time, sarahdhhk@y... writes: > > OK Howard, > > last one you'll be glad to hear;-) > > --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, all - > > > > Just a couple comments on some more musings of mine: As > mindfulness > > practice starts to bear fruit, one (they say! ;-) becomes quite aware of > > beginnings and endings of mindstates, along with the observed object and > the > > accompanying cetasikas. > > Who says, I wonder?(no, not a pand q question, Victor, this time;-) > > I would say, as panna and sati begin to develop, characteristics of > realities > (sorry, but I'm speeding, Howard, so forgive any lack of niceties here) > begin > to be apparent, one at a time and just occasionally in between all the > usual > moha and the other 'junk'. > > In other words, as the practice starts to bear fruit, there isn't any > awareness > of beginnings and endings of mindstates, as I understand. What one takes > for an > understanding of impermanence is merely thinking and intellectual > understanding. In other words, when someone knows a painful sensation > starts > or finishes, this isn't sati of satipatthana which is aware of a > characteristic > as a nama or rupa at that moment. The changing sensations in Tai Chi (which > don't need a Buddha to explain) are not the highly developed panna as he > taught, either. > > >Again, the question occurs as to *how* the beginnings > > > > and endings are observed, because there is no observer standing back > watching > > > > the flow - each mindstate *is* "the observer". It occurs to me that the > > answer lies in the meaning of 'sati', which literally means 'memory'. It > > seems to me that via sati, each citta, besides observing its object, also > has > > > > a more or less clear memory of just-passed cittas. The presence of such > fresh > > > > memory together with the other content of the current citta constitutes a > > > "seeing" of change. This, then conditions subsequent cittas which involve > > > clear comprehension of that change, an instance of pa~n~na. It seems to > me > > that the memory aspect of sati is critical in all this. Thoughts, anyone? > > OK, I agree that sati and panna are the key. The reason that it is taught > (in > the Vism and texts) that the first stage is namarupa pariccheda-~nana ) is > because first panna and sati have to know different namas and rupas very > very > precisely over and over again as those realities experiencing objects > (seeing, > hearing, thinking and mental factors) and those realities which are only > ever > experienced (sounds, tastes and so on). All are known as they are, as > conditioned phenomena and there is no confusion with concepts which cannot > be > directly known. Only by understanding these phenomena, can the higher > levels of > panna develop to know the arammana more deeply, more precisely and more > about > the characteristics of them, such as the arising, 'staying' and falling > away of > each. > > Of course, memory is crucial in both right and wrong understanding, right > and > wrong 'marking' and in making it possible to reflect on any understanding > that > has or hasn't taken place. > > This is rather (read very) rushed, so please let me know if it sounds > garbled > and I'll try to do better later in the week. > > Speak soon, > Sarah > > /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 10098 From: Date: Mon Dec 17, 2001 5:28am Subject: Re: [dsg] Memory, Objects, and Continuity Hi Howard, <<< There is then the question of whether the content of a memory is considered to be an arammana or not. In order for the experience of continuity to occur, it is necessary, it seems to me, for the memories of past cittas to occur simultaneously with the current citta (else such memories are already gone). In that case, it becomes important whether or not the content of a memory is considered an arammana, for if it is, then there is more than one arammana per citta. >>> Let me put in my two cent worth comments. As I understand, the sanna and citta in the same citta always have the same aramma. From the 4 characters of things, sanna manifest as registration (marking), retention, retrieval and recall. Citta is a leader in knowing and sanna is a leader in its subset of function. Sanna can mark and register pretty much every aramma paramattha, pannatti and from my reading nibbhana. <<< My point was the following: Any time there is the "seeing" of the current object as a continuation of a previous one, or, for that matter, as different from a previous one, it requires a comparison of the current object with the previous one (presumably via memory, i.e., via sa~n~na and/or sati), and that requires the current object and the remembered object to both be "present". >>> I don't know to me sanna is different from sati, sati is an awareness and sanna is a mark. Sati is aware of nama or rupa, sanna marks and registers it (nama or rupa), at the same time citta leads a role of knowing it all. <<<>>>> Well, seemed to be this a long long complicated process both in sense of dhamma or neurocircuitry. ( I don't know I personally prefer to call abhidhamma as dhamma, to me it the same thing, thing that is going on in daily life, dhamma is complicate and hard to see, so is abhidhamma. Who sees dhamma sees abhidhamma as well, I think :) ) Sanna does its function by basically marking. Sanna marks everything paramattha (citta, cetasika, rupa and nibbhana), samuha-sanna (grouping or mass), atta-sanna(entity, aggregation-->kaya or self( roots from the previous two)), attha-sanna(memory of meaning), nama-sanna(memory of name) and so on.... So besides paramattha sanna marks pannatti. Just my thought, when citta has sanna as an arammana, sanna marks the previous sanna as its objects as well. To compare or see the change of thing needs a lot of coordination between citta(vinnana-khandha), sanna(sanna-khandha), vedana(vedana-khandha), other cetasikas(sakhara-khandha) as well as rupa(rupa-khandha) at times. I think much later citta does the function of recognition of the difference or the meaning. Well, seem to me that this is an extremely rapid and complicated process. Just my thought, Num 10099 From: Date: Mon Dec 17, 2001 5:47am Subject: Re: [dsg] Ultimate realities (and khandhas) Hi, Jon - In a message dated 12/17/01 6:03:31 AM Eastern Standard Time, jonoabb@y... writes: > I thought to myself at the time, if anyone gets it, Howard will (same > pitiful standard!!). =========================== Always good to keep our standards low, Jon. Much easier to attain that way! ;-)) With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 10100 From: Robert Epstein Date: Mon Dec 17, 2001 11:39am Subject: Re: [dsg] Ultimate realities (and khandhas) --- Jonothan Abbott wrote: > Howard > > --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Jon - > > > > In a message dated 12/15/01 2:50:58 AM Eastern Standard Time, > > jonoabb@y... writes: > > > > > > > > > > This post, the previous one and the next 1 or 2 all deal with > > 'khandhas'. > > > Must be that khandha day. > > > > > ============================== > > Argh!! I now insist that you, as list owner, commence monitoring > > your > > own posts so that there be no further abuse of this sort!! ;-)) > > I thought to myself at the time, if anyone gets it, Howard will (same > pitiful standard!!). > > Good advice. I'll see to it. > Aiiiieeeeee! I just got it!! It's skandhalous as we say in Maha neck of the woods. Robert Ep. 10101 From: Robert Epstein Date: Mon Dec 17, 2001 11:42am Subject: Re: [dsg] A rupee for your rupa --- egberdina wrote: > Hi all, > > When I think I am having a moment of awareness, I am not aware of > phenomena as they are, but I am aware of phenomena as they are not. > When the penny drops, I understand , this is not real. What I mean by > that is: When the penny drops, I understand, that what I thought I > was seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, feeling (note five, not six > senses) is not what is out there, in reality, but in here , as > recreated by a complex series of interdependant processes, including > stimuli from very real, but very unknowable rupas. Well, I raised this question as to the distinction of 'rupas' about a week ago, but since you mention it, I'll join in raising it again. What makes a 'rupa' 'directly seen'. Is it not still transmitted through a sensory/mental process? Robert Ep. PS. I apologize in advance if this has already been explained to me and I've forgotten. I do have a slight feeling of deja vu. ======================= > What exactly is a mental representation of a physical object but a > mental object? What is my point? Rupas are not known as rupas, they > are known as namas. Awareness can only be restricted to the content > of the mind, the outside world is always an interpreted > representation. > > I read an interesting line the other day : "We live in a three pound > universe, the brain". If anyone doubts it, a visit to a mental > hospital or clinic for brain-injured people would be enlightening. > > All the best > > > Herman 10102 From: Robert Epstein Date: Mon Dec 17, 2001 11:44am Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts) --- Victor Yu wrote: > Hello Robert, > > Please read Conclusion B carefully. I am not sure if you understand the > logic here. > > I am not sure what you mean by "Self[Form] = Not-Self[Form]." Well, I will admit to being equally uncertain about your equations! It would be more helpful to me at this point if you would discuss them in sentences rather than in mathematical variables. Best, Robert Ep. > Regards, > Victor > > ----- Original Message ----- > From: "Robert Epstein" > To: > Sent: Monday, December 17, 2001 1:29 AM > Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts) > > > > Victor, > > I more or less understand your logic here, but I don't see how it leads to > the > > conclusion that form is being posited as self. I think the 'oneself' in > the > > statement is an undisclosed identity. Which is what makes it conventional > speech. > > > > In any case, if you were right, and 'oneself' was really being implied to > be the > > same form that is being disqualified from being self, you would be saying > that the > > Buddha is making the equation, Self[Form] = Not-Self[Form]. I assume you > are not > > claiming this. Or X(Y) = -X(Y), or X = -X. > > > > Robert > > > > ============= > > > > --- Victor Yu wrote: > > > Hello Robert, > > > > > > It is confusing, and there is a very subtle point that you probably have > > > noticed. > > > > > > Let's consider: > > > Premise A1: If form is not self, then it is not possible for form to say > > > 'Let this form be thus. Let this form not be thus.' > > > > > > and > > > > > > Premise A1': If form is not self, then it is not possible for one to say > > > 'Let this form be thus. Let this form not be thus.' > > > > > > Premise A2: Form is not self. > > > > > > Conclusion A1: Therefore, it is not possible for form to say 'Let this > form > > > be thus. Let this form not be thus.' > > > > > > Conclusion A1': Therefore, it is not possible for one to say 'Let this > form > > > be thus. Let this form not be thus.' > > > > > > With Premise A1 and Premise A2, we have Conclusion A1. > > > With Premise A1' and Premise A2, we have Conclusion A1'. > > > > > > Conclusion A1' is basically saying that one can not control form. > > > Premise A1 is true. Premise A1' seems to be true. However, Premise A1' > has > > > a very subtle, implicit assumption that form is self. (what do we > replace > > > in Premise A1 to make Premise A1'?) > > > > > > > > > Let's consider another set of premises and conclusions. > > > Premise B1: If form is self, then it is possible for form to say 'Let > this > > > form be thus. Let this form not be thus.' > > > Premise B1': If form is self, then it is possible for one to say 'Let > this > > > form be thus. Let this form not be thus.' > > > > > > Premise B2: It is not possible for form to say ''Let this form be thus. > Let > > > this form not be thus." > > > Premise B2': It is not possible for one to say ''Let this form be thus. > Let > > > this form not be thus." > > > > > > Conclusion B: Therefore, form is not self. > > > > > > We can reach Conclusion B with Premise B1 and Premise B2, or we can > reach > > > the same Conclusion B with Premise B1' and Premise B2'. > > > > > > Premise B1 is true. Premise B1' seems to be very true. However, > Premise > > > B1' has the same subtle, implicit assumption as Premise A1' does, that > form > > > is self. This implicit assumption is what we would make in addition to > the > > > explicit assumption "form is self" in Premise B1'. > > > > > > Premise B2 is nothing more than Conclusion A1. Premise B2' is nothing > more > > > than Conclusion A1'. > > > > > > It seems that we can "prove" that form is not self in Conclusion B with > > > Premise B1 and Premise B2, or with Premise B1' and Premise B2'. > However, > > > what we do is nothing more than restating Premise A2 in Conclusion B. > Both > > > Premise B1' and Premise B2' have the implicit assumption that form is > self. > > > > > > The pronoun "oneself" is a variation of the pronoun "self." > > > > > > Regards, > > > Victor > > > > > > > > > 10103 From: Date: Mon Dec 17, 2001 6:44am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: What is Concentration Actually? Hi, Sarah (and all) - In a message dated 12/17/01 1:14:24 PM Eastern Standard Time, upasaka@a... writes: > Concentration, right or wrong, is a focussing. Such focussing on one > object, or on a small number of objects, when relatively free of > hindrances, > leads to calm and increased clarity, it and also makes investigation > easier. > ====================== Wow! How dyslexic can I get? When I wrote "it and" near the end of the 2nd sentence, I should have written "and it". Sorry. With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 10105 From: Date: Mon Dec 17, 2001 6:51am Subject: Re: [dsg] Memory, Objects, and Continuity Thanks for this, Num. It seems that in your last paragraph you are somewhat giving assent to my "citta & object A, citta & object B, and citta C" scenario. Am I correct in that assessment? With metta, Howard In a message dated 12/17/01 1:28:57 PM Eastern Standard Time, srnsk@a... writes: > Hi Howard, > > <<< There is then the question of whether the > content of a memory is considered to be an arammana or not. In order for > the > experience of continuity to occur, it is necessary, it seems to me, for the > > memories of past cittas to occur simultaneously with the current citta > (else > such memories are already gone). > > In that case, it becomes important whether > or not the content of a memory is considered an arammana, for if it is, > then > there is more than one arammana per citta. >>> > > > Let me put in my two cent worth comments. As I understand, the sanna and > citta in the same citta always have the same aramma. From the 4 characters > > of things, sanna manifest as registration (marking), retention, retrieval > and > recall. Citta is a leader in knowing and sanna is a leader in its subset > of > function. Sanna can mark and register pretty much every aramma paramattha, > > pannatti and from my reading nibbhana. > > > <<< My point was the following: Any time there is the "seeing" of the > current object as a continuation of a previous one, or, for that matter, > as > different from a previous one, it requires a comparison of the current > object > > with the previous one (presumably via memory, i.e., via sa~n~na and/or > sati), > > and that requires the current object and the remembered object to both be > "present". >>> > > > I don't know to me sanna is different from sati, sati is an awareness and > sanna is a mark. Sati is aware of nama or rupa, sanna marks and registers > it > (nama or rupa), at the same time citta leads a role of knowing it all. > > > <<< discerned by citta B, and the occurrence of these two cittas serves as > condition for the later arising of citta C whose object is the "knowing" of > > the transition from object A to object B. This seems possible to me, thiugh > a > > trifle weak. The co-ocurrence of an object of memory with another currently > > observed object seems much simpler.>>>>> > > > Well, seemed to be this a long long complicated process both in sense of > dhamma or neurocircuitry. ( I don't know I personally prefer to call > abhidhamma as dhamma, to me it the same thing, thing that is going on in > daily life, dhamma is complicate and hard to see, so is abhidhamma. Who > sees > dhamma sees abhidhamma as well, I think :) ) Sanna does its function by > basically marking. Sanna marks everything paramattha (citta, cetasika, rupa > > and nibbhana), samuha-sanna (grouping or mass), atta-sanna(entity, > aggregation-->kaya or self( roots from the previous two)), > attha-sanna(memory > of meaning), nama-sanna(memory of name) and so on.... So besides > paramattha > sanna marks pannatti. > > Just my thought, when citta has sanna as an arammana, sanna marks the > previous sanna as its objects as well. To compare or see the change of > thing > needs a lot of coordination between citta(vinnana-khandha), > sanna(sanna-khandha), vedana(vedana-khandha), other > cetasikas(sakhara-khandha) as well as rupa(rupa-khandha) at times. I think > > much later citta does the function of recognition of the difference or the > meaning. Well, seem to me that this is an extremely rapid and complicated > > process. > > Just my thought, > > > Num > /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 10106 From: yuzhonghao Date: Mon Dec 17, 2001 1:25pm Subject: what/who control what? Hello Robert and all, Thank you for putting up with my tendency to put thing in a more abstract form. I will try not to use too many symbols. First, one can control oneself. In other words, one can exercise self-control. There is a profound ethical and spiritual implication to self-control. With self-control, one can refrain from the unskillful. By refraining from the unskillful, one refrains from harming oneself. With self-control, one can strive and make an effort to attain the cessation of dukkha. Secondly, form is not self implies that it is not possible for form not to lend itself to dis-ease. In other words: Precisely because form is not self, form lends itself to dis-ease. Precisely because form is not self, form cannot control itself in the sense that it always lends itself to dis-ease. HOWEVER, form is not self DOES NOT imply that it is not possible for self not to lend form to dis-ease, NOR does it imply it is possible for self not to lend form to dis-ease. In other words, form cannot control itself DOES NOT imply self cannot control form, NOR does it imply self can control form. Why? Because form is not self. Form (or any other aggregate) cannot control itself. Why identify with form (or any other aggregate) by saying "one cannot control form (or any other aggregate)"? Why identify with form (or any other aggregate) by saying "one cannot control oneself"? Regards, Victor 10107 From: Date: Mon Dec 17, 2001 9:37am Subject: Re: [dsg] Memory, Objects, and Continuity Hi Howard, > It seems that in your last paragraph you are > somewhat giving assent to my "citta & object A, citta & object B, and citta > > C" scenario. Am I correct in that assessment? > May I also say "somewhat" :) . I am not so clear of what did you try to say. Num 10108 From: robertkirkpatrick.rm Date: Mon Dec 17, 2001 6:41pm Subject: Fwd: Re: Another Question on Rebirth/Reincarnation --- In dhamma-list@y..., "robertkirkpatrick.rm" wrote: --- In dhamma-list@y..., Christian Patton wrote: > Dear list, > > A lot of the stories I read about the Buddha have him > remain silent regarding 'frivolous' (unanswerable, > outside the realm of knowledge) questions. He also > seems to place a great deal on experience and has a > fairly scientific outlook (in the sense that something > could be repeated over and over with the same > results). With these two impressions, how can we > really and truly 'know' that there is rebirth? It > seems to have quite a large degree of faith involved. > This is not necessarily a bad thing, just not > scientific. The Eightfold Path seems to be an > ++++++++++ Dear Christian, Let us take a 'scientific' look at what you say. Can we know that the sun will arise tommorow? (Or in scientific terms keep going around the sun). Can science prove that 'gravity' will keep working? Maybe tonight it reverses and the earth flies out into space? I think science can't prove otherwise. You see scientists make huge assumptions on all sorts of things; primarily they assume that the universe follows certain laws that worked in the past and will continue to hold in the future. The Buddha, so his followers think, saw into the laws of the universe in a much deeper way than science. He claims that these laws are valid at all times and in all places: that all that arises by conditions ceases when those conditions cease. It is said that those who develop insight into what the Buddha taught can see that indeed it is because of certain conditions that this arises and because of other conditions that that arises. That craving, for instance, is a powerful force that provides the motor for future becoming and that this can be realised here and now. If that stage is reached one would find it as likely that this process of becoming ceased at physical death - if that craving has not being utterly quenched- as for the sun, moon and stars to suddenly fall from the heavens as gravity fails. But as you indicate it can't be absolutely proven that this won't happen, we go on faith. robert --- End forwarded message --- 10109 From: Sarah Date: Mon Dec 17, 2001 8:15pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Ultimate realities (and khandhas) Dear Rob Ep, Jon, Howard & Mike, > > > > This post, the previous one and the next 1 or 2 all deal with > > > 'khandhas'. > > > > Must be that khandha day. > > > > > > > ============================== > > > Argh!! I now insist that you, as list owner, commence monitoring > > > your > > > own posts so that there be no further abuse of this sort!! ;-)) > > > > I thought to myself at the time, if anyone gets it, Howard will (same > > pitiful standard!!). > > > > Good advice. I'll see to it. > > > Aiiiieeeeee! I just got it!! > > It's skandhalous as we say in Maha neck of the woods. > > Robert Ep. At this rate we'll have to pack you guys off to Khandha-ha! "What for?", you may ask. "Oh...Samma hunting" would be my reply. Egberdina's friend (a.k.a Sarah) p.s apologies to all the other members and lurkers on dsg who may find too much nitty-ditthi here for your rupees;-)) 10110 From: Sarah Date: Mon Dec 17, 2001 9:13pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts) Dear Victor, I have to admit I’m pretty lost at this point too.... --- Victor Yu wrote: > > It seems that we can "prove" that form is not self in Conclusion B with > Premise B1 and Premise B2, or with Premise B1' and Premise B2'. However, > what we do is nothing more than restating Premise A2 in Conclusion B. Both > Premise B1' and Premise B2' have the implicit assumption that form is self. > > The pronoun "oneself" is a variation of the pronoun "self." I’m hoping to get back to discussing the Mulapariyaya sutta with you when I’ve caught up. I’m just wondering, however, if you aren’t suggesting here that while all the khandhas are not self and so on, that there is some other self outside these which controls them? I may very well have misunderstood you, for which I apologise if so. All that actually exists, as we’re told over and over again, are the 5khandhas, all of which are anatta. So if there is any other control or oneself or self, surely this is just a figment of the imagination? I’ll try to look at your other posts more closely in the next few days, but the relief of having no students for a couple of weeks is having a bad effect meanwhile as you’ll have seen from my last post and the following sign-off which I hope doesn’t cause any offence;-) Self=One -1 +Ax2 less elf + p +q +r (-p-q) not= +(h)= SARAH 10111 From: Date: Mon Dec 17, 2001 4:50pm Subject: Re: [dsg] A rupee for your rupa Hi, Robert - In a message dated 12/17/01 2:43:57 PM Eastern Standard Time, epsteinrob@Y... writes: > Well, I raised this question as to the distinction of 'rupas' about a week > ago, > but since you mention it, I'll join in raising it again. What makes a > 'rupa' > 'directly seen'. Is it not still transmitted through a sensory/mental > process? > > Robert Ep. > ======================== A rupa, be it a sight, sound, touch, etc, is an object of sensory discernment. It is the objective pole of an act of discernment, and while it and the vi~n~nana discerning it arise in dependence on conditions, neither is compounded by the mind. This is true not only of rupas, and cittas, but also of feelings, desires, etc. Each of them is discerned by an act of consciousness, visual, auditory, olfactory, tactile, gustatory, OR mental, but none of them is *constructed* by mind. Only concepts are constructed by mind, being mental compounds of the "directly seen" dhammas. This is my understanding. With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 10112 From: Robert Epstein Date: Mon Dec 17, 2001 10:11pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein --- abhidhammika wrote: > > > > Dear Robert > > > How are you? Thank you for your clarification on your understanding > of the term "sentient". > > However, I happened, and will continue, to use the term "sentient" > and the expression "sentient existence" to mean any living organism, > or a life form, which would be an equivalent Pali term "satta" or > Vedic Sanskrit term "sattva". > > Pali Text Society's Pali-English Dictionary defines the term "Satta" > as a living being, creature, a sentient & rational being, a person. > Please see column 1, page 673 in the dictionary. > > I also used the term "sentient existence" as the equivalent Pali > term "bhava" or life. I have no problem with your definition of 'sentient being', since it accords with my understanding as well. I consider any living being to have a 'sensory' existence of some kind. To me, to be alive is to have some form of consciousness. If an amoeba is exposed to light, it will contract. A plant will respond to noise, light, touch, etc. in various ways. Any living thing has a response to the environment. If it is alive, it feels or perceives, or responds is some way. It has a 'living experience'. The cittas may not be like ours. There may not be what we call 'thoughts', but there is still some form of consciousness. Rocks do not have this experience, as far as one knows, do not respond to stimuli, and do not ordinarily qualify as sentient. So I think we have the same basic understanding of what is being spoken of. > I wrote the following in my Parinibbaana Subcommentary (Part Two): > > "The term `bhavanga' is made up of two words `bhava+anga'. Bhava > means life or sentient existence. Anga means component or cause. > Thus, bhavanga means life-cause or life-component, or the cause of > sentient existence. Bhavanga cittam is the consciousness that makes > the sentient existence possible. It causes and perpetuates sentient > existence." > > Therefore, the meaning of the term "sentient" in my subcommentary is > not limited to the five sensory consciousnesses only. In the language > of abhidhamma, the expression "sentient existence" covers both the > five sensory consciousnesses (pancadvaara viññaana) and the mental > consciousness (manodvaara viññaana). That is fine. Please note that I do not consider the content-free awareness I have proposed to be necessarily based in brain activity. > Thus, when I wrote "The commentary suggests parinibbaana as nullity > of sentient existence." in my subcommentary, I meant that > parinibbaana is free from any state of living being or any underlying > beingness or awareness as you proposed. I understand that this is your point of view. You have stated it even more definitively above. > Therefore, your arguments still need to take into consideration the > meaning of the term "sentient existence" as used in my subcommentary > in line with Pali Text Society's Pali-English Dictionary. > > Of course, I will consider your argumemts written from the > perspective of the narrower limited meaning of the term "sentient" as > sensory. I will also look forward to your arguments based on wider > meaning of the term "sentient" covering both sensory and mental > consciousnesses. That is a good clarification. I will have to review the language of the Sutta to see how this may change the meaning. However, I am still interested to hear more about what the Buddha may have meant by saying that the Arahant in Parinibbana enters an 'undefined reality'. This does seem like a statement of complete cessation of all and every sort of existence to me, and I would like to know how it illluminates the 'complete cessation of sentient existence'. You stated in your subcommentary that you thought it meant that we could not define Parinibbana 'in terms of mind and matter'. I can certainly accept that. However, that either suggests that it can be defined in some other way that we limited earthly beings do not have access to, or else that it is a state truly beyond definition. There is nothing 'beyond definition' or 'undefineable' about complete cessation. If the lamp has not only gone out, but been utterly destroyed, what is there to say about that? It is not undefineable, it is smashed, finished, burnt out, over, dead. Why does Buddha not say something this definite about the state of the Arahant if that is the case? I cannot believe that the Buddha in his wisdom would substitute uncertainty and undefineability for certainty and absolute clarity for no good reason. Clearly to me, the state of 'undefined reality' is something more than complete cessation of all existence. If indeed it is complete cessation of all sentient existence as you propose, then there must be another form of existence into which the Arahant enters which is truly 'undefineable', otherwise it just makes no sense that the Buddha would use this term. I have gone on and been a bit redundant to underline this point. One really needs to deal with the term 'undefined reality' and account for its use in some way. Of course, it is 'undefineable' in terms of mind and matter as you state, but it still does not explain why the term is used at all, if you propose that it is indeed merely pointing to a state of complete cessation of all life, all existence, all experience, all consciousness, all awareness, nothing left but absence. Elsewhere the Buddha has made a point of saying that the state of Parinibbana 'is not one of darkness', but of light. And elsewhere he has said that 'mind is luminous' but defiled by incoming defilements, indicating to me at least, if not to others, that the mind is inherently luminous, and that cittas are only in a state of ignorance because of a kind of shrouding or delusion. It implies that when the delusion is gone, there is still an underlying luminosity to be discovered. To me, these clues to the state the Buddha points to cannot be ignored or somehow explained away in terms that do not account for their actual usage. The Buddha said these things for a reason, and there must be an accounting taken of why he would possibly use terms that evoke such provocative possibilities if he were not trying to point to the state beyond existence, and that this state is one of light and freedom, not one of darkness and oblivion. > If I haven't answered them in my previous two parts of the > subcommentary, I will respond to them in my subsequent > subcommentaries. I appreciate that, and while I review the translation with your latest good information, I will await your further comments. Best, Robert Ep. ================== > With regards, > > Suan > > > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Robert Epstein wrote: > > Dear Suan, > > I did misread your comments to say 'sensual' rather than 'sensory' > existence, > > which is very strange, because when I *read* it [I thought] I > thought to myself > > 'well that is slightly odd, I'm sure he means the same as > *sentient* existence, > > but in fact you didn't even write that. In any case, I assumed it > meant something > > similar. Here is the dictionary on sentient: > > > > Having a faculty, or faculties, of sensation and perception. > > > > and as a noun: > > > > One who has the faculty of perception; a sentient being. > > > > In this context, that is what I assumed was meant by 'sensual', so > in fact, my > > meaning in the argument below is exactly the same. > > > > However, I apologize for misreading the word. And I look forward > to your response > > when you have the chance. > > > > Best, > > Robert Ep. > > > > =================== > > > > --- abhidhammika wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > Dear Robert > > > > > > How are you? Thank you for your reply message. > > > > > > I had a chance to read your reply just now. I missed my Internet > > > sessions previous night due to technical problems in my ISP's > servers. > > > > > > You wrote: > > > > > > "Later on you say that there is a 'nullity of sensual existence'. > Now > > > to me, experience and 'sensual existence' are not synonymous." > > > > > > Could you please check the spelling "sensual existence"? > > > > > > In my post, I wrote "nullity of sentient existence", (not sensual > > > existence). > > > > > > So, if your arguments in the present post were based on "nullity > of > > > sensual existence", you now may need to rewrite your arguments > based > > > on "nullity of sentient existence." > > > > > > I will read the rest of your present post, and other posts later. > I > > > am very sleepy now (2 a.m in Canberra). > > > > > > With regards, > > > > > > Suan > > > > > > > > > > > > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Robert Epstein 10113 From: Sarah Date: Mon Dec 17, 2001 10:19pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Memory, Objects, and Continuity Dear Howard, --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Sarah - > > Thanks for the following. I don't see, however, where this implies > only one object per citta. Where does it say that the object-relation is > one-to-one? > When I read it later, it also seemed rather unclear to me.. H: > > >Side question: Does the principle > > > of one arammana per citta occur in the Abhidhamma, itself, or only in the S:> > from > > the Pa.t.thaana (Conditional Relations) book of Abhidhamma > > > > “ (i) visible object-base is related to eye-consciousness element and its > > associated states by object condition. > > > > (and so on for sound, odour etc... associated states will refer to > > cetasikas, > > I’m pretty sure,S.) > > > > “ (viii) Taking any state as object, these states, consciousness and > mental > > factors, arise; those (former) states are related to those (latter) states > > > by > > object condition.â€? Howard, by referring to visible object as arammana of seeing and associated cetasikas, sound as arammana of hearing and cetasikas, ‘any state as object’ of citta and cetasikas, it all suggests one object only of citta as I read it. After all it is the singular ‘state’ that is used here. S: >>> PTS conditional Relations, p2 > > > > > From U Narada’s Guide to conditional Relations, it says under the 6th > > cognizable object that it consists of: > > > > “......the remaining twenty-one states of materiality, 89 consciousness, > 53 > > mental factors, Nibbana and concept. Of these latter objectd, materiality, > > consciousness and mental factors are either of the past, present or future > > but > > Nibbana and concept are time-freed. > > So in this object condition there is no state that cannot be an object of > > consciousness and mental factors. This object condition pervades the > > teaching > > in the pali Canon.....â€? Again as arammana, it is always the singular state (nama, rupa, nibbana or concept) that is referred to. Nowhere have I ever seen any suggestion of more than one arammana at a time. I thought Num made some very useful points in his post on this thread. I agreed with all his comments and look forward to any more discussion between you both. As he said, ‘besides paramattha sanna marks pannatti’.It’s so very different from our usual meaning of memory. You wonder how 2 objects can be compared if they are not appearing together. What about if you are house-hunting? Do you need to have all the houses in front of you at the same time in order to compare them? I prefer your later time-sharing model (to Mike) where you suggest that the occurrence of citta A and citta B are a condition for citta C. I think we all really appreciate your interest in understanding these Abhidhamma points and in checking it out rather than in just accepting it blindly. Let me know if the quotes still don't make the grade and I'll try to do better. Btw, your ‘dyslexic apology’ made me feel I should have sent half a dozen for the many (mostly minor) errors I caught up with in my own posts when I read them over later;-) I woke up today and my first thought was ‘I bet I’ve now got lots of homework from Howard’ and I was right..I’ll get back on the others sooner or later. Sarah 10114 From: Robert Epstein Date: Mon Dec 17, 2001 10:38pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Memory, Objects, and Continuity --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Mike - > > In the following you inquire, first quoting me: > > > In that case, it > > becomes important whether > > or not the content of a memory is considered an > > aramma.na, for if it is, then > > there is more than one aramma.na per citta. > > Not sure if I understand you here. If a concept > (memory) is aarammana for manovi~n~naa.na, what other > aarammana is present? > ============================== > My point was the following: Any time there is the "seeing" of the > current object as a continuation of a previous one, or, for that matter, as > different from a previous one, it requires a comparison of the current object > with the previous one (presumably via memory, i.e., via sa~n~na and/or sati), > and that requires the current object and the remembered object to both be > "present". If that is so - and to me it seems unavoidable, and if the > remembered object is considered an arammana, then there are two arammanas > present, the remembered one and the current one. Is it possible, Howard, that sati or sanna are able to refer to the accumulated storehouse of memory that is passed on from citta to citta and see both objects in a comparative 'image' which is the knowledge of the objects? Would this image qualify as an aaramaana which contained content of two object? Or do memories, comparisions, images, etc., not qualify as aarammana? Unless they are both present > in mind, there is no way to compare. If both the previous object and its > memory are gone, then the current citta does not know of that object! > Incidentally, subsequent to writing the post you quote below, I looked > at Nyanaponika's little book on Abhidhamma. In an appendix on memory, he also > raises the need for memories of objects to co-occur with the discernment of > an object in a given citta. He makes the very same point as I am making here. > (So, I'm not in bad company! ;-)) He doesn't raise the issue, however, of how > that effects the notion of one arammana per citta. Since knowledge and accumulations are passed on from one citta to the next, the whole range of accumulations that are passed on, memories, etc., either are not considered the 'one object' of the citta, or are not considered 'objects', or else constitute an awful lot of different objects which are being passed on, no? Or do I misunderstand how the system works? > I have just re-thought the "unavoidablility" of the co-occurrence of > the remembered object and the current. It *may* be avoidable after all, > although I'm not at all certain on this issue. (Sorry to be doing my thinking > "out loud", as it were.) One possibility that just occured to me is based on > the time-sharing model: Object A is discerned by citta A, then object B is > discerned by citta B, and the occurrence of these two cittas serves as > condition for the later arising of citta C whose object is the "knowing" of > the transition from object A to object B. Can a citta arise in the transition between two other cittas? This seems to be inviting an absolute infinite regress, as Citta C, whose object was the transition between A and B, itself becomes a transitional citta *between A and B* since it occurs in their transition, and also has its discernment of the transition become the object passed on to Citta D, which only occurs after Citta B has terminated. The pattern becomes, A(C)B(D) with A giving over to B, while C somehow passes its transitional sandwhich knowledge to D after B [and presumably it before B] has subsided. If C lasts longer than the transition from A to B, then it is lasting more than one moment and you have B and D necessarily existing at the same moment. Two cittas at a time doesn't work. Can cetasikas carry the comparative knowledge from one citta to the next? I recall recently that Sarah advised that the cetasika died along with its citta. If I remember correctly, which is highly unlikely. Best, Robert Ep. ================= This seems possible to me, thiugh a > trifle weak. The co-ocurrence of an object of memory with another currently > observed object seems much simpler. However, what *is* the case is not always > simpler than what one might imagine could be the case. > Just a clarification here with regard to my purpose in all this: I am > neither trying to disprove nor vindicate Abhidhammic notions, but rather to > understand them and their implications, to grasp the explanatory capability > of Abhidhamma. The Buddha did say to accept something only after examining it > and seeing that it accords with direct experience, and part of doing that is > to see how it accounts for actual experience, not in a hand-waiving manner > and not just by much use of Pali terms, but by really digging in and seeing > what the implications are. > > With metta, > Howard > > In a message dated 12/16/01 6:54:37 PM Eastern Standard Time, > mlnease@y... writes: > 10115 From: Robert Epstein Date: Mon Dec 17, 2001 10:54pm Subject: Re: [dsg] what/who control what? Thank you Victor. I think that is a lot more clear. Yes, it makes sense to refrain from identifying 'form' of any kind as 'self'. However when you say that 'one' can possibly control form, you are implying that this 'one' is a 'self' that may or may not control form, although as you say, 'form' is not self. So this seems to me to be a contradiction of 'anatta', which not only says that the kandhas are not self, but that *there is no self* period, that the idea of self is an illusion. Do you agree with this, or do you think that there is a self that is beyond form? Best, Robert Ep. ================ --- yuzhonghao wrote: > Hello Robert and all, > > Thank you for putting up with my tendency to put thing in a more > abstract form. I will try not to use too many symbols. > > First, one can control oneself. In other words, one can exercise > self-control. There is a profound ethical and spiritual implication > to self-control. With self-control, one can refrain from the > unskillful. By refraining from the unskillful, one refrains from > harming oneself. With self-control, one can strive and make an > effort to attain the cessation of dukkha. > > Secondly, form is not self implies that it is not possible for form > not to lend itself to dis-ease. In other words: > Precisely because form is not self, form lends itself to dis-ease. > Precisely because form is not self, form cannot control itself in the > sense that it always lends itself to dis-ease. > > HOWEVER, > form is not self DOES NOT imply that it is not possible for self not > to lend form to dis-ease, NOR does it imply it is possible for self > not to lend form to dis-ease. > > In other words, > form cannot control itself DOES NOT imply self cannot control form, > NOR does it imply self can control form. Why? Because form is not > self. > > Form (or any other aggregate) cannot control itself. Why identify > with form (or any other aggregate) by saying "one cannot control form > (or any other aggregate)"? Why identify with form (or any other > aggregate) by saying "one cannot control oneself"? > > > Regards, > Victor 10116 From: Robert Epstein Date: Mon Dec 17, 2001 10:56pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Ultimate realities (and khandhas) --- Sarah wrote: > Dear Rob Ep, Jon, Howard & Mike, > > > > > > > This post, the previous one and the next 1 or 2 all deal with > > > > 'khandhas'. > > > > > Must be that khandha day. > > > > > > > > > ============================== > > > > Argh!! I now insist that you, as list owner, commence monitoring > > > > your > > > > own posts so that there be no further abuse of this sort!! ;-)) > > > > > > I thought to myself at the time, if anyone gets it, Howard will (same > > > pitiful standard!!). > > > > > > Good advice. I'll see to it. > > > > > Aiiiieeeeee! I just got it!! > > > > It's skandhalous as we say in Maha neck of the woods. > > > > Robert Ep. > > > At this rate we'll have to pack you guys off to Khandha-ha! > > "What for?", you may ask. > > "Oh...Samma hunting" would be my reply. > > Egberdina's friend > (a.k.a Sarah) > > p.s apologies to all the other members and lurkers on dsg who may find too much > nitty-ditthi here for your rupees;-)) > ha ha, Sarah, you are a true pun-dit. Robert Ep. 10117 From: Robert Epstein Date: Mon Dec 17, 2001 10:58pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts) --- Sarah wrote: > Dear Victor, > > I have to admit I’m pretty lost at this point too.... > > --- Victor Yu wrote: > > > It seems that we can "prove" that form is not self in Conclusion B with > > Premise B1 and Premise B2, or with Premise B1' and Premise B2'. However, > > what we do is nothing more than restating Premise A2 in Conclusion B. Both > > Premise B1' and Premise B2' have the implicit assumption that form is self. > > > > The pronoun "oneself" is a variation of the pronoun "self." > > I’m hoping to get back to discussing the Mulapariyaya sutta with you when I’ve > caught up. I’m just wondering, however, if you aren’t suggesting here that > while all the khandhas are not self and so on, that there is some other self > outside these which controls them? I may very well have misunderstood you, for > which I apologise if so. I had gotten the same impression. If true, I can always say 'it takes one to know one' since I am still always hunting for the 'primordial Awareness' I have dragged in from Mahayana. Robert Ep. ============================== All that actually exists, as we’re told over and over > again, are the 5khandhas, all of which are anatta. So if there is any other > control or oneself or self, surely this is just a figment of the imagination? > > I’ll try to look at your other posts more closely in the next few days, but the > relief of having no students for a couple of weeks is having a bad effect > meanwhile as you’ll have seen from my last post and the following sign-off > which I hope doesn’t cause any offence;-) > > > Self=One -1 +Ax2 less elf + p +q +r (-p-q) not= +(h)= SARAH > > 10118 From: Robert Epstein Date: Mon Dec 17, 2001 11:01pm Subject: Re: [dsg] A rupee for your rupa --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Robert - > > In a message dated 12/17/01 2:43:57 PM Eastern Standard Time, > epsteinrob@Y... writes: > > > > Well, I raised this question as to the distinction of 'rupas' about a week > > ago, > > but since you mention it, I'll join in raising it again. What makes a > > 'rupa' > > 'directly seen'. Is it not still transmitted through a sensory/mental > > process? > > > > Robert Ep. > > > ======================== > A rupa, be it a sight, sound, touch, etc, is an object of sensory > discernment. It is the objective pole of an act of discernment, and while it > and the vi~n~nana discerning it arise in dependence on conditions, neither is > compounded by the mind. This is true not only of rupas, and cittas, but also > of feelings, desires, etc. Each of them is discerned by an act of > consciousness, visual, auditory, olfactory, tactile, gustatory, OR mental, > but none of them is *constructed* by mind. Only concepts are constructed by > mind, being mental compounds of the "directly seen" dhammas. This is my > understanding. Hi Howard. I guess this comes down to whether the mind is capable of a direct act of perception without forming a concept. I guess you would say that it is possible, that the rupa can be directly discerned -- is this at the level of satipatthana? And are there any recorded details as to how the mind functions or reduces its normal extrapolating tendencies during such a pure act? Best, Robert Ep. ======================== > With metta, > Howard > > /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble > in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a > phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 10119 From: Sarah Date: Mon Dec 17, 2001 11:13pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Memory, Objects, and Continuity Dear Howard, --- upasaka@a... wrote: > ============================== >at Nyanaponika's little book on Abhidhamma. In an appendix on memory, he also > > raises the need for memories of objects to co-occur with the discernment of > an object in a given citta. He makes the very same point as I am making here. > > (So, I'm not in bad company! ;-)) He doesn't raise the issue, however, of how > > that effects the notion of one arammana per citta. I’ve just been prompted by your note here in a post to Mike to read the appendix you refer to. Many thanks, it's an interesting article. I think Nyanaponika stresses the importance of sanna (perception) as a ‘universal’ cetasika. “So we may sum up: perception (sanna) is the taking up, the making, and the remembering of the object’s distinctive marks. In this connection it is noteworthy that ‘mark’ or ‘signal’ is also one of the different meanings of the word sanna itself.” On p121 he describes the “simple act of seeing a rose” which “is in reality a very complex process composed of different phases, each consisting of numerous smaller combinations of conscious processes (cittavithi), which again are made up of several single moments of consciousness (cittakkhana) following each other in a definite sequence of diverse functions. Among these phases there is one that connects the present perception of a rose with a previous one, and there is another that attaches to the present perception the name ‘rose’ remembered from previous experience...........Finally, the individual contributions of all those different perceptual processes have to be remembered and coordinated in order to form the final and complete perception of a rose.” So sanna arises with every citta unlike sati. I assume you are using ‘discernment’ to refer to cognizing as that which every citta does (as opposed to what sati does)? I don’t think there is any suggestion in this appendix of more than one arammana per citta or even of more than one memory per citta. It’s not an easy subject and sanna, like phassa and many other mental factors, is so very different from how we’ve always viewed ‘memory’. Thanks for your careful considerations. Sarah 10120 From: Date: Mon Dec 17, 2001 6:34pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Memory, Objects, and Continuity Hi, Sarah - In a message dated 12/18/01 1:21:27 AM Eastern Standard Time, sarahdhhk@y... writes: > > Dear Howard, > > --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Sarah - > > > > Thanks for the following. I don't see, however, where this implies > > > only one object per citta. Where does it say that the object-relation is > > one-to-one? > > > > When I read it later, it also seemed rather unclear to me.. > > > H: > > >Side question: Does the principle > > > > of one arammana per citta occur in the Abhidhamma, itself, or only in > the > > S:> > from > > > the Pa.t.thaana (Conditional Relations) book of Abhidhamma > > > > > > “ (i) visible object-base is related to eye-consciousness element > and its > > > associated states by object condition. > > > > > > (and so on for sound, odour etc... associated states will refer to > > > cetasikas, > > > I’m pretty sure,S.) > > > > > > “ (viii) Taking any state as object, these states, consciousness and > > mental > > > factors, arise; those (former) states are related to those (latter) > states > > > > > by > > > object condition.â€? > > Howard, by referring to visible object as arammana of seeing and associated > cetasikas, sound as arammana of hearing and cetasikas, ‘any state as object’ > of > citta and cetasikas, it all suggests one object only of citta as I read it. > After all it is the singular ‘state’ that is used here. ------------------------------------------------------------ Howard: I think that you are probably correct, Sarah. ----------------------------------------------------------- > > > S: >>> PTS conditional Relations, p2 > > > > > > > From U Narada’s Guide to conditional Relations, it says under the > 6th > > > cognizable object that it consists of: > > > > > > “......the remaining twenty-one states of materiality, 89 > consciousness, > > 53 > > > mental factors, Nibbana and concept. Of these latter objectd, > materiality, > > > consciousness and mental factors are either of the past, present or > future > > > but > > > Nibbana and concept are time-freed. > > > So in this object condition there is no state that cannot be an object > of > > > consciousness and mental factors. This object condition pervades the > > > teaching > > > in the pali Canon.....â€? > > Again as arammana, it is always the singular state (nama, rupa, nibbana or > concept) that is referred to. Nowhere have I ever seen any suggestion of > more > than one arammana at a time. > ------------------------------------------------------------ Howard: Mmm, hmm. Probably so. ------------------------------------------------------------ > > I thought Num made some very useful points in his post on this thread. I > agreed > with all his comments and look forward to any more discussion between you > both. > As he said, ‘besides paramattha sanna marks pannatti’.It’s so very > different > from our usual meaning of memory. > > You wonder how 2 objects can be compared if they are not appearing > together. > What about if you are house-hunting? Do you need to have all the houses in > front of you at the same time in order to compare them? -------------------------------------------------------------- Howard: No. But what you *do* need is the memories of the houses. -------------------------------------------------------------- I prefer your later> > time-sharing model (to Mike) where you suggest that the occurrence of citta > A > and citta B are a condition for citta C. > ----------------------------------------------------------- Howard: Yes, it's not too bad. Actually, though, I prefer the idea of the memory of a past object being a concomitant of the current citta in which there is a new object. After all, the *memory* of a past object need not be considered an object itself. So there could be the hearing of a current sound together with the memory of the immediately preceding slightly louder or softer sound, or even further back than the immediately preceding sound. After all, we can and do distinguish between a current object and a remembered preceding one. We never confuse a memory with a current discernment. ---------------------------------------------------------------- > > I think we all really appreciate your interest in understanding these > Abhidhamma points and in checking it out rather than in just accepting it > blindly. Let me know if the quotes still don't make the grade and I'll try > to > do better. > > Btw, your ‘dyslexic apology’ made me feel I should have sent half a dozen > for > the many (mostly minor) errors I caught up with in my own posts when I read > them over later;-) > > I woke up today and my first thought was ‘I bet I’ve now got lots of > homework > from Howard’ and I was right..I’ll get back on the others sooner or later. > > Sarah ================================ With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 10121 From: Date: Mon Dec 17, 2001 6:56pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Memory, Objects, and Continuity Hi, Rob - In a message dated 12/18/01 1:41:22 AM Eastern Standard Time, epsteinrob@Y... writes: > > --- upasaka@a... wrote: > > Hi, Mike - > > > > In the following you inquire, first quoting me: > > > > > In that case, it > > > becomes important whether > > > or not the content of a memory is considered an > > > aramma.na, for if it is, then > > > there is more than one aramma.na per citta. > > > > Not sure if I understand you here. If a concept > > (memory) is aarammana for manovi~n~naa.na, what other > > aarammana is present? > > ============================== > > My point was the following: Any time there is the "seeing" of the > > current object as a continuation of a previous one, or, for that matter, > as > > different from a previous one, it requires a comparison of the current > object > > with the previous one (presumably via memory, i.e., via sa~n~na and/or > sati), > > and that requires the current object and the remembered object to both be > > > "present". If that is so - and to me it seems unavoidable, and if the > > remembered object is considered an arammana, then there are two arammanas > > > present, the remembered one and the current one. > > Is it possible, Howard, that sati or sanna are able to refer to the > accumulated > storehouse of memory that is passed on from citta to citta and see both > objects in > a comparative 'image' which is the knowledge of the objects? Would this > image > qualify as an aaramaana which contained content of two object? Or do > memories, > comparisions, images, etc., not qualify as aarammana? > --------------------------------------------------------------- Howard: Well, I'm now thinking that there might be dual rolls for memories. On the one hand, they might occur as mental concomitants to cittas, and could condition the experiencing the object of the citta. And on the other hand, a memory can, itself, serve as the arammana of a citta. --------------------------------------------------------------- > > Unless they are both present > > in mind, there is no way to compare. If both the previous object and its > > memory are gone, then the current citta does not know of that object! > > Incidentally, subsequent to writing the post you quote below, I > looked > > at Nyanaponika's little book on Abhidhamma. In an appendix on memory, he > also > > raises the need for memories of objects to co-occur with the discernment > of > > an object in a given citta. He makes the very same point as I am making > here. > > (So, I'm not in bad company! ;-)) He doesn't raise the issue, however, of > how > > that effects the notion of one arammana per citta. > > Since knowledge and accumulations are passed on from one citta to the next, > the > whole range of accumulations that are passed on, memories, etc., either are > not > considered the 'one object' of the citta, or are not considered 'objects', > or else > constitute an awful lot of different objects which are being passed on, no? > Or do > I misunderstand how the system works? ----------------------------------------------------------- Howard: Surely you're not asking ME!! ;-)) I do tend to think that memories frequently are concomitants and not objects. The memory of a previous sound will then condition the perception of the current sound, as a kind of "internal conditioning" within a citta. ---------------------------------------------------------- > > > I have just re-thought the "unavoidablility" of the co-occurrence > of > > the remembered object and the current. It *may* be avoidable after all, > > although I'm not at all certain on this issue. (Sorry to be doing my > thinking > > "out loud", as it were.) One possibility that just occured to me is based > on > > the time-sharing model: Object A is discerned by citta A, then object B > is > > discerned by citta B, and the occurrence of these two cittas serves as > > condition for the later arising of citta C whose object is the "knowing" > of > > the transition from object A to object B. > > Can a citta arise in the transition between two other cittas? This seems > to be > inviting an absolute infinite regress, as Citta C, whose object was the > transition > between A and B, itself becomes a transitional citta *between A and B* > since it > occurs in their transition, and also has its discernment of the transition > become > the object passed on to Citta D, which only occurs after Citta B has > terminated. > The pattern becomes, A(C)B(D) with A giving over to B, while C somehow > passes its > transitional sandwhich knowledge to D after B [and presumably it before B] > has > subsided. If C lasts longer than the transition from A to B, then it is > lasting > more than one moment and you have B and D necessarily existing at the same > moment. > Two cittas at a time doesn't work. > ------------------------------------------------------- Howard: I'm neither envisioning a squeezed-in citta, nor two cittas at a time. I'm thinking of citta C as a mental cognition of a transition. But even though Sarah has expressed some liking of it. I'm quite vague on this time-sharing scheme and a bit uneasy with it. I feel much better with the notion of memory-conditioned cittas. ------------------------------------------------------- > > Can cetasikas carry the comparative knowledge from one citta to the next? > I > recall recently that Sarah advised that the cetasika died along with its > citta. > ------------------------------------------------------ Howard: Actually, my understanding is that out of the bundle of cetasikas accompanying a citta, only some are removed or replaced, with others remaining (or, better said, recurring). -------------------------------------------------------- > > If I remember correctly, which is highly unlikely. > > Best, > Robert Ep. > ============================== With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 10122 From: Date: Mon Dec 17, 2001 7:05pm Subject: Re: [dsg] A rupee for your rupa Hi, Rob - In a message dated 12/18/01 2:03:35 AM Eastern Standard Time, epsteinrob@Y... writes: > Hi Howard. > I guess this comes down to whether the mind is capable of a direct act of > perception without forming a concept. I guess you would say that it is > possible, > that the rupa can be directly discerned -- is this at the level of > satipatthana? > And are there any recorded details as to how the mind functions or reduces > its > normal extrapolating tendencies during such a pure act? > ============================ I'm afraid I will have to leave this to be answered by those folks who really know what they are talking about (with regard to Abhidhamma)! ;-)) With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 10123 From: Date: Mon Dec 17, 2001 7:14pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Memory, Objects, and Continuity Hi, Sarah - In a message dated 12/18/01 2:15:25 AM Eastern Standard Time, sarahdhhk@y... writes: > > Dear Howard, > > --- upasaka@a... wrote: > ============================== > >at Nyanaponika's little book on Abhidhamma. In an appendix on memory, he > also > > > > raises the need for memories of objects to co-occur with the discernment > of > > an object in a given citta. He makes the very same point as I am making > here. > > > > (So, I'm not in bad company! ;-)) He doesn't raise the issue, however, of > how > > > > that effects the notion of one arammana per citta. > > > I’ve just been prompted by your note here in a post to Mike to read the > appendix you refer to. Many thanks, it's an interesting article. > > I think Nyanaponika stresses the importance of sanna (perception) as a > ‘universal’ cetasika. “So we may sum up: perception (sanna) is the taking > up, > the making, and the remembering of the object’s distinctive marks. In this > connection it is noteworthy that ‘mark’ or ‘signal’ is also one of the > different meanings of the word sanna itself.â€? > > On p121 he describes the “simple act of seeing a roseâ€? which “is in > reality a > very complex process composed of different phases, each consisting of > numerous > smaller combinations of conscious processes (cittavithi), which again are > made > up of several single moments of consciousness (cittakkhana) following each > other in a definite sequence of diverse functions. Among these phases > there is > one that connects the present perception of a rose with a previous one, and > there is another that attaches to the present perception the name ‘rose’ > remembered from previous experience...........Finally, the individual > contributions of all those different perceptual processes have to be > remembered > and coordinated in order to form the final and complete perception of a > rose.â€? > > So sanna arises with every citta unlike sati. I assume you are using > ‘discernment’ to refer to cognizing as that which every citta does (as > opposed > to what sati does)? > ------------------------------------------------------------- Howard: Yes. I prefer the term 'discernment', which suggests a function, to 'consciousness', which has a "substance sense" to it. ------------------------------------------------------------- I don’t think there is any suggestion in this appendix of> > more than one arammana per citta or even of more than one memory per citta. ------------------------------------------------------------- Howard: I agree. -------------------------------------------------------------- > > It’s not an easy subject and sanna, like phassa and many other mental > factors, > is so very different from how we’ve always viewed ‘memory’. > --------------------------------------------------------------- Howard: I think the most important part of what Nyanaponika says with respect to this thread is "Finally, the individual contributions of all those different perceptual processes have to be remembered and coordinated in order to form the final and complete perception of a rose." So, memory is being used as a summing-up operation which makes non-co-occurring things co-occur. ----------------------------------------------------------------- Thanks for your> > careful considerations. > > Sarah > > ================================== With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 10124 From: Victor Yu Date: Tue Dec 18, 2001 0:18am Subject: Re: [dsg] what/who can control what/who? what/who cannot control what/who? Hello Robert, I am not sure how you got the idea that I said one can possiby control form. I will try to be more clear: Form is not self implies that form cannot control itself. Form is not self does not imply that one cannot control form. Form is not self does not imply that one cannot be controlled by form. Form is not self does not imply that one cannot control oneself. One can control oneself. One can control oneself does not imply that one can control form. One can control oneself does not imply that one can be controlled by form. Why identify form as self by saying "one can control form"? Why identify form as self by saying "one can be controlled by form"? Why identify self as form by saying "one cannot control form"? Why identify self as form by saying "one cannot be controlled by form"? Why identify self as form by saying "one cannot control oneself"? I am not sure how you got the idea that 'anatta' means that "there is no self"? Thank you. Regards, Victor ----- Original Message ----- From: "Robert Epstein" To: Sent: Tuesday, December 18, 2001 1:54 AM Subject: Re: [dsg] what/who control what? > Thank you Victor. I think that is a lot more clear. > > Yes, it makes sense to refrain from identifying 'form' of any kind as 'self'. > However when you say that 'one' can possibly control form, you are implying that > this 'one' is a 'self' that may or may not control form, although as you say, > 'form' is not self. So this seems to me to be a contradiction of 'anatta', which > not only says that the kandhas are not self, but that *there is no self* period, > that the idea of self is an illusion. Do you agree with this, or do you think > that there is a self that is beyond form? > > Best, > Robert Ep. > > ================ > > --- yuzhonghao wrote: > > Hello Robert and all, > > > > Thank you for putting up with my tendency to put thing in a more > > abstract form. I will try not to use too many symbols. > > > > First, one can control oneself. In other words, one can exercise > > self-control. There is a profound ethical and spiritual implication > > to self-control. With self-control, one can refrain from the > > unskillful. By refraining from the unskillful, one refrains from > > harming oneself. With self-control, one can strive and make an > > effort to attain the cessation of dukkha. > > > > Secondly, form is not self implies that it is not possible for form > > not to lend itself to dis-ease. In other words: > > Precisely because form is not self, form lends itself to dis-ease. > > Precisely because form is not self, form cannot control itself in the > > sense that it always lends itself to dis-ease. > > > > HOWEVER, > > form is not self DOES NOT imply that it is not possible for self not > > to lend form to dis-ease, NOR does it imply it is possible for self > > not to lend form to dis-ease. > > > > In other words, > > form cannot control itself DOES NOT imply self cannot control form, > > NOR does it imply self can control form. Why? Because form is not > > self. > > > > Form (or any other aggregate) cannot control itself. Why identify > > with form (or any other aggregate) by saying "one cannot control form > > (or any other aggregate)"? Why identify with form (or any other > > aggregate) by saying "one cannot control oneself"? > > > > > > Regards, > > Victor 10125 From: egberdina Date: Tue Dec 18, 2001 1:55am Subject: Re: [dsg] A rupee for your rupa Dear Robert, Sorry to you and anyone else, I had no idea this was already a point of discussion. Thank you for your reply all the same. I'll try to pay a bit more attention in future. All the best Herman --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Robert Epstein wrote: > > --- egberdina wrote: > > Hi all, > > > > When I think I am having a moment of awareness, I am not aware of > > phenomena as they are, but I am aware of phenomena as they are not. > > When the penny drops, I understand , this is not real. What I mean by > > that is: When the penny drops, I understand, that what I thought I > > was seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, feeling (note five, not six > > senses) is not what is out there, in reality, but in here , as > > recreated by a complex series of interdependant processes, including > > stimuli from very real, but very unknowable rupas. > > Well, I raised this question as to the distinction of 'rupas' about a week ago, > but since you mention it, I'll join in raising it again. What makes a 'rupa' > 'directly seen'. Is it not still transmitted through a sensory/mental process? > > Robert Ep. > > PS. I apologize in advance if this has already been explained to me and I've > forgotten. I do have a slight feeling of deja vu. > > ======================= > > > What exactly is a mental representation of a physical object but a > > mental object? What is my point? Rupas are not known as rupas, they > > are known as namas. Awareness can only be restricted to the content > > of the mind, the outside world is always an interpreted > > representation. > > > > I read an interesting line the other day : "We live in a three pound > > universe, the brain". If anyone doubts it, a visit to a mental > > hospital or clinic for brain-injured people would be enlightening. > > > > All the best > > > > > > Herman 10126 From: m. nease Date: Tue Dec 18, 2001 2:06am Subject: Re: [dsg] Memory, Objects, and Continuity Dear Sarah and Howard, Thanks for this great quotation. What is 'Nyanaponika's little book on Abhidhamma' exactly? --- Sarah wrote: > On p121 he describes the “simple act of seeing a > rose” which “is in reality a > very complex process composed of different phases, > each consisting of numerous > smaller combinations of conscious processes > (cittavithi), which again are made > up of several single moments of consciousness > (cittakkhana) following each > other in a definite sequence of diverse functions. > Among these phases there is > one that connects the present perception of a rose > with a previous one, and > there is another that attaches to the present > perception the name ‘rose’ > remembered from previous > experience...........Finally, the individual > contributions of all those different perceptual > processes have to be remembered > and coordinated in order to form the final and > complete perception of a rose.” Am I right in thinking that, by 'perception' (here), he means concept? > So sanna arises with every citta unlike sati. I > assume you are using > ‘discernment’ to refer to cognizing as that which > every citta does (as opposed > to what sati does)? I don’t think there is any > suggestion in this appendix of > more than one arammana per citta or even of more > than one memory per citta. Ven. Buddhadhatta defines aaramma.na as 'a sense-object.' I'm not sure if it's 'abhidammically' important (whether a citta can take more than one aaramma.na ); provisionally I sidestep the issue by thinking of it just as the object taken by a citta. Whether I'm looking at one egg or a dozen eggs, the singular/plural aspect is entirely conceptual. I'm inclined to think of all mental and physical impingements as being minute, contributing over time to a constructed concept (as I think Howard described better in an earlier post)--sort of like the pixels projected one after another by the tube behind a television screen seeming to form a complete picture (thanks to Kom). Not sure if singularity/plurality is really an issue at this level except for the importance of the sequential nature of cittas (mentioned by VN above) and the way in which this contributes to the conventional experience of the sense- and mind-fields. > It’s not an easy subject and sanna, like phassa and > many other mental factors, > is so very different from how we’ve always viewed > ‘memory’. Thanks for your > careful considerations. Actually, the more I understand (I think) about these cetasikas, the more sense the way I've always viewed memory seems to make, subjectively, intuitively, logically and by way of the various expressions in the Dhammavinaya. Otherwise I think I'd have lost interest in abhidhamma long ago... mike 10127 From: Sarah Date: Tue Dec 18, 2001 2:08am Subject: Re: [dsg] Beginnings, Endings, Sati, and Pa~n~na Hi, Howard, --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Sarah - > > In part of the following you write: ============================ S: > > In other words, as the practice starts to bear fruit, there isn't any > > awareness > > of beginnings and endings of mindstates, as I understand. What one takes > > for an > > understanding of impermanence is merely thinking and intellectual > > understanding. > ========================= H: > This I DO NOT GET! As I understand it, the essence of wisdom (short of > > path and fruition consciousness) is the direct apprehension of the three > characteristics of anicca, dukkha, and anatta. > ============================= Eventually, but when we’re talking about beginning to develop a little understanding, I don’t think we should kid ourselves that it is the highly developed wisdom which directly apprehends these characteristics as yet. ................... We can read about the stages of insight in detail in the Visuddhimagga ch XV111, starting with the clear understanding of nama and rupa. At the end it says (37): ‘The correct view of mentality and materiality, which, after defining mentality-materiality by these various methods, has been established on the plane of non-confusion by overcoming the perception of a being, is what should be understood as purification of view. Other terms for it are ‘defining of mentality-materiality’ and ‘delimitation of formations’. .................... It may seem that there is clear understanding of the impermanence of sounds and feelings, but is there really any understanding of hearing and sound when they arise or of bodily feeling and heat or cold (as namas and rupas) at this moment? The second stage of insight is the understanding the conditions for nama and rupa. Understanding penetrates or knows the characteristics of these realities even more deeply. It understands (directly) that without the arammana and other conditions, the namas could not arise. Each one arises because of its own conditions and is devoid of self. Now we know that namas and rupas fall away rapidly, but the highly developed wisdom of the third stage of insight that directly understands the rapid succession can only be realized after the first two stages have been attained. ........................ In K.Sujin’s ‘Survey of Paramattha Dhammas’ (transl by Nina) and found at: http://www.abhidhamma.org/Para12.htm we read in Chapter 2.,The Stages of Vipassanå: “.....Someone who does not even know the difference between the characteristics of nama and rúpa may mistakenly believe that he has reached the third stage of insight, the stage of comprehension by groups, sammasana ñåùa. He may think that he can experience the arising and falling away of nåmas, one after the other, and that that is the third stage of insight. However, if someone has not developed satipaììhåna and has not been aware of the characteristics of different kinds of nåma which appear, he does not realize nåma as the element which experiences. He may believe that he experiences the arising and falling away of nåma, but he does not clearly know what nåma is. He confuses nåma and rúpa, he does not know that nåma is entirely different from rúpa. A person who is impatient wishes that vipassanå ñåùa arises soon. He will try to do something other than being aware of the characteristics of nåma and rúpa which naturally appear and have arisen because of the appropriate conditions. It is impossible to hasten the development of paññå. Paññå can only grow gradually and there is no other condition for its growth but the development of satipaììhåna in our ordinary daily life. If someone tries to do something else he goes the wrong way and the wrong cause cannot bring the right result. If someone hopes for a quick result of his practice, it is the wrong path, he does not understand what the right Path is. Lobha-múla-citta accompanied by wrong view motivates the development of the wrong path and this will lead to the wrong release 23, not the right release which is freedom from defilements. The fourth vipassanå ñåùa is knowledge of the arising and falling away of nåma and rúpa, udayabbaya ñåùa 24 . Vipassanå ñåùa of the third stage realizes the rapid succession of nåmas and rúpas as they arise and fall. However, at this stage paññå is not yet keen enough to see the danger and disdavantages of the arising and falling away, so that there can be detachment from them. The immediate arising of a new dhamma after the falling away of the former dhamma covers up the danger of the arising and falling away. Paññå should become keener so that the following stage of insight can be reached. At the fourth stage paññå can penetrate more clearly the arising and falling away of each kind of nåma and each kind of rúpa separately....” ....................... Howard, I think you might find it interesting to read the full chapter here. I’m looking forward to the day when the full Visuddhimagga is on line as there are some useful parts in the section on ‘knowledge of rise and all’ in ch XX. 93f. Just a couple of short quotes here: (98) ‘..when he thus sees rise and fall in the two ways, according to condition and according to instant, the several truths, aspects of the dependent origination, methods, and characteristics become evident to him. 'When he sees the arising of aggregates with the arising of ignorance and the cessation of aggregates with the cessation of ignorance, this is his seeing of rise and fall according to condition. when he sees the rise and fall of aggregates by seeing the characteristic of generation and the characteristic of change, this is his seeing of rise and fall according to instant. For it is only at the instant of arising that there is the characteristic of generation, and only at the instant of dissolution that there is the characteristic of change.' and (103): 'The characteristic of not-self becomes evident to him through seeing rise according to condition owing to his discovery that states have no curiosity and that their existence depends upon conditions. The characteristic of impermanence becomes evident to him through seeing rise and fall according to instant owing to his discovery of non-existence after having been and owing to his discovery that they are secluded from past and future....' ..................... I’m getting carried away again as I read out loud here.;-) I think the point I started out with was that it’s tempting to think that there is some direct understanding of the impermanence of realities, especially when the desire for results in our practice is strong. Certainly when I was a keen meditator, it seemed very simple and very obvious from direct experience. Only when I began to consider more carefully and develop a little more understanding about namas and rupas did it become apparent that many of these results and insights were mere wishful thinking. Sarah ============================= 10128 From: egberdina Date: Tue Dec 18, 2001 2:22am Subject: Re: [dsg] A rupee for your rupa Dear Howard, Thank you up front for all the issues you raise and fruitful discussions that you initiate. I regret not being able to participate to the extent that I would like. My non-participation is not a statement about what I perceive the value of matters raised to be, more a statement of how I am currently allocating my time. And the big winners are the really mundane issues like work, work, work. Many people (sorry again, Rob Ep) have raised really interesting and important discussions that I would have like to contribute to, but it just didn't happen. I am especially sorry that I have not replied to Frank Kuan's recent posts. Sorry, Frank. Anyway, Howard, thank you for reading this introduction. Are you saying that what is perceived is not "tempered" by the process of perception, by the organs of perception, by the quality of the medium through which particular qualities of the rupa are transmitted? Does a mosquito see the same as a snail ? I have many more questions , but this'll do for starters :-) All the best Herman --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Robert - > > In a message dated 12/17/01 2:43:57 PM Eastern Standard Time, > epsteinrob@Y... writes: > > > > Well, I raised this question as to the distinction of 'rupas' about a week > > ago, > > but since you mention it, I'll join in raising it again. What makes a > > 'rupa' > > 'directly seen'. Is it not still transmitted through a sensory/mental > > process? > > > > Robert Ep. > > > ======================== > A rupa, be it a sight, sound, touch, etc, is an object of sensory > discernment. It is the objective pole of an act of discernment, and while it > and the vi~n~nana discerning it arise in dependence on conditions, neither is > compounded by the mind. This is true not only of rupas, and cittas, but also > of feelings, desires, etc. Each of them is discerned by an act of > consciousness, visual, auditory, olfactory, tactile, gustatory, OR mental, > but none of them is *constructed* by mind. Only concepts are constructed by > mind, being mental compounds of the "directly seen" dhammas. This is my > understanding. > > With metta, > Howard 10129 From: m. nease Date: Tue Dec 18, 2001 2:22am Subject: Re: [dsg] Memory, Objects, and Continuity Hi Howard, Hope you don't mind my butting in again... --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Sarah - > sarahdhhk@y... writes: > -------------------------------------------------------------- > > I prefer your later> > > time-sharing model (to Mike) where you suggest > that the occurrence of citta > > A > > and citta B are a condition for citta C. > > > ----------------------------------------------------------- > Howard: > Yes, it's not too bad. Actually, though, I > prefer the idea of the > memory of a past object being a concomitant of the > current citta in which > there is a new object. After all, the *memory* of a > past object need not be > considered an object itself. So there could be the > hearing of a current sound > together with the memory of the immediately > preceding slightly louder or > softer sound, or even further back than the > immediately preceding sound. I think you're starting to lose me here. If I may turn off the TV and go back to the movie metaphor, isn't this like seeing more than one frame at a time? It makes more sense to me that whatever is compounded of more than one moment's experience is concept, not experience itself--of course I may be wrong about this. > After all, we can and do distinguish between a > current object and a > remembered preceding one. Awareness (or is it understanding?) can and maybe does do this, but-- > We never confuse a > memory with a current discernment. Maybe I'm misunderstanding you--but in fact, I think this kind of confusion is the normal state of things--'I' ceaselessly confuse, for example, 'my' concept (memory) of 'this computer' with the experience of present phenomena. A moment of truly making this distinction is a very rare one, I think. My apologies if I've misconstrued your comments! mike 10130 From: Victor Yu Date: Tue Dec 18, 2001 2:45am Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts) Hello Sarah, Thank you for replying and tending to my message. I have to admit that I might get carried away with using expressions like "Premise", "Conclusion", "If p, then q. p. Therefore, q" etc. too much all at once in a message. I smiled when I saw your sign-off. You questioned that: If all aggregates are not self, then is there self outside of the aggregate that controls them? All aggregate are not self implies that all aggregates cannot control themselves, that they lend themselves to dis-ease, to afflication. Please try to examine very carefully if all aggregate are not self implies whether or not there is a self outside of the aggregate that controls them. And please consider the questions: (they are not trick questions) "Can I control myself? Can I refrain from doing the unskillful that harms myself?" I am interested in knowing how you get the idea that I might be suggesting here that while all the khandhas are not self and so, there is some other self outside these which controls them. And I look forward to discussing Mulapariyaya Sutta. Regards, Victor ----- Original Message ----- From: "Sarah" To: Sent: Tuesday, December 18, 2001 12:13 AM Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts) > Dear Victor, > > I have to admit I'm pretty lost at this point too.... > > --- Victor Yu wrote: > > > It seems that we can "prove" that form is not self in Conclusion B with > > Premise B1 and Premise B2, or with Premise B1' and Premise B2'. However, > > what we do is nothing more than restating Premise A2 in Conclusion B. Both > > Premise B1' and Premise B2' have the implicit assumption that form is self. > > > > The pronoun "oneself" is a variation of the pronoun "self." > > I'm hoping to get back to discussing the Mulapariyaya sutta with you when I've > caught up. I'm just wondering, however, if you aren't suggesting here that > while all the khandhas are not self and so on, that there is some other self > outside these which controls them? I may very well have misunderstood you, for > which I apologise if so. All that actually exists, as we're told over and over > again, are the 5khandhas, all of which are anatta. So if there is any other > control or oneself or self, surely this is just a figment of the imagination? > > I'll try to look at your other posts more closely in the next few days, but the > relief of having no students for a couple of weeks is having a bad effect > meanwhile as you'll have seen from my last post and the following sign-off > which I hope doesn't cause any offence;-) > > > Self=One -1 +Ax2 less elf + p +q +r (-p-q) not= +(h)= SARAH 10131 From: abhidhammika Date: Tue Dec 18, 2001 6:46am Subject: Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein And Howard Dear Robert Epstein And Howard How are you? Thank you for your kind responses to the Parinibbaana Subcommentary Part Two. I have read all your responses including Howard's post (10007) regarding Robert's first reply. As your responses contain very profound and interesting issues and statements, I will have to analyse them carefully before I respond to them. I may even need to go to other parts of the Tipitaka to get more information, even though my experience with Tipitaka tells me that statements and interpretations on nibbana, like any other topic, are very consistent. In the meantime, if both or either of you could define or explain to me the terms "nihilism" and "annihilationism" used in your psots, I would be very grateful to you. In what sense do you use them? Have you come across their equivalent Pali or Sanskrit terms? It seems that these terms play important roles in understanding the afterlife Parinibbaana. Apparantly, I may end up serializing Parinibbaana Subcommentaries. So please be patient with the waiting periods. By the way, I do not forget to write something as well in response to Howard's "nonconceptual state of being." With best wishes, Suan http://www.bodhiology.org --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Robert Epstein wrote: > > --- abhidhammika wrote: > > > > > > > > Dear Robert > > > > > > How are you? Thank you for your clarification on your understanding > > of the term "sentient". > > > > However, I happened, and will continue, to use the term "sentient" > > and the expression "sentient existence" to mean any living organism, > > or a life form, which would be an equivalent Pali term "satta" or > > Vedic Sanskrit term "sattva". > > > > Pali Text Society's Pali-English Dictionary defines the term "Satta" > > as a living being, creature, a sentient & rational being, a person. > > Please see column 1, page 673 in the dictionary. > > > > I also used the term "sentient existence" as the equivalent Pali > > term "bhava" or life. > > I have no problem with your definition of 'sentient being', since it accords with > my understanding as well. I consider any living being to have a 'sensory' > existence of some kind. To me, to be alive is to have some form of consciousness. > If an amoeba is exposed to light, it will contract. A plant will respond to > noise, light, touch, etc. in various ways. Any living thing has a response to the > environment. If it is alive, it feels or perceives, or responds is some way. It > has a 'living experience'. The cittas may not be like ours. There may not be > what we call 'thoughts', but there is still some form of consciousness. Rocks do > not have this experience, as far as one knows, do not respond to stimuli, and do > not ordinarily qualify as sentient. So I think we have the same basic > understanding of what is being spoken of. > > > I wrote the following in my Parinibbaana Subcommentary (Part Two): > > > > "The term `bhavanga' is made up of two words `bhava+anga'. Bhava > > means life or sentient existence. Anga means component or cause. > > Thus, bhavanga means life-cause or life-component, or the cause of > > sentient existence. Bhavanga cittam is the consciousness that makes > > the sentient existence possible. It causes and perpetuates sentient > > existence." > > > > Therefore, the meaning of the term "sentient" in my subcommentary is > > not limited to the five sensory consciousnesses only. In the language > > of abhidhamma, the expression "sentient existence" covers both the > > five sensory consciousnesses (pancadvaara viññaana) and the mental > > consciousness (manodvaara viññaana). > > That is fine. Please note that I do not consider the content-free awareness I > have proposed to be necessarily based in brain activity. > > > Thus, when I wrote "The commentary suggests parinibbaana as nullity > > of sentient existence." in my subcommentary, I meant that > > parinibbaana is free from any state of living being or any underlying > > beingness or awareness as you proposed. > > I understand that this is your point of view. You have stated it even more > definitively above. > > > Therefore, your arguments still need to take into consideration the > > meaning of the term "sentient existence" as used in my subcommentary > > in line with Pali Text Society's Pali-English Dictionary. > > > > Of course, I will consider your argumemts written from the > > perspective of the narrower limited meaning of the term "sentient" as > > sensory. I will also look forward to your arguments based on wider > > meaning of the term "sentient" covering both sensory and mental > > consciousnesses. > > That is a good clarification. I will have to review the language of the Sutta to > see how this may change the meaning. However, I am still interested to hear more > about what the Buddha may have meant by saying that the Arahant in Parinibbana > enters an 'undefined reality'. This does seem like a statement of complete > cessation of all and every sort of existence to me, and I would like to know how > it illluminates the 'complete cessation of sentient existence'. You stated in > your subcommentary that you thought it meant that we could not define Parinibbana > 'in terms of mind and matter'. I can certainly accept that. However, that either > suggests that it can be defined in some other way that we limited earthly beings > do not have access to, or else that it is a state truly beyond definition. There > is nothing 'beyond definition' or 'undefineable' about complete cessation. If the > lamp has not only gone out, but been utterly destroyed, what is there to say about > that? It is not undefineable, it is smashed, finished, burnt out, over, dead. > Why does Buddha not say something this definite about the state of the Arahant if > that is the case? I cannot believe that the Buddha in his wisdom would substitute > uncertainty and undefineability for certainty and absolute clarity for no good > reason. Clearly to me, the state of 'undefined reality' is something more than > complete cessation of all existence. If indeed it is complete cessation of all > sentient existence as you propose, then there must be another form of existence > into which the Arahant enters which is truly 'undefineable', otherwise it just > makes no sense that the Buddha would use this term. > > I have gone on and been a bit redundant to underline this point. One really needs > to deal with the term 'undefined reality' and account for its use in some way. Of > course, it is 'undefineable' in terms of mind and matter as you state, but it > still does not explain why the term is used at all, if you propose that it is > indeed merely pointing to a state of complete cessation of all life, all > existence, all experience, all consciousness, all awareness, nothing left but > absence. > > Elsewhere the Buddha has made a point of saying that the state of Parinibbana 'is > not one of darkness', but of light. And elsewhere he has said that 'mind is > luminous' but defiled by incoming defilements, indicating to me at least, if not > to others, that the mind is inherently luminous, and that cittas are only in a > state of ignorance because of a kind of shrouding or delusion. It implies that > when the delusion is gone, there is still an underlying luminosity to be > discovered. > > To me, these clues to the state the Buddha points to cannot be ignored or somehow > explained away in terms that do not account for their actual usage. The Buddha > said these things for a reason, and there must be an accounting taken of why he > would possibly use terms that evoke such provocative possibilities if he were not > trying to point to the state beyond existence, and that this state is one of light > and freedom, not one of darkness and oblivion. > > > If I haven't answered them in my previous two parts of the > > subcommentary, I will respond to them in my subsequent > > subcommentaries. > > I appreciate that, and while I review the translation with your latest good > information, I will await your further comments. > > Best, > Robert Ep. > > ================== > > > With regards, > > > > Suan > > > > 10132 From: Kenneth Ong Date: Tue Dec 18, 2001 7:42am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein And Howard Hi all, there is a paragraph in the book titled "Abhidhamma Studies" by Ven Nyanaponika Thera Quote "When in the above passage, the quality of a "real thing" is denied to the attainment of cessation, this certainly does not mean that this state is "unreal" in the sense of hallucinations or a figment of imagination. We should therefore better speak of it as being "different real" because all the data of our experience of reality and even of the most sublime states of absorption are absent in the that state. In the same way, Nibbana may be said to have no "existence" in terms of the khandhas world, but by denying its reality we would fall into the error of annihilationism (ucchedaditthi)." unquote. Howard, in the appendix 2 of this book, it said abt memory, maybe the next few days, I will type it out for your perusal. I would say this book is like a dissertation, a very interesting book to read for those who are interested in understanding of Abhidhamma. I personally think it is very refreshing. It also talk abt the time factor of the present moment. Kind regards Ken O --- abhidhammika wrote: > > > > Dear Robert Epstein And Howard > > How are you? > > Thank you for your kind responses to the Parinibbaana Subcommentary > Part Two. > > I have read all your responses including Howard's post (10007) > regarding Robert's first reply. > > As your responses contain very profound and interesting issues and > statements, I will have to analyse them carefully before I respond to > them. I may even need to go to other parts of the Tipitaka to get > more information, even though my experience with Tipitaka tells me > that statements and interpretations on nibbana, like any other topic, > are very consistent. > > In the meantime, if both or either of you could define or explain to > me the terms "nihilism" and "annihilationism" used in your psots, I > would be very grateful to you. In what sense do you use them? Have > you come across their equivalent Pali or Sanskrit terms? It seems > that these terms play important roles in understanding the afterlife > Parinibbaana. > > Apparantly, I may end up serializing Parinibbaana Subcommentaries. So > please be patient with the waiting periods. > > By the way, I do not forget to write something as well in response to > Howard's "nonconceptual state of being." > > With best wishes, > > Suan > > http://www.bodhiology.org > > 10133 From: Kom Tukovinit Date: Tue Dec 18, 2001 8:49am Subject: RE: [dsg] A rupee for your rupa Dear Robert, Sorry to just drop in here. I may have missed earlier dicussions but I thought this point was interesting. Normal disclaimer: this is my understanding only! > -----Original Message----- > From: Robert Epstein [mailto:epsteinrob@y...] > Sent: Monday, December 17, 2001 11:01 PM > To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com > Subject: Re: [dsg] A rupee for your rupa > > Hi Howard. > I guess this comes down to whether the mind is > capable of a direct act of > perception without forming a concept. I guess > you would say that it is possible, > that the rupa can be directly discerned -- is > this at the level of satipatthana? > And are there any recorded details as to how the > mind functions or reduces its > normal extrapolating tendencies during such a pure act? > By the model presented by the Abhidhamma, the mind constantly cognizes, mostly without Sati and Panna, different realities all the time. However, after the cognition of realities fall away, the cognition of concept virtually immediately arises, regardless of whether or not Satipatthana is arising or not. I think there are at least two follow-on questions from this discussion: 1) What is satipathanna, and how is it different from the mind that cognizes the realities but is not satipatthana? 2) Is cognizing concepts unpure? Does this mean people developing Satipathanna have no concept? I bet you have heard the answer to the first question already. Satipatthana is citta and cetasikas rising to cognize a reality as it truly is. Satipatthana always arises with Panna (wisdom), and always has a reality, and never concepts, as its object. Satipatthana is the *only* way that panna can develop to the point of the enlightenment. It is *impossible* to develop Satipatthana without hearing from a Sammasam Buddha, unless one is a self-englightened one (a Buddha). Satipatthana is different from other cittas that arise to cognize realities as discussed: by co-arising namas, by the object, by its function, by result, and the proximity of how it arises. It is possible for unskillful cittas to mistake something not Satipatthana to be Satipatthana. As you can see, other kinds of cittas (including those with attachments and ignorance) can also have realities as their objects. A. Sujin mentioned on the India trip that some people mistake that they are developing Satipatthana because they have moments that they experience one reality at a time. As for the second question, you may be able to guess what I am about to say. The "purity" of the mind more or less totally depends on the qualities of the co-arising factors. Regardless of the objects (realities or concepts), the mind is unpure if there are akusala factors co-arising with it. The mind is "pure" if there are kusala factors arising with it. The interesting part, even if we are thinking about a concept that appears like wisdom (thinking about the true dhamma, for example), the mind that thinks about the concept maybe in fact unpure if attachments or ignorance are co-arising with the mind. Cognizing realities, or thinking about the "right" concepts are no guarantee that the mind is pure (you can see why chanting or memorizing Satipatthana sutta may not help very much if there are no understandings). In all cases, realities rise and fall by their conditions, are non-self and uncontrollable, anatta. Realities rule! An arahat, someone whose mind is completely pure, also cognize concepts. However, their minds (roughly) rise with only sobhana (beautiful, pure) factors. They never mistake concepts as realities or realities as concepts, a far cry from someone who hasn't accumulated wisdom to tell the differences. kom 10134 From: Date: Tue Dec 18, 2001 4:40am Subject: Re: [dsg] Memory, Objects, and Continuity Hi, Sarah, Rob, and all - I had written the following to you, Rob: > Howard: > Well, I'm now thinking that there might be dual rolls for memories. > On > the one hand, they might occur as mental concomitants to cittas, and could > condition the experiencing the object of the citta. And on the other hand, > a > memory can, itself, serve as the arammana of a citta. > Also, You, Sarah, in replying to my post about Nyanaponika Thera's writing about the need for memory, posted the following material from his appendix on memory: " On p121 he describes the 'simple act of seeing a rose' which 'is in reality a very complex process composed of different phases, each consisting of numerous smaller combinations of conscious processes (cittavithi), which again are made up of several single moments of consciousness (cittakkhana) following each other in a definite sequence of diverse functions. Among these phases there is one that connects the present perception of a rose with a previous one, and there is another that attaches to the present perception the name "rose" remembered from previous experience...........Finally, the individual contributions of all those different perceptual processes have to be remembered and coordinated in order to form the final and complete perception of a rose.' " I'd like to add a drop more from Ven Nyanaponika which points to my idea of memory as concomitant instead of object. In that same appendix, shortly after the rose example, he writes the following: "Apart from what, in common usage, is called 'remembering,' the reminiscent function of perception in general operates also: (a) in the imperceptably brief phases of a complete perceptual process, the sequence of which is based on the connecting function of 'grasping the past phases'; (b) in the consecutive train of thoughts where this 'grasping of the past' is so habitual, and refers to an event so close to the present, that in normal parlance it is not called 'memory,' though it is not essentially different from it." The view that I am tentatively adopting is that the function of memory, be it an aspect of sa~n~na or sati or both or somethings else, is constantly operative, in all cittas, as a concomitant, conditioning the citta (an internal conditioning), and generally serving as a summing-up feature, as a continuity provider, and as a comparison enabler, and, in addition, as with other concomitants, a memory may, itself, serve as an arammana for a citta. Now, this analysis, being based on mere deductive and inductive reasoning (as an attempt to make plausible the Abhidhammic scheme) has to be taken as mere conjecture. The only way to know for sure what the facts are is to develop the microscopic mindfulness and clear comprehension required to directly "see" what the facts are, or, lacking that, to be persuaded of the testimony of another who has done so. With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 10135 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Tue Dec 18, 2001 11:50am Subject: FW: three rounds ---------- Van: Nina van Gorkom Datum: Mon, 17 Dec 2001 19:18:31 +0100 Aan: Jonothan Abbott Onderwerp: three rounds Jon wrote to Rob Ep: I would like to fine-tune your 4 factors a little. I would state them as follows: 1/ The study of the texts 2/ Ascertaining as surely as possible the intended meaning of the texts (and this I believe requires association with someone who understands them correctly) 3/ Considering and reflecting on what has been read and heard 4/ Understanding how that relates to the experience of the present moment Consider the difference between these 2 statements: (1) If you do A, B and C, then you will experience D. (2) D can only be experienced if factors A, B and C have been developed. The difference between the 2, which I'm sure you can appreciate, Rob, is an important one. It is my attempt at distinguishing between the factors being seen as 'things-to-do' and the same factors being regarded as things of value in their own right, worth developing, and about which we have confidence that, properly developed, will lead us in the right direction but the fruit of which will only become apparent as and when conditions that are peculiar to us allow. What I am trying to say is that there is no *perceptible, immediately obvious* connection between the necessary factors properly developed and the understanding for which these factors are an indispensible pre-condition (but then who said it was a '4-steps-to-understanding' kind of thing?). The simile given in the suttas is that of the grip marks that gradually get worn into the wooden handle of a carpenter's tool: no wearing away is ever apparent at the time, only over time and after continued use (this is the 'adze handle' simile). This lack of immediate feedback by which 'progress' can be seen and 'practice' thereby verified makes it all the more important that we have a proper understanding in the first place of what the path is as taught. Nina: Dear Jonothan, I was so happy with your post here. This refers to what I wrote before to you about A. Sujin stressing very much in India (and before): sacca ~naa.na, firm foundation knowledge of the truth that has to be realized, kicca ~naa.na, the task that is development, kata ~naa.na, the fruit that becomes apparent, but many degrees of these three. I want to write about it in my India impressions but this subject is very difficult, so I am waiting for more details when you are in Bgk. It is wonderful Jaran will be there too, he studies commentaries in Thai. I give you the location in the Thai co : Co to Dhammacakkaa pavattana sutta, Mahåvagga, in Thai part 2, p. 426: I got stuck where it states about the 12 aspects, three rounds for four Truths. I like your stressing that we should first have a proper understanding of what the Path is. Nina. 10136 From: onco111 Date: Tue Dec 18, 2001 0:19pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Memory, Objects, and Continuity Hi Howard, I've been loosely peeking in at your recent discussion, and I like the questions and investigations you are doing. I've been quite tempted to join in the discussion, and I couldn't hold back any longer. Brief comments below. > The view that I am tentatively adopting is that the function of > memory, be it an aspect of sa~n~na or sati or both or somethings else, is > constantly operative, in all cittas, as a concomitant, conditioning the citta > (an internal conditioning), and generally serving as a summing-up feature, as > a continuity provider, and as a comparison enabler, and, in addition, as with > other concomitants, a memory may, itself, serve as an arammana for a citta. Patthana also has sañña as a concommitant (cetasika), conditioning the citta (conascence). I like your "summing-up feature" idea, but I'm not sure about this "continuity provider". What is this continuity? Is it a sense of continuity? A real continuity? And what exactly IS a comparison? Holding two objects at the same time and weighing them, like on a scale? Or holding one, "marking" it, and then holding another with sañña again marking, i.e. giving an impression of change, difference, similarity? Once the old object is gone, it's gone. What is there in the remembering? Nothing, really, just a sense of similarity, no? Very scattered thinking, but maybe I'll get some time next March to think more clearly about this all. Whew! Dan 10137 From: Date: Tue Dec 18, 2001 1:31pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Beginnings, Endings, Sati, and Pa~n~na Hi, Sarah - In a message dated 12/18/01 5:10:12 AM Eastern Standard Time, sarahdhhk@y... writes: > Howard, I think you might find it interesting to read the full chapter here. > I’m looking forward to the day when the full Visuddhimagga is on line as > there > are some useful parts in the section on ‘knowledge of rise and all’ in ch > XX. > 93f. > =========================== Well, I've just gotta sit myself down and really study it. I happen to own the work. With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 10138 From: Date: Tue Dec 18, 2001 1:51pm Subject: Re: [dsg] A rupee for your rupa Hi, Herman - In a message dated 12/18/01 5:34:44 AM Eastern Standard Time, hhofman@d... writes: > Dear Howard, > > Thank you up front for all the issues you raise and fruitful > discussions that you initiate. I regret not being able to participate > to the extent that I would like. My non-participation is not a > statement about what I perceive the value of matters raised to be, > more a statement of how I am currently allocating my time. And the > big winners are the really mundane issues like work, work, work. Many > people (sorry again, Rob Ep) have raised really interesting and > important discussions that I would have like to contribute to, but it > just didn't happen. I am especially sorry that I have not replied to > Frank Kuan's recent posts. Sorry, Frank. > > Anyway, Howard, thank you for reading this introduction. ----------------------------------------------------------- Howard: A pleasure! Thanks for saying what you said. ----------------------------------------------------------- > > Are you saying that what is perceived is not "tempered" by the > process of perception, by the organs of perception, by the quality of > the medium through which particular qualities of the rupa are > transmitted? Does a mosquito see the same as a snail ? > --------------------------------------------------------------- Howard: I'm not saying that at all. In fact, since my take on matters is phenomenological (rather than materialist, or objectivist), from my perspective it is *all* about perception, though there are commonalities among "perceivers" which provide an inter-subjectivity (as opposed to an objectivity). No, what I was saying was, for example, that there is a difference between hearing a sound and hearing a melody. When we hear a sound, it is a simple percept which is heard. When we "hear" a melody we actually cognize a mental construct composed by the mind from a sequence of heard sounds. (A single sound, as heard, however, while not such a composition, is nonetheless influenced (conditioned) by numerous mental concomitants including dispositions and also by previous sounds. For example, a sound may be heard as quiet following a very loud sound, but may be heard as loud following a very soft sound.) ---------------------------------------------------------------- > > I have many more questions , but this'll do for starters :-) > > > All the best > > Herman > =================================== With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 10139 From: Date: Tue Dec 18, 2001 2:00pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Memory, Objects, and Continuity Hi, Mike - In a message dated 12/18/01 5:47:19 AM Eastern Standard Time, mlnease@y... writes: > Hi Howard, > > Hope you don't mind my butting in again... > > --- upasaka@a... wrote: > > Hi, Sarah - > > > sarahdhhk@y... writes: > > > -------------------------------------------------------------- > > > > I prefer your later> > > > time-sharing model (to Mike) where you suggest > > that the occurrence of citta > > > A > > > and citta B are a condition for citta C. > > > > > > ----------------------------------------------------------- > > Howard: > > Yes, it's not too bad. Actually, though, I > > prefer the idea of the > > memory of a past object being a concomitant of the > > current citta in which > > there is a new object. After all, the *memory* of a > > past object need not be > > considered an object itself. So there could be the > > hearing of a current sound > > together with the memory of the immediately > > preceding slightly louder or > > softer sound, or even further back than the > > immediately preceding sound. > > I think you're starting to lose me here. If I may > turn off the TV and go back to the movie metaphor, > isn't this like seeing more than one frame at a time? > It makes more sense to me that whatever is compounded > of more than one moment's experience is concept, not > experience itself--of course I may be wrong about > this. > --------------------------------------------------------- Howard: No, I'm not thinking, in this context, of a memory as providing an object in addition to the current object. I'm thinking of the memory as a subliminal memory *trace* which conditions the current object by its presence and is a mental concomitant of the current citta. For example, the "memory" of the immediately preceding very soft sound may cause the current sound to appear very loud. But it is only the current sound that is the object of the current citta. At other times, a memory may not be subliminal, but may be the unique object of the current citta. --------------------------------------------------------- > > > After all, we can and do distinguish between a > > current object and a > > remembered preceding one. > > Awareness (or is it understanding?) can and maybe does > do this, but-- > > > We never confuse a > > memory with a current discernment. > > Maybe I'm misunderstanding you--but in fact, I think > this kind of confusion is the normal state of > things--'I' ceaselessly confuse, for example, 'my' > concept (memory) of 'this computer' with the > experience of present phenomena. A moment of truly > making this distinction is a very rare one, I think. > > My apologies if I've misconstrued your comments! > > mike > =============================== With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 10140 From: Date: Tue Dec 18, 2001 2:22pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Memory, Objects, and Continuity Hi, Dan - In a message dated 12/18/01 3:22:08 PM Eastern Standard Time, dalthorp@o... writes: > Hi Howard, > I've been loosely peeking in at your recent discussion, and I like > the questions and investigations you are doing. I've been quite > tempted to join in the discussion, and I couldn't hold back any > longer. Brief comments below. > > > The view that I am tentatively adopting is that the function > of > > memory, be it an aspect of sa~n~na or sati or both or somethings > else, is > > constantly operative, in all cittas, as a concomitant, conditioning > the citta > > (an internal conditioning), and generally serving as a summing-up > feature, as > > a continuity provider, and as a comparison enabler, and, in > addition, as with > > other concomitants, a memory may, itself, serve as an arammana for > a citta. > > Patthana also has sañña as a concommitant (cetasika), conditioning > the citta (conascence). I like your "summing-up feature" idea, but > I'm not sure about this "continuity provider". What is this > continuity? Is it a sense of continuity? A real continuity? > ------------------------------------------------------------- Howard: It's a *sense* of continuity, and it would be due to the summing-up feature. ------------------------------------------------------------- And what > > exactly IS a comparison? Holding two objects at the same time and > weighing them, like on a scale? Or holding one, "marking" it, and > then holding another with sañña again marking, i.e. giving an > impression of change, difference, similarity? Once the old object is > gone, it's gone. What is there in the remembering? Nothing, really, > just a sense of similarity, no? > --------------------------------------------------------- Howard: Perhaps that is enough. But I have to plead major ignorance on this question. --------------------------------------------------------- > > Very scattered thinking, but maybe I'll get some time next March to > think more clearly about this all. > > Whew! > > ============================ With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 10141 From: Date: Tue Dec 18, 2001 2:44pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Memory, Objects, and Continuity Hi Howard and everyone, <<--------------------------------------------------------------- I think the most important part of what Nyanaponika says with respect to this thread is "Finally, the individual contributions of all those different perceptual processes have to be remembered and coordinated in order to form the final and complete perception of a rose." So, memory is being used as a summing-up operation which makes non-co-occurring things co-occur. ----------------------------------------------------------------- >> I still have a hard time to understand what you tried to say. Let me try to say something from different way. I have to repeat some statements. My understanding is sanna, vedana, sakara (other cetasikas) and vinnana (citta) always coarise. In the same citta, all four arise simultaneously, have exactly the same arammana, one arammana at a time and then fall away together completely. Sanna (memory, recognition, perception....) is namadhamma which have a nature of marking, noting, registering, retention, recall. Sati (mindfulness, awareness, at times memory!!) is another namadhamma which has character of not-floting away, functions as not-confusing(from what is kusala, akusala, nama , rupa), its manifestation as facing or attending its arammana and has firm rememberance as its proximate cause. So sanna co-occur with every citta, while sati co-occur only in every good(sobana) citta. Sanna mainly has two main kinds, sacca-sanna and attasanna (at times called nanatta-sanna, including kana (samuha)-sanna(moha-based),, kama-sanna (lobha-based), patika-sanna (dosa-based) My understanding is citta is so fast reality is hard to see b/c atta-sanna always disguises what is real(sacca). Sacca sanna will gradually develop as sati-patthana developing. Sarah mentioned about Udayappaya-~nana , which is a wisdom level that can really see sacca b/c kana-sanna is eradicated by wisdom that can clearly see anatta. It always happens in daily life but hard to really, if the previous rupa or arammana does not cease, there will be no sucessive arammana. But b/c the citta and aramana are completely fallen away so new citta and sanna can recognize new stimulus and later on become a continuity or story. I cannot imagine how to live in this world without sanna. I agree with the last part of your statements above. Sanna is pervasive. Sound to me that your whole statement and topic refer to a very long long citta process, and of course sanna occur all along in that process. I don't think I can come up exactly with a mechanism of continuity. But let me share some experience. I went to Universal Studio in LA many years ago. I'd seen "Back to the Future", I do not remember how to call this type of movie but it's all simulated. I sat in a car-like theatre. Well, in a movie, there was a scene that make me feel like the car is falling down into a crater. I really felt that I was falling down. My perception was the dinosaurs are becoming bigger and bigger, the the crater's wall is moving upward (by cinematography technique) and I was about to fall in to a mouth of a dinosaur. The sound effects of gusty blowing wind, also the theatre was made that it can drop down and rotate (it can drop only a foot oor two). The combination of the visual perception, sound effect, the my physical sensation (positional sense, muscle tone that I try to counteract my sense of falling, heart rate, and so on) and definitely my sanna, my citta and other cetasikas was working in an extremely well organized manner, so my mind perceived that I was falling into a crater into a mouth of a dinosaur. When I stepped out of the theatre, I looked back at the car and a thought came to me that it was all an illusion. In that 15 minutes, definitely there was a series of long rapid successive moments of nama-rupa perception-->color/seeing, sound/hearing, kaya-arammana/physical sensation and concept(pannatti)/mano-dvara. Sanna is there all along, definitely atta-sanna, kana-sanna, attha-sanna. It's me who was falling, dinosaur was going to eat me. Sucessive perception and mental processes become story. It was fun. I can recall that pretty clearly, definitely with sanna, citta and other conditions as well. Num 10142 From: azita gill Date: Tue Dec 18, 2001 9:00pm Subject: chatgroup Hi all, Azita is my name, and I have benn reading very interesting Dhamma via the dsg. However I am having difficulty sending mail to the group. Is there a code i should know about or ..... I am lost and would love to comment on some of what I read. Azita. http://greetings.yahoo.com.au - Yahoo! Greetings - Send your festive greetings online! 10143 From: Sarah Date: Tue Dec 18, 2001 10:03pm Subject: Intro to Vinaya Commentary - words of the Buddha? <5> Dear Friends, ******************** Smp. = Samantapaasaadikaa. This is the commentary to the Vinaya by Buddhaghosa Baahiranidaana, The Inception of Discipline & the Vinaya Nidaana = the introductory chapter to the Smp. which I'm quoting from ******************** Just to recap, in the Baahiranidaana, Buddhaghosa is establishing the authenticity of the Vinaya, Suttanta and Abhidhamma. The ‘Dhamma and the Vinaya’ took 7 months to rehearse at the 1st Council held in Rajagaha, 2 months after the Buddha’s Parinibbana. Just to repeat from last week’s final paragraph from this text: ‘ The word of the Buddha which should be known as uniform in sentiment, twofold as the Dhamma and the Vinaya, threefold according to the first, intermediate, and last words, and similarly as Pitakas (Baskets), fivefold according to the Nikayas (Collections), ninefold according to the Angas (Factors), and forming 84,000 divisions according to the Units of the Dhamma.’ ...... To continue: ‘How is it twofold as the dhamma and the vinaya? All this, in its entirety, is reckoned as the dhamma and the Vinaya. Herein the Basket of the Discipline is the Vinaya, the rest of the word of the Buddha is the Dhamma. Hence was it stated: “Let us, friends, rehearse the Dhamma and the Vinaya,” and :I shall question Upali on the Vinaya and Ananda on the dhamma.” Thus it is twofold as the Dhamma and the Vinaya.’ ..... With regard to the term, Abhidhamma, it says: ‘Since here are found conditions which possess growth and their own characteristics, are revered and differentiated and said to be excellent- on account of these it is called Abhidhamma.’ . ..... A little later, there is a description of the 3 Pitakas, Vinaya, suttanta and Abhidhamma: ‘Here follows the explanation and elucidation. These three Pitakas, indeed, according to formal analyses are said to be the authoritative injunctions, the popular teachings, and the ultimate truth respectively; or they are the discourses necesitated by transgressions, those adapted to circumstances, and those set out in acordance with reality respectively; or again, discourses on the various categories of restraint, on the refutation of heresies, and on the distinction between Name and Form , respectively. Herein, the Vinayapitaka is called the exposition of injunctions as it has been preached with a preponderance of authority by the Exalted One in whom all authority is vested; the suttapitaka, the exposition of popular teachings as it has beem preached with great emphasis on popular ethics by the Exalted One who was proficient in popular ethics; and the Abhidhammapitaka, the exposition of ultimate truth as it has been preached with great leanings on absolute truth by the Exalted One who is adept in the absolute truths. ‘Likewise, the first is called the teaching necessitated by transgressions wherin those beings who are given to many misdeeds are admonished in accordance with the nature of their offences; the second, that adapted to circumstances wherein beings who are given to divers dispositions, latent tendencies, and traits of character are admonished in accordance with their adaptability; and the third, that set out in accordance with reality wherein bengs who conceive of an ego and what pertains to it, only in the presence of a pile of conditions, are instructed in terms of the absolute truth.......’ ******************** So we have in these quotes the emphasis on ‘uniform sentiment’ in the 3 Pitakas and the different emphasis, according to circumstances, of which language or ‘style’ is used. In the Atthasalini (The Expositor), we also find references to the Abhidhamma-Pitaka being included in the Khuddaka Nikaya (as rehearsed at the First Council) and also references to the Abhidhamma in one or two suttas which Rob K kindly brought to my/our attention *. I may refer to these next time. ..... Meanwhile, I promised Ken O to check Buddhaghosa’s sources more carefully for this ‘episode’. Buddhaghosa himself makes it clear in Smp. that, as with all his commentaries, this is ‘a re-compiled commentary’ of the Siiha.la A.t.thakathaa. which was first recited under Mahinda. According to Jayawickrama’s introduction to the Baahiranidaana: ‘Evidence is not lacking for the survival of the Sihala Atthakatha even after Buddhaghosa and the other commentators that followed, though they finally went into oblivion in due course. The statement that they burned in a huge bonfire is merely a figurative way of stating that they no longer served any purpose. The disappearance of the Sihala Atthkatha is looked upon by writers as a great blow to the development of Sinhalese literature. However that may be, it is decidedly the fruits of the endeavours of the ‘teachers of yore’ in some finalized form that were available to Buddhaghosa when he started compiling his commentaries and paved the way for the perfet commentarial literature in Pali available today.....’ ..... I mentioned before that according to Buddhaghosa, the origin of the Mahavihara commentarial tradition goes back to the time of the First Coucil. The commentaries were, he writes: ‘....rehearsed at the very outset, for the purpose of elucidating the meaning, by the 500 (who were) endowed with self-mastery, and were likewise rehearsed even afterwards were subsequently brought to the island of the Sihalas by Maha-Mahinda (who was) endowed with self-mastery...’ ..... I quoted last time that sometimes the Buddha preached ‘a sermon in concise form’ and then one of the chief disciples would explain in greater detail. Malalasekera continues (The Pali Literature of Ceylon); ‘When later the text of the canon came to be compiled, arranged, and edited, some of the expositions found their way into the Pitakas and were given a permanent place therein. Thus we have the Sangiti-suttanta of the Digha Nikaya, ascribed to Sariputta and forming a complete catechism of terms and passages of exegetical nature. Such was also the Sacca-vibhanga (an exposition of the four Noble Truths) of the Majjhima, which later found its proper place in the second book of the Abhidhamma-Pitaka, and also the Madhu-pindika-sutta of Maha-Kaccayana, included in the Majjhima Nikaya. It sometimes happened that for a proper understanding of the text, explanations of a commentarial nature were quite essential; and in such cases the commentary was naturally incorporated into the text and formed part of the text itself.......Then there is the Niddesa, a whole book of commentary on texts now included in the Sutta-nipata; and there are passages clearly of a commentarial nature scattered throughout the Nikayas.’ ******************** This is a really just a little fun exercise for me and a bit of a balancing act between the historical information, present relevance, abhidhamma vs commentaries, Baahiranidaana vs other texts and so on. Of course there is more that could have been included on the early schisms, linguistic traditions, arrival of Mahinda, Indian commentaries and so on.....Mainly I’ll drift on with the passages I find of most interest unless anyone 'shouts', like Ken O. Sarah *http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/files/ ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 10144 From: Sarah Date: Tue Dec 18, 2001 10:10pm Subject: Re: [dsg] chatgroup Hi Azita, I'm glad to hear you're following dsg. Certainly this post of yours has been sent Ok, so just keep doing whatever you did with this one;-) To reply to a particular post, you could try hitting the 'reply' tag above the message, then editing the message and adding your note and when it's done, hit the 'send' tag. Very best wishes to you and all our other old dsg friends Down Under.....must be nice and warm in Queensland right now..... Look forward to all those saved up comments. xxSarah p.s maybe you could let Jon know off-list if you're still having any trouble replying. --- azita gill wrote: > Hi all, Azita is my name, and I have benn reading > very interesting Dhamma via the dsg. However I am > having difficulty sending mail to the group. Is there > a code i should know about or ..... I am lost and > would love to comment on some of what I read. > Azita. > 10145 From: Date: Tue Dec 18, 2001 5:44pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein And Howard Hi, Suan - In a message dated 12/18/01 9:49:45 AM Eastern Standard Time, abhidhammika@y... writes: > In the meantime, if both or either of you could define or explain to > me the terms "nihilism" and "annihilationism" used in your psots, I > would be very grateful to you. In what sense do you use them? Have > you come across their equivalent Pali or Sanskrit terms? It seems > that these terms play important roles in understanding the afterlife > Parinibbaana. > =========================== What I mean by 'nihilism' is the belief that nothing exists at all, in any manner. What I mean by 'annihilationism' is the belief that there are things which truly exist, but then cease to exist in any sense at all, are annihilated. I understand Buddhism to teach that conditioned dhammas exist dependently, contingently, lacking own-being, and not as independent "things", but only things-in-relation. Because of such (contingent) existence, nihilism is false. Because of the lack of *independent* existence, both substantialism and annihilationism are false. And because of impermanence of all conditioned dhammas, eternalism is also false. As far as nibbana is concerned, at least nibbana without remnant, I see it as consciousness of absence of objects: a luminous, timeless reality, permanent in the double sense of being timeless, and of being available at all times from within the temporal realms. Nibbana with remnant, the ordinary state of the living arahant, I see as based on the luminous, timeless nibbana, but with an overlay of conditions which are seen through as empty, fleeting shadows. (I have no way of expressing this except in a semi-poetic way.) With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 10146 From: Robert Epstein Date: Tue Dec 18, 2001 10:58pm Subject: Re: [dsg] what/who can control what/who? what/who cannot control what/who? --- Victor Yu wrote: > Hello Robert, > > I am not sure how you got the idea that I said one can possiby control form. Hi Victor, No, the idea that I got is just that you are saying there is a self beyond form, beyond the khandas. So my question to you is: Do you think there is a self beyond form, and what is the nature of that self? You say below that anatta does not mean there is no self. I believe most Theravadins here would say that anatta means that nothing that can be pointed to in the world of form qualifies as self, and that nothing beyond the world of form can be called 'self' either. What, if anything, would you say qualifies as a definition of self or a 'true self', as opposed to the false self of the khandas? Thanks, Robert Ep. ========================== > I will try to be more clear: > > Form is not self implies that form cannot control itself. > Form is not self does not imply that one cannot control form. > Form is not self does not imply that one cannot be controlled by form. > Form is not self does not imply that one cannot control oneself. > > One can control oneself. > One can control oneself does not imply that one can control form. > One can control oneself does not imply that one can be controlled by form. > > Why identify form as self by saying "one can control form"? > Why identify form as self by saying "one can be controlled by form"? > > Why identify self as form by saying "one cannot control form"? > Why identify self as form by saying "one cannot be controlled by form"? > Why identify self as form by saying "one cannot control oneself"? > > I am not sure how you got the idea that 'anatta' means that "there is no > self"? > > Thank you. > > Regards, > Victor > > > ----- Original Message ----- > From: "Robert Epstein" > To: > Sent: Tuesday, December 18, 2001 1:54 AM > Subject: Re: [dsg] what/who control what? > > > > Thank you Victor. I think that is a lot more clear. > > > > Yes, it makes sense to refrain from identifying 'form' of any kind as > 'self'. > > However when you say that 'one' can possibly control form, you are > implying that > > this 'one' is a 'self' that may or may not control form, although as you > say, > > 'form' is not self. So this seems to me to be a contradiction of > 'anatta', which > > not only says that the kandhas are not self, but that *there is no self* > period, > > that the idea of self is an illusion. Do you agree with this, or do you > think > > that there is a self that is beyond form? > > > > Best, > > Robert Ep. > > > > ================ > > > > --- yuzhonghao wrote: 10147 From: Robert Epstein Date: Tue Dec 18, 2001 11:00pm Subject: Re: [dsg] A rupee for your rupa --- egberdina wrote: > Dear Robert, > > Sorry to you and anyone else, I had no idea this was already a point > of discussion. > > Thank you for your reply all the same. I'll try to pay a bit more > attention in future. > > All the best > > Herman > ========= Dear Herman, Oh, I didn't think you were being redundant. I was glad you brought it up, since it still seems to be unresolved for me. Robert Ep. ========= > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Robert Epstein wrote: > > > > --- egberdina wrote: > > > Hi all, > > > > > > When I think I am having a moment of awareness, I am not aware of > > > phenomena as they are, but I am aware of phenomena as they are > not. > > > When the penny drops, I understand , this is not real. What I > mean by > > > that is: When the penny drops, I understand, that what I thought > I > > > was seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, feeling (note five, not > six > > > senses) is not what is out there, in reality, but in here , as > > > recreated by a complex series of interdependant processes, > including > > > stimuli from very real, but very unknowable rupas. > > > > Well, I raised this question as to the distinction of 'rupas' about > a week ago, > > but since you mention it, I'll join in raising it again. What > makes a 'rupa' > > 'directly seen'. Is it not still transmitted through a > sensory/mental process? > > > > Robert Ep. > > > > PS. I apologize in advance if this has already been explained to > me and I've > > forgotten. I do have a slight feeling of deja vu. > > > > ======================= > > > > > What exactly is a mental representation of a physical object but > a > > > mental object? What is my point? Rupas are not known as rupas, > they > > > are known as namas. Awareness can only be restricted to the > content > > > of the mind, the outside world is always an interpreted > > > representation. > > > > > > I read an interesting line the other day : "We live in a three > pound > > > universe, the brain". If anyone doubts it, a visit to a mental > > > hospital or clinic for brain-injured people would be enlightening. > > > > > > All the best > > > > > > > > > Herman 10148 From: Robert Epstein Date: Tue Dec 18, 2001 11:09pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein And Howard Dear Suan, I will of course be happy to wait until your next subcommentary, and will be very happy when it arrives. I also want to re-read your Subcommentary part II which I find has some fascinating elements. It seems to me that you have written an argument there that actually agrees with my sense of the 'undefined reality' of the Arahant in Parinibbana, but I may very well be deluded. I will go back to it and hopefully be able to say something more about it in the near future, while waiting for your next message. Regards, Robert Ep. =============================== --- abhidhammika wrote: > > > > Dear Robert Epstein And Howard > > How are you? > > Thank you for your kind responses to the Parinibbaana Subcommentary > Part Two. > > I have read all your responses including Howard's post (10007) > regarding Robert's first reply. > > As your responses contain very profound and interesting issues and > statements, I will have to analyse them carefully before I respond to > them. I may even need to go to other parts of the Tipitaka to get > more information, even though my experience with Tipitaka tells me > that statements and interpretations on nibbana, like any other topic, > are very consistent. > > In the meantime, if both or either of you could define or explain to > me the terms "nihilism" and "annihilationism" used in your psots, I > would be very grateful to you. In what sense do you use them? Have > you come across their equivalent Pali or Sanskrit terms? It seems > that these terms play important roles in understanding the afterlife > Parinibbaana. > > Apparantly, I may end up serializing Parinibbaana Subcommentaries. So > please be patient with the waiting periods. > > By the way, I do not forget to write something as well in response to > Howard's "nonconceptual state of being." > > With best wishes, > > Suan > > http://www.bodhiology.org > 10149 From: Robert Epstein Date: Tue Dec 18, 2001 11:11pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein And Howard --- Kenneth Ong wrote: > Hi all, > > there is a paragraph in the book titled "Abhidhamma Studies" by Ven > Nyanaponika Thera > > Quote > "When in the above passage, the quality of a "real thing" is denied to the > attainment of cessation, this certainly does not mean that this state is > "unreal" in the sense of hallucinations or a figment of imagination. We > should therefore better speak of it as being "different real" because all > the data of our experience of reality and even of the most sublime states > of absorption are absent in the that state. In the same way, Nibbana may > be said to have no "existence" in terms of the khandhas world, but by > denying its reality we would fall into the error of annihilationism > (ucchedaditthi)." unquote. This is a great quote, Kenneth, and I hope Suan will note the Pali {?} here for 'annihilationism' {ucchedaditthi}, which may put the idea into a better context. Thanks, Robert Ep. ================================= > Howard, in the appendix 2 of this book, it said abt memory, maybe the next > few days, I will type it out for your perusal. > > I would say this book is like a dissertation, a very interesting book to > read for those who are interested in understanding of Abhidhamma. I > personally think it is very refreshing. It also talk abt the time factor > of the present moment. > > > > > Kind regards > Ken O > > > > > > > --- abhidhammika wrote: > > > > > > > Dear Robert Epstein And Howard > > > > How are you? > > > > Thank you for your kind responses to the Parinibbaana Subcommentary > > Part Two. > > > > I have read all your responses including Howard's post (10007) > > regarding Robert's first reply. > > > > As your responses contain very profound and interesting issues and > > statements, I will have to analyse them carefully before I respond to > > them. I may even need to go to other parts of the Tipitaka to get > > more information, even though my experience with Tipitaka tells me > > that statements and interpretations on nibbana, like any other topic, > > are very consistent. > > > > In the meantime, if both or either of you could define or explain to > > me the terms "nihilism" and "annihilationism" used in your psots, I > > would be very grateful to you. In what sense do you use them? Have > > you come across their equivalent Pali or Sanskrit terms? It seems > > that these terms play important roles in understanding the afterlife > > Parinibbaana. > > > > Apparantly, I may end up serializing Parinibbaana Subcommentaries. So > > please be patient with the waiting periods. > > > > By the way, I do not forget to write something as well in response to > > Howard's "nonconceptual state of being." > > > > With best wishes, > > > > Suan > > > > http://www.bodhiology.org > > 10150 From: Robert Epstein Date: Tue Dec 18, 2001 11:18pm Subject: RE: [dsg] A rupee for your rupa Dear Kom, Thank you very much for 'dropping in'! I take it that what you are saying is that the mind of the Arahant will still have concepts arising, but that they will never be confused with arising realities. Therefore in the moment that a 'rupa' is the object of discernment the 'rupa' will be seen by sati and panna for what it truly is, and this is direct perception of 'rupa'? I take it that 'nama' can also be directly perceived as what it is by the Arahant? Thanks, Robert Ep. ============= --- Kom Tukovinit wrote: > Dear Robert, > > Sorry to just drop in here. I may have missed earlier > dicussions but I thought this point was interesting. Normal > disclaimer: this is my understanding only! > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: Robert Epstein [mailto:epsteinrob@y...] > > Sent: Monday, December 17, 2001 11:01 PM > > To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com > > Subject: Re: [dsg] A rupee for your rupa > > > > Hi Howard. > > I guess this comes down to whether the mind is > > capable of a direct act of > > perception without forming a concept. I guess > > you would say that it is possible, > > that the rupa can be directly discerned -- is > > this at the level of satipatthana? > > And are there any recorded details as to how the > > mind functions or reduces its > > normal extrapolating tendencies during such a pure act? > > > > By the model presented by the Abhidhamma, the mind > constantly cognizes, mostly without Sati and Panna, > different realities all the time. However, after the > cognition of realities fall away, the cognition of concept > virtually immediately arises, regardless of whether or not > Satipatthana is arising or not. > > I think there are at least two follow-on questions from this > discussion: > 1) What is satipathanna, and how is it different from the > mind that cognizes the realities but is not satipatthana? > 2) Is cognizing concepts unpure? Does this mean people > developing Satipathanna have no concept? > > I bet you have heard the answer to the first question > already. Satipatthana is citta and cetasikas rising to > cognize a reality as it truly is. Satipatthana always > arises with Panna (wisdom), and always has a reality, and > never concepts, as its object. Satipatthana is the *only* > way that panna can develop to the point of the > enlightenment. It is *impossible* to develop Satipatthana > without hearing from a Sammasam Buddha, unless one is a > self-englightened one (a Buddha). Satipatthana is different > from other cittas that arise to cognize realities as > discussed: by co-arising namas, by the object, by its > function, by result, and the proximity of how it arises. > > It is possible for unskillful cittas to mistake something > not Satipatthana to be Satipatthana. As you can see, other > kinds of cittas (including those with attachments and > ignorance) can also have realities as their objects. A. > Sujin mentioned on the India trip that some people mistake > that they are developing Satipatthana because they have > moments that they experience one reality at a time. > > As for the second question, you may be able to guess what I > am about to say. The "purity" of the mind more or less > totally depends on the qualities of the co-arising factors. > Regardless of the objects (realities or concepts), the mind > is unpure if there are akusala factors co-arising with it. > The mind is "pure" if there are kusala factors arising with > it. The interesting part, even if we are thinking about a > concept that appears like wisdom (thinking about the true > dhamma, for example), the mind that thinks about the concept > maybe in fact unpure if attachments or ignorance are > co-arising with the mind. Cognizing realities, or thinking > about the "right" concepts are no guarantee that the mind is > pure (you can see why chanting or memorizing Satipatthana > sutta may not help very much if there are no > understandings). In all cases, realities rise and fall by > their conditions, are non-self and uncontrollable, anatta. > Realities rule! > > An arahat, someone whose mind is completely pure, also > cognize concepts. However, their minds (roughly) rise with > only sobhana (beautiful, pure) factors. They never mistake > concepts as realities or realities as concepts, a far cry > from someone who hasn't accumulated wisdom to tell the > differences. > > kom 10151 From: azita gill Date: Tue Dec 18, 2001 11:18pm Subject: Re: [dsg] contact [ not Phassa] --- Sarah wrote: > Hi Azita, > > I'm glad to hear you're following dsg. > > Certainly this post of yours has been sent Ok, so > just keep doing whatever you > did with this one;-) > > To reply to a particular post, you could try hitting > the 'reply' tag above the > message, then editing the message and adding your > note and when it's done, hit > the 'send' tag. > > Very best wishes to you and all our other old dsg > friends Down Under.....must > be nice and warm in Queensland right now..... > > Look forward to all those saved up comments. > > xxSarah > > p.s maybe you could let Jon know off-list if you're > still having any trouble > replying. > > --- azita gill wrote: > > Hi all, Azita is my > name, and I have benn reading > > very interesting Dhamma via the dsg. However I > am > > having difficulty sending mail to the group. Is > there > > a code i should know about or ..... I am lost and > > would love to comment on some of what I read. > > > Azita. > > yes Sarah, it's meltingly hot here in Cairns. No questions yet, this is another test run to see if I've got it yet. Azita > > > 10152 From: Robert Epstein Date: Tue Dec 18, 2001 11:24pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Memory, Objects, and Continuity Dear Dan, You seem to raise the interesting possibility that comparisions regarding a remembered object and another object may in fact not be real, but only be conceptual. As I look at this, it seems very possible that the reality of memory is necessarily selective, and not actual, since there is no longer a true and detailed object to be observed. Best, Robert Ep. ========================= --- onco111 wrote: > Hi Howard, > I've been loosely peeking in at your recent discussion, and I like > the questions and investigations you are doing. I've been quite > tempted to join in the discussion, and I couldn't hold back any > longer. Brief comments below. > > > The view that I am tentatively adopting is that the function > of > > memory, be it an aspect of sa~n~na or sati or both or somethings > else, is > > constantly operative, in all cittas, as a concomitant, conditioning > the citta > > (an internal conditioning), and generally serving as a summing-up > feature, as > > a continuity provider, and as a comparison enabler, and, in > addition, as with > > other concomitants, a memory may, itself, serve as an arammana for > a citta. > > Patthana also has sañña as a concommitant (cetasika), conditioning > the citta (conascence). I like your "summing-up feature" idea, but > I'm not sure about this "continuity provider". What is this > continuity? Is it a sense of continuity? A real continuity? And what > exactly IS a comparison? Holding two objects at the same time and > weighing them, like on a scale? Or holding one, "marking" it, and > then holding another with sañña again marking, i.e. giving an > impression of change, difference, similarity? Once the old object is > gone, it's gone. What is there in the remembering? Nothing, really, > just a sense of similarity, no? > > Very scattered thinking, but maybe I'll get some time next March to > think more clearly about this all. > > Whew! > > Dan 10153 From: Robert Epstein Date: Tue Dec 18, 2001 11:32pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Intro to Vinaya Commentary - words of the Buddha? <5> Dear Sarah, Just want to apologize for not responding to recent contributions to your Vinaya Commentary posts. I am very interested and I am collecting them, trying to look through them, and hopefully will comment at some point in the near future. Thanks for continuing this series. Best, Robert Ep. ====================== --- Sarah wrote: > Dear Friends, > > ******************** > Smp. = Samantapaasaadikaa. This is the commentary to the Vinaya by Buddhaghosa > > Baahiranidaana, The Inception of Discipline & the Vinaya Nidaana = the > introductory chapter to the Smp. which I'm quoting from > ******************** > > Just to recap, in the Baahiranidaana, Buddhaghosa is establishing the > authenticity of the Vinaya, Suttanta and Abhidhamma. The ‘Dhamma and the > Vinaya’ took 7 months to rehearse at the 1st Council held in Rajagaha, 2 months > after the Buddha’s Parinibbana. > > Just to repeat from last week’s final paragraph from this text: > > ‘ The word of the Buddha which should be known as uniform in sentiment, twofold > as the Dhamma and the Vinaya, threefold according to the first, intermediate, > and last words, and similarly as Pitakas (Baskets), fivefold according to the > Nikayas (Collections), ninefold according to the Angas (Factors), and forming > 84,000 divisions according to the Units of the Dhamma.’ > ...... > > To continue: > ‘How is it twofold as the dhamma and the vinaya? All this, in its entirety, is > reckoned as the dhamma and the Vinaya. Herein the Basket of the Discipline is > the Vinaya, the rest of the word of the Buddha is the Dhamma. Hence was it > stated: “Let us, friends, rehearse the Dhamma and the Vinaya,” and :I shall > question Upali on the Vinaya and Ananda on the dhamma.” Thus it is twofold as > the Dhamma and the Vinaya.’ ..... > > A little later we read: > > ‘How is it threefold according to the Pitakas? Indeed, all this, in its > entirety, has the three divisions as the Vinaya-pitaka, the suttantapitaka, and > the Abhidhammapitaka. Therein, having brought together all that has been both > rehearsed and not at the First convocation, both Patimokkha, the two Vibhanga, > the 22 Khandhaka, and the 16 Parivara, it is called the Vinayapitaka. > > ‘The collection of the 34 suttas beginning with Brahmajala called the > Dighanikaya, that of 152 suttas beginning with Mulapariyaya called the > Majjhimanikaya, that of 7,762 suttas beginning with Oghataranasutta called the > Samyuttanikaya, that of 9.557 suttas beginning with the Cittapariyadanasutta, > called the Anguttaranikaya, and the Khuddakanikaya consisting of the 15 works: > Khuddakapatha, Dhammapada, Udana, Itivuttaka, Suttanipata, Vimanavatthu, > Petavatthu, Thera and Therigatha, Jataka, Niddesa, Patisambhida, Apadana, > Buddhavamsa, and Cariyapitaka, are called Suttantapitaka. > > Dhammasangani, Vibhanga, dhatukatha, Puggalapannatti, Kathavattu, Yamaka, and > Patthana constitute the Abhidhammapitaka.’ > ..... > > With regard to the term, Abhidhamma, it says: > > ‘Since here are found conditions which possess growth and their own > characteristics, are revered and differentiated and said to be excellent- on > account of these it is called Abhidhamma.’ . > ..... > > A little later, there is a description of the 3 Pitakas, Vinaya, suttanta and > Abhidhamma: > > ‘Here follows the explanation and elucidation. These three Pitakas, indeed, > according to formal analyses are said to be the authoritative injunctions, the > popular teachings, and the ultimate truth respectively; or they are the > discourses necesitated by transgressions, those adapted to circumstances, and > those set out in acordance with reality respectively; or again, discourses on > the various categories of restraint, on the refutation of heresies, and on the > distinction between Name and Form , respectively. Herein, > the Vinayapitaka is called the exposition of injunctions as it has been > preached with a preponderance of authority by the Exalted One in whom all > authority is vested; the suttapitaka, the exposition of popular teachings as > it has beem preached with great emphasis on popular ethics by the Exalted One > who was proficient in popular ethics; and the Abhidhammapitaka, the exposition > of ultimate truth as it has been preached with great leanings on absolute truth > by the Exalted One who is adept in the absolute truths. > > ‘Likewise, the first is called the teaching necessitated by transgressions > wherin those beings who are given to many misdeeds are admonished in accordance > with the nature of their offences; the second, that adapted to circumstances > wherein beings who are given to divers dispositions, latent tendencies, and > traits of character are admonished in accordance with their adaptability; and > the third, that set out in accordance with reality wherein bengs who conceive > of an ego and what pertains to it, only in the presence of a pile of > conditions, are instructed in terms of the absolute truth.......’ > > ******************** > > So we have in these quotes the emphasis on ‘uniform sentiment’ in the 3 Pitakas > and the different emphasis, according to circumstances, of which language or > ‘style’ is used. > > In the Atthasalini (The Expositor), we also find references to the > Abhidhamma-Pitaka being included in the Khuddaka Nikaya (as rehearsed at the > First Council) and also references to the Abhidhamma in one or two suttas which > Rob K kindly brought to my/our attention *. I may refer to these next time. > ..... > > Meanwhile, I promised Ken O to check Buddhaghosa’s sources more carefully for > this ‘episode’. Buddhaghosa himself makes it clear in Smp. that, as with all > his commentaries, this is ‘a re-compiled commentary’ of the Siiha.la > A.t.thakathaa. which was first recited under Mahinda. According to > Jayawickrama’s introduction to the Baahiranidaana: > > ‘Evidence is not lacking for the survival of the Sihala Atthakatha even after > Buddhaghosa and the other commentators that followed, though they finally went > into oblivion in due course. The statement that they burned in a huge bonfire > is merely a figurative way of stating that they no longer served any purpose. > The disappearance of the Sihala Atthkatha is looked upon by writers as a great > blow to the development of Sinhalese literature. However that may be, it is > decidedly the fruits of the endeavours of the ‘teachers of yore’ in some > finalized form that were available to Buddhaghosa when he started compiling his > commentaries and paved the way for the perfet commentarial literature in Pali > available today.....’ > ..... > > I mentioned before that according to Buddhaghosa, the origin of the Mahavihara > commentarial tradition goes back to the time of the First Coucil. The > commentaries were, he writes: > > ‘....rehearsed at the very outset, for the purpose of elucidating the meaning, > by the 500 (who were) endowed with self-mastery, and were likewise rehearsed > even afterwards were subsequently brought to the island of the Sihalas by > Maha-Mahinda (who was) endowed with self-mastery...’ > ..... > > I quoted last time that sometimes the Buddha preached ‘a sermon in concise > form’ and then one of the chief disciples would explain in greater detail. > Malalasekera continues (The Pali Literature of Ceylon); > > ‘When later the text of the canon came to be compiled, arranged, and edited, > some of the expositions found their way into the Pitakas and were given a > permanent place therein. Thus we have the Sangiti-suttanta of the Digha > Nikaya, ascribed to Sariputta and forming a complete catechism of terms and > passages of exegetical nature. Such was also the Sacca-vibhanga (an exposition > of the four Noble Truths) of the Majjhima, which later found its proper place > in the second book of the Abhidhamma-Pitaka, and also the Madhu-pindika-sutta > of Maha-Kaccayana, included in the Majjhima Nikaya. It sometimes happened that > for a proper understanding of the text, explanations of a commentarial nature > were quite essential; and in such cases the commentary was naturally > incorporated into the text and formed part of the text itself.......Then there > is the Niddesa, a whole book of commentary on texts now included in the > Sutta-nipata; and there are passages clearly of a commentarial nature > scattered throughout the Nikayas.’ > > ******************** > > This is a really just a little fun exercise for me and a bit of a balancing act > between the historical information, present relevance, abhidhamma vs > commentaries, Baahiranidaana vs other texts and so on. Of course there is more > that could have been included on the early schisms, linguistic traditions, > arrival of Mahinda, Indian commentaries and so on.....Mainly I’ll drift on with > the passages I find of most interest unless anyone 'shouts', like Ken O. > > Sarah > > *http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/files/ > ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 10154 From: Sarah Date: Tue Dec 18, 2001 11:51pm Subject: Re: [dsg] contact [ not Phassa] Hi again Azita, --- azita gill wrote: > > > yes Sarah, it's meltingly hot here in Cairns. No > questions yet, this is another test run to see if I've > got it yet. Azita > > You're almost getting it right..we're all hearing you loud and clear;-) Perhaps you can put your new message at the top where we can see it, delete some of the old stuff no longer needed in your reply (including the yahoo blurb at the bottom so we don't re-read it all), and I'm not quite sure how your new message ends up in these .>>quote marks, but you'll work all that out. If you don't have any questions, we look forward to some answers! Hope you don't melt before we hear back from you, Sarah p.s Some of us will be in Bkk over New Year (28th Dec til 1st Jan) if you're able to join us;-) 10155 From: Kenneth Ong Date: Wed Dec 19, 2001 0:30am Subject: Re: [dsg] Intro to Vinaya Commentary - words of the Buddha? <5> Hi Sarah thanks for the commentary. I keeping them just like Rob Ep. Kind regards Ken O (whispering) --- Sarah wrote: > Dear Friends, > > ******************** > Smp. = Samantapaasaadikaa. This is the commentary to the Vinaya by > Buddhaghosa > > Baahiranidaana, The Inception of Discipline & the Vinaya Nidaana = the > introductory chapter to the Smp. which I'm quoting from > ******************** > > Just to recap, in the Baahiranidaana, Buddhaghosa is establishing the > authenticity of the Vinaya, Suttanta and Abhidhamma. The ‘Dhamma and the > Vinaya’ took 7 months to rehearse at the 1st Council held in Rajagaha, 2 > months > after the Buddha’s Parinibbana. > > Just to repeat from last week’s final paragraph from this text: > > ‘ The word of the Buddha which should be known as uniform in sentiment, > twofold > as the Dhamma and the Vinaya, threefold according to the first, > intermediate, > and last words, and similarly as Pitakas (Baskets), fivefold according > to the > Nikayas (Collections), ninefold according to the Angas (Factors), and > forming > 84,000 divisions according to the Units of the Dhamma.’ > ...... > > To continue: > ‘How is it twofold as the dhamma and the vinaya? All this, in its > entirety, is > reckoned as the dhamma and the Vinaya. Herein the Basket of the > Discipline is > the Vinaya, the rest of the word of the Buddha is the Dhamma. Hence was > it > stated: “Let us, friends, rehearse the Dhamma and the Vinaya,” and :I > shall > question Upali on the Vinaya and Ananda on the dhamma.” Thus it is > twofold as > the Dhamma and the Vinaya.’ ..... > > A little later we read: > > ‘How is it threefold according to the Pitakas? Indeed, all this, in its > entirety, has the three divisions as the Vinaya-pitaka, the > suttantapitaka, and > the Abhidhammapitaka. Therein, having brought together all that has > been both > rehearsed and not at the First convocation, both Patimokkha, the two > Vibhanga, > the 22 Khandhaka, and the 16 Parivara, it is called the Vinayapitaka. > > ‘The collection of the 34 suttas beginning with Brahmajala called the > Dighanikaya, that of 152 suttas beginning with Mulapariyaya called the > Majjhimanikaya, that of 7,762 suttas beginning with Oghataranasutta > called the > Samyuttanikaya, that of 9.557 suttas beginning with the > Cittapariyadanasutta, > called the Anguttaranikaya, and the Khuddakanikaya consisting of the 15 > works: > Khuddakapatha, Dhammapada, Udana, Itivuttaka, Suttanipata, Vimanavatthu, > Petavatthu, Thera and Therigatha, Jataka, Niddesa, Patisambhida, > Apadana, > Buddhavamsa, and Cariyapitaka, are called Suttantapitaka. > > Dhammasangani, Vibhanga, dhatukatha, Puggalapannatti, Kathavattu, > Yamaka, and > Patthana constitute the Abhidhammapitaka.’ > ..... > > With regard to the term, Abhidhamma, it says: > > ‘Since here are found conditions which possess growth and their own > characteristics, are revered and differentiated and said to be > excellent- on > account of these it is called Abhidhamma.’ . > ..... > > A little later, there is a description of the 3 Pitakas, Vinaya, > suttanta and > Abhidhamma: > > ‘Here follows the explanation and elucidation. These three Pitakas, > indeed, > according to formal analyses are said to be the authoritative > injunctions, the > popular teachings, and the ultimate truth respectively; or they are the > discourses necesitated by transgressions, those adapted to > circumstances, and > those set out in acordance with reality respectively; or again, > discourses on > the various categories of restraint, on the refutation of heresies, and > on the > distinction between Name and Form , respectively. > Herein, > the Vinayapitaka is called the exposition of injunctions as it has been > preached with a preponderance of authority by the Exalted One in whom > all > authority is vested; the suttapitaka, the exposition of popular > teachings as > it has beem preached with great emphasis on popular ethics by the > Exalted One > who was proficient in popular ethics; and the Abhidhammapitaka, the > exposition > of ultimate truth as it has been preached with great leanings on > absolute truth > by the Exalted One who is adept in the absolute truths. > > ‘Likewise, the first is called the teaching necessitated by > transgressions > wherin those beings who are given to many misdeeds are admonished in > accordance > with the nature of their offences; the second, that adapted to > circumstances > wherein beings who are given to divers dispositions, latent tendencies, > and > traits of character are admonished in accordance with their > adaptability; and > the third, that set out in accordance with reality wherein bengs who > conceive > of an ego and what pertains to it, only in the presence of a pile of > conditions, are instructed in terms of the absolute truth.......’ quote> > > ******************** > > So we have in these quotes the emphasis on ‘uniform sentiment’ in the 3 > Pitakas > and the different emphasis, according to circumstances, of which > language or > ‘style’ is used. > > In the Atthasalini (The Expositor), we also find references to the > Abhidhamma-Pitaka being included in the Khuddaka Nikaya (as rehearsed at > the > First Council) and also references to the Abhidhamma in one or two > suttas which > Rob K kindly brought to my/our attention *. I may refer to these next > time. > ..... > > Meanwhile, I promised Ken O to check Buddhaghosa’s sources more > carefully for > this ‘episode’. Buddhaghosa himself makes it clear in Smp. that, as with > all > his commentaries, this is ‘a re-compiled commentary’ of the Siiha.la > A.t.thakathaa. which was first recited under Mahinda. According to > Jayawickrama’s introduction to the Baahiranidaana: > > ‘Evidence is not lacking for the survival of the Sihala Atthakatha even > after > Buddhaghosa and the other commentators that followed, though they > finally went > into oblivion in due course. The statement that they burned in a huge > bonfire > is merely a figurative way of stating that they no longer served any > purpose. > The disappearance of the Sihala Atthkatha is looked upon by writers as > a great > blow to the development of Sinhalese literature. However that may be, > it is > decidedly the fruits of the endeavours of the ‘teachers of yore’ in some > finalized form that were available to Buddhaghosa when he started > compiling his > commentaries and paved the way for the perfet commentarial literature in > Pali > available today.....’ > ..... > > I mentioned before that according to Buddhaghosa, the origin of the > Mahavihara > commentarial tradition goes back to the time of the First Coucil. The > commentaries were, he writes: > > ‘....rehearsed at the very outset, for the purpose of elucidating the > meaning, > by the 500 (who were) endowed with self-mastery, and were likewise > rehearsed > even afterwards were subsequently brought to the island of the Sihalas > by > Maha-Mahinda (who was) endowed with self-mastery...’ > ..... > > I quoted last time that sometimes the Buddha preached ‘a sermon in > concise > form’ and then one of the chief disciples would explain in greater > detail. > Malalasekera continues (The Pali Literature of Ceylon); > > ‘When later the text of the canon came to be compiled, arranged, and > edited, > some of the expositions found their way into the Pitakas and were given > a > permanent place therein. Thus we have the Sangiti-suttanta of the Digha > Nikaya, ascribed to Sariputta and forming a complete catechism of terms > and > passages of exegetical nature. Such was also the Sacca-vibhanga (an > exposition > of the four Noble Truths) of the Majjhima, which later found its proper > place > in the second book of the Abhidhamma-Pitaka, and also the > Madhu-pindika-sutta > of Maha-Kaccayana, included in the Majjhima Nikaya. It sometimes > happened that > for a proper understanding of the text, explanations of a commentarial > nature > were quite essential; and in such cases the commentary was naturally > incorporated into the text and formed part of the text itself.......Then > there > is the Niddesa, a whole book of commentary on texts now included in the > Sutta-nipata; and there are passages clearly of a commentarial nature > scattered throughout the Nikayas.’ > > ******************** > > This is a really just a little fun exercise for me and a bit of a > balancing act > between the historical information, present relevance, abhidhamma vs > commentaries, Baahiranidaana vs other texts and so on. Of course there > is more > that could have been included on the early schisms, linguistic > traditions, > arrival of Mahinda, Indian commentaries and so on.....Mainly I’ll drift > on with > the passages I find of most interest unless anyone 'shouts', like Ken O. > > > Sarah > > *http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/files/ > ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 10156 From: Sarah Date: Wed Dec 19, 2001 1:07am Subject: Re: [dsg] some more about metta Dear Victor, Back to the Mulapariyaya Sutta and anatta... --- Victor Yu wrote: > Hello Sarah, > > This is a question for consideration: What does pronoun "I" in the > statement "Panna sees panna as it actually is with right discernment thus: > 'This is not mine. This I am not. This is not my self.'" refer to? > > Again, for reference, > "He directly knows water as water... fire as fire... wind as wind... beings > as beings... gods as gods... Pajapati as Pajapati... Brahma as Brahma... the > luminous gods as luminous gods... the gods of refulgent glory as gods of > refulgent glory... ... the All as the All..." > http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/majjhima/mn001.html > > In the passage above it is said that "He directly knows water as water..." > Is it panna that directly knows water as water? > > Reply in context below ******************** I’ll do my best, Sir! There is a useful translation by Bhikkhu Bodhi of this sutta with its commentary and subcommentaries, published by BPS under the title 'The Discourse on the Root of Existence'. ..... I think we need to understand, as others have commented before, that in this sutta we are looking at how the world is perceived and understood by the worldling, the learner, the arahat and finally by the Buddha. With regard to the worldlings, we read in the commentary notes (p34) that ‘they have not destroyed the multiple forms of personality view’. From the sutta it says: ‘..he perceves earth as earth; having perceived earth as earth, he conceives ( himself as ) earth; he conceives (himself) in earth; he conceives (himself apart) from earth; he conceives ‘earth as mine’; he delights in earth. What is the reason? Because it has not been fully understood by him, I declare.......water as water ....’’..he perceives through a perversion of perception, seizing upon the conventional expression (and thinking) “it is earth’ (lokavohaara”m gahetvaa sa~n~naavipallaasena sa~njaanaati). Or, without releasing such a segment of earth, he perceives it as a being (satta) or as belonging to a being. Why does he perceive it in this way? This should not be asked, for the worldling is like a madman. he seizes upon anything he can in whatever way he can......” ..... We may think that this just refers to those fighting over land or terrorists, but what about this moment? Do we take the computer for being some-thing? Is there any awareness that all that is seen at this moment is visible object with no thing or self in it? As soon as there is the perversion with the idea of ‘thing’ in it, there is the madness being referred to, as I understand. ..... A little later in the commentary (p.40) we read: ‘Objection: If the conventional expression is applied, what is the fault? Don’t ariyans also make use of the conventional expression, as when they say: “This, venerable sir, is the great earth,” etc? ‘Reply: It is not the mere employment of the expression that is intended here, but the wrong adherence which occurs through the conventional expression. Thus he says: “he perceives through a perversion of perception.” This is his meaning: He perceives it as beautiful, etc., through a perverted perception springing from unwise reflection. By this, weak conceiving through craving, conceit, and views is shown.’ ..... The commentary notes continue with all the many ways earth is perceived as self. the reason for this is ‘because it has not been fully understood by him..’ We read (p46) that ‘He who fully understands the earth understands it by the three types of full understanding: the full understanding of the known (~naataparin~n~na), the full understanding of scrutinization (tiira.napari~n~naa), and the full understanding of abandoning (pahaanapari~n~naa)............Or, alternatively, the defining of mentality-materiality (naamaruupa vavatthaana) is the full understanding of the known; from insight-comprehension of the groups (kalaapasammasana) as far as conformity knowledge (anuloma) is the full understanding by scrutinization; and the knowledge of the ariyan path is the full understanding by abandoning.’ ..... The subcy adds (p47): ‘therein, the “full understanding of the known” is the wisdom of full understanding by which one fully understands, delimits (paricchhindati), the plane of insight (vipassanaabhuumi)....’ ******************** Victor, one reason I’ve added some of these quotes is because I think they’re also relevant to other discussions too. As we discussed on the ultimate and conventional truth thread, it’s not so much a question of the words we use, but the understanding that lies behind them. When we say we touch earth or the computer, is there any understanding of only hardness which is experienced at that moment or do we have the idea of touching a thing? As understanding begins to grow, the language doesn’t change in conventional usage but what the arahat or Buddha understand by ‘earth’, ‘water’, ‘Gods’ or ‘Brahma’ is not what is understood by us in our madness. In the same way, we can say ‘form is not self’ as many times as we like, but it doesn’t mean there is necessarily any understanding of any rupa or form appearing at this moment. You wondered why I had got the idea (like Rob Ep, I think) that you were suggesting a self outside the khandhas. I think this was because, although you quote excellent lines about anatta from excellent suttas, the idea of controlling the various realities, suggests a deep-rooted clinging to self rather than an understanding of conditions that determines these same khandhas. If we say ‘Yes, one can control oneself’ (to quote from another post of yours) and know this is merely conventional usage, that’s fine. However, if we cling to an idea that this is possible in truth, it shows the perversity of view at that moment. Thanks for all your challenging posts metta, Sarah p.s I’m so glad you smiled at my last sign-off. Actually, I’m sorry to say the detailed formula was quite lost on Jon, so we may just have to give up our formulas as being too profound for dsg;-) ................................................................................. 10157 From: Sarah Date: Wed Dec 19, 2001 5:53am Subject: Re: [dsg] A rupee for your rupa Hi Howard, --- upasaka@a... wrote (to Rob Ep): > ======================== > A rupa, be it a sight, sound, touch, etc, is an object of sensory > discernment. It is the objective pole of an act of discernment, and while it > and the vi~n~nana discerning it arise in dependence on conditions, neither is > > compounded by the mind. This is true not only of rupas, and cittas, but also > of feelings, desires, etc. Each of them is discerned by an act of > consciousness, visual, auditory, olfactory, tactile, gustatory, OR mental, > but none of them is *constructed* by mind. Only concepts are constructed by > mind, being mental compounds of the "directly seen" dhammas. This is my > understanding. ************ This is very clear, accurate and articulate summary, I think. How many rupees do I owe? However, I have a question (of course) about the following note in another post to me: ..... > ----------------------------------------------------------- > Howard: > Yes, it's not too bad. Actually, though, I prefer the idea of the > memory of a past object being a concomitant of the current citta in which > there is a new object. After all, the *memory* of a past object need not be > considered an object itself. So there could be the hearing of a current sound > > together with the memory of the immediately preceding slightly louder or > softer sound, or even further back than the immediately preceding sound. > After all, we can and do distinguish between a current object and a > remembered preceding one. We never confuse a memory with a current > discernment. > ---------------------------------------------------------------- I just question whether there isn’t some mixing up of concepts and sanna (perception)? Sanna is the concomitant or conascent cetasika of the current citta, but the memory of the past object (i.e. the concept) is its object. Thus it is not the concept that accompanies the citta, but the sanna. The concept, of course, is present arammana, but as discussed last time, it can be a concept about anything, past, present or future. At the moment of hearing sound, the hearing is also accompanied by sanna which marks the sound (just as it is) in the ear door process at that moment. The memory (sanna) of the immediately preceding sound would accompany the cittas in the mind-door process taking concept as object (or maybe marking it directly in either the previous ear door or mind door process, but not at the same time as the marking of the present sound). Any perception of louder or softer or any other comparison suggests a concept as object at that moment, I think as Dan was suggesting. As Mike suggested, I also think there is plenty of confusing, but even when there isn’t any confusion, the curent hearing with sanna just hears and marks the present sound. Any memory of a previous sound must be by thinking of concept (as in the rose scenario). Remember ear-door, eye-door, mind-door and other door processes are changing all the time. Thinking of concepts is so fast and not in words as we usually have the idea. Hope I haven’t confused the issue even more with my ramblings and very limited abhidhamma understanding. Sarah ................................................................................... 10158 From: Sarah Date: Wed Dec 19, 2001 6:03am Subject: Re: [dsg] Ultimate realities (and khandhas) Hi Rob, > > > ha ha, Sarah, you are a true pun-dit. > > Robert Ep. ....and you out-pun-ed us all with your skandhalous pundit humour;-) Reminds me of the clowns in Shakespeare...good to have the contrasts and a little light relief too;-) Sarah 10159 From: abhidhammika Date: Wed Dec 19, 2001 6:06am Subject: Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein And Howard Dear Howard, Robert Epstein, and Ken Ong How are you? I have read all your responses to my request previous night. Thank you for your further clarification of the terms "nihilism" and "annihilationism". I have also taken note of Robert's suggestion that the Pali term for annihilationism might be "ucchedaditthi". I will carefully consider your clarifications and suggestions when I write my next and future subcommentaries. With regards, Suan http://www.bodhiology.org --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Suan - > > In a message dated 12/18/01 9:49:45 AM Eastern Standard Time, > abhidhammika@y... writes: > > > > In the meantime, if both or either of you could define or explain to > > me the terms "nihilism" and "annihilationism" used in your psots, I > > would be very grateful to you. In what sense do you use them? Have > > you come across their equivalent Pali or Sanskrit terms? It seems > > that these terms play important roles in understanding the afterlife > > Parinibbaana. > > > =========================== > What I mean by 'nihilism' is the belief that nothing exists at all, in > any manner. What I mean by 'annihilationism' is the belief that there are > things which truly exist, but then cease to exist in any sense at all, are > annihilated. > I understand Buddhism to teach that conditioned dhammas exist > dependently, contingently, lacking own-being, and not as independent > "things", but only things-in-relation. Because of such (contingent) > existence, nihilism is false. Because of the lack of *independent* existence, > both substantialism and annihilationism are false. And because of > impermanence of all conditioned dhammas, eternalism is also false. > As far as nibbana is concerned, at least nibbana without remnant, I > see it as consciousness of absence of objects: a luminous, timeless reality, > permanent in the double sense of being timeless, and of being available at > all times from within the temporal realms. Nibbana with remnant, the ordinary > state of the living arahant, I see as based on the luminous, timeless > nibbana, but with an overlay of conditions which are seen through as empty, > fleeting shadows. (I have no way of expressing this except in a semi-poetic > way.) > > With metta, > Howard 10160 From: Sarah Date: Wed Dec 19, 2001 6:10am Subject: Re: [dsg] Intro to Vinaya Commentary - words of the Buddha? <5> Hi Ken O and Rob Ep, Thanks, I heard;-) I have some pasages marked for next week that are specially selected for you both....They may answer a few questions. It'll be my Xmas gift. it's fun for me too. Sarah --- Kenneth Ong wrote: > Hi Sarah > > thanks for the commentary. I keeping them just like Rob Ep. > > > Kind regards > Ken O (whispering) 10161 From: Date: Wed Dec 19, 2001 1:33am Subject: Re: [dsg] Memory, Objects, and Continuity Hi, Rob (and Dan) - In a message dated 12/19/01 2:25:51 AM Eastern Standard Time, epsteinrob@Y... writes: > Dear Dan, > You seem to raise the interesting possibility that comparisions regarding a > remembered object and another object may in fact not be real, but only be > conceptual. As I look at this, it seems very possible that the reality of > memory > is necessarily selective, and not actual, since there is no longer a true > and > detailed object to be observed. > > Best, > Robert Ep =========================== It doesn't seem to me that memories are concepts, but, rather, varyingly defective clones of the original experience, with elements missing, unclear, or, at times, transfromed. Sometimes memories are near perfect. In any case, I suspect that the memory *traces* are more typically close to perfect, but with conscious activations of them varying in faithfulness. My concept of 'rose', forged from the many memories of roses and pictures of roses, is different from an actual memory of a rose, and that, in turn, is different from the train of cittas which constitutes the "seeing" of a rose (and which, itself, involves "close memories" of just-passed cittas, plus recognition). With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 10162 From: Date: Wed Dec 19, 2001 2:02am Subject: Re: [dsg] A rupee for your rupa Hi, Sarah - It seems that in the following you are saying that all memories are concepts. Perhaps so. I won't deny that as a strong possibility. I'm just not certain. With metta, Howard In a message dated 12/19/01 8:54:38 AM Eastern Standard Time, sarahdhhk@y... writes: > Hi Howard, > > --- upasaka@a... wrote (to Rob Ep): > > ======================== > > A rupa, be it a sight, sound, touch, etc, is an object of sensory > > discernment. It is the objective pole of an act of discernment, and while > it > > and the vi~n~nana discerning it arise in dependence on conditions, > neither is > > > > compounded by the mind. This is true not only of rupas, and cittas, but > also > > of feelings, desires, etc. Each of them is discerned by an act of > > consciousness, visual, auditory, olfactory, tactile, gustatory, OR > mental, > > but none of them is *constructed* by mind. Only concepts are constructed > by > > mind, being mental compounds of the "directly seen" dhammas. This is my > > understanding. > ************ > > This is very clear, accurate and articulate summary, I think. How many > rupees > do I owe? > > However, I have a question (of course) about the following note in another > post > to me: > ..... > > ----------------------------------------------------------- > > Howard: > > Yes, it's not too bad. Actually, though, I prefer the idea of the > > memory of a past object being a concomitant of the current citta in which > > > there is a new object. After all, the *memory* of a past object need not > be > > considered an object itself. So there could be the hearing of a current > sound > > > > together with the memory of the immediately preceding slightly louder or > > softer sound, or even further back than the immediately preceding sound. > > After all, we can and do distinguish between a current object and a > > remembered preceding one. We never confuse a memory with a current > > discernment. > > ---------------------------------------------------------------- > > I just question whether there isn’t some mixing up of concepts and sanna > (perception)? Sanna is the concomitant or conascent cetasika of the current > citta, but the memory of the past object (i.e. the concept) is its object. > Thus > it is not the concept that accompanies the citta, but the sanna. The > concept, > of course, is present arammana, but as discussed last time, it can be a > concept > about anything, past, present or future. > > At the moment of hearing sound, the hearing is also accompanied by sanna > which > marks the sound (just as it is) in the ear door process at that moment. The > memory (sanna) of the immediately preceding sound would accompany the > cittas in > the mind-door process taking concept as object (or maybe marking it > directly > in either the previous ear door or mind door process, but not at the same > time > as the marking of the present sound). Any perception of louder or softer or > any > other comparison suggests a concept as object at that moment, I think as > Dan > was suggesting. > > As Mike suggested, I also think there is plenty of confusing, but even when > there isn’t any confusion, the curent hearing with sanna just hears and > marks > the present sound. Any memory of a previous sound must be by thinking of > concept (as in the rose scenario). Remember ear-door, eye-door, mind-door > and > other door processes are changing all the time. Thinking of concepts is so > fast > and not in words as we usually have the idea. > > Hope I haven’t confused the issue even more with my ramblings and very > limited > abhidhamma understanding. > > Sarah > /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 10163 From: Robert Epstein Date: Wed Dec 19, 2001 7:54am Subject: Re: [dsg] some more about metta Dear Sarah, Trivial request: I missed your sign-off, and I'm curious. Can you repost it? Put this in the 'ridiculously minute unimportant requests department'. Thanks, Robert Ep. =============== > metta, > Sarah > > p.s I’m so glad you smiled at my last sign-off. Actually, I’m sorry to say the > detailed formula was quite lost on Jon, so we may just have to give up our > formulas as being too profound for dsg;-) 10164 From: Date: Wed Dec 19, 2001 2:56am Subject: Re: [dsg] A rupee for your rupa Hi again, Sarah - In a message dated 12/19/01 10:04:28 AM Eastern Standard Time, upasaka@a... writes: > > > It seems that in the following you are saying that all memories are > concepts. Perhaps so. I won't deny that as a strong possibility. I'm just > not > certain. > ========================== Just to add a drop more: We do have sense memories, for example the smell of a rose. Such a rose-smell memory appears to be a perfect replica of a direct olfactory discernment except for its clarity. Moreover, the smell of a rose in a dream, which I presume is the activation of an olfactory memory trace, is virtually indistinguishable from "the real thing". So, I think that to view all memories as concepts may go too far. The thing about our theories, as I see it, whether personal or taken from Abhidhamma, is that they must be able to *explain* our experience in order to be adequate. This is what has been motivating my recent "musings". With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 10165 From: Robert Epstein Date: Wed Dec 19, 2001 7:58am Subject: Re: [dsg] Ultimate realities (and khandhas) --- Sarah wrote: > Hi Rob, > > > > > > ha ha, Sarah, you are a true pun-dit. > > > > Robert Ep. > > ....and you out-pun-ed us all with your skandhalous pundit humour;-) > > Reminds me of the clowns in Shakespeare...good to have the contrasts and a > little light relief too;-) > > Sarah : ) Regards, Robert Ep. 10166 From: Robert Epstein Date: Wed Dec 19, 2001 8:04am Subject: Re: [dsg] Intro to Vinaya Commentary - words of the Buddha? <5> --- Sarah wrote: > Hi Ken O and Rob Ep, > > Thanks, I heard;-) > > I have some pasages marked for next week that are specially selected for you > both....They may answer a few questions. It'll be my Xmas gift. it's fun for me > too. > > Sarah Oh goodie! Well Ken O. and I are definitely looking forward! There's nothing like a Dhamma gift for Christmas! [Do we have our 'religions' all mixed up? I'm a Jewish Buddhist with Hindu tendencies celebrating Christmas with my family....... [My parents are slightly mystically-minded atheists, my wife is a former Baptist who has her own form of spirituality these days, and my daughter happens to be going to a Jewish pre-school, where she comes home and sings "Shabbat Sholom"] Regards, Robert Ep. ======================= > --- Kenneth Ong wrote: > Hi Sarah > > > > thanks for the commentary. I keeping them just like Rob Ep. > > > > > > Kind regards > > Ken O (whispering) 10167 From: Robert Epstein Date: Wed Dec 19, 2001 8:08am Subject: Re: [dsg] Memory, Objects, and Continuity Hi Howard, This raises another interesting question to me. It may not be the thing most needed for progressing in Dhamma, but it occurs to me that the concept is the only way we ever get a 'complete' view of an object. Of course, this concept may not be real, but very useful to be able to review a rose from a variety of imagined angles and have an overall sense of what it 'is' [even if it really isn't]. When concepts are seen as concepts rather than realities, I suppose they can be employed even more usefully, with mindfulness. Best, Robert Ep. ============ --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Rob (and Dan) - > > In a message dated 12/19/01 2:25:51 AM Eastern Standard Time, > epsteinrob@Y... writes: > > > > Dear Dan, > > You seem to raise the interesting possibility that comparisions regarding a > > remembered object and another object may in fact not be real, but only be > > conceptual. As I look at this, it seems very possible that the reality of > > memory > > is necessarily selective, and not actual, since there is no longer a true > > and > > detailed object to be observed. > > > > Best, > > Robert Ep > =========================== > It doesn't seem to me that memories are concepts, but, rather, > varyingly defective clones of the original experience, with elements > missing, unclear, or, at times, transfromed. Sometimes memories are near > perfect. In any case, I suspect that the memory *traces* are more typically > close to perfect, but with conscious activations of them varying in > faithfulness. > My concept of 'rose', forged from the many memories of roses and > pictures of roses, is different from an actual memory of a rose, and that, in > turn, is different from the train of cittas which constitutes the "seeing" of > a rose (and which, itself, involves "close memories" of just-passed cittas, > plus recognition). > > With metta, > Howard > > /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble > in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a > phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) > 10168 From: Date: Wed Dec 19, 2001 3:14am Subject: Re: [dsg] Memory, Objects, and Continuity Hi, Robert - I agree completely. Concepts are what are used to function in the world. Even the Buddha used concepts. But he also understood exactly what's what. With metta, Howard In a message dated 12/19/01 11:09:57 AM Eastern Standard Time, epsteinrob@Y... writes: > > Hi Howard, > This raises another interesting question to me. It may not be the thing > most > needed for progressing in Dhamma, but it occurs to me that the concept is > the only > way we ever get a 'complete' view of an object. Of course, this concept > may not > be real, but very useful to be able to review a rose from a variety of > imagined > angles and have an overall sense of what it 'is' [even if it really isn't]. > When > concepts are seen as concepts rather than realities, I suppose they can be > employed even more usefully, with mindfulness. > > Best, > Robert Ep. > /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 10169 From: Date: Wed Dec 19, 2001 3:57am Subject: Re: [dsg] Memory, Objects, and Continuity Hi again, Robert - In a message dated 12/19/01 11:15:38 AM Eastern Standard Time, upasaka@a... writes: > Hi, Robert - > > I agree completely. Concepts are what are used to function in the > world. Even the Buddha used concepts. But he also understood exactly what's > > what. > > With metta, > Howard > =========================== Let me add the following metaphorical thoughts: Without concepts we can't see the forest for the trees. Without wisdom we can't see the trees for the forest. Moreover, without wisdom we can't see that the trees are not self-existent, but are parts of an interconnected web which includes the earth, the sun, and the clouds. In the foregoing, trees, the earth, the sun, and the clouds represent the "paramattha dhammas," forests represent (the presumed referents) of concepts, and *all* of these, each existing in a sense, are empty. One more point as to the knowledge-giving character of concepts: It would seem that one of their functions is to serve as a shorthand summing up of the relations among various dhammas. In a single representational unit, a concept codifies a complex relational structure obtaining among dhammas, it seems to me. With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 10170 From: Kom Tukovinit Date: Wed Dec 19, 2001 8:59am Subject: RE: [dsg] A rupee for your rupa Dear Robert, > -----Original Message----- > From: Robert Epstein [mailto:epsteinrob@y...] > Sent: Tuesday, December 18, 2001 11:18 PM > To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com > Subject: RE: [dsg] A rupee for your rupa > > > Dear Kom, > Thank you very much for 'dropping in'! > > I take it that what you are saying is that the > mind of the Arahant will still have > concepts arising, but that they will never be > confused with arising realities. > Therefore in the moment that a 'rupa' is the > object of discernment the 'rupa' will > be seen by sati and panna for what it truly is, > and this is direct perception of > 'rupa'? I take it that 'nama' can also be > directly perceived as what it is by the > Arahant? > Yes, a consciousness of the arahat may have a concept as its object. This would make sense. Otherwise, how does the Buddha call anybody by name, as name is a concept? An arahat has no confusion regarding to concept/realities, nama/rupa, anicca (impermanence)/nicca, dukkha (not enduring)/ sukkha, and anatta/atta. Therefore, in the moment that a 'rupa' is the object of discernment ***of the consciousness co-arising with wisdom***, the 'rupa' will be seen by sati and panna as it truly is. 'Nama' can also be directly perceived as it is, but not only by an arahat, but for any consciousness with wisdom that has the nama as the object. It is just that for somebody not an arahat, there will be *other* moments where the consciousness will be confused about the realities, whereas an arahat is never confused. kom 10171 From: yuzhonghao Date: Wed Dec 19, 2001 9:33am Subject: Re: [dsg] what/who can control what/who? what/who cannot control what/who? Hello Robert and all, Robert, I will not answer your question about whether there is self beyond form and what the nature of that self is. The reason why I will not answer your question is that both the view "there is a self" and the view "there is no self" are speculative, and so is defining, delineating what self is. Please consider very carefully about whether form (or feeling, perception, mental formations, consciousness) is not self implies there is no self. Here are two discourses that might be of interest to you: Digha Nikaya 15, Maha-Nidana Sutta, The Great Causes Discourse http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/digha/dn15.html Samyutta Nikaya XLIV.10, Ananda Sutta, To Ananda http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/samyutta/sn44-010.html Thank you. Regards, Victor --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Robert Epstein wrote: > > --- Victor Yu wrote: > > Hello Robert, > > > > I am not sure how you got the idea that I said one can possiby control form. > > Hi Victor, > No, the idea that I got is just that you are saying there is a self beyond form, > beyond the khandas. > > So my question to you is: Do you think there is a self beyond form, and what is > the nature of that self? > > You say below that anatta does not mean there is no self. I believe most > Theravadins here would say that anatta means that nothing that can be pointed to > in the world of form qualifies as self, and that nothing beyond the world of form > can be called 'self' either. > > What, if anything, would you say qualifies as a definition of self or a 'true > self', as opposed to the false self of the khandas? > > Thanks, > Robert Ep. > > ========================== > > > I will try to be more clear: > > > > Form is not self implies that form cannot control itself. > > Form is not self does not imply that one cannot control form. > > Form is not self does not imply that one cannot be controlled by form. > > Form is not self does not imply that one cannot control oneself. > > > > One can control oneself. > > One can control oneself does not imply that one can control form. > > One can control oneself does not imply that one can be controlled by form. > > > > Why identify form as self by saying "one can control form"? > > Why identify form as self by saying "one can be controlled by form"? > > > > Why identify self as form by saying "one cannot control form"? > > Why identify self as form by saying "one cannot be controlled by form"? > > Why identify self as form by saying "one cannot control oneself"? > > > > I am not sure how you got the idea that 'anatta' means that "there is no > > self"? > > > > Thank you. > > > > Regards, > > Victor 10172 From: yuzhonghao Date: Wed Dec 19, 2001 10:07am Subject: Re: what/who can control what/who? what/who cannot control what/who? Hello Robert and all, Robert, I am not sure how you get the idea the I am saying there is a self beyond form, beyond the khandas? Thank you. Regards, Victor --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Robert Epstein wrote: > > --- Victor Yu wrote: > > Hello Robert, > > > > I am not sure how you got the idea that I said one can possiby control form. > > Hi Victor, > No, the idea that I got is just that you are saying there is a self beyond form, > beyond the khandas. [snip] 10173 From: yuzhonghao Date: Wed Dec 19, 2001 10:19am Subject: Concept Hello all, I have some questions regarding concept. What does it mean by concept? How does concept come to be? Thank you. Regards, Victor 10174 From: Victor Yu Date: Wed Dec 19, 2001 3:21pm Subject: Re: [dsg] some more about metta Hello Sarah, Please understand that the view "there is a self" and the view "there is no self" are both speculative. Why discuss whether there is a self or there is no self outside the khandhas? Regards, Victor > You wondered why I had got the idea (like Rob Ep, I think) that you were > suggesting a self outside the khandhas. I think this was because, although you > quote excellent lines about anatta from excellent suttas, the idea of > controlling the various realities, suggests a deep-rooted clinging to self > rather than an understanding of conditions that determines these same khandhas. > If we say 'Yes, one can control oneself' (to quote from another post of yours) > and know this is merely conventional usage, that's fine. However, if we cling > to an idea that this is possible in truth, it shows the perversity of view at > that moment. > > Thanks for all your challenging posts > > metta, > Sarah > > p.s I'm so glad you smiled at my last sign-off. Actually, I'm sorry to say the > detailed formula was quite lost on Jon, so we may just have to give up our > formulas as being too profound for dsg;-) 10175 From: rikpa21 Date: Wed Dec 19, 2001 5:11pm Subject: Re: [dsg] some more about metta --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "Victor Yu" wrote: > Hello Sarah, > > Please understand that the view "there is a self" and the view "there is no > self" are both speculative. > Why discuss whether there is a self or there is no self outside the > khandhas? But what is not speculative, and can be observed (or reasoned to), is that all composed entities lack core, or intrinsic essence. So while I understand the gist of what yuo're saying here, it stands to reason that if we understand what the "self" is being refuted, i.e. independent existence, then we can say, without the lest bit of speculation, that there is no such thing as a "self." 10176 From: Victor Yu Date: Wed Dec 19, 2001 8:12pm Subject: Re: [dsg] some more about metta Hello, Please understand that the very definition/delineation of self as independent exisitence is speculative view. Regards, Victor ----- Original Message ----- From: "rikpa21" To: Sent: Wednesday, December 19, 2001 8:11 PM Subject: Re: [dsg] some more about metta > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "Victor Yu" wrote: > > Hello Sarah, > > > > Please understand that the view "there is a self" and the > view "there is no > > self" are both speculative. > > Why discuss whether there is a self or there is no self outside the > > khandhas? > > But what is not speculative, and can be observed (or reasoned to), > is that all composed entities lack core, or intrinsic essence. So > while I understand the gist of what yuo're saying here, it stands to > reason that if we understand what the "self" is being refuted, i.e. > independent existence, then we can say, without the lest bit of > speculation, that there is no such thing as a "self." 10177 From: Date: Wed Dec 19, 2001 4:27pm Subject: Re: [dsg] FW: three rounds Hi Nina and Jon, I don't know this will be any helpful to you or not. From my Thai Abhidhammattha-sagaha, those 3 ~nana were mentioned under anul~om~nana. I am going to change into a parrot, OK. --------------------------- Anul~om~nana is a pa~n~na that acknowledge that one have to give in/follow ariyasacca, so one can be detached. Ariyasacca is dukkhasacca, samutayasacca, nirodhasacca and maggasacca. Sacca~nana is pa~n~na which knows clearly that dukkha is nama and rupa which are lokiya. Samutaya is tanha, nirodha is nibbana and magga is 8 ariya-magga. Knowledge at this level is knowing according to the truth:sacca~nana. Kicca~nana is pa~n~na which knows clearly that dukkha should be known, samutaya should be let go, nirodha should be enlighten and magga should be developed. Knowledge at this level is knowing according to responsiblity:kicca~nana. Kata~nana is pa~n~na which knows clearly that dukkha which should be known, is known. Samutaya which should be let go, is let go. Nirodha which should be enlighten, is enlighten and all 8 magga which should be developed, is developed. Knowledge at this level is knowing according to what has been done:kata~nana. Sacca~nana and kicca~nana is ~nana in lokiya level. Kata~nana is lokuttara~nana. The two lokiya~nanas have been already perfected in sakarupekka~nana. So ano~loma~nana is named pa~n~na which knows clearly in following through, through ariyasacca. Then nibbana will be an arammana in next ~nana, kotarabhu~nana. ----------------------------- Hope further information from other sources will help more. Num 10178 From: Sarah Date: Wed Dec 19, 2001 10:02pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein Dear Rob Ep, --- Robert Epstein wrote: > > I have gone on and been a bit redundant to underline this point. One really > needs > to deal with the term 'undefined reality' I’ll leave these references in Suan’s capable hands. > Elsewhere the Buddha has made a point of saying that the state of Parinibbana > 'is > not one of darkness', but of light. Would you give the reference for this? >And elsewhere he has said that 'mind is > luminous' but defiled by incoming defilements, indicating to me at least, if > not > to others, that the mind is inherently luminous, and that cittas are only in > a > state of ignorance because of a kind of shrouding or delusion. It implies > that > when the delusion is gone, there is still an underlying luminosity to be > discovered. Now, Rob, we had a very long discussion about this sutta in Ang. Nikaya. We clearly saw that the Pali commentaries made it clear that the ‘luminous mind’ is referring to the bhavanga cittas arising between the sense-door and mind-door processes. Reluctantly, I believe you acknowledged this, but since (in this post and one or two others) you have reverted to your own understanding as being, in effect, more reliable than the commentaries, I think. Meanwhile I’m enjoying your discussion with Suan which I don’t mean to interrupt. I agree that the points should not be ignored and we should try to ‘account for their actual usage.’ Thanks, Sarah p.s I’ll try to show some self-moderation and send that other silly sign-off you missed off-list. All - Pls try to remember to cut off those parts of old posts which are not necessary for our replies....we all forget sometimes, but many people take the posts in ‘digest’ form and it does help them. ================== 10179 From: Sarah Date: Wed Dec 19, 2001 10:23pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The noble nine fold path - Erik Dear Joe, Great to hear you’re still reading in after a long silence. Are you in Thailand or in one of your other exotic locations right now? I hope the writing and publishing is going well. --- lpjoe wrote: > Sarah & Erik > > I've been following your volley with interest, while reading some short > works by Upasika Kee Nanayon (1902-1978), one of the most respected > women dhamma teachers in Thailand. I was wondering if the following > excerpts from Upasika's LOOKING INWARD: Observations on the Art of > Meditation, bear on the discussion at all. Thanks for showing us this article. It starts with ‘we have to catch sight of....’ How do you understand this phrase, Joe? Does it suggest any idea of self and control and ‘should do’ to you? Is this how you understand the Satipathana Sutta? I’m not trying to be tricky, I am sincerely interested to hear more about your considered understanding. Btw, you have another chance to catch us and Erik ‘all in one’ in Bkk over new Year if you’re around. Let me know off-list if so. Sarah > THE PURE PRESENT > > We have to catch sight of the sensation of knowing when the mind > gains knowledge of anything and yet isn't aware of itself, to see how > it latches onto things -- physical form, feeling, perceptions, > thought-formations, and consciousness. We have to probe on in and > look > on our own. We can't use the teachings we've memorized to catch > sight > of these things. That won't get us anywhere at all. We may remember, > "The body is inconstant," but even though we can say it, we can't see > it. > 10180 From: Kom Tukovinit Date: Wed Dec 19, 2001 10:59pm Subject: RE: [dsg] A rupee for your rupa Dear Robert, Sorry if this a duplicate. My email doesn't seem to reach egroups too well. > -----Original Message----- > From: Robert Epstein [mailto:epsteinrob@y...] > Sent: Tuesday, December 18, 2001 11:18 PM > To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com > Subject: RE: [dsg] A rupee for your rupa > > > Dear Kom, > Thank you very much for 'dropping in'! > > I take it that what you are saying is that the > mind of the Arahant will still have > concepts arising, but that they will never be > confused with arising realities. > Therefore in the moment that a 'rupa' is the > object of discernment the 'rupa' will > be seen by sati and panna for what it truly is, > and this is direct perception of > 'rupa'? I take it that 'nama' can also be > directly perceived as what it is by the > Arahant? > Yes, a consciousness of the arahat may have a concept as its object. This would make sense. Otherwise, how does the Buddha call anybody by name, as name is a concept? An arahat has no confusion regarding to concept/realities, nama/rupa, anicca (impermanence)/nicca, dukkha (not enduring)/ sukkha, and anatta/atta. Therefore, in the moment that a 'rupa' is the object of discernment ***of the consciousness co-arising with wisdom***, the 'rupa' will be seen by sati and panna as it truly is. 'Nama' can also be directly perceived as it is, but not only by an arahat, but for any consciousness with wisdom that has the nama as the object. It is just that for somebody not an arahat, there will be *other* moments where the consciousness will be confused about the realities, whereas an arahat is never confused. kom 10181 From: Purnomo . Date: Wed Dec 19, 2001 10:59pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Concept If we seek a 'Concept', we have to collect all our experiences and we 'just' make a conclusion. That is a concept--for me. How about you ? I am guarantee that is different. Why ? Because that is 'concept' for me. And That's true for me not you. So, concept is not absolute truth. purnomo-- >From: "yuzhonghao" >Reply-To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com >To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com >Subject: [dsg] Concept >Date: Wed, 19 Dec 2001 18:19:28 -0000 > >Hello all, > >I have some questions regarding concept. What does it mean by >concept? How does concept come to be? > >Thank you. > >Regards, >Victor 10182 From: Robert Epstein Date: Wed Dec 19, 2001 11:13pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Memory, Objects, and Continuity --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi again, Robert - > > In a message dated 12/19/01 11:15:38 AM Eastern Standard Time, > upasaka@a... writes: > > > > Hi, Robert - > > > > I agree completely. Concepts are what are used to function in the > > world. Even the Buddha used concepts. But he also understood exactly what's > > > > what. > > > > With metta, > > Howard > > > =========================== > Let me add the following metaphorical thoughts: Without concepts we > can't see the forest for the trees. Without wisdom we can't see the trees for > the forest. Moreover, without wisdom we can't see that the trees are not > self-existent, but are parts of an interconnected web which includes the > earth, the sun, and the clouds. > In the foregoing, trees, the earth, the sun, and the clouds represent > the "paramattha dhammas," forests represent (the presumed referents) of > concepts, and *all* of these, each existing in a sense, are empty. > One more point as to the knowledge-giving character of concepts: It > would seem that one of their functions is to serve as a shorthand summing up > of the relations among various dhammas. In a single representational unit, a > concept codifies a complex relational structure obtaining among dhammas, it > seems to me. which perhaps cannot be perceived directly, although it does exist? Nice metaphor in any case. Robert Ep. 10183 From: Robert Epstein Date: Wed Dec 19, 2001 11:15pm Subject: RE: [dsg] A rupee for your rupa --- Kom Tukovinit wrote: > Dear Robert, > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: Robert Epstein [mailto:epsteinrob@y...] > > Sent: Tuesday, December 18, 2001 11:18 PM > > To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com > > Subject: RE: [dsg] A rupee for your rupa > > > > > > Dear Kom, > > Thank you very much for 'dropping in'! > > > > I take it that what you are saying is that the > > mind of the Arahant will still have > > concepts arising, but that they will never be > > confused with arising realities. > > Therefore in the moment that a 'rupa' is the > > object of discernment the 'rupa' will > > be seen by sati and panna for what it truly is, > > and this is direct perception of > > 'rupa'? I take it that 'nama' can also be > > directly perceived as what it is by the > > Arahant? > > > Yes, a consciousness of the arahat may have a concept as its > object. This would make sense. Otherwise, how does the > Buddha call anybody by name, as name is a concept? An > arahat has no confusion regarding to concept/realities, > nama/rupa, anicca (impermanence)/nicca, dukkha (not > enduring)/ sukkha, and anatta/atta. Therefore, in the > moment that a 'rupa' is the object of discernment ***of the > consciousness co-arising with wisdom***, the 'rupa' will > be seen by sati and panna as it truly is. 'Nama' can also > be > directly perceived as it is, but not only by an arahat, but > for any consciousness with wisdom that has the nama as the > object. It is just that for somebody not an arahat, there > will be *other* moments where the consciousness will be > confused about the realities, whereas an arahat is never > confused. > > kom Thanks, Kom. That's very clear and helpful. Best, Robert Ep. 10184 From: Robert Epstein Date: Wed Dec 19, 2001 11:16pm Subject: RE: [dsg] A rupee for your rupa Who made up this cute thread name by the way? Robert Ep. 10185 From: Robert Epstein Date: Wed Dec 19, 2001 11:18pm Subject: Re: [dsg] what/who can control what/who? what/who cannot control what/who? Well, Victor, If you are saying that you yourself do not speculate about whether there is a self beyond form, I will accept that. But I take it that you are indeed saying that the statements regarding the khandas as non-self do not imply that there is no self. Best, Robert Ep. ======== --- yuzhonghao wrote: > Hello Robert and all, > > Robert, I will not answer your question about whether there is self > beyond form and what the nature of that self is. > > The reason why I will not answer your question is that both the > view "there is a self" and the view "there is no self" are > speculative, and so is defining, delineating what self is. > > Please consider very carefully about whether form (or feeling, > perception, mental formations, consciousness) is not self implies > there is no self. > > Here are two discourses that might be of interest to you: > > Digha Nikaya 15, Maha-Nidana Sutta, The Great Causes Discourse > http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/digha/dn15.html > > Samyutta Nikaya XLIV.10, Ananda Sutta, To Ananda > http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/samyutta/sn44-010.html > > Thank you. > > Regards, > Victor > > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Robert Epstein wrote: > > > > --- Victor Yu wrote: > > > Hello Robert, > > > > > > I am not sure how you got the idea that I said one can possiby > control form. > > > > Hi Victor, > > No, the idea that I got is just that you are saying there is a self > beyond form, > > beyond the khandas. > > > > So my question to you is: Do you think there is a self beyond > form, and what is > > the nature of that self? > > > > You say below that anatta does not mean there is no self. I > believe most > > Theravadins here would say that anatta means that nothing that can > be pointed to > > in the world of form qualifies as self, and that nothing beyond the > world of form > > can be called 'self' either. > > > > What, if anything, would you say qualifies as a definition of self > or a 'true > > self', as opposed to the false self of the khandas? > > > > Thanks, > > Robert Ep. > > > > ========================== 10186 From: Robert Epstein Date: Wed Dec 19, 2001 11:21pm Subject: Re: [dsg] some more about metta --- rikpa21 wrote: > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "Victor Yu" wrote: > > Hello Sarah, > > > > Please understand that the view "there is a self" and the > view "there is no > > self" are both speculative. > > Why discuss whether there is a self or there is no self outside the > > khandhas? > > But what is not speculative, and can be observed (or reasoned to), > is that all composed entities lack core, or intrinsic essence. So > while I understand the gist of what yuo're saying here, it stands to > reason that if we understand what the "self" is being refuted, i.e. > independent existence, then we can say, without the lest bit of > speculation, that there is no such thing as a "self." unless there is a self that is not a composed entity, or separate being. Robert Ep. 10187 From: Robert Epstein Date: Thu Dec 20, 2001 2:11am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein --- Sarah wrote: > Dear Rob Ep, > > --- Robert Epstein wrote: > > > I have gone on and been a bit redundant to underline this point. One really > > needs > > to deal with the term 'undefined reality' > > I’ll leave these references in Suan’s capable hands. > > > > Elsewhere the Buddha has made a point of saying that the state of Parinibbana > > 'is > > not one of darkness', but of light. > > Would you give the reference for this? It may be hard for me to find the reference, but it was in one of the threads in this group a few weeks ago or less. It may have been one of the Suttas that Gayan translated. If I can find it I will. > >And elsewhere he has said that 'mind is > > luminous' but defiled by incoming defilements, indicating to me at least, if > > not > > to others, that the mind is inherently luminous, and that cittas are only in > > a > > state of ignorance because of a kind of shrouding or delusion. It implies > > that > > when the delusion is gone, there is still an underlying luminosity to be > > discovered. > > Now, Rob, we had a very long discussion about this sutta in Ang. Nikaya. We > clearly saw that the Pali commentaries made it clear that the ‘luminous mind’ > is referring to the bhavanga cittas arising between the sense-door and > mind-door processes. Reluctantly, I believe you acknowledged this, but since > (in this post and one or two others) you have reverted to your own > understanding as being, in effect, more reliable than the commentaries, I > think. I hate to do this, but so many discussions come up here, it is easy to get lost. Yes, I may be 'reverting' to my former interpretation -- Could you do me a favor and tell me, if you remember, where the quote is from the commentaries on this subject? I know it's in the archives and I'd like to review it so I can review my own 'view' and what the commentaries say on the 'luminosity' being of the 'bhavanga cittas'. Although I remember that point, I don't quite 'get it' and not sure I totally got it then. So if I can read those passages maybe it would help me with that one. Still, there is the 'undefined reality' of parinibbana to deal with, and the reference I can't give you at the moment of nibbana being 'not of darkness'. There were a couple of other stanzas quoted in the last couple of weeks too, but I unfortunately may not have saved them. I will look back through my saved posts. > Meanwhile I’m enjoying your discussion with Suan which I don’t mean to > interrupt. I agree that the points should not be ignored and we should try to > ‘account for their actual usage.’ You are of course not interrupting. It is a most interesting area, and it's always great to hear your view on things. Regards, Robert Ep. 10188 From: egberdina Date: Thu Dec 20, 2001 2:17am Subject: Re: [dsg] Concept DEar Purnomo, I haven't seen your name for a long time! Nice to hear from you again. A question for you. I understand that seeing colour is seeing visible object as it is. Today I had to help a customer who thought his computer monitor was not working. When a monitor is properly connected it has a little green light showing, when the monitor is not receiving video signal the light is orange. I asked the customer, "Is the light green or orange" he said "I don't know, I'm colour blind" So is colour absolute? And when/how do you know that you are seeing the absolute colour? All the best Herman --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "Purnomo ." wrote: > > If we seek a 'Concept', we have to collect all our experiences and we 'just' > make a conclusion. That is a concept--for me. How about you ? I am guarantee > that is different. Why ? Because that is 'concept' for me. And That's true > for me not you. So, concept is not absolute truth. > > purnomo-- > > >From: "yuzhonghao" > >Reply-To: dhammastudygroup@y... > >To: dhammastudygroup@y... > >Subject: [dsg] Concept > >Date: Wed, 19 Dec 2001 18:19:28 -0000 > > > >Hello all, > > > >I have some questions regarding concept. What does it mean by > >concept? How does concept come to be? > > > >Thank you. > > > >Regards, > >Victor 10189 From: Robert Epstein Date: Thu Dec 20, 2001 2:25am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein Found some interesting stanzas on a cambodian buddhism website. Here's a couple: Dabba Sutta (Ud VIII.10) -- About Dabba Mallaputta (2) The Blessed One said, "When Dabba Mallaputta rose up into the air and, sitting cross-legged in the sky, in space, entered the fire property and then emerged from it and was totally unbound, his body burned and was consumed so that neither ashes nor soot could be discerned. Just as when ghee or oil is burned and consumed, neither ashes nor soot can be discerned, in the same way, when Dabba Mallaputta rose up into the air and, sitting cross-legged in the sky, in space, entered the fire property and then emerged from it and was totally unbound, his body burned and was consumed so that neither ashes nor soot could be discerned." Then, on realizing the significance of that, the Blessed One on that occasion exclaimed: Just as the destination of a glowing fire struck with a [blacksmith's] iron hammer, gradually growing calm, is not known: Even so, there's no destination to describe for those who are rightly released -- having crossed over the flood of sensuality's bond -- for those who have attained unwavering bliss. I find the 'unwavering bliss' of interest here re. the idea that there is nothing but cessation in parinibbana and nothing remaining. Next: We have talked about this one before. Nibbana Sutta (Ud VIII.1) -- Total Unbinding (1) There is that sphere where there is neither earth, nor water, nor fire, nor wind; neither sphere of the infinitude of space, nor sphere of the infinitude of consciousness, nor sphere of nothingness, nor sphere of neither perception nor non-perception; neither this world, nor the next world, nor sun, nor moon. And there, I say, there is neither coming, nor going, nor stasis; neither passing away nor arising: without stance, without foundation, without support (mental object). This, just this, is the end of stress. I like 'nor sphere of nothingness', and 'nor sphere of neither perception nor non-perception'. Seems to suggest to me something other than 'nothingness', which would be the result of total cessation of all existence. This may have been the one that in one translation said 'neither light nor darkness'. Not sure. Regards, Robert Ep. 10190 From: Kenneth Ong Date: Thu Dec 20, 2001 5:05am Subject: Re: [dsg] Memory, Objects, and Continuity Hi Howard, This topic is interesting, IMHO, my theory is sounds quite similar to yours, Taking panna as the conclusion object of citta 6. Citta 1 take the object of p, p is transfer to Citta 2 (through the ability of sanna to mark), the object has became "pa" which I imply that Citta 2 is "p + a" and not "p" and "a" as my basis is that since memory is accumulative. It adds on until citta 6 as panna but that does not end, bc we only known as panna without real meaning or definition thats we are so used to it. Then citta 7 will maybe infer panna literally as wisdom in English language. (this is again, starts another round the process of cittas). In such a way, memory of any sense object, is first mark by sanna in the first citta, then accumulated by sanna in the series of process of cittas before it make any sense to the present moment (the concluding citta). Similarly we would not have known panna without in our early childhood days where we learn alphabets. We take some time to remember P with is the combinations of marks of "|" and the mirror image of "c". Kind regards Ken O > ============================== > My point was the following: Any time there is the "seeing" of the > > current object as a continuation of a previous one, or, for that > matter, as > different from a previous one, it requires a comparison of the current > object > with the previous one (presumably via memory, i.e., via sa~n~na and/or > sati), > and that requires the current object and the remembered object to both > be > "present". If that is so - and to me it seems unavoidable, and if the > remembered object is considered an arammana, then there are two > arammanas > present, the remembered one and the current one. Unless they are both > present > in mind, there is no way to compare. If both the previous object and its > > memory are gone, then the current citta does not know of that object! > Incidentally, subsequent to writing the post you quote below, I > looked > at Nyanaponika's little book on Abhidhamma. In an appendix on memory, he > also > raises the need for memories of objects to co-occur with the discernment > of > an object in a given citta. He makes the very same point as I am making > here. > (So, I'm not in bad company! ;-)) He doesn't raise the issue, however, > of how > that effects the notion of one arammana per citta. > I have just re-thought the "unavoidablility" of the co-occurrence > of > the remembered object and the current. It *may* be avoidable after all, > although I'm not at all certain on this issue. (Sorry to be doing my > thinking > "out loud", as it were.) One possibility that just occured to me is > based on > the time-sharing model: Object A is discerned by citta A, then object B > is > discerned by citta B, and the occurrence of these two cittas serves as > condition for the later arising of citta C whose object is the "knowing" > of > the transition from object A to object B. This seems possible to me, > thiugh a > trifle weak. The co-ocurrence of an object of memory with another > currently > observed object seems much simpler. However, what *is* the case is not > always > simpler than what one might imagine could be the case. > Just a clarification here with regard to my purpose in all this: > I am > neither trying to disprove nor vindicate Abhidhammic notions, but rather > to > understand them and their implications, to grasp the explanatory > capability > of Abhidhamma. The Buddha did say to accept something only after > examining it > and seeing that it accords with direct experience, and part of doing > that is > to see how it accounts for actual experience, not in a hand-waiving > manner > and not just by much use of Pali terms, but by really digging in and > seeing > what the implications are. > > With metta, > Howard 10191 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Thu Dec 20, 2001 5:25am Subject: Re: [dsg] A rupee for your rupa Howard & Rob --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Rob - > > In a message dated 12/18/01 2:03:35 AM Eastern Standard Time, > epsteinrob@Y... writes: > > > > Hi Howard. > > I guess this comes down to whether the mind is capable of a direct act > of > > perception without forming a concept. I guess you would say that it > is > > possible, > > that the rupa can be directly discerned -- is this at the level of > > satipatthana? > > And are there any recorded details as to how the mind functions or > reduces > > its > > normal extrapolating tendencies during such a pure act? > > > ============================ > I'm afraid I will have to leave this to be answered by those > folks who > really know what they are talking about (with regard to Abhidhamma)! > ;-)) > > With metta, > Howard This question has been discussed before (no surprise!), and you may find interesting the passage below from a very useful post of Kom's (#7300 in the archives) Jon [Q]: > We don't get an experience of an outer object without a mental > interpretation of impressions which are put together by the mind to form an image. [A]: When one of the 5 sense objects impinges on the sense organ, and there is a process of consciousness (the sense-door process) (A) rising to cognize the object, the process of consciousness is said to be experiencing the actual characteristics (sabhava) of the object. The mind-door process of consciousness that rises immediately afterward (B), interrupted only by some "life-continuity" consciousness, also experience the sabhava of the object. It is only some processes later (extremely short) (C) that the consciousness starts to make an interpretation of the sense object, such as "shapes", "persons", "Robert", etc. The abhidhamma teaching indicates that the consciousness and the mental factors (in your terminology, the mind) at (A) and (B) are cognizing the actual characteristics (sabhava) of the reality (perhaps without thorough penetration), and the consciousness at (C) is cognizing concept (pannatti) of that reality. (A) and (B) cognize the characteristics (sabhava) of actual realities, where as (C) cognizes the concept which has no sabhava. For us who may not have accumulated enough wisdom, it may appear that (A), (B), and (C) are cognizing the same thing, where as they are actually not. This is the brief explanation of how the mind can cognize both what is real (with sabhava) and what is unreal (without sabhava) and appear to the person that the dhamma with and without sabhava are ones and the same (while they are not). 10192 From: Date: Thu Dec 20, 2001 0:32am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein Hi, Sarah - In a message dated 12/20/01 1:04:32 AM Eastern Standard Time, sarahdhhk@y... writes: > Now, Rob, we had a very long discussion about this sutta in Ang. Nikaya. We > clearly saw that the Pali commentaries made it clear that the ‘luminous mind > ’ > is referring to the bhavanga cittas arising between the sense-door and > mind-door processes. Reluctantly, I believe you acknowledged this, but > since > (in this post and one or two others) you have reverted to your own > understanding as being, in effect, more reliable than the commentaries, I > think. > =========================== Just for the record, not that my take is of any partcular importance, I, for one, definitely don't "buy" that commentarial interpretation. To me, it is *crystal clear* that the Buddha is saying that the mind is luminous but for defilements which cover it, rather like a sky obfuscated by a cloud cover, a sky which, in itself, is clear, or like gold which is lacking in shine only when corrrupted as part of gold ore, and which manifests its capacity to shine once the impurities are removed. Also, inasmuch as bhavanga cittas are nowhere mentioned in the suttas, I find it implausible that the Buddha is referencing them in this sutta. (Whether or not there *are* such things is a separate issue. There could be many existent things that are not mentioned in the suttas, and are even not among the relatively few leaves of knowledge the Buddha held in his hand.) With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 10193 From: Kenneth Ong Date: Thu Dec 20, 2001 5:29am Subject: Re: [dsg] Memory, Objects, and Continuity Hi Howard and Sarah My intepretation why object is one at time for citta is that our mind could only think at one thing at a time. I believe we could not think two things at one go in our mind. Similarly in my intepretation of Satipatthana Sutta, the objects of mindfullness is always one at a time in the present moment to suit the normal behaviour of our mind. Hence in this way, I conclude that a cittas could only grasp one object at time. Kind regards Ken O --- Sarah wrote: > Dear Howard, > > --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Sarah - > > > > Thanks for the following. I don't see, however, where this > implies > > only one object per citta. Where does it say that the object-relation > is > > one-to-one? > > > > When I read it later, it also seemed rather unclear to me.. > > > H: > > >Side question: Does the principle > > > > of one arammana per citta occur in the Abhidhamma, itself, or only > in the > > S:> > from > > > the Pa.t.thaana (Conditional Relations) book of Abhidhamma > > > > > > “ (i) visible object-base is related to eye-consciousness element > and its > > > associated states by object condition. > > > > > > (and so on for sound, odour etc... associated states will refer to > > > cetasikas, > > > I’m pretty sure,S.) > > > > > > “ (viii) Taking any state as object, these states, consciousness > and > > mental > > > factors, arise; those (former) states are related to those (latter) > states > > > > > by > > > object condition.â€? > > Howard, by referring to visible object as arammana of seeing and > associated > cetasikas, sound as arammana of hearing and cetasikas, ‘any state as > object’ of > citta and cetasikas, it all suggests one object only of citta as I read > it. > After all it is the singular ‘state’ that is used here. > > > S: >>> PTS conditional Relations, p2 > > > > > > > From U Narada’s Guide to conditional Relations, it says under the > 6th > > > cognizable object that it consists of: > > > > > > “......the remaining twenty-one states of materiality, 89 > consciousness, > > 53 > > > mental factors, Nibbana and concept. Of these latter objectd, > materiality, > > > consciousness and mental factors are either of the past, present or > future > > > but > > > Nibbana and concept are time-freed. > > > So in this object condition there is no state that cannot be an > object of > > > consciousness and mental factors. This object condition pervades > the > > > teaching > > > in the pali Canon.....â€? > > Again as arammana, it is always the singular state (nama, rupa, nibbana > or > concept) that is referred to. Nowhere have I ever seen any suggestion of > more > than one arammana at a time. > > I thought Num made some very useful points in his post on this thread. I > agreed > with all his comments and look forward to any more discussion between > you both. > As he said, ‘besides paramattha sanna marks pannatti’.It’s so very > different > from our usual meaning of memory. > > You wonder how 2 objects can be compared if they are not appearing > together. > What about if you are house-hunting? Do you need to have all the houses > in > front of you at the same time in order to compare them? I prefer your > later > time-sharing model (to Mike) where you suggest that the occurrence of > citta A > and citta B are a condition for citta C. > > I think we all really appreciate your interest in understanding these > Abhidhamma points and in checking it out rather than in just accepting > it > blindly. Let me know if the quotes still don't make the grade and I'll > try to > do better. > > Btw, your ‘dyslexic apology’ made me feel I should have sent half a > dozen for > the many (mostly minor) errors I caught up with in my own posts when I > read > them over later;-) > > I woke up today and my first thought was ‘I bet I’ve now got lots of > homework > from Howard’ and I was right..I’ll get back on the others sooner or > later. > > Sarah > 10194 From: Date: Thu Dec 20, 2001 0:53am Subject: Re: [dsg] Memory, Objects, and Continuity Hi, Robert - In a message dated 12/20/01 2:14:36 AM Eastern Standard Time, epsteinrob@Y... writes: > > Let me add the following metaphorical thoughts: Without concepts we > > > can't see the forest for the trees. Without wisdom we can't see the trees > for > > the forest. Moreover, without wisdom we can't see that the trees are not > > self-existent, but are parts of an interconnected web which includes the > > earth, the sun, and the clouds. > > In the foregoing, trees, the earth, the sun, and the clouds > represent > > the "paramattha dhammas," forests represent (the presumed referents) of > > concepts, and *all* of these, each existing in a sense, are empty. > > One more point as to the knowledge-giving character of concepts: > It > > would seem that one of their functions is to serve as a shorthand summing > up > > of the relations among various dhammas. In a single representational > unit, a > > concept codifies a complex relational structure obtaining among dhammas, > it > > seems to me. > > which perhaps cannot be perceived directly, although it does exist? ---------------------------------------------------------- Howard: I think that the relations are every bit as real as the things-in-relation, and I have no doubt that these are directly knowable by some means, whether it be by sati, pa~n~na, or whatever. For us ordinary mortals (a.k.a. worldlings), however, the indirect, representational, bundled knowledge of concepts is usually needed for the task. In any case, I readily agree that concepts are knowledge-giving, essentially so for all but arahants (and useful even for them). Also, however, for us run-of-the-mill worldlings, concepts are a source of fundamental error and had best be dealt with cautiously. ----------------------------------------------------------- > > Nice metaphor in any case. ---------------------------------------------------------- Howard: Thanks. :-) ========================== With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 10195 From: Date: Thu Dec 20, 2001 0:54am Subject: Re: [dsg] A rupee for your rupa It was Sarah, I think! With metta, Howard In a message dated 12/20/01 2:17:12 AM Eastern Standard Time, epsteinrob@Y... writes: > Who made up this cute thread name by the way? > > Robert Ep. > > /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 10196 From: Kenneth Ong Date: Thu Dec 20, 2001 5:52am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein Hi Howard and Sarah, I think I like the notes made by Thanissaro Bhikkhu on "Luminous" at http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/anguttara/an01-049.html Quote Note 1. This statement has engendered a great deal of controversy over the centuries. The commentary maintains that "mind" here refers to the bhavanga-citta, the momentary mental state between periods when the mental stream adverts to objects, but this statement raises more questions than it answers. There is no reference to the bhavanga-citta or the mental stream in any of the suttas (they appear first in an Abhidhamma treatise, the Patthana); and because the commentaries compare the bhavanga-citta to deep sleep, why is it called luminous? And why would the perception of its luminosity be a prerequisite for developing the mind? And further, if "mind" in this discourse means bhavanga-citta, what would it mean to develop the bhavanga-citta? Another interpretation equates the luminosity of the mind with the "consciousness without feature," desribed as "luminous" in MN 49 and DN 11, but this interpretation also has problems. According to MN 49, that consciousness partakes of nothing in the describable world, not even the "Allness of the All," so how could it possibly be defiled? And, because it is not realized until the goal of the practice is reached, why would the perception of its luminosity be a prerequisite for developing the mind? And again, if "mind" here means consciousness without feature, how could the sutta talk of its development? A more reasonable approach to understanding the statement can be derived from taking it in context: the luminous mind is the mind that the meditator is trying to develop. To perceive its luminosity means understanding that defilements such as greed, aversion, or delusion are not intrinsic to its nature, are not a necessary part of awareness. Without this understanding, it would be impossible to practice. With this understanding, however, one can make an effort to cut away existing defilements, leaving the mind in the stage that MN 24 calls "purity in terms of mind." This would correspond to the luminous level of concentration described in the standard simile for the fourth jhana: "And furthermore, with the abandoning of pleasure & pain -- as with the earlier disappearance of elation & distress -- he enters & remains in the fourth jhana: purity of equanimity & mindfulness, neither-pleasure-nor-pain. He sits, permeating the body with a pure, bright awareness. Just as if a man were sitting covered from head to foot with a white cloth so that there would be no part of his body to which the white cloth did not extend; even so, the monk sits, permeating the body with a pure, bright awareness. There is nothing of his entire body unpervaded by pure, bright awareness." From this state it is possible to develop the discernment that not only cuts away existing defilements but also uproots any potential for them to ever arise again. Only in the stages of awakening that follow on those acts of discernment would "consciousness without feature" be realized. Unquote Kind regards Ken O --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Sarah - > > In a message dated 12/20/01 1:04:32 AM Eastern Standard Time, > sarahdhhk@y... writes: > > > > Now, Rob, we had a very long discussion about this sutta in Ang. > Nikaya. We > > clearly saw that the Pali commentaries made it clear that the > ‘luminous mind > > ’ > > is referring to the bhavanga cittas arising between the sense-door and > > mind-door processes. Reluctantly, I believe you acknowledged this, but > > > since > > (in this post and one or two others) you have reverted to your own > > understanding as being, in effect, more reliable than the > commentaries, I > > think. > > > =========================== > Just for the record, not that my take is of any partcular > importance, > I, for one, definitely don't "buy" that commentarial interpretation. To > me, > it is *crystal clear* that the Buddha is saying that the mind is > luminous but > for defilements which cover it, rather like a sky obfuscated by a cloud > cover, a sky which, in itself, is clear, or like gold which is lacking > in > shine only when corrrupted as part of gold ore, and which manifests its > capacity to shine once the impurities are removed. Also, inasmuch as > bhavanga > cittas are nowhere mentioned in the suttas, I find it implausible that > the > Buddha is referencing them in this sutta. (Whether or not there *are* > such > things is a separate issue. There could be many existent things that are > not > mentioned in the suttas, and are even not among the relatively few > leaves of > knowledge the Buddha held in his hand.) > > With metta, > Howard 10197 From: Date: Thu Dec 20, 2001 1:15am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein Hi, Ken - Thank you for this. It, of course, pleases me since it accords with my understanding! ;-)) [I would be even happier, however, had the notes been by, say, Bhikkhu Bodhi.] With metta, Howard In a message dated 12/20/01 9:08:05 AM Eastern Standard Time, ashkenn@y... writes: > > Hi Howard and Sarah, > > I think I like the notes made by Thanissaro Bhikkhu on "Luminous" at > http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/anguttara/an01-049.html > /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 10198 From: Date: Thu Dec 20, 2001 2:49am Subject: Re: [dsg] Memory, Objects, and Continuity Hi again, Rob - In a message dated 12/20/01 8:55:51 AM Eastern Standard Time, upasaka@a... writes: > I think that the relations are every bit as real as the > things-in-relation, and I have no doubt that these are directly knowable by > > some means, whether it be by sati, pa~n~na, or whatever. ========================= I'd like to add a clarification to this. When I say that "relations are every bit as real as the things-in-relation," I should add that they are also just as "unreal". ;-)) What I'm emphasizing here is that we are not going to find any "things" anywhere which are relations. For example, one event may immediately precede another. This can be directly observed. We speak of this as the relation of direct precedence holding between the events. But nowhere will anyone find the "direct-precedence relation"! ;-) Relations are "mere" relations, and the "things" which are related are mere things-in-relation. Neither of these is a complete fiction, the referent of an ungrounded concept, but, likewise, neither of these is an entity. Reifying relations is an even stranger hobby, I think, than reifying things-in-relation. With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 10199 From: Kenneth Ong Date: Thu Dec 20, 2001 8:04am Subject: Re: [dsg] A rupee for your rupa It was Herman. Kind regards Ken O --- upasaka@a... wrote: > It was Sarah, I think! > > With metta, > Howard > > In a message dated 12/20/01 2:17:12 AM Eastern Standard Time, > epsteinrob@Y... writes: > > > > Who made up this cute thread name by the way? > > > > Robert Ep. > > 10200 From: Kenneth Ong Date: Thu Dec 20, 2001 8:03am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein Hi Sarah I am not buying the idea that bhavanga citta as said in the commentary is the luminious mind bc first the objects of bhavanga citta is not known. "Luminous, monks, is the mind.[1] And it is defiled by incoming defilements." On this statement, we could said that it is similar to bhavanga cittas. "Luminous, monks, is the mind. And it is freed from incoming defilements." "Luminous, monks, is the mind. And it is defiled by incoming defilements. The uninstructed run-of-the-mill person doesn't discern that as it actually is present, which is why I tell you that -- for the uninstructed run-of-the-mill person -- there is no development of the mind." "Luminous, monks, is the mind. And it is freed from incoming defilements. The well-instructed disciple of the noble ones discerns that as it actually is present, which is why I tell you that -- for the well-instructed disciple of the noble ones -- there is development of the mind." If bhavanga citta is indeed the luminious mind, that mean the practise of panna should be on bhavanga citta and not on kusala cittas as indicated by this sutta. How do we practise bhavanga cittas which in the first place the object is not known and it purpose is only life continual and furthermore it is a vipaka citta. Hence the my view the interpretation of Bhavanga citta is not correct. The commentary, takes on the first statement as assuming it as bhavanga citta which I also initially thought. Further reading of this sutta, leave me doubting that bhavanga citta as luminious mind. If we assume that bhavanga cittas as indeed the luminous indeed, then it would imply Nibbana is bhavanga cittas as I infered from the last paragraph of the sutta. Then this leave us the problem of cessation of all khandhas after parinibbana Kind regards Ken O --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Sarah - > > In a message dated 12/20/01 1:04:32 AM Eastern Standard Time, > sarahdhhk@y... writes: > > > > Now, Rob, we had a very long discussion about this sutta in Ang. > Nikaya. We > > clearly saw that the Pali commentaries made it clear that the > ‘luminous mind > > ’ > > is referring to the bhavanga cittas arising between the sense-door and > > mind-door processes. Reluctantly, I believe you acknowledged this, but > > > since > > (in this post and one or two others) you have reverted to your own > > understanding as being, in effect, more reliable than the > commentaries, I > > think. > > > =========================== > Just for the record, not that my take is of any partcular > importance, > I, for one, definitely don't "buy" that commentarial interpretation. To > me, > it is *crystal clear* that the Buddha is saying that the mind is > luminous but > for defilements which cover it, rather like a sky obfuscated by a cloud > cover, a sky which, in itself, is clear, or like gold which is lacking > in > shine only when corrrupted as part of gold ore, and which manifests its > capacity to shine once the impurities are removed. Also, inasmuch as > bhavanga > cittas are nowhere mentioned in the suttas, I find it implausible that > the > Buddha is referencing them in this sutta. (Whether or not there *are* > such > things is a separate issue. There could be many existent things that are > not > mentioned in the suttas, and are even not among the relatively few > leaves of > knowledge the Buddha held in his hand.) > > With metta, > Howard > 10201 From: rikpa21 Date: Thu Dec 20, 2001 9:21am Subject: Re: [dsg] some more about metta --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Robert Epstein wrote: > > But what is not speculative, and can be observed (or reasoned to), > > is that all composed entities lack core, or intrinsic essence. So > > while I understand the gist of what yuo're saying here, it stands to > > reason that if we understand what the "self" is being refuted, i.e. > > independent existence, then we can say, without the lest bit of > > speculation, that there is no such thing as a "self." > > unless there is a self that is not a composed entity, or separate being. Hi Robert, Not sure what you mean here. What phenomenon do you have in mind that are not dependent or composed in some way? The Tibetan logicians, using reasoning alone, for example, reject the notion of an uncomposed entity as an absurdity in at least one way: that such a "self" would have to have to have existed for all time without having changed in the slghtest, given it's absent causes and conditions, and exists independently of all causal things. In other words, it is causeless. And if it is causeless, that also means it is unproduced. This type of "causeless entity" is often referred to as the "sky flower" (or the lotus that magically grows in midair)--a logical absurdity--because it suggests that such a thing could appear independent of any causes and conditions. (Could you imagine a world where things could arise causelessly? Ack!) Furthermore, even if such a thing hypothetically existed, it could not interact with any composed entities, because that would imply dependence on those composed entities via the facility of interacting with them--changing and being changed by them, in other words. So the function of interacting means that this "permanent entity" would *have* to be a changing thing, and therefore, it would't be a permanent entity at all, but a changing thing! So whether or not such a thing hypothetically exists is an entirely meaningless proposition from the get-go--at least as far as you or I are concerned. Maybe there is such a permanent, unchanging entity someplace. But you, as a composed and impermanent entity, could never have any knowledge or interaction with it whatsoever, since to interact with it would place it in a position of being a dependent arising, like all other dependent arisings. I'm also not sure what you mean by "separate being" here, unless by this too you're implying that there is something that can exist separate and apart from causes and conditions. Can you provide any examples of anything that would fit this bill, and if you can, how it would have any bearing whatsoever on terminating suffering once and for all? I've always preferred the "diamond slivers" refutation of such a view, that rejects causeless production, production from self, production from other, and production from both self and other. Anyway, since this is an Abhidhamma list and it's been suggested that words not attributable to either the Abhidhamma or its subcommentaries are not in great demand here, I won't expand any more on anatta or dependent origination from the Tibetan Consequentialist logic school's perspective. Rather, I'll just point you at an essay that touches on some of these things in a bit more detail, in hopes that this clarifies a bit more on some of the opint's I've raised with you here: http://www.gruntose.com/Info/Quartz/Essays/Auto_Bud.html 10202 From: Date: Thu Dec 20, 2001 4:23am Subject: Re: [dsg] A rupee for your rupa Hi, Ken - Thank you! Apologies to Herman. I guess he's cute, too! ;-)) With metta, Howard In a message dated 12/20/01 11:28:52 AM Eastern Standard Time, ashkenn@y... writes: > > It was Herman. > > > Kind regards > Ken O > > --- upasaka@a... wrote: > It was Sarah, I think!> > > > > With metta, > > Howard > > > > In a message dated 12/20/01 2:17:12 AM Eastern Standard Time, > > epsteinrob@Y... writes: > > > > > > > Who made up this cute thread name by the way? > > > > > > Robert Ep. > /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 10203 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Thu Dec 20, 2001 10:10am Subject: a pitfall Kom wrote: It is possible for unskillful cittas to mistake something not Satipatthana to be Satipatthana. As you can see, other kinds of cittas (including those with attachments and ignorance) can also have realities as their objects. A. Sujin mentioned on the India trip that some people mistake that they are developing Satipatthana because they have moments that they experience one reality at a time. N: Dear Kom, thank you for this reminder. What a pitfall it can be: we think, Ha! now the object is not a concept but a reality such as hardness, and thus I am developing satipatthana. Oh no, lobha tricks us again. A paramattha dhamma experienced with lobha. Or maybe there is a moment of sati and then quickly after that again trying to hold the object. Cittas arise and pass away so fast. Pa~n~naa must be very keen to discern all those different moments. We had many pertinent, pointed reminders from A. Sujin during this trip, didn't we? Jaran asked how one is sincere (phu trong),and A. Sujin explained many times how important it is to be sincere as to one's own development, what one knows or does not know yet. It is interesting that everybody highlights the points that most impressed him. Jonothan mentioned several other points. If you have time (and Jaran also) perhaps you could say more about your own observations and feelings with regard to what you learnt in India? You inspire me to write more! Best wishes, Nina. 10204 From: Date: Thu Dec 20, 2001 5:12am Subject: Re: [dsg] some more about metta Hi, Erik - Erik, with regard to your post (quoted below), are you saying that you don't accept the notion of the unconditioned dhamma, nibbana, as described, for example, in the Udana? In this regard, I'd be interested in knowing your take on the following which I wrote to Suan: "As far as nibbana is concerned, at least nibbana without remnant, I see it as consciousness of absence of objects: a luminous, timeless reality, permanent in the double sense of being timeless, and of being available at all times from within the temporal realms. Nibbana with remnant, the ordinary state of the living arahant, I see as based on the luminous, timeless nibbana, but with an overlay of conditions which are seen through as empty, fleeting shadows." Incidentally, discernment of an absence can't be said to be conditioned by anything, unless one considers an absence to be a thing. On the other hand, being a discernment, it is not a nullity either. With metta, Howard In a message dated 12/20/01 12:25:29 PM Eastern Standard Time, rikpa21@y... writes: > Hi Robert, > > Not sure what you mean here. What phenomenon do you have in mind > that are not dependent or composed in some way? The Tibetan > logicians, using reasoning alone, for example, reject the notion of > an uncomposed entity as an absurdity in at least one way: that such > a "self" would have to have to have existed for all time without > having changed in the slghtest, given it's absent causes and > conditions, and exists independently of all causal things. In other > words, it is causeless. And if it is causeless, that also means it > is unproduced. This type of "causeless entity" is often referred to > as the "sky flower" (or the lotus that magically grows in midair)--a > logical absurdity--because it suggests that such a thing could > appear independent of any causes and conditions. (Could you imagine > a world where things could arise causelessly? Ack!) > > Furthermore, even if such a thing hypothetically existed, it could > not interact with any composed entities, because that would imply > dependence on those composed entities via the facility of > interacting with them--changing and being changed by them, in other > words. So the function of interacting means that this "permanent > entity" would *have* to be a changing thing, and therefore, it > would't be a permanent entity at all, but a changing thing! > > So whether or not such a thing hypothetically exists is an entirely > meaningless proposition from the get-go--at least as far as you or I > are concerned. Maybe there is such a permanent, unchanging entity > someplace. But you, as a composed and impermanent entity, could > never have any knowledge or interaction with it whatsoever, since to > interact with it would place it in a position of being a dependent > arising, like all other dependent arisings. > > I'm also not sure what you mean by "separate being" here, unless by > this too you're implying that there is something that can exist > separate and apart from causes and conditions. Can you provide any > examples of anything that would fit this bill, and if you can, how > it would have any bearing whatsoever on terminating suffering once > and for all? > > I've always preferred the "diamond slivers" refutation of such a > view, that rejects causeless production, production from self, > production from other, and production from both self and other. > > Anyway, since this is an Abhidhamma list and it's been suggested > that words not attributable to either the Abhidhamma or its > subcommentaries are not in great demand here, I won't expand any > more on anatta or dependent origination from the Tibetan > Consequentialist logic school's perspective. Rather, I'll just point > you at an essay that touches on some of these things in a bit more > detail, in hopes that this clarifies a bit more on some of the > opint's I've raised with you here: > > http://www.gruntose.com/Info/Quartz/Essays/Auto_Bud.html > > /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 10205 From: Robert Epstein Date: Thu Dec 20, 2001 10:54am Subject: Re: [dsg] A rupee for your rupa Thanks Jon, good explanation. Although it is hard for me to understand how the process that arises in the sense door to cognize the object is 'perfect' enough to apprehend it 'transparently' without any influence of its own. Is the idea that the sense organ consciousness is like a photograph and is able to directly 'copy' the object? In a related question, how does this theory account for the characteristic of the sense organ itself which by its very nature and design as 'this type of sense organ rather than that' will influence the way the sense object is perceived? It is not believed, I would think, that the sense organs are 'perfect' in actually taking in the sense object. In what way does a sense organ that has evolved through a physical process to become gradually more refined but still imperfect and which is also subject to individual variation, take in the 'actual' characteristic of the object, or the rupa itself? Even someone who is enlightened is still perceiving 'visible object' through a 'human eye process', no? There is no direct perception according to this idea. Which is why normally I would think that the sense-door process really picks up a sense-door result, rather than a true 'rupa' or actual object-moment. Best, Robert Ep. ======================= --- Jonothan Abbott wrote: > Howard & Rob > > --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Rob - > > > > In a message dated 12/18/01 2:03:35 AM Eastern Standard Time, > > epsteinrob@Y... writes: > > > > > > > Hi Howard. > > > I guess this comes down to whether the mind is capable of a direct act > > of > > > perception without forming a concept. I guess you would say that it > > is > > > possible, > > > that the rupa can be directly discerned -- is this at the level of > > > satipatthana? > > > And are there any recorded details as to how the mind functions or > > reduces > > > its > > > normal extrapolating tendencies during such a pure act? > > > > > ============================ > > I'm afraid I will have to leave this to be answered by those > > folks who > > really know what they are talking about (with regard to Abhidhamma)! > > ;-)) > > > > With metta, > > Howard > > This question has been discussed before (no surprise!), and you may find > interesting the passage below from a very useful post of Kom's (#7300 in > the archives) > > Jon > > [Q]: > We don't get an experience of an outer object without a mental > > interpretation of impressions which are put together by the mind to form > > an image. > > [A]: When one of the 5 sense objects impinges on the sense organ, and > there > is a process of consciousness (the sense-door process) (A) rising to > cognize the object, the process of consciousness is said to be > experiencing > the actual characteristics (sabhava) of the object. The mind-door process > of consciousness that rises immediately afterward (B), interrupted only by > > some "life-continuity" consciousness, also experience the sabhava of the > object. It is only some processes later (extremely short) (C) that the > consciousness starts to make an interpretation of the sense object, such > as "shapes", "persons", "Robert", etc. > > The abhidhamma teaching indicates that the consciousness and the > mental factors (in your terminology, the mind) at (A) and (B) are > cognizing the actual characteristics (sabhava) of the reality (perhaps > without thorough penetration), and the consciousness at (C) is cognizing > concept (pannatti) of that reality. (A) and (B) cognize the > characteristics > (sabhava) of actual realities, where as (C) cognizes the concept which has > > no sabhava. For us who may not have accumulated enough wisdom, it > may appear that (A), (B), and (C) are cognizing the same thing, where as > they are actually not. > > This is the brief explanation of how the mind can cognize both what is > real > (with sabhava) and what is unreal (without sabhava) and appear to the > person that the dhamma with and without sabhava are ones and the same > (while they are not). 10206 From: Robert Epstein Date: Thu Dec 20, 2001 10:57am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein Dear Sarah, I don't want to be unduly heartened by my comrade Howard taking this point of view, but it does seem to me that I never fully accepted the commentary explanation either. I am anxious, however, to see it again so I can see what I was or am talking about. I really don't remember it clearly enough, for which I apologize. I don't mean to be asking you to drag the same commentaries out over and over again. i should have a better filing system for these important discussions. Robert Ep. =========== --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Sarah - > > In a message dated 12/20/01 1:04:32 AM Eastern Standard Time, > sarahdhhk@y... writes: > > > > Now, Rob, we had a very long discussion about this sutta in Ang. Nikaya. We > > clearly saw that the Pali commentaries made it clear that the ‘luminous mind > > ’ > > is referring to the bhavanga cittas arising between the sense-door and > > mind-door processes. Reluctantly, I believe you acknowledged this, but > > since > > (in this post and one or two others) you have reverted to your own > > understanding as being, in effect, more reliable than the commentaries, I > > think. > > > =========================== > Just for the record, not that my take is of any partcular importance, > I, for one, definitely don't "buy" that commentarial interpretation. To me, > it is *crystal clear* that the Buddha is saying that the mind is luminous but > for defilements which cover it, rather like a sky obfuscated by a cloud > cover, a sky which, in itself, is clear, or like gold which is lacking in > shine only when corrrupted as part of gold ore, and which manifests its > capacity to shine once the impurities are removed. Also, inasmuch as bhavanga > cittas are nowhere mentioned in the suttas, I find it implausible that the > Buddha is referencing them in this sutta. (Whether or not there *are* such > things is a separate issue. There could be many existent things that are not > mentioned in the suttas, and are even not among the relatively few leaves of > knowledge the Buddha held in his hand.) > > With metta, > Howard > > /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble > in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a > phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) > > > > 10207 From: Robert Epstein Date: Thu Dec 20, 2001 11:04am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein Very good, Kenneth. Thank you. Robert Ep. ======= --- Kenneth Ong wrote: > Hi Howard and Sarah, > > I think I like the notes made by Thanissaro Bhikkhu on "Luminous" at > http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/anguttara/an01-049.html > > Quote > Note > 1. This statement has engendered a great deal of controversy over the > centuries. The commentary maintains that "mind" here refers to the > bhavanga-citta, the momentary mental state between periods when the mental > stream adverts to objects, but this statement raises more questions than > it answers. There is no reference to the bhavanga-citta or the mental > stream in any of the suttas (they appear first in an Abhidhamma treatise, > the Patthana); and because the commentaries compare the bhavanga-citta to > deep sleep, why is it called luminous? And why would the perception of its > luminosity be a prerequisite for developing the mind? And further, if > "mind" in this discourse means bhavanga-citta, what would it mean to > develop the bhavanga-citta? > > Another interpretation equates the luminosity of the mind with the > "consciousness without feature," desribed as "luminous" in MN 49 and DN > 11, but this interpretation also has problems. According to MN 49, that > consciousness partakes of nothing in the describable world, not even the > "Allness of the All," so how could it possibly be defiled? And, because it > is not realized until the goal of the practice is reached, why would the > perception of its luminosity be a prerequisite for developing the mind? > And again, if "mind" here means consciousness without feature, how could > the sutta talk of its development? > > A more reasonable approach to understanding the statement can be derived > from taking it in context: the luminous mind is the mind that the > meditator is trying to develop. To perceive its luminosity means > understanding that defilements such as greed, aversion, or delusion are > not intrinsic to its nature, are not a necessary part of awareness. > Without this understanding, it would be impossible to practice. With this > understanding, however, one can make an effort to cut away existing > defilements, leaving the mind in the stage that MN 24 calls "purity in > terms of mind." This would correspond to the luminous level of > concentration described in the standard simile for the fourth jhana: "And > furthermore, with the abandoning of pleasure & pain -- as with the earlier > disappearance of elation & distress -- he enters & remains in the fourth > jhana: purity of equanimity & mindfulness, neither-pleasure-nor-pain. He > sits, permeating the body with a pure, bright awareness. Just as if a man > were sitting covered from head to foot with a white cloth so that there > would be no part of his body to which the white cloth did not extend; even > so, the monk sits, permeating the body with a pure, bright awareness. > There is nothing of his entire body unpervaded by pure, bright awareness." > From this state it is possible to develop the discernment that not only > cuts away existing defilements but also uproots any potential for them to > ever arise again. Only in the stages of awakening that follow on those > acts of discernment would "consciousness without feature" be realized. > Unquote > > > > Kind regards > Ken O 10208 From: Robert Epstein Date: Thu Dec 20, 2001 11:07am Subject: Re: [dsg] Memory, Objects, and Continuity --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi again, Rob - > > In a message dated 12/20/01 8:55:51 AM Eastern Standard Time, upasaka@a... > writes: > > > > I think that the relations are every bit as real as the > > things-in-relation, and I have no doubt that these are directly knowable by > > > > some means, whether it be by sati, pa~n~na, or whatever. > ========================= > I'd like to add a clarification to this. When I say that "relations > are every bit as real as the things-in-relation," I should add that they are > also just as "unreal". ;-)) What I'm emphasizing here is that we are not > going to find any "things" anywhere which are relations. For example, one > event may immediately precede another. This can be directly observed. We > speak of this as the relation of direct precedence holding between the > events. But nowhere will anyone find the "direct-precedence relation"! ;-) > Relations are "mere" relations, and the "things" which are related are mere > things-in-relation. Neither of these is a complete fiction, the referent of > an ungrounded concept, but, likewise, neither of these is an entity. Reifying > relations is an even stranger hobby, I think, than reifying > things-in-relation. And yet so easy to do. Just to take a prosaic one: "We're married". Turning the relation of 'marriage' into an object does what to a relationship which is an ongoing act of moment-to-moment relationship? Notice the rising worldwide divorce rate. Robert Ep. 10209 From: Robert Epstein Date: Thu Dec 20, 2001 11:10am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein Very good, Kenneth. You are in excellent form today. I think I'll sit back and watch you and Howard for a while. Sarah, care for popcorn? Best, Robert Ep. ============== --- Kenneth Ong wrote: > Hi Sarah > > I am not buying the idea that bhavanga citta as said in the commentary is > the luminious mind bc first the objects of bhavanga citta is not known. > > > "Luminous, monks, is the mind.[1] And it is defiled by incoming > defilements." > > On this statement, we could said that it is similar to bhavanga cittas. > > "Luminous, monks, is the mind. And it is freed from incoming defilements." > > "Luminous, monks, is the mind. And it is defiled by incoming defilements. > The uninstructed run-of-the-mill person doesn't discern that as it > actually is present, which is why I tell you that -- for the uninstructed > run-of-the-mill person -- there is no development of the mind." > > "Luminous, monks, is the mind. And it is freed from incoming defilements. > The well-instructed disciple of the noble ones discerns that as it > actually is present, which is why I tell you that -- for the > well-instructed disciple of the noble ones -- there is development of the > mind." > > > If bhavanga citta is indeed the luminious mind, that mean the practise of > panna should be on bhavanga citta and not on kusala cittas as indicated by > this sutta. How do we practise bhavanga cittas which in the first place > the object is not known and it purpose is only life continual and > furthermore it is a vipaka citta. Hence the my view the interpretation of > Bhavanga citta is not correct. The commentary, takes on the first > statement as assuming it as bhavanga citta which I also initially thought. > Further reading of this sutta, leave me doubting that bhavanga citta as > luminious mind. > > If we assume that bhavanga cittas as indeed the luminous indeed, then it > would imply Nibbana is bhavanga cittas as I infered from the last > paragraph of the sutta. Then this leave us the problem of cessation of > all khandhas after parinibbana > > > > Kind regards > Ken O > > > --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Sarah - > > > > In a message dated 12/20/01 1:04:32 AM Eastern Standard Time, > > sarahdhhk@y... writes: > > > > > > > Now, Rob, we had a very long discussion about this sutta in Ang. > > Nikaya. We > > > clearly saw that the Pali commentaries made it clear that the > > ‘luminous mind > > > ’ > > > is referring to the bhavanga cittas arising between the sense-door and > > > mind-door processes. Reluctantly, I believe you acknowledged this, but > > > > > since > > > (in this post and one or two others) you have reverted to your own > > > understanding as being, in effect, more reliable than the > > commentaries, I > > > think. > > > > > =========================== > > Just for the record, not that my take is of any partcular > > importance, > > I, for one, definitely don't "buy" that commentarial interpretation. To > > me, > > it is *crystal clear* that the Buddha is saying that the mind is > > luminous but > > for defilements which cover it, rather like a sky obfuscated by a cloud > > cover, a sky which, in itself, is clear, or like gold which is lacking > > in > > shine only when corrrupted as part of gold ore, and which manifests its > > capacity to shine once the impurities are removed. Also, inasmuch as > > bhavanga > > cittas are nowhere mentioned in the suttas, I find it implausible that > > the > > Buddha is referencing them in this sutta. (Whether or not there *are* > > such > > things is a separate issue. There could be many existent things that are > > not > > mentioned in the suttas, and are even not among the relatively few > > leaves of > > knowledge the Buddha held in his hand.) 10210 From: Robert Epstein Date: Thu Dec 20, 2001 11:17am Subject: Re: [dsg] some more about metta Dear Eric, I will just make a last comment and go read your essay. If there were such an uncaused and causeless existent, it would as you say have to be pre-existingly present, unchanging and not interact or change with form. Such a formless form could only be a core awareness, which would be aware without being affected by anything, an underlying impersonal field of a kind. You say that one is a caused and form-ful being, but isn't the point that such a one is not a self, and not actually a being? Enlightenment would then consist of awakening to this underlying impersonal state, which shouldn't rightly be called a self, since it is not personal. The only way in which this relates to Theravada, is that it is a plausible explanation of the luminous mind temporarily obscured or defiled by worldly defilements, but not actually affected by them. Robert Ep. ============= --- rikpa21 wrote: > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Robert Epstein wrote: > > > > But what is not speculative, and can be observed (or reasoned > to), > > > is that all composed entities lack core, or intrinsic essence. > So > > > while I understand the gist of what yuo're saying here, it > stands to > > > reason that if we understand what the "self" is being refuted, > i.e. > > > independent existence, then we can say, without the lest bit of > > > speculation, that there is no such thing as a "self." > > > > unless there is a self that is not a composed entity, or separate > being. > > Hi Robert, > > Not sure what you mean here. What phenomenon do you have in mind > that are not dependent or composed in some way? The Tibetan > logicians, using reasoning alone, for example, reject the notion of > an uncomposed entity as an absurdity in at least one way: that such > a "self" would have to have to have existed for all time without > having changed in the slghtest, given it's absent causes and > conditions, and exists independently of all causal things. In other > words, it is causeless. And if it is causeless, that also means it > is unproduced. This type of "causeless entity" is often referred to > as the "sky flower" (or the lotus that magically grows in midair)--a > logical absurdity--because it suggests that such a thing could > appear independent of any causes and conditions. (Could you imagine > a world where things could arise causelessly? Ack!) > > Furthermore, even if such a thing hypothetically existed, it could > not interact with any composed entities, because that would imply > dependence on those composed entities via the facility of > interacting with them--changing and being changed by them, in other > words. So the function of interacting means that this "permanent > entity" would *have* to be a changing thing, and therefore, it > would't be a permanent entity at all, but a changing thing! > > So whether or not such a thing hypothetically exists is an entirely > meaningless proposition from the get-go--at least as far as you or I > are concerned. Maybe there is such a permanent, unchanging entity > someplace. But you, as a composed and impermanent entity, could > never have any knowledge or interaction with it whatsoever, since to > interact with it would place it in a position of being a dependent > arising, like all other dependent arisings. > > I'm also not sure what you mean by "separate being" here, unless by > this too you're implying that there is something that can exist > separate and apart from causes and conditions. Can you provide any > examples of anything that would fit this bill, and if you can, how > it would have any bearing whatsoever on terminating suffering once > and for all? > > I've always preferred the "diamond slivers" refutation of such a > view, that rejects causeless production, production from self, > production from other, and production from both self and other. > > Anyway, since this is an Abhidhamma list and it's been suggested > that words not attributable to either the Abhidhamma or its > subcommentaries are not in great demand here, I won't expand any > more on anatta or dependent origination from the Tibetan > Consequentialist logic school's perspective. Rather, I'll just point > you at an essay that touches on some of these things in a bit more > detail, in hopes that this clarifies a bit more on some of the > opint's I've raised with you here: > > http://www.gruntose.com/Info/Quartz/Essays/Auto_Bud.html > 10211 From: egberdina Date: Thu Dec 20, 2001 2:26pm Subject: Re: [dsg] A rupee for your rupa Dear Robert, I wholeheartedly second these questions. Your photograph simile is an interesting one. In abhidhamma type- thinking the photo says something about reality, to my way of thinking (and yours as well, from the sound of it), the photo says something about the camera and the process of development of the photo. All the best Herman --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Robert Epstein wrote: > Thanks Jon, good explanation. Although it is hard for me to understand how the > process that arises in the sense door to cognize the object is 'perfect' enough to > apprehend it 'transparently' without any influence of its own. Is the idea that > the sense organ consciousness is like a photograph and is able to directly 'copy' > the object? > > In a related question, how does this theory account for the characteristic of the > sense organ itself which by its very nature and design as 'this type of sense > organ rather than that' will influence the way the sense object is perceived? It > is not believed, I would think, that the sense organs are 'perfect' in actually > taking in the sense object. In what way does a sense organ that has evolved > through a physical process to become gradually more refined but still imperfect > and which is also subject to individual variation, take in the 'actual' > characteristic of the object, or the rupa itself? Even someone who is enlightened > is still perceiving 'visible object' through a 'human eye process', no? There is > no direct perception according to this idea. Which is why normally I would think > that the sense-door process really picks up a sense-door result, rather than a > true 'rupa' or actual object-moment. > > Best, > Robert Ep. > > ======================= > > --- Jonothan Abbott wrote: > > Howard & Rob > > > > --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Rob - > > > > > > In a message dated 12/18/01 2:03:35 AM Eastern Standard Time, > > > epsteinrob@Y... writes: 10212 From: egberdina Date: Thu Dec 20, 2001 2:45pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Memory, Objects, and Continuity Ken, Just to clarify, does there need to be awareness of a thought, before it is a thought? I can certainly agree that there is only awareness of any one thing at any time, but that doesn't mean there isn't a whole lot going on in the background. Thank you for your very clear and well-reasoned recent discussions re luminous mind. All the best Herman --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Kenneth Ong wrote: > Hi Howard and Sarah > > My intepretation why object is one at time for citta is that our mind > could only think at one thing at a time. I believe we could not think two > things at one go in our mind. > > Similarly in my intepretation of Satipatthana Sutta, the objects of > mindfullness is always one at a time in the present moment to suit the > normal behaviour of our mind. > > Hence in this way, I conclude that a cittas could only grasp one object at > time. > > > > Kind regards > Ken O 10213 From: egberdina Date: Thu Dec 20, 2001 3:01pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Memory, Objects, and Continuity Dear Howard, Would it be reasonable to say that relationships only come into play through observation of the relationships, and that this is where the observing self comes in, or an observing citta, which in effect, is the same thing. And an unobserved relationship could be a way of describing a concept, perhaps? All the best Herman --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi again, Rob - > > In a message dated 12/20/01 8:55:51 AM Eastern Standard Time, upasaka@a... > writes: > > > > I think that the relations are every bit as real as the > > things-in-relation, and I have no doubt that these are directly knowable by > > > > some means, whether it be by sati, pa~n~na, or whatever. > ========================= > I'd like to add a clarification to this. When I say that "relations > are every bit as real as the things-in-relation," I should add that they are > also just as "unreal". ;-)) What I'm emphasizing here is that we are not > going to find any "things" anywhere which are relations. For example, one > event may immediately precede another. This can be directly observed. We > speak of this as the relation of direct precedence holding between the > events. But nowhere will anyone find the "direct-precedence relation"! ;-) > Relations are "mere" relations, and the "things" which are related are mere > things-in-relation. Neither of these is a complete fiction, the referent of > an ungrounded concept, but, likewise, neither of these is an entity. Reifying > relations is an even stranger hobby, I think, than reifying > things-in-relation. > > With metta, > Howard 10214 From: Date: Thu Dec 20, 2001 1:39pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Memory, Objects, and Continuity Hi, Herman - In a message dated 12/20/01 6:05:30 PM Eastern Standard Time, hhofman@d... writes: > > Dear Howard, > > Would it be reasonable to say that relationships only come into play > through observation of the relationships, and that this is where the > observing self comes in, or an observing citta, which in effect, is > the same thing. > -------------------------------------------------------------- Howard: From my perspective, nothing exists in any sense outside of the *possibility* of being observed. For me, 'to exist' and 'to be observable' are one and the same, whether we're talking about relations or anything else. -------------------------------------------------------------- And an unobserved relationship could be a way of > > describing a concept, perhaps? -------------------------------------------------------------- Howard: I'm not completely clear on your meaning here. But what you write does engender several thoughts in my mind. It seems to me that we can distinguish between "active concepts" and "inactive concepts", and we can also distinguish between "grounded concepts" and "ungrounded concepts". By an "inactive concept" I mean the mental structure passed along by the mind that serves as the base for an "active concept". For example, we have the inactive concept of 'tree' which becomes activated at the time of (to speak conventionally) the observing of a tree, the remembering of a tree, or the picturing of a tree. By a "grounded concept" I mean one which is constructed from (usually many) similar trains of mindstates involving objects experienced as interrelated in various (and often complex) ways. An "ungrounded concept" is one not based entirely on possible experience . One case of that, I would think would be where the objects subsumed by the concept have been observed (or, at least, are observable), but the relations among them, forming the mental "glue" of the concept, have not been observed and are not observable as holding among the objects. An example of the latter might be the concept of 'unicorn'. Horses exist, and horns exist, but, so far as I know, there is no instance of a horn growing from the head of a horse. So, the relation, while imaginable, is not observable, and the concept 'unicorn' is ungrounded. Likewise, the concept of 'person' as a changing assemblage is grounded, but the concept of 'self' as a unitary and permanent core associated in some way with that changing assemblage is ungrounded. -------------------------------------------------------------- > > All the best > > Herman > ============================== With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 10215 From: Sarah Date: Thu Dec 20, 2001 9:15pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein Hi Rob Ep (and comrades), I’m beginning to regret re-opening the ‘luminous’ can of worms again......especially now I see all your reinforcements joined in during the night (more sighs)....however, they (the worms) were beginning to wriggle out anyway;-( --- Robert Epstein wrote: > Dear Sarah, > I don't want to be unduly heartened by my comrade Howard taking this point of > view, but it does seem to me that I never fully accepted the commentary > explanation either. Hmmm, sounds like you’re more heartened than you care to admit.. > I am anxious, however, to see it again so I can see what > I > was or am talking about. I really don't remember it clearly enough, for > which I > apologize. I don't mean to be asking you to drag the same commentaries out > over > and over again. i should have a better filing system for these important > discussions. I know, in addition to shirking all homework assignments, you’d like me to be your filing system of what you’re talking about... that’s OK, Rob, but we’ll just put it on record;-) These are three posts I wrote on the subject (out of many): http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/message/8281 http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/message/8336 http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/message/8337 The third one should give you a good reminder of what you were talking about;-) To find other old posts of yours on the topic, I’d suggest you go to escribe and type in ‘metta’: http://www.escribe.com/religion/dhammastudygroup/ Once there, you can type in a key word like ‘luminous’ in the search section and see what you find. OK, now I’ll sit back with the popcorn while you go on a revision course. Sarah ......................................................................................................................... 10216 From: Robert Epstein Date: Thu Dec 20, 2001 10:19pm Subject: Re: [dsg] A rupee for your rupa --- egberdina wrote: > Dear Robert, > > I wholeheartedly second these questions. > > Your photograph simile is an interesting one. In abhidhamma type- > thinking the photo says something about reality, to my way of thinking > (and yours as well, from the sound of it), the photo says something > about the camera and the process of development of the photo. Yes, I think you've put that well. That doesn't mean the camera isn't recording something of reality, but it is doing it in the form that camera is capable of. Best, Robert Ep. 10217 From: Robert Epstein Date: Thu Dec 20, 2001 10:33pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein Hi Sarah. Comments at bottom. --- Sarah wrote: > Hi Rob Ep (and comrades), > > I’m beginning to regret re-opening the ‘luminous’ can of worms > again......especially now I see all your reinforcements joined in during the > night (more sighs)....however, they (the worms) were beginning to wriggle out > anyway;-( > > --- Robert Epstein wrote: > Dear Sarah, > > I don't want to be unduly heartened by my comrade Howard taking this point of > > view, but it does seem to me that I never fully accepted the commentary > > explanation either. > > Hmmm, sounds like you’re more heartened than you care to admit.. > > > I am anxious, however, to see it again so I can see what > > I > > was or am talking about. I really don't remember it clearly enough, for > > which I > > apologize. I don't mean to be asking you to drag the same commentaries out > > over > > and over again. i should have a better filing system for these important > > discussions. > > I know, in addition to shirking all homework assignments, you’d like me to be > your filing system of what you’re talking about... that’s OK, Rob, but we’ll > just put it on record;-) > > These are three posts I wrote on the subject > (out of many): > > http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/message/8281 > http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/message/8336 > http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/message/8337 > > The third one should give you a good reminder of what you were talking about;-) > To find other old posts of yours on the topic, I’d suggest you go to escribe > and type in ‘metta’: > http://www.escribe.com/religion/dhammastudygroup/ > > Once there, you can type in a key word like ‘luminous’ in the search section > and see what you find. > > OK, now I’ll sit back with the popcorn while you go on a revision course. > > Sarah Dear Sarah, Thanks for all your clues, and for accepting the popcorn. I feel guilty for being a mutineer, but knowing that guilt is probably akusala, I am trying to discern it as an empty reality! Yes, I have been very bad about my homework. I am duly chastened......I'll do my homework on this one. As you know, luminosity is my holy grail! With affection, Robert Ep. ================ 10218 From: Sarah Date: Thu Dec 20, 2001 10:47pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein Hi Ken O and Howard, --- Kenneth Ong wrote: > Hi Howard and Sarah, > > I think I like the notes made by Thanissaro Bhikkhu on "Luminous" at > http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/anguttara/an01-049.html > Thanks for joining in this thread and for your well-considered comments and notes by Thanissaro Bhikkhu. I think I’ll just add a few notes to those earlier posts I just gave the links for: ***** 1. Everyone, it seems, including Thanissaro Bhikkhu, agree that the ancient Pali commentary: > maintains that "mind" here refers to the > bhavanga-citta.. ***** 2. Without any doubt, very few ‘Buddhists’ are interested in these same commentaries and those that are, usually refer to and expound their value when the interpretation accords with their understanding and ignore them or disagree when they don’t. ***** 3. There are a few of us ‘dinosaurs’ left who, on the other hand, have every confidence in the Pali commentaries and find the interpretations and explanations without fail to accord with the Suttas, Vinaya and Abhidhamma. We fully realise we’re a dying breed, but actually agree with the quote I gave from the Bahiranidana that the Tipitaka is ‘uniform in sentiment’. ***** 4. Accordingly, the commentary explanation about bhavanga cittas is consistent with other commentaries (see Atthasalini quote given in link), Questions of K.Milinda and of course with the Abhidhamma itself. ***** 5. Thanissaro Bhikkhu (T.B. from now on) asks: >“....because the commentaries compare the bhavanga-citta to > deep sleep, why is it called luminous?” ..... As I understand, it is not the cittas which are compared to the sleep, but whilst in the deep sleep, there are only bhavanga cittas without sense-door or mind-door activity. Without sense-door or mind-door activity, there are no defilements apparent. The following was included in one of my earlier quotes from K.Milinda (1V,8.36): ..... “When a man is in deep sleep, O king, his mind has returned home (has entered again into Bhavanga), and a mind thus shut in does not act, and a mind hindered in its action knows not the evil and the good, and he who knows not has no dreams. It is when the mind is active that dreams are dreamt. Just, O king, as in the darkness and gloom, where no light is, no shadow will fall even on the most burnished mirror, so when a man is in deep sleep his mind has returned into itself, and a mind shut in does not act, and a mind inactive knows not the evil and the good, and he who knows not does not dream.” ***** 6. T.B. asks: “And why would the perception of its > luminosity be a prerequisite for developing the mind?” ..... As I understand the sutta, the discussion is about understanding the mind (i.e the cittas) in terms of understanding the wholesome and unwholesome states which arise and fall away rapidly on account of the sense objects experienced with bhavanga cittas in between. In one of those other posts I wrote: ..... “In the 2 suttas in AN, reference is made to the speed of changing cittas and the importance of seeing the danger or unwholesome states and the value of skilful states even ‘if for just the lasting of a finger-snap’.I think it’s important to appreciate the context when we read the following: ‘Monks, I know not of any other single thing so quick to change as the mind: insomuch that it is no easy thing to illustrate how quick to change it is. ‘This mind, monks is luminous, but it is defiled by taints that come from without; that mind, monks, is luminous, but it is cleansed of taints that come from without.’ “ ..... In other words, understanding more about bhavanga cittas (even in theory) helps us to realize how there is nothing lasting, no underlying pure state, but rapidly changing cittas and sense and mind doorways. ..... I wrote before: “In the Abhidhammattha Sangaha (111, 8) we read that: ‘Bhavanga cittas arise and pass away every moment during life whenever there is no active cognitive process taking place. This type of consciousness is most evident during deep dreamless sleep, but it also occurs momentarily during waking life countless times between occasions of active cognition.’ ***** 7. T.B. asks: “And further, if > "mind" in this discourse means bhavanga-citta, what would it mean to > develop the bhavanga-citta?” ..... There is no suggestion of developing bhavanga-citta, as I understand. Bhavanga citta are vipaka citta and cannot be developed. The entire emphasis in the suttas is to seeing the danger of akusala states and developing kusala states. the donosaurs amongst us would say that some understanding of abhidhamma is essential in this regard. ***** 8. T.B. says: ‘> A more reasonable approach to understanding the statement can be derived > from taking it in context: the luminous mind is the mind that the > meditator is trying to develop. To perceive its luminosity means > understanding that defilements such as greed, aversion, or delusion are > not intrinsic to its nature, are not a necessary part of awareness. > Without this understanding, it would be impossible to practice.’ ..... On the contrary, I read and understand the Buddha as making it very clear that the intrinsic nature of the mind is that of ‘greed, aversion, or delusion’. Without these core roots, there is no ‘becoming’ and no dukkha. Of course they have nothing to do with awareness. Awareness, sati, as discussed so often, only arises with skilful states and cittas. It can know any reality. If there is not some understanding of the nature of sati as an occasionally-rising skilful state that is aware of a specific reality (not lasting for a ‘finger-snap’), it would truly be impossible for any practice (patipatti). I believe this understanding conforms more closely with that explained not only in the Suttas, but also in the commentaries and Abhidhamma. ***** 9.T.B. continues to add that: > ‘With this > understanding, however, one can make an effort to cut away existing > defilements, leaving the mind in the stage that MN 24 calls "purity in > terms of mind." This would correspond to the luminous level of > concentration described in the standard simile for the fourth jhana: ..... On the contrary, this again suggests the idea of self-control and a permanent mind-state which, as I understand the Teachings, is quite contrary to their ‘uniform sentiment’. The purity of the states of awareness and concentration referred to in the simile, refer to cittas of an exceedingly high state of wholesomeness, which again are fleeting (though I believe not with any bhavanga cittas in between the mind-door processes in this case). ***** 10. T.B. adds: > From this state it is possible to develop the discernment that not only > cuts away existing defilements but also uproots any potential for them to > ever arise again. Only in the stages of awakening that follow on those > acts of discernment would "consciousness without feature" be realized. ..... This could be considered controversial in that it suggests this highest level of jhana to be an essential ingredient for the eradication of defilements. I truly don’t wish to re-open this can of worms too;-) ***** Howard and Ken O, please know that I’m not asking you to ‘buy’ any idea, but merely raising the understanding of it which has been passed down by the Sangha since the First Council (or at least soon after, as I think all would admit). I don’t want to make this post any longer, but if you feel your other points (from your other posts) have not been properly addressed, please send them back to me again because you’ve considered carefully, I know. Sarah ............................................................................................................ 10219 From: Kom Tukovinit Date: Thu Dec 20, 2001 11:05pm Subject: RE: [dsg] a pitfall Dear Nina, > -----Original Message----- > From: Nina van Gorkom [mailto:nilo@e...] > Sent: Thursday, December 20, 2001 10:11 AM > To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com > Subject: [dsg] a pitfall > > We had many pertinent, pointed reminders from A. > Sujin during this trip, > didn't we? I did. Hearing the dhamma and the reminders (and a chance for questions!) from many learned people is probably the most worthwhile activities that I did in India. Hearing some of the pertinent points (like anatta, for example) again and again seems to help quite a bit. I have even started to hear new angles of explanations about Anatta from K. Jack. Most worthwhile. The points that came to mind immediately that I really appreciated hearing: 1) Anattaness: what is anattaness? 2) How panna becomes developed 3) The purpose of hearing about the dhamma, learning the dhamma, and noticing the dhamma. 4) How long the road is... The point that I haven't yet deciphered yet was the discussions about "understanding". A. Sujin kept mentioning about understanding until it "lies next to your bone". I think I kept asking about it in conventional terms what she meant by that. Sort of a reminder to me what I must go through everytime when there is no understanding of realities. kom 10220 From: Sarah Date: Thu Dec 20, 2001 11:38pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein Dear Rob Ep, --- Robert Epstein wrote: > Dear Sarah, > Thanks for all your clues, and for accepting the popcorn. I feel guilty for > being > a mutineer, but knowing that guilt is probably akusala, I am trying to > discern it > as an empty reality! Yes, well, that’s a bit how I felt about the regret in re-opening this thread ;-) > Yes, I have been very bad about my homework. I am duly chastened......I'll > do my > homework on this one. As you know, luminosity is my holy grail! At this rate, Anders will be paying us his Xmas thread and we’ll still be discussing the same thread as when he left.... Just a couple of BRIEF notes on the Udana quotes from the Cambodian website you mention: 1. Dabba sutta (Ud V111.10) (2) You ‘find the ‘unwavering bliss’ of interest here re. the idea that there is nothing but cessation in parinibbana and nothing remaining’. Masefield translates the last few lines as; ‘Just as, for that hammered with an iron-hammer that has progressively died down, though the fire continues to blaze, a destiny is not known, so for those who are properly liberated, for those who have crossed the flood that is the bond of sense-desires, for those who have reached the happiness that is undisturbed, there is not to be made known a destiny.’ brief com notes: ‘That has progressively died down’ (anupubbuupasantassa); ‘that has, in due course, died down, burnt itself out, ceased’ ‘Just as a destiny is not known (yathaa na ~naayate gati): ‘....or likewise for some sound that has arisen, that has, in due course, died down, fully subsided, a destiny is made known nowhere in the ten directions, on account of its having ceased in a non-relinking fashion due to the cessation of the conditions (that gave rise to it) ‘the happiness’, the dying down of all formations reckoned as that nibbana that is without remnant of substrate, > ================ For the 2nd Nibbana Sutta (Ud V111, 1) This is the other one I discussed at length (essential reading for you;-). See posts: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/message/8895 http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/message/8908 http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/message/9035 http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/message/9038 Firstly, let me remind you that this sutta is about nibbana and not about parinibbana (you tend to mix them together, I think) Also you’ll see the phrases you refer to and like are references to other arupa planes of existence....showing that not only do the conditioned khandhas of the sense realms not existing in nibbana, but also the non-rupa conditioned realities of other realms. The references to light and so on were to nibbana, not parinibbana. I’ve run out of steam and need to take care of some office work, otherwise I’d re-check myself. Maybe you can re-quote the commentary notes on these references that I gave before;-)))) Thanks Rob, Sarah .......................................................................................... 10221 From: Sarah Date: Fri Dec 21, 2001 0:23am Subject: Re: [dsg] Concept Dear Victor and Purnomo, --- yuzhonghao wrote: > Hello all, > > I have some questions regarding concept. What does it mean by > concept? How does concept come to be? I was also very glad to see Purnomo's comments. ..... I just have a few more suggestions: A. It may be useful to read some of the posts under ‘concepts and realities’ in ‘Useful Posts’ at: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/files/Useful_Posts B. I recommend the book ‘Realities and Concepts’ by Sujin Boriharnwanaket to be found on: http://www.abhidhamma.org/ C. In particular, this extract on the various kinds of concept may help: http://www.abhidhamma.org/sujin3.htm ..... ***** The Abhidhammattha Vibhavani (Book 8) distinguishes between six kinds of concepts that are names, nama-pannatti (see Visuddhimagga VIII, note 11). 1. Vijjamana pannattis, concepts which make known what is real, for example the words rupa, nama, vedana (feeling), or sanna (perception) 10. 2. Avijjamana pannattis, concepts which make known what is not real, such as the words Thai or foreigner. These concepts do not represent absolute realities, citta and cetasika which are nama, and rupa. Thai or foreigner are not real in the absolute sense, they are conventional realities, sammutti dhammas. Could akusala citta11 (unwholesome consciousness) be Thai or foreign? Akusala citta is a paramattha dhamma (a reality), it is a dhamma which has its own characteristic, it is not Thai or foreign. 3. Vijjamanena avijjamana pannattis, concepts of the non-existent based on the existent. There is the expression "the person with the six abhinnas."12 The six abhinnas are real but person is not real. Thus this concept stands for what is real and for what is not real. 4. Avijjamanena vijjamana pannattis, concepts of the existent based on the non-existent. There is the expression "woman's voice". The sound is real, but the woman is not real. 5. Vijjamanena vijjamana pannattis, concepts of what is real based on what is real. There is the term cakkhu-vinnana (eye-consciousness). Cakkhu (eye) is a reality, namely the cakkhu-pasada-rupa (eyesense, a reality sensitive to colour or visible object), and vinnana (consciousness) is also a reality, namely the reality which experiences. 6. Avija amanena avijjamana pannattis, concepts of what is not real based on what is not real. There is the expression "the kings son". Both king and son are not real, they are sammutti dhammas, conventional realities. ***** Sarah .................................................................................................. 10222 From: Kom Tukovinit Date: Fri Dec 21, 2001 0:36am Subject: RE: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein Dear Sarah, > -----Original Message----- > From: Sarah [mailto:sarahdhhk@y...] > Sent: Thursday, December 20, 2001 11:39 PM > To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com > Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary > (Part Two) To Robert > Epstein > > At this rate, Anders will be paying us his Xmas > thread and we’ll still be > discussing the same thread as when he left.... Thank you bringing in the quote about bhavanga from Milinda panha and others. You probably know this already, A Survey of Paramatha Dhammas in Thai as well as Nina's explains the concepts of cittta (bhavanga) being "Pantara" the same way. From Nina's version (http://www.abhidhamma.org/Para3.htm), a long quote: ******* In the “Dhammasangaùi” the citta is called “pure” or “luminous” (paùèara), and according to the “Atthasåliní” this refers to the “life-continuum”, bhavanga-citta. Citta is a reality which arises and then falls away immediately. The falling away of the preceding citta is a condition for the arising of the succeeding citta. The citta which sees arises and falls away, there is not continuously a citta which sees. Neither is there continuously a citta which hears, a citta which experiences tangible object or a citta which thinks. When we are fast asleep and not dreaming, there are cittas arising and falling away, succeeding one another. However, at such moments citta does not experience an object through the eyes, the ears, the nose, the tongue, the bodysense or the mind-door. The citta which does not experience an object through any of the six doors is the bhavanga-citta. This citta keeps one alive, it maintains the continuity in one’s life as this particular person. Bhavanga-cittas are arising and falling away until there is another type of citta arising which experiences an object through the eyes, the ears, the nose, the tongue, the bodysense or the mind-door. The bhavanga-cittas arise in between the processes of cittas which experience objects through the six doors 5 and this goes on continuously until the end of one’s lifespan as this particular person. The “Atthasåliní” (Expositor I, Book I, Part IV, Ch II, 140) states: “Mind also is said to be ‘clear’ in the sense of ‘exceedingly pure’ with reference to the bhavanga-citta.” The citta is pure only at the moment it does not experience an object through the doors of eyes, ears, nose, tongue, bodysense or mind. Everybody who is fast asleep looks innocent, pure, he does not experience like or dislike, he is not jealous, stingy, conceited, he has no loving kindness nor compassion; thus, unwholesome or wholesome qualities do not arise because he does not see, hear, experience tangible object or think. However, it should be known that whenever the citta which arises experiences an object through one of the six doors, citta is not pure. The reason is that many different defilements have been accumulated in the citta and these condition the arising of pleasure and attachment when one sees something pleasant, and the arising of displeasure and annoyance when one sees something unpleasant. *** end quote *** Of course, it is easy to like the concept of having pure or luminous mind. But when the mind is pure or lumninous, do we actually know it? What about when the mind is impure or dark with defilments? It is way easier to like something that we consider good, desirable, or something that we consider to be for our development and our stature (I have a pure mind), rather than knowing and understanding the reality that appears now. We have been accumulating those likings for ages. kom 10223 From: Kenneth Ong Date: Fri Dec 21, 2001 1:12am Subject: Luminous mind Hi Sarah, First of all, I deeply respected and highly value the commentaries and Abhidhamma. This portion of the commentary which I feel is inadequate to address the sutta by just equating bhavanga cittas with luminious mind on the basis of the first two statements of the suttas. Let us revisit the last statement of the sutta "Luminous, monks, is the mind. And it is freed from incoming defilements. The well-instructed disciple of the noble ones discerns that as it actually is present, which is why I tell you that -- for the well-instructed disciple of the noble ones -- there is development of the mind." We are saying that there is development of the mind, developing using bhavanga cittas on the basis that you are saying that these well-instructed disciple are highly developed ones then the theory that it is bhavanga citta could still stand on its ground. Bc bhavanga cittas could be discern with highly developed disciples which I strongly believe that all cittas could be discern. What TB sayings is not implying luminious mind as a permanent self. My reading is that he is equating it with Nibbana or the attainment of cessation. Even though we do not know what Nibbana is like. There are two ways to look at it, From the Abhidhamma stand point, it could be bhavanga cittas as they could be possibly be discerned for those who are highly developed disciples. For the Sutta stand point, it could be pointing to Nibbana or the state of mind in the attainment of cessation. (there is no implication of a "permanent self). It sounds like I am backtracking on my previous email. He he :) I think my position is rather neutral now after a new more reread of suttas and rethinking :). A bit off track to the Mahayana traditions. Luminous mind is more common in Mahayana rather than the Thervada. Thervada is more cautious of this approach due to the subtle implication of a permanent self. In one Mahayana sutta, the Buddha said that defilement to the mind is very difficult to discern, only highly developed disciples will know how the mind (which is luminious) is being defiled. In my view, the Mahayana traditions tend to equate the luminious mind as Nibbana or enlightement which I find acceptable as long as there is no notion of a permanent self. Furthermore, in Abhidhamma, I do not think there is an explanation how does bhavanga cittas actually work (except as life continual), its objects (a mystery) and how it is being defiled by the six senses. It simply says that it is being defiled (or impinge or disturb), is there any commentaries on the intracies on how it being defiled. The actual details will be very helpful. Maybe as a Christmas gift to me. (I sound greedy :)) Kind regards Ken O P.S. - I don't think TB agree that luminoius mind is bhavanga cittas or not he will not make such a note. > Thanks for joining in this thread and for your well-considered comments > and > notes by Thanissaro Bhikkhu. I think I’ll just add a few notes to those > earlier posts I just gave the links for: > ***** > > 1. Everyone, it seems, including Thanissaro Bhikkhu, agree that the > ancient Pali commentary: maintains that "mind" here refers to the > > bhavanga-citta.. > ***** > > 2. Without any doubt, very few ‘Buddhists’ are interested in these same > commentaries and those that are, usually refer to and expound their > value when > the interpretation accords with their understanding and ignore them or > disagree > when they don’t. > ***** > > 3. There are a few of us ‘dinosaurs’ left who, on the other hand, have > every > confidence in the Pali commentaries and find the interpretations and > explanations without fail to accord with the Suttas, Vinaya and > Abhidhamma. We > fully realise we’re a dying breed, but actually agree with the quote I > gave > from the Bahiranidana that the Tipitaka is ‘uniform in sentiment’. > ***** > > 4. Accordingly, the commentary explanation about bhavanga cittas is > consistent > with other commentaries (see Atthasalini quote given in link), Questions > of > K.Milinda and of course with the Abhidhamma itself. > ***** > > 5. Thanissaro Bhikkhu (T.B. from now on) asks: > >“....because the commentaries compare the bhavanga-citta to > > deep sleep, why is it called luminous?” > ..... > > As I understand, it is not the cittas which are compared to the sleep, > but > whilst in the deep sleep, there are only bhavanga cittas without > sense-door or > mind-door activity. Without sense-door or mind-door activity, there are > no > defilements apparent. The following was included in one of my earlier > quotes > from K.Milinda (1V,8.36): > ..... > > “When a man is in deep sleep, O king, his mind has returned home > (has entered again into Bhavanga), and a mind thus shut in does not act, > and a > mind hindered in its action knows not the evil and the good, and he who > knows > not has no dreams. It is when the mind is active that dreams are dreamt. > Just, > O king, as in the darkness and gloom, where no light is, no shadow will > fall > even on the most burnished mirror, so when a man is in deep sleep his > mind has > returned into itself, and a mind shut in does not act, and a mind > inactive > knows not the evil and the good, and he who knows not does not dream.” > ***** > > 6. T.B. asks: > “And why would the perception of its > > luminosity be a prerequisite for developing the mind?” > ..... > > As I understand the sutta, the discussion is about understanding the > mind (i.e > the cittas) in terms of understanding the wholesome and unwholesome > states > which arise and fall away rapidly on account of the sense objects > experienced > with bhavanga cittas in between. > > In one of those other posts I wrote: > ..... > “In the 2 suttas in AN, reference is made to the speed of changing > cittas and > the importance of seeing the danger or unwholesome states and the value > of > skilful states even ‘if for just the lasting of a finger-snap’.I think > it’s > important to appreciate the context when we read the following: > > ‘Monks, I know not of any other single thing so quick to change as the > mind: > insomuch that it is no easy thing to illustrate how quick to change it > is. > > ‘This mind, monks is luminous, but it is defiled by taints that come > from > without; that mind, monks, is luminous, but it is cleansed of taints > that come > from without.’ “ > ..... > > In other words, understanding more about bhavanga cittas (even in > theory) helps > us to realize how there is nothing lasting, no underlying pure state, > but > rapidly changing cittas and sense and mind doorways. > ..... > > I wrote before: > > “In the Abhidhammattha Sangaha (111, 8) we read that: > > ‘Bhavanga cittas arise and pass away every moment during life whenever > there > is no active cognitive process taking place. This type of consciousness > is > most evident during deep dreamless sleep, but it also occurs momentarily > during > waking life countless times between occasions of active cognition.’ > ***** > > 7. T.B. asks: “And further, if > > "mind" in this discourse means bhavanga-citta, what would it mean to > > develop the bhavanga-citta?” > ..... > > There is no suggestion of developing bhavanga-citta, as I understand. > Bhavanga > citta are vipaka citta and cannot be developed. The entire emphasis in > the > suttas is to seeing the danger of akusala states and developing kusala > states. > the donosaurs amongst us would say that some understanding of abhidhamma > is > essential in this regard. > ***** > > 8. T.B. says: > ‘> A more reasonable approach to understanding the statement can be > derived > > from taking it in context: the luminous mind is the mind that the > > meditator is trying to develop. To perceive its luminosity means > > understanding that defilements such as greed, aversion, or delusion > are > > not intrinsic to its nature, are not a necessary part of awareness. > > Without this understanding, it would be impossible to practice.’ > ..... > > On the contrary, I read and understand the Buddha as making it very > clear that > the intrinsic nature of the mind is that of ‘greed, aversion, or > delusion’. > Without these core roots, there is no ‘becoming’ and no dukkha. Of > course they > have nothing to do with awareness. Awareness, sati, as discussed so > often, only > arises with skilful states and cittas. It can know any reality. If > there is > not some understanding of the nature of sati as an occasionally-rising > skilful > state that is aware of a specific reality (not lasting for a > ‘finger-snap’), it > would truly be impossible for any practice (patipatti). > > I believe this understanding conforms more closely with that explained > not only > in the Suttas, but also in the commentaries and Abhidhamma. > ***** > > 9.T.B. continues to add that: > > ‘With this > > understanding, however, one can make an effort to cut away existing > > defilements, leaving the mind in the stage that MN 24 calls "purity in > > terms of mind." This would correspond to the luminous level of > > concentration described in the standard simile for the fourth jhana: > ..... > > On the contrary, this again suggests the idea of self-control and a > permanent > mind-state which, as I understand the Teachings, is quite contrary to > their > ‘uniform sentiment’. The purity of the states of awareness and > concentration > referred to in the simile, refer to cittas of an exceedingly high state > of > wholesomeness, which again are fleeting (though I believe not with any > bhavanga > cittas in between the mind-door processes in this case). > ***** > > 10. T.B. adds: > > From this state it is possible to develop the discernment that not > only > > cuts away existing defilements but also uproots any potential for them > to > > ever arise again. Only in the stages of awakening that follow on those > > acts of discernment would "consciousness without feature" be realized. > ..... > > This could be considered controversial in that it suggests this highest > level > of jhana to be an essential ingredient for the eradication of > defilements. I > truly don’t wish to re-open this can of worms too;-) > ***** > > Howard and Ken O, please know that I’m not asking you to ‘buy’ any idea, > but > merely raising the understanding of it which has been passed down by the > Sangha > since the First Council (or at least soon after, as I think all would > admit). > > I don’t want to make this post any longer, but if you feel your other > points > (from your other posts) have not been properly addressed, please send > them back > to me again because you’ve considered carefully, I know. > > Sarah 10224 From: Sarah Date: Fri Dec 21, 2001 1:20am Subject: RE: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein Dear Kom, It is such a relief to have you back. You obviously realised I needed your assistance;-)) Kom>>>>Thank you bringing in the quote about bhavanga from Milinda panha and others. You probably know this already, A Survey of Paramatha Dhammas in Thai as well as Nina's explains the concepts of cittta (bhavanga) being "Pantara" the same way. From Nina's version (http://www.abhidhamma.org/Para3.htm), a long quote: Thanks so much for adding the quotes from Survey. They helped me a lot and I’m glad to be reminded. I may have quoted it before, but not in the posts I sent Rob ep to review. I find it very sobering and a condition for calm to reflect how it’s just on account of the sense-door activity that the kilesa arrise....as soon as there is seeing or hearing or other sense-door activity, immediately it’s a condition for lobha and the other defilements to arise so very fast. We think these sense-door activities last, but when there are bhavanga cittas, there is no sense door experiencing. In the same way, when there is the sense door activity, there is no world of concepts.....The abhidhamma helps a lot, doesn’t it? I was trying to strictly limit my re-quotes in the post, but let me give you the full K.Milinda one which you may have missed last time and also the Atthasalini one: ********** Qs of K.Milinda, 1V,8,36, Max Muller’s transl: ‘Ven Nagasena, when a man dreams a dream, is he awake or asleep?’ ‘Neither the one, O king, nor yet the other. But when his sleep has become light, and he is not yet fully conscious, in that interval it is that dreams are dreamt. When a man is in deep sleep, O king, his mind has returned home (has entered again into Bhavanga), and a mind thus shut in does not act, and a mind hindered in its action knows not the evil and the good, and he who knows not has no dreams. It is when the mind is active that dreams are dreamt. Just, O king, as in the darkness and gloom, where no light is, no shadow will fall even on the most burnished mirror, so when a man is in deep sleep his mind has returned into itself, and a mind shut in does not act, and a mind inactive knows not the evil and the good, and he who knows not does not dream. For it is when the mind is active that dreams are dreamt. As the miror, O king, are you to regard the body, as the darkness sleep, as the light the mind.’ ********** “Mind also is said to be ‘clear’ in the sense of ‘exceedingly pure,’ with reference to the subconscious life-continuum. So the Buddha has said;- ‘bhikkhus, the mind is luminous, but is corrupted by adventitious corruptions.’ Though immoral, it is called ‘clear’ because it issues (from subconscious vital conditions) just as a tributary of the Ganges is like the Ganges and a tributary of the Godhaavarii is like the Godhaavarii” (Atth, 140, p.185 PTSed) *** end quote *** Kom>>>>>Of course, it is easy to like the concept of having pure or luminous mind. But when the mind is pure or lumninous, do we actually know it? What about when the mind is impure or dark with defilments? It is way easier to like something that we consider good, desirable, or something that we consider to be for our development and our stature (I have a pure mind), rather than knowing and understanding the reality that appears now. We have been accumulating those likings for ages. ...... Great comments, Kom..you’re in really good form. Sarah .................... p.s. Jaran, take note of Kom's good example.... maybe with your Thai and pali skills, you could help translate that passage from the Thai commentary for Nina;-) ...and Dan, I’ve marked March in my diary, but let me tell you that we just can’t wait that long ;-( ............................................................................................................................... 10225 From: egberdina Date: Fri Dec 21, 2001 2:48am Subject: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein Dear Sarah, Is it a property of all dinosaurs that they avoid / reject jhana approach to insight? Rejecting an idea because it may be construed as having some notion of self in it sounds like control to me. As long as we remember that it is cittas that think self , and not self that thinks cittas, we should be right :-) Hope you are getting some time of over the silly season :-) Herman --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Sarah wrote: > Hi Ken O and Howard, > > --- Kenneth Ong wrote: > Hi Howard and Sarah, > > > > I think I like the notes made by Thanissaro Bhikkhu on "Luminous" at > > http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/anguttara/an01-049.html > > > > Thanks for joining in this thread and for your well-considered comments and > notes by Thanissaro Bhikkhu. I think I'll just add a few notes to those > earlier posts I just gave the links for: > ***** > > 1. Everyone, it seems, including Thanissaro Bhikkhu, agree that the ancient > Pali commentary: > > maintains that "mind" here refers to the > > bhavanga-citta.. > ***** > > 2. Without any doubt, very few `Buddhists' are interested in these same > commentaries and those that are, usually refer to and expound their value when > the interpretation accords with their understanding and ignore them or disagree > when they don't. > ***** > > 3. There are a few of us `dinosaurs' left who, on the other hand, have every > confidence in the Pali commentaries and find the interpretations and > explanations without fail to accord with the Suttas, Vinaya and Abhidhamma. We > fully realise we're a dying breed, but actually agree with the quote I gave > from the Bahiranidana that the Tipitaka is `uniform in sentiment'. > ***** > > 4. Accordingly, the commentary explanation about bhavanga cittas is consistent > with other commentaries (see Atthasalini quote given in link), Questions of > K.Milinda and of course with the Abhidhamma itself. > ***** > > 5. Thanissaro Bhikkhu (T.B. from now on) asks: > >"....because the commentaries compare the bhavanga-citta to > > deep sleep, why is it called luminous?" > ..... > > As I understand, it is not the cittas which are compared to the sleep, but > whilst in the deep sleep, there are only bhavanga cittas without sense-door or > mind-door activity. Without sense-door or mind-door activity, there are no > defilements apparent. The following was included in one of my earlier quotes > from K.Milinda (1V,8.36): > ..... > > "When a man is in deep sleep, O king, his mind has returned home > (has entered again into Bhavanga), and a mind thus shut in does not act, and a > mind hindered in its action knows not the evil and the good, and he who knows > not has no dreams. It is when the mind is active that dreams are dreamt. Just, > O king, as in the darkness and gloom, where no light is, no shadow will fall > even on the most burnished mirror, so when a man is in deep sleep his mind has > returned into itself, and a mind shut in does not act, and a mind inactive > knows not the evil and the good, and he who knows not does not dream." > ***** > > 6. T.B. asks: > "And why would the perception of its > > luminosity be a prerequisite for developing the mind?" > ..... > > As I understand the sutta, the discussion is about understanding the mind (i.e > the cittas) in terms of understanding the wholesome and unwholesome states > which arise and fall away rapidly on account of the sense objects experienced > with bhavanga cittas in between. > > In one of those other posts I wrote: > ..... > "In the 2 suttas in AN, reference is made to the speed of changing cittas and > the importance of seeing the danger or unwholesome states and the value of > skilful states even `if for just the lasting of a finger-snap'.I think it's > important to appreciate the context when we read the following: > > `Monks, I know not of any other single thing so quick to change as the mind: > insomuch that it is no easy thing to illustrate how quick to change it is. > > `This mind, monks is luminous, but it is defiled by taints that come from > without; that mind, monks, is luminous, but it is cleansed of taints that come > from without.' " > ..... > > In other words, understanding more about bhavanga cittas (even in theory) helps > us to realize how there is nothing lasting, no underlying pure state, but > rapidly changing cittas and sense and mind doorways. > ..... > > I wrote before: > > "In the Abhidhammattha Sangaha (111, 8) we read that: > > `Bhavanga cittas arise and pass away every moment during life whenever there > is no active cognitive process taking place. This type of consciousness is > most evident during deep dreamless sleep, but it also occurs momentarily during > waking life countless times between occasions of active cognition.' > ***** > > 7. T.B. asks: "And further, if > > "mind" in this discourse means bhavanga-citta, what would it mean to > > develop the bhavanga-citta?" > ..... > > There is no suggestion of developing bhavanga-citta, as I understand. Bhavanga > citta are vipaka citta and cannot be developed. The entire emphasis in the > suttas is to seeing the danger of akusala states and developing kusala states. > the donosaurs amongst us would say that some understanding of abhidhamma is > essential in this regard. > ***** > > 8. T.B. says: > `> A more reasonable approach to understanding the statement can be derived > > from taking it in context: the luminous mind is the mind that the > > meditator is trying to develop. To perceive its luminosity means > > understanding that defilements such as greed, aversion, or delusion are > > not intrinsic to its nature, are not a necessary part of awareness. > > Without this understanding, it would be impossible to practice.' > ..... > > On the contrary, I read and understand the Buddha as making it very clear that > the intrinsic nature of the mind is that of `greed, aversion, or delusion'. > Without these core roots, there is no `becoming' and no dukkha. Of course they > have nothing to do with awareness. Awareness, sati, as discussed so often, only > arises with skilful states and cittas. It can know any reality. If there is > not some understanding of the nature of sati as an occasionally- rising skilful > state that is aware of a specific reality (not lasting for a `finger-snap'), it > would truly be impossible for any practice (patipatti). > > I believe this understanding conforms more closely with that explained not only > in the Suttas, but also in the commentaries and Abhidhamma. > ***** > > 9.T.B. continues to add that: > > `With this > > understanding, however, one can make an effort to cut away existing > > defilements, leaving the mind in the stage that MN 24 calls "purity in > > terms of mind." This would correspond to the luminous level of > > concentration described in the standard simile for the fourth jhana: > ..... > > On the contrary, this again suggests the idea of self-control and a permanent > mind-state which, as I understand the Teachings, is quite contrary to their > `uniform sentiment'. The purity of the states of awareness and concentration > referred to in the simile, refer to cittas of an exceedingly high state of > wholesomeness, which again are fleeting (though I believe not with any bhavanga > cittas in between the mind-door processes in this case). > ***** > > 10. T.B. adds: > > From this state it is possible to develop the discernment that not only > > cuts away existing defilements but also uproots any potential for them to > > ever arise again. Only in the stages of awakening that follow on those > > acts of discernment would "consciousness without feature" be realized. > ..... > > This could be considered controversial in that it suggests this highest level > of jhana to be an essential ingredient for the eradication of defilements. I > truly don't wish to re-open this can of worms too;-) > ***** > > Howard and Ken O, please know that I'm not asking you to `buy' any idea, but > merely raising the understanding of it which has been passed down by the Sangha > since the First Council (or at least soon after, as I think all would admit). > > I don't want to make this post any longer, but if you feel your other points > (from your other posts) have not been properly addressed, please send them back > to me again because you've considered carefully, I know. > > Sarah > 10226 From: abhidhammika Date: Fri Dec 21, 2001 6:38am Subject: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Sarah Dear Sarah (and Kom) How are you? Thank you for raising the issues of the luminous mind. As both Robert Epstein and Howard used this beautiful statement of Gotama the Buddha when they introduced the concept of an underlying being (Robert) or 'a consciousness without objects'(Howard) remaining after the Parinibbaana of an Arahant in response to Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two), I will have to deal with this statement of the Buddha when I write my next Parinibbaana Subcommentary (Part Three). As your posts and Kom's post addressed this issue in advance, you have taken off some of my burdens. Your analysis of Thanissaro Bhikkhu's misconceptions and misinterpretations is remarkably good, and freed me of considerable workload. Well, sorry about my being workload-conscious! You know what I mean. Sarah, you wrote: "I'll leave these references in Suan's capable hands." It is very kind of you to have confidence in me. I will try my best to offer academically reliable posts here. You also wrote: "Meanwhile I'm enjoying your discussion with Suan which I don't mean to interrupt. I agree that the points should not be ignored and we should try to `account for their actual usage.'" You are not interrupting the Parinibbana discussion at all. Your contributions are very welcome. Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Three) coming soon, with a new treatment of the luminous mind! With best wishes, Suan http://www.bodhiology.org --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Sarah wrote: > Dear Rob Ep, > > --- Robert Epstein wrote: > > > I have gone on and been a bit redundant to underline this point. One really > > needs > > to deal with the term 'undefined reality' > > I'll leave these references in Suan's capable hands. > > > > Elsewhere the Buddha has made a point of saying that the state of Parinibbana > > 'is > > not one of darkness', but of light. > > Would you give the reference for this? > > >And elsewhere he has said that 'mind is > > luminous' but defiled by incoming defilements, indicating to me at least, if > > not > > to others, that the mind is inherently luminous, and that cittas are only in > > a > > state of ignorance because of a kind of shrouding or delusion. It implies > > that > > when the delusion is gone, there is still an underlying luminosity to be > > discovered. > > Now, Rob, we had a very long discussion about this sutta in Ang. Nikaya. We > clearly saw that the Pali commentaries made it clear that the `luminous mind' > is referring to the bhavanga cittas arising between the sense-door and > mind-door processes. Reluctantly, I believe you acknowledged this, but since > (in this post and one or two others) you have reverted to your own > understanding as being, in effect, more reliable than the commentaries, I > think. > > Meanwhile I'm enjoying your discussion with Suan which I don't mean to > interrupt. I agree that the points should not be ignored and we should try to > `account for their actual usage.' > > Thanks, > > Sarah > > p.s I'll try to show some self-moderation and send that other silly sign-off > you missed off-list. > > All - Pls try to remember to cut off those parts of old posts which are not > necessary for our replies....we all forget sometimes, but many people take the > posts in `digest' form and it does help them. > > ================== > 10227 From: abhidhammika Date: Fri Dec 21, 2001 7:07am Subject: Re: Luminous mind: To Kenneth Ong Dear Ken How are you? You wrote: "This portion of the commentary which I feel is inadequate to address the sutta by just equating bhavanga cittas with luminious mind on the basis of the first two statements of the suttas." As I need to respond to Robert Epstein and Howard in my Parinibbana Subcommentary Series, I have to study the statements of the Buddha that mention 'pabassaramidam, Bhikkhave, cittam' and the commentary. The commentary is very short, yet requires considerable research background to understand it, let alone translate it meaningfully in natural English. As I will be translating the essential portions of it, I also feel the need to write some technical notes on it because the translation on its own would not be enough to make sense for those who haven't some background in abhidhamma. As far as I am concerned, the commentary on 'pabassaramidam, Bhikkhave, cittam' is not only very adequate, but also very deep and involving. You will know this very soon when Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Three) is posted here. You will also see that some of your questions: "how it is being defiled by the six senses. It simply says that it is being defiled (or impinge or disturb), is there any commentaries on the intracies on how it being defiled. The actual details will be very helpful. Maybe as a Christmas gift to me. (I sound greedy.." will also be automatically solved. The commentary in question is that adequate and that involving! With best wishes Suan http://www.bodhiology.org --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Kenneth Ong wrote: > Hi Sarah, > > First of all, I deeply respected and highly value the commentaries and > Abhidhamma. This portion of the commentary which I feel is inadequate to > address the sutta by just equating bhavanga cittas with luminious mind on > the basis of the first two statements of the suttas. > > Let us revisit the last statement of the sutta > "Luminous, monks, is the mind. And it is freed from incoming defilements. > The well-instructed disciple of the noble ones discerns that as it > actually is present, which is why I tell you that -- for the > well-instructed disciple of the noble ones -- there is development of the > mind." > > We are saying that there is development of the mind, developing using > bhavanga cittas on the basis that you are saying that these > well-instructed disciple are highly developed ones then the theory that it > is bhavanga citta could still stand on its ground. Bc bhavanga cittas > could be discern with highly developed disciples which I strongly believe > that all cittas could be discern. > > What TB sayings is not implying luminious mind as a permanent self. My > reading is that he is equating it with Nibbana or the attainment of > cessation. Even though we do not know what Nibbana is like. > > There are two ways to look at it, > > From the Abhidhamma stand point, it could be bhavanga cittas as they could > be possibly be discerned for those who are highly developed disciples. > > For the Sutta stand point, it could be pointing to Nibbana or the state of > mind in the attainment of cessation. (there is no implication of a > "permanent self). > > It sounds like I am backtracking on my previous email. He he :) I think my > position is rather neutral now after a new more reread of suttas and > rethinking :). > > A bit off track to the Mahayana traditions. Luminous mind is more common > in Mahayana rather than the Thervada. Thervada is more cautious of this > approach due to the subtle implication of a permanent self. In one > Mahayana sutta, the Buddha said that defilement to the mind is very > difficult to discern, only highly developed disciples will know how the > mind (which is luminious) is being defiled. In my view, the Mahayana > traditions tend to equate the luminious mind as Nibbana or enlightement > which I find acceptable as long as there is no notion of a permanent self. > > Furthermore, in Abhidhamma, I do not think there is an explanation how > does bhavanga cittas actually work (except as life continual), its objects > (a mystery) and how it is being defiled by the six senses. It simply says > that it is being defiled (or impinge or disturb), is there any > commentaries on the intracies on how it being defiled. The actual details > will be very helpful. Maybe as a Christmas gift to me. (I sound greedy > :)) > > > > Kind regards > Ken O > > P.S. - I don't think TB agree that luminoius mind is bhavanga cittas or > not he will not make such a note. > > > > > Thanks for joining in this thread and for your well-considered comments > > and > > notes by Thanissaro Bhikkhu. I think I'll just add a few notes to those > > earlier posts I just gave the links for: > > ***** > > > > 1. Everyone, it seems, including Thanissaro Bhikkhu, agree that the > > ancient Pali commentary: maintains that "mind" here refers to the > > > bhavanga-citta.. > > ***** > > > > 2. Without any doubt, very few `Buddhists' are interested in these same > > commentaries and those that are, usually refer to and expound their > > value when > > the interpretation accords with their understanding and ignore them or > > disagree > > when they don't. > > ***** > > > > 3. There are a few of us `dinosaurs' left who, on the other hand, have > > every > > confidence in the Pali commentaries and find the interpretations and > > explanations without fail to accord with the Suttas, Vinaya and > > Abhidhamma. We > > fully realise we're a dying breed, but actually agree with the quote I > > gave > > from the Bahiranidana that the Tipitaka is `uniform in sentiment'. > > ***** > > > > 4. Accordingly, the commentary explanation about bhavanga cittas is > > consistent > > with other commentaries (see Atthasalini quote given in link), Questions > > of > > K.Milinda and of course with the Abhidhamma itself. > > ***** > > > > 5. Thanissaro Bhikkhu (T.B. from now on) asks: > > >"....because the commentaries compare the bhavanga-citta to > > > deep sleep, why is it called luminous?" > > ..... > > > > As I understand, it is not the cittas which are compared to the sleep, > > but > > whilst in the deep sleep, there are only bhavanga cittas without > > sense-door or > > mind-door activity. Without sense-door or mind-door activity, there are > > no > > defilements apparent. The following was included in one of my earlier > > quotes > > from K.Milinda (1V,8.36): > > ..... > > > > "When a man is in deep sleep, O king, his mind has returned home > > (has entered again into Bhavanga), and a mind thus shut in does not act, > > and a > > mind hindered in its action knows not the evil and the good, and he who > > knows > > not has no dreams. It is when the mind is active that dreams are dreamt. > > Just, > > O king, as in the darkness and gloom, where no light is, no shadow will > > fall > > even on the most burnished mirror, so when a man is in deep sleep his > > mind has > > returned into itself, and a mind shut in does not act, and a mind > > inactive > > knows not the evil and the good, and he who knows not does not dream." > > ***** > > > > 6. T.B. asks: > > "And why would the perception of its > > > luminosity be a prerequisite for developing the mind?" > > ..... > > > > As I understand the sutta, the discussion is about understanding the > > mind (i.e > > the cittas) in terms of understanding the wholesome and unwholesome > > states > > which arise and fall away rapidly on account of the sense objects > > experienced > > with bhavanga cittas in between. > > > > In one of those other posts I wrote: > > ..... > > "In the 2 suttas in AN, reference is made to the speed of changing > > cittas and > > the importance of seeing the danger or unwholesome states and the value > > of > > skilful states even `if for just the lasting of a finger-snap'.I think > > it's > > important to appreciate the context when we read the following: > > > > `Monks, I know not of any other single thing so quick to change as the > > mind: > > insomuch that it is no easy thing to illustrate how quick to change it > > is. > > > > `This mind, monks is luminous, but it is defiled by taints that come > > from > > without; that mind, monks, is luminous, but it is cleansed of taints > > that come > > from without.' " > > ..... > > > > In other words, understanding more about bhavanga cittas (even in > > theory) helps > > us to realize how there is nothing lasting, no underlying pure state, > > but > > rapidly changing cittas and sense and mind doorways. > > ..... > > > > I wrote before: > > > > "In the Abhidhammattha Sangaha (111, 8) we read that: > > > > `Bhavanga cittas arise and pass away every moment during life whenever > > there > > is no active cognitive process taking place. This type of consciousness > > is > > most evident during deep dreamless sleep, but it also occurs momentarily > > during > > waking life countless times between occasions of active cognition.' > > ***** > > > > 7. T.B. asks: "And further, if > > > "mind" in this discourse means bhavanga-citta, what would it mean to > > > develop the bhavanga-citta?" > > ..... > > > > There is no suggestion of developing bhavanga-citta, as I understand. > > Bhavanga > > citta are vipaka citta and cannot be developed. The entire emphasis in > > the > > suttas is to seeing the danger of akusala states and developing kusala > > states. > > the donosaurs amongst us would say that some understanding of abhidhamma > > is > > essential in this regard. > > ***** > > > > 8. T.B. says: > > `> A more reasonable approach to understanding the statement can be > > derived > > > from taking it in context: the luminous mind is the mind that the > > > meditator is trying to develop. To perceive its luminosity means > > > understanding that defilements such as greed, aversion, or delusion > > are > > > not intrinsic to its nature, are not a necessary part of awareness. > > > Without this understanding, it would be impossible to practice.' > > ..... > > > > On the contrary, I read and understand the Buddha as making it very > > clear that > > the intrinsic nature of the mind is that of `greed, aversion, or > > delusion'. > > Without these core roots, there is no `becoming' and no dukkha. Of > > course they > > have nothing to do with awareness. Awareness, sati, as discussed so > > often, only > > arises with skilful states and cittas. It can know any reality. If > > there is > > not some understanding of the nature of sati as an occasionally- rising > > skilful > > state that is aware of a specific reality (not lasting for a > > `finger-snap'), it > > would truly be impossible for any practice (patipatti). > > > > I believe this understanding conforms more closely with that explained > > not only > > in the Suttas, but also in the commentaries and Abhidhamma. > > ***** > > > > 9.T.B. continues to add that: > > > `With this > > > understanding, however, one can make an effort to cut away existing > > > defilements, leaving the mind in the stage that MN 24 calls "purity in > > > terms of mind." This would correspond to the luminous level of > > > concentration described in the standard simile for the fourth jhana: > > ..... > > > > On the contrary, this again suggests the idea of self-control and a > > permanent > > mind-state which, as I understand the Teachings, is quite contrary to > > their > > `uniform sentiment'. The purity of the states of awareness and > > concentration > > referred to in the simile, refer to cittas of an exceedingly high state > > of > > wholesomeness, which again are fleeting (though I believe not with any > > bhavanga > > cittas in between the mind-door processes in this case). > > ***** > > > > 10. T.B. adds: > > > From this state it is possible to develop the discernment that not > > only > > > cuts away existing defilements but also uproots any potential for them > > to > > > ever arise again. Only in the stages of awakening that follow on those > > > acts of discernment would "consciousness without feature" be realized. > > ..... > > > > This could be considered controversial in that it suggests this highest > > level > > of jhana to be an essential ingredient for the eradication of > > defilements. I > > truly don't wish to re-open this can of worms too;-) > > ***** > > > > Howard and Ken O, please know that I'm not asking you to `buy' any idea, > > but > > merely raising the understanding of it which has been passed down by the > > Sangha > > since the First Council (or at least soon after, as I think all would > > admit). > > > > I don't want to make this post any longer, but if you feel your other > > points > > (from your other posts) have not been properly addressed, please send > > them back > > to me again because you've considered carefully, I know. > > > > Sarah 10228 From: Kenneth Ong Date: Fri Dec 21, 2001 8:56am Subject: Re: [dsg] Memory, Objects, and Continuity Hi Herman --- egberdina wrote: > Ken, > > Just to clarify, does there need to be awareness of a thought, before > it is a thought? k: You got to excuse me for my amateurish explanation. Furthermore, I kind of lazy person who do not like to get into too much details studies. I assuming that a present thought moment we have are series of cittas that form it. For pple like me, yes :). For highly developed disciples, every citta is being discern even before it became the present thought moment (a series of citta) > I can certainly agree that there is only awareness of any one thing > at any time, but that doesn't mean there isn't a whole lot going on > in the background. k: that is true, there is a whole lot of noise in our background. The Abhidhamma point is that they are serial process and not simutlaneous process. All such noises in the background is also a serial process (as explain in my earlier email). There is a logic to the background noise bc there are billions of citta in a twinkle of an eye, just imagine of much brain cells interactions we have just to breath, listen, see....(without we knowing it). Thus such speed give us an impression when we observe one thought moment but in the back ground seems that all our senses happened simultaneously. Similarily like light owes its speed to be of one colour, but in fact the background of the light is a combination of seven colours. Furthermore, my assumption is that speed is relative. A fly speed will mean differently to us and to the fly itself. Speed is a controlling factor for pple like me but for those highly developed disciple, I think it is not an issue at all. Kind regards Ken O 10229 From: Kenneth Ong Date: Fri Dec 21, 2001 9:13am Subject: RE: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein Hi Kom > The “Atthasåliní” (Expositor I, Book I, Part IV, Ch II, 140) > states: “Mind also is said to be ‘clear’ in the sense of > ‘exceedingly pure’ with reference to the bhavanga-citta.” > The citta is pure only at the moment it does not experience > an object through the doors of eyes, ears, nose, tongue, > bodysense or mind. On this basis, could we say that the patisandhi citta also exceeding pure since to me it also does not experience any sense object. Kind regards Ken O 10230 From: Kenneth Ong Date: Fri Dec 21, 2001 9:26am Subject: RE: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein Hi Sarah, Franking speaking by posting this passage it developed more confusion. > I was trying to strictly limit my re-quotes in the post, but let me give > you > the full K.Milinda one which you may have missed last time and also the > Atthasalini one: > > ********** > Qs of K.Milinda, 1V,8,36, Max Muller’s transl: > > ‘Ven Nagasena, when a man dreams a dream, is he awake or asleep?’ > ‘Neither the one, O king, nor yet the other. k: To me, this statement will imply that when a man dreams he is neither sleeping or awake. >But when his sleep has become light, and he is not yet fully conscious, in that interval it is that dreams are dreamt. When a man is in deep sleep, O king, his mind has returned home (has entered again into Bhavanga), and a mind thus shut in does not act, and a mind hindered in its action knows not the evil and the good, and he who knows > not has no dreams. It is when the mind is active that dreams are dreamt. > Just, O king, as in the darkness and gloom, where no light is, no shadow will fall even on the most burnished mirror, so when a man is in deep sleep his mind has returned into itself, and a mind shut in does not act, and a mind inactive knows not the evil and the good, and he who knows not does not dream. For it is when the mind is active that dreams are dreamt. As the miror, O king, > are > you to regard the body, as the darkness sleep, as the light the mind.’ k: Returned home? Return to itself? - sounds like bhavanga citta a permanent dwelling for the mind. Subtely it would imply a permanent self. Kind regards Ken O 10231 From: tikmok Date: Fri Dec 21, 2001 9:28am Subject: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein Dear Ken O, --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Kenneth Ong wrote: > Hi Kom > > > The "Atthasåliní" (Expositor I, Book I, Part IV, Ch II, 140) > > states: "Mind also is said to be `clear' in the sense of > > `exceedingly pure' with reference to the bhavanga-citta." > > The citta is pure only at the moment it does not experience > > an object through the doors of eyes, ears, nose, tongue, > > bodysense or mind. > > On this basis, could we say that the patisandhi citta also exceeding pure= > since to me it also does not experience any sense object. There are 19 possible types of citta that are said to perform patisandhi function. For the entire life of a being, the patisanthi, the bhavanga, an= d the cutti citta are of the same type. In a single life-time, the co-arisi= ng cetasikas and the object (aramana) of patisandhi, bhavanga, and cuti citta = are "identical", although each citta performs a different function. kom 10232 From: Kenneth Ong Date: Fri Dec 21, 2001 9:41am Subject: RE: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein Hi Kom, > Of course, it is easy to like the concept of having pure or > luminous mind. But when the mind is pure or lumninous, do > we actually know it? What about when the mind is impure or > dark with defilments? It is way easier to like something > that we consider good, desirable, or something that we > consider to be for our development and our stature (I have a > pure mind), rather than knowing and understanding the > reality that appears now. We have been accumulating those > likings for ages. k: I belive investigating is a pre-requsite for seeing reality as it is. Without examine and ascertain concepts for congruity and interpolating between Sutta and Abhidhamm, then the meaningful purpose of Abhidhamma will weaken considerably. When we are studying such concepts, I believe we are not desiring that we prefer a luminious mind than a defile mind, we are trying to make sense out of its meaning of the sutta in its relation to Abhidhamma. We are still investigation and learning and not yearning that luminious mind is our goal, similarily to our investigating of Nibbana or PariNibbana. Kind regards Ken O 10233 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Fri Dec 21, 2001 10:11am Subject: Re: [dsg] FW: three rounds op 20-12-2001 06:27 schreef srnsk@a... op srnsk@a...: Num: From my Thai > Abhidhammattha-sagaha, those 3 ~nana were mentioned under anul~om~nana. > --------------------------- > > Anul~om~nana is a pa~n~na that acknowledge that one have to give in/follow > ariyasacca, so one can be detached. Ariyasacca is dukkhasacca, samutayasacca, > nirodhasacca and maggasacca. > > > Sacca~nana is pa~n~na which knows clearly that dukkha is nama and rupa which > are lokiya. Samutaya is tanha, nirodha is nibbana and magga is 8 ariya-magga. > Knowledge at this level is knowing according to the truth:sacca~nana. > > Kicca~nana is pa~n~na which knows clearly that dukkha should be known, > samutaya should be let go, nirodha should be enlighten and magga should be > developed. Knowledge at this level is knowing according to > responsiblity:kicca~nana. > > Kata~nana is pa~n~na which knows clearly that dukkha which should be known, > is known. Samutaya which should be let go, is let go. Nirodha which should > be enlighten, is enlighten and all 8 magga which should be developed, is > developed. Knowledge at this level is knowing according to what has been > done:kata~nana. > > > Sacca~nana and kicca~nana is ~nana in lokiya level. Kata~nana is > lokuttara~nana. The two lokiya~nanas have been already perfected in > sakarupekka~nana. So ano~loma~nana is named pa~n~na which knows clearly in > following through, through ariyasacca. Then nibbana will be an arammana in > next ~nana, kotarabhu~nana. > > Hope further information from other sources will help more. > > Num > >Dear Num, thank you very much for this info. I tried to look it up in the Co to Abhidhammattha Sangaha, translated by A. Somporn, but I have an incomplete edition in booklets and could not find it. Now, I used to think that kata ~naa.na must be lokuttara but in India I learnt differently. A. Sujin said, when speaking about the highest level (doy ukkrit, in Pali ugghati is to lift up) kata ~naa.na is lokuttara, but there are other levels, when vipassana ~naa.na realizes the impermanence and thus dukkha of dhammas that arise and fall away. It is all so detailed and subtle. We have to look at the context: you mention the level of anuloma, arising before gotrabhu, which is followed by lokuttara citta. This is already "doy ukkrit", according to the highest level. Also she said, when there is kata~naa.na there are still sacca ~naa.na and kicca ~naa.na, they develop on and on. One realizes more and more the Truths that should be known (sacca) and the Truths that are known through the development of vipassana ~naa.na (kicca), and then there will be the fruit, kata ~naa.na according to the level that has been reached. Would you perhaps have time to also look at the Thai Co. I mentioned? It makes sense to me that she deals with these three in such a dynamic way, because they are not static, not abstract texbook terms. I still have on my computer your q. about pakatupanissaya p. from before I went to India, but I think Sarah answered these? Then I want to know whether your hand got cured completely? Can you type without pain? Thank you again for the texts, Nina. 10234 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Fri Dec 21, 2001 10:11am Subject: Concept Hi Purnomo. Nice to hear from you again. You explained in a very concise way the difference between concept and paramattha, in a way understandanble to everybody. I like the way you formulated this, best wishes, Nina. 10235 From: Date: Fri Dec 21, 2001 10:17am Subject: A Cautionary Note: The Conventional Nature of Cittas and Processes Hi, all - I expect that some of you may find the title of this post to be somewhat displeasing. If so, you have my apologies. Let me explain what I mean. The Abhidhamma, itself, views a stream of consciousness as continuous in the sense of being unbroken, without gaps. But that stream is analyzed into processes, and the processes into cittas. As I see it, that parsing of experience into processes and cittas, while not ungrounded, is still conventional. As I understand it, a boundary between processes occurs on the occasion of one arammana being replaced by another - a cessation and an origination. Within a process, a boundary between cittas occurs on the occasion of a cetasika ceasing and/or a new cetasika originating. This sort of conceptual parsing is well grounded inasmuch as differences among arammanas are discernable as are differences among cetasikas. There is no mistaking hardness with warmth or feeling with volition, for example. But what differences are considered significant is a matter of convention. I see the parsing of experience into processes, and of those into cittas, as not different in kind, for example, from our isolating certain groups of experiences called 'tables' from out of the entire range of experience. One could imagine [and this idea is not original with me - I read it somewhere, but have embellished it a bit] a person from some remote tropical island coming upon a table for the first time and thinking how odd it is that four perfectly useful wooden sticks (or, as his people would call them, "coconut smashers") should have been attached to a perfectly serviceable "hut floor". Now, don't get me wrong. The concepts of processes and cittas *seem* to be quite well grounded ones (as does the concept of table), but, nonetheless, they are conventions, and there is as much danger in reifying them as there is in reifying tables, mountains,and persons. Perhaps there is even more danger, because for the mass of worldings these concepts are *mere* concept, not being a part of our conscious experience. After all, how many of us can "see" cessations or originations of cetasikas and arammanas? With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 10236 From: Kenneth Ong Date: Fri Dec 21, 2001 5:45pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein Hi Kom, What you have done is describing what is patisandhi citta and I believe has not answered my question. If we based on the commentary as excerpt below to describe bhavanga citta as exceeding pure bc it experience no sense object, then I would said that the first citta of our life continual will also be exceeding pure bc it also does not experience any sense object. My hunch is that the commentaries explanation on exceeding pure just bc it experiences no sense object is not satisfactory. Then this would infer that Nibbana will also be exceeding pure since it also experience no sense object. It will then equate Nibbana to luminious mind. Kind regards Ken O --- tikmok wrote: > Dear Ken O, > > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Kenneth Ong wrote: > > Hi Kom > > > > > The "Atthasåliní" (Expositor I, Book I, Part IV, Ch II, 140) > > > states: "Mind also is said to be `clear' in the sense of > > > `exceedingly pure' with reference to the bhavanga-citta." > > > The citta is pure only at the moment it does not experience > > > an object through the doors of eyes, ears, nose, tongue, > > > bodysense or mind. > > > > On this basis, could we say that the patisandhi citta also exceeding > pure= > > > since to me it also does not experience any sense object. > > There are 19 possible types of citta that are said to perform patisandhi > > function. For the entire life of a being, the patisanthi, the bhavanga, > an= > d > the cutti citta are of the same type. In a single life-time, the > co-arisi= > ng > cetasikas and the object (aramana) of patisandhi, bhavanga, and cuti > citta = > > are "identical", although each citta performs a different function. > > kom 10237 From: Date: Fri Dec 21, 2001 2:00pm Subject: Re: [dsg] A Cautionary Note: The Conventional Nature of Cittas and Processes Hi Howard, > Now, don't get me wrong. The concepts of processes and cittas *seem* > to be quite well grounded ones (as does the concept of table), but, > nonetheless, they are conventions, and there is as much danger in reifying > them as there is in reifying tables, mountains,and persons. Perhaps there > is > even more danger, because for the mass of worldings these concepts are > *mere* > concept, not being a part of our conscious experience. I really appreciate your input here. I completely agree with your point. May I add that the same apply to suttanta/vinaya pitaka, the budhism as a whole or even to sciences, medicine and into daily life. Concept (pannatti) is concept, reality is reality. Reminded me of Kom and Nina's posts about pitfall. There is an analogy in suttanta pitaka, sangyutta-nikaya, tayana-sutta, the Buddha said to an luminous god regarding a bhikkhu who enters into a monkshood but does not practice any good and do bad things, like a man grasping a ka-grass-leaf (a kind of grass with a sharp edge leaf), if he not holds the grass-leaf firmly enough. The leaf will make a painful cut on his hand. So good thing can turn into double-edge sword if we do not hold it firmly or correctly. Num 10238 From: Date: Fri Dec 21, 2001 2:10pm Subject: Re: [dsg] A Cautionary Note: The Conventional Nature of Cittas and Processes Hi, Num - In a message dated 12/21/01 10:02:55 PM Eastern Standard Time, srnsk@a... writes: > > Hi Howard, > > > Now, don't get me wrong. The concepts of processes and cittas *seem* > > to be quite well grounded ones (as does the concept of table), but, > > nonetheless, they are conventions, and there is as much danger in > reifying > > them as there is in reifying tables, mountains,and persons. Perhaps there > > > is > > even more danger, because for the mass of worldings these concepts are > > *mere* > > concept, not being a part of our conscious experience. > > I really appreciate your input here. I completely agree with your point. > May > I add that the same apply to suttanta/vinaya pitaka, the budhism as a whole > > or even to sciences, medicine and into daily life. Concept (pannatti) is > > concept, reality is reality. > > Reminded me of Kom and Nina's posts about pitfall. There is an analogy in > suttanta pitaka, sangyutta-nikaya, tayana-sutta, the Buddha said to an > luminous god regarding a bhikkhu who enters into a monkshood but does not > practice any good and do bad things, like a man grasping a ka-grass-leaf (a > > kind of grass with a sharp edge leaf), if he not holds the grass-leaf > firmly > enough. The leaf will make a painful cut on his hand. So good thing can > turn > into double-edge sword if we do not hold it firmly or correctly. ------------------------------------------------------------------- Howard: Mmm! Great simile. It reminds me of the simile of holding a snake to get its venom. If it is held properly, right below the head, you can get the snake's venom, but held wrongly, by the tail, the snake will get the person instead! ------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > > Num > ================================ With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 10239 From: Sarah Date: Sat Dec 22, 2001 0:58am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Sarah Dear Suan and Ken O, Thanks for your kind note, Suan, and for your good questions, Ken O. Suan, I'm sure it is a lot of work to translate just a few short extracts from the commentaries. it may be helpful to be reminded that Nina (and Jim) worked quite hard on these same Ang Nik suttas and commentary notes which I think you both may find it interesting to review at: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/message/8386 commentary notes translation http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/message/8408 sutta translation Suan, I'll look forward to your next set of Parinibbana sub-com notes (3) and your analysis. Ken O, you may wish to quote back some of Nina's translation with further comments in the meantime for Nina or Kom or myself. Sarah .......................................................................................................... --- abhidhammika wrote: > > > > Dear Sarah (and Kom) > > How are you? Thank you for raising the issues of the luminous mind. > As both Robert Epstein and Howard used this beautiful statement of > Gotama the Buddha when they introduced the concept of an underlying > being (Robert) or 'a consciousness without objects'(Howard) remaining > after the Parinibbaana of an Arahant in response to Parinibbana > Subcommentary (Part Two), I will have to deal with this statement of > the Buddha when I write my next Parinibbaana Subcommentary (Part > Three). > > As your posts and Kom's post addressed this issue in advance, you > have taken off some of my burdens. > 10240 From: Sarah Date: Sat Dec 22, 2001 1:51am Subject: Re: [dsg] Luminous mind Dear Ken O, --- Kenneth Ong wrote: > Hi Sarah, > "Luminous, monks, is the mind. And it is freed from incoming defilements. > The well-instructed disciple of the noble ones discerns that as it > actually is present, which is why I tell you that -- for the > well-instructed disciple of the noble ones -- there is development of the > mind." > > We are saying that there is development of the mind, developing using > bhavanga cittas on the basis that you are saying that these > well-instructed disciple are highly developed ones then the theory that it > is bhavanga citta could still stand on its ground. Bc bhavanga cittas > could be discern with highly developed disciples which I strongly believe > that all cittas could be discern. ..... Sometimes when we read the texts it seems that all realities should be known. However, we should remember we are reading about the Buddha’s extraordinary understanding. Can we expect ‘all cittas’ could be discerned? (Btw, Howard uses discern in the sense of ‘cognizing’ i.e. what each citta does regardless of whether there is any wisdom accompanying it. You seem to use it in the sense of ‘being known’ or ‘understood’....you may like to compare notes with him;-)) You’ll see in the following extract from the com notes I just gave a link for, that the defilements arise in the javana process in a later sense door or mind door process. Any understanding also arises in these javana processes only, to know any reality. This is what is meant development of the mind. It is not referring to understanding bhavanga cittas specifically, but we need to know there are these cittas in between other doorways. ********************* idampi nirupakkilesataaya parisuddhanti pabhassara.m. ta~nca khoti ta.m bhava"ngacitta.m. N: It is also pure, because it is unsoiled (by defilements); thus luminous. That indeed, meaning, that life-continuum. aagantukehiiti asahajaatehi pacchaa javanakkha.ne uppajjanakehi. N: ? by oncoming ?(defilements). by those that are not conascent with it, but arise later at the moment of impulsion (javana). upakkilesehiiti raagaadiihi upakkili.t.thattaa upakkili.t.tha.m naamaati vuccati. N: ?by defilements. By being soiled by desire etc. it is indeed called defiled. ******************** > A bit off track to the Mahayana traditions. Luminous mind is more common > in Mahayana rather than the Thervada. Thervada is more cautious of this > approach due to the subtle implication of a permanent self. ..... In Theravada, there is no underlying awareness or luminosity and nibbana is that reality which is experienced by lokuttara cittas only. Before those moments it is not experienced in any way. ..... > Furthermore, in Abhidhamma, I do not think there is an explanation how > does bhavanga cittas actually work (except as life continual), its objects > (a mystery) and how it is being defiled by the six senses. It simply says > that it is being defiled (or impinge or disturb), is there any > commentaries on the intracies on how it being defiled. The actual details > will be very helpful. Maybe as a Christmas gift to me. (I sound greedy > :)) ..... As we won’t be seeing you, that’s OK;-)) I’ll adda couple of links. Kom and Num are also very clued up on the details. As Suan suggested, it helps a lot to understand some abhidhamma when reading the Suttas and commentaries. All the details are there, for sure. Let me suggest you read up on the processes and javana cittas from: 1. Useful Posts - processes http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/files/Useful_Posts > 2. Abhidhamma in Daily Life, ch 12 (Bhavanga), 13 (Sense-door and Mind-door processes), 14 (Javana) http://www.abhidhamma.org/ Meanwhile I’ll go off for a hike and look in on my return. As I’ve said before, you’re a natural ‘abhidhammist’ or ‘abhidhammika’ - I really appreciate your keen interest, intelligent questions and good humour too;-). Sarah p.s. I apologise for just taking out a few parts from your post ........................................................................................... 10241 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Sat Dec 22, 2001 2:00am Subject: Re: [dsg] Ultimate realities (and khandhas) Rob Ep --- Robert Epstein wrote: > Dear Jon, > Thank you very much for helping to clarify some of these terms and how > they fit > together. The idea that dhammas include namas and rupas, and that > cittas and > Nibbana are also included, is very helpful. > > Now here is where I got confused: if dhammas are the 'ultimate > realities' I > derived from this that they were 'real', meaning that they had a status > as > 'entities'. This is obviously not what is meant by 'real' at all. Indeed not (and as you know, terms used in the teachings rarely carry their convnetional meanings). We need to find out *in what sense* dhammas are said to be 'realities' -- what is the distinguishing characteristic of a reality (especially vis-à-vis a concept)? > I now take it that what is meant by 'real' and 'ultimate' is merely > that: Your summary that follows is pretty much on track, but I have suggested one or two minor refinements (my version in inverted commas)-- > a/ they are being discerned as they actually are, in their fleeting, > momentary > occurence as an aspect of physical or mental reality, ie, rupas or > namas. "a/ They are *capable of* being discerned (by panna) for what they actually are, namely (going from the general to the particular) - as a nama or a rupa, - as having their own distinctive characteristic or nature (sabhava -- i.e., that which distinguishes, say, visible object from sound), and - as having the 3 universal characteristics (anicca, dukkha, anatta)." > b/ they are irreducible to anything other or smaller. No combined or > aggregate > arisings, such as the complex concept of an object existing > independently, would > be considered real or ultimate. "b/ They are ‘ultimate’ in the sense that they are the final, irreducible components of existence. Conventional 'objects' are in fact an aggregation of different rupa-dhammas or, in the case of objects that are people and creatures, nama-dhammas and rupa-dhammas." > And so in a sense by saying they are 'real', one is saying that they are > 'not > real' in the conventional sense, but only momentary and fleeting, not > lasting > beyond the moment. In this sense they are accurately seen as what they > are in the > moment without any conceptual attributions of entity, lasting quality or > satisfaction arising with them, and then they would be seen correctly. "By saying they are 'real', one is not saying that they are 'real' in the conventional sense because, although having their own characteristic, they are only momentary and fleeting, not lasting beyond the moment. However, only developed panna can see dhammas accurately as what they are in the moment, as not having any inherent attributions of entity, lasting quality or satisfaction." > Thanks again, and I think I may be starting to get the concept as it is > described. Yes, it is useful to try to understand things as they are described or explained in the teachings. (It doesn't mean one has to accept that description or explanation.) Jon 10242 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Sat Dec 22, 2001 2:03am Subject: Re: [dsg] 'Self' as object of discernment (and khandhas) Rob Ep --- Robert Epstein wrote: > Thanks, Jon. > Can you please explain to me within the scheme described below, > what exactly is a concept, and where is it classified? > > And why is it not a dhamma? > It would seem to me that a thought, image, idea or concept would also > have a > particular content that would identify it. Again, you are right on track when you say... > If I imagine or think of a rupa, is > that considered completely different than actually mentally apprehending > one at the moment of seeing? Is this the distinction? At the moment that consciousness experiences a rupa (hardness, sound etc), the rupa is directly experienced, while at a later moment of thinking about the sound the actual rupa is not available to be experienced. This analysis is useful to know about because, even without us having to consciously think about it, this sort of thing is going on all the time. Every moment of actual sense-door experience is a condition for a whole lot of thinking about the rupa that has just been experienced. For example, if the rupa that represents the sound of a person's voice is experienced, it is only by 'thinking' about that rupa that we can attribute meaning to the words and significance to the tone of speech etc. Comparing the 2 kinds of moments-- - at the moment of actual hearing, the object of consciousness/citta is the *rupa that is sound* (a dhamma) - at the subsequent moments of thinking about the sound that was heard, the object of consciousness/citta is *a thought about the sound that had been heard* (and this is not a dhamma). At both moments there is citta/consciousness (a reality) experiencing an object. In the former case the object of the citta (sound) is a reality while in the latter case the object of the citta (thought about sound) is not a reality. Jon 10243 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Sat Dec 22, 2001 2:06am Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts) Victor --- Victor Yu wrote: > Hello Jon, > > Thank you. Whether it is hard to realize or not, conditioned phenomenon > such as consciousness or perception is impermanent, is > unsatisfactory/dukkha, is to be seen as it actually is with right > discernment thus: "This is not mine. This I am not. This is not my > self." Yes, I wouldn't argue with what you say. But we need to know *how* this 'right discernment' is to be developed. Any suggestions? Jon 10244 From: Anders Honore Date: Sat Dec 22, 2001 2:14am Subject: Back again... Hi everybody. Remember me? Anyway, now that the Christmas holidays have come, I've got some extra time on my hands, and why not spend it here again? Regards Anders Honore 10245 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Sat Dec 22, 2001 2:16am Subject: Re: [dsg] Ultimate realities (and khandhas) Howard --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Jon - > > In a message dated 12/15/01 2:50:58 AM Eastern Standard Time, > jonoabb@y... writes: > > > > Rupas are not the same as physical objects. ‘Physical objects’ > are not > > dhammas in any sense, but are the terms in which we think about > particular > > agglomerations of rupas. > > > ============================= > I think this is an important matter. "Physical objects" are the > imagined external entities that are referenced by those mental > constructs, > conglomerations of rupas, which *I* mean by concepts. The physical > objects > have only conventional existence, though they are based on genuine > observation of rupas and relations among rupas. Imagined external > entities, > of course, can not be directly examined, by wisdom or anything else. I am with you so far, Howard. > However, > those *thoughts* which I call concepts, *are* directly observable. It depends what you man by 'directly observable'. A thought is of course the (sole) object of the moment of consciousness that 'thinks' the thought, and is in that sense 'observed' by the citta. And of course there are mental factors (such as strong attachment or aversion, perhaps) accompanying that moment of consciousness, so there is plenty of 'reality' going on at the time. 'Observableness' in this sense is not the distinguishing criterion of a dhamma. The distinguishing characteristic mentioned by the texts is that of having an individual essence that is capable of being directly experienced by sati/panna. Mere observableness, in the sense of being the object of citta, is common to both dhammas and concepts. > It seems > to me that you (and Nina and Khun Sujin) use the term 'concept' to refer > to > the *referents* of constructed thought, whereas I use the term 'concept' > to > refer to the thought, itself, something which I think *does* fall under > the > 4th foundation of mindfulness. Well, I think all of us are using the term 'concept' to refer to the thought itself (as opposed the consciousness that 'thinks' the thought), but I'm not sure why you say it falls under the 4th foundation of mindfulness. Is there a particular passage in the Satipatthana Sutta you have in mind? As I understand the texts -- - the moment of consciousness that has as its object a thought is real (a dhamma) - the thought itself, however, is a mere mental construct lacking any individual characteristic capable of being experienced, and is not a dhamma. I think the passage from CMA* pasted below is useful. Jon *'CMA' = Bhikkhu Bodhi, 'A Comprehensive Manual of Abhidhamma' (BPS) The Abhidhammattha Sangaha of Acariya Anuruddha, with explanatory guide (The explanatory guide is compiled from, but is not a direct translation of, the main commentaries to the A-S) Guide to Ch I, #2 According to the Abhidhamma philosophy, there are 2 kinds of realities—the conventional (sammuti) and the ultimate (paramattha). Conventional realities are the referents of ordinary conceptual thought (pannatti) and conventional modes of expression (vohaara). They include such entities as living beings, men, women, animals, and the apparently stable persisting objects that constitute our unanalyzed picture of the world. The Abhidhamma philosophy maintains that these notions do not possess ultimate validity, for the objects which they signify [ie. the living beings, men, women, animals etc] do not exist in their own right as irreducible realities. Their mode of being is conceptual, not actual. They are products of mental construction (parikappanaa), not realities existing by reason of their own nature. Ultimate realities, in contrast, are things that exist by reason of their own extrinsic nature (sabhaava). These are the dhammas: the final, irreducible components of existence, the ultimate entities which result from a correctly performed analysis of experience. Hence the word ‘paramattha’ is applied to them, which is derived from ‘parama’ = ultimate, highest, final, and ‘attha’ = reality, thing. Ultimate realities are not only the ultimate existents, but are also the ultimate objects of right knowledge. As one extracts oil from sesame seed, so one can extract the ultimate realities from the conventional realities. Concepts do not possess ultimacy. It is the objective actualities that lie behind our conceptual constructs – the dhammas – that form the ultimate realities of the Abhidhamma. Ultimate realities are so subtle and profound that an ordinary person cannot see them. His mind is obscured by concepts. Only by means of wise attention to things (yoniso manasikara) can one see beyond the concepts. Thus ‘paramattha’ is described as that which belongs to the domain of ultimate or supreme knowledge. 10246 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Sat Dec 22, 2001 2:33am Subject: Re: [dsg] Eightfold Path (esp. right view) Mike --- "m. nease" wrote: > Jon, > > Thanks for this great excerpt--hope you'll add it to > the files. Where you write: > > --- jonoabb wrote: > > > Finally, whereas the role of wisdom in the mundane > > jhanas is > > subordinate to that of concentration, in the > > supramundane > > jhanas wisdom and concentration are well balanced, > > with > > concentration fixing the mind on the unconditioned > > element and > > wisdom fathoming the deep significance of the Four > > Noble > > Truths. [5.4] > > > > [Jon's notes:] > > > 5.4. The primary attribute of a moment of jhana > > citta is the > > degree of concentration on the object at that > > moment, whereas > > the attribute of a moment of magga citta is the > > wisdom that > > pierces the Truths. > > Do you mean, "The primary attribute of a moment of > [mundane] jhana citta is the degree of concentration > on the object at that moment, whereas the attribute > of a moment of magga citta is the wisdom that pierces > the Truths [in balance with concentration (as well as > the other path-factors)]? Or have I missed or > misunderstood something here? No, your version is spot on. Thanks for the elucidation. Jon PS How're the travels going? 10247 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Sat Dec 22, 2001 2:37am Subject: Re: [dsg] Eightfold Path (esp. right effort) Rob Ep --- Robert Epstein wrote: > > > > 2/ How does mundane Right View/Understanding lay the groundwork for > the > > > Supramundane Path Factors to arise. > > > > Every moment of mundane Right View (i.e. panna of the level of > > satipatthana) is accompanied by other mundane factors of the Eightfold > > Path. These mundane path factors are accumulated and grow in > strength. > > This is how, on my reading of the teachings, the conditions for > > supramundane consciousness are developed. > > > > Jon > > So a single citta can accumulate and pass on any path factors that it > has > experienced? And they, in accumulation, lead to the arising of the > others? As I understand it, Rob, all mental factors (cetasikas) are accumulated and passed from one citta to the next. The accumulation of an individual factor in this manner is one of the conditions for its arising again in the future. Jon 10248 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Sat Dec 22, 2001 2:41am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The Two Truths (for Howard) Rob Ep --- Robert Epstein wrote: > > > The root cause of our problems is not our wrong conceptual grasp of > > things, but our incorrect understanding of realities. > > > > Jon > > Can I take it that this last sentence could be finished: "...our > incorrect > understanding of realities as they arise.' ? Yes, it is the development of the correct understanding of realities as they arise that leads to magga citta, so it must be the incorrect understanding of those same realities that is at the root of the problem. This I think neatly states the situation in its ultimate sense. ;-)) ;-)) However, wrong understanding about realities that has been accumulated (stored up) can manifest, for example, at moments of thinking when there is no reality as object of the consciousness. So in more conventional terms we do talk about a general incorrect understanding of realities (= wrong view). Jon 10249 From: Sarah Date: Sat Dec 22, 2001 2:41am Subject: Re: [dsg] Memory, Objects, and Continuity Dear Mike, Hope you had a good trip up north. --- "m. nease" wrote: > Dear Sarah and Howard, > > Thanks for this great quotation. What is > 'Nyanaponika's little book on Abhidhamma' exactly? 'Abhidhamma Studies'..an inexpensive book avialable from BPS or Wisdom books >>.Finally, the individual > > contributions of all those different perceptual > > processes have to be remembered > > and coordinated in order to form the final and > > complete perception of a rose.” > > Am I right in thinking that, by 'perception' (here), > he means concept? I didn't answer before because I think it's a little clear. sometimes perception or perceptual seems to refer to sanna and sometimes to concept as you suggest. Anway, the gist was that there are many, many cittas accompanied by sanna marking their objects (visible object through the eye door and then many concepts through the mind-door) before the idea or concept of rose is thought about. > Ven. Buddhadhatta defines aaramma.na as 'a > sense-object.' I'm not sure if it's 'abhidammically' > important (whether a citta can take more than one > aaramma.na ); provisionally I sidestep the issue by > thinking of it just as the object taken by a citta. As I wrote earlier to Howard, arammana can be concept or reality. sometimes sense-object just refers to objects appearing through the 5 sense-doors in which case this meaning would be too limited. If it applies to mind-door objects as well (talking about 6 sense-doors as the texts often do), that's fine. The problem with thinking there can be more than one object at a time is that then we tend to have the idea of being able to see and hear or see and think or think of many concepts at the same time. This kind of (wrong) thinking makes it very difficult for sati to arise, I think. > Actually, the more I understand (I think) about these > cetasikas, the more sense the way I've always viewed > memory seems to make, subjectively, intuitively, > logically and by way of the various expressions in the > Dhammavinaya. Otherwise I think I'd have lost > interest in abhidhamma long ago... Good, tell us more;-) See you soon for some live discussion I hope. Sarah 10250 From: Sarah Date: Sat Dec 22, 2001 2:15am Subject: jhanas for Herman Dear Herman, --- egberdina wrote: > Dear Sarah, > > Is it a property of all dinosaurs that they avoid / reject jhana > approach to insight? It’s a little difficult for me to answer for all dinosaurs, but most the ones I know well, read and understand that there are examples in the texts of those realizing nibbana after having attained the highest jhanas and the ‘dry-insight workders’ who have not attained these highest jhanas. Individual accumulations are very complicated and therefore even amongst those that have attained jhanas, there are many, many ‘varieties’ and levels and ways that nibbana is realized and whether jhanas are ‘used’ at the time of enlightenment. It’s a complicated area. Rob K and Teng Kee have researched it far more and may add details. I think most dinosaurs would say there is no rule in this regard, but I know it’s another controversial area. >Rejecting an idea because it may be construed as > having some notion of self in it sounds like control to me. I think the reason that the texts make it clear that it is not an essentail pre-requisite for the development of insight is because this is what the Buddha taught. Do you understand differently? >As long > as we remember that it is cittas that think self , and not self that > thinks cittas, we should be right :-) I like this quote and reminder and may save it for future use, thanks:-) > Hope you are getting some time of over the silly season :-) Today was the first Saturday since the beginning of September that I didn’t have to teach. Bliss! So I dragged Jon away from his dusty legal tomes in his office and we went for a beautiful 3hr hike in the hills. This is the best time of year in Hong Kong - clear sunny, cool days and a chance to put on boots and gloves for a few days. We have his mother visiting from Adelaide next week and then Bkk for the weekend. Hope you and entourage have a good holiday season and hope you’re not melting like Azita;-) Sarah ................................................................................................. 10251 From: egberdina Date: Sat Dec 22, 2001 2:45am Subject: Re: [dsg] Ultimate realities (and khandhas) Jon, I am wondering if the quality of ultimate realities are subjective ie specific to each self. The colour blind person will see whatever they see, it is irreducible, it is colour, which is not capable of being described in other terms, not capable of being sensed through another door, unless you use LSD. Likewise, the non-colour blind person will see specific colour, looking at the same object as the colour blind person. Yet the colour experience will be different. In this way there is nothing absolute or ultimate about seeing the object as it really is, unless ultimate or absolute has relative connotations. So two arahants, sitting in a VW at the traffic lights, one colour blind, one not colour blind, will see two different realities as the lights change. I wonder which one will write the preferred commentaries? ( :-) ) All the best Herman --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Jonothan Abbott wrote: > Rob Ep > > --- Robert Epstein wrote: > Dear Jon, > > Thank you very much for helping to clarify some of these terms and how > > they fit > > together. The idea that dhammas include namas and rupas, and that > > cittas and > > Nibbana are also included, is very helpful. > > > > Now here is where I got confused: if dhammas are the 'ultimate > > realities' I > > derived from this that they were 'real', meaning that they had a status > > as > > 'entities'. This is obviously not what is meant by 'real' at all. > > Indeed not (and as you know, terms used in the teachings rarely carry > their convnetional meanings). We need to find out *in what sense* dhammas > are said to be 'realities' -- what is the distinguishing characteristic of > a reality (especially vis-à-vis a concept)? > > > I now take it that what is meant by 'real' and 'ultimate' is merely > > that: > > Your summary that follows is pretty much on track, but I have suggested > one or two minor refinements (my version in inverted commas)-- > > > a/ they are being discerned as they actually are, in their fleeting, > > momentary > > occurence as an aspect of physical or mental reality, ie, rupas or > > namas. > > "a/ They are *capable of* being discerned (by panna) for what they > actually are, namely (going from the general to the particular) > - as a nama or a rupa, > - as having their own distinctive characteristic or nature (sabhava -- > i.e., that which distinguishes, say, visible object from sound), and > - as having the 3 universal characteristics (anicca, dukkha, anatta)." > > > b/ they are irreducible to anything other or smaller. No combined or > > aggregate > > arisings, such as the complex concept of an object existing > > independently, would > > be considered real or ultimate. > > "b/ They are `ultimate' in the sense that they are the final, irreducible > components of existence. Conventional 'objects' are in fact an > aggregation of different rupa-dhammas or, in the case of objects that are > people and creatures, nama-dhammas and rupa-dhammas." > > > And so in a sense by saying they are 'real', one is saying that they are > > 'not > > real' in the conventional sense, but only momentary and fleeting, not > > lasting > > beyond the moment. In this sense they are accurately seen as what they > > are in the > > moment without any conceptual attributions of entity, lasting quality or > > satisfaction arising with them, and then they would be seen correctly. > > "By saying they are 'real', one is not saying that they are 'real' in the > conventional sense because, although having their own characteristic, they > are only momentary and fleeting, not lasting beyond the moment. However, > only developed panna can see dhammas accurately as what they are in the > moment, as not having any inherent attributions of entity, lasting quality > or satisfaction." > > > Thanks again, and I think I may be starting to get the concept as it is > > described. > > Yes, it is useful to try to understand things as they are described or > explained in the teachings. (It doesn't mean one has to accept that > description or explanation.) > > Jon 10252 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Sat Dec 22, 2001 2:45am Subject: Re: [dsg] FW: three rounds Nina --- Nina van Gorkom wrote: > >Dear Jonothan, I was so happy with your post here. This refers to > what > I wrote before to you about A. Sujin stressing very much in India (and > before): sacca ~naa.na, firm foundation knowledge of the truth that has > to > be realized, kicca ~naa.na, the task that is development, kata ~naa.na, > the > fruit that becomes apparent, but many degrees of these three. > I want to write about it in my India impressions but this subject is > very > difficult, so I am waiting for more details when you are in Bgk. It is > wonderful Jaran will be there too, he studies commentaries in Thai. I > give > you the location in the Thai co : Co to Dhammacakkaa pavattana sutta, > Mahåvagga, in Thai part 2, p. 426: I got stuck where it states about the > 12 > aspects, three rounds for four Truths. > I like your stressing that we should first have a proper understanding > of > what the Path is. > Nina. Thanks for this further reference. I will certainly try to pursue this while we are in Bangkok (can't guarantee the outcome, though!). It is something I've never managed to 'get'. Jon 10253 From: Sarah Date: Sat Dec 22, 2001 2:47am Subject: RE: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein Dear Ken O, last one;-) --- Kenneth Ong wrote: > Hi Sarah, > > Franking speaking by posting this passage it developed more confusion. Yes, it is a little difficult which is why I didn't post it all the first time I think. > > ********** > > Qs of K.Milinda, 1V,8,36, Max Muller’s transl: > > > > ‘Ven Nagasena, when a man dreams a dream, is he awake or asleep?’ > > ‘Neither the one, O king, nor yet the other. > > k: To me, this statement will imply that when a man dreams he is neither > sleeping or awake. That's right.... no sense-door activity (as I mentioned to Frank before), but mind-door activity and thinking of concepts. > >But when his sleep has become light, and he is not yet fully conscious, > in that interval it is that dreams are dreamt. When a man is in deep > sleep, O king, his mind has returned home (has entered again into > Bhavanga), and a mind thus shut in does not act, and a mind hindered in > its action knows not the evil and the good, and he who knows > > not has no dreams. It is when the mind is active that dreams are dreamt. > > > Just, O king, as in the darkness and gloom, where no light is, no shadow > will fall even on the most burnished mirror, so when a man is in deep > sleep his mind has returned into itself, and a mind shut in does not act, > and a mind inactive knows not the evil and the good, and he who knows not > does not dream. For it is when the mind is active that dreams are dreamt. > As the miror, O king, > > are > > you to regard the body, as the darkness sleep, as the light the mind.’ > > > k: Returned home? Return to itself? - sounds like bhavanga citta a > permanent dwelling for the mind. Subtely it would imply a permanent self. No....just changing cittas (remember yr abhidhamma?)....it just means the mind is not active anymore...no more concepts and so on, no dreams, no kilesa. Nothing permanent at all. Just one citta and then another. Sarah 10254 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Sat Dec 22, 2001 2:47am Subject: Re: [dsg] FW: three rounds Thanks, Num. This will be useful info to base our discussion on. Jon --- srnsk@a... wrote: > Hi Nina and Jon, > > > I don't know this will be any helpful to you or not. From my Thai > Abhidhammattha-sagaha, those 3 ~nana were mentioned under anul~om~nana. > I am > going to change into a parrot, OK. > > --------------------------- > > Anul~om~nana is a pa~n~na that acknowledge that one have to give > in/follow > ariyasacca, so one can be detached. Ariyasacca is dukkhasacca, > samutayasacca, > nirodhasacca and maggasacca. > > > Sacca~nana is pa~n~na which knows clearly that dukkha is nama and rupa > which > are lokiya. Samutaya is tanha, nirodha is nibbana and magga is 8 > ariya-magga. > Knowledge at this level is knowing according to the truth:sacca~nana. > > Kicca~nana is pa~n~na which knows clearly that dukkha should be known, > samutaya should be let go, nirodha should be enlighten and magga should > be > developed. Knowledge at this level is knowing according to > responsiblity:kicca~nana. > > Kata~nana is pa~n~na which knows clearly that dukkha which should be > known, > is known. Samutaya which should be let go, is let go. Nirodha which > should > be enlighten, is enlighten and all 8 magga which should be developed, is > > developed. Knowledge at this level is knowing according to what has been > > done:kata~nana. > > > Sacca~nana and kicca~nana is ~nana in lokiya level. Kata~nana is > lokuttara~nana. The two lokiya~nanas have been already perfected in > sakarupekka~nana. So ano~loma~nana is named pa~n~na which knows clearly > in > following through, through ariyasacca. Then nibbana will be an arammana > in > next ~nana, kotarabhu~nana. > > ----------------------------- > > Hope further information from other sources will help more. > > > Num 10255 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Sat Dec 22, 2001 2:52am Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts) Victor --- Victor Yu wrote: > Hello Robert, Howard, and all, > > If the Buddha used two kinds of speeches, conventional and > non-conventional, > I would be interested in knowing some examples of non-conventional > speech > that the Buddha used. There is a useful entry in Buddhist Dictionary under 'paramattha' that discusses this question. I paste it below (in edited form). Jon 'Paramattha' .. .. .. "The Buddha, in explaining his doctrine, sometimes used conventional language and sometimes the philosophical mode of expression which is in accordance whith undeluded insight into reality. ... Thus, whenever the suttas speak of man, woman or person, or of the rebirth of a being, this must not be taken as being valid in the ultimate sense, but as a mere conventional mode of speech (vohára-vacana). "It is one of the main characteristics of the Abhidhamma Pitaka, in distinction from most of the Sutta Pitaka, that it does not employ conventional language, but deals only with ultimates, or realities in the highest sense (paramattha-dhammá). "But also in the Sutta Pitaka there are many expositions in terms of ultimate language (paramattha-desaná), namely, wherever these texts deal with the groups (khandha), elements (dhátu) or sense-bases (áyatana), and their components; and wherever the 3 characteristics (ti-lakkhana, q.v.) are applied. The majority of Sutta texts, however, use the conventional language, as appropriate in a practical or ethical context, because it "would not be right to say that 'the groups' (khandha) feel shame, etc." "It should be noted, however, that also statements of the Buddha couched in conventional language, are called 'truth' (vohára-sacca), being correct on their own level, which does not contradict the fact that such statements ultimately refer to impermanent and impersonal processes." 10256 From: Sarah Date: Sat Dec 22, 2001 2:54am Subject: Re: [dsg] Back again... Hi Anders, Really great to see you back....;-))) --- Anders Honore wrote: > Hi everybody. Remember me? The name rings a bell, I think... > Anyway, now that the Christmas holidays have come, I've got some extra time > on my hands, and why not spend it here > again? Exactly so, no better place to spend them. You'll find most the same old faces around and many of the same old themes.....;-)) Hope you got through all your study assignments with flying colours and look forward to reading your always challenging and enjoyable posts here. You must be pretty snow-bound in Denmark now, right? Sarah ............................................................................................ 10257 From: egberdina Date: Sat Dec 22, 2001 3:12am Subject: Re: jhanas for Herman Dear Sarah, The way I read the Tipitaka is that the Buddha and all of his monks dwelt in the jhanas day in day out, every opportunity they got. I find it strange that there is subtle discouragement to do as the Buddha did. I doubt whether jhana can be researched other than by doing it. Or is that what you meant? ( no intention to cast aspersions on Rob K or Teng Kee here, either way) It is "bloody hot" at present. Air-con is great , especially if you own shares in an electricity company as well. All the best Herman --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Sarah wrote: > Dear Herman, > > --- egberdina wrote: > Dear Sarah, > > > > Is it a property of all dinosaurs that they avoid / reject jhana > > approach to insight? > > It's a little difficult for me to answer for all dinosaurs, but most the ones I > know well, read and understand that there are examples in the texts of those > realizing nibbana after having attained the highest jhanas and the `dry-insight > workders' who have not attained these highest jhanas. Individual accumulations > are very complicated and therefore even amongst those that have attained > jhanas, there are many, many `varieties' and levels and ways that nibbana is > realized and whether jhanas are `used' at the time of enlightenment. It's a > complicated area. Rob K and Teng Kee have researched it far more and may add > details. I think most dinosaurs would say there is no rule in this regard, but > I know it's another controversial area. > > >Rejecting an idea because it may be construed as > > having some notion of self in it sounds like control to me. > > I think the reason that the texts make it clear that it is not an essentail > pre-requisite for the development of insight is because this is what the Buddha > taught. Do you understand differently? > > > Hope you and entourage have a good holiday season and hope you're not melting > like Azita;-) > > Sarah 10258 From: egberdina Date: Sat Dec 22, 2001 3:49am Subject: Clinical Death / Rebirth Hi all, Medical and legal opinions vary enormously as to what constitutes death. The lack of measurable heart beat and brain activity are not decisive indications of cessation of life. The body stays warm for a long time after heart beat has stopped. Cellular death is not complete for days. Gruesome finds at cemetries have indicated that people not yet quite dead have been interred (scratch marks on the inside of the coffin). Yet the Abhidhamma posits a precise moment of death. It is the last thought that characterises death. Unless it is the last thought, you're not dead. (this sounds like a conceptual definition). Given that there is no sense door or mind door activity when the brain stops functioning, I presume that it is always the same object held by the life-continuum citta when initiating any new life and ending any old life. Perhaps nibbana? Herman 10259 From: abhidhammika Date: Sat Dec 22, 2001 7:10am Subject: Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Sarah And Nina Dear Sarah And Nina (and Jim) How are you? Thank you, Sarah, for providing me with previous posts with Nina's translations. It is always helpful to consult the results of the hard works of dhamma friends like Nina and Jim. With best wishes to you all, Suan --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Sarah wrote: > Dear Suan and Ken O, > > Thanks for your kind note, Suan, and for your good questions, Ken O. > > Suan, I'm sure it is a lot of work to translate just a few short extracts from > the commentaries. it may be helpful to be reminded that Nina (and Jim) worked > quite hard on these same Ang Nik suttas and commentary notes which I think you > both may find it interesting to review at: > > http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/message/8386 > commentary notes translation > > http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/message/8408 > sutta translation > > Suan, I'll look forward to your next set of Parinibbana sub-com notes (3) and > your analysis. Ken O, you may wish to quote back some of Nina's translation > with further comments in the meantime for Nina or Kom or myself. > > Sarah > .................................................................... ...................................... > > --- abhidhammika wrote: > > > > > > > Dear Sarah (and Kom) > > > > How are you? Thank you for raising the issues of the luminous mind. > > As both Robert Epstein and Howard used this beautiful statement of > > Gotama the Buddha when they introduced the concept of an underlying > > being (Robert) or 'a consciousness without objects'(Howard) remaining > > after the Parinibbaana of an Arahant in response to Parinibbana > > Subcommentary (Part Two), I will have to deal with this statement of > > the Buddha when I write my next Parinibbaana Subcommentary (Part > > Three). > > > > As your posts and Kom's post addressed this issue in advance, you > > have taken off some of my burdens. > > > > > 10260 From: Date: Sat Dec 22, 2001 2:29am Subject: Re: [dsg] Luminous mind Hi, Sarah - In a message dated 12/22/01 4:53:26 AM Eastern Standard Time, sarahdhhk@y... writes to Ken Org: > (Btw, Howard uses > discern in the sense of ‘cognizing’ i.e. what each citta does regardless > of > whether there is any wisdom accompanying it. You seem to use it in the > sense of > ‘being known’ or ‘understood’....you may like to compare notes with > him;-)) > > ============================ Yes, you are correct. I frequently use 'discernment' in place of 'consciousness' as the English for 'vi~n~nana' (whereas some folks use 'discernment' as the English for 'sati'). The reason I do so is to avoid the "substance connotation" often carried by 'consciousness', the sort of connotation which lends itself to the error made by Sati (I think it was) who said something along the lines that it "is this self-same consciousness which is reborn." I came upon this 'discernment' usage in only one place, the book The Selfless Mind, by Peter Harvey, and I found it very appealing in its clear expressing of a *function*. (Sometimes, when I want to convey the slightly different nuance of an entire mindstate, involving not only discernment, but other functions as well - basically, a citta, but without emphasizing a delimited beginning and ending, I will say 'mindstate' or 'state of mind' or 'state of consciousness', rather than 'state of discernment', which strikes me as "odd".) Note: All the foregoing is not not a discussion of Dhamma. It is merely a clarifiaction of how I have been using language. With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 10261 From: Date: Sat Dec 22, 2001 2:32am Subject: Re: [dsg] Back again... Hi, Anders - Welcome back! :-) With metta, Howard In a message dated 12/22/01 5:16:50 AM Eastern Standard Time, anders.honore@g... writes: > Hi everybody. Remember me? > /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 10262 From: Date: Sat Dec 22, 2001 3:01am Subject: Re: [dsg] Ultimate realities (and khandhas) Hi, Jon - In a message dated 12/22/01 5:17:06 AM Eastern Standard Time, jonoabb@y... writes: > > Howard > > --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Jon - > > > > In a message dated 12/15/01 2:50:58 AM Eastern Standard Time, > > jonoabb@y... writes: > > > > > > > Rupas are not the same as physical objects. ‘Physical objects’ > > are not > > > dhammas in any sense, but are the terms in which we think about > > particular > > > agglomerations of rupas. > > > > > ============================= > > I think this is an important matter. "Physical objects" are the > > imagined external entities that are referenced by those mental > > constructs, > > conglomerations of rupas, which *I* mean by concepts. The physical > > objects > > have only conventional existence, though they are based on genuine > > observation of rupas and relations among rupas. Imagined external > > entities, > > of course, can not be directly examined, by wisdom or anything else. > > I am with you so far, Howard. > > > However, > > those *thoughts* which I call concepts, *are* directly observable. > > It depends what you man by 'directly observable'. A thought is of course > the (sole) object of the moment of consciousness that 'thinks' the > thought, and is in that sense 'observed' by the citta. And of course > there are mental factors (such as strong attachment or aversion, perhaps) > accompanying that moment of consciousness, so there is plenty of 'reality' > going on at the time. > > 'Observableness' in this sense is not the distinguishing criterion of a > dhamma. The distinguishing characteristic mentioned by the texts is that > of having an individual essence that is capable of being directly > experienced by sati/panna. Mere observableness, in the sense of being the > object of citta, is common to both dhammas and concepts. > ------------------------------------------------------------- Howard: Two questions here, Jon. For one, I assume that by "individual essence" here you merely mean characteristic/lakkhana? More than that is not part of what *I* consider to be compatible with the Buddha's Dhamma. The second question is with regard to 'dhamma'. I was under the impression that *everything* is a "dhamma" in the Buddha's usage. If not, then what is the distinction between just plain 'dhamma' and 'paramattha dhamma'? One more point: When I say "concept" I am talking about an idea / thought / mental construct, and not about its real or imagined referent. We *are* aware of concepts in that sense, even with wisdom it seems to me. In the four foundations of mindfulness, the fourth foundation, mindfulness of dhammas, surely does include concepts. Included there are the four noble truths. These are *ideas*, ideas which convey critically important facts about the world expressed by the Buddha, ideas involving suffering / unsatisfactoriness, its cause, its ending, and the means for ending it. This was reiterated time and again in the suttas. And everywhere in the suttas the four noble truths are presented they are done so quite conventionally. --------------------------------------------------------------- > > > It seems > > to me that you (and Nina and Khun Sujin) use the term 'concept' to refer > > to > > the *referents* of constructed thought, whereas I use the term 'concept' > > to > > refer to the thought, itself, something which I think *does* fall under > > the > > 4th foundation of mindfulness. > > Well, I think all of us are using the term 'concept' to refer to the > thought itself (as opposed the consciousness that 'thinks' the thought), > but I'm not sure why you say it falls under the 4th foundation of > mindfulness. Is there a particular passage in the Satipatthana Sutta you > have in mind? > --------------------------------------------------------- Howard: I wrote the foregoing before reading what you just said. What Iwrote there is what I have in mind. -------------------------------------------------------- > > As I understand the texts -- > - the moment of consciousness that has as its object a thought is real (a > dhamma) > - the thought itself, however, is a mere mental construct lacking any > individual characteristic capable of being experienced, and is not a > dhamma. > -------------------------------------------------------------- Howard: Again, then, I must ask what dhammas are not *paramattha* dhammas. It seems to me that in the suttas, the Buddha uses 'dhamma' to refer to any distinguishable thing. ------------------------------------------------------------- > > I think the passage from CMA* pasted below is useful. > > Jon > > *'CMA' = Bhikkhu Bodhi, 'A Comprehensive Manual of Abhidhamma' (BPS) > The Abhidhammattha Sangaha of Acariya Anuruddha, with explanatory guide > (The explanatory guide is compiled from, but is not a direct translation > of, the main commentaries to the A-S) > > Guide to Ch I, #2 > According to the Abhidhamma philosophy, there are 2 kinds of realities—the > conventional (sammuti) and the ultimate (paramattha). Conventional > realities are the referents of ordinary conceptual thought (pannatti) and > conventional modes of expression (vohaara). They include such entities as > living beings, men, women, animals, and the apparently stable persisting > objects that constitute our unanalyzed picture of the world. The > Abhidhamma philosophy maintains that these notions do not possess ultimate > validity, for the objects which they signify [ie. the living beings, men, > women, animals etc] do not exist in their own right as irreducible > realities. Their mode of being is conceptual, not actual. They are > products of mental construction (parikappanaa), not realities existing by > reason of their own nature. > > Ultimate realities, in contrast, are things that exist by reason of their > own extrinsic nature (sabhaava). These are the dhammas: the final, > irreducible components of existence, the ultimate entities which result > from a correctly performed analysis of experience. Hence the word > ‘paramattha’ is applied to them, which is derived from ‘parama’ = > ultimate, highest, final, and ‘attha’ = reality, thing. > > Ultimate realities are not only the ultimate existents, but are also the > ultimate objects of right knowledge. As one extracts oil from sesame > seed, so one can extract the ultimate realities from the conventional > realities. Concepts do not possess ultimacy. It is the objective > actualities that lie behind our conceptual constructs – the dhammas – that > form the ultimate realities of the Abhidhamma. > > Ultimate realities are so subtle and profound that an ordinary person > cannot see them. His mind is obscured by concepts. Only by means of wise > attention to things (yoniso manasikara) can one see beyond the concepts. > Thus ‘paramattha’ is described as that which belongs to the domain of > ultimate or supreme knowledge. > -------------------------------------------------------------- Howard: So, in Abhidhamma, 'paramattha' is redundant in 'paramattha dhamma'? And also, are you saying that the Buddha could not know concepts with wisdom, because concepts are not paramattha dhammas? I was under the impression that the Buddha was able to see *everything* with wisdom, just by turning his attention to it. But concepts are an exception? ============================== With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 10263 From: Date: Sat Dec 22, 2001 3:15am Subject: Re: [dsg] Eightfold Path (esp. right effort) Hi, Jon - In a message dated 12/22/01 5:37:42 AM Eastern Standard Time, jonoabb@y... writes: > As I understand it, Rob, all mental factors (cetasikas) are accumulated > and passed from one citta to the next. The accumulation of an individual > factor in this manner is one of the conditions for its arising again in > the future. > > ============================= I don't understand this. What sort of "accumulation" is this? Cetasikas (and cittas) are functions or operations, not substances. The occurrence of an event now is a condition for the occurrence of future events or features of such events, but nothing is passed along. It was my understanding that abhidhamma simply views cetasikas as arising and ceasing. While a given cetasika could be operative through several cittas (i.e. while other cetasikas may come and go, the ending and arising of cetasikas [and arammanas] marking citta boundaries), it is not a thing to be "passed along", but is simply a function which is operative for as long as it takes. With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 10264 From: Kom Tukovinit Date: Sat Dec 22, 2001 8:38am Subject: RE: [dsg] A Cautionary Note: The Conventional Nature of Cittas and Processes Dear Howard, > -----Original Message----- > From: upasaka@a... [mailto:upasaka@a...] > Mmm! Great simile. It reminds me of the simile of holding > a snake to > get its venom. If it is held properly, right below the head, you > can get the > snake's venom, but held wrongly, by the tail, the snake will get > the person > instead! Does by any chance the simile mention holding the venomous snake by its tail? A. Sujin gives this simile often to illustrate that learning the dhamma for the wrong purpose is like holding a venomous snake byt its tail. She mentioned that the right purpose is so that we can understand (with wisdom, obviously) the realities that are appearing now. kom 10265 From: Kom Tukovinit Date: Sat Dec 22, 2001 8:44am Subject: RE: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein Dear Ken O, -----Original Message----- >Hi Kom, >What you have done is describing what is patisandhi citta and I believe >has not answered my question. If we based on the commentary as excerpt I certainly did, and I think the description confirms the inferral that if bhawanga is exceedingly pure, most likely, we can infer that the Patisandhi and Cuti citta can be also said to be exceedingly pure. >My hunch is that the commentaries explanation on exceeding pure >just bc it experiences no sense object is not satisfactory. Then this I think the point of contention here is the hypothesis that the commentaries' explanation is unsatisfactory where as some people believe it is. The inferral to nibbana would not be possible without the hypothesis. Of this, I am not knowledgeable to say one way or another, except that I believe that the commentaries are of exceptional, most likely unrivaled, qualities in explaining the Buddha's words. >would infer that Nibbana will also be exceeding pure since it also >experience no sense object. It will then equate Nibbana to luminious >mind. Of this, if discussed, we most likely would also revisit what nibbana is, and how the commentaries are unequivocal about its being "non-cognizing" nama, not anywhere close to citta and cetasikas which are cognizing nama. I believe Suan is about to give an explanation involving this area. It may allow you to draw your own conclusion. kom 10266 From: Date: Sat Dec 22, 2001 4:02am Subject: Re: [dsg] A Cautionary Note: The Conventional Nature of Cittas and Processes Hi, Kom - In a message dated 12/22/01 11:39:36 AM Eastern Standard Time, tikmok@y... writes: > Dear Howard, > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: upasaka@a... [mailto:upasaka@a...] > > Mmm! Great simile. It reminds me of the simile of > holding > > a snake to > > get its venom. If it is held properly, right below the > head, you > > can get the > > snake's venom, but held wrongly, by the tail, the snake > will get > > the person > > instead! > > Does by any chance the simile mention holding the venomous > snake by its tail? > ---------------------------------------------- Howard: Yes. I had written that. ;-)) ----------------------------------------------- A. Sujin gives this simile often to> > illustrate that learning the dhamma for the wrong purpose is > like holding a venomous snake byt its tail. She mentioned > that the right purpose is so that we can understand (with > wisdom, obviously) the realities that are appearing now. > > kom > ========================== No doubt, it is the very same simile, though Khun Sujin wasn't my source. I imagine it comes from a sutta. With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 10267 From: Kom Tukovinit Date: Sat Dec 22, 2001 9:28am Subject: RE: [dsg] A Cautionary Note: The Conventional Nature of Cittas and Processes Dear Howard, > -----Original Message----- > ---------------------------------------------- > Howard: > Yes. I had written that. ;-)) > ----------------------------------------------- You certainly did. Thank you for the correction. kom 10268 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Sat Dec 22, 2001 10:17am Subject: luminous mind Dear Suan and Rob Ep, I posted the Co to the sutta on Bhavanga some time ago for Rob Ep but may be it was overlooked, so I post it again. I am really looking forward to Suan's translation, explanation and analysis. I got stuck in the subco. since I find the language so difficult, all those composites. I find the comparison of bhavangacitta to the good parents and the defilements arising at the moment of javana to the naughty children interesting, but I have a feeling that I do not yet fully understand this, that there is more to it. But there is no hurry, I know you have very many working hours. I would like to say to Rob: A. Sujin often said: when there is bhavangacitta, nothing appears, no object appears. We do not know its object, as you know it is the same as that experienced shortly before the dying-consciousness of the previous life. The bhavangacitta is not involved in outer objects, and thus, no defilements arise. But when sense-door processes begin, objects are impinging on the doorways and experienced, objects appear, and on account of them defilements are bound to arise. But right understanding of them can be developed so that they are known as conditioned dhammas, no self. Nina. Here is the Commentary, but the translation is coarse and only the first part was corrected by Jim: @at.t.hakathaa 49. navame pabhassaranti pa.n.dara.m parisuddha.m. cittanti bhava"ngacitta.m. ki.m pana cittassa va.n.no naama atthiiti? natthi. N: As to the ninth,² luminous². Luminous is clear, pure. citta is the life-continuum. But how does there exist indeed a colour of citta? No, it does not. niilaadiina~nhi a~n~natarava.n.na.m vaa hotu ava.n.na.m vaa ya.mki~nci parisuddhataaya ``pabhassara''nti vuccati. N: For anything which may be a certain colour, beginning with blue, or without colour, is called luminous because of its purity. idampi nirupakkilesataaya parisuddhanti pabhassara.m. ta~nca khoti ta.m bhava"ngacitta.m. N: It is also pure, because it is unsoiled (by defilements); thus luminous. That indeed, meaning, that life-continuum. aagantukehiiti asahajaatehi pacchaa javanakkha.ne uppajjanakehi. N: ³ by oncoming ³(defilements). by those that are not conascent with it, but arise later at the moment of impulsion (javana). upakkilesehiiti raagaadiihi upakkili.t.thattaa upakkili.t.tha.m naamaati vuccati. N: ³by defilements². By being soiled by desire etc. it is indeed called defiled. katha.m? yathaa hi siilavantaa aacaarasampannaa maataapitaro vaa aacariyupajjhaayaa vaa dussiilaana.m duraacaaraana.m avattasampannaana.m puttaana~nceva antevaasikasaddhivihaarikaana~nca vasena ``attano putte vaa antevaasikasaddhivihaarike vaa na tajjenti na sikkhaapenti na ovadanti naanusaasantii''ti ava.n.na.m akitti.m labhanti, eva.msampadamida.m veditabba.m. N: How is that so? For, as parents, teachers or preceptors, of good conduct, possessed of good behaviour, because of the children, pupils or co-residents of bad conduct, misbehhaved, disobedient, receive dispraise or disapproval thus, ³ they neither instill awe to, nor discipline, admonish or exhort their own children, their pupils, their co-residents², evenso should this (bhavangacitta) having a similar consequence be understood. aacaarasampannaa maataapitaro viya ca aacariyupajjhaayaa viya ca bhava"ngacitta.m da.t.thabba.m, N: Just as parents, teachers, preceptors, who are of good conduct, evenso the life-continuum should be seen, puttaadiina.m vasena tesa.m akittilaabho viya javanakkha.ne rajjanadussanamuyhanasabhaavaana.m lobhasahagataadiina.m cittaana.m vasena uppannehi aagantukehi upakkilesehi pakatiparisuddhampi bhava"ngacitta.m upakkili.t.tha.m naama hotiiti. N: Just as the acquirement of a bad name for them, through the children etc., evenso, because of the cittas that are of a nature of defilement, corruption and infatuation, accompanied by desire and so on, arising at the moments of impulsion, evenso is also the life-continuum, that is by nature pure, indeed soiled, by the oncoming defilements that have arisen. ***** 50. dasamepi bhava"ngacittameva citta.m. N: With reference to the tenth, consciousness is also the life-continuum. vippamuttanti javanakkha.ne arajjamaana.m adussamaana.m amuyhamaana.m tihetuka~naa.nasampayuttaadikusalavasena uppajjamaana.m aagantukehi upakkilesehi vippamutta.m naama hoti. N: ³Freed²: because of wholesomeness arising at the time of impulsion, without defilements, corruptions and infatuations, and because consciousness is accompanied by three wholesome roots, accompanied by wisdom, and thus it is indeed freed of the arising of oncoming defilements. idhaapi yathaa siilavantaana.m aacaarasampannaana.m puttaadiina.m vasena maataadayo ``sobhanaa eteyeva attano puttakaadayo sikkhaapenti ovadanti anusaasantii''ti va.n.nakittilaabhino honti, eva.m javanakkha.ne uppannakusalacittavasena ida.m bhava"ngacitta.m aagantukehi upakkilesehi vippamuttanti vuccatiiti. N: Here also, just as parents etc., with virtuous conduct, possessed with good behaviour, because of their children, etc. , acquire praise and approval, thus, ² they train, encourage, admonish their own children that these things are indeed wholesome ³, evenso because of the arising of wholesome consciousness at the time of impulsion, that life-continuum is said to be freed of oncoming defilements. ******* pa.nihitaacchavaggava.n.nanaa. N: Explanation of the chapter on pure intention. 6. accharaasa"nghaatavaggava.n.nanaa N: Explanation of the chapter on the Snapping of the Fingers. 51. cha.t.thassa pa.thame ta.m assutavaa puthujjanoti ta.m bhava"ngacitta.m sutavirahito puthujjano. N: With reference to the first section of the sixth chapter, ³the ordinary person who is uninstructed², he is the ordinary person who has not heard of that life-continuum. agamaadhigamaabhaavaa~neyyo assutavaa iti. N: He is not learned since he has not developed understanding of the teachings nor (any higher) attainment of what should be attained (bhaavaa~neyyo ?). yo hi ida.m sutta.m aadito pa.t.thaaya atthavasena upaparikkhanto ``ida.m bhava"ngacitta.m naama pakatiparisuddhampi javanakkha.ne uppannehi lobhaadiihi upakkilesehi upakkili.t.tha''nti neva aagamavasena na adhigamavasena jaanaati, yassa ca khandhadhaatuaayatanapaccayaakaarasatipa.t.thaanaadiisu uggahaparipucchaavinicchayavirahitattaa yathaabhuuta~naa.napa.tivedhasaadhako neva aagamo, pa.tipattiyaa adhigantabbassa anadhigatattaa na adhigamo atthi. N: (uninstructed)Because he who is investigating this sutta etc. from the beginning, as follows: ³This life-continuum indeed that is also pure by nature, is at the moment of impulsion polluted by defilements that have arisen, such as attachment, etc. that have arisen², does not understand it, because he has no access (to the teachings) nor has he attained the truth), and since he, as to the aggregates, the elements, the sensefields, the causal genesis, the applications of mindfulness etc. is exempt from study, does not ask questions, and has no discrimination, therefore he has no access to seeing realities as they are, as to realization and accomplishment, and since he does not engage in the practice that should be engaged in, he has no attainment. so aagamaadhigamaabhaavaa ~neyyo assutavaa iti. svaaya.m -- N: He is uneducated with regard to knowledge of the teachings and attainment that should be cultivated. He is such a person (so ayam). ****** 10269 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Sat Dec 22, 2001 10:17am Subject: Re: [dsg] reminders India op 21-12-2001 08:05 schreef Kom Tukovinit op tikmok@y...: >> > Kom: Hearing the dhamma and the reminders (and a chance > for questions!) from many learned people is probably the > most worthwhile activities that I did in India. Hearing > some of the pertinent points (like anatta, for example) > again and again seems to help quite a bit. I have even > started to hear new angles of explanations about Anatta from > K. Jack. Most worthwhile. Nina: Dear Kom: Please could you tell me about Jack's explanations, it may have escaped me. He always has good remarks. > > Kom: The points that came to mind immediately that I really > appreciated hearing: > 1) Anattaness: what is anattaness? > 2) How panna becomes developed > 3) The purpose of hearing about the dhamma, learning the > dhamma, and noticing the dhamma. > 4) How long the road is... Nina: more than ever I found was clinging to self shown, how deeply rooted this is, with examples from daily life. Yes, the purpose of all our study: understanding this very moment. When A. Sujin explains about seeing and visible object it seems always new to me, as if I hear it for the first time. all such reminders help to consider it more. I believe that just reading is not enough, we also have to find some time to listen to tapes. (breakfast time?) You could get the India tapes form Bgk, they are glad to send them. How long the road is: because no self who can do anything. Just listening, considering. We shall not think of the future, how long it will be, what counts is only now. And the development of the perfections is important, all kinds of kusala with the right purpose, no gain for oneself. By the way, I appreciated Bhante's reminder the other day of the application of the teachings. One may think and think and no application. >Kom: The point that I haven't yet deciphered yet was the > discussions about "understanding". A. Sujin kept mentioning > about understanding until it "lies next to your bone". I > think I kept asking about it in conventional terms what she > meant by that. Sort of a reminder to me what I must go > through everytime when there is no understanding of > realities. N: I heard the word bone (kraduk), also under the Bodhi tree, but did not get the whole expression. Is it: understanding has to become deeply engrained, to become a habit, firmly established? At the same time A. S. stressed that the development must be very natural, no forcing, thus, it should not be a heavy burden. I thought so often of Sukin who brought up before the cheerfulness of Dhamma (achaan rarung). Every day she reminded us of that. Best wishes, Nina. 10270 From: Kom Tukovinit Date: Sat Dec 22, 2001 11:11am Subject: RE: [dsg] reminders India Dear Nina, > -----Original Message----- > From: Nina van Gorkom [mailto:nilo@e...] > > again and again seems to help quite a bit. I have even > > started to hear new angles of explanations > about Anatta from > > K. Jack. Most worthwhile. > > Nina: Dear Kom: Please could you tell me about > Jack's explanations, it may > have escaped me. He always has good remarks. I don't think the explanation he gave was different from what I heard from the tapes from Ajarn Sujin, except that I have heard him say this so explicitly for the first time (doesn't mean he hadn't said it before: I just haven't heard it). He explains Anatta to be the characteristics that are unchangeable/uncontrollable, e.g., heat cannot be hardness. This is in contrast with possible other explanations: 1) Non-self because of the impermanence: how could there be a self if all realities that we take as self rises and falls away completely and immediately? 2) Anatta as being uncontrolable as all realities that we take as self are conditioned intricately by other realities. > > Kom: The points that came to mind immediately > that I really > > appreciated hearing: > > 1) Anattaness: what is anattaness? > > 2) How panna becomes developed > > 3) The purpose of hearing about the dhamma, learning the > > dhamma, and noticing the dhamma. > > 4) How long the road is... > > Nina: more than ever I found was clinging to self > shown, how deeply rooted > this is, with examples from daily life. Yes, this is even more evident if another person who understand points it out! > How long the road is: because no self who can do > anything. Just listening, > considering. We shall not think of the future, > how long it will be, what > counts is only now. And the development of the > perfections is important, > all kinds of kusala with the right purpose, no > gain for oneself. Thank you for the encouragement, Nina. > >Kom: The point that I haven't yet deciphered yet was the > > discussions about "understanding". A. Sujin > kept mentioning > > about understanding until it "lies next to your > bone". > > N: I heard the word bone (kraduk), also under the > Bodhi tree, but did not > get the whole expression. Is it: understanding > has to become deeply > engrained, to become a habit, firmly established? Yes. I asked her about what she meant by "kao jai jrod kraduk". The explanation that I remembered was to understand firmly. She gave an example at that point that when you ask a person a question, they answer it correctly, but when you ask the person the same question differently, they answer it incorrectly. This shows that there is no understanding, or the understanding is not firm (not jrod kraduk). She then asked me how firm my understanding was, and I told her that it depends, because sometimes I am quite misled, and then she said, until one reaches magga (which one? Sotapanna? Arahat?), then it shows that one is not truly firm. A. Supi explained that he studied the dhammas keeping firmly in mind that the results manifest only when the causes are complete/filled. If panna doesn't rise to cognize the realities, that means one's understandings about the dhammas at the pannatti level are not enough or are not firm. If there is no vipassana nana, then panna at the lower/weaker levels haven't been developed enough for that to happen. This is so with magga and so on. He said, by understanding this truly, then one doesn't struggle for satipathanna/vipassana nana/magga/results to happen. Thanks again. kom 10271 From: Anders Honore Date: Sat Dec 22, 2001 2:46pm Subject: Re: RE: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein 22-12-01 17:44:57, Kom Tukovinit skrev: >Dear Ken O, > >-----Original Message----- >>Hi Kom, > >>What you have done is describing what is patisandhi citta >and I believe >>has not answered my question. If we based on the >commentary as excerpt > >I certainly did, and I think the description confirms the >inferral that if bhawanga is exceedingly pure, most likely, >we can infer that the Patisandhi and Cuti citta can be also >said to be exceedingly pure. > >>My hunch is that the commentaries explanation on exceeding >pure >>just bc it experiences no sense object is not satisfactory. >Then this > >I think the point of contention here is the hypothesis that >the commentaries' explanation is unsatisfactory where as >some people believe it is. The inferral to nibbana would >not be possible without the hypothesis. Of this, I am not >knowledgeable to say one way or another, except that I >believe that the commentaries are of exceptional, most >likely unrivaled, qualities in explaining the Buddha's >words. > >>would infer that Nibbana will also be exceeding pure since >it also >>experience no sense object. It will then equate Nibbana to >luminious >>mind. > >Of this, if discussed, we most likely would also revisit >what nibbana is, and how the commentaries are unequivocal >about its being "non-cognizing" nama, not anywhere close to >citta and cetasikas which are cognizing nama. > >I believe Suan is about to give an explanation involving >this area. It may allow you to draw your own conclusion. Hi, kom. I believe that we've been over this in the past, huh? :-) My two cents: For Nibbana=luminous mind: All conditioned things, including all mind states are ultimately unsatisfactory, and thus cannot be said to be really pure. They are also impermanent, and the sutta seems to indicate a rather permanent quality, seeing as how the mind retains its luminosity in spite of incoming defilements. Against Nibbana=luminous mind: The suttas are relative, and so are the words 'pure' and 'mind',. One cannot expect that the Buddha covered his ground in all his sermons. My conclusion: The suttas are relative - so who cares whether it refers to Nibbana or not? What I would deem much more relevant is that all of this falls into the realm of speculative knowledge. The Buddha spoke about the higher Jhanas and Nibba ana etc, for those with the capacity for realising and actualising these things. Not for mere speculation. The suttas, in this regard, are mere signposts, to insure that the practitioner will steer in the right direction: The are not truths in and of themselves, but pure conventionalty, adapted to the circumstances of the (in this case rather advanced) practitioner. If you are not close to being able to investigate the luminous for yourself in this very present moment, then what good will speculating about it do? The questiosn you gotta ask yourselves are: Will this reduce my clinging or add to it (in terms of clinging to views and concepts)? Will this sharpen my discernment (in terms of my own actual experienced reality)? Regards Anders 10272 From: Anders Honore Date: Sat Dec 22, 2001 2:32pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Back again... Thanks Howard :-) 22-12-01 16:32:48, upasaka@a... skrev: >Hi, Anders - > > Welcome back! :-) > >With metta, >Howard 10273 From: Anders Honore Date: Sat Dec 22, 2001 2:08pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Back again... 22-12-01 11:54:02, Sarah skrev: >Hi Anders, > >Really great to see you back....;-))) Thanks, sarah. While it lasts, at least :-) > --- Anders Honore wrote: > Hi everybody. Remember >me? > >The name rings a bell, I think... I think I've heard of that guy named Anders too. A real showoff, wasn't he? >Exactly so, no better place to spend them. You'll find most the same old faces >around and many of the same old themes.....;-)) > > Hope you got through all your study assignments with flying colours and look >forward to reading your always challenging and enjoyable posts here. Ah well, don't expect me to be so talkative these days. I pick my battles more carefully now :-) >You must be pretty snow-bound in Denmark now, right? Ah, no. We have snow, but not much. It's starting to thaw now. Sadly... Nice to hear from you rgds Anders 10274 From: christine_forsyth Date: Sat Dec 22, 2001 3:37pm Subject: Re: Clinical Death / Rebirth Dear Herman, I am very interested in this from an ethical point of view. Regarding organ transplants from baby to baby, 'fresh' is essential......but how to be fresh and still 'clincally dead' from a Buddhist point of view? Not much literature available on the Australian scene...... http://www.health.state.ny.us/nysdoh/bsd/attachb.htm Determination of death in children less than one year of age metta, Christine --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "egberdina" wrote: > Hi all, > > Medical and legal opinions vary enormously as to what constitutes > death. The lack of measurable heart beat and brain activity are not > decisive indications of cessation of life. The body stays warm for a > long time after heart beat has stopped. Cellular death is not > complete for days. Gruesome finds at cemetries have indicated that > people not yet quite dead have been interred (scratch marks on the > inside of the coffin). > > Yet the Abhidhamma posits a precise moment of death. It is the last > thought that characterises death. Unless it is the last thought, > you're not dead. (this sounds like a conceptual definition). Given > that there is no sense door or mind door activity when the brain > stops functioning, I presume that it is always the same object held > by the life-continuum citta when initiating any new life and ending > any old life. > > Perhaps nibbana? > > > Herman 10275 From: yuzhonghao Date: Sat Dec 22, 2001 4:47pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts) Hello Jon, Please understand conditioned phenomenon as it actually is: Conditioned phenomenon is impermanent. Conditioned phenomenon is unsatisfactory/dukkha. Conditioned phenomenon is to be seen as it actually is with right discernment thus: "This is not mine. This I am not. This is not my self." Regards, Victor --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Jonothan Abbott wrote: > Victor > > --- Victor Yu wrote: > Hello Jon, > > > > Thank you. Whether it is hard to realize or not, conditioned phenomenon > > such as consciousness or perception is impermanent, is > > unsatisfactory/dukkha, is to be seen as it actually is with right > > discernment thus: "This is not mine. This I am not. This is not my > > self." > > Yes, I wouldn't argue with what you say. But we need to know *how* this > 'right discernment' is to be developed. Any suggestions? > > Jon 10276 From: yuzhonghao Date: Sat Dec 22, 2001 5:05pm Subject: Re: [dsg] some more about metta Hello Sarah, Please consider carefully the following passage from Anguttara Nikaya VII.60, Kodhana Sutta, An Angry Person http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/anguttara/an07-060.html "...Like oneself, all beings hold themselves most dear, yet an angry person, deranged, can kill himself in many ways: with a sword, taking poison, hanging himself by a rope in a mountain glen. Doing these deeds that kill beings and do violence to himself, the angry person doesn't realize that he's ruined. This snare of Mara, in the form of anger, dwelling in the cave of the heart: cut it out with self-control, discernment, persistence, right view. The wise man would cut out each & every form of unskillfulness. Train yourselves: 'May we not be blotted out.' Free from anger & untroubled, free from greed, without longing, tamed, your anger abandoned, free from fermentation, you will be unbound." I am not sure how self-control is not possible in truth. I am not sure what conventional usage has to do with self-control. Regards, Victor [snip] > If we say `Yes, one can control oneself' (to quote from another post of yours) > and know this is merely conventional usage, that's fine. However, if we cling > to an idea that this is possible in truth, it shows the perversity of view at > that moment. > > Thanks for all your challenging posts > > metta, > Sarah [snip] 10277 From: yuzhonghao Date: Sat Dec 22, 2001 5:15pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Concept Hello Purnomo, As I understand it from checking out the dictionary, concept means a general idea derived or inferred from specific instances or occurrences. It also means something formed in mind, a thought or a notion. It seems to me that concept can be categorized as nama, a representation. Regards, Victor --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "Purnomo ." wrote: > > If we seek a 'Concept', we have to collect all our experiences and we 'just' > make a conclusion. That is a concept--for me. How about you ? I am guarantee > that is different. Why ? Because that is 'concept' for me. And That's true > for me not you. So, concept is not absolute truth. > > purnomo-- > > >From: "yuzhonghao" > >Reply-To: dhammastudygroup@y... > >To: dhammastudygroup@y... > >Subject: [dsg] Concept > >Date: Wed, 19 Dec 2001 18:19:28 -0000 > > > >Hello all, > > > >I have some questions regarding concept. What does it mean by > >concept? How does concept come to be? > > > >Thank you. > > > >Regards, > >Victor > > > > 10278 From: Kenneth Ong Date: Sat Dec 22, 2001 7:22pm Subject: RE: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein Hi Sarah > Yes, it is a little difficult which is why I didn't post it all the > first time > I think. k: I do not think it is difficult at all. > > > > k: To me, this statement will imply that when a man dreams he is > neither > > sleeping or awake. > > That's right.... no sense-door activity (as I mentioned to Frank > before), but > mind-door activity and thinking of concepts. k: Nope I do not greed there is no sense-door activity if we look at the statement again and your are using the neither awake portiion to explain no sense door activity. I am using neither sleeping which means there is a possibility of sense door activity > > > >But when his sleep has become light, and he is not yet fully > conscious, > > in that interval it is that dreams are dreamt. When a man is in deep > > sleep, O king, his mind has returned home (has entered again into > > Bhavanga), and a mind thus shut in does not act, and a mind hindered > in > > its action knows not the evil and the good, and he who knows > > > not has no dreams. It is when the mind is active that dreams are > dreamt. > > > > > Just, O king, as in the darkness and gloom, where no light is, no > shadow > > will fall even on the most burnished mirror, so when a man is in deep > > sleep his mind has returned into itself, and a mind shut in does not > act, > > and a mind inactive knows not the evil and the good, and he who knows > not > > does not dream. For it is when the mind is active that dreams are > dreamt. > > As the miror, O king, > > > are > > > you to regard the body, as the darkness sleep, as the light the > mind.’ > > > > > > k: Returned home? Return to itself? - sounds like bhavanga citta a > > permanent dwelling for the mind. Subtely it would imply a permanent > self. > > No....just changing cittas (remember yr abhidhamma?)....it just means > the mind > is not active anymore...no more concepts and so on, no dreams, no > kilesa. > Nothing permanent at all. Just one citta and then another. > > Sarah k: To me I think we are prejudice. When the this passage explain return home, your position is changing cittas but when i see it it is abt permanent self. So when I think TB is not talking abt permanent self, you do not think otherwise as what your have written in msg #10218 (quoted below). "9.T.B. continues to add that: > ‘With this > understanding, however, one can make an effort to cut away existing > defilements, leaving the mind in the stage that MN 24 calls "purity in > terms of mind." This would correspond to the luminous level of > concentration described in the standard simile for the fourth jhana: ..... On the contrary, this again suggests the idea of self-control and a permanent mind-state which, as I understand the Teachings, is quite contrary to their ‘uniform sentiment’. The purity of the states of awareness and concentration referred to in the simile, refer to cittas of an exceedingly high state of wholesomeness, which again are fleeting (though I believe not with any bhavanga cittas in between the mind-door processes in this case)." Kind regards Ken O 10279 From: Kenneth Ong Date: Sat Dec 22, 2001 8:07pm Subject: RE: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein Hi Kom and Sarah Since Kom said that > I certainly did, and I think the description confirms the > inferral that if bhawanga is exceedingly pure, most likely, > we can infer that the Patisandhi and Cuti citta can be also > said to be exceedingly pure. k: Will that implied the luminious mind would include patisandhi and cuti citta in that sutta we are arguing abt. I think by nature Bhavanga citta is luminious and not bc it is free of sense objects, then this will also explain why Nibbana could unlikely not be luminious mind as it is also deprived of sense objects. To Sarah, I requote a passage by Nina. "A. Sujin often said: when there is bhavangacitta, nothing appears, no object appears. We do not know its object, as you know it is the same as that experienced shortly before the dying-consciousness of the previous life. The bhavangacitta is not involved in outer objects, and thus, no defilements arise. But when sense-door processes begin, objects are impinging on the doorways and experienced, objects appear, and on account of them defilements are bound to arise. But right understanding of them can be developed so that they are known as conditioned dhammas, no self." My interpretation is all along that Bhavanga citta could be discerned. If bhavanga citta could not discerned who knows what is the nature of bhavanga cittas and there is no way to described bhavanga cittas in the first place in the commentaries. If we revisit the sutta last passage again, "well-instructed disciple of the noble ones, there is development of the mind.", when we talk abt noble ones it usually refers to those who at least reach first level of arahat (sorry I always lousy at pali names :)). Two things, 1. luminious mind could be indeed bhavanga cittas as the sutta points on the development of the mind is refering to the nobles ones and not any ordinary practitioners. 2. luminious mind could be discerned To Kom again, Even if the luminouis mind includes Patisandhi and cuti citta, they still could be discern by nobles ones. Kind regards Ken O 10280 From: Date: Sat Dec 22, 2001 4:55pm Subject: Re: [dsg] A Cautionary Note: The Conventional Nature of Cittas and Processes Hi again Howard, << ----------------------------------------------------------------- Mmm! Great simile. It reminds me of the simile of holding a snake to get its venom. If it is held properly, right below the head, you can get the snake's venom, but held wrongly, by the tail, the snake will get the person instead! ----------------------- >> I heard about this analogy before as well. Today, I did look the sutta up from Thai suttanta-pitaka. Very interesting, Alaguttupamasutra, majimanikaya. Briefly, at the beginning there is a bhiikhu who stated that he had already understood what the Buddha had taught. He claimed that the "dhamma" which the Buddha said that it will harm anyone who associates with it, actually does not harm anyone. The Buddha then said that bhikkhu who had learned vinaya, sutta and abhidhamma but not considered them carefully with panna would not get any wholesome result but can also caused him some even more unwholesome deed. Later on the Buddha said about a man who is trying to catch a snake but without panna he holds the snake at its tail. So the snake will have chances to constrict around his arm and then bite him. My personal understanding after I read this sutra is : There are 3 most venomous snakes named lobha, dosa and moha. A man who even has a good intention, very interested in dhamma and in getting rid of his defilement, but do not consider dhamma carefully, at times he will have a chance that he will be bitten by those snakes. I do not think dhammavinaya (the Buddha teaching) in itself a venom, but an antivenom. Another point I'd like to raise is I like the way someone called 3 pitaka as 3 gems. To me these 3 gems need each other, very interdependent on each other and cannot understand one without other. So these 3 gems are always together, even at times we look into just one gem, but the reflection of the other two is always there as well. Just my opinion. Best wishes, Num 10281 From: Robert Epstein Date: Sat Dec 22, 2001 10:05pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Luminous mind --- Kenneth Ong wrote: > Furthermore, in Abhidhamma, I do not think there is an explanation how > does bhavanga cittas actually work (except as life continual), its objects > (a mystery) and how it is being defiled by the six senses. It simply says > that it is being defiled (or impinge or disturb), is there any > commentaries on the intracies on how it being defiled. The actual details > will be very helpful. Dear Kenneth, I think the problem is just that: the bhavanga cittas are *not* defiled. They are free from any incoming phenomena from eveything that has been said on this thread, and so the statement that the 'mind is defiled by incoming defilements' makes no sense regarding bhavanga cittas, as far as I can understand. If anyone can explain it, I would be happy too. Best, Robert Ep. 10282 From: Robert Epstein Date: Sat Dec 22, 2001 10:26pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Ultimate realities (and khandhas) Thanks again, Jon. Your further details are helpful in clarifying these ideas. I appreciate it. Best, Robert Ep. =============== --- Jonothan Abbott wrote: > Rob Ep > > --- Robert Epstein wrote: > Dear Jon, > > Thank you very much for helping to clarify some of these terms and how > > they fit > > together. The idea that dhammas include namas and rupas, and that > > cittas and > > Nibbana are also included, is very helpful. > > > > Now here is where I got confused: if dhammas are the 'ultimate > > realities' I > > derived from this that they were 'real', meaning that they had a status > > as > > 'entities'. This is obviously not what is meant by 'real' at all. > > Indeed not (and as you know, terms used in the teachings rarely carry > their convnetional meanings). We need to find out *in what sense* dhammas > are said to be 'realities' -- what is the distinguishing characteristic of > a reality (especially vis-à-vis a concept)? > > > I now take it that what is meant by 'real' and 'ultimate' is merely > > that: > > Your summary that follows is pretty much on track, but I have suggested > one or two minor refinements (my version in inverted commas)-- > > > a/ they are being discerned as they actually are, in their fleeting, > > momentary > > occurence as an aspect of physical or mental reality, ie, rupas or > > namas. > > "a/ They are *capable of* being discerned (by panna) for what they > actually are, namely (going from the general to the particular) > - as a nama or a rupa, > - as having their own distinctive characteristic or nature (sabhava -- > i.e., that which distinguishes, say, visible object from sound), and > - as having the 3 universal characteristics (anicca, dukkha, anatta)." > > > b/ they are irreducible to anything other or smaller. No combined or > > aggregate > > arisings, such as the complex concept of an object existing > > independently, would > > be considered real or ultimate. > > "b/ They are ‘ultimate’ in the sense that they are the final, irreducible > components of existence. Conventional 'objects' are in fact an > aggregation of different rupa-dhammas or, in the case of objects that are > people and creatures, nama-dhammas and rupa-dhammas." > > > And so in a sense by saying they are 'real', one is saying that they are > > 'not > > real' in the conventional sense, but only momentary and fleeting, not > > lasting > > beyond the moment. In this sense they are accurately seen as what they > > are in the > > moment without any conceptual attributions of entity, lasting quality or > > satisfaction arising with them, and then they would be seen correctly. > > "By saying they are 'real', one is not saying that they are 'real' in the > conventional sense because, although having their own characteristic, they > are only momentary and fleeting, not lasting beyond the moment. However, > only developed panna can see dhammas accurately as what they are in the > moment, as not having any inherent attributions of entity, lasting quality > or satisfaction." > > > Thanks again, and I think I may be starting to get the concept as it is > > described. > > Yes, it is useful to try to understand things as they are described or > explained in the teachings. (It doesn't mean one has to accept that > description or explanation.) > > Jon 10283 From: Robert Epstein Date: Sat Dec 22, 2001 10:28pm Subject: Re: [dsg] 'Self' as object of discernment (and khandhas) Thanks, Jon. One question, below. --- Jonothan Abbott wrote: > At both moments there is citta/consciousness (a reality) experiencing an > object. In the former case the object of the citta (sound) is a reality > while in the latter case the object of the citta (thought about sound) is > not a reality. > > Jon Okay, I may be dense, but then what is a nama in this continuum? Robert 10284 From: Robert Epstein Date: Sat Dec 22, 2001 11:04pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Eightfold Path (esp. right effort) --- Jonothan Abbott wrote: > Rob Ep > > --- Robert Epstein wrote: > > > > > 2/ How does mundane Right View/Understanding lay the groundwork for > > the > > > > Supramundane Path Factors to arise. > > > > > > Every moment of mundane Right View (i.e. panna of the level of > > > satipatthana) is accompanied by other mundane factors of the Eightfold > > > Path. These mundane path factors are accumulated and grow in > > strength. > > > This is how, on my reading of the teachings, the conditions for > > > supramundane consciousness are developed. > > > > > > Jon > > > > So a single citta can accumulate and pass on any path factors that it > > has > > experienced? And they, in accumulation, lead to the arising of the > > others? > > As I understand it, Rob, all mental factors (cetasikas) are accumulated > and passed from one citta to the next. The accumulation of an individual > factor in this manner is one of the conditions for its arising again in > the future. > > Jon Interesting, Jon. I hadn't realized that. So there are billions of cetasikas being passed along? Robert Ep. 10285 From: Robert Epstein Date: Sat Dec 22, 2001 11:10pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The Two Truths (for Howard) Dear Jon, I understand your statement that both arising and conceptual wrong understanding can be an obstacle. But this leaves me a little confused about what you meant in your original statement by: 'The root cause of our problems in not our wrong conceptual grasp of things...' Could you say a word about that? I understand the second part of the sentence, but I don't understand how wrong conceptual grasp is not a root cause, yet our 'general accumulated wrong view' about realities is. I don't quite have the distinction between those two..... Best, Robert Ep. ====================== --- Jonothan Abbott wrote: > Rob Ep > > --- Robert Epstein wrote: > > > > The root cause of our problems is not our wrong conceptual grasp of > > > things, but our incorrect understanding of realities. > > > > > > Jon > > > > Can I take it that this last sentence could be finished: "...our > > incorrect > > understanding of realities as they arise.' ? > > Yes, it is the development of the correct understanding of realities as > they arise that leads to magga citta, so it must be the incorrect > understanding of those same realities that is at the root of the problem. > This I think neatly states the situation in its ultimate sense. ;-)) ;-)) > > However, wrong understanding about realities that has been accumulated > (stored up) can manifest, for example, at moments of thinking when there > is no reality as object of the consciousness. So in more conventional > terms we do talk about a general incorrect understanding of realities (= > wrong view). > > Jon 10286 From: Robert Epstein Date: Sat Dec 22, 2001 11:19pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Ultimate realities (and khandhas) --- egberdina wrote: > Jon, > > I am wondering if the quality of ultimate realities are subjective ie > specific to each self. The colour blind person will see whatever they > see, it is irreducible, it is colour, which is not capable of being > described in other terms, not capable of being sensed through another > door, unless you use LSD. > > Likewise, the non-colour blind person will see specific colour, > looking at the same object as the colour blind person. Yet the colour > experience will be different. In this way there is nothing absolute > or ultimate about seeing the object as it really is, unless ultimate > or absolute has relative connotations. > > So two arahants, sitting in a VW at the traffic lights, one colour > blind, one not colour blind, will see two different realities as the > lights change. I wonder which one will write the preferred > commentaries? ( :-) ) Dear Herman, I agree with much of what you say here, but not about the VW. My understanding is that arahants prefer Mercedes sports cars, or at the very least a nice Toyota SUV. Best, Robert Ep. 10287 From: Kom Tukovinit Date: Sat Dec 22, 2001 11:52pm Subject: RE: RE: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein Dear Anders, I am happy to see you back. > -----Original Message----- > Hi, kom. I believe that we've been over this in > the past, huh? :-) Yes, both on the luminosity and nibanna. I think the themes have repeated many times. Some with excellent references/translations of the commentaries. > My conclusion: The suttas are relative - so who > cares whether it refers to Nibbana or not? What I > would deem much more > relevant is that all of this falls into the realm > of speculative knowledge. The Buddha spoke about > the higher Jhanas and > Nibba ana etc, for those with the capacity for > realising and actualising these things. Not for > mere speculation. The suttas, > in this regard, are mere signposts, to insure > that the practitioner will steer in the right > direction: The are not truths in and of > themselves, but pure conventionalty, adapted to > the circumstances of the (in this case rather > advanced) practitioner. I wouldn't agree that the Buddha speaks relatively, but on the other hand, I would be happy with the statement that two people would certainly interpret it differently. > > If you are not close to being able to investigate > the luminous for yourself in this very present > moment, then what good will > speculating about it do? The questiosn you gotta > ask yourselves are: > > Will this reduce my clinging or add to it (in > terms of clinging to views and concepts)? > > Will this sharpen my discernment (in terms of my > own actual experienced reality)? We almost agree on this point, except the question I would ask is, would considering the different implications improve my understanding? Agreeing on something on the first post on your return. Now, that is something to be appreciated! kom 10288 From: Robert Epstein Date: Sat Dec 22, 2001 11:58pm Subject: Re: [dsg] luminous mind Thanks, Nina, for posting the Commentary on the luminosity of the bhavanga cittas. I found it very helpful to review it and as usual, the commentators speak in very clear language, which is quite helpful. What I am going to say in response is somewhat challenging what I have read, however, and I hope it won't be seen as too disrespectful. I am trying to thrash out some of these issues, and I am looking for the logic in them. I have great respect for the commentators, but do not always accept their interpretation 'automatically' as I hope I do the Buddha's own words. The following is to all who are taking part in this fascinating and controversial conversation, and hope it is not too lengthy or redundant. I understand the analogy of the children and parents in the commentary below, where the parents [bhavanga cittas] could be said to be defiled because their reputation is ruined by the delinquent children, even though the parents themselves are never directly defiled, but it doesn't seem to me to be a working analogy for the actual consciousnesses in question. I plead ignorance if I misuse any of the categories, but I will be happy to be corrected. From what I understand, the bhavanga cittas are never touched by sense-objects, since they only arise to maintain the life-continuum and personal identity when the sense-doors have 'closed' in deep sleep. Therefore, they are totally sealed off from any incoming defilements. They remain pure, and in that sense, could certainly be said to be 'luminous'. This luminosity would in itself mean that the consciousnesses in question have a certain 'light' and I assume this would be the light of the mind, the light of consciousness or awareness in one form or another. Consciousnesses shed their light on the object of their perception or thought, and thus 'discern' it to one degree or another. So luminosity would make sense in regard to a consciousness that was not 'covered over' with a lot of 'junk', such as ignorance and misinterpreted sensory moments. On the other hand, the cittas that are defiled by contact with outside objects are not said to be the luminous ones. These are the naughty children who are filled with ignorance, wrong thoughts and mis-perceptions, which are like dark clouds which cover their luminosity until they are cleared away. To me, no matter how you slice it, you still have the same problem, and I don't see the commentaries actually addressing it. The sutta speaks clearly of the mind that is luminous being defiled. The commentary can only say that the 'reputation' of the bhavanga cittas is ruined by the delinquent children. I know it's just an analogy, but I don't see how the bhavanga cittas are implicated at all in the defilement of akusala cittas [if that is the right term to use], and I don't see at all how the defiled cittas have anything to do with the luminosity of the bhavanga cittas. They are just completely separate and have no contact with each other at all. Surely, the Buddha would have been clear enough to name the two categories of which he was speaking if they were two different groups. It makes a lot more sense in reading the sutta to say that the same cittas or mind that is luminous is the one that is being temporarily defiled. I don't see anything in the commentary that reasonably explains this away. I am surprised to hear that there is general agreement among the current living commentators that the luminous mind refers to the bhavanga cittas. Is this true? If the Buddha was referring to the bhavanga cittas as the luminous ones and the normal waking cittas as the defiled ones, he would have to say something like this, in my admittedly limited opinion: "The consciousness of the mind in sleep is luminous as it is untouched by incoming defilements. The consciousness of the waking mind is defiled by incoming defilements. The waking consciousness can be purified through the development of wisdom and the consciousness that has been purified thus will surely be seen to be luminous." But when he says "Mind is luminous and it is defiled by incoming defilements" it is a simple statement of a pure mind that has been defiled. I can accept the idea that a citta arises with defilements which obscure its potential clarity and thus the defilement must be cleared away for that citta to 'shine' with discernment and wisdom. But I cannot see any way to put two disparate consciousnesses together in the statement, so that it is interpreted to be the opposite of what it says. What puzzles me more is why it is even seen as necessary. To say that the mind, composed of a string of cittas that have the potential to see clearly but which are deceived by moha and misinterpretation, is defiled but is inherently luminous, seems to be completely reasonable. It does not necessarily posit an underlying mind that is an object or entity. It can easily be interpreted to be a succession of cittas which carry defilements, thus obscuring their luminous quality, which all consciousnesses have potentially, and which then must be freed from defilement by sati and panna. And this interpretation seems to me to be much more direct and make a lot more sense, than bringing the bhavanga cittas into it and somehow having to figure out how they have something to do with defilement -- the very opposite of their condition by definition. I hope I have not spoken too strongly, but I am just trying to be as logical as I can. And I hope that it is all in the service of a worthwhile discussion. Best, Robert Ep. ================================ --- Nina van Gorkom wrote: > Dear Suan and Rob Ep, > I posted the Co to the sutta on Bhavanga some time ago for Rob Ep but may be > it was overlooked, so I post it again. I am really looking forward to Suan's > translation, explanation and analysis. I got stuck in the subco. since I > find the language so difficult, all those composites. > I find the comparison of bhavangacitta to the good parents and the > defilements arising at the moment of javana to the naughty children > interesting, but I have a feeling that I do not yet fully understand this, > that there is more to it. But there is no hurry, I know you have very many > working hours. > I would like to say to Rob: A. Sujin often said: when there is > bhavangacitta, nothing appears, no object appears. We do not know its > object, as you know it is the same as that experienced shortly before the > dying-consciousness of the previous life. The bhavangacitta is not involved > in outer objects, and thus, no defilements arise. But when sense-door > processes begin, objects are impinging on the doorways and experienced, > objects appear, and on account of them defilements are bound to arise. But > right understanding of them can be developed so that they are known as > conditioned dhammas, no self. > Nina. > Here is the Commentary, but the translation is coarse and only the first > part was corrected by Jim: > > @at.t.hakathaa > > 49. navame pabhassaranti pa.n.dara.m parisuddha.m. cittanti > bhava"ngacitta.m. ki.m pana cittassa va.n.no naama atthiiti? natthi. > > N: As to the ninth,2 luminous2. Luminous is clear, pure. citta is the > life-continuum. But how does there exist indeed a colour of citta? No, it > does not. > > niilaadiina~nhi a~n~natarava.n.na.m vaa hotu ava.n.na.m vaa ya.mki~nci > parisuddhataaya ``pabhassara''nti vuccati. > > N: For anything which may be a certain colour, beginning with blue, or > without colour, is called luminous because of its purity. > > idampi nirupakkilesataaya > parisuddhanti pabhassara.m. ta~nca khoti ta.m bhava"ngacitta.m. > > N: It is also pure, because it is unsoiled (by defilements); thus luminous. > That indeed, meaning, that life-continuum. > > aagantukehiiti asahajaatehi pacchaa javanakkha.ne uppajjanakehi. > > N: 3 by oncoming 3(defilements). by those that are not conascent with it, > but arise later at the moment of impulsion (javana). > > upakkilesehiiti raagaadiihi upakkili.t.thattaa upakkili.t.tha.m naamaati > vuccati. > > N: 3by defilements2. By being soiled by desire etc. it is indeed called > defiled. > > katha.m? yathaa hi siilavantaa aacaarasampannaa maataapitaro > vaa aacariyupajjhaayaa vaa dussiilaana.m duraacaaraana.m > avattasampannaana.m puttaana~nceva antevaasikasaddhivihaarikaana~nca vasena > ``attano putte vaa antevaasikasaddhivihaarike vaa na tajjenti na > sikkhaapenti na ovadanti naanusaasantii''ti ava.n.na.m akitti.m labhanti, > eva.msampadamida.m veditabba.m. > > N: How is that so? For, as parents, teachers or preceptors, of good conduct, > possessed of good behaviour, because of the children, pupils or co-residents > of bad conduct, misbehhaved, disobedient, receive dispraise or disapproval > thus, 3 they neither instill awe to, nor discipline, admonish or exhort > their own children, their pupils, their co-residents2, evenso should this > (bhavangacitta) having a similar consequence be understood. > > aacaarasampannaa maataapitaro viya ca > aacariyupajjhaayaa viya ca bhava"ngacitta.m da.t.thabba.m, > > N: Just as parents, teachers, preceptors, who are of good conduct, evenso > the life-continuum should be seen, > > puttaadiina.m > vasena tesa.m akittilaabho viya javanakkha.ne > rajjanadussanamuyhanasabhaavaana.m lobhasahagataadiina.m cittaana.m vasena > uppannehi aagantukehi upakkilesehi pakatiparisuddhampi bhava"ngacitta.m > upakkili.t.tha.m naama hotiiti. > > N: Just as the acquirement of a bad name for them, through the children > etc., evenso, because of the cittas that are of a nature of defilement, > corruption and infatuation, accompanied by desire and so on, arising at the > moments of impulsion, evenso is also the life-continuum, that is by nature > pure, indeed soiled, by the oncoming defilements that have arisen. > > ***** > > 50. dasamepi bhava"ngacittameva citta.m. > > N: With reference to the tenth, consciousness is also the life-continuum. > > vippamuttanti javanakkha.ne > arajjamaana.m adussamaana.m amuyhamaana.m > tihetuka~naa.nasampayuttaadikusalavasena uppajjamaana.m > aagantukehi upakkilesehi vippamutta.m naama hoti. > > N: 3Freed2: because of wholesomeness arising at the time of impulsion, > without defilements, corruptions and infatuations, and because consciousness > is accompanied by three wholesome roots, accompanied by wisdom, and thus it > is indeed freed of the arising of oncoming defilements. > > idhaapi yathaa > siilavantaana.m aacaarasampannaana.m puttaadiina.m vasena maataadayo > ``sobhanaa eteyeva attano puttakaadayo sikkhaapenti ovadanti > anusaasantii''ti va.n.nakittilaabhino honti, eva.m javanakkha.ne > uppannakusalacittavasena ida.m bhava"ngacitta.m aagantukehi upakkilesehi > vippamuttanti vuccatiiti. > > N: Here also, just as parents etc., with virtuous conduct, possessed with > good behaviour, because of their children, etc. , acquire praise and > approval, thus, 2 they train, encourage, admonish their own children that > these things are indeed wholesome 3, evenso because of the arising of > wholesome consciousness at the time of impulsion, that life-continuum is > said to be freed of oncoming defilements. > > ******* > pa.nihitaacchavaggava.n.nanaa. > > N: Explanation of the chapter on pure intention. > > 6. accharaasa"nghaatavaggava.n.nanaa > N: Explanation of the chapter on the Snapping of the Fingers. > > 51. cha.t.thassa pa.thame ta.m assutavaa puthujjanoti ta.m > bhava"ngacitta.m sutavirahito puthujjano. > > N: With reference to the first section of the sixth chapter, 3the ordinary > person who is uninstructed2, he is the ordinary person who has not heard of > that life-continuum. > > agamaadhigamaabhaavaa~neyyo assutavaa iti. > > N: He is not learned since he has not developed understanding of the > teachings nor (any higher) attainment of what should be attained > (bhaavaa~neyyo ?). > > yo hi ida.m sutta.m aadito pa.t.thaaya atthavasena > upaparikkhanto ``ida.m bhava"ngacitta.m naama pakatiparisuddhampi > javanakkha.ne uppannehi lobhaadiihi upakkilesehi upakkili.t.tha''nti neva > aagamavasena na adhigamavasena jaanaati, yassa ca > khandhadhaatuaayatanapaccayaakaarasatipa.t.thaanaadiisu > uggahaparipucchaavinicchayavirahitattaa > yathaabhuuta~naa.napa.tivedhasaadhako neva aagamo, pa.tipattiyaa > adhigantabbassa anadhigatattaa na adhigamo atthi. > > N: (uninstructed)Because he who is investigating this sutta etc. from the > beginning, as follows: 3This life-continuum indeed that is also pure by > nature, is at the moment of impulsion polluted by defilements that have > arisen, such as attachment, etc. that have arisen2, does not understand it, > because he has no access (to the teachings) nor has he attained the truth), > and since he, as to the aggregates, the elements, the sensefields, the > causal genesis, the applications of mindfulness etc. is exempt from study, > does not ask questions, and has no discrimination, therefore he has no > access to seeing realities as they are, as to realization and > accomplishment, and since he does not engage in the practice that should be > engaged in, he has no attainment. > > so aagamaadhigamaabhaavaa > ~neyyo assutavaa iti. svaaya.m -- > N: He is uneducated with regard to knowledge of the teachings and attainment > that should be cultivated. He is such a person (so ayam). > > ****** 10289 From: Anders Honore Date: Sun Dec 23, 2001 5:36am Subject: Re: [dsg] luminous mind Personally, I don't believe the commentaries at face value, and I believe that Bikkhu Bodhi has more or less skilfully pointed that they are sometimes even dead-wrong as they contradict some suttas. A lot of what is found in the commentaries (which are often abidhammically inspired) doesn't rely find backing in the suttas themselves, which, along with the Vinaya Pitaka, is the only source I will personally acknowledge as being actually authoritative. That the commentators were all supposedly Arahants is something I find more credible to be a later invention by the supporters of the commentaries, to lend authority to their claims. That it is not to say that they can't be extremely helpful in clarifying certain points (I have certainly found them to be so), but I would personally recommend that they should be taken with a grain of salt 23-12-01 08:58:03, Robert Epstein skrev: >Thanks, Nina, for posting the Commentary on the luminosity of the bhavanga cittas. >I found it very helpful to review it and as usual, the commentators speak in very >clear language, which is quite helpful. What I am going to say in response is >somewhat challenging what I have read, however, and I hope it won't be seen as too >disrespectful. I am trying to thrash out some of these issues, and I am looking >for the logic in them. I have great respect for the commentators, but do not >always accept their interpretation 'automatically' as I hope I do the Buddha's own >words. > >The following is to all who are taking part in this fascinating and controversial >conversation, and hope it is not too lengthy or redundant. > >I understand the analogy of the children and parents in the commentary below, >where the parents [bhavanga cittas] could be said to be defiled because their >reputation is ruined by the delinquent children, even though the parents >themselves are never directly defiled, but it doesn't seem to me to be a working >analogy for the actual consciousnesses in question. > >I plead ignorance if I misuse any of the categories, but I will be happy to be >corrected. From what I understand, the bhavanga cittas are never touched by >sense-objects, since they only arise to maintain the life-continuum and personal >identity when the sense-doors have 'closed' in deep sleep. Therefore, they are >totally sealed off from any incoming defilements. They remain pure, and in that >sense, could certainly be said to be 'luminous'. This luminosity would in itself >mean that the consciousnesses in question have a certain 'light' and I assume this >would be the light of the mind, the light of consciousness or awareness in one >form or another. Consciousnesses shed their light on the object of their >perception or thought, and thus 'discern' it to one degree or another. So >luminosity would make sense in regard to a consciousness that was not 'covered >over' with a lot of 'junk', such as ignorance and misinterpreted sensory moments. > >On the other hand, the cittas that are defiled by contact with outside objects are >not said to be the luminous ones. These are the naughty children who are filled >with ignorance, wrong thoughts and mis-perceptions, which are like dark clouds >which cover their luminosity until they are cleared away. > >To me, no matter how you slice it, you still have the same problem, and I don't >see the commentaries actually addressing it. The sutta speaks clearly of the mind >that is luminous being defiled. The commentary can only say that the 'reputation' >of the bhavanga cittas is ruined by the delinquent children. I know it's just an >analogy, but I don't see how the bhavanga cittas are implicated at all in the >defilement of akusala cittas [if that is the right term to use], and I don't see >at all how the defiled cittas have anything to do with the luminosity of the >bhavanga cittas. They are just completely separate and have no contact with each >other at all. > >Surely, the Buddha would have been clear enough to name the two categories of >which he was speaking if they were two different groups. > >It makes a lot more sense in reading the sutta to say that the same cittas or mind >that is luminous is the one that is being temporarily defiled. I don't see >anything in the commentary that reasonably explains this away. I am surprised to >hear that there is general agreement among the current living commentators that >the luminous mind refers to the bhavanga cittas. Is this true? > >If the Buddha was referring to the bhavanga cittas as the luminous ones and the >normal waking cittas as the defiled ones, he would have to say something like >this, in my admittedly limited opinion: > >"The consciousness of the mind in sleep is luminous as it is untouched by incoming >defilements. The consciousness of the waking mind is defiled by incoming >defilements. The waking consciousness can be purified through the development of >wisdom and the consciousness that has been purified thus will surely be seen to be >luminous." > >But when he says "Mind is luminous and it is defiled by incoming defilements" it >is a simple statement of a pure mind that has been defiled. I can accept the idea >that a citta arises with defilements which obscure its potential clarity and thus >the defilement must be cleared away for that citta to 'shine' with discernment and >wisdom. But I cannot see any way to put two disparate consciousnesses together in >the statement, so that it is interpreted to be the opposite of what it says. > >What puzzles me more is why it is even seen as necessary. To say that the mind, >composed of a string of cittas that have the potential to see clearly but which >are deceived by moha and misinterpretation, is defiled but is inherently luminous, >seems to be completely reasonable. It does not necessarily posit an underlying >mind that is an object or entity. It can easily be interpreted to be a succession >of cittas which carry defilements, thus obscuring their luminous quality, which >all consciousnesses have potentially, and which then must be freed from defilement >by sati and panna. And this interpretation seems to me to be much more direct >and make a lot more sense, than bringing the bhavanga cittas into it and somehow >having to figure out how they have something to do with defilement -- the very >opposite of their condition by definition. > >I hope I have not spoken too strongly, but I am just trying to be as logical as I >can. And I hope that it is all in the service of a worthwhile discussion. 10290 From: Anders Honore Date: Sun Dec 23, 2001 5:31am Subject: Re: [dsg] Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein 23-12-01 08:52:23, Kom Tukovinit skrev: >Dear Anders, > >I am happy to see you back. It's good talking with you as well, Kom. >> -----Original Message----- >I wouldn't agree that the Buddha speaks relatively, but on >the other hand, I would be happy with the statement that two >people would certainly interpret it differently. Well, since words in and of themselves are inherently relative (you can only have *this* in relation to *that* - if one, changes, then so does the relation to the other and the meaning is lost), I would certainly say that the Buddha speaks relatively. >> Will this reduce my clinging or add to it (in >> terms of clinging to views and concepts)? >> >> Will this sharpen my discernment (in terms of my >> own actual experienced reality)? > >We almost agree on this point, except the question I would >ask is, would considering the different implications improve >my understanding? Okay, so how would considering the different implications change your effective *experience* of reality. Not your conceptual understanding of reality as a whole, but your understanding of the present moment and the objects at hand discerned in the present moment. That is what really matters, because that is the tool with which you will efface the defilements of the mind. The Buddhist path is all about knowing your own mind, so that it can be liberated. It is *not* about knowing the minds of others (although you will understand the workings of them better, once you get to know your own), or about knowing the "rules" the goversn the mind. The "rules" that govern the mind don't contain the actual defilements, your own mind does, and it is that which is to be known. The only way to know your own mind is to observe it with clarity, and just discern mindfully "Here is desire, here is clinging, here is anger, here is attachment to self" etc., as such things are present in the mind. If you try and drag a conceptual model of the mind unto your own mind, your discernment of the mind will be obscured, because there is not clear seeing. A person may have studied the abbidhamma and sutta pitaka a thousand times, and have memorised a thousand causal reactionary responses of the mind as found in those scriptures, but if he doesn't know his own mind, it's all gone to waste. The scriptures are only pointers to help us on the path. We use the experience from studying to our minds to verify what is contained in the scriptures, not the other way around. >Agreeing on something on the first post on your return. >Now, that is something to be appreciated! Haha, it sure is! 10291 From: Anders Honore Date: Sun Dec 23, 2001 5:19am Subject: Re: [dsg] Ultimate realities (and khandhas) 23-12-01 08:19:11, Robert Epstein skrev: > >--- egberdina wrote: >> Jon, >> >> I am wondering if the quality of ultimate realities are subjective ie >> specific to each self. The colour blind person will see whatever they >> see, it is irreducible, it is colour, which is not capable of being >> described in other terms, not capable of being sensed through another >> door, unless you use LSD. >> >> Likewise, the non-colour blind person will see specific colour, >> looking at the same object as the colour blind person. Yet the colour >> experience will be different. In this way there is nothing absolute >> or ultimate about seeing the object as it really is, unless ultimate >> or absolute has relative connotations. >> >> So two arahants, sitting in a VW at the traffic lights, one colour >> blind, one not colour blind, will see two different realities as the >> lights change. I wonder which one will write the preferred >> commentaries? ( :-) ) > >Dear Herman, >I agree with much of what you say here, but not about the VW. My understanding is >that arahants prefer Mercedes sports cars, or at the very least a nice Toyota SUV. ROFL! Good one, Robert! 10292 From: abhidhammika Date: Sun Dec 23, 2001 7:13am Subject: Re: luminous mind: To Nina Dear Nina How are you? It is very kind of you to re-post your translations of Anguttara statements on the luminous mind. Thank you for your efforts and sharing your works with all of us. You wrote: "I am really looking forward to Suan's translation, explanation and analysis. I got stuck in the subco. since I find the language so difficult, all those composites." I have tranlated the portions of commentary I am about to use in Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Three). I still need to write technical notes on them, though. My idea is to write a kind of my own modern subcommentary on the luminous mind in the form of the technical notes. However, if you would like me to translate the Pali subcommentary on the commentary portions, please let me know. I could send them to you off-list. As you know, the Tiikaa passage is a bit lengthy, and to include translation of the whole passage in the Parinibbana Subcommentary series would compromise the purpose of the snappy presentation of my arguments. The readers would find it difficult to follow my arguments as their minds could be bogged down in Tiikaa's technical details. With regards, Suan http://www.bodhiology.org --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Nina van Gorkom wrote: > Dear Suan and Rob Ep, > I posted the Co to the sutta on Bhavanga some time ago for Rob Ep but may be > it was overlooked, so I post it again. I am really looking forward to Suan's > translation, explanation and analysis. I got stuck in the subco. since I > find the language so difficult, all those composites. > I find the comparison of bhavangacitta to the good parents and the > defilements arising at the moment of javana to the naughty children > interesting, but I have a feeling that I do not yet fully understand this, > that there is more to it. But there is no hurry, I know you have very many > working hours. > I would like to say to Rob: A. Sujin often said: when there is > bhavangacitta, nothing appears, no object appears. We do not know its > object, as you know it is the same as that experienced shortly before the > dying-consciousness of the previous life. The bhavangacitta is not involved > in outer objects, and thus, no defilements arise. But when sense- door > processes begin, objects are impinging on the doorways and experienced, > objects appear, and on account of them defilements are bound to arise. But > right understanding of them can be developed so that they are known as > conditioned dhammas, no self. > Nina. > Here is the Commentary, but the translation is coarse and only the first > part was corrected by Jim: > > @at.t.hakathaa > > 49. navame pabhassaranti pa.n.dara.m parisuddha.m. cittanti > bhava"ngacitta.m. ki.m pana cittassa va.n.no naama atthiiti? natthi. > > N: As to the ninth,² luminous². Luminous is clear, pure. citta is the > life-continuum. But how does there exist indeed a colour of citta? No, it > does not. > > niilaadiina~nhi a~n~natarava.n.na.m vaa hotu ava.n.na.m vaa ya.mki~nci > parisuddhataaya ``pabhassara''nti vuccati. > > N: For anything which may be a certain colour, beginning with blue, or > without colour, is called luminous because of its purity. > > idampi nirupakkilesataaya > parisuddhanti pabhassara.m. ta~nca khoti ta.m bhava"ngacitta.m. > > N: It is also pure, because it is unsoiled (by defilements); thus luminous. > That indeed, meaning, that life-continuum. > > aagantukehiiti asahajaatehi pacchaa javanakkha.ne uppajjanakehi. > > N: ³ by oncoming ³(defilements). by those that are not conascent with it, > but arise later at the moment of impulsion (javana). > > upakkilesehiiti raagaadiihi upakkili.t.thattaa upakkili.t.tha.m naamaati > vuccati. > > N: ³by defilements². By being soiled by desire etc. it is indeed called > defiled. > > katha.m? yathaa hi siilavantaa aacaarasampannaa maataapitaro > vaa aacariyupajjhaayaa vaa dussiilaana.m duraacaaraana.m > avattasampannaana.m puttaana~nceva antevaasikasaddhivihaarikaana~nca vasena > ``attano putte vaa antevaasikasaddhivihaarike vaa na tajjenti na > sikkhaapenti na ovadanti naanusaasantii''ti ava.n.na.m akitti.m labhanti, > eva.msampadamida.m veditabba.m. > > N: How is that so? For, as parents, teachers or preceptors, of good conduct, > possessed of good behaviour, because of the children, pupils or co- residents > of bad conduct, misbehhaved, disobedient, receive dispraise or disapproval > thus, ³ they neither instill awe to, nor discipline, admonish or exhort > their own children, their pupils, their co-residents², evenso should this > (bhavangacitta) having a similar consequence be understood. > > aacaarasampannaa maataapitaro viya ca > aacariyupajjhaayaa viya ca bhava"ngacitta.m da.t.thabba.m, > > N: Just as parents, teachers, preceptors, who are of good conduct, evenso > the life-continuum should be seen, > > puttaadiina.m > vasena tesa.m akittilaabho viya javanakkha.ne > rajjanadussanamuyhanasabhaavaana.m lobhasahagataadiina.m cittaana.m vasena > uppannehi aagantukehi upakkilesehi pakatiparisuddhampi bhava"ngacitta.m > upakkili.t.tha.m naama hotiiti. > > N: Just as the acquirement of a bad name for them, through the children > etc., evenso, because of the cittas that are of a nature of defilement, > corruption and infatuation, accompanied by desire and so on, arising at the > moments of impulsion, evenso is also the life-continuum, that is by nature > pure, indeed soiled, by the oncoming defilements that have arisen. > > ***** > > 50. dasamepi bhava"ngacittameva citta.m. > > N: With reference to the tenth, consciousness is also the life- continuum. > > vippamuttanti javanakkha.ne > arajjamaana.m adussamaana.m amuyhamaana.m > tihetuka~naa.nasampayuttaadikusalavasena uppajjamaana.m > aagantukehi upakkilesehi vippamutta.m naama hoti. > > N: ³Freed²: because of wholesomeness arising at the time of impulsion, > without defilements, corruptions and infatuations, and because consciousness > is accompanied by three wholesome roots, accompanied by wisdom, and thus it > is indeed freed of the arising of oncoming defilements. > > idhaapi yathaa > siilavantaana.m aacaarasampannaana.m puttaadiina.m vasena maataadayo > ``sobhanaa eteyeva attano puttakaadayo sikkhaapenti ovadanti > anusaasantii''ti va.n.nakittilaabhino honti, eva.m javanakkha.ne > uppannakusalacittavasena ida.m bhava"ngacitta.m aagantukehi upakkilesehi > vippamuttanti vuccatiiti. > > N: Here also, just as parents etc., with virtuous conduct, possessed with > good behaviour, because of their children, etc. , acquire praise and > approval, thus, ² they train, encourage, admonish their own children that > these things are indeed wholesome ³, evenso because of the arising of > wholesome consciousness at the time of impulsion, that life- continuum is > said to be freed of oncoming defilements. > > ******* > pa.nihitaacchavaggava.n.nanaa. > > N: Explanation of the chapter on pure intention. > > 6. accharaasa"nghaatavaggava.n.nanaa > N: Explanation of the chapter on the Snapping of the Fingers. > > 51. cha.t.thassa pa.thame ta.m assutavaa puthujjanoti ta.m > bhava"ngacitta.m sutavirahito puthujjano. > > N: With reference to the first section of the sixth chapter, ³the ordinary > person who is uninstructed², he is the ordinary person who has not heard of > that life-continuum. > > agamaadhigamaabhaavaa~neyyo assutavaa iti. > > N: He is not learned since he has not developed understanding of the > teachings nor (any higher) attainment of what should be attained > (bhaavaa~neyyo ?). > > yo hi ida.m sutta.m aadito pa.t.thaaya atthavasena > upaparikkhanto ``ida.m bhava"ngacitta.m naama pakatiparisuddhampi > javanakkha.ne uppannehi lobhaadiihi upakkilesehi upakkili.t.tha''nti neva > aagamavasena na adhigamavasena jaanaati, yassa ca > khandhadhaatuaayatanapaccayaakaarasatipa.t.thaanaadiisu > uggahaparipucchaavinicchayavirahitattaa > yathaabhuuta~naa.napa.tivedhasaadhako neva aagamo, pa.tipattiyaa > adhigantabbassa anadhigatattaa na adhigamo atthi. > > N: (uninstructed)Because he who is investigating this sutta etc. from the > beginning, as follows: ³This life-continuum indeed that is also pure by > nature, is at the moment of impulsion polluted by defilements that have > arisen, such as attachment, etc. that have arisen², does not understand it, > because he has no access (to the teachings) nor has he attained the truth), > and since he, as to the aggregates, the elements, the sensefields, the > causal genesis, the applications of mindfulness etc. is exempt from study, > does not ask questions, and has no discrimination, therefore he has no > access to seeing realities as they are, as to realization and > accomplishment, and since he does not engage in the practice that should be > engaged in, he has no attainment. > > so aagamaadhigamaabhaavaa > ~neyyo assutavaa iti. svaaya.m -- > N: He is uneducated with regard to knowledge of the teachings and attainment > that should be cultivated. He is such a person (so ayam). > > ****** 10293 From: yuzhonghao Date: Sun Dec 23, 2001 7:49am Subject: Re: [dsg] reminders India Hello Nina, I am not sure how you arrived the idea "no self who can do anything." Regards, Victor [snip] > How long the road is: because no self who can do anything. [snip] 10294 From: Kenneth Ong Date: Sun Dec 23, 2001 9:27am Subject: RE: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein Hi Kom and Sarah, "Luminous, monks, is the mind.[1] And it is defiled by incoming defilements." "Luminous, monks, is the mind. And it is freed from incoming defilements." k: The first statement of the sutta is I think of paramount impt. If we said that it is Nibbana or enlightment, then it the first place how did it get defiled. To say that our mind is originally luminous, then I believe this is to assume that there is some kind of a permanent self inside us. If we say that luminious mind is Nibbana as Nibbana is the object in the supramundance stage (as indicated by the last passage), it contradicts the first statement bc Nibbana could never be defiled if not why Buddha reach that stage in the first instance and then exhort his disciples to do that. My view is that luminous in this context should be bhavanga citta as it could discern in the present as a form of developement by noble ones. k: Without discerning bhavanga cittas, then we leave a three citta gap in each sense proccess of 17 cittas. If we total it up, it is a lot of cittas in a present moment (which consists of billions of cittas). This is a force to reckon with and notwithstanding such cittas still have latent tendecies as ignorance in this latent tendecies could only be eradicated by the last stage of Arahat. Secondly, bhavanga cittas should be very sutble and unlike kusala or unkusala cittas which have repetition effect (javana). Thirdly, bhavanga citta is always the initator of all thought process including vipaka ones. Hence the first stage till before reaching the last stage of the noble ones, discernment of bhavanga cittas should be considered impt for the development of the mind in my interpretation of the last passage of the sutta. Kind regards Ken O 10295 From: Robert Epstein Date: Sun Dec 23, 2001 11:45am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: luminous mind: To Nina Dear Suan, As much as I appreciate your snappy presentation of the subcommentary -- and I do indeed, let me make the following plea: If you do make the translation for Nina, please post it on-list. Though I may struggle with the commentaries, I am anxious to read them, particularly on this topic. I think we would all benefit from seeing it, if you decide to make that effort, and I for one will certainly be grateful. You could do it as a separate post, and then do your 'snappy presentation' in a separate message. Best, Robert Ep. =========================== --- abhidhammika wrote: > > > > Dear Nina > > How are you? > > It is very kind of you to re-post your translations of Anguttara > statements on the luminous mind. Thank you for your efforts and > sharing your works with all of us. > > You wrote: > > "I am really looking forward to Suan's translation, explanation and > analysis. I got stuck in the subco. since I find the language so > difficult, all those composites." > > I have tranlated the portions of commentary I am about to use in > Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Three). I still need to write > technical notes on them, though. > > My idea is to write a kind of my own modern subcommentary on the > luminous mind in the form of the technical notes. > > However, if you would like me to translate the Pali subcommentary on > the commentary portions, please let me know. I could send them to you > off-list. As you know, the Tiikaa passage is a bit lengthy, and to > include translation of the whole passage in the Parinibbana > Subcommentary series would compromise the purpose of the snappy > presentation of my arguments. The readers would find it difficult to > follow my arguments as their minds could be bogged down in Tiikaa's > technical details. > > > With regards, > > Suan > > http://www.bodhiology.org > > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Nina van Gorkom wrote: > > Dear Suan and Rob Ep, > > I posted the Co to the sutta on Bhavanga some time ago for Rob Ep > but may be > > it was overlooked, so I post it again. I am really looking forward > to Suan's > > translation, explanation and analysis. I got stuck in the subco. > since I > > find the language so difficult, all those composites. > > I find the comparison of bhavangacitta to the good parents and the > > defilements arising at the moment of javana to the naughty children > > interesting, but I have a feeling that I do not yet fully > understand this, > > that there is more to it. But there is no hurry, I know you have > very many > > working hours. > > I would like to say to Rob: A. Sujin often said: when there is > > bhavangacitta, nothing appears, no object appears. We do not know > its > > object, as you know it is the same as that experienced shortly > before the > > dying-consciousness of the previous life. The bhavangacitta is not > involved > > in outer objects, and thus, no defilements arise. But when sense- > door > > processes begin, objects are impinging on the doorways and > experienced, > > objects appear, and on account of them defilements are bound to > arise. But > > right understanding of them can be developed so that they are known > as > > conditioned dhammas, no self. > > Nina. > > Here is the Commentary, but the translation is coarse and only the > first > > part was corrected by Jim: > > > > @at.t.hakathaa > > > > 49. navame pabhassaranti pa.n.dara.m parisuddha.m. cittanti > > bhava"ngacitta.m. ki.m pana cittassa va.n.no naama atthiiti? > natthi. > > > > N: As to the ninth,2 luminous2. Luminous is clear, pure. citta is > the > > life-continuum. But how does there exist indeed a colour of citta? > No, it > > does not. > > > > niilaadiina~nhi a~n~natarava.n.na.m vaa hotu ava.n.na.m vaa > ya.mki~nci > > parisuddhataaya ``pabhassara''nti vuccati. > > > > N: For anything which may be a certain colour, beginning with blue, > or > > without colour, is called luminous because of its purity. > > > > idampi nirupakkilesataaya > > parisuddhanti pabhassara.m. ta~nca khoti ta.m bhava"ngacitta.m. > > > > N: It is also pure, because it is unsoiled (by defilements); thus > luminous. > > That indeed, meaning, that life-continuum. > > > > aagantukehiiti asahajaatehi pacchaa javanakkha.ne uppajjanakehi. > > > > N: 3 by oncoming 3(defilements). by those that are not conascent > with it, > > but arise later at the moment of impulsion (javana). > > > > upakkilesehiiti raagaadiihi upakkili.t.thattaa upakkili.t.tha.m > naamaati > > vuccati. > > > > N: 3by defilements2. By being soiled by desire etc. it is indeed > called > > defiled. > > > > katha.m? yathaa hi siilavantaa aacaarasampannaa maataapitaro > > vaa aacariyupajjhaayaa vaa dussiilaana.m duraacaaraana.m > > avattasampannaana.m puttaana~nceva > antevaasikasaddhivihaarikaana~nca vasena > > ``attano putte vaa antevaasikasaddhivihaarike vaa na tajjenti na > > sikkhaapenti na ovadanti naanusaasantii''ti ava.n.na.m akitti.m > labhanti, > > eva.msampadamida.m veditabba.m. > > > > N: How is that so? For, as parents, teachers or preceptors, of good > conduct, > > possessed of good behaviour, because of the children, pupils or co- > residents > > of bad conduct, misbehhaved, disobedient, receive dispraise or > disapproval > > thus, 3 they neither instill awe to, nor discipline, admonish > or exhort > > their own children, their pupils, their co-residents2, evenso > should this > > (bhavangacitta) having a similar consequence be understood. > > > > aacaarasampannaa maataapitaro viya ca > > aacariyupajjhaayaa viya ca bhava"ngacitta.m da.t.thabba.m, > > > > N: Just as parents, teachers, preceptors, who are of good conduct, > evenso > > the life-continuum should be seen, > > > > puttaadiina.m > > vasena tesa.m akittilaabho viya javanakkha.ne > > rajjanadussanamuyhanasabhaavaana.m lobhasahagataadiina.m > cittaana.m vasena > > uppannehi aagantukehi upakkilesehi pakatiparisuddhampi > bhava"ngacitta.m > > upakkili.t.tha.m naama hotiiti. > > > > N: Just as the acquirement of a bad name for them, through the > children > > etc., evenso, because of the cittas that are of a nature of > defilement, > > corruption and infatuation, accompanied by desire and so on, > arising at the > > moments of impulsion, evenso is also the life-continuum, that is by > nature > > pure, indeed soiled, by the oncoming defilements that have arisen. > > > > ***** > > > > 50. dasamepi bhava"ngacittameva citta.m. > > > > N: With reference to the tenth, consciousness is also the life- > continuum. > > > > vippamuttanti javanakkha.ne > > arajjamaana.m adussamaana.m amuyhamaana.m > > tihetuka~naa.nasampayuttaadikusalavasena uppajjamaana.m > > aagantukehi upakkilesehi vippamutta.m naama hoti. > > > > N: 3Freed2: because of wholesomeness arising at the time of > impulsion, > > without defilements, corruptions and infatuations, and because > consciousness > > is accompanied by three wholesome roots, accompanied by wisdom, and > thus it > > is indeed freed of the arising of oncoming defilements. > > > > idhaapi yathaa > > siilavantaana.m aacaarasampannaana.m puttaadiina.m vasena maataadayo > > ``sobhanaa eteyeva attano puttakaadayo sikkhaapenti ovadanti > > anusaasantii''ti va.n.nakittilaabhino honti, eva.m javanakkha.ne > > uppannakusalacittavasena ida.m bhava"ngacitta.m aagantukehi > upakkilesehi > > vippamuttanti vuccatiiti. > > > > N: Here also, just as parents etc., with virtuous conduct, > possessed with > > good behaviour, because of their children, etc. , acquire praise and > > approval, thus, 2 they train, encourage, admonish their own > children that > > these things are indeed wholesome 3, evenso because of the arising > of > > wholesome consciousness at the time of impulsion, that life- > continuum is > > said to be freed of oncoming defilements. > > > > ******* > > pa.nihitaacchavaggava.n.nanaa. > > > > N: Explanation of the chapter on pure intention. > > > > 6. accharaasa"nghaatavaggava.n.nanaa > > N: Explanation of the chapter on the Snapping of the Fingers. > > > > 51. cha.t.thassa pa.thame ta.m assutavaa puthujjanoti ta.m > > bhava"ngacitta.m sutavirahito puthujjano. > > > > N: With reference to the first section of the sixth chapter, 3the > ordinary > > person who is uninstructed2, he is the ordinary person who has not > heard of > > that life-continuum. > > > > agamaadhigamaabhaavaa~neyyo assutavaa iti. > > > > N: He is not learned since he has not developed understanding of the > > teachings nor (any higher) attainment of what should be attained > > (bhaavaa~neyyo ?). > > > > yo hi ida.m sutta.m aadito pa.t.thaaya atthavasena > > upaparikkhanto ``ida.m bhava"ngacitta.m naama pakatiparisuddhampi > > javanakkha.ne uppannehi lobhaadiihi upakkilesehi > upakkili.t.tha''nti neva > > aagamavasena na adhigamavasena jaanaati, yassa ca > > khandhadhaatuaayatanapaccayaakaarasatipa.t.thaanaadiisu > > uggahaparipucchaavinicchayavirahitattaa > > yathaabhuuta~naa.napa.tivedhasaadhako neva aagamo, pa.tipattiyaa > > adhigantabbassa anadhigatattaa na adhigamo atthi. > > > > N: (uninstructed)Because he who is investigating this sutta etc. > from the > > beginning, as follows: 3This life-continuum indeed that is also > pure by > > nature, is at the moment of impulsion polluted by defilements that > have > > arisen, such as attachment, etc. that have arisen2, does not > understand it, > > because he has no access (to the teachings) nor has he attained > the truth), > > and since he, as to the aggregates, the elements, the sensefields, > the > > causal genesis, the applications of mindfulness etc. is exempt from > study, > > does not ask questions, and has no discrimination, therefore he has > no > > access to seeing realities as they are, as to realization and > > accomplishment, and since he does not engage in the practice that > should be > > engaged in, he has no attainment. > > > > so aagamaadhigamaabhaavaa > > ~neyyo assutavaa iti. svaaya.m -- > > N: He is uneducated with regard to knowledge of the teachings and > attainment > > that should be cultivated. He is such a person (so ayam). > > > > ****** 10296 From: Robert Epstein Date: Sun Dec 23, 2001 11:47am Subject: RE: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein --- Kenneth Ong wrote: > Hi Kom and Sarah, > > > "Luminous, monks, is the mind.[1] And it is defiled by incoming > defilements." > > "Luminous, monks, is the mind. And it is freed from incoming defilements." > > > k: The first statement of the sutta is I think of paramount impt. If we > said that it is Nibbana or enlightment, then it the first place how did it > get defiled. To say that our mind is originally luminous, then I believe > this is to assume that there is some kind of a permanent self inside us. > If we say that luminious mind is Nibbana as Nibbana is the object in the > supramundance stage (as indicated by the last passage), it contradicts the > first statement bc Nibbana could never be defiled if not why Buddha reach > that stage in the first instance and then exhort his disciples to do that. > My view is that luminous in this context should be bhavanga citta as it > could discern in the present as a form of developement by noble ones. The problem, again, Ken, is that the bhavanga cittas are *never* defiled, are they? They are defined by being free of defilement, so it is the same problem as saying that Nibbana is defiled. Robert Ep. > > k: Without discerning bhavanga cittas, then we leave a three citta gap in > each sense proccess of 17 cittas. If we total it up, it is a lot of > cittas in a present moment (which consists of billions of cittas). This is > a force to reckon with and notwithstanding such cittas still have latent > tendecies as ignorance in this latent tendecies could only be eradicated > by the last stage of Arahat. Secondly, bhavanga cittas should be very > sutble and unlike kusala or unkusala cittas which have repetition effect > (javana). Thirdly, bhavanga citta is always the initator of all thought > process including vipaka ones. Hence the first stage till before reaching > the last stage of the noble ones, discernment of bhavanga cittas should be > considered impt for the development of the mind in my interpretation of > the last passage of the sutta. > > > > > Kind regards > Ken O 10297 From: Date: Sun Dec 23, 2001 7:41am Subject: Re: [dsg] FW: three rounds Dear Nina, <<<<< Now, I used to think that kata ~naa.na must be lokuttara but in India I learnt differently. A. Sujin said, when speaking about the highest level (doy ukkrit, in Pali ugghati is to lift up) kata ~naa.na is lokuttara, but there are other levels, when vipassana ~naa.na realizes the impermanence and thus dukkha of dhammas that arise and fall away. It is all so detailed and subtle. We have to look at the context: you mention the level of anuloma, arising before gotrabhu, which is followed by lokuttara citta. This is already "doy ukkrit", according to the highest level. Also she said, when there is kata~naa.na there are still sacca ~naa.na and kicca ~naa.na, they develop on and on. One realizes more and more the Truths that should be known (sacca) and the Truths that are known through the development of vipassana ~naa.na (kicca), and then there will be the fruit, kata ~naa.na according to the level that has been reached. Would you perhaps have time to also look at the Thai Co. I mentioned? It makes sense to me that she deals with these three in such a dynamic way, because they are not static, not abstract texbook terms. I still have on my computer your q. about pakatupanissaya p. from before I went to India, but I think Sarah answered these? Then I want to know whether your hand got cured completely? Can you type without pain? >>>>>>> It is good for me to reread and rethink about this. I like what Kom told me, Dhamma is very deep and subtle, also has multiple aspects (naya). The Bhuddha pierced through them all with his panna. The great discipline like Ven.Sariputta listened to just one sentence but could pierce through 1000 aspects(naya) of that one sentence. For me, I have to keep listening, reading, thinking and reflecting over and over and …….. To me, panna is illuminating. No matter how rear, how little, how weak or how shakable it is, it is always beneficial. My tipitaka CDrom and the online versions do not have any commentaries. I think the abhidhammattha-sagaha (abdms) I have, is a mahamakutta-rajavitayalau version. I do also have some parichetas by Aj.Somporn. I looked up the dhammacakkappavatana sutra and reread the abdms. The word saccanana, kiccanana and katanana were not found in Thai tipitaka, but in the dhammacakkaappavatana sutra mentions about 3 rounds of the 4 ariyasacca with 12 aspects (just not using those 3 words) . The contents in the sutra looked like it mentioned by ugghata perspective. In abdms the word ugghata also has a comparative (ugghata-tara) and superlative (ugghata-tama) forms. In PC 7, this 3 round was mentioned under sabbha-sagaha with 5-kandha, 5-upadhana, ayatana, dhatu and ariyasacca. The middle path and the 2 extreme paths are also mentioned here. Then in PC 9 as I mentioned before, this 3 rounds are mentioned first in anuloma-nana. Both the sutra and abdms say that if one sees one in four ariyasacca, he also sees other three simultaneously. Seemed to me that kata-nana is about to begin in anuloma but the other two can be accumulated in any level before. As I understand if there is kata-nana, the other two will be automatically there as well. It's mentioned that this 3-round occurs again in gotrabhu- and magga-nana. I understand that only magga and pala-nana are lokuttara, then even paccavekkhana-nana is lokiya level again. Again this is my understanding, sotapatimagga and pala is the first time the whole three nana is perfected but there are still more akusala to eliminate, so these three nana is not completely perfected yet. I think magga-nana of an arahat is ugghata-tama and for sekha-puggalas are in ugghata-tara level. That what I was able to get from my reading. I am looking forward to hear more from you as well as Jon and Jaran in BKK then ( hope I do not put too much burden on you, Jon :)) About pakatupanissaya-paccaya, I think I saw Sarah said something about it(thanks Sarah). I have been reading more about it, so I think I have some more understanding about it. Rgd my hand, it is doing much better now. I can type and write with no more pain. I am also back in playing tennis ( I did not do the cankamma, sorry!). I still have to put a buddy-strap on my fingers when I am playing tennis, so far I can hit it without any pain. Thanks for everything. Appreciate, Num 10298 From: egberdina Date: Sun Dec 23, 2001 3:23pm Subject: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein Dear Anders, Good to have you back :-) All the best Herman > > If you are not close to being able to investigate the luminous for yourself in this very present moment, then what good will > speculating about it do? The questiosn you gotta ask yourselves are: > > Will this reduce my clinging or add to it (in terms of clinging to views and concepts)? > > Will this sharpen my discernment (in terms of my own actual experienced reality)? > > Regards > Anders 10299 From: m. nease Date: Sun Dec 23, 2001 3:28pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Memory, Objects, and Continuity Hi Howard, --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Howard: > No, I'm not thinking, in this context, of a > memory as providing an > object in addition to the current object. I'm > thinking of the memory as a > subliminal memory *trace* which conditions the > current object by its presence > and is a mental concomitant of the current citta. > For example, the "memory" > of the immediately preceding very soft sound may > cause the current sound to > appear very loud. Interesting thought and example... > But it is only the current sound > that is the object of the > current citta. At other times, a memory may not be > subliminal, but may be the > unique object of the current citta. . I'm inclined to think that sa~n~naa occurs with varying strengths from latent (like anusaya), so not 'manifest' at all, to subtle (subliminal?) to very distinct (no idea if this is good abhidhamma or not). Still it makes most sense to me that each of these moments would occur 'serially', whether truly discretely or not. Good point though that this doesn't account for how a previous memory can affect the subjective experience of something like relative volume. mike 10300 From: Kenneth Ong Date: Sun Dec 23, 2001 7:08pm Subject: RE: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein Hi Robert Ep The problem, again, Ken, is that the bhavanga cittas are *never* > defiled, are > they? They are defined by being free of defilement, so it is the same > problem as > saying that Nibbana is defiled. k: Let me assume that defilements as to sensory objects. To me bhavanga citta is by nature luminious and not defiled. But when being disturb by sensory objects, it is considered defiled. In the same way, a clear water (bhavanga citta) will become cloudy if we start disturbing it by stirring it (sensory objects). In this way, I believe it is considered defiled. But if we fall asleep, bhavanga cittas are no longer affected by sensory objects, it become luminous again. Just like sand particles settled down, the water becomes clear again. Water is by nature clear and only through mud, sand particles (by stirring them), it becomes defiled. Sorry I do not quote commentaries bc I know nuts abt them, I basing on logic and my intuition. Hope this helps :). Kind regards Ken O 10301 From: m. nease Date: Sun Dec 23, 2001 9:12pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Concept Dear Purnomo, --- "Purnomo ." wrote: > If we seek a 'Concept', we have to collect all our > experiences and we 'just' > make a conclusion. That is a concept--for me. How > about you ? I am guarantee > that is different. Why ? Because that is 'concept' > for me. And That's true > for me not you. So, concept is not absolute truth. Exactly right, I think, except I would say that the conclusion makes itself--or rather that it forms due to conditions (sa~n~aa- and sankhaara-khandhas being of particular importance to this I think). mike 10302 From: m. nease Date: Sun Dec 23, 2001 9:25pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein Hi Howard, --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Just for the record, not that my take is of > any partcular importance, > I, for one, definitely don't "buy" that commentarial > interpretation. Your take is always of some importance to me, Howard. I think it's interesting that we are diametrically opposed here, especially since we are in such close agreement, I think, in many other respects. Anyway, also just for the record, I definitely *do* 'buy' that commentarial interpretation... > To me, > it is *crystal clear* that the Buddha is saying that > the mind is luminous but > for defilements which cover it, rather like a sky > obfuscated by a cloud > cover, a sky which, in itself, is clear, or like > gold which is lacking in > shine only when corrrupted as part of gold ore, and > which manifests its > capacity to shine once the impurities are removed. ...and to me, it is *crystal clear* that the Buddha is *not* saying any such thing, anywhere in the Pali canon--with this meaning. Hope we can continue to agreeably disagree, however totally. mike 10303 From: Kenneth Ong Date: Sun Dec 23, 2001 9:30pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Luminous mind Hi Sarah > Sometimes when we read the texts it seems that all realities should be > known. > However, we should remember we are reading about the Buddha’s > extraordinary > understanding. Can we expect ‘all cittas’ could be discerned? (Btw, > Howard uses > discern in the sense of ‘cognizing’ i.e. what each citta does regardless > of > whether there is any wisdom accompanying it. You seem to use it in the > sense of > ‘being known’ or ‘understood’....you may like to compare notes with > him;-)) k: In fact all cittas can be discern (even if there is no sati or panna) due to the universal cetasikas that followed each cittas. > You’ll see in the following extract from the com notes I just gave a > link for, that the defilements arise in the javana process in a later sense door or mind door process. Any understanding also arises in these javana processes only, to know any reality. This is what is meant development of the mind. It is not referring to understanding bhavanga cittas specifically, but we need to know there are these cittas in between other doorways. k: In my view, to know any reality in javana process is what we call the present moment of now that we currently have. To discount bhavanga cittas as a development process is not consistent with the sutta. We could not on one hand saying that it is bhavanga cittas on the first two statements than says that developement of the mind on the next two statements is not bhavanga citta. It is contradictary. To be in line with the sutta, it is meant for the development of the mind for bhavanga cittas and not other cittas. We know that each suttas could mean a different method of practise. And that sutta could point that other than looking at javana process, bhavanga citta should be noted for those who are noble ones. The gist word of the whole sutta is I think "noble ones". Then the sutta will be view more in line with Abhidhamma as well as Sutta perspective. > > Furthermore, in Abhidhamma, I do not think there is an explanation how > > does bhavanga cittas actually work (except as life continual), its > objects (a mystery) and how it is being defiled by the six senses. It simply says that it is being defiled (or impinge or disturb), is there any > > commentaries on the intracies on how it being defiled. The actual > details will be very helpful. Maybe as a Christmas gift to me. (I sound > greedy :)) > ..... > > As we won’t be seeing you, that’s OK;-)) > I’ll adda couple of links. Kom and Num are also very clued up on the > details. > As Suan suggested, it helps a lot to understand some abhidhamma when > reading > the Suttas and commentaries. All the details are there, for sure. k: When we talk abt commentaries. I know there are Abhidhamma commentaries. Are there sutta commentaries (I think there is)? I have the book dispeller of delusion, is the commentaries on mindfullness is Abhidhamma perspective or sutta perspective commentaries. Or I have confused myself with the term commentaries. he he :) k: Merry Christmas and Happy New Year to you and everyone in the list. Enjoy your stay in Bangkok, hmm I disappointed that I could not attend. One day maybe kamma may work for me, who knows, he he :). Kind regards Ken O 10304 From: m. nease Date: Sun Dec 23, 2001 9:34pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein Hi Kenneth, Thanks for this interesting quotation. I agree with Ven. Thanissaro that 'luminosity', 'purity', 'brightness' etc. in the suttas often refers to jhana (as in Howard's pure gold, e.g.) rather than to bhavanga. Nowhere do I think it refers to some underlying, boundless, luminous, cosmic consciousness. mike p.s. I met Ven. Thanissaro a couple of weeks ago--he has a new book out if anyone's interested, 'Buddhist Monastic Code Vol. 2'. Good stuff... --- Kenneth Ong wrote: > Hi Howard and Sarah, > > I think I like the notes made by Thanissaro Bhikkhu > on "Luminous" at > http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/anguttara/an01-049.html > > Quote > Note > 1. This statement has engendered a great deal of > controversy over the > centuries. The commentary maintains that "mind" here > refers to the > bhavanga-citta, the momentary mental state between > periods when the mental > stream adverts to objects, but this statement raises > more questions than > it answers. There is no reference to the > bhavanga-citta or the mental > stream in any of the suttas (they appear first in an > Abhidhamma treatise, > the Patthana); and because the commentaries compare > the bhavanga-citta to > deep sleep, why is it called luminous? And why would > the perception of its > luminosity be a prerequisite for developing the > mind? And further, if > "mind" in this discourse means bhavanga-citta, what > would it mean to > develop the bhavanga-citta? > > Another interpretation equates the luminosity of the > mind with the > "consciousness without feature," desribed as > "luminous" in MN 49 and DN > 11, but this interpretation also has problems. > According to MN 49, that > consciousness partakes of nothing in the describable > world, not even the > "Allness of the All," so how could it possibly be > defiled? And, because it > is not realized until the goal of the practice is > reached, why would the > perception of its luminosity be a prerequisite for > developing the mind? > And again, if "mind" here means consciousness > without feature, how could > the sutta talk of its development? > > A more reasonable approach to understanding the > statement can be derived > from taking it in context: the luminous mind is the > mind that the > meditator is trying to develop. To perceive its > luminosity means > understanding that defilements such as greed, > aversion, or delusion are > not intrinsic to its nature, are not a necessary > part of awareness. > Without this understanding, it would be impossible > to practice. With this > understanding, however, one can make an effort to > cut away existing > defilements, leaving the mind in the stage that MN > 24 calls "purity in > terms of mind." This would correspond to the > luminous level of > concentration described in the standard simile for > the fourth jhana: "And > furthermore, with the abandoning of pleasure & pain > -- as with the earlier > disappearance of elation & distress -- he enters & > remains in the fourth > jhana: purity of equanimity & mindfulness, > neither-pleasure-nor-pain. He > sits, permeating the body with a pure, bright > awareness. Just as if a man > were sitting covered from head to foot with a white > cloth so that there > would be no part of his body to which the white > cloth did not extend; even > so, the monk sits, permeating the body with a pure, > bright awareness. > There is nothing of his entire body unpervaded by > pure, bright awareness." > From this state it is possible to develop the > discernment that not only > cuts away existing defilements but also uproots any > potential for them to > ever arise again. Only in the stages of awakening > that follow on those > acts of discernment would "consciousness without > feature" be realized. 10305 From: Robert Epstein Date: Sun Dec 23, 2001 9:57pm Subject: RE: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein Hi Kenneth. I guess we can get someone else to chime in again on this, but my understanding is that the bhavanga cittas never make any contact with sense objects and thus are never defiled. They only get 'turned on' in deep sleep, unconsciousness or death to ensure the continuity during the 'blank periods' when the conscious mind and sensory phenomena are absent. So when there is sense object impinging on a citta, it is never bhavanga citta, it is always the 'waking' citta. When bhavanga citta awakens, there is never any object there. Bhavanga citta only has as its object the last object before the previous death, and it never varies, so there is no chance of any defilement. If the above is true, by this logic, I cannot see how the bhavanga citta can be the one referred to in the statement: 'Mind is luminous, but is defiled by incoming defilements'. It would be quite impossible. And in fact, the commentaries seems to assume as I do that the bhavanga cittas cannot be directly defiled. That is why they employ the 'parent and child' analogy, which says that the waking cittas, which are defiled, ruin the reputation of the parents, the bhavanga cittas, even though the bhavanga cittas are never themselves defiled. So in a sense the Buddha could be saying that the bhavanga cittas are defiled by the other cittas, even though they themselves are actually *not* defiled. With respect, this seems to be stretching the meaning of the Buddha's very simple declarative statement quite a bit, in my opinion. I look forward to reading a greater part of the commentary on this subject, if Suan takes on the time-consuming task of translating it, and I hope it will clarify the above. Until then, I think it is interesting to note the different 'streams' of cittas that are taking place on different levels in the human structure, as it is constructed from moment to moment by a series of changing conditions and events. There are the subconsious cittas, the bhavanga cittas; the conscious ones, which perceive namas and rupas, and the supra-mundane cittas, which discern the reality of arising namas and rupas and some of which are capable of perceiving Nibbana. But as I understand it, it is still the case that only one of these cittas appears at a time. It is an interesting picture of reality. Best, Robert Ep. ============ --- Kenneth Ong wrote: > Hi Robert Ep > > The problem, again, Ken, is that the bhavanga cittas are *never* > > defiled, are > > they? They are defined by being free of defilement, so it is the same > > problem as > > saying that Nibbana is defiled. > > > k: Let me assume that defilements as to sensory objects. To me bhavanga > citta is by nature luminious and not defiled. But when being disturb by > sensory objects, it is considered defiled. In the same way, a clear water > (bhavanga citta) will become cloudy if we start disturbing it by stirring > it (sensory objects). In this way, I believe it is considered defiled. > But if we fall asleep, bhavanga cittas are no longer affected by sensory > objects, it become luminous again. Just like sand particles settled down, > the water becomes clear again. Water is by nature clear and only through > mud, sand particles (by stirring them), it becomes defiled. > > Sorry I do not quote commentaries bc I know nuts abt them, I basing on > logic and my intuition. > > Hope this helps :). > > > > > Kind regards > Ken O 10306 From: m. nease Date: Sun Dec 23, 2001 10:05pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Concept Great reminder Sarah, thanks...mike --- Sarah wrote: > The Abhidhammattha Vibhavani (Book 8) distinguishes > between six kinds of > concepts that are names, nama-pannatti (see > Visuddhimagga VIII, note 11). > > 1. Vijjamana pannattis, concepts which make > known what is real, for > example the words rupa, nama, vedana (feeling), or > sanna (perception) 10. > > 2. Avijjamana pannattis, concepts which > make known what is not real, > such as the words Thai or foreigner. These concepts > do not represent absolute > realities, citta and cetasika which are nama, and > rupa. Thai or foreigner are > not real in the absolute sense, they are > conventional realities, sammutti > dhammas. Could akusala citta11 (unwholesome > consciousness) be Thai or foreign? > Akusala citta is a paramattha dhamma (a reality), it > is a dhamma which has its > own characteristic, it is not Thai or foreign. > > 3. Vijjamanena avijjamana pannattis, > concepts of the non-existent > based on the existent. There is the expression "the > person with the six > abhinnas."12 The six abhinnas are real but person is > not real. Thus this > concept stands for what is real and for what is not > real. > > 4. Avijjamanena vijjamana pannattis, > concepts of the existent based on > the non-existent. There is the expression "woman's > voice". The sound is real, > but the woman is not real. > > 5. Vijjamanena vijjamana pannattis, > concepts of what is real based on > what is real. There is the term cakkhu-vinnana > (eye-consciousness). Cakkhu > (eye) is a reality, namely the cakkhu-pasada-rupa > (eyesense, a reality > sensitive to colour or visible object), and vinnana > (consciousness) is also a > reality, namely the reality which experiences. > > 6. Avija amanena avijjamana pannattis, > concepts of what is not real > based on what is not real. There is the expression > "the kings son". Both king > and son are not real, they are sammutti dhammas, > conventional realities. 10307 From: Robert Epstein Date: Sun Dec 23, 2001 10:16pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Concept Dear Sarah, I agree with Mike that this is a helpful and excellent list. Based on it, I would ask you for a clarification: Jon has said that concepts are not realities, but I thought that concepts were namas and that they *were* considered realities. Am I confused? Can a nama such as the ones below be discerned as a paramatha dhamma, and if so, what are the concepts which are not eligible as objects for sati and panna? I keep hanging on this theme, because I seem to be having a lot of trouble sorting out the 'real' from the 'unreal' as regards concepts. Thanks, Robert Ep. ============= --- "m. nease" wrote: > Great reminder Sarah, thanks...mike > > --- Sarah wrote: > > > The Abhidhammattha Vibhavani (Book 8) distinguishes > > between six kinds of > > concepts that are names, nama-pannatti (see > > Visuddhimagga VIII, note 11). > > > > 1. Vijjamana pannattis, concepts which make > > known what is real, for > > example the words rupa, nama, vedana (feeling), or > > sanna (perception) 10. > > > > 2. Avijjamana pannattis, concepts which > > make known what is not real, > > such as the words Thai or foreigner. These concepts > > do not represent absolute > > realities, citta and cetasika which are nama, and > > rupa. Thai or foreigner are > > not real in the absolute sense, they are > > conventional realities, sammutti > > dhammas. Could akusala citta11 (unwholesome > > consciousness) be Thai or foreign? > > Akusala citta is a paramattha dhamma (a reality), it > > is a dhamma which has its > > own characteristic, it is not Thai or foreign. > > > > 3. Vijjamanena avijjamana pannattis, > > concepts of the non-existent > > based on the existent. There is the expression "the > > person with the six > > abhinnas."12 The six abhinnas are real but person is > > not real. Thus this > > concept stands for what is real and for what is not > > real. > > > > 4. Avijjamanena vijjamana pannattis, > > concepts of the existent based on > > the non-existent. There is the expression "woman's > > voice". The sound is real, > > but the woman is not real. > > > > 5. Vijjamanena vijjamana pannattis, > > concepts of what is real based on > > what is real. There is the term cakkhu-vinnana > > (eye-consciousness). Cakkhu > > (eye) is a reality, namely the cakkhu-pasada-rupa > > (eyesense, a reality > > sensitive to colour or visible object), and vinnana > > (consciousness) is also a > > reality, namely the reality which experiences. > > > > 6. Avija amanena avijjamana pannattis, > > concepts of what is not real > > based on what is not real. There is the expression > > "the kings son". Both king > > and son are not real, they are sammutti dhammas, > > conventional realities. 10308 From: Robert Epstein Date: Sun Dec 23, 2001 10:31pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Sarah Dear Sarah, Well, I have at least done a *bit* of homework, and went and read the translations of the 'luminous mind' commentary that Nina was working on. I appreciate those being there, they are quite clear in what they say. Here is the excerpt I am focussing on at the moment. I have left out the Pali, as it is available in the dsg files. My comments follow: ============== >>It is also pure, because it is unsoiled (by defilements); thus luminous. That indeed, meaning, that life-continuum. N: 3 by oncoming 3(defilements). by those that are not conascent with it, but arise later at the moment of impulsion (javana). >>N: 3by defilements2. By being soiled by desire etc. it is indeed called defiled.>> >>N: How is that so? For, as parents, teachers or preceptors, of good conduct, possessed of good behaviour, because of the children, pupils or co-residents of bad conduct, misbehhaved, disobedient, receive dispraise or disapproval thus, 3 they neither instill awe to, nor discipline, admonish or exhort their own children, their pupils, their co-residents2, evenso should this (bhavangacitta) having a similar consequence be understood.>> >>N: Just as parents, teachers, preceptors, who are of good conduct, evenso the life-continuum should be seen,>> >>N: Just as the acquirement of a bad name for them, through the children etc., evenso, because of the cittas that are of a nature of being passionate, hateful, or deluded, accompanied by desire and so on, arising at the moments of impulsion, evenso is also the life-continuum, that is by nature pure, indeed soiled, by the oncoming defilements that have arisen.>> =================== Although I understand the parent-child analogy, I can't see the comparison. The bhavanga-cittas have no responsibility to the defiled cittas in question. They have no relationship to them at all. Though they are 'pure' and the waking cittas are 'defiled' that is as far as the good parent/bad child analogy goes. There is no real soiling of the reputation of the bhavanga cittas via the soiling of the waking cittas. It has no effect on the bhavanga cittas at all. To whom would the reputation be ruined, or who would hold the bhavanga cittas responsible for not 'preventing' the defiling of the waking cittas? It seems to me to be an analogy that doesn't apply to the reality of these cittas. The Buddha's statement is quite simple and clear. The explanation that attributes this to the bhavanga cittas is convoluted. I would think there would have to be some logical extrapolation from the Buddha's original words for the commentary's viewpoint to be understood. Best, Robert Ep. ================================================== --- Sarah wrote: > Dear Suan and Ken O, > > Thanks for your kind note, Suan, and for your good questions, Ken O. > > Suan, I'm sure it is a lot of work to translate just a few short extracts from > the commentaries. it may be helpful to be reminded that Nina (and Jim) worked > quite hard on these same Ang Nik suttas and commentary notes which I think you > both may find it interesting to review at: > > http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/message/8386 > commentary notes translation > > http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/message/8408 > sutta translation > > Suan, I'll look forward to your next set of Parinibbana sub-com notes (3) and > your analysis. Ken O, you may wish to quote back some of Nina's translation > with further comments in the meantime for Nina or Kom or myself. > > Sarah 10309 From: m. nease Date: Sun Dec 23, 2001 10:36pm Subject: Re: [dsg] FW: three rounds Dear Kom, --- Nina van Gorkom wrote: > Then I want to know whether your hand got cured > completely? Can you type > without pain? I think I knew but had forgotten that, perhaps, we haven't heard from you because of typing difficulty? If this is still a problem, I'll be very happy to transcribe for the list anything you can get to me in any audio format. mike 10310 From: Sarah Date: Sun Dec 23, 2001 10:43pm Subject: Intro to Vinaya Commentary - words of the Buddha? <6> Dear Friends, (Firstly, i apologise that this segment or 'episode' is a little longer than intended because of the last minute inclusion of the water-snake section in full) ******************** Smp. = Samantapaasaadikaa. This is the commentary to the Vinaya by Buddhaghosa Baahiranidaana, The Inception of Discipline & the Vinaya Nidaana = the introductory chapter to the Smp., translated by N.A, Jayawickrama Atth.=Atthasalini, commentary by Buddhaghosa to Dhammasangini, 1st book of the Abhidhamma Pitaka, PTS, translated by Pe Muang Tin Mah.= Mahavamsa., Chronicle of the history of Sri Lanka from the time of the visit of the Buddha, PTS, translated by W.Geiger. Based on the same ancient Sinhala commentaries which Buddhaghosa used. Written by Mahanama in Pali around 1000 A.D. but based on the original Mahavamsa Comm. ******************** Just to recap, last time I quoted from the Bahiranidanawhere it discussed the different emphasis found in the Suttanta, Vinaya and Abhidhamma. With regard to the Abhidhamma, it said: > the third, that set out in accordance with reality wherein bengs who conceive > of an ego and what pertains to it, only in the presence of a pile of > conditions, are instructed in terms of the absolute truth.......’ > > ******************** I’ll continue with just a few more quotes from The Bahiranidana concerning the division of Suttanta, Vinaya and Abhidhamma as reportedly rehearsed at the 1st Council. (Identical details are found in the Atth., pp 26-31): ‘Similarly, the first is called discourse on the various categories of restraint as in it are discussed all aspects of restraint, which are diametrically opposed to remissness in conduct; the second , discourse on the refutation of heresies as in it is discussed the unravelling of perverse views, which is diametrically opposed to the 62 heretical theories; and the third , discourse on the distinction between Name and Form as in it is discussed the differentiation of Name and Form which is diametrically opposed to lust and other evil tendencies. ‘....Hence the training in the higher morality is specifically discussed in the Vinayapitaka, the training in higher thought in the Suttapitaka, and the training in higher wisdom in the Abhidhammapitaka........... ‘And in these three (Pitakas) the dhamma, the meaning, the exposition, and the comprehension are difficult to access to men of little wit and providing no basis of support even as the great ocean is to hares and such animals; and hence they are profound. In this manner, herein, should the fourfold profundity too of each one of them be understood.’ ********** By coincidence, the next extract I already planned to refer to is the same sutta that Num and Howard have been discussing (Alagadduupama Sutta, Mi,133f) .It appears after these extracts just quoted on the importance of the 3 Pitakas. Because of the interest, it may be useful to read it in this context. It can be found in both the Bahiranidana and the Atthasalini. I’ll continue to use the translation I’ve been using from the Bahiranidana: ‘...One should also elaborate on all topics such as the division of the learning and how and under what conditions a monk attains whatever (there may be of) success or failure, the threefold division of the learning in these three Pitakas should be observed. The modes of learning are three (in number): that which may be compared to the water-snake, that which aims at release, and the mode of learning of a treasurer. Here, what has been wrongly grasped, and learned by heart for the reproach of others is comparable to the simile of the water-snake: regarding which it is said , "Even as, O monks, a man who is in need of a water-snake, who seeks for one and goes about searching for one, were to see a large water-snake, he would seize it by the coils or tail, and that water-snake were to turn round and bite him in the hand or arm or any other part of his body, he would, in consequence of that undergo death or pain amounting to death. What is the reason for it? O monks, it was due to the imporoper handling of the water-snake. Even in the same way, O monks, some foolish men in this world commit to memory the Dhamma consisting of sutta, geyya, veyyakarana, gatha, udana, itivuttaka, jataka, abbhutadhamma, and vedalla. Having committed to memory the Dhamma, they do not examine with intelligence the significance of those teachings. As they do not examine intelligently their significance, those teachings do not arouse comprehension. They commit the teachings to memory for the sake of censuring others and freeing themselves of others’ blame. They do not experience that purpose for the sake of which (the virtuous) master the Dhamma. Those teachings which have been wrongly grasped by them are conducive to their disadvantage and misery for a long time. What is the reason for it? O monks, it is due to the wrong comprehension of the teachings." ‘Whatever has been well grasped, and perfected, desiring the fulfilment of the aggregate of moral precepts themselves not with the purpose of censuring others - it brings about release. Regarding this it is said, "Those teachings being well grasped by them are conducive to their advantage and happiness for a long time. What is the reason for it? O monks, it is due to their correct comprehension of the teachings." ‘Again, whatever a canker-waned sage who has understood the aggregates, rid himself of the defilements, developed the path, pierced through the state of mutability, and realized cessation, accomplishes solely for the purpose of guarding the line of continuity and protecting the linage, this is the mode of learning of a treasurer.’ ********** Hopefully, we’re all learning here to ‘examine with intelligence the significance of those teachings’ rather than learning ‘by heart for the reproach of others’. I quoted these extracts in full because of the interest in this sutta. There is further discussion about the danger of the wrong grasp of the Vinaya and Suttanta. With regard to wrong grasp of the Abhidhamma, it says: ‘ He who is faring ill along in the Abhidhamma over-rides the thoughts on the nature of things and thinks even of what should not be reflected on. consequently he arrives at confusion of mind......’ ********** I’ll just skip now to the end of the chapter in the Bahiranidana on the First council where we read: ‘ Thus, this word of the Buddha which is uniform in sentiment taken as a whole (without division), and consists of such divisions as the Dhamma and the Vinaya in the divisions such as those into two and so forth, has been laid down as, "This is the Dhamma and this is the Vinaya, these are the first, intermediate, and final sayings of the Buddha, these are the Vinaya, Sutta, and Abhidhamma Pitakas, these are the Nikayas from Digha to Khuddaka, these are the nine angas commencing with sutta and these are the 84,000 Units of the Dhamma," was rehearsed together by the assembly of self-controlled monks with Mahakassapa as their leader verily observing this distinction. ‘And not only this, but other divers distinctions in compilation to be met in the three Pitakas, such as the stanzas containing lists of contents, the arrangement into chapters, noting down the repetitions, and the classification into kindred sections of ones, twos, and so forth, that into groups of kindred topics, and into group of fifties and so forth, have been determined when it was rehearsed together in seven months, ‘And at the conclusion of its rehearsal this great earth trembled and quaked, shook and shook violently many times over, up to its ocean-limits as though giving its blessing at the joy produced that this dispensation of the Lord of Ten Powers had been made by the Elder Mahakassapa to last a period of time extending 5,000 years. And many wondrous things became manifest. And this is the First Great Convocation ......’ ********** When I read and write these words, I feel the greatest gratitude and respect for these great arahats who preserved the Teachings in this way. The last details regarding the First Council itself and the earth quaking can also be found at Atth. pp34-35. ********** It could be said that as these commentaries were both written by Buddhaghosa, it is not surprising that the details and inclusion of the Abhidhamma explanations are the same. Looking at the Mahavamsa, I also don’t find any disparity in details. We read about the 700,000 leading bhikkhus amongst the ‘khattiyas and brahmans, vessas and suddas, and gods likewise’ at the Parinibbana. we read about Mahakassapa pointing ‘500 eminent bhikkhus, who had overcome the asavas, repeaters of the ninefold doctrine and versed in all its separate parts; but there was one less because of the thera Ananda....’ It continues with the same details of how they arrived in Rajagaha after ‘they had made their pilgrimage over Jambudipa (India), consoling here and there the sorrowing people’ and how they spent the first of the rain-months repairing the dwellings in Rajagaha. Similar details are given about Ananda’s arahatship, how Upali was selected to ‘speak for the vinaya’ and Ananda for the rest of the dhamma with Mahakassapa asking questions and so on. In the Theravada tradition, the dates and importance of the First, Second and Third Councils are found mostly in the Bahiranidana, the Smp., references in the Vinaya itself and the Mahavamsa. As I’ve mentioned, they are all in conformity. Without wishing to enter into any debate on the topic (about which I know nothing;-), I’ll just add a note from Geiger’s introduction to his translation of Mahavamsa concerning the inclusion of the Abhidhamma in the ‘later tradition’ accounts of the First Council (especially for Ken O and Rob Ep) : ‘Among the Northern buddhist sources dealing with the first Council I mention the Mahavastu. Here, in agreement with the southern tradition Kasyapa is given as the originator of the coucil, the number of the bhiksus taking part is stated to be 500 and the place the aptaparna grotto near Rajagrha. ‘There is, besides, an account in the second volume of the Dulva, the Tibetan Vinaya of the Sarvastivadin sect. The fixing of the canon took place, according to this source, in the following order: 1) Dharma, by Ananda; 2)Vinaya, by Upali; 3)Matrka (i.e.Abhidarma) by Mahakasyapa himself..... ‘Fa-hian and Hiuen-thsang also mention the First Council. The former gives the number of the bhiksus a 500, the latter as 1,000; the former speaks in a general way of ‘a collection of sacred books’, the latter expressly mentions also the redaction of the Abhidharma by Mahakasyapa.’ ********** I look forward to discussing more about the commentaries, perhaps, next time. Best wishes and happy holidays meanwhile, Sarah ` .......................................................................................................... 10311 From: m. nease Date: Sun Dec 23, 2001 10:52pm Subject: Re: [dsg] A Cautionary Note: The Conventional Nature of Cittas and Processes Hi Howard, --- upasaka@a... wrote: > I expect that some of you may find the title > of this post to be > somewhat displeasing. Not a bit, speaking for myself... > If so, you have my apologies. > Let me explain what I > mean. > The Abhidhamma, itself, views a stream of > consciousness as continuous > in the sense of being unbroken, without gaps. But > that stream is analyzed > into processes, and the processes into cittas. As I > see it, that parsing of > experience into processes and cittas, while not > ungrounded, is still > conventional. I agree. I think Sarah's earlier post addresses this well, notably number 1: The Abhidhammattha Vibhavani (Book 8) distinguishes between six kinds of concepts that are names, nama-pannatti (see Visuddhimagga VIII, note 11). 1. Vijjamana pannattis, concepts which make known what is real, for example the words rupa, nama, vedana (feeling), or sanna (perception). 2. Avijjamana pannattis, concepts which make known what is not real, such as the words Thai or foreigner. These concepts do not represent absolute realities, citta and cetasika which are nama, and rupa. Thai or foreigner are not real in the absolute sense, they are conventional realities, sammutti dhammas. Could akusala citta11 (unwholesome consciousness) be Thai or foreign? Akusala citta is a paramattha dhamma (a reality), it is a dhamma which has its own characteristic, it is not Thai or foreign. 3. Vijjamanena avijjamana pannattis, concepts of the non-existent based on the existent. There is the expression "the person with the six abhinnas."12 The six abhinnas are real but person is not real. Thus this concept stands for what is real and for what is not real. 4. Avijjamanena vijjamana pannattis, concepts of the existent based on the non-existent. There is the expression "woman's voice". The sound is real, but the woman is not real. 5. Vijjamanena vijjamana pannattis, concepts of what is real based on what is real. There is the term cakkhu-vinnana (eye-consciousness). Cakkhu (eye) is a reality, namely the cakkhu-pasada-rupa (eyesense, a reality sensitive to colour or visible object), and vinnana (consciousness) is also a reality, namely the reality which experiences. 6. Avija amanena avijjamana pannattis, concepts of what is not real based on what is not real. There is the expression "the kings son". Both king and son are not real, they are sammutti dhammas, conventional realities. I'm just catching up here, so if this was already posted in response or I'm out of order(!), my apologies. mike 10312 From: Robert Epstein Date: Sun Dec 23, 2001 10:55pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Sarah Dear Sarah, Doing some more homework, I have gone to the second link you suggest here and looked at Nina's very helpful translation of the original 'luminous mind' sutta. Her comments also suggest two solutions to me to the interpretation of the sutta which I think may be helpful also. I have interspersed my comments below those of Nina that follow: =============================================== N: This consciousness, monks, is luminous, and it is indeed corrupted by oncoming defilements. N:The ordinary person who has not learned (the Dhamma, not listened to it) does not understand it as it really is. N:Therefore I say that for the ordinary person who has not listened there is no mental development (literally. free: the ordinary person who has not listened to the Dhamma has not developed the mind.) N: This consciousness, monks, is luminous, and it is indeed released from oncoming defilements. N: The learned noble disciple understand it as it really is. N: Therefore I say that the learned, noble disciple has developed the mind. =============================================== Nina's remarks with my comments follow: >>Remarks:The upakilesas, defilements arising with the citta (different from the anusayas, latent tendencies who do not arise with the akusala citta but can condition akusala), are like visitors from outside. It seems disturbing, but we have to note: the ariyan knows the citta as it really is: yathaabutta. One has to know also akusala citta as it is, otherwise one cannot become an ariyan, this is stressed in this short sutta.>> *Robert Ep.: This is how I hear what Nina is saying: When one awakens they are disturbed or shocked by the sudden incoming sensory phenomena and the reactivity of their akusala cittas and tendencies. It seems as if the 'defiled reality' has come to impinge on the 'pure' reality of sleep, as reflected in the bhavanga cittas. This illusion of a 'mind' which is disturbed by defilements is settled in the Arahat, who finally is able to enjoy pure cittas in the waking state, and thus the defiled mind has been resolved. This interpretation combines the total impact of akusala cittas coming into consciousness and the purity experienced by the bhavanga cittas. This combined effect makes some sense to me as an interpretation of the sutta that includes the bhavanga cittas, but is not limited to them. One problem, however, with this model of the 'development of the mind' is that it tends towards a view of the mind as being a real entity that continues from sleep to wakefulness, experiencing and comparing different experiences of purity and defilement. Of course, this is accomplished by the accumulations which are passed on from citta to citta, but the sense of continuity accomplished by this process may also tend to suggest a continuous mind which is the storehouse of experiences. Nina's Remarks continued: >>Yathaabhuuta: bhuuta: that which has grown, is, exists, the truth. yathaabhuuta: in its real essence, according to the truth. vippamutta: pamu~ncati: to release. >>The Atthasalini speaks about the bhavangacitta as being pure, using the word pa.n.dara (I, Book I, Part IV, Ch II, 140) : "Mind also is said to be clear in the sense of exceedingly pure with reference to the Bhavanga-citta." Now I like to quote from Acharn's Survey of Paramattha dhammas where she explains about the bhavanga-citta which is different from the cittas experiencing objects impinging on the six doors. She explains that when one is fast asleep one does not know who one is or where one is, one does not experience the world. When one wakes up the world appears, one experiences all the objects impinging on the six doors and then these objects give rise to defilements. The bhavanga-citta, life-continuum, that has the function of keeping continuity in the life of an individual, arises when fast asleep and also in between the processes of cittas. Thus our life, consisting of an uninterrupted series of cittas, goes on. The bhavanga-citta experiences the same object as the rebirth-consciousness, and this object is like an echo of the object experienced shortly before the dying-consciousness of the previous life. This citta is pure, but it does not mean that there are no latent tendencies of defilements, anusayas, which lie dormant in the citta. It is called pure or luminous, because at that moment no defilements arise. >>I quote: < The citta is pure only at the moment it does not experience an object through the doors of eyes, ears, nose, tongue, bodysense or mind. Everybody who is fast asleep looks innocent, pure, he does not experience like or dislike, he is not jealous, stingy, conceited, he has no lovingkindness nor compassion; thus, unwholesome or wholesome qualities do not arise because he does not see, hear, experience tangible object or think. However, it should be known that whenever the citta which arises experiences an object through one of the six doors, citta is not pure. The reason is that many different defilements have been accumulated in the citta and these condition the arising of pleasure and attachment when one sees something pleasant, and the arising of displeasure and annoyance when one sees something unpleasant.> >>The person who is enlightened, the ariyasaavako, has eradicated anusayas by the development of pa~n~naa of the eightfold Path. It is pa~n~naa which knows realities as they are, yathaabhuuta, no other way. Anusayas are eradicated at the different stages of enlightenment, and only the arahat is freed from all defilements, he has no more latent tendencies of defilements, no conditions for their arising. Nina.>> Robert Ep.: This last idea, that the luminous mind, free of defilements, represents the condition of the Arahat who has become rid of all latent tendencies towards defilements, makes a lot of sense. This implies, however, the idea that the mind is inherently luminous, not just the bhavanga cittas, but the stream of cittas as a wholeis luminous and pure, and that when the arahant is released from defilements he is the one in the position to experience the pure, luminous mind which knows realities as they are. I think it is possible to draw this conclusion without positing a mind as an object or entity. All one has to do is see the stream of cittas as being an inherently pure and luminous process, because of the function the cittas have of discerning and illuminating objects, which function is obscured by arising defilements. It would be very much like a dust cloud of moha which keeps the cittas 'dirty' or 'defiled' in their ability to illuminate objects for the mundane-level perceiver, whereas the arahant graduates to the true function of these cittas. I wonder if this makes sense, or is acceptable to others here? It seems to be implied in what Nina says here, at least to me. And can still include the bhavanga cittas in the sense that they form the basis for comparison of the undefiled and defiled experience in the worldling. Best Regards, Robert Ep. =================================================== --- Sarah wrote: > Dear Suan and Ken O, > > Thanks for your kind note, Suan, and for your good questions, Ken O. > > Suan, I'm sure it is a lot of work to translate just a few short extracts from > the commentaries. it may be helpful to be reminded that Nina (and Jim) worked > quite hard on these same Ang Nik suttas and commentary notes which I think you > both may find it interesting to review at: > > http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/message/8386 > commentary notes translation > > http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/message/8408 > sutta translation 10313 From: Robert Epstein Date: Sun Dec 23, 2001 10:58pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein --- Sarah wrote: > Dear Rob Ep, > > --- Robert Epstein wrote: > > > Dear Sarah, > > Thanks for all your clues, and for accepting the popcorn. I feel guilty for > > being > > a mutineer, but knowing that guilt is probably akusala, I am trying to > > discern it > > as an empty reality! > > Yes, well, that’s a bit how I felt about the regret in re-opening this thread > ;-) > > > Yes, I have been very bad about my homework. I am duly chastened......I'll > > do my > > homework on this one. As you know, luminosity is my holy grail! > > At this rate, Anders will be paying us his Xmas thread and we’ll still be > discussing the same thread as when he left.... > > Just a couple of BRIEF notes on the Udana quotes from the Cambodian website you > mention: > > 1. Dabba sutta (Ud V111.10) (2) > > You ‘find the ‘unwavering bliss’ of interest here re. the idea that there is > nothing but cessation in parinibbana and nothing remaining’. > > Masefield translates the last few lines as; > > ‘Just as, for that hammered with an iron-hammer that has progressively died > down, though the fire continues to blaze, a destiny is not known, so for those > who are properly liberated, for those who have crossed the flood that is the > bond of sense-desires, for those who have reached the happiness that is > undisturbed, there is not to be made known a destiny.’ > > brief com notes: > ‘That has progressively died down’ (anupubbuupasantassa); ‘that has, in due > course, died down, burnt itself out, ceased’ > > ‘Just as a destiny is not known (yathaa na ~naayate gati): ‘....or likewise for > some sound that has arisen, that has, in due course, died down, fully subsided, > a destiny is made known nowhere in the ten directions, on account of its having > ceased in a non-relinking fashion due to the cessation of the conditions (that > gave rise to it) > > ‘the happiness’, the dying down of all formations reckoned as that nibbana that > is without remnant of substrate, > > > ================ > > For the 2nd Nibbana Sutta (Ud V111, 1) > > This is the other one I discussed at length (essential reading for you;-). See > posts: > http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/message/8895 > http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/message/8908 > http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/message/9035 > http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/message/9038 > > Firstly, let me remind you that this sutta is about nibbana and not about > parinibbana (you tend to mix them together, I think) Dear Sarah, Rather than mixing Nibbana and Parinibbana, I think I just tend to be overly optimistic about what may be going on in Parinibbana. The clarification of what in the Buddha's words refers specifically to Nibbana as oppposed to Parinibbana will be most helpful. Thanks, Robert Ep. ==================== ....Also you’ll see the > phrases you refer to and like are references to other arupa planes of > existence....showing that not only do the conditioned khandhas of the sense > realms not existing in nibbana, but also the non-rupa conditioned realities of > other realms. > > The references to light and so on were to nibbana, not parinibbana. I’ve run > out of steam and need to take care of some office work, otherwise I’d re-check > myself. Maybe you can re-quote the commentary notes on these references that I > gave before;-)))) > > Thanks Rob, > Sarah 10314 From: Sarah Date: Sun Dec 23, 2001 11:56pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Concept Dear Rob Ep, I think I can answer this one quickly (unlike all the luminous posts sitting in a queue;-) --- Robert Epstein wrote: > Dear Sarah, > I agree with Mike that this is a helpful and excellent list. Based on it, I > would > ask you for a clarification: Jon has said that concepts are not realities, > but I > thought that concepts were namas and that they *were* considered realities. Realities (paramattha dhammas) are namas and rupas that can be directly known by sati and panna and having lakhana (characteristics), sabhava (essence) and so on....of course they are all (except nibbana) anicca, dukkha and anatta. Concepts are ideas or illusions of which there are many kinds as listed, sometimes based on realities and often not. They are NOT namas and they don't have these lakhana and sabhava. The cittas which think about and experience concepts, on the other hand, ARE namas and therefore realities which can be known. It's very important to understand the difference between concepts and realities. Really it's by developing more sati and panna which know realities that the difference becomes crystal clear. I think some of the posts under 'Concepts and Realities' that I mentioned are very helpful to review. Pls ask anything further as really I'm more at home here than with the jhanas and bhavangas.....;-)) > Am I > confused? Can a nama such as the ones below be discerned as a paramatha > dhamma, > and if so, what are the concepts which are not eligible as objects for sati > and > panna? I keep hanging on this theme, because I seem to be having a lot of > trouble > sorting out the 'real' from the 'unreal' as regards concepts. OK, that's fine....It's really great that you don't mind sharing the confusion that many, many others will also be experiencing..... So none of the concepts below are namas or can be discerned (in a Howard or a Ken O sense of the word) AS paramatha dhamma. However, some of them represent realities i.e 1) and 5) and these realities themselves can be discerned as paramatha dhamma, whether namas or rupas. To get 'real' for a moment with an example of a rupa. There can be the concept of 'sound' or of 'thunder'. The concepts can be thought about, but can never be the objects of awareness. They never 'exist'. 'Sound' may however represent a reality (if we've heard the Buddha's Teachings) and that characteristic of sound itself, when it is heard, can be directly known by sati and panna. 'Thunder', on the other hand, is a concept representing that which is not real and can therefore never be known. In the same way, let me give the example of a nama. There can be the concept of 'hearing' or of. 'speaking'. Again, the concepts themselves can only be thought about and don't exist. Hearing, however, may represent a reality and the actual reality of experiencing sound, which is a nama, can be known directly. 'Speaking' again represents that which is never real and can therefore never be known by sati and panna. Hope that clarifies, but very happy to hear more from you. Sarah ............................................................................................... > > --- Sarah wrote: > > > > > The Abhidhammattha Vibhavani (Book 8) distinguishes > > > between six kinds of > > > concepts that are names, nama-pannatti (see > > > Visuddhimagga VIII, note 11). > > > > > > 1. Vijjamana pannattis, concepts which make > > > known what is real, for > > > example the words rupa, nama, vedana (feeling), or > > > sanna (perception) 10. > > > > > > 2. Avijjamana pannattis, concepts which > > > make known what is not real, > > > such as the words Thai or foreigner. These concepts > > > do not represent absolute > > > realities, citta and cetasika which are nama, and > > > rupa. Thai or foreigner are > > > not real in the absolute sense, they are > > > conventional realities, sammutti > > > dhammas. Could akusala citta11 (unwholesome > > > consciousness) be Thai or foreign? > > > Akusala citta is a paramattha dhamma (a reality), it > > > is a dhamma which has its > > > own characteristic, it is not Thai or foreign. > > > > > > 3. Vijjamanena avijjamana pannattis, > > > concepts of the non-existent > > > based on the existent. There is the expression "the > > > person with the six > > > abhinnas."12 The six abhinnas are real but person is > > > not real. Thus this > > > concept stands for what is real and for what is not > > > real. > > > > > > 4. Avijjamanena vijjamana pannattis, > > > concepts of the existent based on > > > the non-existent. There is the expression "woman's > > > voice". The sound is real, > > > but the woman is not real. > > > > > > 5. Vijjamanena vijjamana pannattis, > > > concepts of what is real based on > > > what is real. There is the term cakkhu-vinnana > > > (eye-consciousness). Cakkhu > > > (eye) is a reality, namely the cakkhu-pasada-rupa > > > (eyesense, a reality > > > sensitive to colour or visible object), and vinnana > > > (consciousness) is also a > > > reality, namely the reality which experiences. > > > > > > 6. Avija amanena avijjamana pannattis, > > > concepts of what is not real > > > based on what is not real. There is the expression > > > "the kings son". Both king > > > and son are not real, they are sammutti dhammas, > > > conventional realities. 10315 From: Sarah Date: Mon Dec 24, 2001 1:17am Subject: Re: [dsg] some more about metta Hi Victor, Pls check this other translation for the 'self-control' part you quote: --- yuzhonghao wrote: > Hello Sarah, > This snare of Mara, in the form of anger, > dwelling in the cave of the heart: > cut it out with self-control, > discernment, persistence, right view. > The wise man would cut out > each & every form of unskillfulness. > Train yourselves: > 'May we not be blotted out.' PTS, Hare translation: 'thus lurking in the heart is Mara's snare In anger's loathsome form. But root it out By insight, zeal, right view, restraint; the wise Would one by one each evil state root out And thus in Dhamma would he train himself: Be not our minds obscured, but anger freed And freed from trouble, greed and coveting.' > I am not sure how self-control is not possible in truth. I am not > sure what conventional usage has to do with self-control. I don't have the Pali in front of me, but what is translated in the first copy by self-control is translated by insight (vipassana?) in the second. There is a difference, I think between understanding anger to be dug out by self-control and by insight or pa~n~na. There is no self-anything involved in the latter. Even if we use self-control which I often do, there can still be understanding that in reality there is no self and no control, only conditioned realities. By the way, the full sutta you quote from here is a really excellent one for reminding us of the value of metta. I can't resist quoting this part before I go (AN,Bk of 7s, 60, Anger): ********** 'How ugly is an angry man! His sleep Is comfortless; with fortune in his hands He suffers loss; and being full of wrath He wounds by act and (bitter) word. O'erwhelmed By rage, his wealth he wastes away. made mad And crazy by his bile, his name's bemired With odium.(aayasakyan) Shunned and forsaken is An angry man by friend and relative. By wrath is loss incurred; by wrath the mind Is racked. Irate, he knows not that within Fear is engendered, nor knows the goal. When anger-bound, man Dhamma cannot see; When anger conquers man, blind darkness reigns.' ********** Isn't it so true, that when the mind is 'anger-bound' , the Dhamma is lost. Thanks, Victor, Sarah ................................................................................................................................. 10316 From: Sarah Date: Mon Dec 24, 2001 1:29am Subject: Re: [dsg] Memory, Objects, and Continuity --- Sarah wrote: > > Am I right in thinking that, by 'perception' (here), > > he means concept? > > I didn't answer before because I think it's a little clear. I gave a very unclear response when talking about clear and unclear. Pls read 'unclear' rather than 'clear' in this post sent on 22nd. S. 10317 From: Sarah Date: Mon Dec 24, 2001 1:44am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: jhanas for Herman Dear Herman, I'd much rather talk about visible objects, but you ask me ones about jhanas instead;-)) --- egberdina wrote: > Dear Sarah, > > The way I read the Tipitaka is that the Buddha and all of his monks > dwelt in the jhanas day in day out, every opportunity they got. I > find it strange that there is subtle discouragement to do as the > Buddha did. I hope that I would always encourage anyone to develop all kinds of skilful states and mental development according to what is realitstic and possible right now. Do we really have the accumulations of the Buddha and his chief disciples? Is there any understanding now of the difference between wholesome and unwholesome states? Is there any comprehension as to which moments there is calm or samatha in a day, what the object is and why these cittas are calm? Is there any beginning level of understanding the danger of clinging to sense objects? >> I doubt whether jhana can be researched other than by doing it. Can there be 'doing it' just by wishing or intending to 'just do it' or just by concentrating on an object without any undersatanding as discussed? >Or is > that what you meant? ( no intention to cast aspersions on Rob K or > Teng Kee here, either way) I don't think anyone here would suggest that theoretical research or understanding is the actual development or practice. One great value in the research may be that by understanding more about the intricacies and the exceedingly high level of wisdom required, one may realize what extraordinary levels of skilful states those in the Buddha's time had attained. On the other hand, some may read these details and feel confident this is what is achievable today. It just depends;-) Sarah ........................................................................................................... 10318 From: Sarah Date: Mon Dec 24, 2001 2:25am Subject: Re: [dsg] Luminous mind Ken O wrote >. Or I have > confused myself with the term commentaries. he he :) Good one, Ken;-)) I'll have to get back on the rest of this post and a few others some other time when I can give them the consideration they deserve.... We'll be pretty busy looking after my mother-in-law for the next couple of days, so let's just see...thanks in advance. > k: Merry Christmas and Happy New Year to you and everyone in the list. > Enjoy your stay in Bangkok, hmm I disappointed that I could not attend. Luckily for us, we've found a few replacements....we'll be meeting up with quite a few dsg members and other friends and looking forward to meeting Mike and one other dsg member for the first time;-)) I'm sure you'll be able to join us another time. > One day maybe kamma may work for me, who knows, he he :). meanwhile it's working out well for you here with all your list-mates :) Oops, time to go, Speak soon Ken, Sarah 10319 From: abhidhammika Date: Mon Dec 24, 2001 7:38am Subject: [dsg] Re: luminous mind: To Robert Epstein And Like-minded Dhamma Friends Dear Robert (And Like-minded Friends) How are you? Thank you for your request. Tiikaa on the luminous mind is very good for those who do not mind reading serous technical explanations, together with Pali grammatical discussions. As you might be aware of some dhamma friends criticizing commentaries on Pali Suttas, I am sincerely reluctant to translate and post them for general readers. For those of us who have to read Pali texts for professional reasons, commentaries (Atthakathas) and Subcommentaries (Tiikaa) are the only reliable sources for all the academic needs. You will soon find that Tiikaa author had even explained all the Pali particles in details which can guide us in choosing the right syntax when we translate the Buddha's original Pali statements. Well, now, you and like-minded friends show appreciation and request for such texts, I will try my best to translate and post the Tiikaa on luminous mind on-list. Won't be long! With best wishes, Suan http://www.bodhiology.org --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Robert Epstein wrote: > Dear Suan, > As much as I appreciate your snappy presentation of the subcommentary -- and I do > indeed, let me make the following plea: > > If you do make the translation for Nina, please post it on-list. Though I may > struggle with the commentaries, I am anxious to read them, particularly on this > topic. I think we would all benefit from seeing it, if you decide to make that > effort, and I for one will certainly be grateful. > > You could do it as a separate post, and then do your 'snappy presentation' in a > separate message. > > > > Best, > Robert Ep. > > =========================== > > > --- abhidhammika wrote: > > > > > > > > Dear Nina > > > > How are you? > > > > It is very kind of you to re-post your translations of Anguttara > > statements on the luminous mind. Thank you for your efforts and > > sharing your works with all of us. > > > > You wrote: > > > > "I am really looking forward to Suan's translation, explanation and > > analysis. I got stuck in the subco. since I find the language so > > difficult, all those composites." > > > > I have tranlated the portions of commentary I am about to use in > > Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Three). I still need to write > > technical notes on them, though. > > > > My idea is to write a kind of my own modern subcommentary on the > > luminous mind in the form of the technical notes. > > > > However, if you would like me to translate the Pali subcommentary on > > the commentary portions, please let me know. I could send them to you > > off-list. As you know, the Tiikaa passage is a bit lengthy, and to > > include translation of the whole passage in the Parinibbana > > Subcommentary series would compromise the purpose of the snappy > > presentation of my arguments. The readers would find it difficult to > > follow my arguments as their minds could be bogged down in Tiikaa's > > technical details. > > > > > > With regards, > > > > Suan > > > > http://www.bodhiology.org > > > > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Nina van Gorkom wrote: > > > Dear Suan and Rob Ep, 10320 From: Date: Mon Dec 24, 2001 3:14am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein Hi, Mike - In a message dated 12/24/01 12:25:36 AM Eastern Standard Time, mlnease@y... writes: > Hi Howard, > > --- upasaka@a... wrote: > > > Just for the record, not that my take is of > > any partcular importance, > > I, for one, definitely don't "buy" that commentarial > > interpretation. > > Your take is always of some importance to me, Howard. > I think it's interesting that we are diametrically > opposed here, especially since we are in such close > agreement, I think, in many other respects. Anyway, > also just for the record, I definitely *do* 'buy' > that commentarial interpretation... > > > To me, > > it is *crystal clear* that the Buddha is saying that > > the mind is luminous but > > for defilements which cover it, rather like a sky > > obfuscated by a cloud > > cover, a sky which, in itself, is clear, or like > > gold which is lacking in > > shine only when corrrupted as part of gold ore, and > > which manifests its > > capacity to shine once the impurities are removed. > > ...and to me, it is *crystal clear* that the Buddha is > *not* saying any such thing, anywhere in the Pali > canon--with this meaning. Hope we can continue to > agreeably disagree, however totally. > > mike > ================================== Always happy to agree or disagree with you, Mike. As far as this particular issue is concerned, I look forward to the time that you and I will "meet the Buddha", however many aeons off, to ask him about it! (Actually, there wouldn't then be any need to ask. ;-) With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 10321 From: Date: Mon Dec 24, 2001 3:31am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein Hi, Mike (and Ken) - In a message dated 12/24/01 12:35:14 AM Eastern Standard Time, mlnease@y... writes: > > Hi Kenneth, > > Thanks for this interesting quotation. I agree with > Ven. Thanissaro that 'luminosity', 'purity', > 'brightness' etc. in the suttas often refers to jhana > (as in Howard's pure gold, e.g.) rather than to > bhavanga. Nowhere do I think it refers to some > underlying, boundless, luminous, cosmic consciousness. ------------------------------------------------------------- Howard: Ahh! But that's not what I mean either. While I do see nibbana without remnant as timeless, boundless, luminous etc, that is not what I was referring to. All I meant with regard to the Pabhassara (sp?) Sutta is that it says that the mind is not *essentially* defiled. The defilements are adventitious. The mind, *in and of itself*, is luminous in the sense of being undefiled; when defilements are present the mind appears dark, its light blocked; but when defilements are supressed or removed (in jhana in the case of suppression, or permanently in nibbana with or without remant) it shines forth. If the mind were inherently defiled, then freedom would be impossible. The point to this sutta, as I see it, is that defilements are insubstantial, inessential, and impermanent, rather like impurities in the gold ore of mind which *can* be fully removed. -------------------------------------------------------------- > > mike > > p.s. I met Ven. Thanissaro a couple of weeks ago--he > has a new book out if anyone's interested, 'Buddhist > Monastic Code Vol. 2'. Good stuff... > ============================= With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 10322 From: Kom Tukovinit Date: Mon Dec 24, 2001 9:05am Subject: RE: [dsg] FW: three rounds Dear Mike, > -----Original Message----- > From: m. nease [mailto:mlnease@y...] > > I think I knew but had forgotten that, perhaps, we > haven't heard from you because of typing difficulty? Thanks for the concern and offer, but it was Num who was having difficulty. Here's his response: >Rgd my hand, it is doing much better now. I can type and write with no more >pain. I am also back in playing tennis ( I did not do the cankamma, sorry!). >I still have to put a buddy-strap on my fingers when I am playing tennis, so >far I can hit it without any pain. The reason that I am not so active is because of my occupation with other things, both good and not so good. Thanks again for the concern. kom 10323 From: Robert Epstein Date: Mon Dec 24, 2001 9:11am Subject: Re: [dsg] Concept Hi Sarah. So concepts that directly reference a reality are realities themselves? Or not. For example, if I say the word 'panna', it is a word that refers to a concept, no? Is panna a concept or a reality? Is panna considered 'real'? Can it be experienced as an object? The 'experience' of a rupa is itself a nama? In the 'experience of hardness', is the experience a nama, and the hardness experienced a rupa? Is the citta that then 'thinks about' and 'interprets' what it has seen, ['oh that's a table'], itself a nama? I am clear that the 'table' in that equation is a concept, not a reality. And in the list below, is this a list of all types of concepts? Which ones are considered namas, only 1 and 5? Thanks, Robert Ep. ====================== --- Sarah wrote: > Dear Rob Ep, > > I think I can answer this one quickly (unlike all the luminous posts sitting in > a queue;-) > > --- Robert Epstein wrote: > Dear Sarah, > > I agree with Mike that this is a helpful and excellent list. Based on it, I > > would > > ask you for a clarification: Jon has said that concepts are not realities, > > but I > > thought that concepts were namas and that they *were* considered realities. > > Realities (paramattha dhammas) are namas and rupas that can be directly known > by sati and panna and having lakhana (characteristics), sabhava (essence) and > so on....of course they are all (except nibbana) anicca, dukkha and anatta. > > Concepts are ideas or illusions of which there are many kinds as listed, > sometimes based on realities and often not. They are NOT namas and they don't > have these lakhana and sabhava. > > The cittas which think about and experience concepts, on the other hand, ARE > namas and therefore realities which can be known. > > It's very important to understand the difference between concepts and > realities. Really it's by developing more sati and panna which know realities > that the difference becomes crystal clear. > > I think some of the posts under 'Concepts and Realities' that I mentioned are > very helpful to review. Pls ask anything further as really I'm more at home > here than with the jhanas and bhavangas.....;-)) > > > Am I > > confused? Can a nama such as the ones below be discerned as a paramatha > > dhamma, > > and if so, what are the concepts which are not eligible as objects for sati > > and > > panna? I keep hanging on this theme, because I seem to be having a lot of > > trouble > > sorting out the 'real' from the 'unreal' as regards concepts. > > OK, that's fine....It's really great that you don't mind sharing the confusion > that many, many others will also be experiencing..... So none of the concepts > below are namas or can be discerned (in a Howard or a Ken O sense of the word) > AS paramatha dhamma. However, some of them represent realities i.e 1) and 5) > and these realities themselves can be discerned as paramatha dhamma, whether > namas or rupas. > > To get 'real' for a moment with an example of a rupa. There can be the concept > of 'sound' or of 'thunder'. The concepts can be thought about, but can never be > the objects of awareness. They never 'exist'. 'Sound' may however represent a > reality (if we've heard the Buddha's Teachings) and that characteristic of > sound itself, when it is heard, can be directly known by sati and panna. > 'Thunder', on the other hand, is a concept representing that which is not real > and can therefore never be known. > > In the same way, let me give the example of a nama. There can be the concept > of 'hearing' or of. 'speaking'. Again, the concepts themselves can only be > thought about and don't exist. Hearing, however, may represent a reality and > the actual reality of experiencing sound, which is a nama, can be known > directly. 'Speaking' again represents that which is never real and can > therefore never be known by sati and panna. > > Hope that clarifies, but very happy to hear more from you. > > Sarah > 10324 From: Robert Epstein Date: Mon Dec 24, 2001 9:24am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: jhanas for Herman Dear Sarah, I think three things are true: 1/ You are clearly not *against* developing the jhanas, just saying that it is extremely difficult to approach such refined states. 2/ I think it is also clear that there are *some* teachers alive today who are familiar with the jhanas and their practice, such as Ajahn Brahmavamso, who has lectured and taught on them quite a bit. 3/ I think the final point is that you are saying that it is not *necessary* to develop these advanced states in order to progress on the path of discernment, sati and panna, that these qualities are independent of any particular state. Is this correct? Best, Robert Ep. ============ --- Sarah wrote: > Dear Herman, > > I'd much rather talk about visible objects, but you ask me ones about jhanas > instead;-)) > > --- egberdina wrote: > Dear Sarah, > > > > The way I read the Tipitaka is that the Buddha and all of his monks > > dwelt in the jhanas day in day out, every opportunity they got. I > > find it strange that there is subtle discouragement to do as the > > Buddha did. > > I hope that I would always encourage anyone to develop all kinds of skilful > states and mental development according to what is realitstic and possible > right now. Do we really have the accumulations of the Buddha and his chief > disciples? Is there any understanding now of the difference between wholesome > and unwholesome states? Is there any comprehension as to which moments there is > calm or samatha in a day, what the object is and why these cittas are calm? Is > there any beginning level of understanding the danger of clinging to sense > objects? > > >> I doubt whether jhana can be researched other than by doing it. > > Can there be 'doing it' just by wishing or intending to 'just do it' or just by > concentrating on an object without any undersatanding as discussed? > > >Or is > > that what you meant? ( no intention to cast aspersions on Rob K or > > Teng Kee here, either way) > > I don't think anyone here would suggest that theoretical research or > understanding is the actual development or practice. One great value in the > research may be that by understanding more about the intricacies and the > exceedingly high level of wisdom required, one may realize what extraordinary > levels of skilful states those in the Buddha's time had attained. On the other > hand, some may read these details and feel confident this is what is achievable > today. It just depends;-) > > Sarah > ........................................................................................................... > 10325 From: Robert Epstein Date: Mon Dec 24, 2001 9:42am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: luminous mind: To Robert Epstein And Like-minded Dhamma Friends Dear Suan, I both understand your reluctance to have the commentaries criticized, and also thank you for your willingness to do so for the education of those who are sincerely interested. I happen to fall into both categories, as I sometimes may debate points in the commentaries, while still sincerely desiring to learn. I am sensitive to the feelings of those who take the commentaries as part of the Canon, and perhaps this type of debate is not always appropriate. If there are points that should not be argued, I would be happy to just listen and learn in those cases and not bring up doubts on the list. In any case, I greatly appreciate your sub-commentaries and any parts of the actual commentaries that you share with us. Thanks, Robert Ep. ================================ --- abhidhammika wrote: > > Dear Robert (And Like-minded Friends) > > How are you? > > Thank you for your request. > > Tiikaa on the luminous mind is very good for those who do not mind > reading serous technical explanations, together with Pali grammatical > discussions. > > As you might be aware of some dhamma friends criticizing commentaries > on Pali Suttas, I am sincerely reluctant to translate and post them > for general readers. > > For those of us who have to read Pali texts for professional reasons, > commentaries (Atthakathas) and Subcommentaries (Tiikaa) are the only > reliable sources for all the academic needs. > > You will soon find that Tiikaa author had even explained all the Pali > particles in details which can guide us in choosing the right syntax > when we translate the Buddha's original Pali statements. > > Well, now, you and like-minded friends show appreciation and request > for such texts, I will try my best to translate and post the Tiikaa > on luminous mind on-list. > > Won't be long! > > With best wishes, > > Suan > > http://www.bodhiology.org > > > > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Robert Epstein wrote: > > Dear Suan, > > As much as I appreciate your snappy presentation of the > subcommentary -- and I do > > indeed, let me make the following plea: > > > > If you do make the translation for Nina, please post it on-list. > Though I may > > struggle with the commentaries, I am anxious to read them, > particularly on this > > topic. I think we would all benefit from seeing it, if you decide > to make that > > effort, and I for one will certainly be grateful. > > > > You could do it as a separate post, and then do your 'snappy > presentation' in a > > separate message. > > > > > > > > Best, > > Robert Ep. > > > > =========================== > > > > 10326 From: Robert Epstein Date: Mon Dec 24, 2001 9:46am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Mike (and Ken) - > > In a message dated 12/24/01 12:35:14 AM Eastern Standard Time, > mlnease@y... writes: > > > > > > Hi Kenneth, > > > > Thanks for this interesting quotation. I agree with > > Ven. Thanissaro that 'luminosity', 'purity', > > 'brightness' etc. in the suttas often refers to jhana > > (as in Howard's pure gold, e.g.) rather than to > > bhavanga. Nowhere do I think it refers to some > > underlying, boundless, luminous, cosmic consciousness. > ------------------------------------------------------------- > Howard: > Ahh! But that's not what I mean either. While I do see nibbana without > remnant as timeless, boundless, luminous etc, that is not what I was > referring to. All I meant with regard to the Pabhassara (sp?) Sutta is that > it says that the mind is not *essentially* defiled. The defilements are > adventitious. The mind, *in and of itself*, is luminous in the sense of being > undefiled; when defilements are present the mind appears dark, its light > blocked; but when defilements are supressed or removed (in jhana in the case > of suppression, or permanently in nibbana with or without remant) it shines > forth. If the mind were inherently defiled, then freedom would be impossible. > The point to this sutta, as I see it, is that defilements are insubstantial, > inessential, and impermanent, rather like impurities in the gold ore of mind > which *can* be fully removed. > -------------------------------------------------------------- Dear Howard, In the moment when a defilement arises, at that moment, where is the pure, undefiled mind which is like the 'gold' in the 'ore'? Can there be a mind separate from its content, whether defiled or undefiled? Is the 'mind' one thing, and the 'defilement' something else? Is the 'citta' pure, but its 'content' impure? Just wondering how one would posit this without either defining mind as a substrate that lasts beyond the moment, or a substance that is separate from its content, or without causing a separation into 'two minds' or consciousnesses, the pure mind and the experience of impurity, superimposed on top. Best, Robert 10327 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Mon Dec 24, 2001 10:10am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: subcommentary Pali op 23-12-2001 16:13 schreef abhidhammika op abhidhammika@y...: difficult, all those composites." > > I have tranlated the portions of commentary I am about to use in > Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Three). I still need to write > technical notes on them, though. > > My idea is to write a kind of my own modern subcommentary on the > luminous mind in the form of the technical notes. > > However, if you would like me to translate the Pali subcommentary on > the commentary portions, please let me know. I could send them to you > off-list. As you know, the Tiikaa passage is a bit lengthy, and to > include translation of the whole passage in the Parinibbana > Subcommentary series would compromise the purpose of the snappy > presentation of my arguments. The readers would find it difficult to > follow my arguments as their minds could be bogged down in Tiikaa's > technical details. > Dear Suan, It is so kind of you to offer to translate the subco, and I like Kom's suggestion of moving this to another forum, to your convenience either to Abh or to palistudy. Even if you could translate only the difficult words and constructions of the subco, now and then just a few terms, it would be of great help so that I can continue working on it. I would not like to cause trouble so that you work late at night. With many thanks, best wishes from Nina. 10328 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Mon Dec 24, 2001 10:10am Subject: Re: [dsg] luminous mind > > 23-12-01 08:58:03, Robert Epstein wrote: > >> Thanks, Nina, for posting the Commentary on the luminosity of the bhavanga >> cittas. >> I found it very helpful to review it and as usual, the commentators speak in >> very >> clear language, which is quite helpful. What I am going to say in response >> is >> somewhat challenging what I have read, however, and I hope it won't be seen >> as too >> disrespectful. I am trying to thrash out some of these issues, and I am >> looking >> for the logic in them. I have great respect for the commentators, but do not >> always accept their interpretation 'automatically' as I hope I do the >> Buddha's own >> words. >> >> I understand the analogy of the children and parents in the commentary below, >> where the parents [bhavanga cittas] could be said to be defiled because their >> reputation is ruined by the delinquent children, even though the parents >> themselves are never directly defiled, but it doesn't seem to me to be a >> working >> analogy for the actual consciousnesses in question. >> >> I plead ignorance if I misuse any of the categories, but I will be happy to >> be >> corrected. From what I understand, the bhavanga cittas are never touched by >> sense-objects, since they only arise to maintain the life-continuum and >> personal >> identity when the sense-doors have 'closed' in deep sleep. Therefore, they >> are >> totally sealed off from any incoming defilements. They remain pure, and in >> that >> sense, could certainly be said to be 'luminous'. This luminosity would in >> itself >> mean that the consciousnesses in question have a certain 'light' and I assume >> this >> would be the light of the mind, the light of consciousness or awareness in >> one >> form or another. Consciousnesses shed their light on the object of their >> perception or thought, and thus 'discern' it to one degree or another. So >> luminosity would make sense in regard to a consciousness that was not >> 'covered >> over' with a lot of 'junk', such as ignorance and misinterpreted sensory >> moments. >> >> On the other hand, the cittas that are defiled by contact with outside >> objects are >> not said to be the luminous ones. These are the naughty children who are >> filled >> with ignorance, wrong thoughts and mis-perceptions, which are like dark >> clouds >> which cover their luminosity until they are cleared away. >> >> To me, no matter how you slice it, you still have the same problem, and I >> don't >> see the commentaries actually addressing it. The sutta speaks clearly of the >> mind >> that is luminous being defiled. The commentary can only say that the >> 'reputation' >> of the bhavanga cittas is ruined by the delinquent children. I know it's >> just an >> analogy, but I don't see how the bhavanga cittas are implicated at all in the >> defilement of akusala cittas [if that is the right term to use], and I don't >> see >> at all how the defiled cittas have anything to do with the luminosity of the >> bhavanga cittas. They are just completely separate and have no contact with >> each >> other at all. >> >> Surely, the Buddha would have been clear enough to name the two categories of >> which he was speaking if they were two different groups. >> >> It makes a lot more sense in reading the sutta to say that the same cittas or >> mind >> that is luminous is the one that is being temporarily defiled. I don't see >> anything in the commentary that reasonably explains this away. I am >> surprised to >> hear that there is general agreement among the current living commentators >> that >> the luminous mind refers to the bhavanga cittas. Is this true? >> >> If the Buddha was referring to the bhavanga cittas as the luminous ones and >> the >> normal waking cittas as the defiled ones, he would have to say something like >> this, in my admittedly limited opinion: >> >> "The consciousness of the mind in sleep is luminous as it is untouched by >> incoming >> defilements. The consciousness of the waking mind is defiled by incoming >> defilements. The waking consciousness can be purified through the >> development of >> wisdom and the consciousness that has been purified thus will surely be seen >> to be >> luminous." >> >> But when he says "Mind is luminous and it is defiled by incoming defilements" >> it >> is a simple statement of a pure mind that has been defiled. I can accept the >> idea >> that a citta arises with defilements which obscure its potential clarity and >> thus >> the defilement must be cleared away for that citta to 'shine' with >> discernment and >> wisdom. But I cannot see any way to put two disparate consciousnesses >> together in >> the statement, so that it is interpreted to be the opposite of what it says. >> >> What puzzles me more is why it is even seen as necessary. To say that the >> mind, >> composed of a string of cittas that have the potential to see clearly but >> which >> are deceived by moha and misinterpretation, is defiled but is inherently >> luminous, >> seems to be completely reasonable. It does not necessarily posit an >> underlying >> mind that is an object or entity. It can easily be interpreted to be a >> succession >> of cittas which carry defilements, thus obscuring their luminous quality, >> which >> all consciousnesses have potentially, and which then must be freed from >> defilement >> by sati and panna. And this interpretation seems to me to be much more >> direct >> and make a lot more sense, than bringing the bhavanga cittas into it and >> somehow >> having to figure out how they have something to do with defilement -- the >> very >> opposite of their condition by definition. >> >> I hope I have not spoken too strongly, but I am just trying to be as logical >> as I >> can. And I hope that it is all in the service of a worthwhile discussion. > Nina: Dear Rob Ep, I read your post with great interest and I appreciate your serious and enthusiastic study of the Dhamma. I cannot go into all of your points, since I am so busy writing my Impressions about our India trip. Shall we wait for Suan who is an expert? I can make a few remarks. We are trained to think in a logical way, it is the way we are brought up. But when we read the commentators (you are not disrespectful at all) we could try to fathom what their intention was: giving some explanations, some pointers, so that we better undertsand the Tipitaka. To us it may not always seem to be logical, but, it can help us to come closer to reality. I reflected again on the similes: maybe we should not try to carry these too far in all details but take them as they are: pointing out that bhavangacitta cannot be akusala nor kusala, that it is only vipaka, and that the javanacittas are kusala cittas or akusala cittas. To speak with Num: this is just my own thinking. As you say, bhavangacitta can be known, it can be known by developed pa~n~naa. When I asked A. Sujin whether we (or rather pa~n~naa) can also know its object she said no. This makes sense to me. Bhavangacitta itself knows its object. Bhavanga-citta has its own characteristic that can appear to sati and pa~n~naa, after it has fallen away its characteristic can appear, but its object does not have a characteristic that can appear to sati and pa~n~naa. Also in India we discussed the bhavangacitta. It seems that we can see and hear at the same time, but these arise in different processes which are demarcated by bhavangacittas (more than three). When there is bhavangacitta no outer object appears: she said: nothing appears, there is nothing. But it is amazing that when the ear-door process begins and hearing arises, an object, in this case, sound appears. It can appear, that is, citta experiences it. Take sound now: it appears and no "I" who can change that sound, it has its own characteristic, it arises because of its own conditions. When sound appears, it shows that there is hearing experiencing sound. No "I" who can change the hearing either. Before that there was nothing, and then there is something. In this way A. Sujin explained the difference between bhavangacitta and the moment an outer object is experienced again. Gradually we can learn the difference. But of course, it is not easy. Lodewijk said that I should tell you that we enjoyed your story about your family celebrating Christmas each in his own way: your wife as a Baptist and your daughter coming home from school singing Shalom. Best wishes, Nina. 10329 From: Date: Mon Dec 24, 2001 7:08am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein Hi, Robert - In a message dated 12/24/01 12:48:27 PM Eastern Standard Time, epsteinrob@Y... writes: > Dear Howard, > In the moment when a defilement arises, at that moment, where is the pure, > undefiled mind which is like the 'gold' in the 'ore'? Can there be a mind > separate from its content, whether defiled or undefiled? Is the 'mind' one > thing, > and the 'defilement' something else? Is the 'citta' pure, but its > 'content' > impure? Just wondering how one would posit this without either defining > mind as a > substrate that lasts beyond the moment, or a substance that is separate > from its > content, or without causing a separation into 'two minds' or > consciousnesses, the > pure mind and the experience of impurity, superimposed on top. > > ============================ When the mind is defiled, it is defiled and not pure. The point is that it is not *essentially* defiled. The mind is *always* pure only in the sense that any defiled state is a passing state, not inherent, and, ultimately, permanently removable. Admittedly, my talk of the mind "in and of itself" was not well formulated. I only meant that the mind is freeable from defilement. The defilements can be removed, and the mind - that is, all the mental functions - can still operate, and, now, cleanly, smoothly, and without impediment. My only point as to what the sutta says is that the mind is not essentially defiled. It's no different when we speak about diamonds. A diamond in the rough is dull and unattractive; it doesn't shine. But it *can* shine. It needs to be polished. If the obscuring covering couldn't be rubbed away, the diamond would be inherently dull and of no interest. But it is inherently pure *in the sense that* it can be made to shine. With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 10330 From: m. nease Date: Mon Dec 24, 2001 3:12pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein Hi Howard, --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Always happy to agree or disagree with you, > Mike. Back at you Howard. > As far as this > particular issue is concerned, I look forward to the > time that you and I will > "meet the Buddha", however many aeons off, to ask > him about it! What an odd notion (though I must say I don't mind the idea of rebirth in the sasana of a living Buddha...)! Thanks for the good wishes, just the same. mike 10331 From: m. nease Date: Mon Dec 24, 2001 3:12pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein Hi Howard, --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Always happy to agree or disagree with you, > Mike. Back at you Howard. > As far as this > particular issue is concerned, I look forward to the > time that you and I will > "meet the Buddha", however many aeons off, to ask > him about it! What an odd notion (though I must say I don't mind the idea of rebirth in the sasana of a living Buddha...)! Thanks for the good wishes, just the same. mike 10332 From: Date: Mon Dec 24, 2001 10:17am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein Hi, Mike - In a message dated 12/24/01 6:13:02 PM Eastern Standard Time, mlnease@y... writes: > Hi Howard, > > --- upasaka@a... wrote: > > > Always happy to agree or disagree with you, > > Mike. > > Back at you Howard. > > > As far as this > > particular issue is concerned, I look forward to the > > time that you and I will > > "meet the Buddha", however many aeons off, to ask > > him about it! > > What an odd notion (though I must say I don't mind the > idea of rebirth in the sasana of a living Buddha...)! > Thanks for the good wishes, just the same. --------------------------------------------------------- Howard: Mike!! You should know me better! I was speaking metaphorically. By "meeting the Buddha" I meant becoming enlightened. ;-)) -------------------------------------------------------- > > mike > ============================ With (not so) metaphorical metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 10333 From: m. nease Date: Mon Dec 24, 2001 3:41pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein Hi Howard, --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Mike (and Ken) - > mlnease@y... writes: > > Hi Kenneth, > > > > Thanks for this interesting quotation. I agree > with > > Ven. Thanissaro that 'luminosity', 'purity', > > 'brightness' etc. in the suttas often refers to > jhana > > (as in Howard's pure gold, e.g.) rather than to > > bhavanga. Nowhere do I think it refers to some > > underlying, boundless, luminous, cosmic > consciousness. > ------------------------------------------------------------- > Howard: > Ahh! But that's not what I mean either. While > I do see nibbana without > remnant as timeless, boundless, luminous etc, that > is not what I was > referring to. All I meant with regard to the > Pabhassara (sp?) Sutta is that > it says that the mind is not *essentially* defiled. Yes--the question is, to which mind (citta) does it refer? > The defilements are > adventitious. So is mind free from defilement. In fact it is nearly infinitely rarer than mind with defilements. > The mind, *in and of itself*, is > luminous in the sense of being > undefiled; Again, which mind? I would agree that patisandhi-, bhavanga-, cuti- and jhana-cittas are relatively undefiled, may be called pure, luminous or whatever--but only because the latent defilements 'in' them are not manifest for the moment. The latent defilements are present in all of them. Nibbaana is not citta--it is aarammana, not arrammanika, that which takes the aarammana. > when defilements are present the mind > appears dark, its light > blocked; but when defilements are supressed or > removed (in jhana in the case > of suppression, or permanently in nibbana with or > without remant) it shines > forth. Apples and oranges, I think--jhana is a citta, nibbaana is not. No doubt jhana-citta can be described as 'luminous', 'pure' etc., because of the suppression of defilements. Magga-citta (which takes nibbaana as aarammana) presumably even more so, because of the absence of even subtle defilements. > If the mind were inherently defiled, then > freedom would be impossible. There is no 'mind' to be inherently defiled or undefiled, except conventionally speaking--just cittas arising and subsiding, some with and some without defilements--but nearly 100% with at least latent defilements and most with medium to coarse defilements. > The point to this sutta, as I see it, is that > defilements are insubstantial, > inessential, and impermanent, rather like impurities > in the gold ore of mind > which *can* be fully removed. Certainly defilements are insubstantial, inessential, and impermanent--just like paramis, indriyas and so on. It would be nice if that were true only of the ugly factors but not of the beautiful ones, but this is not the case. Why nibbaana, the end of rebirth, is such a worthy goal... mike 10334 From: m. nease Date: Mon Dec 24, 2001 3:47pm Subject: RE: [dsg] FW: three rounds Dear Kom, --- Kom Tukovinit wrote: > Thanks for the concern and offer, but it was Num who > was > having difficulty. Thanks for the correction. > The reason that I am not so active is because of my > occupation with other things, both good and not so > good. Glad for the former. Attached is what I have of the Survey so far... mike 10335 From: Mom Bongkojpriya (Betty) Yugala Date: Mon Dec 24, 2001 4:11pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Digest Number 734 Dear Nina, It is so wonderful to read your letters and comments each time in the digests, even though I have a very hard time keeping up with them. Have been "lurking" for too long. Was extremely sorry to have had to cancel going to India at the last moment, and so I look forward to reading your comments and thoughts about that trip. But, in following the present discussion on bhavangacittas, a question arose on whether the bhavangas are luminous and without defilements or not. This discussion then lead me to ask the following: If the aramana (object) of the bhavangacittas of a particular lifetime is the very last javanacitta of the previous lifetime, and that object is then either akusala vipakacitta or kusala vipaka citta (for non-arahats), would not the bhavangacittas themselves either be akusala vipakacitta or kusala vipakacitta, the same as their aramana? And, if that is so, then can bhavangacittas be understood as defiled/not-defiled, just like vithi cittas (that arise in sense-door/mind-door processes)? with metta and joy for the new year, Betty _________________________________> > Dear Howard, > In the moment when a defilement arises, at that moment, where is the pure, > undefiled mind which is like the 'gold' in the 'ore'? Can there be a mind > separate from its content, whether defiled or undefiled? Is the 'mind' one thing, > and the 'defilement' something else? Is the 'citta' pure, but its 'content' > impure? Just wondering how one would posit this without either defining mind as a > substrate that lasts beyond the moment, or a substance that is separate from its > content, or without causing a separation into 'two minds' or consciousnesses, the > pure mind and the experience of impurity, superimposed on top. > > Best, > Robert > Message: 6 > Date: Mon, 24 Dec 2001 19:10:35 +0100 > From: Nina van Gorkom > Subject: Re: luminous mind > > > > > > 23-12-01 08:58:03, Robert Epstein wrote: > > > >> Thanks, Nina, for posting the Commentary on the luminosity of the bhavanga > >> cittas. . .. > . . .From what I understand, the bhavanga cittas are never touched by > >> sense-objects, since they only arise to maintain the life-continuum and > >> personal > >> identity when the sense-doors have 'closed' in deep sleep. Therefore, they > >> are > >> totally sealed off from any incoming defilements. They remain pure, and in > >> that > >> sense, could certainly be said to be 'luminous'. This luminosity would in > >> itself > >> mean that the consciousnesses in question have a certain 'light' and I assume > >> this > >> would be the light of the mind, the light of consciousness or awareness in > >> one > >> form or another. Consciousnesses shed their light on the object of their > >> perception or thought, and thus 'discern' it to one degree or another. So > >> luminosity would make sense in regard to a consciousness that was not > >> 'covered > >> over' with a lot of 'junk', such as ignorance and misinterpreted sensory > >> moments. . .. . . .but I don't see how the bhavanga cittas are implicated at all in the > >> defilement of akusala cittas [if that is the right term to use], and I don't > >> see > >> at all how the defiled cittas have anything to do with the luminosity of the > >> bhavanga cittas. They are just completely separate and have no contact with > >> each > >> other at all. > >> > >> > Nina: Dear Rob Ep, I read your post with great interest and I appreciate > your serious and enthusiastic study of the Dhamma. I cannot go into all of > your points, since I am so busy writing my Impressions about our India trip. > Shall we wait for Suan who is an expert? I can make a few remarks. > We are trained to think in a logical way, it is the way we are brought up. > But when we read the commentators (you are not disrespectful at all) we > could try to fathom what their intention was: giving some explanations, some > pointers, so that we better undertsand the Tipitaka. To us it may not always > seem to be logical, but, it can help us to come closer to reality. I > reflected again on the similes: maybe we should not try to carry these too > far in all details but take them as they are: pointing out that > bhavangacitta cannot be akusala nor kusala, that it is only vipaka, and that > the javanacittas are kusala cittas or akusala cittas. To speak with Num: > this is just my own thinking. > As you say, bhavangacitta can be known, it can be known by developed > pa~n~naa. When I asked A. Sujin whether we (or rather pa~n~naa) can also > know its object she said no. This makes sense to me. Bhavangacitta itself > knows its object. Bhavanga-citta has its own characteristic that can appear > to sati and pa~n~naa, after it has fallen away its characteristic can > appear, but its object does not have a characteristic that can appear to > sati and pa~n~naa. > Also in India we discussed the bhavangacitta. It seems that we can see and > hear at the same time, but these arise in different processes which are > demarcated by bhavangacittas (more than three). When there is bhavangacitta > no outer object appears: she said: nothing appears, there is nothing. But it > is amazing that when the ear-door process begins and hearing arises, an > object, in this case, sound appears. It can appear, that is, citta > experiences it. Take sound now: it appears and no "I" who can change that > sound, it has its own characteristic, it arises because of its own > conditions. When sound appears, it shows that there is hearing experiencing > sound. No "I" who can change the hearing either. Before that there was > nothing, and then there is something. In this way A. Sujin explained the > difference between bhavangacitta and the moment an outer object is > experienced again. Gradually we can learn the difference. But of course, it > is not easy. > Lodewijk said that I should tell you that we enjoyed your story about your > family celebrating Christmas each in his own way: your wife as a Baptist and > your daughter coming home from school singing Shalom. Best wishes, Nina. 10336 From: Date: Mon Dec 24, 2001 0:52pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein Hi, Mike - C'mon, Mike! If the Buddha could speak conventionally, can't I? Should my speech be more precise than his? Not every conventional phrase requires unpacking. As worldlings, "we" (hmmm, guess I'd better be careful ;-) pass along from mindstate to mindstate dispositions to thinking in terms of "me" and "mine"and in terms of separate, self-existent realities, and we pass along subliminal dispositions to grasp at and push away these things. And, yes, this is at the subliminal (anusaya) level, and, much of the time these dispositions are manifest as outflowings (asava). All the foregoing is "defiled mind". After enlightenment, mind is undefiled. That is to say, no more of the three poisons - whoops, that's not too conventional is it? ;-) After enlightenment, *no* cittas carry ignorant dispositions. BTW, how many cittas have you actually observed? (How about the "patisandhi-, bhavanga-, cuti- and jhana-cittas" that you talk about below?) I'm not aware of having observed any cittas myself at all, though I'm aware of being conscious, of discerning hardness, softness, colors, tastes, feelings, emotions, thiughts, etc. I have observed desire and aversion, I have caught myself (whoops, better be careful!) thinking about DSG, for example, and trees, and people as if they really *were* something. I catch myself being unmindful (but with that catching, I save myself for the moment). But I can't ever recall catching a glimpse of a citta. Isn't it a bit odd to stand on one's head avoiding all empirical talk while at the same time talking about things like cittas which we have never, ever observed? We debate whether or not it is the bhavanga cittas constitute luminous mind, when the Buddha never taught anyone about bhavanga cittas, and we wouldn't know one if it sidled up to us and gave us a deep bow! Isn't there a bit of a danger in getting caught in a realm of unobserved "ultimate realities" that the Buddha never presented in any of the teachings given by him to multitudes of people over 45 years and recorded in the Sutta Pitaka, but shunning what we actually do experience? I personally think there is such a danger. With conventional metta (something actually felt, not a theoretical "ultimate reality"), Howard In a message dated 12/24/01 6:43:07 PM Eastern Standard Time, mlnease@y... writes: > > Hi Howard, > > --- upasaka@a... wrote: > > Hi, Mike (and Ken) - > > mlnease@y... writes: > > > > Hi Kenneth, > > > > > > Thanks for this interesting quotation. I agree > > with > > > Ven. Thanissaro that 'luminosity', 'purity', > > > 'brightness' etc. in the suttas often refers to > > jhana > > > (as in Howard's pure gold, e.g.) rather than to > > > bhavanga. Nowhere do I think it refers to some > > > underlying, boundless, luminous, cosmic > > consciousness. > > > ------------------------------------------------------------- > > Howard: > > Ahh! But that's not what I mean either. While > > I do see nibbana without > > remnant as timeless, boundless, luminous etc, that > > is not what I was > > referring to. All I meant with regard to the > > Pabhassara (sp?) Sutta is that > > it says that the mind is not *essentially* defiled. > > Yes--the question is, to which mind (citta) does it > refer? > > > The defilements are > > adventitious. > > So is mind free from defilement. In fact it is nearly > infinitely rarer than mind with defilements. > > > The mind, *in and of itself*, is > > luminous in the sense of being > > undefiled; > > Again, which mind? I would agree that patisandhi-, > bhavanga-, cuti- and jhana-cittas are relatively > undefiled, may be called pure, luminous or > whatever--but only because the latent defilements 'in' > them are not manifest for the moment. The latent > defilements are present in all of them. Nibbaana is > not citta--it is aarammana, not arrammanika, that > which takes the aarammana. > > > when defilements are present the mind > > appears dark, its light > > blocked; but when defilements are supressed or > > removed (in jhana in the case > > of suppression, or permanently in nibbana with or > > without remant) it shines > > forth. > > Apples and oranges, I think--jhana is a citta, > nibbaana is not. No doubt jhana-citta can be > described as 'luminous', 'pure' etc., because of the > suppression of defilements. Magga-citta (which takes > nibbaana as aarammana) presumably even more so, > because of the absence of even subtle defilements. > > > If the mind were inherently defiled, then > > freedom would be impossible. > > There is no 'mind' to be inherently defiled or > undefiled, except conventionally speaking--just cittas > arising and subsiding, some with and some without > defilements--but nearly 100% with at least latent > defilements and most with medium to coarse > defilements. > > > The point to this sutta, as I see it, is that > > defilements are insubstantial, > > inessential, and impermanent, rather like impurities > > in the gold ore of mind > > which *can* be fully removed. > > Certainly defilements are insubstantial, inessential, > and impermanent--just like paramis, indriyas and so > on. It would be nice if that were true only of the > ugly factors but not of the beautiful ones, but this > is not the case. Why nibbaana, the end of rebirth, > is such a worthy goal... > > mike > /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 10337 From: Robert Epstein Date: Mon Dec 24, 2001 7:20pm Subject: Re: [dsg] luminous mind Dear Nina, Thank you for your very nice note. I appreciate you taking the trouble, while so busy, to help me understand some of your sense of the commentaries and how to relate to them. Your notes on bhavanga cittas was extremely interesting. It hadn't occured to me that the bhavanga cittas were filling in the spaces and keeping the continuity between individual sense-door moments. So they are really present and doing their job all the time. It is also interesting to note that although one cannot know the object of the bhavanga-citta, the possibility of knowing when the bhavanga-citta is present would give an important clue to when the sense-door moments are taking place or not. It would seem to be one important boundary in trying to discern the arising and falling of namas and rupas. All of that of course is way ahead of me. I will try to keep this in mind while considering some of the 'luminous mind' commentary, if Suan is kindly able to translate some of it along with his next sub-commentary. Thanks much to you and Lodewijk for your appreciative note on my family's mixed up religious orientation!! : ) I sincerely wish you both the best! And thanks again for your whole message! Regards, Robert Ep. ================================== --- Nina van Gorkom wrote: > > > > > 23-12-01 08:58:03, Robert Epstein wrote: > > > >> Thanks, Nina, for posting the Commentary on the luminosity of the bhavanga > >> cittas. > >> I found it very helpful to review it and as usual, the commentators speak in > >> very > >> clear language, which is quite helpful. What I am going to say in response > >> is > >> somewhat challenging what I have read, however, and I hope it won't be seen > >> as too > >> disrespectful. I am trying to thrash out some of these issues, and I am > >> looking > >> for the logic in them. I have great respect for the commentators, but do not > >> always accept their interpretation 'automatically' as I hope I do the > >> Buddha's own > >> words. > >> > >> I understand the analogy of the children and parents in the commentary below, > >> where the parents [bhavanga cittas] could be said to be defiled because their > >> reputation is ruined by the delinquent children, even though the parents > >> themselves are never directly defiled, but it doesn't seem to me to be a > >> working > >> analogy for the actual consciousnesses in question. > >> > >> I plead ignorance if I misuse any of the categories, but I will be happy to > >> be > >> corrected. From what I understand, the bhavanga cittas are never touched by > >> sense-objects, since they only arise to maintain the life-continuum and > >> personal > >> identity when the sense-doors have 'closed' in deep sleep. Therefore, they > >> are > >> totally sealed off from any incoming defilements. They remain pure, and in > >> that > >> sense, could certainly be said to be 'luminous'. This luminosity would in > >> itself > >> mean that the consciousnesses in question have a certain 'light' and I assume > >> this > >> would be the light of the mind, the light of consciousness or awareness in > >> one > >> form or another. Consciousnesses shed their light on the object of their > >> perception or thought, and thus 'discern' it to one degree or another. So > >> luminosity would make sense in regard to a consciousness that was not > >> 'covered > >> over' with a lot of 'junk', such as ignorance and misinterpreted sensory > >> moments. > >> > >> On the other hand, the cittas that are defiled by contact with outside > >> objects are > >> not said to be the luminous ones. These are the naughty children who are > >> filled > >> with ignorance, wrong thoughts and mis-perceptions, which are like dark > >> clouds > >> which cover their luminosity until they are cleared away. > >> > >> To me, no matter how you slice it, you still have the same problem, and I > >> don't > >> see the commentaries actually addressing it. The sutta speaks clearly of the > >> mind > >> that is luminous being defiled. The commentary can only say that the > >> 'reputation' > >> of the bhavanga cittas is ruined by the delinquent children. I know it's > >> just an > >> analogy, but I don't see how the bhavanga cittas are implicated at all in the > >> defilement of akusala cittas [if that is the right term to use], and I don't > >> see > >> at all how the defiled cittas have anything to do with the luminosity of the > >> bhavanga cittas. They are just completely separate and have no contact with > >> each > >> other at all. > >> > >> Surely, the Buddha would have been clear enough to name the two categories of > >> which he was speaking if they were two different groups. > >> > >> It makes a lot more sense in reading the sutta to say that the same cittas or > >> mind > >> that is luminous is the one that is being temporarily defiled. I don't see > >> anything in the commentary that reasonably explains this away. I am > >> surprised to > >> hear that there is general agreement among the current living commentators > >> that > >> the luminous mind refers to the bhavanga cittas. Is this true? > >> > >> If the Buddha was referring to the bhavanga cittas as the luminous ones and > >> the > >> normal waking cittas as the defiled ones, he would have to say something like > >> this, in my admittedly limited opinion: > >> > >> "The consciousness of the mind in sleep is luminous as it is untouched by > >> incoming > >> defilements. The consciousness of the waking mind is defiled by incoming > >> defilements. The waking consciousness can be purified through the > >> development of > >> wisdom and the consciousness that has been purified thus will surely be seen > >> to be > >> luminous." > >> > >> But when he says "Mind is luminous and it is defiled by incoming defilements" > >> it > >> is a simple statement of a pure mind that has been defiled. I can accept the > >> idea > >> that a citta arises with defilements which obscure its potential clarity and > >> thus > >> the defilement must be cleared away for that citta to 'shine' with > >> discernment and > >> wisdom. But I cannot see any way to put two disparate consciousnesses > >> together in > >> the statement, so that it is interpreted to be the opposite of what it says. > >> > >> What puzzles me more is why it is even seen as necessary. To say that the > >> mind, > >> composed of a string of cittas that have the potential to see clearly but > >> which > >> are deceived by moha and misinterpretation, is defiled but is inherently > >> luminous, > >> seems to be completely reasonable. It does not necessarily posit an > >> underlying > >> mind that is an object or entity. It can easily be interpreted to be a > >> succession > >> of cittas which carry defilements, thus obscuring their luminous quality, > >> which > >> all consciousnesses have potentially, and which then must be freed from > >> defilement > >> by sati and panna. And this interpretation seems to me to be much more > >> direct > >> and make a lot more sense, than bringing the bhavanga cittas into it and > >> somehow > >> having to figure out how they have something to do with defilement -- the > >> very > >> opposite of their condition by definition. > >> > >> I hope I have not spoken too strongly, but I am just trying to be as logical > >> as I > >> can. And I hope that it is all in the service of a worthwhile discussion. > > > Nina: Dear Rob Ep, I read your post with great interest and I appreciate > your serious and enthusiastic study of the Dhamma. I cannot go into all of > your points, since I am so busy writing my Impressions about our India trip. > Shall we wait for Suan who is an expert? I can make a few remarks. > We are trained to think in a logical way, it is the way we are brought up. > But when we read the commentators (you are not disrespectful at all) we > could try to fathom what their intention was: giving some explanations, some > pointers, so that we better undertsand the Tipitaka. To us it may not always > seem to be logical, but, it can help us to come closer to reality. I > reflected again on the similes: maybe we should not try to carry these too > far in all details but take them as they are: pointing out that > bhavangacitta cannot be akusala nor kusala, that it is only vipaka, and that > the javanacittas are kusala cittas or akusala cittas. To speak with Num: > this is just my own thinking. > As you say, bhavangacitta can be known, it can be known by developed > pa~n~naa. When I asked A. Sujin whether we (or rather pa~n~naa) can also > know its object she said no. This makes sense to me. Bhavangacitta itself > knows its object. Bhavanga-citta has its own characteristic that can appear > to sati and pa~n~naa, after it has fallen away its characteristic can > appear, but its object does not have a characteristic that can appear to > sati and pa~n~naa. > Also in India we discussed the bhavangacitta. It seems that we can see and > hear at the same time, but these arise in different processes which are > demarcated by bhavangacittas (more than three). When there is bhavangacitta > no outer object appears: she said: nothing appears, there is nothing. But it > is amazing that when the ear-door process begins and hearing arises, an > object, in this case, sound appears. It can appear, that is, citta > experiences it. Take sound now: it appears and no "I" who can change that > sound, it has its own characteristic, it arises because of its own > conditions. When sound appears, it shows that there is hearing experiencing > sound. No "I" who can change the hearing either. Before that there was > nothing, and then there is something. In this way A. Sujin explained the > difference between bhavangacitta and the moment an outer object is > experienced again. Gradually we can learn the difference. But of course, it > is not easy. > Lodewijk said that I should tell you that we enjoyed your story about your > family celebrating Christmas each in his own way: your wife as a Baptist and > your daughter coming home from school singing Shalom. Best wishes, Nina. 10338 From: egberdina Date: Mon Dec 24, 2001 7:43pm Subject: The weather Hi all, Does one need to study commentaries and subcommentaries to experience the weather? No. Are cold, hot, wet, windy etc verbal phenomena? No. Are there phenomena described by words such as cold, hot, wet, windy? Yes. Does one need to study commentaries and subcommentaries to describe the weather? Only if you want to describe the weather in terms of the commentaries and subcommentaries. Is it necessary to describe the weather? Only if you believe that you are separate from the weather, and that describing it will give you a level of control over it. Will cold, hot, wet, windy etc be more better experienced after studying the commentaries and subcommentaries? No, you will be confusing a weathermans's autobiography with the weather, and thus won't know anything about the weather. Will the weather cease once you have understood it and you die? Don't be stupid. Once you have understood the weather, will you still get cold, hot, wet, windy? Yes. Will it matter? No. Does it matter now? No, you only think it does. Does the sun go around the earth? Read the commentaries and report back. Merry Christmas and a happy New Year Herman 10339 From: Date: Mon Dec 24, 2001 2:55pm Subject: Re: [dsg] The weather Hi, Herman - The foregoing is a very amusing post, and is one with which I have much sympathy. One small point, though: With regard to "Does the sun go around the earth? Read the commentaries and report back.", in this case our own observation will tell us "Yes, the sun *does* go around the earth", and only by reading the "commentaries" of the astronomers do we learn differently. So, my point is what? It is that there are extremes at both ends, and that it is generally good to avoid extremes. With cautious and limited scepticism, and much metta, Howard In a message dated 12/24/01 10:44:16 PM Eastern Standard Time, hhofman@d... writes: > Hi all, > > Does one need to study commentaries and subcommentaries to experience > the weather? > > No. > > Are cold, hot, wet, windy etc verbal phenomena? > > No. > > Are there phenomena described by words such as cold, hot, wet, windy? > > Yes. > > Does one need to study commentaries and subcommentaries to describe > the weather? > > Only if you want to describe the weather in terms of the commentaries > and subcommentaries. > > Is it necessary to describe the weather? > > Only if you believe that you are separate from the weather, and that > describing it will give you a level of control over it. > > Will cold, hot, wet, windy etc be more better experienced after > studying the commentaries and subcommentaries? > > No, you will be confusing a weathermans's autobiography with the > weather, and thus won't know anything about the weather. > > Will the weather cease once you have understood it and you die? > > Don't be stupid. > > Once you have understood the weather, will you still get cold, hot, > wet, windy? > > Yes. > > Will it matter? > > No. > > Does it matter now? > > No, you only think it does. > > Does the sun go around the earth? > > Read the commentaries and report back. > > Merry Christmas and a happy New Year > > > Herman > /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 10340 From: Robert Epstein Date: Mon Dec 24, 2001 8:18pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Robert - > > In a message dated 12/24/01 12:48:27 PM Eastern Standard Time, > epsteinrob@Y... writes: > > > > Dear Howard, > > In the moment when a defilement arises, at that moment, where is the pure, > > undefiled mind which is like the 'gold' in the 'ore'? Can there be a mind > > separate from its content, whether defiled or undefiled? Is the 'mind' one > > thing, > > and the 'defilement' something else? Is the 'citta' pure, but its > > 'content' > > impure? Just wondering how one would posit this without either defining > > mind as a > > substrate that lasts beyond the moment, or a substance that is separate > > from its > > content, or without causing a separation into 'two minds' or > > consciousnesses, the > > pure mind and the experience of impurity, superimposed on top. > > > > > ============================ > When the mind is defiled, it is defiled and not pure. The point is > that it is not *essentially* defiled. The mind is *always* pure only in the > sense that any defiled state is a passing state, not inherent, and, > ultimately, permanently removable. Admittedly, my talk of the mind "in and of > itself" was not well formulated. I only meant that the mind is freeable from > defilement. The defilements can be removed, and the mind - that is, all the > mental functions - can still operate, and, now, cleanly, smoothly, and > without impediment. My only point as to what the sutta says is that the mind > is not essentially defiled. It's no different when we speak about diamonds. A > diamond in the rough is dull and unattractive; it doesn't shine. But it *can* > shine. It needs to be polished. If the obscuring covering couldn't be rubbed > away, the diamond would be inherently dull and of no interest. But it is > inherently pure *in the sense that* it can be made to shine. Well, I understand your meaning Howard, and I know I'm taking a sort of opposite tack here, since I am one of the people who think the 'luminous mind' sutta is referring to the mind and its potential. But to be rigorous, it seems interesting to me to look at this idea of the mind and see what is really there. If the mind is like a diamond in the rough that is covered with defilements and is potentially 'pure', it seems to posit an underlying mind that is a thing. How is it that something that is not a thing has a different potential than it has now? Am I being overly nit-picky here? If it is the potential of pure mental functions, that could exist if the defilements were not there, this is not quite like the diamond in the rough. The diamond that is undefiled is *really there* under the dirt. Under the defilements is there a separate citta that is not defiled? Or is the citta synonomous with its defilement of the moment? Later it will be replaced by a pure citta if such should arise, but it will not be the same one. I am one of those who believes in the possibility of an underlying continuous awareness, but in lieu of that, what would be there to be defiled and then become undefiled? Anyway, I feel a bit confused, so I hope there are some points worth making here. Forgive me sharing my thought process. Best, Robert Ep. 10341 From: Date: Mon Dec 24, 2001 6:21pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein Hi, Robert - In a message dated 12/24/01 11:19:08 PM Eastern Standard Time, epsteinrob@Y... writes: > Well, I understand your meaning Howard, and I know I'm taking a sort of > opposite > tack here, since I am one of the people who think the 'luminous mind' sutta > is > referring to the mind and its potential. > > But to be rigorous, it seems interesting to me to look at this idea of the > mind > and see what is really there. If the mind is like a diamond in the rough > that is > covered with defilements and is potentially 'pure', it seems to posit an > underlying mind that is a thing. How is it that something that is not a > thing has > a different potential than it has now? Am I being overly nit-picky here? > > If it is the potential of pure mental functions, that could exist if the > defilements were not there, this is not quite like the diamond in the > rough. The > diamond that is undefiled is *really there* under the dirt. Under the > defilements > is there a separate citta that is not defiled? Or is the citta synonomous > with > its defilement of the moment? Later it will be replaced by a pure citta if > such > should arise, but it will not be the same one. > > I am one of those who believes in the possibility of an underlying > continuous > awareness, but in lieu of that, what would be there to be defiled and then > become > undefiled? > > Anyway, I feel a bit confused, so I hope there are some points worth making > here. > Forgive me sharing my thought process. > > Best, > Robert Ep. > ============================== The term 'mind' is a conventional one, no better or worse than the Pali 'nama'. It is a general term for a variety of functions, including discernment, feelings, volitions, ... well, you know the list. When these functions involve ignorance, craving, and aversion we say that "mind is defiled". When not, not. The defilements can be permanently removed. The Buddha said that, and I happen to believe it. Dirty diamonds and gritty gold are metaphors for this. As is the case with all metaphors, they can't be pushed too far. They are aids to thinking, and no more. But as far as providing the nitty gritty details of what, exactly, is the case in terms of such hard-to-find things as cittas, well, there's no way that I have the slightest idea. As I said a while ago to Mike, while I'm aware of being conscious, and of experiencing feelings, emotions, sights, sounds, smells, and tastes, I've never experienced a citta, and I never read a sutta by the Buddha in which he discussed cittas, and, for sure I'll have to defer to those who have, wherever one can find such folks, to give such an analysis. With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 10342 From: Date: Tue Dec 25, 2001 4:22am Subject: Re: [dsg] The weather Hi again, Herman - In a message dated 12/24/01 10:55:25 PM Eastern Standard Time, upasaka@a... writes: > Hi, Herman - > > The foregoing is a very amusing post, and is one with which I have > much sympathy. ========================== Actually, the *foregoing* was EMPTY! I meant to say the *following*. (Of course, empty things are important in Buddhism! ;-)) With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 10343 From: yuzhonghao Date: Tue Dec 25, 2001 10:58am Subject: Re: [dsg] some more about metta Hello Sarah, I am not sure what you mean by "there is no self" and "there is no control," and I am not sure how you got the ideas "there is no self" and "there is no control." On one hand you say you often use self-control. On the other hand, you say that in reality there is no control. I am not sure what you mean here. If interested, you might want to refer to Samyutta Nikaya XLIV.10, Ananda Sutta, To Ananda http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/samyutta/sn44-010.html If possible, if would be helpful if you could find a specific reference from the discourses in which the Buddha claimed that there is no self. Please be very careful not to misrepresent what the Buddha taught that conditioned phenomenon is not self. Thank you for replying, and Happy Holidays. Regards, Victor > Even if we use self-control which I often do, there can still be understanding > that in reality there is no self and no control, only conditioned realities. 10344 From: Kom Tukovinit Date: Tue Dec 25, 2001 0:29pm Subject: RE: [dsg] some more about metta Dear Victor, Sotapatti-magga, the first level of enlightenment, eliminates the wrong view of self, which is the root of all other wrong views. A sotapanna and above no longer has the wrong view of self. Access to insights has suttas related to the views: http://www.accesstoinsight.org/index-subject.html#ditthi http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/anguttara/an04-178.html http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/majjhima/mn109.html#sel fview http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/majjhima/mn148.html#sel fid http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/samyutta/sn41-003.html http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/samyutta/sn22-001.html http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/samyutta/sn22-047.html If you have the complete translation of Digha Nikaya, the Buddha listed all the different wrong views in details in Dighanikaya->Brahmnajala Sutta (DN1). I am sure there are many more suttas discussing the wrong view of self, and its oppposite, anataness, in many more suttas in many different variations than listed here, since this is the first most fundamental kilesa that needs to be eradicated. kom > -----Original Message----- > From: yuzhonghao [mailto:victoryu@s...] > Sent: Tuesday, December 25, 2001 10:59 AM > To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com > Subject: Re: [dsg] some more about metta > > > Hello Sarah, > > I am not sure what you mean by "there is no self" > and "there is no > control," and I am not sure how you got the ideas > "there is no self" > and "there is no control." > > On one hand you say you often use self-control. > On the other hand, > you say that in reality there is no control. I > am not sure what you > mean here. > > If interested, you might want to refer to > Samyutta Nikaya XLIV.10, Ananda Sutta, To Ananda > http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/samyutta/sn44 -010.html If possible, if would be helpful if you could find a specific reference from the discourses in which the Buddha claimed that there is no self. Please be very careful not to misrepresent what the Buddha taught that conditioned phenomenon is not self. Thank you for replying, and Happy Holidays. Regards, Victor > Even if we use self-control which I often do, there can still be understanding > that in reality there is no self and no control, only conditioned realities. 10345 From: m. nease Date: Tue Dec 25, 2001 2:52pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein OK, Howard, never mind--sorry I brought it up. mike --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Mike - > > C'mon, Mike! If the Buddha could speak > conventionally, can't I? Should > my speech be more precise than his? Not every > conventional phrase requires > unpacking. > As worldlings, "we" (hmmm, guess I'd better > be careful ;-) pass along > from mindstate to mindstate dispositions to thinking > in terms of "me" and > "mine"and in terms of separate, self-existent > realities, and we pass along > subliminal dispositions to grasp at and push away > these things. And, yes, > this is at the subliminal (anusaya) level, and, much > of the time these > dispositions are manifest as outflowings (asava). > All the foregoing is > "defiled mind". After enlightenment, mind is > undefiled. That is to say, no > more of the three poisons - whoops, that's not too > conventional is it? ;-) > After enlightenment, *no* cittas carry ignorant > dispositions. > BTW, how many cittas have you actually > observed? (How about the > "patisandhi-, bhavanga-, cuti- and jhana-cittas" > that you talk about below?) > I'm not aware of having observed any cittas myself > at all, though I'm aware > of being conscious, of discerning hardness, > softness, colors, tastes, > feelings, emotions, thiughts, etc. I have observed > desire and aversion, I > have caught myself (whoops, better be careful!) > thinking about DSG, for > example, and trees, and people as if they really > *were* something. I catch > myself being unmindful (but with that catching, I > save myself for the > moment). But I can't ever recall catching a glimpse > of a citta. Isn't it a > bit odd to stand on one's head avoiding all > empirical talk while at the same > time talking about things like cittas which we have > never, ever observed? We > debate whether or not it is the bhavanga cittas > constitute luminous mind, > when the Buddha never taught anyone about bhavanga > cittas, and we wouldn't > know one if it sidled up to us and gave us a deep > bow! > Isn't there a bit of a danger in getting > caught in a realm of > unobserved "ultimate realities" that the Buddha > never presented in any of the > teachings given by him to multitudes of people over > 45 years and recorded in > the Sutta Pitaka, but shunning what we actually do > experience? I personally > think there is such a danger. > > With conventional metta (something actually felt, > not a theoretical "ultimate > reality"), > Howard > 10346 From: Date: Tue Dec 25, 2001 1:35pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein Hi, Mike - In a message dated 12/25/01 5:53:28 PM Eastern Standard Time, mlnease@y... writes: > OK, Howard, never mind--sorry I brought it up. > > mike > =========================== No, I'M sorry, and I SHOULD be! I've always tended towards "living in my head". In recent years, because of the Buddha's wonderful Dhamma, appreciated and practiced by me as an empirical *path*, and not as one more "philosophy", I've found my life and heart transformed. I'm afraid that over the months I have reacted badly to the inte llectual theorizing on DSG, an activity that I have fully participated in. I've reacted to it with aversion. But worst of all, I've now taken out my unhappiness on you (in my reply) - and even a bit in a recent post to my "comrade" ;-)), Robert E. Let me explain a bit further, please. I have tired so much of opinions, theories, and philosophical investigations into questions which have come to appear to me like "How many cittas can dance on the head of a pin?", because such intellectual philosophizing has not been a good "path" for me and is something that I had finally gotten away from, replacing it with regular meditation and an ongoing mindfulness practice. But, for a while now, I've gotten back to the old "living in my head" pattern, I've gotten away from any steadiness in my meditation practice, and the results have not been good. Oh, I can use words well, and I can reason well. But this has become a substitute for the practice that had come to serve me so well. This is a personal matter, and it calls for me to change things for myself. But my response has been quite poor! Instead of easing off on the intellectual discussions and putting more effort into the regularity of my practice, I've just concocted increasing discontent. There is absolutely no reason at all for me to have directed any of my discontent towards you, or, for that matter, towards any of the lovely folks on this list! You have my sincere apology. It's not you. It's me. I'm very sorry. Please excuse me. With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 10347 From: Robert Epstein Date: Tue Dec 25, 2001 7:31pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein I understand, Howard, and I certainly take your point. : ) Hope you are having happy Holidays! Regards, Robert ======== --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Robert - > > In a message dated 12/24/01 11:19:08 PM Eastern Standard Time, > epsteinrob@Y... writes: > > > > Well, I understand your meaning Howard, and I know I'm taking a sort of > > opposite > > tack here, since I am one of the people who think the 'luminous mind' sutta > > is > > referring to the mind and its potential. > > > > But to be rigorous, it seems interesting to me to look at this idea of the > > mind > > and see what is really there. If the mind is like a diamond in the rough > > that is > > covered with defilements and is potentially 'pure', it seems to posit an > > underlying mind that is a thing. How is it that something that is not a > > thing has > > a different potential than it has now? Am I being overly nit-picky here? > > > > If it is the potential of pure mental functions, that could exist if the > > defilements were not there, this is not quite like the diamond in the > > rough. The > > diamond that is undefiled is *really there* under the dirt. Under the > > defilements > > is there a separate citta that is not defiled? Or is the citta synonomous > > with > > its defilement of the moment? Later it will be replaced by a pure citta if > > such > > should arise, but it will not be the same one. > > > > I am one of those who believes in the possibility of an underlying > > continuous > > awareness, but in lieu of that, what would be there to be defiled and then > > become > > undefiled? > > > > Anyway, I feel a bit confused, so I hope there are some points worth making > > here. > > Forgive me sharing my thought process. > > > > Best, > > Robert Ep. > > > ============================== > The term 'mind' is a conventional one, no better or worse than the > Pali 'nama'. It is a general term for a variety of functions, including > discernment, feelings, volitions, ... well, you know the list. When these > functions involve ignorance, craving, and aversion we say that "mind is > defiled". When not, not. The defilements can be permanently removed. The > Buddha said that, and I happen to believe it. Dirty diamonds and gritty gold > are metaphors for this. As is the case with all metaphors, they can't be > pushed too far. They are aids to thinking, and no more. But as far as > providing the nitty gritty details of what, exactly, is the case in terms of > such hard-to-find things as cittas, well, there's no way that I have the > slightest idea. As I said a while ago to Mike, while I'm aware of being > conscious, and of experiencing feelings, emotions, sights, sounds, smells, > and tastes, I've never experienced a citta, and I never read a sutta by the > Buddha in which he discussed cittas, and, for sure I'll have to defer to > those who have, wherever one can find such folks, to give such an analysis. > > With metta, > Howard > 10348 From: Robert Epstein Date: Tue Dec 25, 2001 7:50pm Subject: RE: [dsg] some more about metta Dear Friends, I found Thanissaro Bikkhu's essay on 'No-Self/Not-Self' very worthwhile in this discussion. Here's the link: http://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/modern/thanissaro/notself2.html Best, Robert Ep. ======================== --- Kom Tukovinit wrote: > > Dear Victor, > > Sotapatti-magga, the first level of enlightenment, > eliminates the wrong view of self, which is the root of all > other wrong views. A sotapanna and above no longer has the > wrong view of self. > > Access to insights has suttas related to the views: > http://www.accesstoinsight.org/index-subject.html#ditthi > http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/anguttara/an04-178.html > http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/majjhima/mn109.html#sel > fview > http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/majjhima/mn148.html#sel > fid > http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/samyutta/sn41-003.html > http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/samyutta/sn22-001.html > http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/samyutta/sn22-047.html > > If you have the complete translation of Digha Nikaya, the > Buddha listed all the different wrong views in details in > Dighanikaya->Brahmnajala Sutta (DN1). > > I am sure there are many more suttas discussing the wrong > view of self, and its oppposite, anataness, in many more > suttas in many different variations than listed here, since > this is the first most fundamental kilesa that needs to be > eradicated. > > kom > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: yuzhonghao [mailto:victoryu@s...] > > Sent: Tuesday, December 25, 2001 10:59 AM > > To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com > > Subject: Re: [dsg] some more about metta > > > > > > Hello Sarah, > > > > I am not sure what you mean by "there is no self" > > and "there is no > > control," and I am not sure how you got the ideas > > "there is no self" > > and "there is no control." > > > > On one hand you say you often use self-control. > > On the other hand, > > you say that in reality there is no control. I > > am not sure what you > > mean here. > > > > If interested, you might want to refer to > > Samyutta Nikaya XLIV.10, Ananda Sutta, To Ananda > > http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/samyutta/sn44 > -010.html > > If possible, if would be helpful if you could find a > specific > reference from the discourses in which the Buddha claimed > that there > is no self. > > Please be very careful not to misrepresent what the Buddha > taught > that conditioned phenomenon is not self. > > Thank you for replying, and Happy Holidays. > > Regards, > Victor > > > > Even if we use self-control which I often do, there can > still be > understanding > > that in reality there is no self and no control, only > conditioned > realities. 10349 From: Robert Epstein Date: Tue Dec 25, 2001 8:39pm Subject: To Howard on Christmas Day (was: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary) Dear Howard, Thank you for sharing your thoughts and feelings about your practice and your relationship to the discussions on this list. It is our humanity which counts in the final analysis, who we really are at this moment. I like to take note of the meanings of the different holidays, when they arise, and to me Christmas is about fellowship, good will [metta], and universal love - the common qualities that we all have as human beings, one of which is suffering that we all share. Maybe the reason why you're here is similar to what it is for me: it is for the quality of the relationships, the good-hearted people who are here. Part of what we share is also a sincere desire to follow our true path as the Buddha outlined. But what is often hard is for us to accept that we don't all have the same path. There are places where we can share and there are places where we diverge. Somehow we think that we have to agree with each other or else totally disagree. But this is a lesson to all of us. The discomfort of being pulled out of your practice teaches you what your practice is, and thus you suffer and return to yourself in a sense and know your path anew. And in taking stock and clarifying what you need to do to be true to yourself -- and I'm sure everyone will forgive my conventional use of 'self' here -- you may notice that things have changed, that more has happened in terms of clarification by being here at dsg than just having intellectual discussions. Everyone here is trying in their own way to fulfill the promise of the Dharma, but maybe some of us need to meditate more, and some of us progress by contemplation and study. But this is all part of the flow of life that we have to accept if we are going to become the unchanging observer of all that changes in life. What does it all show, Howard? That life can't be controlled, that we can't even 'maintain' our practice -- all we can do is reestablish it from moment to moment and start out from scratch every day. Approached in the right way, this can be liberating. I hope you will begin your sitting again. I hope I will too. I hope you will see that your present state is inevitable, that it is not in stopping suffering or holding onto practice that our equanimity lies, but in letting go of everything and standing steadily on the shifting ground under our feet. Whatever we hold onto will fall apart. Whatever we let go of will return as a gift. I hope my speaking does not come off as abstract and philosophical. I really mean it, and believe it can be applied now to this moment of living. This is my wish for you on Christmas Day -- I am sorry for your suffering and am happy to stand with many others here as your sangha in a time like this. I hope you will do the same for me. If you need to talk, just drop me a line or ask for my phone number. In Friendship, Robert Ep. =================================== --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Mike - > > In a message dated 12/25/01 5:53:28 PM Eastern Standard Time, > mlnease@y... writes: > > > > OK, Howard, never mind--sorry I brought it up. > > > > mike > > > =========================== > No, I'M sorry, and I SHOULD be! > I've always tended towards "living in my head". In recent years, > because of the Buddha's wonderful Dhamma, appreciated and practiced by me as > an empirical *path*, and not as one more "philosophy", I've found my life and > heart transformed. > I'm afraid that over the months I have reacted badly to the inte > llectual theorizing on DSG, an activity that I have fully participated in. > I've reacted to it with aversion. But worst of all, I've now taken out my > unhappiness on you (in my reply) - and even a bit in a recent post to my > "comrade" ;-)), Robert E. Let me explain a bit further, please. > I have tired so much of opinions, theories, and philosophical > investigations into questions which have come to appear to me like "How many > cittas can dance on the head of a pin?", because such intellectual > philosophizing has not been a good "path" for me and is something that I had > finally gotten away from, replacing it with regular meditation and an ongoing > mindfulness practice. But, for a while now, I've gotten back to the old > "living in my head" pattern, I've gotten away from any steadiness in my > meditation practice, and the results have not been good. Oh, I can use words > well, and I can reason well. But this has become a substitute for the > practice that had come to serve me so well. This is a personal matter, and it > calls for me to change things for myself. > But my response has been quite poor! Instead of easing off on the > intellectual discussions and putting more effort into the regularity of my > practice, I've just concocted increasing discontent. There is absolutely no > reason at all for me to have directed any of my discontent towards you, or, > for that matter, towards any of the lovely folks on this list! You have my > sincere apology. It's not you. It's me. I'm very sorry. Please excuse me. > > With metta, > Howard > 10350 From: m. nease Date: Tue Dec 25, 2001 8:42pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein Hi Howard, Not to worry--I get as impatient with empty theorizing as anyone (if not more so)--unless I agree with it of course. No apologies necessary--thanks for the thoughtful response just the same. mike --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Mike - > > In a message dated 12/25/01 5:53:28 PM Eastern > Standard Time, > mlnease@y... writes: > > > > OK, Howard, never mind--sorry I brought it up. > > > > mike > > > =========================== > No, I'M sorry, and I SHOULD be! > I've always tended towards "living in my > head". In recent years, > because of the Buddha's wonderful Dhamma, > appreciated and practiced by me as > an empirical *path*, and not as one more > "philosophy", I've found my life and > heart transformed. > I'm afraid that over the months I have > reacted badly to the inte > llectual theorizing on DSG, an activity that I have > fully participated in. > I've reacted to it with aversion. But worst of all, > I've now taken out my > unhappiness on you (in my reply) - and even a bit in > a recent post to my > "comrade" ;-)), Robert E. Let me explain a bit > further, please. > I have tired so much of opinions, theories, > and philosophical > investigations into questions which have come to > appear to me like "How many > cittas can dance on the head of a pin?", because > such intellectual > philosophizing has not been a good "path" for me and > is something that I had > finally gotten away from, replacing it with regular > meditation and an ongoing > mindfulness practice. But, for a while now, I've > gotten back to the old > "living in my head" pattern, I've gotten away from > any steadiness in my > meditation practice, and the results have not been > good. Oh, I can use words > well, and I can reason well. But this has become a > substitute for the > practice that had come to serve me so well. This is > a personal matter, and it > calls for me to change things for myself. > But my response has been quite poor! Instead > of easing off on the > intellectual discussions and putting more effort > into the regularity of my > practice, I've just concocted increasing discontent. > There is absolutely no > reason at all for me to have directed any of my > discontent towards you, or, > for that matter, towards any of the lovely folks on > this list! You have my > sincere apology. It's not you. It's me. I'm very > sorry. Please excuse me. > > With metta, > Howard > 10351 From: Date: Tue Dec 25, 2001 5:13pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein Hi, Rob - In a message dated 12/25/01 10:32:19 PM Eastern Standard Time, epsteinrob@Y... writes: > I understand, Howard, and I certainly take your point. > > : ) > > Hope you are having happy Holidays! > > Regards, > Robert > =========================== Thanks, Robert. I wish you all the best as well! With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 10352 From: Date: Tue Dec 25, 2001 5:50pm Subject: Re: To Howard on Christmas Day (was: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary) Hi, Rob - In a message dated 12/25/01 11:39:53 PM Eastern Standard Time, epsteinrob@Y... writes: > > Dear Howard, > Thank you for sharing your thoughts and feelings about your practice and > your > relationship to the discussions on this list. It is our humanity which > counts in > the final analysis, who we really are at this moment. > > I like to take note of the meanings of the different holidays, when they > arise, > and to me Christmas is about fellowship, good will [metta], and universal > love - > the common qualities that we all have as human beings, one of which is > suffering > that we all share. > ---------------------------------------------------------- Yes, I feel the same. ---------------------------------------------------------- > > Maybe the reason why you're here is similar to what it is for me: it is > for the > quality of the relationships, the good-hearted people who are here. Part > of what > we share is also a sincere desire to follow our true path as the Buddha > outlined. > But what is often hard is for us to accept that we don't all have the same > path. > There are places where we can share and there are places where we diverge. > Somehow we think that we have to agree with each other or else totally > disagree. > But this is a lesson to all of us. The discomfort of being pulled out of > your > practice teaches you what your practice is, and thus you suffer and return > to > yourself in a sense and know your path anew. > --------------------------------------------------------- A wonderful point, Rob. -------------------------------------------------------- > > And in taking stock and clarifying what you need to do to be true to > yourself -- > and I'm sure everyone will forgive my conventional use of 'self' here < > slight > smile> -- you may notice that things have changed, that more has happened > in terms > of clarification by being here at dsg than just having intellectual > discussions. > ------------------------------------------------------------ Actually, there have been clarifications for me of various sorts. I've really gained much from DSG, and I hope to continue to do so. (The problem is not in the list.) ------------------------------------------------------------ > > Everyone here is trying in their own way to fulfill the promise of the > Dharma, but > maybe some of us need to meditate more, and some of us progress by > contemplation > and study. > > But this is all part of the flow of life that we have to accept if we are > going to > become the unchanging observer of all that changes in life. What does it > all > show, Howard? That life can't be controlled, that we can't even 'maintain' > our > practice -- all we can do is reestablish it from moment to moment and start > out > from scratch every day. > ------------------------------------------------------------- Yes. Mistakes are easily made and wrong directions easily taken. It's a kind of gift (maybe a Christmas present ;-) when life shows this to you. ------------------------------------------------------------- Approached in the right way, this can be liberating.> > I hope you will begin your sitting again. ------------------------------------------------------------- Thanks. I have. Now I must continue. ------------------------------------------------------------ I hope I will too. I hope you will see> > that your present state is inevitable, that it is not in stopping suffering > or > holding onto practice that our equanimity lies, but in letting go of > everything > and standing steadily on the shifting ground under our feet. Whatever we > hold > onto will fall apart. Whatever we let go of will return as a gift. > ------------------------------------------------------------- Thanks, Rob, for a good teaching. ------------------------------------------------------------- I hope my> > speaking does not come off as abstract and philosophical. I really mean > it, and > believe it can be applied now to this moment of living. ------------------------------------------------------------- Not at all abstract and philosophical, but obviously from your heart. And, please, I don't want anything I've said to lend even the slightest "chill" to anyone's inclination to be as abstract and philosophical as they find useful! My inclinations and disinclinations are mine alone, and I don't wish to impose anything on anyone! I particularly regret the tone of my post to Mike, and would undo it if only I could. ------------------------------------------------------------- > > This is my wish for you on Christmas Day -- I am sorry for your suffering > and am > happy to stand with many others here as your sangha in a time like this. I > hope > you will do the same for me. If you need to talk, just drop me a line or > ask for > my phone number. > ---------------------------------------------------------- Thank you, Rob. You have been most kind. (By the way, I have received a private post (off list) from another DSG list member which also was wonderfully supportive, and for which I am most appreciative.) ---------------------------------------------------------- > > In Friendship, > Robert Ep. > ============================= With much metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 10353 From: Sarah Date: Tue Dec 25, 2001 10:52pm Subject: apologies and so on Dear Howard (& Mike), May I just add a short note to say how much I've (and everyone else I've spoken to) always greatly appreciated your contributions on dsg. None of this (Ie inderstanding of dhamma) is easy for anyone - far too much moha and ditthi around for that - and most of us get a bit (or more) impatient or 'rattled' at times. Howard, you're an exemplary list-member and model of good nature because it's so rare for any of this frustration to show. I hope you and your family have a pleasant and relaxing holiday season and thank you for sharing your feelings so sincerely. Very best wishes, always to you both, Sarah ================================================== --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Mike - > > In a message dated 12/25/01 5:53:28 PM Eastern Standard Time, > mlnease@y... writes: > > > > OK, Howard, never mind--sorry I brought it up. > > > > mike > > > =========================== > No, I'M sorry, and I SHOULD be! > I've always tended towards "living in my head". In recent years, > because of the Buddha's wonderful Dhamma, appreciated and practiced by me as > an empirical *path*, and not as one more "philosophy", I've found my life and 10354 From: Date: Tue Dec 25, 2001 5:53pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein Hi, Mike - In a message dated 12/25/01 11:43:28 PM Eastern Standard Time, mlnease@y... writes: > Hi Howard, > > Not to worry--I get as impatient with empty theorizing > as anyone (if not more so)--unless I agree with it of > course. No apologies necessary--thanks for the > thoughtful response just the same. > > mike > ========================= Ahhh, you make me breathe easily! Thank you so much, my friend, for your very kind understanding and acceptance. With much metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 10355 From: Date: Tue Dec 25, 2001 6:03pm Subject: Re: [dsg] apologies and so on Hi, Sarah - In a message dated 12/26/01 1:53:26 AM Eastern Standard Time, sarahdhhk@y... writes: > > Dear Howard (& Mike), > > May I just add a short note to say how much I've (and everyone else I've > spoken > to) always greatly appreciated your contributions on dsg. None of this (Ie > inderstanding of dhamma) is easy for anyone - far too much moha and ditthi > around for that - and most of us get a bit (or more) impatient or 'rattled' > at > times. Howard, you're an exemplary list-member and model of good nature > because > it's so rare for any of this frustration to show. > ------------------------------------------------------------- Howad: Thank you so much, Sarah. As usual, you are genuinely sweet and supportive. ------------------------------------------------------------ > > I hope you and your family have a pleasant and relaxing holiday season and > thank you for sharing your feelings so sincerely. > ---------------------------------------------------------- Howard: The same to you and Jon. I wish you both and your loved ones a season of much peace and a new year filled with all that you wish for yourselves. --------------------------------------------------------- > > Very best wishes, always to you both, > > Sarah =========================== With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 10356 From: Sarah Date: Wed Dec 26, 2001 0:08am Subject: Re: [dsg] Concept Dear Rob Ep, --- Robert Epstein wrote: > Hi Sarah. > So concepts that directly reference a reality are realities themselves? Or > not. No. A concept is always a concept (whichever kind) and never turns into a reality. > For example, if I say the word 'panna', it is a word that refers to a > concept, no? It is the kind of concept that represents a reality. (vijjamaana pa~n~natti) > Is panna a concept or a reality? Is panna considered 'real'? Can it be > experienced as an object? Both (i.e. concept and reality). Panna is real when it arises and performs its task of ‘understanding’. There is no need for a name at this time. Yes it can itself (being a reality) not only be eperienced as an object but also be known by sati and panna as it has its characteristic and ‘nature’. Of course it could also be experienced by unwholesome mind-states too. > The 'experience' of a rupa is itself a nama? In the 'experience of > hardness', is > the experience a nama, and the hardness experienced a rupa? Yes, the ‘experiencing’ (i.e. citta with accompanying cetasikas) is always a nama. Exactly right with regard to hardness. The ‘experiencing’ through the body-sense is a nama and the hardness, which is only ever experienced, is a rupa. Later the javana cittas which ‘run’ through the object are also namas.Then there may be thinking about the ‘hardness’. The thinking would then consist of more namas, but the idea about the past rupas is now a concept. (I’m trying to keep it fairly simple here;-) >Is the citta > that > then 'thinks about' and 'interprets' what it has seen, ['oh that's a table'], > itself a nama? I am clear that the 'table' in that equation is a concept, > not a > reality. Yes, you’re getting very ‘warm’ (thinking of Xmas guessing party games now;-) yes, the thinking, the interpreting (more thinking with sanna and so on) are all namas. As you say, the ‘table’ is a concept and in this case in a different category of concepts from panna because ‘table’ never exists. > > And in the list below, is this a list of all types of concepts? Which ones > are > considered namas, only 1 and 5? Concepts are never namas. I think you mean, which ones represent namas? Then the answer would be as you say, 1) vijjamaana pa~n~nattis and 5) vijjamaanena vijjamaana pannattis. Thes are just the concepts that are names (naama pa~n~natti). It gets more complicated, but perhaps I’ll refer you to 3 excellent archive posts for more details first and then you can ask Jon, myself or anyone else if you have more questions about these (now I know you take your homework seriously, Rob;-)) The third link answers the last question in detail, I think: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/message/2918 http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/message/3362 http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/message/3494 Hoping you and your family are having a pleasant holiday. We just had a lovely long leisurely lunch sitting outside on the Peak with Jon’s mother and her friend. Sarah ====================================================== 10357 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Wed Dec 26, 2001 0:44am Subject: Re: [dsg] A rupee for your rupa Rob Ep --- Robert Epstein wrote: > Thanks Jon, good explanation. Although it is hard for me to understand > how the > process that arises in the sense door to cognize the object is 'perfect' > enough to > apprehend it 'transparently' without any influence of its own. Is the > idea that > the sense organ consciousness is like a photograph and is able to > directly 'copy' > the object? All cittas (moments of consciousness) experience an object, and the cittas that see or hear experience in particular the rupas that are visible object or sound. Indeed, the cittas that experience visible object or sound have as their specific function the *seeing* or *hearing* of the visible/auditory object, in the sense of experiencing it 'in its bare immediacy and simplicity' [CMA - full extract pasted below]. > In a related question, how does this theory account for the > characteristic of the > sense organ itself which by its very nature and design as 'this type of > sense > organ rather than that' will influence the way the sense object is > perceived? It > is not believed, I would think, that the sense organs are 'perfect' in > actually > taking in the sense object. In what way does a sense organ that has > evolved > through a physical process to become gradually more refined but still > imperfect > and which is also subject to individual variation, take in the 'actual' > characteristic of the object, or the rupa itself? Even someone who is > enlightened > is still perceiving 'visible object' through a 'human eye process', no? > There is > no direct perception according to this idea. A minor clarification here, Rob. The sense-organ, being a rupa, does not experience /perceive the sense-object. That perception is the function of the citta discussed above. The sense-organ is of course one of the necessary conditions for the arising of the sense-door consciousness, but the functions of seeing, hearing etc are performed by cittas, not rupas. > Which is why normally I would think > that the sense-door process really picks up a sense-door result, rather > than a true 'rupa' or actual object-moment. It is the cittas that arise in the processes that follow the bare perceiving of the sense-door object that have what you term a 'sense-door result' as their object. I hope this helps. Jon ['CMA' = Bhikkhu Bodhi, 'A Comprehensive Manual of Abhidhamma' (BPS) The Abhidhammattha Sangaha of Acariya Anuruddha, with explanatory guide (The explanatory guide is compiled from, but is not a direct translation of, the main commentaries to the A-S)] Ch I, #8. Analysis of Functions (Guide) "In a cognitive process at the sense doors, … there arises a citta which directly cognizes the impingent object. "This citta, and the specific function it performs, is determined by the nature of the object. If the object is a visible form, eye consciousness arises seeing it; if it is a sound, ear consciousness arises hearing it, and so forth. "In this context, the functions of seeing and hearing, etc., do not refer to the cognitive acts which explicitly identify the objects of sight and hearing, etc., as such. They signify, rather, the rudimentary momentary occasions of consciousness by which the sense datum is experienced in its bare immediacy and simplicity prior to all identificatory cognitive operations." 10358 From: Sarah Date: Wed Dec 26, 2001 0:45am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: jhanas for Herman Dear Rob Ep, --- Robert Epstein wrote: > Dear Sarah, > I think three things are true: > 1/ You are clearly not *against* developing the jhanas, just saying that it > is > extremely difficult to approach such refined states. Just so.If there is no ‘beginner’ level of samatha bhavana in daily life, why would one think that ther can be any highly developed jhana practice. Just as we might say, if there is no understanding of namas and rupas now, clearly and distinctly as they are, why would one have the idea there can be any understanding or realizing of nibbana? For both kinds of development, there has to be clear understanding of the difference between skilful and unskilful mind-states, including and especially at those times of concentrating on an object, I think. > 2/ I think it is also clear that there are *some* teachers alive today who > are > familiar with the jhanas and their practice, such as Ajahn Brahmavamso, who > has > lectured and taught on them quite a bit. I’m sorry but I can’t comment on this one. > 3/ I think the final point is that you are saying that it is not *necessary* > to > develop these advanced states in order to progress on the path of > discernment, > sati and panna, that these qualities are independent of any particular state. > Is > this correct? When the Buddha talks about the necessary conditions for developing vipassana, he refers to hearing the Teachings, considering, putting into practice and so on. I don’t believe he ever says ‘develop jhana’ first. He does encourage us, however, to develop all kinds of skilful states. He also says that these states along with all other realities are not self. In other words, they are not developed by ‘wishing’ or ‘trying to do’ or ‘concentrating on an object’ without any understanding. It’s certainly true that many monks in the Buddha’s day had already developed the highest jhanas. It wasm’t by coincidence that the Buddha was born at that time in India where exrtraordinarily high levels of wisdom and wholesomeness where apparent. I’ve talked quite a bit about how I understand metta can be developed. Let me just mention another object of samatha: ‘earth kasina’. In theory, we could sit cross-legged and focus on a lump of earth and develop a higher and higher state of concentration. I don’t believe, however, there would be any wholesome concentration, calm or understanding attained. If, on the other hand, naturally in daily life we happen to reflect for a moment on the importance we attribute to all our possessions, which we believe we own, when in reality, they are just ‘earth’ and don’t belong to anyone. At the end of life, if not before, we lose them all and yet this ‘earth’ is what we fight and argue about and which we hold so very dear. We crave for pleasant feelings and cling so much to sense objects i.e. to rupas. Samatha development is the detachment from this craving. Just a little wise reflection may condition moments of calm now without any special effort at all. As I was writing the last segment on the Intro to the Vinaya, there were conditions for moments of calm as I reflected on the extraordinary wisdom and compassion of the arahats who spent 7mths reviewing the Teachings at the 1st Council. Their work was done, but for the sake of generations to come (like us here) they painstakingly organised and categorised the Tipitaka and the earth quaked at these extraordinary deeds. This would come under reflection on the Sangha, I believe. When I started writing, I had no intention or wish to experience these few moments of calm or samatha. It was just by conditions. A few moments later, there were tears in my eyes reflecting some attachment and aversion. The kilesa 'defile' so very, very quickly. I'm not sure my 'rambles' clarify anything. Seems like a Rob Ep day today;-) Sarah ============ 10359 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Wed Dec 26, 2001 0:49am Subject: Re: [dsg] Ultimate realities (and khandhas) Herman --- egberdina wrote: > Jon, > > I am wondering if the quality of ultimate realities are subjective ie > specific to each self. The colour blind person will see whatever they > see, it is irreducible, it is colour, which is not capable of being > described in other terms, not capable of being sensed through another > door, unless you use LSD. > > Likewise, the non-colour blind person will see specific colour, > looking at the same object as the colour blind person. Yet the colour > experience will be different. In this way there is nothing absolute > or ultimate about seeing the object as it really is, unless ultimate > or absolute has relative connotations. > > So two arahants, sitting in a VW at the traffic lights, one colour > blind, one not colour blind, will see two different realities as the > lights change. I wonder which one will write the preferred > commentaries? ( :-) ) An interesting example you give here, Herman ;-)) I would agree that, speaking in purely conventional terms, no 2 persons ever experience the same thing in the same way, even if they are equally endowed with understanding and sensory perception. However, in terms of the ultimate realities about which you ask, we cannot talk about 2 people seeing or hearing the same thing. This is because the citta of the sense-door experience has as its object simply a rupa (visible object or sound) that arises by virtue of conditions that are beyond that person's control. Each moment of sense-door experience is a moment of vipaka (result of kamma), and the object experienced by a person at a given moment depends on, among other things, their past kamma. So even if, in conventional terms, 2 people are looking at or listening to the same thing, the moment-to-moment seeing or hearing of rupas will be determined by factors that are unique to each individual. But it is what is in common at such moments that is the subject of the Buddha's teaching. The actual experiencing of visible object or sound by the relevant sense-door consciousness is a universal experience common to all beings that have the appropriate faculty, no matter in what shape those faculties are. And the same goes for the processes that follow those experiences. This is the subject, the 'field', of the development of understanding leading to breaking the link with samsara. To summarise, it is of the nature of things that: - when 2 people are seeing/hearing 'the same thing at the same time' (speaking conventionally), it's a safe bet that in terms of ultimate realities there is no conformity in the *actual objects being experienced* on a moment-to-moment basis - however, in terms of the *different kinds of consciousness and their objects* that are experienced in this lifetime, there is total and universal conformity among all beings So colour-blindness does not preclude an understanding of the true nature of the visible object appearing at the present moment. Given the choice between a commentary written by the person with perfect vision but weak understanding, and one written by the colour-blind person with good understanding, I'd take the latter any day (regardless of their taste in cars). Jon 10360 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Wed Dec 26, 2001 1:08am Subject: Re: [dsg] Ultimate realities (and khandhas) Howard --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Jon - ……………….. > > 'Observableness' in this sense is not the distinguishing criterion of > a > > dhamma. The distinguishing characteristic mentioned by the texts is > that > > of having an individual essence that is capable of being directly > > experienced by sati/panna. Mere observableness, in the sense of being > the > > object of citta, is common to both dhammas and concepts. > > > ------------------------------------------------------------- > Howard: > Two questions here, Jon. For one, I assume that by "individual > essence" here you merely mean characteristic/lakkhana? More than that is > not > part of what *I* consider to be compatible with the Buddha's Dhamma. I'm not sure whether 'sabhaava', as used in the texts, is coterminous with 'lakkhana', but that is indeed how I think of it. BTW, I believe that to those coming from a Mahayana background the words 'individual essence' tend to convey an idea of 'entitiness', but in the texts they carry no such connotation. > The second question is with regard to 'dhamma'. I was under the impression > that > *everything* is a "dhamma" in the Buddha's usage. If not, then what is > the > distinction between just plain 'dhamma' and 'paramattha dhamma'? I think that to say *everything* is a dhamma is a little too sweeping. As far as I know, the term 'dhamma' always has a specific meaning, although that meaning varies according to the context. In the context of the realities that are to be or can be known by awareness and understanding, the terms 'dhammas' and 'paramattha dhammas' can be used interchangeably. In the suttas, the term 'khandhas' is frequently used in a similar context, and the meaning of khandhas and paramattha dhammas is coterminous, except that the latter includes nibbana also. > One more point: When I say "concept" I am talking about an idea / > > thought / mental construct, and not about its real or imagined referent. > We > *are* aware of concepts in that sense, even with wisdom it seems to me. > In > the four foundations of mindfulness, the fourth foundation, mindfulness > of > dhammas, surely does include concepts. Included there are the four noble > > truths. These are *ideas*, ideas which convey critically important facts > > about the world expressed by the Buddha, ideas involving suffering / > unsatisfactoriness, its cause, its ending, and the means for ending it. > This > was reiterated time and again in the suttas. And everywhere in the > suttas the > four noble truths are presented they are done so quite conventionally. While I agree that in the suttas the Four Noble Truths are presented in conventional terms, I would not agree that they are mere ideas or concepts. However, that question aside for the purposes of the present discussion (to be taken up on another day?), the other descriptions given in the Satipatthana Sutta for the 4th foundation of mindfulness (Five Hindrances, Aggregates, Sense-bases, Factors of Enlightenment) all clearly refer to realities and not concepts, as I understand them. So even on you own interpretation, Howard, wouldn't that leave the Four Noble Truths as the only possible 'concept' anyway? ………………….. > > As I understand the texts -- > > - the moment of consciousness that has as its object a thought is > real (a > > dhamma) > > - the thought itself, however, is a mere mental construct lacking any > > individual characteristic capable of being experienced, and is not a > > dhamma. > > > -------------------------------------------------------------- > Howard: > Again, then, I must ask what dhammas are not *paramattha* > dhammas. It > seems to me that in the suttas, the Buddha uses 'dhamma' to refer to any > > distinguishable thing. 'Dhammas' can be found to have different meanings in different contexts, but I think the important thing from our point of view is that the Buddha did distinguish between 'realties' and 'concepts' and it is importatnt to know in any particular context whether he was talking about one, the other or both. …………………….. > > Thus ‘paramattha’ is described as that which belongs to the domain > of > > ultimate or supreme knowledge. > > > -------------------------------------------------------------- > Howard: > So, in Abhidhamma, 'paramattha' is redundant in 'paramattha > dhamma'? > And also, are you saying that the Buddha could not know concepts with > wisdom, > because concepts are not paramattha dhammas? I was under the impression > that > the Buddha was able to see *everything* with wisdom, just by turning his > > attention to it. But concepts are an exception? A citta that has a concept as its object can be accompanied by wisdom and, in that case, the concept is the object of the wisdom too, since all mental factors take the same object as the citta they accompany. However, a concept cannot be the object of a citta that is accompanied by *wisdom of the level of satipatthana*. Only a reality can be the object of such a citta, since the function of wisdom of this level is to understand something about the true nature of realities. Jon PS The distinction discussed just above helps in understadning one of the essential differences between bhavana of the level of samatha and bhavana of the level of vipassana. 10361 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Wed Dec 26, 2001 1:11am Subject: Re: [dsg] Eightfold Path (esp. right effort) Howard --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Jon - > > In a message dated 12/22/01 5:37:42 AM Eastern Standard Time, > jonoabb@y... writes: > > > > As I understand it, Rob, all mental factors (cetasikas) are > accumulated > > and passed from one citta to the next. The accumulation of an > individual > > factor in this manner is one of the conditions for its arising again > in > > the future. > > > > > ============================= > I don't understand this. What sort of "accumulation" is this? > Cetasikas (and cittas) are functions or operations, not substances. The > occurrence of an event now is a condition for the occurrence of future > events > or features of such events, but nothing is passed along. It was my > understanding that abhidhamma simply views cetasikas as arising and > ceasing. > While a given cetasika could be operative through several cittas (i.e. > while > other cetasikas may come and go, the ending and arising of cetasikas > [and > arammanas] marking citta boundaries), it is not a thing to be "passed > along", > but is simply a function which is operative for as long as it takes. > > With metta, > Howard I mean, for example, that every moment of, say, attachment that arises is accumulated and passes from one citta to the next (this is what we mean by the latent tendency for attachment). All other mental factors (including, for example, sanna/memory) are similarly accumulated and passed from one citta to the next. Jon 10362 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Wed Dec 26, 2001 1:12am Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts) Victor --- yuzhonghao wrote: > Hello Jon, > > Please understand conditioned phenomenon as it actually is: > Conditioned phenomenon is impermanent. > Conditioned phenomenon is unsatisfactory/dukkha. > Conditioned phenomenon is to be seen as it actually is with right > discernment thus: "This is not mine. This I am not. This is not my > self." While I understand the meaning of what you are saying, there is surely more to it than this. Did the Buddha give any clues as to *how this understanding is to be developed*? Otherwise, one is just repeating the words of the suttas. Jon > Regards, > Victor > > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Jonothan Abbott wrote: > > Victor > > > > --- Victor Yu wrote: > Hello Jon, > > > > > > Thank you. Whether it is hard to realize or not, conditioned > phenomenon > > > such as consciousness or perception is impermanent, is > > > unsatisfactory/dukkha, is to be seen as it actually is with right > > > discernment thus: "This is not mine. This I am not. This is not > my > > > self." > > > > Yes, I wouldn't argue with what you say. But we need to know *how* > this > > 'right discernment' is to be developed. Any suggestions? > > > > Jon 10363 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Wed Dec 26, 2001 1:15am Subject: Re: [dsg] 'Self' as object of discernment (and khandhas) Rob Ep --- Robert Epstein wrote: > Thanks, Jon. One question, below. > > --- Jonothan Abbott wrote: > > > At both moments there is citta/consciousness (a reality) experiencing > an > > object. In the former case the object of the citta (sound) is a > reality > > while in the latter case the object of the citta (thought about sound) > is > > not a reality. > > > > Jon > > Okay, I may be dense, but then what is a nama in this continuum? A nama is a reality that experiences an object. In the instance given above, the citta/moment of consciousness is a nama. Cetasikas (mental factors that accompany a citta) are also namas, since they experience an object too, namely, the same object as the citta they accompany. So all cittas and cetasikas are namas. In the language of the suttas, namas are the 4 khandhas other than rupa-kkhandha. These are: 2. Vedana/feeling [a cetasika] 3. Sanna/perception or memory [a cetasika] 4. Sankhara/the formations [the 50 cetasikas other than the preceding 2] 5. Vinnana/consciousness [citta] Jon 10364 From: Sarah Date: Wed Dec 26, 2001 1:15am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Sarah Dear Rob Ep, --- Robert Epstein wrote: > Dear Sarah, > Well, I have at least done a *bit* of homework, and went and read the > translations > of the 'luminous mind' commentary that Nina was working on. I appreciate > those > being there, they are quite clear in what they say. I’m very impressed;-) =================== > Although I understand the parent-child analogy, I can't see the comparison. > The > bhavanga-cittas have no responsibility to the defiled cittas in question. > They > have no relationship to them at all. Though they are 'pure' and the waking > cittas > are 'defiled' that is as far as the good parent/bad child analogy goes. > There is > no real soiling of the reputation of the bhavanga cittas via the soiling of > the > waking cittas. It has no effect on the bhavanga cittas at all. To whom > would the > reputation be ruined, or who would hold the bhavanga cittas responsible for > not > 'preventing' the defiling of the waking cittas? It seems to me to be an > analogy > that doesn't apply to the reality of these cittas. As Nina said, I think we have to be careful not to take the analogy too far. Having said that, I find it very interesting too. As I understand, just as the bad child may spoil the reputation of the parent due to a lack of comprehension (by society) of where the fault really lies and confusing parent and child together, perhaps we can say that the kilesa give the entire mind states or process of phenomena a bad reputation through ignorance of the real state of affairs. In our ignorance, we notice someone’s anger and think they are an ‘angry person’. There is no comprehension that dosa just arises in a few javana cittas. With no understanding of ‘pure’ bhavanga cittas between processes, they are all sullied by those cittas with dosa. It doesn’t seem convoluted to me, but then I just accept the commentary interpretation and don’t try to analyse too much. The commentary makes it clear that the kilesa that defile the mind are arising in the later javana process, so there’s no idea of pure and impure cittas together or of vipaka and javana cittas together (none of which would make any sense). Like you, I'm very interested to read the sub-commentary and translation in due course too. When we read the Buddha’s descritptions of realities in fine detail in the Abhidhamma and sometimes in the Suttas, it is a description rather than a prescription as Jon and Dan pointed out before. Accumulations vary so much and so there is no rule at all as to which realities will become known at any given time. Bhavanga cittas may be known by someone’s panna and not another’s. It doesn’t matter at all. > The Buddha's statement is quite simple and clear. The explanation that > attributes > this to the bhavanga cittas is convoluted. I would think there would have to > be > some logical extrapolation from the Buddha's original words for the > commentary's > viewpoint to be understood. For many years (read decades) I used to just ‘switch off’ when I heard about bhavanga cittas....Like you say, it just seemed too convoluted. In the last year, I’ve been hearing explanations and considering in ways that are very helpful for me at this time. Again, there’s no rule, but since you asked or suggested another interpretation, the topic has come up... Often I use an alarm-clock to wake up and probably because I’ve been talking with Ken O about sleep and bhavangas, I’ve been noticing how as soon as the alarm rings, the worlds of eye-door, ear-door, mind-door with lots of lobha, dosa and panatti are so apparent within seconds. Occasionally there’s a little awareness, but usually there is just the grasping, aversion, the stories and the ignorance instantly. Always fun talking to you, Rob, Sarah ================================================== 10365 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Wed Dec 26, 2001 1:17am Subject: Re: [dsg] Eightfold Path (esp. right effort) Rob Ep --- Robert Epstein wrote: > > > > > As I understand it, Rob, all mental factors (cetasikas) are > accumulated > > and passed from one citta to the next. The accumulation of an > individual > > factor in this manner is one of the conditions for its arising again > in > > the future. > > > > Jon > > Interesting, Jon. I hadn't realized that. So there are billions of > cetasikas > being passed along? In a manner of speaking. As Howard has pointed out in a recent post to me, 'Cetasikas (and cittas) are functions or operations, not substances'. So it would be more correct to say that the cumulative effect of all preceding cetasikas is being passed along at each moment of citta. Jon 10366 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Wed Dec 26, 2001 1:31am Subject: Re: [dsg] Memory, Objects, and Continuity Num Thanks for a very informative post. Do you have any references on the 4 manifestations of sanna that you mention --'registration (marking), retention, retrieval and recall'? I would be interested to know where I can read more about this. Jon --- srnsk@a... wrote: > Hi Howard, > > <<< There is then the question of whether the > content of a memory is considered to be an arammana or not. In order for > the > experience of continuity to occur, it is necessary, it seems to me, for > the > memories of past cittas to occur simultaneously with the current citta > (else > such memories are already gone). > > In that case, it becomes important whether > or not the content of a memory is considered an arammana, for if it is, > then > there is more than one arammana per citta. >>> > > > Let me put in my two cent worth comments. As I understand, the sanna > and > citta in the same citta always have the same aramma. From the 4 > characters > of things, sanna manifest as registration (marking), retention, > retrieval and > recall. Citta is a leader in knowing and sanna is a leader in its > subset of > function. Sanna can mark and register pretty much every aramma > paramattha, > pannatti and from my reading nibbhana. 10367 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Wed Dec 26, 2001 4:14am Subject: Re: [dsg] Seasons greetings (was, apologies and so on) Howard > > I hope you and your family have a pleasant and relaxing holiday season > and > > thank you for sharing your feelings so sincerely. > > > ---------------------------------------------------------- > Howard: > The same to you and Jon. I wish you both and your loved ones a > season > of much peace and a new year filled with all that you wish for > yourselves. > --------------------------------------------------------- Thanks Howard, and the same to you and yours. I hope it's a good year for you (on and off the list), with understanding. Jon 10368 From: Purnomo . Date: Wed Dec 26, 2001 4:58am Subject: Re: [dsg] Concept Dear, too I am interested to discuss 'concept'. So I wrote it. Before, I just see and read, no respond, because, 1. My knowledge is so small 2. I am not interested. Colour is not absolute. Try, your friend and you make simulate. You ask your friend, "what colour is an apple?" What your friend answer is his/her experience. Maybe is same with you. But 'image' of his/her colour is not same with you. nice see you purnomo >From: "egberdina" >Reply-To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com >To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com >Subject: Re: [dsg] Concept >Date: Thu, 20 Dec 2001 10:17:46 -0000 > >DEar Purnomo, > >I haven't seen your name for a long time! Nice to hear from you again. >A question for you. I understand that seeing colour is seeing visible >object as it is. Today I had to help a customer who thought his >computer monitor was not working. When a monitor is properly >connected it has a little green light showing, when the monitor is >not receiving video signal the light is orange. I asked the >customer, "Is the light green or orange" he said "I don't know, > I'm colour blind" > >So is colour absolute? And when/how do you know that you are seeing >the absolute colour? > >All the best > > >Herman 10369 From: Purnomo . Date: Wed Dec 26, 2001 5:23am Subject: Re: [dsg] Concept Dear, friend thank you. I'm so glad and surprise because you 'praise' me. I like your books. You are my favourite. Your books is so advance and almost make me difficult to understand it. And thank you for all my friend who give me some books so my knowledge of dhamma grow up. Nice, purnomo >From: Nina van Gorkom >Reply-To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com >To: >Subject: [dsg] Concept >Date: Fri, 21 Dec 2001 19:11:40 +0100 > >Hi Purnomo. Nice to hear from you again. You explained in a very concise >way >the difference between concept and paramattha, in a way understandanble to >everybody. I like the way you formulated this, >best wishes, Nina. 10370 From: Purnomo . Date: Wed Dec 26, 2001 6:15am Subject: Re: [dsg] Concept Hello, friend I agree. -purnomo >From: "yuzhonghao" >Reply-To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com >To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com >Subject: Re: [dsg] Concept >Date: Sun, 23 Dec 2001 01:15:10 -0000 > >Hello Purnomo, > >As I understand it from checking out the dictionary, concept means a >general idea derived or inferred from specific instances or >occurrences. It also means something formed in mind, a thought or a >notion. It seems to me that concept can be categorized as nama, a >representation. > >Regards, >Victor > > > >--- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "Purnomo ." wrote: > > > > If we seek a 'Concept', we have to collect all our experiences and >we 'just' > > make a conclusion. That is a concept--for me. How about you ? I am >guarantee > > that is different. Why ? Because that is 'concept' for me. And >That's true > > for me not you. So, concept is not absolute truth. > > > > purnomo-- 10371 From: Date: Wed Dec 26, 2001 3:08am Subject: Re: [dsg] Ultimate realities (and khandhas) Hi, Jon - Thank you for the following informative post. At one point you ask, with regard to the possibility of concepts being among the objects discussed in the 4th foundation of mindfulness: "So even on your own interpretation, Howard, wouldn't that leave the Four Noble Truths as the only possible 'concept' anyway?" With regard to this, I would say that, yes, these seem to be the only concepts dealt with there. But I certainly do see them as concepts. With metta, Howard In a message dated 12/26/01 4:11:54 AM Eastern Standard Time, jonoabb@y... writes: > Howard > > --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Jon - > ……………….. > > > 'Observableness' in this sense is not the distinguishing criterion of > > a > > > dhamma. The distinguishing characteristic mentioned by the texts is > > that > > > of having an individual essence that is capable of being directly > > > experienced by sati/panna. Mere observableness, in the sense of being > > the > > > object of citta, is common to both dhammas and concepts. > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------- > > Howard: > > Two questions here, Jon. For one, I assume that by "individual > > essence" here you merely mean characteristic/lakkhana? More than that is > > not > > part of what *I* consider to be compatible with the Buddha's Dhamma. > > I'm not sure whether 'sabhaava', as used in the texts, is coterminous with > 'lakkhana', but that is indeed how I think of it. > > BTW, I believe that to those coming from a Mahayana background the words > 'individual essence' tend to convey an idea of 'entitiness', but in the > texts they carry no such connotation. > > > The second question is with regard to 'dhamma'. I was under the > impression > > that > > *everything* is a "dhamma" in the Buddha's usage. If not, then what is > > the > > distinction between just plain 'dhamma' and 'paramattha dhamma'? > > I think that to say *everything* is a dhamma is a little too sweeping. As > far as I know, the term 'dhamma' always has a specific meaning, although > that meaning varies according to the context. > > In the context of the realities that are to be or can be known by > awareness and understanding, the terms 'dhammas' and 'paramattha dhammas' > can be used interchangeably. In the suttas, the term 'khandhas' is > frequently used in a similar context, and the meaning of khandhas and > paramattha dhammas is coterminous, except that the latter includes nibbana > also. > > > One more point: When I say "concept" I am talking about an idea / > > > > thought / mental construct, and not about its real or imagined referent. > > We > > *are* aware of concepts in that sense, even with wisdom it seems to me. > > In > > the four foundations of mindfulness, the fourth foundation, mindfulness > > of > > dhammas, surely does include concepts. Included there are the four noble > > > > truths. These are *ideas*, ideas which convey critically important facts > > > > about the world expressed by the Buddha, ideas involving suffering / > > unsatisfactoriness, its cause, its ending, and the means for ending it. > > This > > was reiterated time and again in the suttas. And everywhere in the > > suttas the > > four noble truths are presented they are done so quite conventionally. > > While I agree that in the suttas the Four Noble Truths are presented in > conventional terms, I would not agree that they are mere ideas or > concepts. > > However, that question aside for the purposes of the present discussion > (to be taken up on another day?), the other descriptions given in the > Satipatthana Sutta for the 4th foundation of mindfulness (Five Hindrances, > Aggregates, Sense-bases, Factors of Enlightenment) all clearly refer to > realities and not concepts, as I understand them. So even on you own > interpretation, Howard, wouldn't that leave the Four Noble Truths as the > only possible 'concept' anyway? > > ………………….. > > > As I understand the texts -- > > > - the moment of consciousness that has as its object a thought is > > real (a > > > dhamma) > > > - the thought itself, however, is a mere mental construct lacking any > > > individual characteristic capable of being experienced, and is not a > > > dhamma. > > > > > -------------------------------------------------------------- > > Howard: > > Again, then, I must ask what dhammas are not *paramattha* > > dhammas. It > > seems to me that in the suttas, the Buddha uses 'dhamma' to refer to any > > > > distinguishable thing. > > 'Dhammas' can be found to have different meanings in different contexts, > but I think the important thing from our point of view is that the Buddha > did distinguish between 'realties' and 'concepts' and it is importatnt to > know in any particular context whether he was talking about one, the other > or both. > > …………………….. > > > Thus ‘paramattha’ is described as that which belongs to the > domain > > of > > > ultimate or supreme knowledge. > > > > > -------------------------------------------------------------- > > Howard: > > So, in Abhidhamma, 'paramattha' is redundant in 'paramattha > > dhamma'? > > And also, are you saying that the Buddha could not know concepts with > > wisdom, > > because concepts are not paramattha dhammas? I was under the impression > > that > > the Buddha was able to see *everything* with wisdom, just by turning his > > > > attention to it. But concepts are an exception? > > A citta that has a concept as its object can be accompanied by wisdom and, > in that case, the concept is the object of the wisdom too, since all > mental factors take the same object as the citta they accompany. > > However, a concept cannot be the object of a citta that is accompanied by > *wisdom of the level of satipatthana*. Only a reality can be the object > of such a citta, since the function of wisdom of this level is to > understand something about the true nature of realities. > > Jon > > PS The distinction discussed just above helps in understadning one of the > essential differences between bhavana of the level of samatha and bhavana > of the level of vipassana. > > /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 10372 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Wed Dec 26, 2001 10:24am Subject: lost tapes Dear Robert, did you find the tapes? If not I copy again, now I have the right code, best wishes, Nina. 10373 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Wed Dec 26, 2001 10:24am Subject: chatting about India Dear Kom, I want to chat some more with you about India. You wrote: A. Supi explained that he studied the dhammas keeping firmly in mind that the results manifest only when the causes are complete/filled. If panna doesn't rise to cognize the realities, that means one's understandings about the dhammas at the pannatti level are not enough or are not firm. If there is no vipassana nana, then panna at the lower/weaker levels haven't been developed enough for that to happen. This is so with magga and so on. He said, by understanding this truly, then one doesn't struggle for satipathanna/vipassana nana/magga/results to happen. I find this very good, reminding us about conditions. What else can we do now but listening, studying, considering, verifying in daily life now what we learnt. I also found it helpful that A. Sujin said: understanding leads to detachment from the beginning to the end, stressing detachment so often. I was reminded that even reading the scriptures and wishing to gain understanding is often done with an idea of self. You were more in the back of the bus, near A. Supi and next to Jonothan. What else did you discuss? I better ask now, otherwise those good reminders are gone. I appreciated the many personal talks, waiting in the Hotel hall for the bus, or after dinner in a smaller group, or in a teashop along the road when the drivers had to rest. Also hearing the tapes in the bus, anumodana for your help to bring them to the front of the bus. Near the Bodhitree I had a really good "alley walk" (cankamma) with Jonothan, a higher lane all around the place. Jonothan said, " let us walk, and we can pay repect at the same time." When talking on Dhamma it is also a subject of samatha, dhammanusati as you know. It is very natural, no need to sit. Best wishes, Nina. 10374 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Wed Dec 26, 2001 10:24am Subject: Three Rounds Dear Num, Thank you for your further info. In the Co to the Dhammacakkhapavattana Sutta the three ~naa.nas are dealt with expressively. Now another text: Debates Commentary,( to Kathavatthu, I also have the Thai), Ch 20, VI, Some thought that all the twelve constituent parts were lokuttara, but this has been refuted. Here the English translation is not clear: the diversity of insight as to nature: sacca, the need to do, kicca, and the being done, kata, respecting each truth. I looked at my India notes: I understood from A. Sujin: there is even kata ~naa.na at the first stage of vipassana ~naa.na, but not fulfilled. The nature of dukkha is penetrated more when there is mahaavipassana ~naa.na, when the arising and falling away of dhammas has been realized. We can say, when realities are seen as just elements, dhatus, at the first vipassana ~naa.na, there is some fruit of the development, something has baan done, kata, but the development has to go on and on. Best wishes, I am glad you can play tennis again, Nina. 10375 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Wed Dec 26, 2001 10:24am Subject: non-self, to Victor. Dear Victor, you wrote: how do you digest that there is no self doing anything. Lodewijk, my husband, said, tell him that I do not digest it either. That is very honest, because so long as we are not sotapanna we have not digested the fact that there is no "I" who can do anything as to the development of understanding, it is all dependent on many conditions. You have asked the same question about non-self many times to different people, and maybe you were not satisfied with the answers. You are looking for something but have not found it. We heard A. Sujin say in India: "We say there is no self, but do we understand realities as nama dhamma and as rupa dhamma? " We should be very sincere as to the answer. I think debates on words such as self and non-self, thus, thinking of words cannot help to really understand what nama and rupa are. These have to be investigated as they occur in our life now. This is different from just thinking of words. We can even leave out the words self and non-self, but try to find out more about our life, do you like this better? I do not know what you are interested in, what you like to study. I discussed with Lodewijk Pavlov reactions, it tells us something about the uncontrollability of realities. For us, there is someone who always provokes us so that it becomes nerve racking. I know that is lack of patience. There are moments that dosa becomes so strong, but all such happenings are conditioned. When you suddenly feel violent pain, there is painful feeling and immediately there is bound to be aversion with unpleasant feeling. Can you change this? No Victor who is the owner of such sensations, it is because of conditions. Now you are reading on the computer, but there is also seeing, different moments because of conditions. Seeing and thinking, maybe with aversion, who knows, but they all arise because of different conditioning factors. You hear a noise from outside, can you change this? Do you own hearing or what you hear? Can you control it? You could verify this. Gradually we may understand more about conditions for the dhammas that arise, and finally you may understand that there is no Victor who really exists, but that there are only fleeting, insignificant phenomena. But to really understand this thoroughly is a long way of development. Only the enlightened person has no more doubts. You often quote suttas, and of course it is good to read them. But it is not easy to understand suttas, so much more is implied than we would think. We read about seeing and hearing and we may let it go, but, these should be investigated so that we gain more understanding of all these phenomena. If we neglect this we shall not understand the suttas. Jon said in India: realities are not what we think they are. We interprate the world and ourselves wrongly without realizing it. Your question was a good reminder for me of the long way we have to go in order to understand realities. Best wishes, Nina. 10376 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Wed Dec 26, 2001 10:24am Subject: Re: [dsg] luminous mind op 25-12-2001 01:11 schreef Mom Bongkojpriya (Betty) Yugala op beyugala@k...: In following the present discussion on bhavangacittas, a question arose > on whether the bhavangas are luminous and without defilements or not. This > discussion then lead me to ask the following: If the aramana (object) of the > bhavangacittas of a particular lifetime is the very last javanacitta of the > previous lifetime, and that object is then either akusala vipakacitta or > kusala vipaka citta (for non-arahats), would not the bhavangacittas > themselves either be akusala vipakacitta or kusala vipakacitta, the same as > their aramana? And, if that is so, then can bhavangacittas be understood as > defiled/not-defiled, just like vithi cittas (that arise in > sense-door/mind-door processes)? > >Dear Betty, How nice to hear from you. I understand how difficult it is with all your social obligations to keep up with all the posts. As to the object of the bhavangacitta, this is the same as that experienced by the last javanacittas before dying in the previous life. This again depends on the kamma that will produce the next rebirth. In our case, thus in the case of birth as a human, this object is a pleasant object. Then the last javanacittas were kusala cittas and experienced that object through one of the six doors (see Visuddhimagga for details). Now, the rebirth-consciousness takes this same object, but that citta is vipakacitta, in our case, kusala vipakacitta experiencing a pleasant object. Thus, that citta is vipaka, but the object experienced by it is not vipaka. We use the word vipaka just for the citta experiencing an object. Thus, if we keep this in mind it is not so difficult to understand that the bhavangacitta is luminous, nothing to do with the uncoming defilements at the moment of javana. It only experiences its object throughout life, it is merely vipaka, not doing anything, passive. This citta arises in deep sleep without dreams, and also in between the processes there are extremely short moments of deep sleep. No possibility for kusala or akusala at such moments, is there? Some people use the word subconsciousness or they think of a citta that stores up experiences, but this is not possible. Bhavangacittas arise and fall away and are part of the series of cittas, a series that is not interrupted (contiguity condition, anantara paccaya). As such they play their part just like the other cittas to condition the latent tendencies to carry on from moment to moment. Best wishes, from Nina. 10377 From: Mom Bongkojpriya (Betty) Yugala Date: Wed Dec 26, 2001 10:23am Subject: Re: [dsg] color blindness Dear Herman, Its nice to be able to participate on the list again, after being so far behind in the reading of the daily digests. If a person is "color blind", he still sees color, even if it is just varying shades of black and white. Color is color, no matter what "color" it is, and so it is still a paramatha dhamma, an absolute reality, a rupa, and not a concept. Only a totally blind person, whose eye base (ayatana, not the physical eye which is a concept) is not "working" (vipaka) and therefore cannot "pick up" visible object, color. Hope this clarifies the point. with metta, Betty > >From: "egberdina" > >Reply-To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com > >To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com > >Subject: Re: [dsg] Concept > >Date: Thu, 20 Dec 2001 10:17:46 -0000 > > > >DEar Purnomo, > > > >I haven't seen your name for a long time! Nice to hear from you again. > >A question for you. I understand that seeing colour is seeing visible > >object as it is. Today I had to help a customer who thought his > >computer monitor was not working. When a monitor is properly > >connected it has a little green light showing, when the monitor is > >not receiving video signal the light is orange. I asked the > >customer, "Is the light green or orange" he said "I don't know, > > I'm colour blind" > > > >So is colour absolute? And when/how do you know that you are seeing > >the absolute colour? > > > >All the best > > > > > >Herman > > 10378 From: Date: Wed Dec 26, 2001 6:54am Subject: Re: [dsg] Memory, Objects, and Continuity Hi Jon, > Do you have any references on the 4 manifestations of sanna that you > mention --'registration (marking), retention, retrieval and recall'? I > would be interested to know where I can read more about this. > The bottom-line of how I came up with those descriptions is from multiple sources. Hmm, let me tell you how I came up. I have been reading lakkhanaticcatuka, (four characters: {characteristics (lakkhanam: specific or generic attribute) function (rasa: function or achievement), manifestation (paccupat-thana: manifestation, appearance or effect) and proximate cause (padatthanam) }), from various sources, English, Pali and couple of different translations of these 4 characteristics in Thai, from Milindapanha, a little bit from my tipitaka online search. And I have to admit that I also reflect about it from my background, my training and practice at work. I cut this from Nina's "Cetasikas": " {The Atthasalini (I, Part IV, Chapter 1, 110) states about sanna: ...It has the characteristic of noting (In Pali: sanjanati, cognizing well) and the function of recognizing what has been previously noted.}". Which is consistent with pali description that I have in my Thai abdms. I think Nina put it together very nicely, from the same page, " { The Visuddhimagga (XIV, 130) gives a similar definition. We can use the words perceiving, noting, recognizing and 'marking' in order to designate the reality, which is sanna, but words are inadequate to describe realities. We should study the characteristic and function of sanna. Sanna is not the same as citta which is the 'leader' in cognizing an object. As we have seen, sanna recognizes the object and it 'marks' it so that it can be recognized again. This is explained by way of a simile: carpenters put tags or signs on logs so that they can recognize them at once by means of these marks. This simile can help us to understand the complex process of recognizing or remembering. What we in conventional language call "remembering" consists of many different moments of citta and each of these moments of citta is accompanied by sanna which connects past experiences with the present one and conditions again recognition in the future. This connecting function is represented by the words 'recognition' and 'marking' (1 See Abhidhamma Studies, by the Ven. Nyanaponika, 1976, page 70, where it is explained that the making of marks and remembering is included in every act of perception.) when the present experience has fallen away it has become past and what was future becomes the present, and all the time there is sanna which performs its function so that an object can be recognized. If we remember that sanna accompanies every citta, we will better understand that the characteristic of sanna is not exactly the same as what we mean by the conventional terms of 'recognition', 'perception' or 'marking' . Each citta which arises falls away immediately and is succeeded by the next citta, and since each citta is accompanied by sanna which recognizes and 'marks 'the object, one can recognize or remember what was perceived or learnt before. }" To me noting, marking or the term I usually use in my work, registration point to same thing to make a mark of the input for later recall. Rasa or function as quoted above "recognizing what has been previously noted", which I use the word "recall". I put it the word retention and retrieval to fill the process between noting and recall. And I think that's part of sanna as well. When some one has memory problem, the way I was trained is where on the process has pathology. Registration problem is usually from attention span, level of consciousness. Recall usually with neuropathology or at times psychological. Anterograde amnesia is when one cannot retain new information and retrograde amnesia is when one cannot retrieve what had been retained before. The following I cut from online abdms by Nárada Thera, Vájiráráma, Colombo. I think he put the examples from Milindapanha, Atthasalini and Visuddhimagga together. ----------------------------------------------------------------------- 4. Saññá - Sam + ñá, to know, (Compare Latin cognoscere, to know.) The meaning of this term widely varies according to the context. To avoid unnecessary confusion, it is best to understand the specific meaning used in the particular connection as a universal mental state. The chief characteristic of saññá is the cognition of an object by way of a mark as blue etc. It is saññá that enables one to recognize an object that has once been perceived by the mind through the senses. "Its procedure is likened to the carpenter's recognition of certain kinds of wood by the mark he had made on each; to the treasurer's specifying certain articles of jewelry by the ticket on each; to the wild animal's discernment in the scarecrow of the work of man." Saññá, therefore, means simple sense perception. "Perception," according to a modern Dictionary of Philosophy, "is the apprehension of ordinary sense-objects, such as trees, houses, chairs, etc., on the occasion of sensory stimulation." Perception is not used here in the sense employed by early modern philosophers such as Bacon, Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz. As one of the five khandhas (Aggregates) saññá is used in the sense of perception. Could it be that memory is due to this saññá? Saññá, viññána and paññá should be differentiated from one another. Saññá is like the mere perception of a rupee coin by a child. By its whiteness, roundness and size it merely recognizes the coin as a rupee, utterly ignorant of its monetary value. A man, for instance, discerns its value and its utility, but is not aware of its chemical composition. Viññána is comparable to the ordinary man's knowledge of the rupee. Paññá is like the analytical knowledge of a chemist who knows all its chemical properties in every detail. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- I feel like word or term have limitation but it impotant in communication. Even sanna is appearing here and now but word cannot describe it all. Further input and feedback are appreciated. Num 10379 From: Robert Epstein Date: Wed Dec 26, 2001 0:19pm Subject: Re: To Howard on Christmas Day (was: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary) : ) Robert Ep. =========== --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Rob - > > In a message dated 12/25/01 11:39:53 PM Eastern Standard Time, > epsteinrob@Y... writes: > > > > > > Dear Howard, > > Thank you for sharing your thoughts and feelings about your practice and > > your > > relationship to the discussions on this list. It is our humanity which > > counts in > > the final analysis, who we really are at this moment. > > > > I like to take note of the meanings of the different holidays, when they > > arise, > > and to me Christmas is about fellowship, good will [metta], and universal > > love - > > the common qualities that we all have as human beings, one of which is > > suffering > > that we all share. > > > ---------------------------------------------------------- > Yes, I feel the same. > ---------------------------------------------------------- > > > > > Maybe the reason why you're here is similar to what it is for me: it is > > for the > > quality of the relationships, the good-hearted people who are here. Part > > of what > > we share is also a sincere desire to follow our true path as the Buddha > > outlined. > > But what is often hard is for us to accept that we don't all have the same > > path. > > There are places where we can share and there are places where we diverge. > > Somehow we think that we have to agree with each other or else totally > > disagree. > > But this is a lesson to all of us. The discomfort of being pulled out of > > your > > practice teaches you what your practice is, and thus you suffer and return > > to > > yourself in a sense and know your path anew. > > > --------------------------------------------------------- > A wonderful point, Rob. > -------------------------------------------------------- > > > > > And in taking stock and clarifying what you need to do to be true to > > yourself -- > > and I'm sure everyone will forgive my conventional use of 'self' here < > > slight > > smile> -- you may notice that things have changed, that more has happened > > in terms > > of clarification by being here at dsg than just having intellectual > > discussions. > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Actually, there have been clarifications for me of various sorts. I've > really gained much from DSG, and I hope to continue to do so. (The problem is > not in the list.) > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > > > Everyone here is trying in their own way to fulfill the promise of the > > Dharma, but > > maybe some of us need to meditate more, and some of us progress by > > contemplation > > and study. > > > > But this is all part of the flow of life that we have to accept if we are > > going to > > become the unchanging observer of all that changes in life. What does it > > all > > show, Howard? That life can't be controlled, that we can't even 'maintain' > > our > > practice -- all we can do is reestablish it from moment to moment and start > > out > > from scratch every day. > > > ------------------------------------------------------------- > Yes. Mistakes are easily made and wrong directions easily taken. It's > a kind of gift (maybe a Christmas present ;-) when life shows this to you. > ------------------------------------------------------------- > Approached in the right way, this can be liberating.> > > I hope you will begin your sitting again. > ------------------------------------------------------------- > Thanks. I have. Now I must continue. > ------------------------------------------------------------ > I hope I will too. I hope you will see> > > that your present state is inevitable, that it is not in stopping suffering > > or > > holding onto practice that our equanimity lies, but in letting go of > > everything > > and standing steadily on the shifting ground under our feet. Whatever we > > hold > > onto will fall apart. Whatever we let go of will return as a gift. > > > ------------------------------------------------------------- > Thanks, Rob, for a good teaching. > ------------------------------------------------------------- > I hope my> > > speaking does not come off as abstract and philosophical. I really mean > > it, and > > believe it can be applied now to this moment of living. > ------------------------------------------------------------- > Not at all abstract and philosophical, but obviously from your heart. > And, please, I don't want anything I've said to lend even the slightest > "chill" to anyone's inclination to be as abstract and philosophical as they > find useful! My inclinations and disinclinations are mine alone, and I don't > wish to impose anything on anyone! I particularly regret the tone of my post > to Mike, and would undo it if only I could. > ------------------------------------------------------------- > > > > > This is my wish for you on Christmas Day -- I am sorry for your suffering > > and am > > happy to stand with many others here as your sangha in a time like this. I > > hope > > you will do the same for me. If you need to talk, just drop me a line or > > ask for > > my phone number. > > > ---------------------------------------------------------- > Thank you, Rob. You have been most kind. (By the way, I have received > a private post (off list) from another DSG list member which also was > wonderfully supportive, and for which I am most appreciative.) > ---------------------------------------------------------- > > > > > In Friendship, > > Robert Ep. > > > ============================= > With much metta, > Howard > > /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble > in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a > phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 10380 From: yuzhonghao Date: Wed Dec 26, 2001 1:36pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts) Hello Jon, It is good that you understand that: Conditioned phenomenon is impermanent. Conditioned phenomenon is unsatisfactory/dukkha. Conditioned phenomenon is to be seen as it actually is with right discernment thus: "This is not mine. This I am not. This is not my self." Regards, Victor --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Jonothan Abbott wrote: > Victor > > --- yuzhonghao wrote: > Hello Jon, > > > > Please understand conditioned phenomenon as it actually is: > > Conditioned phenomenon is impermanent. > > Conditioned phenomenon is unsatisfactory/dukkha. > > Conditioned phenomenon is to be seen as it actually is with right > > discernment thus: "This is not mine. This I am not. This is not my > > self." > > While I understand the meaning of what you are saying, there is surely > more to it than this. Did the Buddha give any clues as to *how this > understanding is to be developed*? Otherwise, one is just repeating the > words of the suttas. > > Jon > > > Regards, > > Victor > > 10381 From: Date: Wed Dec 26, 2001 8:49am Subject: Re: [dsg] Three Rounds Dear Nina, > In the Co to the > Dhammacakkhapavattana Sutta the three ~naa.nas are dealt with expressively. > Now another text: Debates Commentary,( to Kathavatthu, I also have the > Thai), Ch 20, VI, Some thought that all the twelve constituent parts were > lokuttara, but this has been refuted. Here the English translation is not > clear: the diversity of insight as to nature: sacca, the need to do, kicca, > and the being done, kata, respecting each truth. > I looked at my India notes: I understood from A. Sujin: there is even kata > ~naa.na at the first stage of vipassana ~naa.na, but not fulfilled. I will try to read the Co. when it's available to me then. Kathavatthu is something way above my head to read. I do not think I can read that without Co. The more I read Co., the more I feel it is very consistent with tipitaka. There are definitely some reorganization, and at times some new words or terms were introduced. I do not agree with everything in it (mainly because I do not understand it). I really admire and appreciate the hard work of the writers. For now, I will keep your information in my information bank and will think about it more later. Thanks and appreciate. Num 10382 From: yuzhonghao Date: Wed Dec 26, 2001 1:51pm Subject: Re: non-self, to Victor. Hello Nina, Thank you replying. Please consider very carefully about whether the Buddha taught "there is no self who can do anything." Also, I would be very interested to learn about some specific reference, if there is any, from the discourse that would support view "there is no self who can do anything." Regards, Victor 10383 From: Sarah Date: Wed Dec 26, 2001 2:16pm Subject: Re: [dsg] some more about metta Dear Victor, --- yuzhonghao wrote: > Hello Sarah, > > I am not sure what you mean by "there is no self" and "there is no > control," and I am not sure how you got the ideas "there is no self" > and "there is no control." Did you read my coments on the Mulapariyaya Sutta? Did these help at all in this regard? > On one hand you say you often use self-control. On the other hand, > you say that in reality there is no control. I am not sure what you > mean here. When I mentioned I often use "self-control", I was talking about using these words only, which I should have put in quotation marks. Again as I discussed in the post on the M.Sutta, it just depends whether one is using the words conventionally for convenience or whether one really believes there is self-control. Kom added a good response and I've already said plenty on this theme;-) > If interested, you might want to refer to > Samyutta Nikaya XLIV.10, Ananda Sutta, To Ananda > http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/samyutta/sn44-010.html > > If possible, if would be helpful if you could find a specific > reference from the discourses in which the Buddha claimed that there > is no self. > > Please be very careful not to misrepresent what the Buddha taught > that conditioned phenomenon is not self. > > Thank you for replying, and Happy Holidays. > Thank you for the reference and the reminder. I have a feeling we're going round in a circle here;-) Happy Holidays and best wishes for the New Year to you too, Victor. Sarah 10384 From: m. nease Date: Wed Dec 26, 2001 3:42pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Concept Dear Purnomo, As I understand it a naama is characterized by its ability to experience an object. For example, tactile consciousness (kayavi~n~naa.na) experiences tangible object, heat for example--feeling (vedanaa) arising with tactile conciousness experiences feeling, (pleasant or unpleasant in this case). So kayavi~n~naa.na, a citta, and vedanaa, a cetasika, are both experiencing the same object (aarammana), heat--they are both naamas (heat is a ruupa, it doesn't experience anything). Of course, many other cetasikas arise at the same time as vedanaa, all experiencing the same aarammana. The concept of pleasant or unpleasant heat arises afterwards but doesn't experience anything, it is an idea made up of memories of the experiences. To me, this is important only because the experiences (naamas) and the things they can experience (aarammanas, naamas or ruupas) can be the objects of satipa.t.thaana and so can produce the kind of understanding (sati-pa~n~naa) that destroys defilements. Concepts can't be the objects of satipa.t.thaana, so can't produce this kind of understanding. This is the way I see it, anyway. Always nice to see you here, Purnomo, mike 10385 From: m. nease Date: Wed Dec 26, 2001 3:52pm Subject: Re: [dsg] non-self, to Victor. Dear Nina, What an excellent post, thanks. Good to be reminded that what I think of as 'insight' into the characteristics is really just conceptual, not liberating at all. I also liked your reference to Pavlov. I don't often find much in common between science and the Dhamma, but operant conditioning is an exception I think--the idea of conditioned response has a great deal in common with accumulated kamma and sankharakkhandha for example, I think. It helps to see 'accumulation' as condtion--even though only conceptually, of course. mike --- Nina van Gorkom wrote: > Dear Victor, you wrote: how do you digest that there > is no self doing > anything. Lodewijk, my husband, said, tell him that > I do not digest it > either. That is very honest, because so long as we > are not sotapanna we have > not digested the fact that there is no "I" who can > do anything as to the > development of understanding, it is all dependent on > many conditions. > You have asked the same question about non-self many > times to different > people, and maybe you were not satisfied with the > answers. You are looking > for something but have not found it. > We heard A. Sujin say in India: "We say there is no > self, but do we > understand realities as nama dhamma and as rupa > dhamma? " We should be very > sincere as to the answer. > I think debates on words such as self and non-self, > thus, thinking of words > cannot help to really understand what nama and rupa > are. These have to be > investigated as they occur in our life now. > This is different from just thinking of words. We > can even leave out the > words self and non-self, but try to find out more > about our life, do you > like this better? I do not know what you are > interested in, what you like to > study. > I discussed with Lodewijk Pavlov reactions, it tells > us something about the > uncontrollability of realities. For us, there is > someone who always provokes > us so that it becomes nerve racking. I know that is > lack of patience. There > are moments that dosa becomes so strong, but all > such happenings are > conditioned. When you suddenly feel violent pain, > there is painful feeling > and immediately there is bound to be aversion with > unpleasant feeling. Can > you change this? No Victor who is the owner of such > sensations, it is > because of conditions. Now you are reading on the > computer, but there is > also seeing, different moments because of > conditions. Seeing and thinking, > maybe with aversion, who knows, but they all arise > because of different > conditioning factors. You hear a noise from outside, > can you change this? Do > you own hearing or what you hear? Can you control > it? You could verify this. > Gradually we may understand more about conditions > for the dhammas that > arise, and finally you may understand that there is > no Victor who really > exists, but that there are only fleeting, > insignificant phenomena. But to > really understand this thoroughly is a long way of > development. Only the > enlightened person has no more doubts. > You often quote suttas, and of course it is good to > read them. But it is not > easy to understand suttas, so much more is implied > than we would think. We > read about seeing and hearing and we may let it go, > but, these should be > investigated so that we gain more understanding of > all these phenomena. If > we neglect this we shall not understand the suttas. > Jon said in India: > realities are not what we think they are. We > interprate the world and > ourselves wrongly without realizing it. > Your question was a good reminder for me of the long > way we have to go in > order to understand realities. > Best wishes, Nina. 10386 From: Robert Epstein Date: Wed Dec 26, 2001 5:21pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Concept Dear Sarah, It's getting a little clearer, I hope. A concept can be the object of a citta, but a concept is never a nama. A concept of the Universe is not a citta, because the 'Universe' is not a real object, but a conceptual, imaginary one. But the citta that thinks about the concept of the Universe can have that concept as its 'unreal' object. Is this correct? A citta that recognizes a concept as a concept, an unreal object, occurs with sati and perhaps with panna, but a citta that mistakes a concept for a reality -- that thinks the 'Universe' is a real object, not a concept -- occurs with moha, and is a 'deluded' citta. Is this correct? Thanks, Robert ========== --- Sarah wrote: > Dear Rob Ep, > > --- Robert Epstein wrote: > Hi Sarah. > > So concepts that directly reference a reality are realities themselves? Or > > not. > > No. A concept is always a concept (whichever kind) and never turns into a > reality. > > > For example, if I say the word 'panna', it is a word that refers to a > > concept, no? > > It is the kind of concept that represents a reality. (vijjamaana pa~n~natti) > > > Is panna a concept or a reality? Is panna considered 'real'? Can it be > > experienced as an object? > > Both (i.e. concept and reality). Panna is real when it arises and performs its > task of ‘understanding’. There is no need for a name at this time. Yes it can > itself (being a reality) not only be eperienced as an object but also be known > by sati and panna as it has its characteristic and ‘nature’. Of course it could > also be experienced by unwholesome mind-states too. > > > The 'experience' of a rupa is itself a nama? In the 'experience of > > hardness', is > > the experience a nama, and the hardness experienced a rupa? > > Yes, the ‘experiencing’ (i.e. citta with accompanying cetasikas) is always a > nama. Exactly right with regard to hardness. The ‘experiencing’ through the > body-sense is a nama and the hardness, which is only ever experienced, is a > rupa. Later the javana cittas which ‘run’ through the object are also > namas.Then there may be thinking about the ‘hardness’. The thinking would then > consist of more namas, but the idea about the past rupas is now a concept. > (I’m trying to keep it fairly simple here;-) > > >Is the citta > > that > > then 'thinks about' and 'interprets' what it has seen, ['oh that's a table'], > > itself a nama? I am clear that the 'table' in that equation is a concept, > > not a > > reality. > > Yes, you’re getting very ‘warm’ (thinking of Xmas guessing party games now;-) > yes, the thinking, the interpreting (more thinking with sanna and so on) are > all namas. As you say, the ‘table’ is a concept and in this case in a different > category of concepts from panna because ‘table’ never exists. > > > > > And in the list below, is this a list of all types of concepts? Which ones > > are > > considered namas, only 1 and 5? > > Concepts are never namas. I think you mean, which ones represent namas? Then > the answer would be as you say, 1) vijjamaana pa~n~nattis and 5) vijjamaanena > vijjamaana pannattis. > > Thes are just the concepts that are names (naama pa~n~natti). It gets more > complicated, but perhaps I’ll refer you to 3 excellent archive posts for more > details first and then you can ask Jon, myself or anyone else if you have more > questions about these (now I know you take your homework seriously, Rob;-)) The > third link answers the last question in detail, I think: > > http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/message/2918 > http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/message/3362 > http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/message/3494 > > > Hoping you and your family are having a pleasant holiday. We just had a lovely > long leisurely lunch sitting outside on the Peak with Jon’s mother and her > friend. > > Sarah 10387 From: Sarah Date: Wed Dec 26, 2001 8:59pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Concept Dear Rob Ep, --- Robert Epstein wrote: > Dear Sarah, > It's getting a little clearer, I hope. Good! > > A concept can be the object of a citta, but a concept is never a nama. Right! > A concept of the Universe is not a citta, because the 'Universe' is not a > real > object, but a conceptual, imaginary one. Mmmm, yes the Universe is a concept and and the “Universe’ is not a real object. Even if it were a concept of a real object, it would not be a citta. The reason that neither a concept or a rupa is ever a citta is because a citta is a reality which experiences an object which concepts and rupas don’t do. > But the citta that thinks about the concept of the Universe can have that > concept > as its 'unreal' object. Is this correct? Yes, spot on! (Cittas in the mind-door process only). > A citta that recognizes a concept as a concept, an unreal object, occurs with > sati > and perhaps with panna, Mmmmmm, sati arises with all kusala (wholesome) cittas and panna with any related to bhavana (mental development). So if there is wise reflection about concepts, like now hopefully, this reflection will be accompanied by sati and panna. However, as Jon wrote in a post yesterday, if it is sati of satipatthana, accompanied by panna, the object can only be a reality and never a concept. So there is no ‘knowing’ a concept, because a concept doesn’t exist except in our imagination. Sati and panna know that at these moments the reality is thinking which can be understood precisely. >but a citta that mistakes a concept for a reality -- > that > thinks the 'Universe' is a real object, not a concept -- occurs with moha, > and is > a 'deluded' citta. Is this correct? Certainly there is moha at these moments. When there is the ‘deluded’ citta which wrongly takes concept for reality, there is also (micha) ditthi at these moments. This is why we can consider ditthi as the most ‘dangerous’ cetasika (to quote K.Sujin) and the first one that has to be eradicated. I think you’re getting ‘very warm’ indeed, Speak soon, Sarah ========== 10388 From: Sarah Date: Wed Dec 26, 2001 10:20pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein Dear Howard, I don’t wish to bring up points that you may prefer to have a ‘break’ from and quite understand if you prefer not to respond to this note. I also hope I’m not taking this comment of yours to Rob Ep too much out of context: .......... Howard: “But as far as providing the nitty gritty details of what, exactly, is the case in terms of such hard-to-find things as cittas, well, there's no way that I have the slightest idea. As I said a while ago to Mike, while I'm aware of being conscious, and of experiencing feelings, emotions, sights, sounds, smells, and tastes, I've never experienced a citta, and I never read a sutta by the Buddha in which he discussed cittas........." .................... What I just wish to humbly say is that perhaps you underestimate what ‘your’ panna knows and perhaps the terminology has caused some communication difficulty. If we forget for a moment the word ‘citta’ and instead talk about tasting, it may sound a little more real;-) I’m sure we’ve all had plenty of experience ‘tasting’ over the holiday. At the moments of tasting the tastes (which are amongst the objects there is some awareness of, you mention), aren’t these just momentary phenomena discerning (yr usage) the tastes? The experiencing, the tasting, is different from that which is tasted. We are used to think ‘I’m tasting the turkey of fried rice (in Jon’s case)’ when really isn’t it just an experiencing of the rupa at that moment? So, even it it’s intellectual understanding at this moment, if it’s right and skilful, it must be accompanied by sati and panna at this level which understand the nature of this citta, tasting. So it is for seeing, hearing, smelling, touching and thinking. These are the cittas that really can be known directly at this moment, not just by thinking about them either. (Of course, when we talk about bhavanga cittas, it is bound to be at an intellectual level only, unless panna has been highly developed.) I hope this doesn’t sound too ‘clumsy’..I’m having trouble finding the right words today. In the Ang Nik suttas being discussed on the luminous thread (1-10), we read: ‘Monks, I know not of any other single thing so quick to change as the mind...’ and later read ‘Monks, if for just the lasting of a finger-snap a monk indulges a thought of goodwill, such an one is to be called a monk. Not empty of result is his musing..’It goes on to talk about the ‘power’ of skilful and unskilful states of mind. In other words, we shouldn’t underestimate the power of the little wise reflection andawareness that occurs in a day. There’s no need to feel discouraged if there is less wise attention than we’d like. This morning we had a mini-personal drama. In a nutshell, there was some uncertainty about whether Jon's mother would be able to continue with her trip and leave Hong Kong which would have meant one or both of us having to cancel our planned trip to Bangkok to stay and take care of her. So ‘my rapidly changing mind’ was having moments of genuine concern for my mother-in-law, aversion to all this news and worry, attachment to ‘me’ and ‘my’ plans and so on. A few moments of kusala cittas, but many more moments of akusala cittas with many vipaka cittas such as seeing and hearing in between. This is daily life and facing up to and getting to know the different cittas, cetasikas and rupas just a little. Just one ‘finger-snap’ of awareness at a time. Fortunately the repeat blood-test gave a good result and we can all continue with our plans. Again there were moments of gladness for my mother-in-law and more attachment to ‘me’ and my plans and of course more seeing, hearing, tasting and so on. Howard, I haven’t really considered how frequently the Buddha discusses ‘citta’, using this terminology in the suttas. As others have suggested, I believe it is synonymous with ‘mano’ and ‘vi~n~nana’ which may be more commonly used, I’m not sure. I’d just like to finish with these translation notes by Gayan posted in the series of translations to Mike where the term citta is discussed in a sutta. I’ll just sign off first and hope I've helped rather than hindered or aggravated the proliferations;-)) Best wishes, Sarah (p.s. Rob Ep: I’ve just noticed this line which may be relevant to my post to you yesterday, I’m not sure :”when citta is dirty, the beings become dirty” -) ********************* Extract from Gayan’s post (8896): 2nd Gaddula sutta , khanda samyutta , S N " dittham vo bhikkhave caranam naama cittanti evam bhante. tampi kho bhikkhave caranam naama cittam citteneva cintitam tena pi kho bhikkhave caranena cittena cittanneca cittataram, tasmatiha bhikkhave abhikkhanam sakam cittam paccavekkhitabbam, diigharattam idam cittam samkilittham raagena , dosena , mohenati. citta samkileso bhikkhave satta samkilissamti cittavodana satta visujjhanti. naaham bhikkhave annam eka nikaayampi samanupassami evam cittam yathayidam bhikkhave tiracchanagataa paanaa te pi kho tiracchanagataa paanaa cittaneva cintitaa. tehipi kho bhikkhave tiracchanagatehi paanehi cittanneca cittataram. " monks , have you seen a 'drawing' called 'carana' ? ( citta -> citra ( sanskrit ) ) yes venerable sir. monks, even that 'carana' is thought by the citta ( mind ) monks , ( so) the mind is more 'versatile/interesting/diverse...'(creatively, beautifully displayed) than that carana ( which is also thought by the mind ) [ carana is said to be a kind of beautiful animation graphics type of a thing existed those days ] monks every moment you should observe the mind. for a long period this mind has been subjected to the dirt of raaga, dosa, moha. when citta is dirty, the beings become dirty when the mind is cleaned, the beings become cleaned. monks I cant see a more versatile/diverse(creatively, beautifully displayed) category of beings than this animal category, monks even those animals are thought by the mind itself. this mind is more versatile than the animal kingdom, so monks you should observe it every moment. -------------------------------------------------- discussing above sutta, when one enjoys a carana citta like above, the enjoyment comes because of raaga , dosa , moha. The carana is displayed in the mind and the end product is helped by the raaga, dosa, moha dirt that has been there in the mind for a long time. Like a Movie,-> the same movie can be enjoyed by different persons with diffrent mind states. But the movie 'they' are seeing is different from eachother, because the movie created in the minds differ according to the person's mind state.( with diffrent intensities of raaga, dosa, moha ) ******************** 10389 From: Robert Epstein Date: Wed Dec 26, 2001 10:55pm Subject: Re: [dsg] A rupee for your rupa I understand Jon, and appreciate the clarification, but it seems to me that this notion of a 'direct perception' of the rupa by the citta through the sense-door, takes for granted that the 'sense organ' is 'accurate'. Why would an evolutionary device that is more-or-less evolved to approximate an external object give a truly representative impression of an actual object? I would think it would be imperfect in many ways. If I see an object, my binocular vision takes two images and combines them to get a three-dimensional image which represents neither actual 'ocular photos' taken. If a fly sees the same image, it gets hundreds [I forget how many] images shaped by the particiular structure of that sense-organ. Are these *both* accurate though different? Does the human eye somehow have a 'perfect' image of the object which the fly does not? Best, Robert Ep. =================== --- Jonothan Abbott wrote: > > > Rob Ep > > --- Robert Epstein wrote: > Thanks Jon, good > explanation. Although it is hard for me to understand > > how the > > process that arises in the sense door to cognize the object is 'perfect' > > enough to > > apprehend it 'transparently' without any influence of its own. Is the > > idea that > > the sense organ consciousness is like a photograph and is able to > > directly 'copy' > > the object? > > All cittas (moments of consciousness) experience an object, and the cittas > that see or hear experience in particular the rupas that are visible > object or sound. > > Indeed, the cittas that experience visible object or sound have as their > specific function the *seeing* or *hearing* of the visible/auditory > object, in the sense of experiencing it 'in its bare immediacy and > simplicity' [CMA - full extract pasted below]. > > > In a related question, how does this theory account for the > > characteristic of the > > sense organ itself which by its very nature and design as 'this type of > > sense > > organ rather than that' will influence the way the sense object is > > perceived? It > > is not believed, I would think, that the sense organs are 'perfect' in > > actually > > taking in the sense object. In what way does a sense organ that has > > evolved > > through a physical process to become gradually more refined but still > > imperfect > > and which is also subject to individual variation, take in the 'actual' > > characteristic of the object, or the rupa itself? Even someone who is > > enlightened > > is still perceiving 'visible object' through a 'human eye process', no? > > There is > > no direct perception according to this idea. > > A minor clarification here, Rob. The sense-organ, being a rupa, does not > experience /perceive the sense-object. That perception is the function of > the citta discussed above. The sense-organ is of course one of the > necessary conditions for the arising of the sense-door consciousness, but > the functions of seeing, hearing etc are performed by cittas, not rupas. > > > Which is why normally I would think > > that the sense-door process really picks up a sense-door result, rather > > than a true 'rupa' or actual object-moment. > > It is the cittas that arise in the processes that follow the bare > perceiving of the sense-door object that have what you term a 'sense-door > result' as their object. > > I hope this helps. > > Jon > > ['CMA' = Bhikkhu Bodhi, 'A Comprehensive Manual of Abhidhamma' (BPS) > The Abhidhammattha Sangaha of Acariya Anuruddha, with explanatory guide > (The explanatory guide is compiled from, but is not a direct translation > of, the main commentaries to the A-S)] > > Ch I, #8. Analysis of Functions (Guide) > > "In a cognitive process at the sense doors, … there arises a citta which > directly cognizes the impingent object. > > "This citta, and the specific function it performs, is determined by the > nature of the object. If the object is a visible form, eye consciousness > arises seeing it; if it is a sound, ear consciousness arises hearing it, > and so forth. > > "In this context, the functions of seeing and hearing, etc., do not refer > to the cognitive acts which explicitly identify the objects of sight and > hearing, etc., as such. They signify, rather, the rudimentary momentary > occasions of consciousness by which the sense datum is experienced in its > bare immediacy and simplicity prior to all identificatory cognitive > operations." 10390 From: Robert Epstein Date: Wed Dec 26, 2001 10:58pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: jhanas for Herman Dear Sarah, I thought it was a great ramble. Thanks for sharing your wise words. Robert Ep. ====== --- Sarah wrote: > Dear Rob Ep, > > --- Robert Epstein wrote: > Dear Sarah, > > I think three things are true: > > 1/ You are clearly not *against* developing the jhanas, just saying that it > > is > > extremely difficult to approach such refined states. > > Just so.If there is no ‘beginner’ level of samatha bhavana in daily life, why > would one think that ther can be any highly developed jhana practice. Just as > we might say, if there is no understanding of namas and rupas now, clearly and > distinctly as they are, why would one have the idea there can be any > understanding or realizing of nibbana? > > For both kinds of development, there has to be clear understanding of the > difference between skilful and unskilful mind-states, including and especially > at those times of concentrating on an object, I think. > > > 2/ I think it is also clear that there are *some* teachers alive today who > > are > > familiar with the jhanas and their practice, such as Ajahn Brahmavamso, who > > has > > lectured and taught on them quite a bit. > > I’m sorry but I can’t comment on this one. > > > 3/ I think the final point is that you are saying that it is not *necessary* > > to > > develop these advanced states in order to progress on the path of > > discernment, > > sati and panna, that these qualities are independent of any particular state. > > Is > > this correct? > > When the Buddha talks about the necessary conditions for developing vipassana, > he refers to hearing the Teachings, considering, putting into practice and so > on. I don’t believe he ever says ‘develop jhana’ first. He does encourage us, > however, to develop all kinds of skilful states. He also says that these states > along with all other realities are not self. In other words, they are not > developed by ‘wishing’ or ‘trying to do’ or ‘concentrating on an object’ > without any understanding. It’s certainly true that many monks in the Buddha’s > day had already developed the highest jhanas. It wasm’t by coincidence that the > Buddha was born at that time in India where exrtraordinarily high levels of > wisdom and wholesomeness where apparent. > > I’ve talked quite a bit about how I understand metta can be developed. Let me > just mention another object of samatha: ‘earth kasina’. In theory, we could > sit cross-legged and focus on a lump of earth and develop a higher and higher > state of concentration. I don’t believe, however, there would be any wholesome > concentration, calm or understanding attained. If, on the other hand, naturally > in daily life we happen to reflect for a moment on the importance we attribute > to all our possessions, which we believe we own, when in reality, they are just > ‘earth’ and don’t belong to anyone. At the end of life, if not before, we lose > them all and yet this ‘earth’ is what we fight and argue about and which we > hold so very dear. We crave for pleasant feelings and cling so much to sense > objects i.e. to rupas. Samatha development is the detachment from this craving. > Just a little wise reflection may condition moments of calm now without any > special effort at all. > > As I was writing the last segment on the Intro to the Vinaya, there were > conditions for moments of calm as I reflected on the extraordinary wisdom and > compassion of the arahats who spent 7mths reviewing the Teachings at the 1st > Council. Their work was done, but for the sake of generations to come (like us > here) they painstakingly organised and categorised the Tipitaka and the earth > quaked at these extraordinary deeds. This would come under reflection on the > Sangha, I believe. When I started writing, I had no intention or wish to > experience these few moments of calm or samatha. It was just by conditions. A > few moments later, there were tears in my eyes reflecting some attachment and > aversion. The kilesa 'defile' so very, very quickly. > > I'm not sure my 'rambles' clarify anything. > > Seems like a Rob Ep day today;-) > > Sarah 10391 From: Kenneth Ong Date: Wed Dec 26, 2001 11:01pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Concept Hi Mike > Concepts can't be the objects of satipa.t.thaana, so can't produce this kind of understanding. k: I beg to differ. I think concepts are the prelimnary stage for satipatthana. Without realising concepts as it is, then deeper level of satipatthana could not be established. Only through satipatthana the mind becomes much "sharper" present moments become more and more minute. then paramatha dhamma could be understand through breaking down of concepts. the concept level started with the study of body parts, slowly to other namas. As in the book of dispeller of delusion, the study of body parts is discussed at great length, i think even such discussion at length is of paramount importance for the precendent study of paramtha dhamma. The study of concepts are impt bc we are still living at the conceptual world. Through detail studying then there is a possiblity of studying paramtha dhammas. Till then, the investigating of paramatthas dhammas is could only be applied on conceptual level (i.e. a series of cittas to constitute the present moment we have) and not at paramttha dhamma level (citta by citta). Merry Christmas and A happy new year to you :) Kind regards Ken O > > This is the way I see it, anyway. > > Always nice to see you here, Purnomo, > > mike > 10392 From: Robert Epstein Date: Wed Dec 26, 2001 11:01pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Ultimate realities (and khandhas) Dear Jon, Due to pleasantly synchronistic conditions arising, your answer to Herman here has answered the question I just asked in my last post to you. The rupa is experienced directly by the citta and it doesn't matter whether it's an 'accurate' reflection of a 'real external object' [probably because there's no such things -- just momentary rupas arising]. What matters is that the rupa will be shaped by the kammic predispositions of the sense-door moment, and this is all that is necessary to get one's *real rupa* in the moment. It is not *the* rupa, it is the appropriate rupa for that citta in that moment. Thanks, Robert Ep. ======= --- Jonothan Abbott wrote: > Herman > > --- egberdina wrote: > Jon, > > > > I am wondering if the quality of ultimate realities are subjective ie > > specific to each self. The colour blind person will see whatever they > > see, it is irreducible, it is colour, which is not capable of being > > described in other terms, not capable of being sensed through another > > door, unless you use LSD. > > > > Likewise, the non-colour blind person will see specific colour, > > looking at the same object as the colour blind person. Yet the colour > > experience will be different. In this way there is nothing absolute > > or ultimate about seeing the object as it really is, unless ultimate > > or absolute has relative connotations. > > > > So two arahants, sitting in a VW at the traffic lights, one colour > > blind, one not colour blind, will see two different realities as the > > lights change. I wonder which one will write the preferred > > commentaries? ( :-) ) > > An interesting example you give here, Herman ;-)) > > I would agree that, speaking in purely conventional terms, no 2 persons > ever experience the same thing in the same way, even if they are equally > endowed with understanding and sensory perception. > > However, in terms of the ultimate realities about which you ask, we cannot > talk about 2 people seeing or hearing the same thing. This is because the > citta of the sense-door experience has as its object simply a rupa > (visible object or sound) that arises by virtue of conditions that are > beyond that person's control. Each moment of sense-door experience is a > moment of vipaka (result of kamma), and the object experienced by a person > at a given moment depends on, among other things, their past kamma. So > even if, in conventional terms, 2 people are looking at or listening to > the same thing, the moment-to-moment seeing or hearing of rupas will be > determined by factors that are unique to each individual. > > But it is what is in common at such moments that is the subject of the > Buddha's teaching. The actual experiencing of visible object or sound by > the relevant sense-door consciousness is a universal experience common to > all beings that have the appropriate faculty, no matter in what shape > those faculties are. And the same goes for the processes that follow > those experiences. This is the subject, the 'field', of the development > of understanding leading to breaking the link with samsara. > > To summarise, it is of the nature of things that: > - when 2 people are seeing/hearing 'the same thing at the same time' > (speaking conventionally), it's a safe bet that in terms of ultimate > realities there is no conformity in the *actual objects being experienced* > on a moment-to-moment basis > - however, in terms of the *different kinds of consciousness and their > objects* that are experienced in this lifetime, there is total and > universal conformity among all beings > > So colour-blindness does not preclude an understanding of the true nature > of the visible object appearing at the present moment. Given the choice > between a commentary written by the person with perfect vision but weak > understanding, and one written by the colour-blind person with good > understanding, I'd take the latter any day (regardless of their taste in > cars). > > Jon 10393 From: Robert Epstein Date: Wed Dec 26, 2001 11:05pm Subject: Re: [dsg] 'Self' as object of discernment (and khandhas) Thanks, Jon, I think I'm getting it. Robert Ep. ===== --- Jonothan Abbott wrote: > Rob Ep > > --- Robert Epstein wrote: > Thanks, Jon. One > question, below. > > > > --- Jonothan Abbott wrote: > > > > > At both moments there is citta/consciousness (a reality) experiencing > > an > > > object. In the former case the object of the citta (sound) is a > > reality > > > while in the latter case the object of the citta (thought about sound) > > is > > > not a reality. > > > > > > Jon > > > > Okay, I may be dense, but then what is a nama in this continuum? > > A nama is a reality that experiences an object. In the instance given > above, the citta/moment of consciousness is a nama. > > Cetasikas (mental factors that accompany a citta) are also namas, since > they experience an object too, namely, the same object as the citta they > accompany. So all cittas and cetasikas are namas. > > In the language of the suttas, namas are the 4 khandhas other than > rupa-kkhandha. These are: > 2. Vedana/feeling [a cetasika] > 3. Sanna/perception or memory [a cetasika] > 4. Sankhara/the formations [the 50 cetasikas other than the preceding 2] > 5. Vinnana/consciousness [citta] > > Jon 10394 From: Kenneth Ong Date: Wed Dec 26, 2001 11:06pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein Hi Sarah By the way, what happen to Gayan. It is been a long time, I have seen his translation of the sutta which I find very beneficial. I hope he is well and happy Best regards Ken O --- Sarah wrote: > Dear Howard, > > I don’t wish to bring up points that you may prefer to have a ‘break’ > from and > quite understand if you prefer not to respond to this note. I also hope > I’m not > taking this comment of yours to Rob Ep too much out of context: > .......... > Howard: “But as far as > providing the nitty gritty details of what, exactly, is the case in > terms of > such hard-to-find things as cittas, well, there's no way that I have the > > slightest idea. As I said a while ago to Mike, while I'm aware of being > conscious, and of experiencing feelings, emotions, sights, sounds, > smells, > and tastes, I've never experienced a citta, and I never read a sutta by > the > Buddha in which he discussed cittas........." > .................... > > What I just wish to humbly say is that perhaps you underestimate what > ‘your’ > panna knows and perhaps the terminology has caused some communication > difficulty. If we forget for a moment the word ‘citta’ and instead talk > about > tasting, it may sound a little more real;-) I’m sure we’ve all had > plenty of > experience ‘tasting’ over the holiday. At the moments of tasting the > tastes > (which are amongst the objects there is some awareness of, you mention), > aren’t > these just momentary phenomena discerning (yr usage) the tastes? The > experiencing, the tasting, is different from that which is tasted. We > are used > to think ‘I’m tasting the turkey of fried rice (in Jon’s case)’ when > really > isn’t it just an experiencing of the rupa at that moment? > > So, even it it’s intellectual understanding at this moment, if it’s > right and > skilful, it must be accompanied by sati and panna at this level which > understand the nature of this citta, tasting. So it is for seeing, > hearing, > smelling, touching and thinking. These are the cittas that really can be > known > directly at this moment, not just by thinking about them either. (Of > course, > when we talk about bhavanga cittas, it is bound to be at an intellectual > level > only, unless panna has been highly developed.) > > I hope this doesn’t sound too ‘clumsy’..I’m having trouble finding the > right > words today. > > In the Ang Nik suttas being discussed on the luminous thread (1-10), we > read: > ‘Monks, I know not of any other single thing so quick to change as the > mind...’ > and later read ‘Monks, if for just the lasting of a finger-snap a monk > indulges > a thought of goodwill, such an one is to be called a monk. Not empty of > result > is his musing..’It goes on to talk about the ‘power’ of skilful and > unskilful > states of mind. > > In other words, we shouldn’t underestimate the power of the little wise > reflection andawareness that occurs in a day. There’s no need to feel > discouraged if there is less wise attention than we’d like. > > This morning we had a mini-personal drama. In a nutshell, there was some > uncertainty about whether Jon's mother would be able to continue with > her trip > and leave Hong Kong which would have meant one or both of us having to > cancel > our planned trip to Bangkok to stay and take care of her. So ‘my rapidly > changing mind’ was having moments of genuine concern for my > mother-in-law, > aversion to all this news and worry, attachment to ‘me’ and ‘my’ plans > and so > on. A few moments of kusala cittas, but many more moments of akusala > cittas > with many vipaka cittas such as seeing and hearing in between. > > This is daily life and facing up to and getting to know the different > cittas, > cetasikas and rupas just a little. Just one ‘finger-snap’ of awareness > at a > time. > > Fortunately the repeat blood-test gave a good result and we can all > continue > with our plans. Again there were moments of gladness for my > mother-in-law and > more attachment to ‘me’ and my plans and of course more seeing, hearing, > tasting and so on. > > Howard, I haven’t really considered how frequently the Buddha discusses > ‘citta’, using this terminology in the suttas. As others have suggested, > I > believe it is synonymous with ‘mano’ and ‘vi~n~nana’ which may be more > commonly > used, I’m not sure. I’d just like to finish with these translation notes > by > Gayan posted in the series of translations to Mike where the term citta > is > discussed in a sutta. > > I’ll just sign off first and hope I've helped rather than hindered or > aggravated the proliferations;-)) > > Best wishes, > > Sarah > > (p.s. Rob Ep: I’ve just noticed this line which may be relevant to my > post to > you yesterday, I’m not sure :”when citta is dirty, the beings become > dirty” -) > ********************* > Extract from Gayan’s post (8896): > > 2nd Gaddula sutta , khanda samyutta , S N > > " dittham vo bhikkhave caranam naama cittanti evam bhante. > tampi kho bhikkhave caranam naama cittam citteneva cintitam tena pi kho > bhikkhave > caranena cittena cittanneca cittataram, > tasmatiha bhikkhave abhikkhanam sakam cittam paccavekkhitabbam, > diigharattam idam cittam samkilittham raagena , dosena , mohenati. > citta samkileso bhikkhave satta samkilissamti cittavodana satta > visujjhanti. > naaham bhikkhave annam eka nikaayampi samanupassami evam cittam > yathayidam > bhikkhave > tiracchanagataa paanaa te pi kho tiracchanagataa paanaa cittaneva > cintitaa. > tehipi kho bhikkhave tiracchanagatehi paanehi cittanneca cittataram. " > > > monks , have you seen a 'drawing' called 'carana' ? ( citta -> citra ( > sanskrit ) ) > yes venerable sir. > monks, even that 'carana' is thought by the citta ( mind ) > monks , ( so) the mind is more > 'versatile/interesting/diverse...'(creatively, beautifully displayed) > than > that carana ( which is also thought by the mind ) > > [ carana is said to be a kind of beautiful animation graphics type of a > thing existed those days ] > > > monks every moment you should observe the mind. > for a long period this mind has been subjected to the dirt of raaga, > dosa, > moha. > when citta is dirty, the beings become dirty > when the mind is cleaned, the beings become cleaned. > > > monks I cant see a more versatile/diverse(creatively, beautifully > displayed) > category of beings than this animal category, > monks even those animals are thought by the mind itself. > this mind is more versatile than the animal kingdom, > so monks you should observe it every moment. > > > -------------------------------------------------- > > discussing above sutta, > when one enjoys a carana citta like above, the enjoyment comes because > of > raaga , dosa , moha. > The carana is displayed in the mind and the end product is helped by the > raaga, dosa, moha dirt that has been there in the mind for a long time. > > Like a Movie,-> the same movie can be enjoyed by different persons with > diffrent mind states. > But the movie 'they' are seeing is different from eachother, because the > movie created in the minds differ according to the person's mind state.( > with diffrent intensities of raaga, dosa, moha ) > > > ******************** 10395 From: Robert Epstein Date: Wed Dec 26, 2001 11:09pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Sarah Hi Sarah. : ) I enjoyed reading your message, and actually have made a bit of progress lately in at least understanding the point of the commentary on 'luminous mind'. Nina's statement that the bhavanga cittas take place in between sense-door and mind-door moments to maintain continuity was a new piece of info for me. I was looking at the bhavangas as a separate process that only took place during the sleep state or in unconsciousness or death. The thesis that the whole thought or perceptual process is 'soiled' by the defilements while the 'pure bhavanga' moments are obscured by ignorance, does make a more understandable argument. So I will be looking forward to seeing more of the commentary and Suan's comments on these subjects. Nice to talk to you too! : ) Robert ============= --- Sarah wrote: > Dear Rob Ep, > > --- Robert Epstein wrote: > Dear Sarah, > > Well, I have at least done a *bit* of homework, and went and read the > > translations > > of the 'luminous mind' commentary that Nina was working on. I appreciate > > those > > being there, they are quite clear in what they say. > > I’m very impressed;-) > =================== > > > Although I understand the parent-child analogy, I can't see the comparison. > > The > > bhavanga-cittas have no responsibility to the defiled cittas in question. > > They > > have no relationship to them at all. Though they are 'pure' and the waking > > cittas > > are 'defiled' that is as far as the good parent/bad child analogy goes. > > There is > > no real soiling of the reputation of the bhavanga cittas via the soiling of > > the > > waking cittas. It has no effect on the bhavanga cittas at all. To whom > > would the > > reputation be ruined, or who would hold the bhavanga cittas responsible for > > not > > 'preventing' the defiling of the waking cittas? It seems to me to be an > > analogy > > that doesn't apply to the reality of these cittas. > > As Nina said, I think we have to be careful not to take the analogy too far. > Having said that, I find it very interesting too. > > As I understand, just as the bad child may spoil the reputation of the parent > due to a lack of comprehension (by society) of where the fault really lies and > confusing parent and child together, perhaps we can say that the kilesa give > the entire mind states or process of phenomena a bad reputation through > ignorance of the real state of affairs. > > In our ignorance, we notice someone’s anger and think they are an ‘angry > person’. There is no comprehension that dosa just arises in a few javana > cittas. With no understanding of ‘pure’ bhavanga cittas between processes, they > are all sullied by those cittas with dosa. > > It doesn’t seem convoluted to me, but then I just accept the commentary > interpretation and don’t try to analyse too much. The commentary makes it clear > that the kilesa that defile the mind are arising in the later javana process, > so there’s no idea of pure and impure cittas together or of vipaka and javana > cittas together (none of which would make any sense). > > Like you, I'm very interested to read the sub-commentary and translation in due > course too. > > When we read the Buddha’s descritptions of realities in fine detail in the > Abhidhamma and sometimes in the Suttas, it is a description rather than a > prescription as Jon and Dan pointed out before. Accumulations vary so much and > so there is no rule at all as to which realities will become known at any given > time. Bhavanga cittas may be known by someone’s panna and not another’s. It > doesn’t matter at all. > > > The Buddha's statement is quite simple and clear. The explanation that > > attributes > > this to the bhavanga cittas is convoluted. I would think there would have to > > be > > some logical extrapolation from the Buddha's original words for the > > commentary's > > viewpoint to be understood. > > For many years (read decades) I used to just ‘switch off’ when I heard about > bhavanga cittas....Like you say, it just seemed too convoluted. In the last > year, I’ve been hearing explanations and considering in ways that are very > helpful for me at this time. Again, there’s no rule, but since you asked or > suggested another interpretation, the topic has come up... > > Often I use an alarm-clock to wake up and probably because I’ve been talking > with Ken O about sleep and bhavangas, I’ve been noticing how as soon as the > alarm rings, the worlds of eye-door, ear-door, mind-door with lots of lobha, > dosa and panatti are so apparent within seconds. Occasionally there’s a little > awareness, but usually there is just the grasping, aversion, the stories and > the ignorance instantly. > > Always fun talking to you, Rob, > > Sarah > 10396 From: Robert Epstein Date: Wed Dec 26, 2001 11:32pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Concept Dear Sarah, Thanks for your note! If you could define micha/ditthi for me I would be much appreciative! Thanks, Robert Ep. ========= --- Sarah wrote: > Dear Rob Ep, > > --- Robert Epstein wrote: > Dear Sarah, > > It's getting a little clearer, I hope. > > Good! > > > > A concept can be the object of a citta, but a concept is never a nama. > > Right! > > > A concept of the Universe is not a citta, because the 'Universe' is not a > > real > > object, but a conceptual, imaginary one. > > Mmmm, yes the Universe is a concept and and the “Universe’ is not a real > object. Even if it were a concept of a real object, it would not be a citta. > The reason that neither a concept or a rupa is ever a citta is because a citta > is a reality which experiences an object which concepts and rupas don’t do. > > > But the citta that thinks about the concept of the Universe can have that > > concept > > as its 'unreal' object. Is this correct? > > Yes, spot on! (Cittas in the mind-door process only). > > > A citta that recognizes a concept as a concept, an unreal object, occurs with > > sati > > and perhaps with panna, > > Mmmmmm, sati arises with all kusala (wholesome) cittas and panna with any > related to bhavana (mental development). So if there is wise reflection about > concepts, like now hopefully, this reflection will be accompanied by sati and > panna. However, as Jon wrote in a post yesterday, if it is sati of > satipatthana, accompanied by panna, the object can only be a reality and never > a concept. So there is no ‘knowing’ a concept, because a concept doesn’t exist > except in our imagination. Sati and panna know that at these moments the > reality is thinking which can be understood precisely. > > >but a citta that mistakes a concept for a reality -- > > that > > thinks the 'Universe' is a real object, not a concept -- occurs with moha, > > and is > > a 'deluded' citta. Is this correct? > > Certainly there is moha at these moments. When there is the ‘deluded’ citta > which wrongly takes concept for reality, there is also (micha) ditthi at these > moments. This is why we can consider ditthi as the most ‘dangerous’ cetasika > (to quote K.Sujin) and the first one that has to be eradicated. > > I think you’re getting ‘very warm’ indeed, > > Speak soon, > Sarah > ========== 10397 From: Kenneth Ong Date: Wed Dec 26, 2001 11:36pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: luminous mind: To Robert Epstein And Like-minded Dhamma Friends Hi Suan Don't worry abt others critising abt the commentaries. If commentaries could not atest the criticism, then the value of the commentaries will diminish greatly. Even if others critise the commentaries with ill intentions, then it is their aksuala kamma and not ours :). What will happen, will happen :) so why worry what its beyond our control. Kind regards Ken O --- Robert Epstein wrote: > Dear Suan, > I both understand your reluctance to have the commentaries criticized, > and also > thank you for your willingness to do so for the education of those who > are > sincerely interested. I happen to fall into both categories, as I > sometimes may > debate points in the commentaries, while still sincerely desiring to > learn. > > I am sensitive to the feelings of those who take the commentaries as > part of the > Canon, and perhaps this type of debate is not always appropriate. If > there are > points that should not be argued, I would be happy to just listen and > learn in > those cases and not bring up doubts on the list. > > In any case, I greatly appreciate your sub-commentaries and any parts of > the > actual commentaries that you share with us. > > Thanks, > Robert Ep. > > ================================ > > --- abhidhammika wrote: > > > > Dear Robert (And Like-minded Friends) > > > > How are you? > > > > Thank you for your request. > > > > Tiikaa on the luminous mind is very good for those who do not mind > > reading serous technical explanations, together with Pali grammatical > > discussions. > > > > As you might be aware of some dhamma friends criticizing commentaries > > on Pali Suttas, I am sincerely reluctant to translate and post them > > for general readers. > > > > For those of us who have to read Pali texts for professional reasons, > > commentaries (Atthakathas) and Subcommentaries (Tiikaa) are the only > > reliable sources for all the academic needs. > > > > You will soon find that Tiikaa author had even explained all the Pali > > particles in details which can guide us in choosing the right syntax > > when we translate the Buddha's original Pali statements. > > > > Well, now, you and like-minded friends show appreciation and request > > for such texts, I will try my best to translate and post the Tiikaa > > on luminous mind on-list. > > > > Won't be long! > > > > With best wishes, > > > > Suan > > > > http://www.bodhiology.org > > > > > > > > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Robert Epstein wrote: > 10398 From: Kenneth Ong Date: Wed Dec 26, 2001 11:42pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: subcommentary Pali Hi Nina, Kom and (Suan) On the point of moving the translation of subco to other forum, I find it highly objectational bc mainly both these forums are very restricted forums. No public could join. I used to be able to access to palistudy a few months ago but I did not join it bc I thought I find my time available for pali study is limited. when i try to access it recently, I find it under close doors. to me this is a great waste to the spread of pali words that are critical to the success of Theravada traditions. even though I respect privacy of groups but reserving it to certain groups of pple is to me not to the beneficial of sharing the dhamma. Kind regards Ken O > Dear Suan, > It is so kind of you to offer to translate the subco, and I like Kom's > suggestion of moving this to another forum, to your convenience either > to > Abh or to palistudy. Even if you could translate only the difficult > words > and constructions of the subco, now and then just a few terms, it would > be > of great help so that I can continue working on it. I would not like to > cause trouble so that you work late at night. > With many thanks, best wishes from Nina. 10399 From: Kenneth Ong Date: Thu Dec 27, 2001 0:20am Subject: RE: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein Hi Robert I think my water analogy is wrong. I have mixed up bhavanga cittas with other type of cittas. I find that the the parent and child analogy of bhavanga cittas by the commentaries are not adequate to explain the meaning of bhavanga cittas. To me I equate defiled as vibrations. the bhavanga cittas are vibrated by sensory objects through causes and conditions (defilements) even though their objects are not sensory ones. Such vibrations (or disturbances) includes kusala and akusala, as long as there is vibrations hurling at bhavanga cittas, it is meant to be defiled. We could not at one hand saying that is it only being defiled by just aksuala bc it leave a loop hole "what happen if it is being disturbed by kusala". To me it should be viewed that whatever vibrates bhavanga cittas are defilements since bhavanga cittas are by nature luminious in this context. When it is not being vibrated, it is considered luminious. I believe that you have understand that bhavanga cittas are also used for sense proccess and in between sense process. I think I have a problem, how come there is citta that is beyond our six senses. And that also remind me of dreaming. I believe there are latent tendecies in bhavanga cittas also and such tendecies are manifested mostly affected by lobha mula tendecies. When at times we seem to be very awake at dreaming (half awake and half dreaming) the mind door sense process are awake but not strong enough to be truly really awake. At that time of such weak mind door sense process, there is an ability to see, hear and taste and also memory. Such weak mind door sense process only, there is a possiblity of reasoning or perceptions in our dream. Just guessing, he he :) for the fun of it. Kind regards Ken O --- Robert Epstein wrote: > Hi Kenneth. > I guess we can get someone else to chime in again on this, but my > understanding is > that the bhavanga cittas never make any contact with sense objects and > thus are > never defiled. They only get 'turned on' in deep sleep, unconsciousness > or death > to ensure the continuity during the 'blank periods' when the conscious > mind and > sensory phenomena are absent. So when there is sense object impinging > on a citta, > it is never bhavanga citta, it is always the 'waking' citta. When > bhavanga citta > awakens, there is never any object there. Bhavanga citta only has as > its object > the last object before the previous death, and it never varies, so there > is no > chance of any defilement. > > If the above is true, by this logic, I cannot see how the bhavanga citta > can be > the one referred to in the statement: 'Mind is luminous, but is defiled > by > incoming defilements'. It would be quite impossible. > > And in fact, the commentaries seems to assume as I do that the bhavanga > cittas > cannot be directly defiled. That is why they employ the 'parent and > child' > analogy, which says that the waking cittas, which are defiled, ruin the > reputation > of the parents, the bhavanga cittas, even though the bhavanga cittas are > never > themselves defiled. So in a sense the Buddha could be saying that the > bhavanga > cittas are defiled by the other cittas, even though they themselves are > actually > *not* defiled. With respect, this seems to be stretching the meaning of > the > Buddha's very simple declarative statement quite a bit, in my opinion. > > I look forward to reading a greater part of the commentary on this > subject, if > Suan takes on the time-consuming task of translating it, and I hope it > will > clarify the above. > > Until then, I think it is interesting to note the different 'streams' of > cittas > that are taking place on different levels in the human structure, as it > is > constructed from moment to moment by a series of changing conditions and > events. > There are the subconsious cittas, the bhavanga cittas; the conscious > ones, which > perceive namas and rupas, and the supra-mundane cittas, which discern > the reality > of arising namas and rupas and some of which are capable of perceiving > Nibbana. > But as I understand it, it is still the case that only one of these > cittas appears > at a time. It is an interesting picture of reality. > > Best, > Robert Ep. > > ============ > > --- Kenneth Ong wrote: 10400 From: christine_forsyth Date: Thu Dec 27, 2001 1:02am Subject: Bangkok tomorrow...... Dear All, I'm back from the beach.....still very hot here. I don't know if the bush fires in Oz have made it onto World News, many homes destroyed..... I'll be at home for the night, and then catch the planes tomorrow for Sydney and then Bangkok (where, thankfully, the forecast is little cooler than here.) I am really, really looking forward to learning as much as possible, and meeting as many people as possible. metta, Christine 10401 From: Sarah Date: Thu Dec 27, 2001 2:39am Subject: Re: [dsg] Bangkok tomorrow...... Dear Christine, --- christine_forsyth wrote: > Dear All, > > I'm back from the beach.....still very hot here. I don't know if the > bush fires in Oz have made it onto World News, many homes > destroyed..... Yes, CNN headlines....I'm just hoping Herman and family are not affected- I forget where they are in NSW. > I'll be at home for the night, and then catch the planes tomorrow for > Sydney and then Bangkok (where, thankfully, the forecast is little > cooler than here.) So we're preparing for the heat as you prepare for the cool;-) I'm so glad I don't have to keep this little secret any longer. (Christine was the other 'surprise' friend we mentioned we were looking forward to meeting for the first time and actually we're all staying together in the same hotel;-)) > I am really, really looking forward to learning as much as possible, > and meeting as many people as possible. It'll be quite a party and I have no doubt there will be some good discussions. Hope you have good flights and remember to jot down any thoughts or questions on the way;-) Sarah somewhat excited p.s. Rob K...hope you're around and very sorry we'll miss you this New Year. Hopefully, we'll be better co-ordinated next time;-) =============================================== 10402 From: Sarah Date: Thu Dec 27, 2001 2:50am Subject: Re: [dsg] luminous mind Dear Anders, I know I really shouldn't be getting into new discussions just as I'm going away, but I just can't resist making a couple of quick comments here;-) --- Anders Honore wrote: > Personally, I don't believe the commentaries at face value, and I believe > that Bikkhu Bodhi has more or less skilfully > pointed that they are sometimes even dead-wrong as they contradict some > suttas. This is interesting. B.Bodhi is certainly a lot, lot, lot more familiar with the suttas and commentaries than I am, but I have yet to come across such a contradiction and would be happy to have any (contradictions) pointed out Sometimes it just depends on how one understands both (as with the 'luminous' sutta discussion). A lot of what is found in the > commentaries (which are often abidhammically inspired) doesn't rely find > backing in the suttas themselves, which, along > with the Vinaya Pitaka, is the only source I will personally acknowledge as > being actually authoritative. > That the commentators were all supposedly Arahants is something I find more > credible to be a later invention by the > supporters of the commentaries, to lend authority to their claims. You may find it interesting to read back over the series of posts I've been doing on a weekly basis from 'Intro to Vinaya'. These are the areas I'm considering in them. > That it is not to say that they can't be extremely helpful in clarifying > certain points (I have certainly found them to be so), > but I would personally recommend that they should be taken with a grain of > salt Sounds like you're in my category 2 group, i.e. you accept those which conform with your understanding of the Suttas in question;-) (Category 1 were the dinosaurs, that accept them all and category 3 were those who reject them all). Good to have you around, Anders......I reckon you and Kom were just waiting for each other like Erik and Dan wait for each other here too;-)) Best wishes in the New Year for good results in your studies and ever-growing panna. Sarah 10403 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Thu Dec 27, 2001 3:21am Subject: Re: [dsg] Bhavanga cittas Rob --- Robert Epstein wrote: > Hi Sarah. : ) ................ > Nina's statement that the bhavanga cittas take place in between > sense-door and > mind-door moments to maintain continuity was a new piece of info for me. > I was > looking at the bhavangas as a separate process that only took place > during the > sleep state or in unconsciousness or death. You might find the passage from CMA on bhavanga citta below of interest. Jon CMA III, #8 (Guide) … The word bhavanga means factor(anga) of existence (bhava), that is, the indispensable condition of existence. Bhavanga is the function of consciousness by which the continuity of the individual is preserved through the duration of any single existence, from conception to death. … … . Bhavangacittas arise and pass away every moment during life whenever there is no active cognitive process taking place. … When an object impinges on a sense door, the bhavanga is arrested and an active cognitive process ensues for the purpose of cognizing the object. Immediately after the cognitive process is completed, again the bhavanga supervenes and continues until the next cognitive process arises. Arising and perishing at every moment during this passive phase of consciousness, the bhavanga flows on like a stream, without remaining static for two consecutive moments. 10404 From: Sarah Date: Thu Dec 27, 2001 3:24am Subject: RE: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein Dear Ken O, This is really my last post. As Jon's waiting to use the computer, i'll keep it short too. You've written several posts on the 'luminous' thread and I'm always struck by how very carefully you consider all our words and the words in the suttas and commentaries. Your reflections are always interesting and 'your own'. I've written so much on this thread that I think if i said any more I'd just be repeating myself and really boring everyone. So I think I'll just wait to look at the Tika (sub-com) translation and Suan's notes. Meanwhile I'll be happy to read any further reflections that you, Rob, Kom or Nina (or anyone else) has. --- Kenneth Ong wrote: > > Yes, it is a little difficult which is why I didn't post it all the > > first time > > I think. > > k: I do not think it is difficult at all. ;-)) > > > k: To me, this statement will imply that when a man dreams he is > > neither > > > sleeping or awake. > > > > That's right.... no sense-door activity (as I mentioned to Frank > > before), but > > mind-door activity and thinking of concepts. > > k: Nope I do not greed there is no sense-door activity if we look at the > statement again and your are using the neither awake portiion to explain > no sense door activity. I am using neither sleeping which means there is a > possibility of sense door activity Well, as Rob Ep wrote recently, we don't all have to agree;-) S: > > Nothing permanent at all. Just one citta and then another. > k: To me I think we are prejudice. When the this passage explain return > home, your position is changing cittas but when i see it it is abt > permanent self. So when I think TB is not talking abt permanent self, you > do not think otherwise as what your have written in msg #10218 (quoted > below). Hmmm....Firstly, I'm sorry if it sounds prejudiced in anyway. i think that when we read anything the Buddha taught, we know or have confidence that whatever terms are used, it is about realities which are anatta and for the dinosaurs amongst us, all the abhidhamma is inherently part of these Teachings. Hence my understanding about the Milinda passage and bhavanga cittas when it mentions in the English translation 'return home'. When we read a modern writer's ideas or translations, such as now when we read each other's posts, we have to read quite a lot before we really know what the other person's way of thinking is. All we can do is to suggest how it sounds to us according to our understanding. I hope this isn't 'prjudice';-) With regard to TB, I was interested to hear that Mike met him a couple of weeks ago and I suggested that he might even be encouraged to join us here. His translations and writings are so influential and personally I always prefer to talk to someone direct. It would be an honour. However, I also understand that he must be extemely busy. You asked about commentaries, Ken O and the answer is yes, there are commentaries on all the Sutta Pitaka. The main ones were written by Buddhaghosa and the others (Udana, Itivuttaka etc) were written by Dhammapala.Sorry I forget the rest of your question about them. Ooops, overtime. I may raise bhavanga cittas in Bkk with K.Sujin too and let you know if I learn anything new. Hope you keep everyone busy on the list while we're away;-) Just realised that we're about at the 2nd anniversary of dsg. Sarah ================================================= 10405 From: Anders Honore Date: Thu Dec 27, 2001 2:50am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein 27-12-01 07:20:22, Sarah skrev: >Dear Howard, >Howard, I haven?t really considered how frequently the Buddha discusses >?citta?, using this terminology in the suttas. As others have suggested, I >believe it is synonymous with ?mano? and ?vi~n~nana? which may be more commonly >used, I?m not sure. I?d just like to finish with these translation notes by >Gayan posted in the series of translations to Mike where the term citta is >discussed in a sutta. The only sutta I can remember is the "luminosity" sutta, and I think that one has been discussed quite a bit already ;-) I think what Howard may be objecting to regarding citta is the non-practicality of talking about this and that citta. After all, consciousness/vinnana/citta is that which sees, which discerns. Can an eye see itself? If not, then why talk so much about it. I agree with Howard that there are more relevant objects to focus on, such as all that which the consciousness discerns, be it material objects, attachments, desires, anger etc etc. Or am I completely misreading you, Howard? 10406 From: Sarah Date: Thu Dec 27, 2001 3:45am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein p.s. --- Kenneth Ong wrote: > Hi Sarah > > By the way, what happen to Gayan. It is been a long time, I have seen his > translation of the sutta which I find very beneficial. I hope he is well > and happy > It is a long time, now you mention it last time I heard from him he was on his way to Sri lanka.... Gayan, we're thinking of you and appreciating your translation;-) S. 10407 From: Kenneth Ong Date: Thu Dec 27, 2001 5:41am Subject: Some points Hi Sarah > Hmmm....Firstly, I'm sorry if it sounds prejudiced in anyway. i think > that when we read anything the Buddha taught, we know or have confidence that whatever terms are used, it is about realities which are anatta and for the dinosaurs amongst us, all the abhidhamma is inherently part of these Teachings. k: I don't think I have said that abhidhamma is not part of the Tripitika. In fact, I like Abhidhamma too :). I more concern with applying Abhidhamma with the Sutta (even though I am not very fimiliar with both :), gosh got to be more hardworking). I find that in order for Abhidhamma to survive in the long run, there is a need to have its practicality to be applied to the sutta. And definitely using ancient commentaries to support and explain. Actually my guts feel abt Abhidhamma is not concern abt developing kusala cittas, it is more abt understanding reality or seeing reality as it is (satipatthana). If it is confined in just explaining and developing kusala cittas and abt the danger of aksuala cittas, then the whole effect of Abhidhamma spirit will be lost. Care should be given to have a more investigative approach. I find Abhidhamma practical if one able to used present human moments we have as though it is a momentary citta moment, then its usefullness will be manifested. k: In certain ways, I disagree that there is no need for "sitting" or practise in one pointedness. I think the commentaries on "imparting of evenness to the [five] faculties" is very clear on balancing the five faculties. According to the commentary, to be bias on one group is not beneficial and the pitfalls are described clearly. I believe the commentaries do exhort concentration and understanding, and also mindfullness as the protector. I like to see your views or anyone, and any other commentaries that say otherwise to this. (that will be after your trip to bangkok). Definitely when we talk abt jhanas, there is a problem how many of us will know it is good or bad states. Or will we cling to it. As long as mindfullness is our guard and with understanding of anicca and anatta to every state, concentration leading to jhana should not be discouraged. I believe we should encourage pple to concentrate if they wish to, if they wish to investigating in the Abhidhamma way, we should also encourage. We should encourage those with good concentration to practise understanding and likewise to those with good understanding to practise concentration. To me they are both complementary or two legs that we have for walking. As recommended in the commentary they should be developed equally and not one sided. > Hence my understanding about the Milinda passage and bhavanga cittas when it mentions in the English translation 'return home'. When we read a modern writer's ideas or translations, such as now when we read each other's posts, we have to read quite a lot before we really know what the other person's way of thinking is. All we can do is to suggest how it sounds to us according to our understanding. I hope this isn't 'prjudice';-) k: I understand abt Milinda passage when return home or return to itself is used. It is just that I feel, lets us be open minded to views even it doesn't sound right to us. > You asked about commentaries, Ken O and the answer is yes, there are > commentaries on all the Sutta Pitaka. The main ones were written by > Buddhaghosa and the others (Udana, Itivuttaka etc) were written by Dhammapala.Sorry I forget the rest of your question about them. k: I really hope there are commentaries not written by Buddhaghosa bc he is viewed to be more of an Abhidhammaist. The greatest lost will be the ancient texts that Buddhaghosa have used. It would have been very valuable if such texts are still around. > Ooops, overtime. I may raise bhavanga cittas in Bkk with K.Sujin too and > let you know if I learn anything new. k: That will be great :). > Hope you keep everyone busy on the list while we're away;-) Just > realised that we're about at the 2nd anniversary of dsg. k: Hmm you are definitely more competent and knowledgeable than me a thousand times. it will be years even before I could keep everyone busy on the list. In fact I am neither here nor there in the Abhidhamma or Thervada sutta and honestly speaking I am lousy at both and coupled with my lazy attitude :). > Sarah > ================================================= > k: Have a nice and enjoyable trip :) and bon voyage Best wishes Ken O 10408 From: abhidhammika Date: Thu Dec 27, 2001 7:25am Subject: Re: luminous mind: To Kenneth Ong And Like-minded Dhamma Friends Dear Ken How are you? Thank you for your kind encouragement. Personally, I do have an attitude of equanimity towards those who criticize commentaries. The reason I mentioned my reluctance to post translation of them is that I do not want to impose these profound commentarial discussions on the critics and the general readers alike. Another reason is that they are the preserves of advanced students and teachers of Tipitaka who knows Pali. They are not for beginners and laypersons. In terms of modern academic ranking, they belong to the level of post-graduate or doctoral studies and post-doctral research. Therefore, if you post them for general laypersons, your action amounts to baffling, tiring and torturing them. In fact, one of the reasons the commentaries received criticisms could well be that we haven't convinced the critics of the value of the commentaries. Well, now, I know that there are are serious readers on this list, and I am willing to post the commentarial discussions here. And, as the latest news on the matter, I have already finished full translation of commentary and subcommentary on the luminous mind. When I have finished re-checking and editing them, I will be able to post them for the intellectual entertainment of the serious dhamma friends on this list. Coming very soon! With best wishes, Suan http://www.bodhiology.org --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Kenneth Ong wrote: > Hi Suan > > Don't worry abt others critising abt the commentaries. If commentaries > could not atest the criticism, then the value of the commentaries will > diminish greatly. > > Even if others critise the commentaries with ill intentions, then it is > their aksuala kamma and not ours :). > > What will happen, will happen :) so why worry what its beyond our control. > > > Kind regards > Ken O > > --- Robert Epstein wrote: > Dear Suan, 10409 From: Kom Tukovinit Date: Thu Dec 27, 2001 8:02am Subject: RE: [dsg] chatting about India Dear Nina, You have got I think almost all of the big impressions I have from the trip. :-) The other (big) one that still stays in my mind (as I am still trying to make sense out of it) is what most of the teachings in the tipitaka ultimately describe. K. Jaran and A. Supi was discussing about Kilesa, and why only 10 akusala cetasikas are kilesas, and the other 4 are not. The answer, I think you also wrote in Cetasikas, is each Kilesa defiles the mind, where as the other four defile the mental factors. At that point, I was asking him questions about the other groupings of defilements including Asava, etc. A. Supi said at this point that to understand some of the teachings, one has to keep in mind that the teaching ultimately describes realities. The descriptions point to the characteristics of realities: they are there so that we can understand the realities as such. He then used the example of the 8-fold paths, and we discussed why it is that in the sutta, the 8-fold path sounds conventional and very much like concepts, but why it is that it really describes realities. For example, regarding Samma ditthi, we hear that right views include: a) Kamma is real. b) The benefaction of father and mother is real c) There exists ones who know, as it truly is, the existence of life before this, this life, and next life. This may sound very much to some of us like concepts: this is due to fact that there is no penetration of dhammas as they truly are. However, if panna, cognizing the realities, starts to develop, we would understand more, and in more intricate details, about what the statements really mean. For example, if one understands the difference between paramatha dhammas and concepts, then one starts to understand why Kamma and Kusala dhammas (benefaction of father and mother) are real, but father and mother are not real. Then, if one penetrates how kusala and akusala are different from one another, then one understands even more about a) and b). The more one penetrates the dhamma, the deeper and detailed one's understading of Samma-ditthi is, as the characteristics of realities as they truly are. In using this explanation, A. Supi didn't explicitly link the explanation to my question of why there are only 3 dhammas in the asava, but I think the above explanation implies an answer to my question. We read that Asava: 1) flows from the lowest realm of existence to the highest ones 2) is fermented. (The thai explanation also says it is accumulated and fermented) 3) is like poisonous drug or intoxicants. Nina, do you by any chance have any other explanations of why other akusala dhammas are not asava? For example, since Uddhacca, Ahiri, and Anottappa must co-arise with all the 4 asavas, but they are not are asavas. Why? Are there any other reasons besides the one implied above? > -----Original Message----- > From: Nina van Gorkom [mailto:nilo@e...] > Sent: Wednesday, December 26, 2001 10:24 AM > To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com > Subject: [dsg] chatting about India > > I find this very good, reminding us about > conditions. What else can we do > now but listening, studying, considering, > verifying in daily life now what > we learnt. I also found it helpful that A. Sujin > said: understanding leads > to detachment from the beginning to the end, > stressing detachment so often. > I was reminded that even reading the scriptures > and wishing to gain > understanding is often done with an idea of self. Now the question I asked you above is asked in such a context! Thanks for the immediate reminder. kom 10410 From: Date: Thu Dec 27, 2001 3:41am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein Hi, Sarah - Thanks for your post. Yes, as I said: "I'm aware of being conscious, and of experiencing feelings, emotions, sights, sounds, smells, and tastes ..." There certainly is "in me" the awareness of many mental functions and their objects , and often there is the awareness if their impermanence, insubstantiality, and, very much, their impersonality. But the notions of 'citta' and 'process' are, with their presumed well-defined (sharp) starting and ending points, unobserved and, at best, definitional. As a mathematician, I'd have no problem giving formal definitions of these notions in terms of (what *I* see as) the more *basic* notion of the function of discernment of objects. But I've lost interest, as far as really "seeing the way things are", with conceptual theories. Again, as a specific, while it may very well be true that there is but one object per act of discernment at a time, so that there is no parallel processing in effect as far as discernment, alone, is concerned, I have no way of knowing this detail except for taking it "on faith". And I don't see this as of any particular importance ianyway (compared, for example, to the tilakkhana). Moreover, I've never seen that fine point ever alluded to in a discourse. As far as the cetasikas are concerned, I see no reason to speak of all of them as "having an object" at all (some, like sa~n~na, yes), at least not in the same sense that vi~n~nana has an object. For example, certainly vedana arises from contact between vi~n~nana and and arammmana, and, in that sense, it is *associated* with that arammana, but I do not see that as having that same item as object. It is simply that feeling occurs *in response* to contact. In any case, *what is important here* is the *conditionality* of the function of vedana and its *impersonality*. And *these* things *can* be seen. Memorizing supposed facts along the lines of there being up to 17 cittas per rupa is not an aspect of practice that I've ever seen suggested by the Buddha. Might this alleged fact be true? Sure, why not? But liberation won't come even 16 cittas sooner by storing this information in my arsenal. ;-)) Getting bogged down in such things does seem, for me, to be rather much of an impediment, in fact. (I don't imply in the slightest that this need be the case for anyone else.) My point, to summarize, is that much of abhidhamma consists of conceptual constucts, the result of intellectual theorizing. Of course, there is much of interest and value there, including some very useful ways of looking at things, but for me, abhidhammic theorizing has also become a danger, and I have to tread carefully. As I had written, I've tired of such theorizing, but more than that, and here is the main point, theorizing has come to serve in my case as a grossly inadequate substitute for the direct knowing, inadequate as it may be in my case at this stage, that results from the practice of sitting and walking meditation, and ongoing mindfulness practice (supported, of course, by a base of sila). With metta, Howard In a message dated 12/27/01 1:21:46 AM Eastern Standard Time, sarahdhhk@y... writes: > > Dear Howard, > > I don’t wish to bring up points that you may prefer to have a ‘break’ from > and > quite understand if you prefer not to respond to this note. I also hope I’m > not > taking this comment of yours to Rob Ep too much out of context: > .......... > Howard: “But as far as > providing the nitty gritty details of what, exactly, is the case in terms > of > such hard-to-find things as cittas, well, there's no way that I have the > slightest idea. As I said a while ago to Mike, while I'm aware of being > conscious, and of experiencing feelings, emotions, sights, sounds, smells, > and tastes, I've never experienced a citta, and I never read a sutta by the > > Buddha in which he discussed cittas........." > .................... > > What I just wish to humbly say is that perhaps you underestimate what ‘your’ > > panna knows and perhaps the terminology has caused some communication > difficulty. If we forget for a moment the word ‘citta’ and instead talk > about > tasting, it may sound a little more real;-) I’m sure we’ve all had plenty > of > experience ‘tasting’ over the holiday. At the moments of tasting the > tastes > (which are amongst the objects there is some awareness of, you mention), > aren’t > these just momentary phenomena discerning (yr usage) the tastes? The > experiencing, the tasting, is different from that which is tasted. We are > used > to think ‘I’m tasting the turkey of fried rice (in Jon’s case)’ when > really > isn’t it just an experiencing of the rupa at that moment? > > So, even it it’s intellectual understanding at this moment, if it’s right > and > skilful, it must be accompanied by sati and panna at this level which > understand the nature of this citta, tasting. So it is for seeing, hearing, > smelling, touching and thinking. These are the cittas that really can be > known > directly at this moment, not just by thinking about them either. (Of > course, > when we talk about bhavanga cittas, it is bound to be at an intellectual > level > only, unless panna has been highly developed.) > > I hope this doesn’t sound too ‘clumsy’..I’m having trouble finding the > right > words today. > > In the Ang Nik suttas being discussed on the luminous thread (1-10), we > read: > ‘Monks, I know not of any other single thing so quick to change as the > mind...’ > and later read ‘Monks, if for just the lasting of a finger-snap a monk > indulges > a thought of goodwill, such an one is to be called a monk. Not empty of > result > is his musing..’It goes on to talk about the ‘power’ of skilful and > unskilful > states of mind. > > In other words, we shouldn’t underestimate the power of the little wise > reflection andawareness that occurs in a day. There’s no need to feel > discouraged if there is less wise attention than we’d like. > > This morning we had a mini-personal drama. In a nutshell, there was some > uncertainty about whether Jon's mother would be able to continue with her > trip > and leave Hong Kong which would have meant one or both of us having to > cancel > our planned trip to Bangkok to stay and take care of her. So ‘my rapidly > changing mind’ was having moments of genuine concern for my mother-in-law, > aversion to all this news and worry, attachment to ‘me’ and ‘my’ plans > and so > on. A few moments of kusala cittas, but many more moments of akusala cittas > with many vipaka cittas such as seeing and hearing in between. > > This is daily life and facing up to and getting to know the different > cittas, > cetasikas and rupas just a little. Just one ‘finger-snap’ of awareness at > a > time. > > Fortunately the repeat blood-test gave a good result and we can all > continue > with our plans. Again there were moments of gladness for my mother-in-law > and > more attachment to ‘me’ and my plans and of course more seeing, hearing, > tasting and so on. > > Howard, I haven’t really considered how frequently the Buddha discusses > ‘citta’, using this terminology in the suttas. As others have suggested, I > believe it is synonymous with ‘mano’ and ‘vi~n~nana’ which may be more > commonly > used, I’m not sure. I’d just like to finish with these translation notes > by > Gayan posted in the series of translations to Mike where the term citta is > discussed in a sutta. > > I’ll just sign off first and hope I've helped rather than hindered or > aggravated the proliferations;-)) > > Best wishes, > > Sarah > > (p.s. Rob Ep: I’ve just noticed this line which may be relevant to my post > to > you yesterday, I’m not sure :â€?when citta is dirty, the beings become dirtyâ€? > -) > ********************* > Extract from Gayan’s post (8896): > > 2nd Gaddula sutta , khanda samyutta , S N > > " dittham vo bhikkhave caranam naama cittanti evam bhante. > tampi kho bhikkhave caranam naama cittam citteneva cintitam tena pi kho > bhikkhave > caranena cittena cittanneca cittataram, > tasmatiha bhikkhave abhikkhanam sakam cittam paccavekkhitabbam, > diigharattam idam cittam samkilittham raagena , dosena , mohenati. > citta samkileso bhikkhave satta samkilissamti cittavodana satta > visujjhanti. > naaham bhikkhave annam eka nikaayampi samanupassami evam cittam yathayidam > bhikkhave > tiracchanagataa paanaa te pi kho tiracchanagataa paanaa cittaneva cintitaa. > tehipi kho bhikkhave tiracchanagatehi paanehi cittanneca cittataram. " > > > monks , have you seen a 'drawing' called 'carana' ? ( citta -> citra ( > sanskrit ) ) > yes venerable sir. > monks, even that 'carana' is thought by the citta ( mind ) > monks , ( so) the mind is more > 'versatile/interesting/diverse...'(creatively, beautifully displayed) than > that carana ( which is also thought by the mind ) > > [ carana is said to be a kind of beautiful animation graphics type of a > thing existed those days ] > > > monks every moment you should observe the mind. > for a long period this mind has been subjected to the dirt of raaga, dosa, > moha. > when citta is dirty, the beings become dirty > when the mind is cleaned, the beings become cleaned. > > > monks I cant see a more versatile/diverse(creatively, beautifully > displayed) > category of beings than this animal category, > monks even those animals are thought by the mind itself. > this mind is more versatile than the animal kingdom, > so monks you should observe it every moment. > > > -------------------------------------------------- > > discussing above sutta, > when one enjoys a carana citta like above, the enjoyment comes because of > raaga , dosa , moha. > The carana is displayed in the mind and the end product is helped by the > raaga, dosa, moha dirt that has been there in the mind for a long time. > > Like a Movie,-> the same movie can be enjoyed by different persons with > diffrent mind states. > But the movie 'they' are seeing is different from eachother, because the > movie created in the minds differ according to the person's mind state.( > with diffrent intensities of raaga, dosa, moha ) > > > ******************** > /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 10411 From: Date: Thu Dec 27, 2001 9:25am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein Hi, Anders - In a message dated 12/27/01 6:29:08 AM Eastern Standard Time, anders.honore@g... writes: > 27-12-01 07:20:22, Sarah skrev: > > >Dear Howard, > >Howard, I haven?t really considered how frequently the Buddha discusses > >?citta?, using this terminology in the suttas. As others have suggested, I > >believe it is synonymous with ?mano? and ?vi~n~nana? which may be more > commonly > >used, I?m not sure. I?d just like to finish with these translation notes > by > >Gayan posted in the series of translations to Mike where the term citta is > >discussed in a sutta. > > The only sutta I can remember is the "luminosity" sutta, and I think that > one has been discussed quite a bit already ;-) > > I think what Howard may be objecting to regarding citta is the > non-practicality of talking about this and that citta. After all, > consciousness/vinnana/citta is that which sees, which discerns. Can an eye > see itself? If not, then why talk so much about > it. I agree with Howard that there are more relevant objects to focus on, > such as all that which the consciousness discerns, > be it material objects, attachments, desires, anger etc etc. Or am I > completely misreading you, Howard? > ============================ You're basically on target, Anders. To me, what is most important to see, and to see it directly and not theorize about or accept on faith, is the conditionality, impermanence, unsatisfactoriness, insubstantiality, and impersonality of all experience, and, in the seeing, to let it go. It does me little good, as far as I can determine, to study detailed lists of unexperienced phenomena and to then debate with others or with myself as to how "this" unobserved phenomenon relates to "that" unobserved phenomenon. What I need to see, directly, is the arising of suffering, and the grasping which leads to it, directly, in my own life. Most of all, I think it is important to not let studying and reasoning "take over"and replace the practice taught by the Buddha. This is the trap I need to avoid. Other folks may have other points of vulnerability. This is mine. With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 10412 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Thu Dec 27, 2001 3:01pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Memory, Objects, and Continuity Num Many thanks for this reply, and anumodana in your work in analysing the texts and commentaries. The Canonial references seem to be rather few. I must say I had been hoping to uncover something further! However, the supplementary opinions of various writers are interesting. I may follow up while in Bangkok (I am now at Hong Kong airport), and will get back to you on the subject later. Thanks again for the most informative reply. Jon --- srnsk@a... wrote: > Hi Jon, > > > Do you have any references on the 4 manifestations of sanna that you > > mention --'registration (marking), retention, retrieval and recall'? > I > > would be interested to know where I can read more about this. > > > > > The bottom-line of how I came up with those descriptions is from > multiple > sources. Hmm, let me tell you how I came up. > > I have been reading lakkhanaticcatuka, (four characters: > {characteristics > (lakkhanam: specific or generic attribute) function (rasa: function or > achievement), manifestation (paccupat-thana: manifestation, appearance > or > effect) and proximate cause (padatthanam) }), from various sources, > English, > Pali and couple of different translations of these 4 characteristics in > Thai, > from Milindapanha, a little bit from my tipitaka online search. And I > have to > admit that I also reflect about it from my background, my training and > practice at work. > > I cut this from Nina's "Cetasikas": > " {The Atthasalini (I, Part IV, Chapter 1, 110) states about > sanna: > ...It has the characteristic of noting (In Pali: sanjanati, cognizing > well) > and the function of recognizing what has been previously noted.}". > Which is > consistent with pali description that I have in my Thai abdms. > > I think Nina put it together very nicely, from the same page, > " { The Visuddhimagga (XIV, 130) gives a similar definition. We > can > use the words perceiving, noting, recognizing and 'marking' in order to > designate the reality, which is sanna, but words are inadequate to > describe > realities. We should study the characteristic and function of sanna. > Sanna is not the same as citta which is the 'leader' in > cognizing an object. As we have seen, sanna recognizes the object and it > > 'marks' it so that it can be recognized again. This is explained by way > of a > simile: carpenters put tags or signs on logs so that they can recognize > them > at once by means of these marks. This simile can help us to understand > the > complex process of recognizing or remembering. What we in conventional > language call "remembering" consists of many different moments of citta > and > each of these moments of citta is accompanied by sanna which connects > past > experiences with the present one and conditions again recognition in the > > future. This connecting function is represented by the words > 'recognition' > and 'marking' (1 See Abhidhamma Studies, by the Ven. Nyanaponika, 1976, > page > 70, where it is explained that the making of marks and remembering is > included in every act of perception.) when the present experience has > fallen > away it has become past and what was future becomes the present, and all > the > time there is sanna which performs its function so that an object can > be > recognized. If we remember that sanna accompanies every citta, we will > better > understand that the characteristic of sanna is not exactly the same as > what > we mean by the conventional terms of 'recognition', 'perception' or > 'marking' > . Each citta which arises falls away immediately and is succeeded by the > next > citta, and since each citta is accompanied by sanna which recognizes and > > 'marks 'the object, one can recognize or remember what was perceived or > learnt before. }" > > To me noting, marking or the term I usually use in my work, registration > > point to same thing to make a mark of the input for later recall. Rasa > or > function as quoted above "recognizing what has been previously noted", > which > I use the word "recall". I put it the word retention and retrieval to > fill > the process between noting and recall. And I think that's part of sanna > as > well. When some one has memory problem, the way I was trained is where > on > the process has pathology. Registration problem is usually from > attention > span, level of consciousness. Recall usually with neuropathology or at > times > psychological. Anterograde amnesia is when one cannot retain new > information > and retrograde amnesia is when one cannot retrieve what had been > retained > before. > > The following I cut from online abdms by Nárada Thera, Vájiráráma, > Colombo. I > think he put the examples from Milindapanha, Atthasalini and > Visuddhimagga > together. > ----------------------------------------------------------------------- > 4. Saññá - Sam + ñá, to know, (Compare Latin cognoscere, to know.) > The meaning of this term widely varies according to the context. To > avoid > unnecessary confusion, it is best to understand the specific meaning > used in > the particular connection as a universal mental state. > > The chief characteristic of saññá is the cognition of an object by way > of a > mark as blue etc. It is saññá that enables one to recognize an object > that > has once been perceived by the mind through the senses. "Its procedure > is > likened to the carpenter's recognition of certain kinds of wood by the > mark > he had made on each; to the treasurer's specifying certain articles of > jewelry by the ticket on each; to the wild animal's discernment in the > scarecrow of the work of man." > > Saññá, therefore, means simple sense perception. > "Perception," according to a modern Dictionary of Philosophy, "is the > apprehension of ordinary sense-objects, such as trees, houses, chairs, > etc., > on the occasion of sensory stimulation." > > Perception is not used here in the sense employed by early modern > philosophers such as Bacon, Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz. > > As one of the five khandhas (Aggregates) saññá is used in the sense of > perception. > > Could it be that memory is due to this saññá? > > Saññá, viññána and paññá should be differentiated from one another. > Saññá is > like the mere perception of a rupee coin by a child. By its whiteness, > roundness and size it merely recognizes the coin as a rupee, utterly > ignorant > of its monetary value. A man, for instance, discerns its value and its > utility, but is not aware of its chemical composition. Viññána is > comparable > to the ordinary man's knowledge of the rupee. Paññá is like the > analytical > knowledge of a chemist who knows all its chemical properties in every > detail. > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > I feel like word or term have limitation but it impotant in > communication. > Even sanna is appearing here and now but word cannot describe it all. > > Further input and feedback are appreciated. > > Num 10413 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Thu Dec 27, 2001 3:09pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts) Victor --- yuzhonghao wrote: > Hello Jon, > > It is good that you understand that: > Conditioned phenomenon is impermanent. > Conditioned phenomenon is unsatisfactory/dukkha. > Conditioned phenomenon is to be seen as it actually is with right > discernment thus: "This is not mine. This I am not. This is not my > self." Flattery will get you nowhere!! I am much more interested in hearing what you have to say about how the truths taught by the Buddha are to be understood. Please share your thoughts with us, Victor. No need to be afraid -- we are a friendly lot here! Jon > > While I understand the meaning of what you are saying, there is > surely > > more to it than this. Did the Buddha give any clues as to *how this > > understanding is to be developed*? Otherwise, one is just > repeating the > > words of the suttas. >> 10414 From: m. nease Date: Thu Dec 27, 2001 3:28pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Concept Hi Kenneth, --- Kenneth Ong wrote: > Hi Mike > > Concepts can't be the objects of satipa.t.thaana, > so can't produce this > kind of understanding. > k: I beg to differ. I think concepts are the > prelimnary stage for > satipatthana. I didn't say that concepts are not necessary, or not a preliminary stage to satipa.t.t.haana, or that they can't be the objects of understanding--just not the kind of understanding that eradicates defilements (satipa.t.thaana vipassanaa). This is completely different from conceptual understanding, as I see it. Concepts, pa.n.natti, are absolutely necessary as a preliminary stage for satipa.t.thaana, as I undersatnd it. What I meant to say (in brief) is that, as I understand it, concepts can't be the objects of satipa.t.t.haana, they cannot be directly experienced by sati, pa~n~naa etc. because they do not have the characteristic (sabhaava) necessary for direct experience. > Without realising concepts as it is, > then deeper level of > satipatthana could not be established. I agree that understanding the nature of concept is important, and that having the right concepts (pariyatti) is essential. > Only through > satipatthana the mind > becomes much "sharper" present moments become more > and more minute. No comment on this... > then > paramatha dhamma could be understand through > breaking down of concepts. Paramattha dhammas are understood (by pa~n~naa) by direct experience of them with pa~n~naa. Concepts are not paramattha dhammas. > the concept level started with the study of body > parts, slowly to other > namas. As in the book of dispeller of delusion, the > study of body parts > is discussed at great length, i think even such > discussion at length is > of paramount importance for the precendent study of > paramtha dhamma. The > study of concepts are impt bc we are still living at > the conceptual world. I have never suggested otherwise, sorry if I gave that impression. > Through detail studying then there is a possiblity > of studying paramtha > dhammas. Certainly--I have never disagreed with this. > Till then, the investigating of > paramatthas dhammas is could > only be applied on conceptual level (i.e. a series > of cittas to constitute > the present moment we have) and not at paramttha > dhamma level (citta by > citta). Certainly I would agree that, without the pariyatti, the likelihood of ever discovering the paramattha dhammas would be next to nil. > Merry Christmas and A happy new year to you :) Thanks and best wishes to you, too, Kenneth, mike 10415 From: Date: Thu Dec 27, 2001 10:44am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein Hi Howard, > Again, as a specific, while it may very well be true that there is but > one object per act of discernment at a time, so that there is no parallel > processing in effect as far as discernment, alone, is concerned, I have no > way of knowing this detail except for taking it "on faith". And I don't see > > this as of any particular importance ianyway (compared, for example, to the > > tilakkhana). Moreover, I've never seen that fine point ever alluded to in a > > discourse. > As far as the cetasikas are concerned, I see no reason to speak of > all > of them as "having an object" at all (some, like sa~n~na, yes), at least > not > in the same sense that vi~n~nana has an object. For example, certainly > vedana > arises from contact between vi~n~nana and and arammmana, and, in that > sense, > it is *associated* with that arammana, but I do not see that as having that > > same item as object. It is simply that feeling occurs *in response* to > contact. In any case, *what is important here* is the *conditionality* of > the > function of vedana and its *impersonality*. And *these* things *can* be > seen. > You reminded me of maha-satipatthana-sutta. Let me cut just two sections from the sutta, http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/digha/dn22.html You probably have read it before. The sutta talks about things here and now in daily routine life. I understand that is what is you referred to. I agree that understanding, reality is here and now not there and then in the tipitaka. ------------------------------------------------------------------ (B. Feelings)"And how does a monk remain focused on feelings in & of themselves? There is the case where a monk, when feeling a painful feeling, discerns that he is feeling a painful feeling. When feeling a pleasant feeling, he discerns that he is feeling a pleasant feeling. When feeling a neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling, he discerns that he is feeling a neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling. "When feeling a painful feeling of the flesh, he discerns that he is feeling a painful feeling of the flesh. When feeling a painful feeling not of the flesh, he discerns that he is feeling a painful feeling not of the flesh. When feeling a pleasant feeling of the flesh, he discerns that he is feeling a pleasant feeling of the flesh. When feeling a pleasant feeling not of the flesh, he discerns that he is feeling a pleasant feeling not of the flesh. When feeling a neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling of the flesh, he discerns that he is feeling a neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling of the flesh. When feeling a neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling not of the flesh, he discerns that he is feeling a neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling not of the flesh. "In this way he remains focused internally on feelings in & of themselves, or externally on feelings in & of themselves, or both internally & externally on feelings in & of themselves. Or he remains focused on the phenomenon of origination with regard to feelings, on the phenomenon of passing away with regard to feelings, or on the phenomenon of origination & passing away with regard to feelings. Or his mindfulness that 'There are feelings' is maintained to the extent of knowledge & remembrance. And he remains independent, unsustained by (not clinging to) anything in the world. This is how a monk remains focused on feelings in & of themselves. (C. Mind)"And how does a monk remain focused on the mind in & of itself? There is the case where a monk, when the mind has passion, discerns that the mind has passion. When the mind is without passion, he discerns that the mind is without passion. When the mind has aversion, he discerns that the mind has aversion. When the mind is without aversion, he discerns that the mind is without aversion. When the mind has delusion, he discerns that the mind has delusion. When the mind is without delusion, he discerns that the mind is without delusion. "When the mind is restricted, he discerns that the mind is restricted. When the mind is scattered, he discerns that the mind is scattered. When the mind is enlarged, he discerns that the mind is enlarged. When the mind is not enlarged, he discerns that the mind is not enlarged. When the mind is surpassed, he discerns that the mind is surpassed. When the mind is unsurpassed, he discerns that the mind is unsurpassed. When the mind is concentrated, he discerns that the mind is concentrated. When the mind is not concentrated, he discerns that the mind is not concentrated. When the mind is released, he discerns that the mind is released. When the mind is not released, he discerns that the mind is not released. "In this way he remains focused internally on the mind in & of itself, or externally on the mind in & of itself, or both internally & externally on the mind in & of itself. Or he remains focused on the phenomenon of origination with regard to the mind, on the phenomenon of passing away with regard to the mind, or on the phenomenon of origination & passing away with regard to the mind. Or his mindfulness that 'There is a mind' is maintained to the extent of knowledge & remembrance. And he remains independent, unsustained by (not clinging to) anything in the world. This is how a monk remains focused on the mind in & of itself. -------------------------------------------------------- I agree with you about limitation of conceptualization of studying dhamma. As I mentioned before I personally do not like the word Abhidhamma, I mean to me dhamma is dhamma. I also mentioned that I like to read and definitely books of abhidhamma are fascinated me ( I feel abhidhamma is kind of a dry bone, suttanta is kind of lively and vinaya is kind of a mirror to remind myself how deep and pervasive kilesa can be). At this point my reading is kind of orientation to terms and vocabularies in dhamma, (very pannatti). I cannot prove nor disprove a lot of things I have read. Definitely the 17 series of citta is beyond my ability to discern. I can read and memorize (sometimes) the 17 moments back and forth but it does not mean I really see it. And as Nina mentioned, a lot of time I read or look up sutta are a mixture of greed to know and at times b/c I know I know very little and aware that to understand more in useful. I do not try to hypnotize myself to believe in all I have read. To me wisdom (panna) is illuminating and spontaneous. Anyhow, I still favor reading and gathering more information for being a food of thought. To me during reading, not matter I aware or not, mind (citta, consciousness, .....whatevere the term is), color, sound,.... come and go all the time. Always a good reminder that concept is not a reality as well as theory. Have to run to my tennis tournament. One thing I know that my mind have to move couple steps ahead of my opponent and the ball, if I want get deep in to the match. Best wishes, Num 10416 From: Robert Epstein Date: Thu Dec 27, 2001 6:35pm Subject: RE: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein : ) Nice to read your words. Robert Ep. ======= --- Kenneth Ong wrote: > Hi Robert > > I think my water analogy is wrong. I have mixed up bhavanga cittas with > other type of cittas. I find that the the parent and child analogy of > bhavanga cittas by the commentaries are not adequate to explain the > meaning of bhavanga cittas. > > To me I equate defiled as vibrations. the bhavanga cittas are vibrated by > sensory objects through causes and conditions (defilements) even though > their objects are not sensory ones. Such vibrations (or disturbances) > includes kusala and akusala, as long as there is vibrations hurling at > bhavanga cittas, it is meant to be defiled. > > We could not at one hand saying that is it only being defiled by just > aksuala bc it leave a loop hole "what happen if it is being disturbed by > kusala". To me it should be viewed that whatever vibrates bhavanga cittas > are defilements since bhavanga cittas are by nature luminious in this > context. > > When it is not being vibrated, it is considered luminious. > > I believe that you have understand that bhavanga cittas are also used for > sense proccess and in between sense process. I think I have a problem, > how come there is citta that is beyond our six senses. > > And that also remind me of dreaming. I believe there are latent tendecies > in bhavanga cittas also and such tendecies are manifested mostly affected > by lobha mula tendecies. When at times we seem to be very awake at > dreaming (half awake and half dreaming) the mind door sense process are > awake but not strong enough to be truly really awake. At that time of > such weak mind door sense process, there is an ability to see, hear and > taste and also memory. Such weak mind door sense process only, there is a > possiblity of reasoning or perceptions in our dream. Just guessing, he he > :) for the fun of it. > > > Kind regards > Ken O > > > --- Robert Epstein wrote: > Hi Kenneth. > > I guess we can get someone else to chime in again on this, but my > > understanding is > > that the bhavanga cittas never make any contact with sense objects and > > thus are > > never defiled. They only get 'turned on' in deep sleep, unconsciousness > > or death > > to ensure the continuity during the 'blank periods' when the conscious > > mind and > > sensory phenomena are absent. So when there is sense object impinging > > on a citta, > > it is never bhavanga citta, it is always the 'waking' citta. When > > bhavanga citta > > awakens, there is never any object there. Bhavanga citta only has as > > its object > > the last object before the previous death, and it never varies, so there > > is no > > chance of any defilement. > > > > If the above is true, by this logic, I cannot see how the bhavanga citta > > can be > > the one referred to in the statement: 'Mind is luminous, but is defiled > > by > > incoming defilements'. It would be quite impossible. > > > > And in fact, the commentaries seems to assume as I do that the bhavanga > > cittas > > cannot be directly defiled. That is why they employ the 'parent and > > child' > > analogy, which says that the waking cittas, which are defiled, ruin the > > reputation > > of the parents, the bhavanga cittas, even though the bhavanga cittas are > > never > > themselves defiled. So in a sense the Buddha could be saying that the > > bhavanga > > cittas are defiled by the other cittas, even though they themselves are > > actually > > *not* defiled. With respect, this seems to be stretching the meaning of > > the > > Buddha's very simple declarative statement quite a bit, in my opinion. > > > > I look forward to reading a greater part of the commentary on this > > subject, if > > Suan takes on the time-consuming task of translating it, and I hope it > > will > > clarify the above. > > > > Until then, I think it is interesting to note the different 'streams' of > > cittas > > that are taking place on different levels in the human structure, as it > > is > > constructed from moment to moment by a series of changing conditions and > > events. > > There are the subconsious cittas, the bhavanga cittas; the conscious > > ones, which > > perceive namas and rupas, and the supra-mundane cittas, which discern > > the reality > > of arising namas and rupas and some of which are capable of perceiving > > Nibbana. > > But as I understand it, it is still the case that only one of these > > cittas appears > > at a time. It is an interesting picture of reality. > > > > Best, > > Robert Ep. > > > > ============ > > > > --- Kenneth Ong wrote: 10417 From: Robert Epstein Date: Thu Dec 27, 2001 6:38pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Bhavanga cittas thanks, Jon. Robert Ep. ======== --- Jonothan Abbott wrote: > Rob > > --- Robert Epstein wrote: > Hi Sarah. : ) > ................ > > Nina's statement that the bhavanga cittas take place in between > > sense-door and > > mind-door moments to maintain continuity was a new piece of info for me. > > I was > > looking at the bhavangas as a separate process that only took place > > during the > > sleep state or in unconsciousness or death. > > You might find the passage from CMA on bhavanga citta below of interest. > > Jon > > CMA III, #8 (Guide) > … > The word bhavanga means factor(anga) of existence (bhava), that is, the > indispensable condition of existence. Bhavanga is the function of > consciousness by which the continuity of the individual is preserved > through the duration of any single existence, from conception to death. … > … . Bhavangacittas arise and pass away every moment during life whenever > there is no active cognitive process taking place. … > > When an object impinges on a sense door, the bhavanga is arrested and an > active cognitive process ensues for the purpose of cognizing the object. > Immediately after the cognitive process is completed, again the bhavanga > supervenes and continues until the next cognitive process arises. Arising > and perishing at every moment during this passive phase of consciousness, > the bhavanga flows on like a stream, without remaining static for two > consecutive moments. > 10418 From: Robert Epstein Date: Thu Dec 27, 2001 6:41pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: luminous mind: To Kenneth Ong And Like-minded Dhamma Friends Dear Suan, Looking forward to it! Regards, Robert Ep. ====== --- abhidhammika wrote: > > > Dear Ken > > How are you? > > Thank you for your kind encouragement. > > Personally, I do have an attitude of equanimity towards those who > criticize commentaries. > > The reason I mentioned my reluctance to post translation of them is > that I do not want to impose these profound commentarial discussions > on the critics and the general readers alike. > > Another reason is that they are the preserves of advanced students > and teachers of Tipitaka who knows Pali. They are not for beginners > and laypersons. In terms of modern academic ranking, they belong to > the level of post-graduate or doctoral studies and post-doctral > research. Therefore, if you post them for general laypersons, your > action amounts to baffling, tiring and torturing them. In fact, one > of the reasons the commentaries received criticisms could well be > that we haven't convinced the critics of the value of the > commentaries. > > Well, now, I know that there are are serious readers on this list, > and I am willing to post the commentarial discussions here. > > And, as the latest news on the matter, I have already finished full > translation of commentary and subcommentary on the luminous mind. > When I have finished re-checking and editing them, I will be able to > post them for the intellectual entertainment of the serious dhamma > friends on this list. > > Coming very soon! > > With best wishes, > > Suan > > http://www.bodhiology.org > > 10419 From: Date: Thu Dec 27, 2001 2:15pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein Hi, Num - Thank you for a very friendly and helpful post! With metta, Howard In a message dated 12/27/01 6:47:48 PM Eastern Standard Time, srnsk@a... writes: > > Hi Howard, > > > > Again, as a specific, while it may very well be true that there is but > > one object per act of discernment at a time, so that there is no parallel > > > processing in effect as far as discernment, alone, is concerned, I have > no > > way of knowing this detail except for taking it "on faith". And I don't > see > > > > this as of any particular importance ianyway (compared, for example, to > the > > > > tilakkhana). Moreover, I've never seen that fine point ever alluded to in > a > > > > discourse. > > As far as the cetasikas are concerned, I see no reason to speak of > > > all > > of them as "having an object" at all (some, like sa~n~na, yes), at least > > not > > in the same sense that vi~n~nana has an object. For example, certainly > > vedana > > arises from contact between vi~n~nana and and arammmana, and, in that > > sense, > > it is *associated* with that arammana, but I do not see that as having > that > > > > same item as object. It is simply that feeling occurs *in response* to > > contact. In any case, *what is important here* is the *conditionality* of > > > the > > function of vedana and its *impersonality*. And *these* things *can* be > > seen. > > > > You reminded me of maha-satipatthana-sutta. Let me cut just two sections > from > the sutta, http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/digha/dn22.html You > > probably have read it before. The sutta talks about things here and now in > daily routine life. I understand that is what is you referred to. I agree > > that understanding, reality is here and now not there and then in the > tipitaka. > ------------------------------------------------------------------ > (B. Feelings)"And how does a monk remain focused on feelings in & of > themselves? There is the case where a monk, when feeling a painful feeling, > > discerns that he is feeling a painful feeling. When feeling a pleasant > feeling, he discerns that he is feeling a pleasant feeling. When feeling a > neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling, he discerns that he is feeling a > neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling. "When feeling a painful feeling of > the > flesh, he discerns that he is feeling a painful feeling of the flesh. When > feeling a painful feeling not of the flesh, he discerns that he is feeling > a > painful feeling not of the flesh. When feeling a pleasant feeling of the > flesh, he discerns that he is feeling a pleasant feeling of the flesh. When > > feeling a pleasant feeling not of the flesh, he discerns that he is feeling > a > pleasant feeling not of the flesh. When feeling a > neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling of the flesh, he discerns that he is > feeling a neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling of the flesh. When feeling a > > neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling not of the flesh, he discerns that he > is > feeling a neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling not of the flesh. "In this > way > he remains focused internally on feelings in & of themselves, or externally > > on feelings in & of themselves, or both internally & externally on feelings > > in & of themselves. Or he remains focused on the phenomenon of origination > with regard to feelings, on the phenomenon of passing away with regard to > feelings, or on the phenomenon of origination & passing away with regard to > > feelings. Or his mindfulness that 'There are feelings' is maintained to the > > extent of knowledge & remembrance. And he remains independent, unsustained > by > (not clinging to) anything in the world. This is how a monk remains focused > > on feelings in & of themselves. > > (C. Mind)"And how does a monk remain focused on the mind in & of itself? > There is the case where a monk, when the mind has passion, discerns that > the > mind has passion. When the mind is without passion, he discerns that the > mind > is without passion. When the mind has aversion, he discerns that the mind > has > aversion. When the mind is without aversion, he discerns that the mind is > without aversion. When the mind has delusion, he discerns that the mind has > > delusion. When the mind is without delusion, he discerns that the mind is > without delusion. "When the mind is restricted, he discerns that the mind > is > restricted. When the mind is scattered, he discerns that the mind is > scattered. When the mind is enlarged, he discerns that the mind is > enlarged. > When the mind is not enlarged, he discerns that the mind is not enlarged. > When the mind is surpassed, he discerns that the mind is surpassed. When > the > mind is unsurpassed, he discerns that the mind is unsurpassed. When the > mind > is concentrated, he discerns that the mind is concentrated. When the mind > is > not concentrated, he discerns that the mind is not concentrated. When the > mind is released, he discerns that the mind is released. When the mind is > not > released, he discerns that the mind is not released. "In this way he > remains > focused internally on the mind in & of itself, or externally on the mind in > & > of itself, or both internally & externally on the mind in & of itself. Or > he > remains focused on the phenomenon of origination with regard to the mind, > on > the phenomenon of passing away with regard to the mind, or on the > phenomenon > of origination & passing away with regard to the mind. Or his mindfulness > that 'There is a mind' is maintained to the extent of knowledge & > remembrance. And he remains independent, unsustained by (not clinging to) > anything in the world. This is how a monk remains focused on the mind in & > of > itself. > -------------------------------------------------------- > > I agree with you about limitation of conceptualization of studying dhamma. > > As I mentioned before I personally do not like the word Abhidhamma, I mean > to > me dhamma is dhamma. I also mentioned that I like to read and definitely > books of abhidhamma are fascinated me ( I feel abhidhamma is kind of a dry > bone, suttanta is kind of lively and vinaya is kind of a mirror to remind > myself how deep and pervasive kilesa can be). At this point my reading is > kind of orientation to terms and vocabularies in dhamma, (very pannatti). > I > cannot prove nor disprove a lot of things I have read. Definitely the 17 > series of citta is beyond my ability to discern. I can read and memorize > (sometimes) the 17 moments back and forth but it does not mean I really see > > it. And as Nina mentioned, a lot of time I read or look up sutta are a > mixture of greed to know and at times b/c I know I know very little and > aware > that to understand more in useful. I do not try to hypnotize myself to > believe in all I have read. To me wisdom (panna) is illuminating and > spontaneous. Anyhow, I still favor reading and gathering more information > for being a food of thought. To me during reading, not matter I aware or > not, mind (citta, consciousness, .....whatevere the term is), color, > sound,.... come and go all the time. Always a good reminder that > concept > is not a reality as well as theory. > > Have to run to my tennis tournament. One thing I know that my mind have to > move couple steps ahead of my opponent and the ball, if I want get deep in > to > the match. > > Best wishes, > > Num > > /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 10420 From: Purnomo . Date: Fri Dec 28, 2001 3:41am Subject: Re: [dsg] Concept Dear friend, I agree what you said. nice, purnomo >From: "m. nease" >Reply-To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com >To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com >Subject: Re: [dsg] Concept >Date: Wed, 26 Dec 2001 15:42:03 -0800 (PST) > >Dear Purnomo, > >As I understand it a naama is characterized by its >ability to experience an object. > >For example, tactile consciousness (kayavi~n~naa.na) >experiences tangible object, heat for example--feeling >(vedanaa) arising with tactile conciousness >experiences feeling, (pleasant or unpleasant in this >case). So kayavi~n~naa.na, a citta, and vedanaa, a >cetasika, are both experiencing the same object >(aarammana), heat--they are both naamas (heat is a >ruupa, it doesn't experience anything). Of course, >many other cetasikas arise at the same time as >vedanaa, all experiencing the same aarammana. > >The concept of pleasant or unpleasant heat arises >afterwards but doesn't experience anything, it is an >idea made up of memories of the experiences. To me, >this is important only because the experiences >(naamas) and the things they can experience >(aarammanas, naamas or ruupas) can be the objects of >satipa.t.thaana and so can produce the kind of >understanding (sati-pa~n~naa) that destroys >defilements. Concepts can't be the objects of >satipa.t.thaana, so can't produce this kind of >understanding. > >This is the way I see it, anyway. > >Always nice to see you here, Purnomo, > >mike > 10421 From: Purnomo . Date: Fri Dec 28, 2001 3:51am Subject: Re: [dsg] Concept dear all, I agree what you said. I think "Universe" is a concept. Purnomo >From: Sarah >Reply-To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com >To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com >Subject: Re: [dsg] Concept >Date: Thu, 27 Dec 2001 12:59:09 +0800 (CST) > >Dear Rob Ep, > > --- Robert Epstein wrote: > Dear Sarah, > > It's getting a little clearer, I hope. > >Good! > > > > A concept can be the object of a citta, but a concept is never a nama. > >Right! > > > A concept of the Universe is not a citta, because the 'Universe' is not >a > > real > > object, but a conceptual, imaginary one. > >Mmmm, yes the Universe is a concept and and the “Universe’ is not a real >object. Even if it were a concept of a real object, it would not be a >citta. >The reason that neither a concept or a rupa is ever a citta is because a >citta >is a reality which experiences an object which concepts and rupas don’t do. > > > But the citta that thinks about the concept of the Universe can have >that > > concept > > as its 'unreal' object. Is this correct? > >Yes, spot on! (Cittas in the mind-door process only). > > > A citta that recognizes a concept as a concept, an unreal object, occurs >with > > sati > > and perhaps with panna, > >Mmmmmm, sati arises with all kusala (wholesome) cittas and panna with any >related to bhavana (mental development). So if there is wise reflection >about >concepts, like now hopefully, this reflection will be accompanied by sati >and >panna. However, as Jon wrote in a post yesterday, if it is sati of >satipatthana, accompanied by panna, the object can only be a reality and >never >a concept. So there is no ‘knowing’ a concept, because a concept doesn’t >exist >except in our imagination. Sati and panna know that at these moments the >reality is thinking which can be understood precisely. > > >but a citta that mistakes a concept for a reality -- > > that > > thinks the 'Universe' is a real object, not a concept -- occurs with >moha, > > and is > > a 'deluded' citta. Is this correct? > >Certainly there is moha at these moments. When there is the ‘deluded’ citta >which wrongly takes concept for reality, there is also (micha) ditthi at >these >moments. This is why we can consider ditthi as the most ‘dangerous’ >cetasika >(to quote K.Sujin) and the first one that has to be eradicated. > >I think you’re getting ‘very warm’ indeed, > >Speak soon, >Sarah > ========== 10422 From: Purnomo . Date: Fri Dec 28, 2001 3:58am Subject: Re: [dsg] Concept Dear Ong, Concept is important to we understand, but if we want to get deeper level of satipathanna so we have to release all our concept. Do you agree ? nice, purnomo >From: Kenneth Ong >Reply-To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com >To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com >Subject: Re: [dsg] Concept >Date: Thu, 27 Dec 2001 07:01:03 +0000 (GMT) > >Hi Mike > > > Concepts can't be the objects of satipa.t.thaana, so can't produce this >kind of understanding. > >k: I beg to differ. I think concepts are the prelimnary stage for >satipatthana. Without realising concepts as it is, then deeper level of >satipatthana could not be established. Only through satipatthana the mind >becomes much "sharper" present moments become more and more minute. then >paramatha dhamma could be understand through breaking down of concepts. >the concept level started with the study of body parts, slowly to other >namas. As in the book of dispeller of delusion, the study of body parts >is discussed at great length, i think even such discussion at length is >of paramount importance for the precendent study of paramtha dhamma. The >study of concepts are impt bc we are still living at the conceptual world. > Through detail studying then there is a possiblity of studying paramtha >dhammas. Till then, the investigating of paramatthas dhammas is could >only be applied on conceptual level (i.e. a series of cittas to constitute >the present moment we have) and not at paramttha dhamma level (citta by >citta). > >Merry Christmas and A happy new year to you :) > > >Kind regards >Ken O > > > > > > This is the way I see it, anyway. > > > > Always nice to see you here, Purnomo, > > > > mike 10423 From: Purnomo . Date: Fri Dec 28, 2001 4:31am Subject: grandma Dear all, october 26, 2001, it's nightmare for me. Tomorrow, I should be happy because I have finished my study. Unfortunely, My grandma was died. December 24, 2001: My family and I called my 'grandma'. According my culture, 'soul' my grandma was called. I confused and not believe but this is true. I saw that 'grandma' appeared in someone(she who called my grandma). This someone acted if as that was my grandma. Grandma said that she was there so sad. She always cried. I so sad what she said. I know, my grandma have been born in niraya realm. I know I have to 'pindapatta' to help my grandma. Please, give me some messages which can help my grandma so she will be born in happier realm. nice, purnomo 10424 From: Anders Honore Date: Fri Dec 28, 2001 4:30am Subject: ... This was written to me by a friend who has absolutely no affiliations with Buddhism whatsoever: "Our illusory self seeks purity, perfection and so on - but this is all a concept, and so is the "I" that seeks this. This "purity" of self is simply the opposite of not pu?e, which just reflects ones conditioning. You cant have one without the other, and so the individual who sets out to be "pure" denies that he or she is also "not pure." Otherwise how would the individual know pure from not pure. In other words, whatever you do to try to be free of the illusion of self, (or try to strive for, achieve, or realise, or understand,) still remains of this conceptual, conditioned self." Anders 10425 From: Anders Honore Date: Fri Dec 28, 2001 4:27am Subject: Re: [dsg] Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein 27-12-01 23:25:47, upasaka@a... skrev: >Hi, Anders - > >In a message dated 12/27/01 6:29:08 AM Eastern Standard Time, >anders.honore@g... writes: >> I think what Howard may be objecting to regarding citta is the >> non-practicality of talking about this and that citta. After all, >> consciousness/vinnana/citta is that which sees, which discerns. Can an eye >> see itself? If not, then why talk so much about >> it. I agree with Howard that there are more relevant objects to focus on, >> such as all that which the consciousness discerns, >> be it material objects, attachments, desires, anger etc etc. Or am I >> completely misreading you, Howard? >============================ > You're basically on target, Anders. To me, what is most important to >see, and to see it directly and not theorize about or accept on faith, is the >conditionality, impermanence, unsatisfactoriness, insubstantiality, and >impersonality of all experience, and, in the seeing, to let it go. As I was reading above where you said "what is most important to see" I thought "hmm, the most important thing to me is not-clinging, and then you write just below "to let it go". > It does me >little good, as far as I can determine, to study detailed lists of >unexperienced phenomena and to then debate with others or with myself as to >how "this" unobserved phenomenon relates to "that" unobserved phenomenon. Yes, that's what I am trying to stress as well. Study is a support for practise. The study that isn't related to practise becomes speculative and, imo, is no longer beneficial. The danger isn't really in the speculative discussions themselves, but it is extremely difficult to not become entrenched in them. And once that happens, it's all downhill. >What I need to see, directly, is the arising of suffering, and the grasping >which leads to it, directly, in my own life. Most of all, I think it is >important to not let studying and reasoning "take over"and replace the >practice taught by the Buddha. This is the trap I need to avoid. Other folks >may have other points of vulnerability. This is mine. 10426 From: Anders Honore Date: Fri Dec 28, 2001 4:14am Subject: Re: [dsg] luminous mind 27-12-01 11:50:50, Sarah skrev: >Dear Anders, > >I know I really shouldn't be getting into new discussions just as I'm going >away, but I just can't resist making a couple of quick comments here;-) > > --- Anders Honore wrote: > Personally, I don't >believe the commentaries at face value, and I believe >> that Bikkhu Bodhi has more or less skilfully >> pointed that they are sometimes even dead-wrong as they contradict some >> suttas. > >This is interesting. B.Bodhi is certainly a lot, lot, lot more familiar with >the suttas and commentaries than I am, but I have yet to come across such a >contradiction and would be happy to have any (contradictions) pointed out hurry> Sometimes it just depends on how one understands both (as with the >'luminous' sutta discussion). He made some comments in his notes (or was it his introduction?) to his translation of the Samyutta Nikaya. I can't remember where it is (and there's quite few pages to skim through) though, so it may be a while before I can be more specific about this. Btw, did I mention that I now have his full translations of the Digha, Majhima and Samyutta Nikayas? A friendly soul sent them to me for free shortly after I I took a break from dsg. >A lot of what is found in the >> commentaries (which are often abidhammically inspired) doesn't rely find >> backing in the suttas themselves, which, along >> with the Vinaya Pitaka, is the only source I will personally acknowledge as >> being actually authoritative. >> That the commentators were all supposedly Arahants is something I find more >> credible to be a later invention by the >> supporters of the commentaries, to lend authority to their claims. > >You may find it interesting to read back over the series of posts I've been >doing on a weekly basis from 'Intro to Vinaya'. These are the areas I'm >considering in them. I'll go and have a look in the archives. >> That it is not to say that they can't be extremely helpful in clarifying >> certain points (I have certainly found them to be so), >> but I would personally recommend that they should be taken with a grain of >> salt > >Sounds like you're in my category 2 group, i.e. you accept those which conform >with your understanding of the Suttas in question;-) (Category 1 were the >dinosaurs, that accept them all and category 3 were those who reject them all). I should add that I don't neccesarily believe that all the suttas are the quoted words of the Buddha either. When you have thousands of them such as you have in the Pali Canon and you wait a few hundreds before recording them in writing, there's bound to be some minor errors or fabrications. Perhaps I should clarify my own relationship with the commentaries. I evaluate them in the context of the suttas themselves. If I find that there isn't any valid basis for what the commentaries propose in the suttas themselves, then I don't buy it. It doesn't mean that I reject it as untrue or anything, because quite frankly I don't bother myself with having to label things as being "untrue" or "true". It just means that I don't find them relevant for me. Now, eveluating in the context of the suttas is a highly subjective matter of course, and the suttas themselves I interpret in the light of two things: Faith and practise. Things that I don't have any direct experience of myself from my practise (such as the jhanas, supernatural powers etc.) I can only take on faith. Since faith is a rather uncertain thing, I am wary of maintaining any positions on these matters. They are pointers for practitioners on higher stages than me, and so are not things I need concern myself with at the moment. When the suttas deal with things that I have direct experience of in my own practise, I tend to lend authority to my practise over my intellect, as it is the practise that it skilfully removing clinging, and not the intellect and I think the Buddha was quite aware of that. >Good to have you around, Anders......I reckon you and Kom were just waiting for >each other like Erik and Dan wait for each other here too;-)) Haha, probably. >Best wishes in the New Year for good results in your studies and ever-growing >panna. Thank you. Enjoy your trip! Anders 10427 From: Date: Fri Dec 28, 2001 3:02am Subject: Re: [dsg] grandma Hi, Purnomo - In a message dated 12/28/01 7:33:05 AM Eastern Standard Time, purnomo9@h... writes: > Dear all, > > october 26, 2001, it's nightmare for me. Tomorrow, I should be happy > because > I have finished my study. Unfortunely, My grandma was died. > > December 24, 2001: My family and I called my 'grandma'. According my > culture, 'soul' my grandma was called. I confused and not believe but this > is true. I saw that 'grandma' appeared in someone(she who called my > grandma). This someone acted if as that was my grandma. > > Grandma said that she was there so sad. She always cried. I so sad what she > > said. I know, my grandma have been born in niraya realm. I know I have to > 'pindapatta' to help my grandma. > > Please, give me some messages which can help my grandma so she will be born > > in happier realm. > > nice, > > purnomo > ================================ I'm very sorry for your loss. Of course, I don't know in what realm your grandmother has taken rebirth, but I don't think you need presume it is a hell realm. We are in a relatively wonderful realm, and yet we are often very sad right here! Also, in some Buddhist traditions, it takes a bit of time before the final "destination" is determined. So we really don't know the facts. Ultimately, it is our kamma that is the primary determiner in this sort of matter. Meanwhile, I, and I'm certain, all the rest of us, have loving thoughts for you, your family, and for your grandmother, and we can hope that in some way that may be of help. And please, while being mindful of your feelings of loss, let them come and go without magnifying them, and do recall the truth of the quotation at the end of this post. With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 10428 From: Kom Tukovinit Date: Fri Dec 28, 2001 8:07am Subject: RE: [dsg] grandma Dear Purnomo, My condolences for you grandmother's death. Her death can remind us that we too must die, sooner or later. It's important to develop wisdom and kusala whenever we could. What's your grandmother's name? We will think of her whenever a kusala deed is done. kom 10429 From: yklimov Date: Fri Dec 28, 2001 8:31am Subject: Re: grandma Dear Purnomo, I would like to say I am very sorry for your loss. I have never lost anyone yet, but I've lost a friend and I've seen my friends lost their daughter. Be supportive to your Mom or Dad, whoever Mother passed away. The freind of mine, when she was little, her grandma passed away, then when all her relatieves got together, father got a book and asked everyone to tell something good about grandma, then he wrote it into this book. She cherished this book all her life, and now gave it to her teenager son, I feel it's a great way to be close to you ancestors. Today we have camcorders, you can just kind of tape everyone saying something good about her. In my country it's a custom when someone dies, tell whatever good he's done, so he won't forget, leaving us. Love, Yulia PS Congratulation on finishing your study! 10430 From: Date: Fri Dec 28, 2001 4:19am Subject: Re: [dsg] grandma Dear Purnomo, Hope you and your family have strength to carry on during this hard time. I do not know where your grandma has gone. As it said, good seed will bring good fruit; I wish her good seeds took her into a good place. As couple people here have already said, if you can, try to turn this opportunity into learning experience. Our loss is our gain. Dhamma (both good and bad, pleasant and painful, tranquil and agitated) here and now, is our best teacher. This is my magic, OK: Grief when shared is half. Happiness when shared is double. May the force always be with you. Num 10431 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Fri Dec 28, 2001 10:09am Subject: Gayan's text Dear Gayan, thanks very much for the Pali text, I am very happy with it. I have not finished studying it and will come back to you, best wishes, Nina. 10432 From: Anders Honore Date: Fri Dec 28, 2001 1:16pm Subject: Re: [dsg] grandma Perhpas this sutta will help you in this situation: http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/majjhima/mn136.html 28-12-01 13:31:36, "Purnomo ." skrev: >Dear all, > >october 26, 2001, it's nightmare for me. Tomorrow, I should be happy because >I have finished my study. Unfortunely, My grandma was died. > >December 24, 2001: My family and I called my 'grandma'. According my >culture, 'soul' my grandma was called. I confused and not believe but this >is true. I saw that 'grandma' appeared in someone(she who called my >grandma). This someone acted if as that was my grandma. > >Grandma said that she was there so sad. She always cried. I so sad what she >said. I know, my grandma have been born in niraya realm. I know I have to >'pindapatta' to help my grandma. > >Please, give me some messages which can help my grandma so she will be born >in happier realm. > >nice, > >purnomo 10433 From: m. nease Date: Fri Dec 28, 2001 3:22pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein Hi Howard, --- upasaka@a... wrote: > To me, > what is most important to > see, and to see it directly and not theorize about > or accept on faith, is the > conditionality, impermanence, unsatisfactoriness, > insubstantiality, and > impersonality of all experience, and, in the seeing, > to let it go. It does me > little good, as far as I can determine, to study > detailed lists of > unexperienced phenomena and to then debate with > others or with myself as to > how "this" unobserved phenomenon relates to "that" > unobserved phenomenon. I don't like studying detailed lists either, or debating--or see the merit in either one (a different matter of course). Here's and example of what I do like and do see the merit in from the Dhammavinaya: "'The six classes of consciousness should be known.' Thus it was said. In reference to what was it said? Dependent on the eye & forms there arises consciousness at the eye. Dependent on the ear & sounds there arises consciousness at the ear. Dependent on the nose & aromas there arises consciousness at the nose. Dependent on the tongue & flavors there arises consciousness at the tongue. Dependent on the body & tactile sensations there arises consciousness at the body. Dependent on the intellect & ideas there arises consciousness at the intellect. 'The six classes of consciousness should be known.' Thus it was said. And in reference to this was it said. This is the third sextet. ... "If anyone were to say, 'The eye is the self,' that wouldn't be tenable. The arising & falling away of the eye are discerned. And when its arising & falling away are discerned, it would follow that 'My self arises & falls away.' That's why it wouldn't be tenable if anyone were to say, 'The eye is the self.' So the eye is not-self. If anyone were to say, 'Forms are the self,' that wouldn't be tenable... Thus the eye is not-self and forms are not-self. If anyone were to say, 'Consciousness at the eye is the self,' that wouldn't be tenable... Thus the eye is not-self, forms are not-self, consciousness at the eye is not-self. If anyone were to say, 'Contact at the eye is the self,' that wouldn't be tenable... Thus the eye is not-self, forms are not-self, consciousness at the eye is not-self, contact at the eye is not-self. If anyone were to say, 'Feeling is the self,' that wouldn't be tenable... Thus the eye is not-self, forms are not-self, consciousness at the eye is not-self, contact at the eye is not-self, feeling is not self. If anyone were to say, 'Craving is the self,' that wouldn't be tenable. The arising & falling away of craving are discerned. And when its arising & falling away are discerned, it would follow that 'My self arises & falls away.' That's why it wouldn't be tenable if anyone were to say, 'Craving is the self.' Thus the eye is not-self, forms are not-self, consciousness at the eye is not-self, contact at the eye is not-self, feeling is not self, craving is not-self." Majjhima Nikaya 148 Chachakka Sutta The Six Sextets http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/majjhima/mn148.html To me, these are not just lists, or subjects for pointless debates. Although I've included only the third of the Six Sixes, it's clear to me that these particular 'lists' are essential to what the Buddha taught. He never excluded or suggesting excluding the sense bases from consideration because they can't sense 'themselves', e.g.--this notion will not be found in the Tipitaka. Don't mean to preach at you, your post just reminded me of this, one of my favorite suttas. Hope you don't find it empty or meaningless and get some enjoyement, at least, out of it. mike 10434 From: m. nease Date: Fri Dec 28, 2001 3:48pm Subject: Re: [dsg] grandma Dear Purnomo, It's always hard for me to know how to respond to a friend's grief. This kind of terrible unhappiness is so much about what the Buddha taught. Before he was the Buddha, he didn't want his relatives to suffer and die either--he wanted to find a way out of this, for himself and for others. What he found (in part) is that grief, sorrow, suffering, lamentation and dispair are all conditioned by birth--that only by putting and end to rebirth can we put an end to this cycle of suffering. I don't know what to say about helping your grandma now, this is beyond anything I know. But I hope this sadness you experience now will help you to understand and someday be free from suffering. Best Wishes, mike 10435 From: Date: Fri Dec 28, 2001 1:02pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein Hi, Mike - I'm *completely* in agreement with you on the following. I've never read any suttas from which I haven't gained. I have found NONE of them to be empty or meaningless. Just the opposite!! In fact, I just started re-reading a modern commentary on the Kalakarama Sutta, one of my very favorites. I have never experienced empty theorizing in the suttas, and while I consider study of the suttas as secondary to the direct practice of sila, samadhi, and vipassana bhavana, sutta study is very important to me and is something I continually engage in. With metta, Howard In a message dated 12/28/01 6:23:03 PM Eastern Standard Time, mlnease@y... writes: > > Hi Howard, > > --- upasaka@a... wrote: > > > To me, > > what is most important to > > see, and to see it directly and not theorize about > > or accept on faith, is the > > conditionality, impermanence, unsatisfactoriness, > > insubstantiality, and > > impersonality of all experience, and, in the seeing, > > to let it go. It does me > > little good, as far as I can determine, to study > > detailed lists of > > unexperienced phenomena and to then debate with > > others or with myself as to > > how "this" unobserved phenomenon relates to "that" > > unobserved phenomenon. > > I don't like studying detailed lists either, or > debating--or see the merit in either one (a different > matter of course). Here's and example of what I do > like and do see the merit in from the Dhammavinaya: > > "'The six classes of consciousness should be known.' > Thus it was said. In reference to what was it said? > Dependent on the eye & forms there arises > consciousness at the eye. Dependent on the ear & > sounds there arises consciousness at the ear. > Dependent on the nose & aromas there arises > consciousness at the nose. Dependent on the tongue & > flavors there arises consciousness at the tongue. > Dependent on the body & tactile sensations there > arises consciousness at the body. Dependent on the > intellect & ideas there arises consciousness at the > intellect. 'The six classes of consciousness should be > known.' Thus it was said. And in reference to this was > it said. This is the third sextet. ... > "If anyone were to say, 'The eye is the self,' that > wouldn't be tenable. The arising & falling away of the > eye are discerned. And when its arising & falling away > are discerned, it would follow that 'My self arises & > falls away.' That's why it wouldn't be tenable if > anyone were to say, 'The eye is the self.' So the eye > is not-self. If anyone were to say, 'Forms are the > self,' that wouldn't be tenable... Thus the eye is > not-self and forms are not-self. If anyone were to > say, 'Consciousness at the eye is the self,' that > wouldn't be tenable... Thus the eye is not-self, forms > are not-self, consciousness at the eye is not-self. If > anyone were to say, 'Contact at the eye is the self,' > that wouldn't be tenable... Thus the eye is not-self, > forms are not-self, consciousness at the eye is > not-self, contact at the eye is not-self. If anyone > were to say, 'Feeling is the self,' that wouldn't be > tenable... Thus the eye is not-self, forms are > not-self, consciousness at the eye is not-self, > contact at the eye is not-self, feeling is not self. > If anyone were to say, 'Craving is the self,' that > wouldn't be tenable. The arising & falling away of > craving are discerned. And when its arising & falling > away are discerned, it would follow that 'My self > arises & falls away.' That's why it wouldn't be > tenable if anyone were to say, 'Craving is the self.' > Thus the eye is not-self, forms are not-self, > consciousness at the eye is not-self, contact at the > eye is not-self, feeling is not self, craving is > not-self." > > Majjhima Nikaya 148 > Chachakka Sutta > The Six Sextets > > http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/majjhima/mn148.html > > To me, these are not just lists, or subjects for > pointless debates. Although I've included only the > third of the Six Sixes, it's clear to me that these > particular 'lists' are essential to what the Buddha > taught. He never excluded or suggesting excluding the > sense bases from consideration because they can't > sense 'themselves', e.g.--this notion will not be > found in the Tipitaka. > > Don't mean to preach at you, your post just reminded > me of this, one of my favorite suttas. Hope you don't > find it empty or meaningless and get some enjoyement, > at least, out of it. > > mike > /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 10436 From: Kenneth Ong Date: Fri Dec 28, 2001 6:51pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Concept Hi Purnomo, I thought that is what I trying to point out. Sorry I am always lousy in sayings words to pple loss. My wife always complaint (very loudly) to me that I am not a sentimental which I agree with. Bc to me, what will happen will happen, if it comes, let it comes, there is nothing we could do abt it so what is the point to be attached or to be sad. To me this is life. Even if one day, my children would die earlier than me, I told my wife, this is life. I could empathise your emotion loss as I have witnessed the passing of my father and one of my close sister abt eleven years ago when I was 19 yrs old. As my sister died of suicide, the impact was traumatic. That emotion baggage was with me for seven years until the day I learnt Buddhism. Her loss taught me the importance of being kind to everyone I meet as I regret of not being kinder to her while she was alive. Even now when I write this to you, saddness still lingers in my heart. I always wish I could turn back the clock and help her. But this is life. I have to accept it whether I like it or not and carry with my life. My deepest condolences Ken O --- "Purnomo ." wrote: > Dear Ong, > > Concept is important to we understand, but if we want to get deeper > level of > satipathanna so we have to release all our concept. Do you agree ? > > nice, > purnomo > > 10437 From: Date: Fri Dec 28, 2001 2:06pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein Hi again , Mike - One more point. In a message dated 12/28/01 6:23:03 PM Eastern Standard Time, mlnease@y... writes: > He never excluded or suggesting excluding the sense bases from consideration > because they can't > sense 'themselves', e.g.--this notion will not be > found in the Tipitaka. > ============================= For sure he didn't! And what Buddhist would dismiss sense bases from consideration? I, myself, said, if you will recall, that I'm *aware* of being conscious, of seeing, tasting, hearing, and so on and so forth. All objects are objects of the six senses, and it is there that we must "look" to see emptiness, impermanence, insubstantiality, and impersonality. Theoretical constructs such as cittas, and, particularly such things as bhavanga cittas with unobservable objects are another matter. What sort of discernment has no discernable object? Even the discernment of an absence discerns that absence! But, whether or not there are such things as bhavanga cittas with unobservable objects has no bearing whatsoever on the goal of the Dhamma, namely the cessation of suffering. The Dhamma, as I see it, is neither about belief (though some tentative belief can be useful) nor about deduction and theorizing (though some of that may be useful), but is all about moral action, guarding the senses, and cultivating the mind. With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 10438 From: Kom Tukovinit Date: Fri Dec 28, 2001 11:48pm Subject: RE: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein Dear Howard, I believe the most important thing about learning about the bhavanga is that it too can be discerned as an object of Satipatthana. Without the discernment with panna, it is likely that someone with the accumulation of taking the kandha as self will take bhavanga as also self when bhavanga appears to them. As for having "theoretical constructs", I think all the teachings about dhamma is theoretical, until what is taught appears to panna. Nibbana is as theoretical to me as the object that bhawanga citta discerns. kom > -----Original Message----- > From: upasaka@a... [mailto:upasaka@a...] > Sent: Friday, December 28, 2001 7:07 PM > To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com > Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary > (Part Two) To Robert > Epstein > > Theoretical constructs such as cittas, > and, particularly such things > as bhavanga cittas with unobservable objects are > another matter. What sort of > discernment has no discernable object? Even the > discernment of an absence > discerns that absence! But, whether or not there > are such things as bhavanga > cittas with unobservable objects has no bearing > whatsoever on the goal of the > Dhamma, namely the cessation of suffering. The > Dhamma, as I see it, is > neither about belief (though some tentative > belief can be useful) nor about > deduction and theorizing (though some of that may > be useful), but is all > about moral action, guarding the senses, and > cultivating the mind. > > With metta, > Howard 10439 From: Anders Honore Date: Sat Dec 29, 2001 1:27am Subject: Re: RE: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein 29-12-01 08:48:23, Kom Tukovinit skrev: >Dear Howard, > >I believe the most important thing about learning about the >bhavanga is that it too can be discerned as an object of >Satipatthana. Without the discernment with panna, it is >likely that someone with the accumulation of taking the >kandha as self will take bhavanga as also self when bhavanga >appears to them. > >As for having "theoretical constructs", I think all the >teachings about dhamma is theoretical, until what is taught >appears to panna. Nibbana is as theoretical to me as the >object that bhawanga citta discerns. Kom, the very point that is being made is that precisely because they are theoretical, there is no point in dwelling on it, since Buddhism (at least as I perceive it) is a practise and not a philosophical discipline. 10440 From: Anders Honore Date: Sat Dec 29, 2001 1:24am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein 29-12-01 03:02:54, upasaka@a... skrev: >Hi, Mike - > > I'm *completely* in agreement with you on the following. I've never >read any suttas from which I haven't gained. I have found NONE of them to be >empty or meaningless. Just the opposite!! In fact, I just started re-reading >a modern commentary on the Kalakarama Sutta, one of my very favorites. I have >never experienced empty theorizing in the suttas, and while I consider study >of the suttas as secondary to the direct practice of sila, samadhi, and >vipassana bhavana, sutta study is very important to me and is something I >continually engage in. I quite agree. To me, they are secondary to the actual practise as well, but can serve as useful pointers and guidelines to the practise. 10441 From: Kom Tukovinit Date: Sat Dec 29, 2001 6:21am Subject: RE: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein Dear Howards, > -----Original Message----- > From: upasaka@a... [mailto:upasaka@a...] > of my very favorites. I have > never experienced empty theorizing in the suttas, > and while I consider study > of the suttas as secondary to the direct practice > of sila, samadhi, and > vipassana bhavana, sutta study is very important > to me and is something I > continually engage in. > I am glad you found this to be true. After reading your previous post on this thread, I was compelled to post some details of the Kandaraka sutta that someone mentioned recently, to counter the point that direct practice can be done without listening to the dhamma (or listening to more even after the person has begun the direct practice) or consideration of what was heard. Given that you have no such perception anyway, I still post this, to extoll the virtues of the commentators who expand on the meaning of the points otherwise cannot be known. The full sutta is at: http://www.metta.lk/tipitaka/2Sutta-Pitaka/2Majjhima-Nikaya/ Majjhima2/051-kandaka-e1.htm The point that I wanted to raise was in the passage: Soon after the elephant rider’s son had left. The Blessed One addressed the bhikkhus: Bhikkhus, if the elephant rider’ s son had waited some more time until I explained these four persons, he would have amassed, much knowledge. O! Blessed One, this is the time to explain these four persons. The bhikkhus, hearing it from the Blessed One would bear it in mind. Bhikkhus, listen carefully, I will tell.. However, I found the passage from B. Bodhi's more complete, as it matches more to the Thai tipitaka: Soon after he had left, the Blessed One addressed the bhikkhus thus: "Bihkkhus, Pessa, the elephant driver's son, is wise, he has great wisdom. If he had sat a while longer until I had expounded for him in detail these four kinds of persons, he would have greatly benefited. Still he has already greatly benefited even as it is". The commentators explained that Pessa is wise because he develops Satipatthana. Also, from B. Bodhi's note explaining the two benefits mentioned: MA: (Commentators): Pessa would have attained the fruit of stream-entry, but he rose from his seat and left before the Buddha had completed his discourse. The benefits he did receive are two: he gained greater confidence in the Sangha, and he gave rise to a new method for comprehending the foundations of mindfulness. It appears to me in this specific case that by not having the opportunity to listen to the Buddha's explanation, even when Pessa is already developing Satipathana, he missed the chance of an attainment. kom 10442 From: Date: Sat Dec 29, 2001 2:48am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein Hi, Kom - In a message dated 12/29/01 2:49:02 AM Eastern Standard Time, tikmok@y... writes: > Dear Howard, > > I believe the most important thing about learning about the > bhavanga is that it too can be discerned as an object of > Satipatthana. Without the discernment with panna, it is > likely that someone with the accumulation of taking the > kandha as self will take bhavanga as also self when bhavanga > appears to them. > > As for having "theoretical constructs", I think all the > teachings about dhamma is theoretical, until what is taught > appears to panna. Nibbana is as theoretical to me as the > object that bhawanga citta discerns. > > kom > =========================== So, are you saying that you have discerned bhavanga cittas? (I don't recall the Buddha discussing observing bhavanga cittas in the Satipatthana Sutta.) How did they seem? Was there, indeed, no evident object? Was there anything about them you noticed that made you inclined to think they were a "self" more than, for example, an experience of craving? While I have been aware of craving, I've never been aware of bhavanga cittas. For me personally, they are only hypothesized referents of concepts concocted to solve some discontinuity problems in a theory. Direct observation of them would certainly change my perspective on their existence, though not on their importance. With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 10443 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Sat Dec 29, 2001 10:04am Subject: Re: [dsg] chatting about India op 27-12-2001 17:02 schreef Kom Tukovinit op tikmok@y...: > You have got I think almost all of the big impressions I > have from the trip. :-) The other (big) one that still > stays in my mind (as I am still trying to make sense out of > it) is what most of the teachings in the tipitaka ultimately > describe. > > K. Jaran and A. Supi was discussing about Kilesa, and why > only 10 akusala cetasikas are kilesas, and the other 4 are > not. The answer, I think you also wrote in Cetasikas, is > each Kilesa defiles the mind, where as the other four defile > the mental factors. At that point, I was asking him > questions about the other groupings of defilements including > Asava, etc. Dear Kom, thank you for bringing up these points. As to the 10 kilesas, I leant that they defile the dhammas that are conascent with them. Thus, in the case of sloth that is listed but not torpor: when there is sloth, torpor is always conascent with it, it is defiled by it. Regret (not listed as kilesa) is defiled by dosa conascent with it and also by the other kilesas which (not all of them) are conascent with it. > > Kom: A. Supi said at this point that to understand some of the > teachings, one has to keep in mind that the teaching > ultimately describes realities. The descriptions point to > the characteristics of realities: they are there so that we > can understand the realities as such. He then used the > example of the 8-fold path, and we discussed why it is that > in the sutta, the 8-fold path sounds conventional and very > much like concepts, but why it is that it really describes > realities. > > For example, regarding Samma ditthi, we hear that right > views include: > a) Kamma is real. > b) The benefaction of father and mother is real > c) There exists ones who know, as it truly is, the existence > of life before this, this life, and next life. > > This may sound very much to some of us like concepts: this > is due to fact that there is no penetration of dhammas as > they truly are. However, if panna, cognizing the realities, > starts to develop, we would understand more, and in more > intricate details, about what the statements really mean. > For example, if one understands the difference between > paramatha dhammas and concepts, then one starts to > understand why Kamma and Kusala dhammas (benefaction of > father and mother) are real, but father and mother are not > real. Then, if one penetrates how kusala and akusala are > different from one another, then one understands even more > about a) and b). The more one penetrates the dhamma, the > deeper and detailed one's understading of Samma-ditthi is, > as the characteristics of realities as they truly are. N: Think of kammassakata ~naa.na, which arises with each vipassana ~naa.na, as A. Sujin explained. When you understand seeing as only an element, not self, you will also have a deeper understanding of vipaka caused by kamma. Not in conventional terms, but by real, deep understanding. > K: In using this explanation, A. Supi didn't explicitly link > the explanation to my question of why there are only 3 > dhammas in the asava, but I think the above explanation > implies an answer to my question. We read that Asava: > 1) flows from the lowest realm of existence to the highest > ones > 2) is fermented. (The thai explanation also says it is > accumulated and fermented) > 3) is like poisonous drug or intoxicants. > > Nina, do you by any chance have any other explanations of > why other akusala dhammas are not asava? For example, since > Uddhacca, Ahiri, and Anottappa must co-arise with all the 4 > asavas, but they are not are asavas. Why? Are there any > other reasons besides the one implied above? N: The classification by way of asavas shows the danger of these four that arise time and again, under a particular aspect. It shows that they are as dangerous as poison or drogen that can cause great harm, but we do not notice it, also at this moment. After a moment of seeing or hearing cankers arise but we do not know it, we are so intoxicated, the poison is working. Ignorance is so persistent even now, and only the arahat has eradicated this asava. N's original post:> >> I find this very good, reminding us about >> conditions. What else can we do >> now but listening, studying, considering, >> verifying in daily life now what >> we learnt. I also found it helpful that A. Sujin >> said: understanding leads >> to detachment from the beginning to the end, >> stressing detachment so often. > >> I was reminded that even reading the scriptures >> and wishing to gain >> understanding is often done with an idea of self. > > K: Now the question I asked you above is asked in such a > context! Thanks for the immediate reminder. > N: Thank you too for the reminders by way of questions and remarks. 10444 From: Kom Tukovinit Date: Sat Dec 29, 2001 0:34pm Subject: RE: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein Dear Howards, > -----Original Message----- > From: upasaka@a... [mailto:upasaka@a...] > So, are you saying that you have discerned > bhavanga cittas? (I don't > recall the Buddha discussing observing bhavanga > cittas in the Satipatthana > Sutta.) All discernments which are functions of cittas are covered under citta-nupassana satipatthana. Bawhanga is a discernable object of satipatthana, but not as commonly discerned as other cittas that rise in the waking hours. You ask why it is that the Buddha didn't mention bawhanga explicitly in the Satipatthana sutta. I obviously can't answer the question. However, do you know that Anapana-sati sutta is considered to describe Satipatthana completely, even without all the details about objects of discernment that are described in the Satipatthana sutta? Do you know that the single short sentence that V. Asashi described to, and brought, V. Sariputta to become a sotapanna is considered to completely describe the 4 noble truths, even without all the explicit details? It is not just the wordings of the suttas that matter, it is also the wisdom of those who expound on, and listen to, the teachings. >How did they seem? Was there, indeed, no > evident object? You fall asleep, right? What's the difference between the consciousness that is awake and conciousness that is in deep sleep? Deep sleep means not dreaming (as dreaming is virtually identical to thinking while awake). You already know some details of bawhanga: there is no apparent object of discernments (even though there is). This is in contrast to the waking conciousness: there is (often more than not, is it always?) an evident object of conciousness. The bawhanga would appear just like all its (true) descriptions, as consciousness that differs from other conciousness pre-eminently for its object of discernment. It is described this way: it is like being in a world with no seeing, no sound, no smell, no taste, no tactile inputs, no thinking (completely dark, completely free of noise, etc.), and suddenly other things appear. >Was there > anything about them you noticed that made you > inclined to think they were a > "self" more than, for example, an experience of craving? > While I have been aware of craving, I've > never been aware of bhavanga > cittas. Obviously not, we will take things that appear commonly to be self more often (and more avijja is accumulated) than ones that don't appear as often. However, dhamma is truly subtle. Do you know of the different shades of subtleties of the "self-craving" that you have to all the 6 sense bases? If panna becomes keen, then more subtleties are known. The thing is, without the understanding about the different subtleties, and the different possible objects of discernments, then panna cannot develop to see the subtleties (and other possible objects of discernments) as just dhammas and not-self. Do you remember Gayan's translation of the "cheating" dhammas? Before you listen to that, how many do you know personally? How many do you know now? Without listening to and considering those pointers, do you think you can figure all those out by yourself? (These questions are obviously rhetorical, and require no answer). > For me personally, they are only > hypothesized referents of concepts As I mentioned (I think Num said the same thing), everything we learn in the tipitaka (also, for some: commentaries, their teacher's words, their own logics and intuition, their own pre-disposition toward certain concepts), everything remains theoretical until proven by panna. > concocted to solve some discontinuity problems in > a theory. How about dependent origination? Is it a theory and lots of thinking, or do they represent objects of discernments? Again, I think we would only know until panna discerns it to be identical, or not. > Direct > observation of them would certainly change my > perspective on their existence, > though not on their importance. I am glad that this is true as I believe Buddhism is a religion of wisdom, of direct observation, and of realities. Each develops wisdom (hopefully, and not micha-dithi) his/her own way. This is somewhat longer than I expected. I don't mean to preach or to convince, but I am pointing out that the problem of understanding bawhanga is not its being conceptual, but that it is the listener's confidence of the source of the concept. For some, the concept of bawhanga, even if it remains unexperienced, is as valid as Nibbana. For others, it represents other teachings not of the buddha's. kom 10445 From: Date: Sat Dec 29, 2001 9:25am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein Hi, Kom - In a message dated 12/29/01 3:35:43 PM Eastern Standard Time, tikmok@y... writes: > Dear Howards, > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: upasaka@a... [mailto:upasaka@a...] > > > So, are you saying that you have discerned > > bhavanga cittas? (I don't > > recall the Buddha discussing observing bhavanga > > cittas in the Satipatthana > > Sutta.) > > All discernments which are functions of cittas are covered > under citta-nupassana satipatthana. Bawhanga is a > discernable object of satipatthana, but not as commonly > discerned as other cittas that rise in the waking hours. > You ask why it is that the Buddha didn't mention bawhanga > explicitly in the Satipatthana sutta. I obviously can't > answer the question. However, do you know that Anapana-sati > sutta is considered to describe Satipatthana completely, > even without all the details about objects of discernment > that are described in the Satipatthana sutta? > ---------------------------------------------------------- Howard: Yes, I'm familiar with both these suttas. They are certainly among the most important. ---------------------------------------------------------- Do you know > that the single short sentence that V. Asashi described to, > and brought, V. Sariputta to become a sotapanna is > considered to completely describe the 4 noble truths, even > without all the explicit details? > -------------------------------------------------------- Howard: I'm not familiar with what you're discussing here. ------------------------------------------------------ It is not just the> > wordings of the suttas that matter, it is also the wisdom of > those who expound on, and listen to, the teachings. > > >How did they seem? Was there, indeed, no > > evident object? > > You fall asleep, right? What's the difference between the > consciousness that is awake and conciousness that is in deep > sleep? Deep sleep means not dreaming (as dreaming is > virtually identical to thinking while awake). > -------------------------------------------------------- Howard: Yes, I'm familiar with falling asleep. In fact, I get to experience it all too often while meditating! ;-)) However, I've not been aware of deep sleep. Have you? I'm aware that it is said that the mind moves from bhavanga citta to bhavanga citta during deep, dreamless sleep. But, as I said, I've not experienced it. ------------------------------------------------------ You already > > know some details of bawhanga: there is no apparent object > of discernments (even though there is). This is in contrast > to the waking conciousness: there is (often more than not, > is it always?) an evident object of conciousness. > ---------------------------------------------------- Howard: So I have heard it said. But I have had no basis in directly knowing this. -------------------------------------------------- The> > bawhanga would appear just like all its (true) descriptions, > as consciousness that differs from other conciousness > pre-eminently for its object of discernment. It is > described this way: it is like being in a world with no > seeing, no sound, no smell, no taste, no tactile inputs, no > thinking (completely dark, completely free of noise, etc.), > and suddenly other things appear. > > >Was there > > anything about them you noticed that made you > > inclined to think they were a > > "self" more than, for example, an experience of craving? > > While I have been aware of craving, I've > > never been aware of bhavanga > > cittas. > > Obviously not, we will take things that appear commonly to > be self more often (and more avijja is accumulated) than > ones that don't appear as often. However, dhamma is truly > subtle. Do you know of the different shades of subtleties > of the "self-craving" that you have to all the 6 sense > bases? If panna becomes keen, then more subtleties are > known. The thing is, without the understanding about the > different subtleties, and the different possible objects of > discernments, then panna cannot develop to see the > subtleties (and other possible objects of discernments) as > just dhammas and not-self. > --------------------------------------------------------- Howard: I appreciate your telling me this, Kom, but I do not believe I need to know about alleged bhavanga cittas to help me along the path, even should they be realities and not just theoretical constructs. It *is* useful for me to be aware of the impermanence, conditionality, unsatisfactoriness, and impersonality of *all* that I experience, and to let all these things come and go without craving, aversion, and grasping. --------------------------------------------------------- > > Do you remember Gayan's translation of the "cheating" > dhammas? Before you listen to that, how many do you know > personally? How many do you know now? Without listening to > and considering those pointers, do you think you can figure > all those out by yourself? (These questions are obviously > rhetorical, and require no answer). > ------------------------------------------------------------- Howard: There's no need for me to have a large repertoire of observed objects, nor for me to know their particular characteristics. The only characteristics I need to observe are the universal ones which comprise the tilakkhana. ------------------------------------------------------------ > > > For me personally, they are only > > hypothesized referents of concepts > > As I mentioned (I think Num said the same thing), everything > we learn in the tipitaka (also, for some: commentaries, > their teacher's words, their own logics and intuition, their > own pre-disposition toward certain concepts), everything > remains theoretical until proven by panna. > > > concocted to solve some discontinuity problems in > > a theory. > > How about dependent origination? Is it a theory and lots of > thinking, or do they represent objects of discernments? > --------------------------------------------------------------- Howard: Dependent origination is directly discernable, with varying degrees of depth and understanding. In any case, I rarely if *ever* question things directly put forward by the Buddha, especially in the suttas. To the best of my knowledge, bhavanga cittas first appeared in commentaries, rather than the tipitaka. My order of reliability is (1) suttas, (2) abhidhamma, and (3) commentaries. (BTW, there is very good evidence that the Abhidhamma did not originate with the Buddha, but was a later codification of Buddhist ideas.) ------------------------------------------------------------------ > Again, I think we would only know until panna discerns it to > be identical, or not. > > > Direct > > observation of them would certainly change my > > perspective on their existence, > > though not on their importance. > > I am glad that this is true as I believe Buddhism is a > religion of wisdom, of direct observation, and of realities. > Each develops wisdom (hopefully, and not micha-dithi) > his/her own way. > > This is somewhat longer than I expected. I don't mean to > preach or to convince, but I am pointing out that the > problem of understanding bawhanga is not its being > conceptual, but that it is the listener's confidence of the > source of the concept. For some, the concept of bawhanga, > even if it remains unexperienced, is as valid as Nibbana. > ------------------------------------------------------------- Howard: I find the comparison of these two to be "way out". Nibbana is at the very core of the Buddha's teaching! To say the least, bhavanga cittas are not. ------------------------------------------------------------ > For others, it represents other teachings not of the > buddha's. > > kom > ============================== With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 10446 From: m. nease Date: Sat Dec 29, 2001 3:18pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein Hi Howard, --- upasaka@a... wrote: > I'm *completely* in agreement with you on the > following. I'm glad and relieved we're in agreement on this--this is mostly attachment of course... > I've never > read any suttas from which I haven't gained. I have > found NONE of them to be > empty or meaningless. Just the opposite!! In fact, I > just started re-reading > a modern commentary on the Kalakarama Sutta, one of > my very favorites. I have > never experienced empty theorizing in the suttas, > and while I consider study > of the suttas as secondary to the direct practice of > sila, samadhi, and > vipassana bhavana, sutta study is very important to > me and is something I > continually engage in. I find sila and samaadhi (including vipassanaa bhavana) just as important, I think. However for me study comes first, even before sila (though of course each supports all and all support each). The reason I put pariyatti first is that, without conceptual understanding of the teaching of the Buddha, I don't think I would ever discover the Buddha's meaning of sila and samadhi. Personally I find it all too easy to take off in any direction based on my own ideas of sila and samaadhi. Very useful I think to compare my ideas to those expressed in the tipitaka and, of course, to compare my interpretations of the latter to my own experience. mike 10447 From: m. nease Date: Sat Dec 29, 2001 3:28pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein Hi, Howard, --- upasaka@a... wrote: > > He never excluded or suggesting excluding the > sense bases from consideration > > because they can't > > sense 'themselves', e.g.--this notion will not be > > found in the Tipitaka. > > > ============================= > For sure he didn't! And what Buddhist would > dismiss sense bases from > consideration? Sorry that my post gave the impression that I thought you might--it was an oblique reference to another post. I know you're well aware of this. > I, myself, said, if you will recall, > that I'm *aware* of being > conscious, of seeing, tasting, hearing, and so on > and so forth. All objects > are objects of the six senses, and it is there that > we must "look" to see > emptiness, impermanence, insubstantiality, and > impersonality. I do appreciate that you appreciate this, Howard, and didn't mean to suggest otherwise--please excuse my clumsiness. mike 10448 From: Date: Sat Dec 29, 2001 10:35am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein Hi, Mike - In a message dated 12/29/01 6:28:59 PM Eastern Standard Time, mlnease@y... writes: > > Hi, Howard, > > --- upasaka@a... wrote: > > > > He never excluded or suggesting excluding the > > sense bases from consideration > > > because they can't > > > sense 'themselves', e.g.--this notion will not be > > > found in the Tipitaka. > > > > > ============================= > > For sure he didn't! And what Buddhist would > > dismiss sense bases from > > consideration? > > Sorry that my post gave the impression that I thought > you might--it was an oblique reference to another > post. I know you're well aware of this. > ----------------------------------------------------------- Howard: No problem at all, Mike. With internet communication being what it is, I thought it possible that you were misreading me. ---------------------------------------------------------- > > > I, myself, said, if you will recall, > > that I'm *aware* of being > > conscious, of seeing, tasting, hearing, and so on > > and so forth. All objects > > are objects of the six senses, and it is there that > > we must "look" to see > > emptiness, impermanence, insubstantiality, and > > impersonality. > > I do appreciate that you appreciate this, Howard, and > didn't mean to suggest otherwise--please excuse my > clumsiness. > ----------------------------------------------------- Howard: Not at all, Mike. You are certainly careful in your writing and are always the gentleman! ---------------------------------------------------- > > mike > ========================== With much metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 10449 From: lpjoe Date: Sun Dec 30, 2001 1:51am Subject: [dsg] Re: The noble nine fold path - Erik Dear Sarah I'm back home in Chiang Mai after a month in Mexico, and some time spent in Nepal and Laos, mostly promoting Buddhist Stupas in Asia: The Shape of Perfection, at your favorite bookstore now ... > How do you understand this phrase, Joe? Does it suggest any idea of self and > control and `should do' to you? Is this how you understand the Satipathana > Sutta? I'm not trying to be tricky, I am sincerely interested to hear more > about your considered understanding. I take it in Ven. Buddhadasa's Thai sense of phaasaa tham rather than phaasaa khon, that is the dhamma interpretation of 'we' rather than the conventional 'people' one. Just as when 'you' use 'I' or 'you' or 'we' in this discussion group. But I'm no authority, and ultimately the way I interpret it, or you interpret it, is going to be conditioned by what we've read elsewhere, what our teacher(s) have taught us, etc. Joe --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Sarah wrote: > Dear Joe, > > Great to hear you're still reading in after a long silence. Are you in Thailand > or in one of your other exotic locations right now? I hope the writing and > publishing is going well. > > --- lpjoe wrote: > Sarah & Erik > > > > I've been following your volley with interest, while reading some short > > works by Upasika Kee Nanayon (1902-1978), one of the most respected > > women dhamma teachers in Thailand. I was wondering if the following > > excerpts from Upasika's LOOKING INWARD: Observations on the Art of > > Meditation, bear on the discussion at all. > > Thanks for showing us this article. It starts with `we have to catch sight > of....' > > How do you understand this phrase, Joe? Does it suggest any idea of self and > control and `should do' to you? Is this how you understand the Satipathana > Sutta? I'm not trying to be tricky, I am sincerely interested to hear more > about your considered understanding. > > Btw, you have another chance to catch us and Erik `all in one' in Bkk over new > Year if you're around. Let me know off-list if so. > > Sarah > > > > THE PURE PRESENT > > > > We have to catch sight of the sensation of knowing when the mind > > gains knowledge of anything and yet isn't aware of itself, to see how > > it latches onto things -- physical form, feeling, perceptions, > > thought-formations, and consciousness. We have to probe on in and > > look > > on our own. We can't use the teachings we've memorized to catch > > sight > > of these things. That won't get us anywhere at all. We may remember, > > "The body is inconstant," but even though we can say it, we can't see > > it. > > > 10450 From: abhidhammika Date: Sun Dec 30, 2001 5:06am Subject: The White Radiant Mind Dear Dhamma Friends As some of you might remember, I posted Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) awhile ago. In response, Robert Epstein and Upasaka Howard posted reply messages that seem to support a kind of consciousness surviving in parinibbaana after the death of an Arahant. Both of them also cited an Anguttra statement of the Buddha containing the description of the mind as being luminous in support of their survivalist view. This citation has forced me to study Ekakanipaata of Anguttra Nikaaya, its commentary and subcommentary. I also began to translate relavant passages from the Suttam and its commentary. And then, as a manner of one thing leading to another, Robert Epstein, Nina and Kom have requested me to translate the subcommentary on the suttam statement as well. As a result, I now have translated the Buddha's suttam statement, the commentary and subcommentary on that statement. The following suttam statement and its commentary come from Section 49, Ekakanipaata Pali, Anguttaranikaaya and Anguttaranikaaya atthakathaa. In terms of grouping, the section 49 is the ninth statement in "Panihita-accha Vaggo" which contains ten statements. Panihitaaccha Vaggo menas "Establishment and Placidity Group." All statements except the statement eight describe specific mental events. The statement eight at Section 48, which describes the extreme speed of the mind, refers to every mental event. I mention the above facts in order to show that the same term `cittam' that appears in the statements of the Buddha does not necessarily refer to the same mental event. The statements nine and ten are unique among other statements in the group in that the two different types of mental events are described in contrast to one another within the same statement. Even though careful readers of the Pali suttam statements who ar familiar with the technical mind terms can spot those differences in the Buddha's use of the term `cittam', it is the responsibility of the commentators to spell out the specific mental events the Buddha referred to in his statements. I have copied and pasted the Pali passages of the Suttam and Atthakathaa from Chatthasangayana CD-ROM version 3. I made sure that the English translation closely follows the syntax of the original Pali while making sure that the general readers can read them in as natural English as possible. Students of Pali who read these translations can perform "Syntax Walkthrough" to improve their commentarial Pali. In addition, I also provided some notes on selected, often difficult, expressions for further convenience. I will post the Subcommentary translation on the Statement 49 separately very soon when I finish writing some notes on it. SUTTAM STATEMENT AND TRANSLATION 49. "Pabhassaramidam, Bhikkhave, cittam. Tañca kho aagantukehi upakkilesehi upakkilitthanti." "Monks, this mind is radiant. And, that very mind is tarnished by guest blots." COMMENTARY PALI 49. Navame pabhassaranti pandaram parisuddham. Cittanti bhavangacittam. Kim pana cittassa vanno naama atth²ti? Natthi. Niilaadiinañhi aññataravannam vaa hotu avannam vaa yamkiñci parisuddhataaya "pabhassaran"ti vuccati. Idampi nirupakkilesataaya parisuddhanti pabhassaram. Tañca khoti tam bhavangacittam. Aagantukehiiti asahajaatehi pacchaa javanakkhane uppajjanakehi. Upakkilesehiiti raagaadiihi upakkilitthattaa upakkilittham naamaati vuccati. Katham? Yathaa hi siilavantaa aacaarasampannaa maataapitaro vaa aacariyupajjhaayaa vaa dussiilaanam duraacaaraanam avattasampannaanam puttaanañceva antevaasikasaddhivihaarikaanañca vasena "attano putte vaa antevaasikasaddhivihaarike vaa na tajjenti na sikkhaapenti na ovadanti naanusaasantii"ti avannam akittim labhanti, evamsampadamidam veditabbam. Aacaara-sampannaa maataapitaro viya ca aacariyupajjhaayaa viya ca bhavangacittam datthabbam, puttaadiinam vasena tesam akittilaabho viya javanakkhane rajjanadussanamuyhanasa bhaavaanam lobhasahagataadiinam cittaanam vasena uppannehi aagantukehi upakkilesehi pakatiparisuddhampi bhavangacittam upakkilittham naama hotiiti. COMMENTARY TRANSLATION 49. In the ninth statement, the term `radiant' signifies whiteness or purity, and means complete cleanness. The term `mind' refers to the life-cause consciousness. How is there such a thing as the color of the mind? There isn't. Whatever thing, be it with any color such as brown, or be it colorless, is said to be radiant, due to its complete cleanness. This mind, too, is said to be radiant because it is completely clean due to the absence of blots. The phrase `and that very mind' means `that life-cause consciousness.' The phrase `by guest' refers to the asynchronous mental events happening later at the moments of the rapid repeats. The phrase `by blots' means "by the mental events with lust and so on." The Buddha said the scenario of being tarnished due to the mind being tarnished by things such as lust. How so? Like the virtuous and refined parents or teachers and preceptors, - on account of the immoral, unrefined, undutiful sons or insider pupils and live-in pupils, - indeed received condemnation and notoriety as those who do not threaten, train, instruct, and steer one's own sons or insider pupils and live-in pupils, so this example's completeness should be noted. The life-cause consciousness should be seen as the refined parents or as the refined teachers and preceptors. And, like their earning of notoriety by means of sons and so on, the naturally pure life-cause consciousness comes to be tarnished by guest blots happening, at the moments of the rapid repeats, as the mental events co-arising with greed and so on having the instincts of lust, destructiveness, or foolishness. NOTES Aagantukehi - by guests Asahajaatehi uppajjanakehi - the asynchronous mental events Asahajaatehi – not happening together Uppajjanaka – Literally, those that happen Javanakkhane – the moments of the rapid repeats. Javana literally means rapidity. In the context of a cognitive series called viitthi, rapidity refers to the seven rapid repeats of the similar mental events. From the angle of the life-cause consciousness, the Buddha described the rapid repetitions as guests. It is simply a scenario of bhavanga cittas versus javana cittas. Pakatiparisuddham bhavangacittam - the naturally pure life-cause consciousness. Bhavanga cittam is a shorthand name for the sensuous healthy resultant mind (Kaamaavacara kusala vipaaka cittam). Therefore, the natural purity of bhavanga cittam does not extend beyond the meanings of the terms "kusala" and "vipaaka." Furthermore, it is continually conditioned and challenged by javana cittas. With best wishes Suan Lu Zaw http://www.bodhiology.org 10451 From: Kenneth Ong Date: Sun Dec 30, 2001 6:28am Subject: Re: [dsg] The White Radiant Mind Hi Suan Thanks for the New Year Gift. :) Could I clarify this statement in the notes: "Bhavanga cittam is a shorthand name for the sensuous healthy resultant mind (Kaamaavacara kusala vipaaka cittam)." Does that mean that bhavanga cittam only arise with kusala vipaka citta and not for akusala vipaka citta. If it arise only with akusala vipaka citta, then the sense process which starts with 3 bhavanga citta will not be applicable to akusala vipaka citta process. This will then insubstantiate the 17 cittas process of aksuala ones. Another area with this sutta I like to address is that how do we explain kusala vipaka cittas that disturbed the mind. Does that imply that the disturbances causes by kusala citta on bhavanga citta will not affect the luminous nature of the mind and only considered being defiled by akusala cittas. Then how do we in the first instance explain there are three bhavanga cittas in any sense process of any series of cittas. Kind regards Ken O --- abhidhammika wrote: > > > > Dear Dhamma Friends > > As some of you might remember, I posted Parinibbana Subcommentary > (Part Two) awhile ago. In response, Robert Epstein and Upasaka Howard > posted reply messages that seem to support a kind of consciousness > surviving in parinibbaana after the death of an Arahant. Both of them > also cited an Anguttra statement of the Buddha containing the > description of the mind as being luminous in support of their > survivalist view. This citation has forced me to study Ekakanipaata > of Anguttra Nikaaya, its commentary and subcommentary. I also began > to translate relavant passages from the Suttam and its commentary. > And then, as a manner of one thing leading to another, Robert > Epstein, Nina and Kom have requested me to translate the > subcommentary on the suttam statement as well. As a result, I now > have translated the Buddha's suttam statement, the commentary and > subcommentary on that statement. > > The following suttam statement and its commentary come from Section > 49, Ekakanipaata Pali, Anguttaranikaaya and Anguttaranikaaya > atthakathaa. In terms of grouping, the section 49 is the ninth > statement in "Panihita-accha Vaggo" which contains ten statements. > Panihitaaccha Vaggo menas "Establishment and Placidity Group." All > statements except the statement eight describe specific mental > events. The statement eight at Section 48, which describes the > extreme speed of the mind, refers to every mental event. > > I mention the above facts in order to show that the same > term `cittam' that appears in the statements of the Buddha does not > necessarily refer to the same mental event. The statements nine and > ten are unique among other statements in the group in that the two > different types of mental events are described in contrast to one > another within the same statement. > > Even though careful readers of the Pali suttam statements who ar > familiar with the technical mind terms can spot those differences in > the Buddha's use of the term `cittam', it is the responsibility of > the commentators to spell out the specific mental events the Buddha > referred to in his statements. > > I have copied and pasted the Pali passages of the Suttam and > Atthakathaa from Chatthasangayana CD-ROM version 3. I made sure that > the English translation closely follows the syntax of the original > Pali while making sure that the general readers can read them in as > natural English as possible. Students of Pali who read these > translations can perform "Syntax Walkthrough" to improve their > commentarial Pali. In addition, I also provided some notes on > selected, often difficult, expressions for further convenience. > > I will post the Subcommentary translation on the Statement 49 > separately very soon when I finish writing some notes on it. > > > > SUTTAM STATEMENT AND TRANSLATION > > 49. "Pabhassaramidam, Bhikkhave, cittam. Tañca kho aagantukehi > upakkilesehi upakkilitthanti." > > "Monks, this mind is radiant. And, that very mind is tarnished by > guest blots." > > > COMMENTARY PALI > > 49. Navame pabhassaranti pandaram parisuddham. > Cittanti bhavangacittam. Kim pana cittassa vanno naama > atth²ti? Natthi. Niilaadiinañhi aññataravannam vaa > hotu > avannam vaa yamkiñci parisuddhataaya "pabhassaran"ti > vuccati. Idampi nirupakkilesataaya parisuddhanti > pabhassaram. Tañca khoti tam bhavangacittam. > > Aagantukehiiti asahajaatehi pacchaa javanakkhane > uppajjanakehi. Upakkilesehiiti raagaadiihi upakkilitthattaa > upakkilittham naamaati vuccati. > > Katham? Yathaa hi siilavantaa aacaarasampannaa maataapitaro vaa > aacariyupajjhaayaa vaa dussiilaanam duraacaaraanam > avattasampannaanam puttaanañceva antevaasikasaddhivihaarikaanañca > vasena "attano putte vaa antevaasikasaddhivihaarike vaa na > tajjenti na sikkhaapenti na ovadanti naanusaasantii"ti avannam > akittim labhanti, evamsampadamidam veditabbam. > > Aacaara-sampannaa maataapitaro viya ca aacariyupajjhaayaa > viya ca bhavangacittam datthabbam, puttaadiinam vasena tesam > akittilaabho viya javanakkhane rajjanadussanamuyhanasa > bhaavaanam lobhasahagataadiinam cittaanam vasena uppannehi > aagantukehi upakkilesehi pakatiparisuddhampi bhavangacittam > upakkilittham naama hotiiti. > > > > COMMENTARY TRANSLATION > > 49. In the ninth statement, the term `radiant' signifies whiteness or > purity, and means complete cleanness. The term `mind' refers to the > life-cause consciousness. How is there such a thing as the color of > the mind? There isn't. Whatever thing, be it with any color such as > brown, or be it colorless, is said to be radiant, due to its complete > cleanness. This mind, too, is said to be radiant because it is > completely clean due to the absence of blots. The phrase `and that > very mind' means `that life-cause consciousness.' > > The phrase `by guest' refers to the asynchronous mental events > happening later at the moments of the rapid repeats. The phrase `by > blots' means "by the mental events with lust and so on." The Buddha > said the scenario of being tarnished due to the mind being tarnished > by things such as lust. > > How so? Like the virtuous and refined parents or teachers and > preceptors, - on account of the immoral, unrefined, undutiful sons or > insider pupils and live-in pupils, - indeed received condemnation and > notoriety as those who do not threaten, train, instruct, and steer > one's own sons or insider pupils and live-in pupils, so this > example's completeness should be noted. > > The life-cause consciousness should be seen as the refined parents or > as the refined teachers and preceptors. And, like their earning of > notoriety by means of sons and so on, the naturally pure life-cause > consciousness comes to be tarnished by guest blots happening, at the > moments of the rapid repeats, as the mental events co-arising with > greed and so on having the instincts of lust, destructiveness, or > foolishness. > > > NOTES > > Aagantukehi - by guests > > Asahajaatehi uppajjanakehi - the asynchronous mental events > > Asahajaatehi – not happening together > > Uppajjanaka – Literally, those that happen > > Javanakkhane – the moments of the rapid repeats. Javana literally > means rapidity. In the context of a cognitive series called viitthi, > rapidity refers to the seven rapid repeats of the similar mental > events. > > From the angle of the life-cause consciousness, the Buddha described > the rapid repetitions as guests. It is simply a scenario of bhavanga > cittas versus javana cittas. > > Pakatiparisuddham bhavangacittam - the naturally pure life-cause > consciousness. Bhavanga cittam is a shorthand name for the sensuous > healthy resultant mind (Kaamaavacara kusala vipaaka cittam). > Therefore, the natural purity of bhavanga cittam does not extend > beyond the meanings of the terms "kusala" and "vipaaka." Furthermore, > it is continually conditioned and challenged by javana cittas. > > > With best wishes > > Suan Lu Zaw > > http://www.bodhiology.org 10452 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Sun Dec 30, 2001 6:43am Subject: Re: [dsg] abhidhamma Dear Num, I read what you said about applying your knowledge of the abhidhamma (saññaa) in your profession, and I always find it interesting when you speak about your experiences as a doctor. The Abhidhamma helps you to understand your patients better, for example the study of conditions, upanissaya paccaya. What would your life be without the Abhidhamma? You can guess now what I am about to say. You said Abhidhamma is like a dry bone. Lodewijk said, tell him it is like the flesh and sinews of our life. I agree that a Book like the Kathavatthu, Points of Controversy. is difficult reading. We do not have to study all details, it depends on the individual what he studies. In the Kathavatthu a question is asked in one way and then it is affirmed, and after that the same question is asked in another way and then it is refuted. It teaches us more precision. I find the "Guide through the Abhidhamma Pitaka" by Nyanatiloka, B.P.S. Kandy, very helpful to gradually get used to reading difficult passages, especially the Kathavatthu. For instance, Ch II, may someone by just repeating the word dukkha attain enlightenment. But this really happens, people are repeating words without understanding. Ch I: Is there in the absolute sense any personality to be found? These are questions people today also ask. Take the second Book of the Abhidhamma, the Vibhanga, Book of Analysis. The P.T.S. has edited this with a most helpful Intro by Iggleden. Here we see that also in the Abhidhamma there is Suttanta Method and Abhidhamma method. We should not separate these methods so much. In this book there are very vivid reminders of good and bad qualities occurring in daily life. Take conceit, that I quoted in my Cetasikas: ...pride of health, pride of youth, pride of life, pride of gain, pride of being honoured, pride of being respected, pride of prominence, pride of having adherence, pride of wealth, pride of appearance, pride of erudition, pride of intelligence, pride of being a knowledgeable authority.... This is not a list just to be remembered, or to debate about. It is a reminder to be aware when such forms of conceit occur, and they occur all the time, very treacherous. Only through satipatthana can we fully appreciate the great value of the Abhidhamma. As I said, not everybody has to study all details, but understanding of the basic notions helps us to have more precision with regard to realities. It is important to know that there are four paramattha dhammas, that our life consists of citta, cetasika and rupa. If there is no basic knowledge one is hopelessly confused about the different realities that occur, one is confused about what is a concept and what a reality. But I am sure that you know all this. Best wishes, Nina. 10453 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Sun Dec 30, 2001 6:43am Subject: grandma Dear Purnomo,, I sympatheze with you because of your loss and sadness. There were very kind messages for you written with kusala cittas. I want to repost Num's message because it is so helpful and comforting: > I do not know where your grandma has gone. As it said, good seed will bring > good fruit; I wish her good seeds took her into a good place. > > As couple people here have already said, if you can, try to turn this > opportunity into learning experience. Our loss is our gain. Dhamma (both good > and bad, pleasant and painful, tranquil and agitated) here and now, is our > best teacher. > This is my magic, OK: Grief when shared is half. Happiness when shared is > double. > May the force always be with you. Nina: >Num gave us such good points: the learning experience, our loss is our gain. This can help all of us when we have a loss, and this is bound to happen for us too, anyway. You feel sad and although you know this is akusala, dosa, you can't help feeling sad. We all have that experience. But it shows how anatta it is. It is conditioned by former dosa that has been accumulated for a long time and thus there are conditions for it. Only the anagami who has attained the third stage of enlightenment has no sadness anymore, he has eradicated dosa. In India we extended merit to deceased people after our Dhamma talks. If they are in planes where they can know about our kusala they can rejoice in it and have kusala citta as well. This is a way of dana, dana is not only the giving of things to others. Now that I am alone in Holland I neglect this way of dana, but I shall try to remember this. Kom is a good example, he mentioned this. This is the way to give help to the person who was once your grandmother. If we worry about what happened to her, in what plane she is, it is only thinking, thinking with akusala. This does not help her. Dhamma here and now is our best teacher, what would your life be without the Dhamma. You understand now the difference between reality and concept. Your grandma is in reality five khandhas, nama and rupa, arising and falling away. She is no longer your grandma, but there is a new life, there are still the five khandhas arising and falling away. Her kindness and good qualities that arose in this life have been accumulated and form conditions for the arising again of kusala in the future. A friend of mine is worried about his next rebirth, of all the akusala kamma that could produce it. This is again thinking about what is not real. The person who has eradicated the belief in a self is no longer worried about what would happen to a "self" after death. But if we think about it that even akusala kamma many lives ago can produce rebirth it helps us to see the disadvantage of being in the cycle of birth and death. It reminds us to develop right understanding. Robert K. wrote a post about mindfulness of death. It is a subject of samatha we can practise any time in daily life. He spoke about it that life is so fragile, because in fact there is death at each moment when one citta arises and passes away, to be followed by the next one that arises and passes away. This is called momentary death. At the end of life the same happens: the dying-consciousness falls away and is immediately succeeded by the rebirth-consciousness. Robert wrote: "It is a good time now: we are human and have contact with the teaching of a Sammasambuddha. Much can be done indeed." Your study of the Dhamma is kusala and you can extend merit to your grandma. Death can remind us not to waste time. Best wishes, Nina. 10454 From: Kom Tukovinit Date: Sun Dec 30, 2001 7:34am Subject: RE: [dsg] chatting about India Dear Nina, > -----Original Message----- > > > > K. Jaran and A. Supi was discussing about > Kilesa, and why > > only 10 akusala cetasikas are kilesas, and the > other 4 are > > not. The answer, I think you also wrote in > Cetasikas, is > > each Kilesa defiles the mind, where as the > other four defile > > the mental factors. At that point, I was asking him > > questions about the other groupings of > defilements including > > Asava, etc. > > Dear Kom, thank you for bringing up these points. > As to the 10 kilesas, I > leant that they defile the dhammas that are > conascent with them. Thus, in > the case of sloth that is listed but not torpor: > when there is sloth, torpor > is always conascent with it, it is defiled by it. > Regret (not listed as > kilesa) is defiled by dosa conascent with it and > also by the other kilesas > which (not all of them) are conascent with it. Thanks for explaining these points further. I would like to confirm what I understand you to say. 1) Torpor is defiled by sloth and other conascent kilesas? 2) Regret is defiled by kilesa and other conasccent kilesas? Thanks for discussing these points. kom 10455 From: m. nease Date: Sun Dec 30, 2001 3:12pm Subject: Sa~n~naa Just a follow-up from our brief (off-list) discussion on sa~n~naa yesterday. By the way, my internet access has been somewhat curtailed for the forseeable future. I'll receive a daily digest and respond when I'm able. 3. Remembrance or perception, sa~n~naa cetasika, "marks" the object so that it can be recognized. Sa~n~naa cetasika remembers each object which appears; it remembers the different objects appearing one after the other as a "whole", as a story, a concept of beings and people. Sa~n~naa remembers pleasant feeling, unpleasant feeling, bodily pleasant and painful feeling and indifferent feeling with regard to each object which appears. Sa~n~naa cetasika is an important condition inciting to attachment and clinging in life. from Survey of Paramattha Dhammas Sujin Boriharnwanaket Translated by Nina van Gorkom mike 10456 From: m. nease Date: Sun Dec 30, 2001 3:41pm Subject: Re: [dsg] The White Radiant Mind Dear Suan, Thanks for taking the time for this excellent work. Your conclusions concur with those arrived at yesterday in Bangkok after consulting the Thai translations of the sutta and commentaries (as I understood them). Even though topic itself, the purity of citta of bhavanga (and kusala and vipakka) citta and their defilement by 'guest blots' (I loved this) in the process of akusala javana (if I've understood this correctly) seems to me to be a minor point, it is of major significance if the sutta quoted has been misunderstood to support the Mahayana notion of cosmic consciousness without base or object. There are so few cases in the Tipitaka of suttas that can be misinterpreted in this way that, in my opinion, a detailed clarification is of really great value. Thanks again for your hard work. mike --- abhidhammika wrote: > > > > Dear Dhamma Friends > > As some of you might remember, I posted Parinibbana > Subcommentary > (Part Two) awhile ago. In response, Robert Epstein > and Upasaka Howard > posted reply messages that seem to support a kind of > consciousness > surviving in parinibbaana after the death of an > Arahant. Both of them > also cited an Anguttra statement of the Buddha > containing the > description of the mind as being luminous in support > of their > survivalist view. This citation has forced me to > study Ekakanipaata > of Anguttra Nikaaya, its commentary and > subcommentary. I also began > to translate relavant passages from the Suttam and > its commentary. > And then, as a manner of one thing leading to > another, Robert > Epstein, Nina and Kom have requested me to translate > the > subcommentary on the suttam statement as well. As a > result, I now > have translated the Buddha's suttam statement, the > commentary and > subcommentary on that statement. > > The following suttam statement and its commentary > come from Section > 49, Ekakanipaata Pali, Anguttaranikaaya and > Anguttaranikaaya > atthakathaa. In terms of grouping, the section 49 is > the ninth > statement in "Panihita-accha Vaggo" which contains > ten statements. > Panihitaaccha Vaggo menas "Establishment and > Placidity Group." All > statements except the statement eight describe > specific mental > events. The statement eight at Section 48, which > describes the > extreme speed of the mind, refers to every mental > event. > > I mention the above facts in order to show that the > same > term `cittam' that appears in the statements of the > Buddha does not > necessarily refer to the same mental event. The > statements nine and > ten are unique among other statements in the group > in that the two > different types of mental events are described in > contrast to one > another within the same statement. > > Even though careful readers of the Pali suttam > statements who ar > familiar with the technical mind terms can spot > those differences in > the Buddha's use of the term `cittam', it is the > responsibility of > the commentators to spell out the specific mental > events the Buddha > referred to in his statements. > > I have copied and pasted the Pali passages of the > Suttam and > Atthakathaa from Chatthasangayana CD-ROM version 3. > I made sure that > the English translation closely follows the syntax > of the original > Pali while making sure that the general readers can > read them in as > natural English as possible. Students of Pali who > read these > translations can perform "Syntax Walkthrough" to > improve their > commentarial Pali. In addition, I also provided some > notes on > selected, often difficult, expressions for further > convenience. > > I will post the Subcommentary translation on the > Statement 49 > separately very soon when I finish writing some > notes on it. > > > > SUTTAM STATEMENT AND TRANSLATION > > 49. "Pabhassaramidam, Bhikkhave, cittam. Tañca kho > aagantukehi > upakkilesehi upakkilitthanti." > > "Monks, this mind is radiant. And, that very mind is > tarnished by > guest blots." > > > COMMENTARY PALI > > 49. Navame pabhassaranti pandaram > parisuddham. > Cittanti bhavangacittam. Kim pana cittassa > vanno naama > atth²ti? Natthi. Niilaadiinañhi > aññataravannam vaa > hotu > avannam vaa yamkiñci parisuddhataaya > "pabhassaran"ti > vuccati. Idampi nirupakkilesataaya > parisuddhanti > pabhassaram. Tañca khoti tam bhavangacittam. > > Aagantukehiiti asahajaatehi pacchaa javanakkhane > > uppajjanakehi. Upakkilesehiiti raagaadiihi > upakkilitthattaa > upakkilittham naamaati vuccati. > > Katham? Yathaa hi siilavantaa aacaarasampannaa > maataapitaro vaa > aacariyupajjhaayaa vaa dussiilaanam > duraacaaraanam > avattasampannaanam puttaanañceva > antevaasikasaddhivihaarikaanañca > vasena "attano putte vaa > antevaasikasaddhivihaarike vaa na > tajjenti na sikkhaapenti na ovadanti > naanusaasantii"ti avannam > akittim labhanti, evamsampadamidam veditabbam. > > Aacaara-sampannaa maataapitaro viya ca > aacariyupajjhaayaa > viya ca bhavangacittam datthabbam, puttaadiinam > vasena tesam > akittilaabho viya javanakkhane > rajjanadussanamuyhanasa > bhaavaanam lobhasahagataadiinam cittaanam vasena > uppannehi > aagantukehi upakkilesehi pakatiparisuddhampi > bhavangacittam > upakkilittham naama hotiiti. > > > > COMMENTARY TRANSLATION > > 49. In the ninth statement, the term `radiant' > signifies whiteness or > purity, and means complete cleanness. The term > `mind' refers to the > life-cause consciousness. How is there such a thing > as the color of > the mind? There isn't. Whatever thing, be it with > any color such as > brown, or be it colorless, is said to be radiant, > due to its complete > cleanness. This mind, too, is said to be radiant > because it is > completely clean due to the absence of blots. The > phrase `and that > very mind' means `that life-cause consciousness.' > > The phrase `by guest' refers to the asynchronous > mental events > happening later at the moments of the rapid repeats. > The phrase `by > blots' means "by the mental events with lust and so > on." The Buddha > said the scenario of being tarnished due to the mind > being tarnished > by things such as lust. > > How so? Like the virtuous and refined parents or > teachers and > preceptors, - on account of the immoral, unrefined, > undutiful sons or > insider pupils and live-in pupils, - indeed received > condemnation and > notoriety as those who do not threaten, train, > instruct, and steer > one's own sons or insider pupils and live-in pupils, > so this > example's completeness should be noted. > > The life-cause consciousness should be seen as the > refined parents or > as the refined teachers and preceptors. And, like > their earning of > notoriety by means of sons and so on, the naturally > pure life-cause > consciousness comes to be tarnished by guest blots > happening, at the > moments of the rapid repeats, as the mental events > co-arising with > greed and so on having the instincts of lust, > destructiveness, or > foolishness. > > > NOTES > > Aagantukehi - by guests > > Asahajaatehi uppajjanakehi - the asynchronous mental > events > > Asahajaatehi – not happening together > > Uppajjanaka – Literally, those that happen > > Javanakkhane – the moments of the rapid repeats. > Javana literally > means rapidity. In the context of a cognitive series > called viitthi, > rapidity refers to the seven rapid repeats of the > similar mental > events. > > From the angle of the life-cause consciousness, the > Buddha described > the rapid repetitions as guests. It is simply a > scenario of bhavanga > cittas versus javana cittas. > > Pakatiparisuddham bhavangacittam - the naturally > pure life-cause > consciousness. Bhavanga cittam is a shorthand name > for the sensuous > healthy resultant mind (Kaamaavacara kusala vipaaka > cittam). > Therefore, the natural purity of bhavanga cittam > does not extend > beyond the meanings of the terms "kusala" and > "vipaaka." Furthermore, > it is continually conditioned and challenged by > javana cittas. > > > With best wishes > > Suan Lu Zaw > > http://www.bodhiology.org 10457 From: m. nease Date: Sun Dec 30, 2001 3:54pm Subject: Re: [dsg] The White Radiant Mind Happy New Year, Kenneth, Hope you don't mind my attempting to respond to this. --- Kenneth Ong wrote: > "Bhavanga cittam is a shorthand name for the > sensuous > healthy resultant mind (Kaamaavacara kusala vipaaka > cittam)." > > Does that mean that bhavanga cittam only arise with > kusala vipaka citta > and not for akusala vipaka citta. In human beings, the aarammana of bhavanga is always a pleasant object, as I understand it--the same object as that of the patisandhi citta, the rebirth consciousness--otherwise, no rebirth in manussa bhumi--so, yes, always kusala vipaaka citta. > If it arise only > with akusala vipaka [you meant kusala vipaaka?] > citta, then the sense process which starts with 3 > bhavanga citta will not > be applicable to akusala vipaka citta process. > This > will then > insubstantiate the 17 cittas process of aksuala > ones. The three bhavangas precede the sense-door process but are not a part of it--not vithi cittas. They are the same whether the precede a process of akusala or kusala (usually akusala, of course), as I understand it. > Another area with this sutta I like to address is > that how do we explain > kusala vipaka cittas that disturbed the mind. Does > that imply that the > disturbances causes by kusala citta on bhavanga > citta will not affect the > luminous nature of the mind and only considered > being defiled by akusala > cittas. As I understand it, yes--the kusala citta is still considered luminous, pure (and the vipaaka, as I understand it). > Then how do we in the first instance > explain there are three > bhavanga cittas in any sense process of any series > of cittas. They are not a part of the process--they precede it but are not vithi-citta. Hope I got this right and that it's of some use to you... mike 10458 From: m. nease Date: Sun Dec 30, 2001 3:57pm Subject: Re: [dsg] abhidhamma Thanks for the excellent post, Nina-- > If there is no > basic knowledge one is > hopelessly confused about the different realities > that occur, one is > confused about what is a concept and what a reality. -and thanks for helping me to see this. mike 10459 From: Date: Sun Dec 30, 2001 11:56am Subject: Re: [dsg] The White Radiant Mind <<<<< 49. In the ninth statement, the term `radiant' signifies whiteness or purity, and means complete cleanness. The term `mind' refers to the life-cause consciousness..' >>>>>> Dear Suan: Let me introduce myself. My name is Num. My Pali is at infancy level. I looked up in my Thai Tipitaka CD, which also has a Pali counterpart, both in Thai and Roman Pali. As I mentioned before the CD does not contain any commentaries. From my CD, as you mentioned the beginning of book 20th, suttanpitaka, aguttaranikaya started with danger of visible object, taste, odor and tangible object. Then in the 2nd vagga with pairs of opposite dhamma lust/asupa, anger/metta, sloth/energy, agitation/calmness, doubt/wise attention. In the 3rd vagga mentioned about quality and potentiality of the mind. The word "papasara" appears in 4 statements, 50-51-52and 53. I do not feel this refers to just bhavagacitta, at all. My understanding after I read the sutta, is the mind becomes defiled by upakilesa. So my understanding is all citta that accompanied by kilesa are not "papasara", not clear, not radiant, and not clean. The mind in itself is clear but the accompanied quality or states though can make the mind unclean. My understanding akusala cetasika is the one who makes the mind unclean. My 2 cents opinion after I read the sutta is citta by itself is clear but the quality of citta can be contaminated by kilesa. So all kusala citta are clear, I think vipaka and kiriya citta may also be able to fit in here. I do not feel it refers to only bhavagacitta. Just like to share my opinion. Thanks and appreciate in your hard work. Num 10460 From: yuzhonghao Date: Sun Dec 30, 2001 5:05pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts) Hello Jon, The truths taught by the Buddha are to be understood and not to be misunderstood as they are. Regards, Victor --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Jonothan Abbott wrote: > Victor > > --- yuzhonghao wrote: > Hello Jon, > > > > It is good that you understand that: > > Conditioned phenomenon is impermanent. > > Conditioned phenomenon is unsatisfactory/dukkha. > > Conditioned phenomenon is to be seen as it actually is with right > > discernment thus: "This is not mine. This I am not. This is not my > > self." > > Flattery will get you nowhere!! I am much more interested in hearing what > you have to say about how the truths taught by the Buddha are to be > understood. > > Please share your thoughts with us, Victor. No need to be afraid -- we > are a friendly lot here! > > Jon > > > > > While I understand the meaning of what you are saying, there is > > surely > > > more to it than this. Did the Buddha give any clues as to *how this > > > understanding is to be developed*? Otherwise, one is just > > repeating the > > > words of the suttas. 10461 From: yuzhonghao Date: Sun Dec 30, 2001 5:18pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Concept Hello all, I have a question regarding the discussion on concept: How does a concept come to be? Regards, Victor 10462 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Sun Dec 30, 2001 8:43pm Subject: Re: [dsg] grandma Purnomo I was very sorry to hear of the loss of your grandmother. What is the best way to help a departed relative? I believe the answer to this, like to most questions, is to develop kusala and in particular the understanding that we learn about from studying the dhamma. Kusala accrues to the benefit of oneself and others. If your grandma is in a realm where she can perceive your deeds, she may be able to benefit directly from appreciating your wholesome deeds. My condolences to you and your family. Jon --- "Purnomo ." wrote: > Dear all, > > october 26, 2001, it's nightmare for me. Tomorrow, I should be happy > because > I have finished my study. Unfortunely, My grandma was died. > > December 24, 2001: My family and I called my 'grandma'. According my > culture, 'soul' my grandma was called. I confused and not believe but > this > is true. I saw that 'grandma' appeared in someone(she who called my > grandma). This someone acted if as that was my grandma. > > Grandma said that she was there so sad. She always cried. I so sad what > she > said. I know, my grandma have been born in niraya realm. I know I have > to > 'pindapatta' to help my grandma. > > Please, give me some messages which can help my grandma so she will be > born > in happier realm. > > nice, > > purnomo > 10463 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Sun Dec 30, 2001 8:55pm Subject: Hello from Bangkok Hi all, Just to touch base. Sarah and I have just had a very pleasant 'dsg' brunch at our hotel with Ivan, Sukin (and his charming wife), Jaran, Mike and Christine. Unfortunately, Erik was suffering from pre-New Years hangover and failed to make it, but he assures us he and Aert will be at the discussion this afternoon. We have enjoyed meeting Mike and Christine for the first time, and also the discussions at the Foundation yesterday and on Saturday. We have managed to touch on a number of current topics (luminous mind among them), and hope to be able to post about it when back in Hong Kong (we leave BAngkok tomorrow, Tuesday). New Year wishes to all. Jon PS Nina, i'm still working on the 3 rounds and 4NT 10464 From: robertkirkpatrick.rm Date: Sun Dec 30, 2001 11:23pm Subject: Re: [dsg] abhidhamma --- Thanks for all your helpful posts recently Mike, Here is something from a book I'm now looking at. The Udanaatthakatha (trans. masefield p.878) Blind from birth chapter: "since they do not know Dhamma, they do not know that which is not Dhamma either. For these, on account of pervesenesses, take dhamma though skilled as unskilled, take dhamma though unskilled as skilled. And not only are they confused where dhamma and what is not dhamma are concerened, but also the ripening thereof are concerned..Similarly, they neither know dhamma to be a thing having an owm nature (sabhava), nor do they know that which is not dhamma to be a thing lacking an own nature.(Dhammam sabhavadhammam..adhammam asabhavadhammam) And as such they declare a thing having an own nature as though it were a thing lacking an own nature.... robert In dhammastudygroup@y..., "m. nease" wrote: > Thanks for the excellent post, Nina-- > > > If there is no > > basic knowledge one is > > hopelessly confused about the different realities > > that occur, one is > > confused about what is a concept and what a reality. > > -and thanks for helping me to see this. > > mike > 10465 From: Robert Epstein Date: Sun Dec 30, 2001 11:42pm Subject: Re: [dsg] The White Radiant Mind Dear Suan, Thank you so much for the translation! I am quite excited, especially after taking a first look... I will only make two preliminary comments tonight, and will then study further. Thanks again! comments below: --- abhidhammika wrote: > > Dear Dhamma Friends > > As some of you might remember, I posted Parinibbana Subcommentary > (Part Two) awhile ago. In response, Robert Epstein and Upasaka Howard > posted reply messages that seem to support a kind of consciousness > surviving in parinibbaana after the death of an Arahant. Both of them > also cited an Anguttra statement of the Buddha containing the > description of the mind as being luminous in support of their > survivalist view. Just want to mention, in my own defense, that the idea that there may be some form of awareness in parinibbana is not *necessarily* a survivalist view. If by survivalist, you mean that an entity or identifiable being remains, as would be dependent on one or more of the five kandhas, then this is not what I have in mind. The awareness which I have in mind would be undifferentiated, unformed and unindividuated. While one can argue that even such a primordial, unformative awareness is a violation of one's reading of the definition of parinibbana, I don't think you can as easily accuse it of constituting an *entity* which survives the extinction of the kandhas. In both my view, and I believe Howard's, if there is any awareness that survives extinction of the kandhas, it would in fact *not* be an entity or being of any kind. What it would be has been discussed to some extent, but I will not go into it now. You are right, Suan, however, that to me the implication is that the 'luminous mind' suggests the possibility of this primordial pre-existent awareness which is then defiled by the concept of separate self-hood or entity, as well as other delusions which fetter it and cause suffering. [snip] > SUTTAM STATEMENT AND TRANSLATION > > 49. "Pabhassaramidam, Bhikkhave, cittam. Tañca kho aagantukehi > upakkilesehi upakkilitthanti." > > "Monks, this mind is radiant. And, that very mind is tarnished by > guest blots." This translation is quite revelatory on its face, and should cause everyone who has been interested in this sutta to pause and take a deep breath. According to your translation, Suan, the phrase 'that very mind' implies that the same citta that is radiant is the one that is tarnished by blots or defilements that don't belong there [my interpretation of 'guest' if that is a correct interpretation]. I understand that this is not the interpretation of the commentaries, but just taking the Sutta on its own for a moment, it seems that the 'guest' status of the 'blots' suggests that it is not the natural state of the citta to be thus blotted or defiled. It is hard for me to see how the commentary's interpretation makes use of the fact that the phrase 'that very mind' seems to especially emphasize the fact that Buddha is referring to one and the same mind, not two different ones. It doesn't seem on the face of it that such a statement would refer to the complex relationship of the bhavanga cittas being indirectly defiled by the javana cittas that arise at a different time. The statement appears to be much more simple than this, but I am very much looking forward to your subcommentary. I don't know if you plan to translate the full stanza of the original sutta, but if it were possible it would be great to see the whole verse. In any case, I thank you for this effort, which is already quite provocative. Best, Robert Ep. =========== 10466 From: wynn Date: Mon Dec 31, 2001 5:06am Subject: Contradiction (Views) Hi, The Buddha talk about Right View (samma ditthi). However, in Sutta Nipata verse 787, 800, 882, the Buddha said or (more impersonally) the true sage, has no views. How do you explain this contradiction? Thanks, Wynn 10467 From: abhidhammika Date: Mon Dec 31, 2001 6:51am Subject: Re: [dsg] The White Radiant Mind: To Ken Dear Ken How are you? Happy New Year! This is only a very brief answer. You asked: "Does that mean that bhavanga cittam only arise with kusala vipaka citta and not for akusala vipaka citta." The correct question is "Is bhavanga cittam the same as kaamavacara kusala vipaaka cittam in the present contect?" The answer is as follows. Yes, for human beings and sensuous gods (kaamaavacara devas), bhavanga cittam is always kaamaavacara kusala vipaaka cittam. That is why bhavanga cittam is described as being white or pure. With Best wishes, Suan http://www.bodhiology.org --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Kenneth Ong wrote: > Hi Suan > > Thanks for the New Year Gift. :) > > Could I clarify this statement in the notes: > > "Bhavanga cittam is a shorthand name for the sensuous > healthy resultant mind (Kaamaavacara kusala vipaaka cittam)." > > Does that mean that bhavanga cittam only arise with kusala vipaka citta > and not for akusala vipaka citta. If it arise only with akusala vipaka > citta, then the sense process which starts with 3 bhavanga citta will not > be applicable to akusala vipaka citta process. This will then > insubstantiate the 17 cittas process of aksuala ones. > > Another area with this sutta I like to address is that how do we explain > kusala vipaka cittas that disturbed the mind. Does that imply that the > disturbances causes by kusala citta on bhavanga citta will not affect the > luminous nature of the mind and only considered being defiled by akusala > cittas. Then how do we in the first instance explain there are three > bhavanga cittas in any sense process of any series of cittas. > > > > Kind regards > Ken O > 10468 From: abhidhammika Date: Mon Dec 31, 2001 7:21am Subject: Re: [dsg] The White Radiant Mind: To Mike And Ken Dear Mike (and Ken) How are you? Happy New Year! Thank you for completing my answer to Ken. Hi, Ken, what Mike wrote is corret. He has saved me from providing further details to your questions at this stage. With Best Wishes, Suan --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "m. nease" wrote: > Happy New Year, Kenneth, > > Hope you don't mind my attempting to respond to this. > > --- Kenneth Ong wrote: > > > "Bhavanga cittam is a shorthand name for the > > sensuous > > healthy resultant mind (Kaamaavacara kusala vipaaka > > cittam)." > > > > Does that mean that bhavanga cittam only arise with > > kusala vipaka citta > > and not for akusala vipaka citta. > > In human beings, the aarammana of bhavanga is always a > pleasant object, as I understand it--the same object > as that of the patisandhi citta, the rebirth > consciousness--otherwise, no rebirth in manussa > bhumi--so, yes, always kusala vipaaka citta. > > > If it arise only > > with akusala vipaka [you meant kusala vipaaka?] > > citta, then the sense process which starts with 3 > > bhavanga citta will not > > be applicable to akusala vipaka citta process. > > This > > will then > > insubstantiate the 17 cittas process of aksuala > > ones. > > The three bhavangas precede the sense-door process but > are not a part of it--not vithi cittas. They are the > same whether the precede a process of akusala or > kusala (usually akusala, of course), as I understand > it. > > > Another area with this sutta I like to address is > > that how do we explain > > kusala vipaka cittas that disturbed the mind. Does > > that imply that the > > disturbances causes by kusala citta on bhavanga > > citta will not affect the > > luminous nature of the mind and only considered > > being defiled by akusala > > cittas. > > As I understand it, yes--the kusala citta is still > considered luminous, pure (and the vipaaka, as I > understand it). > > > Then how do we in the first instance > > explain there are three > > bhavanga cittas in any sense process of any series > > of cittas. > > They are not a part of the process--they precede it > but are not vithi-citta. > > Hope I got this right and that it's of some use to > you... > > mike > 10469 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Mon Dec 31, 2001 7:49am Subject: Re: [dsg] Luminous Mind > >> >> >> SUTTAM STATEMENT AND TRANSLATION >> >> 49. "Pabhassaramidam, Bhikkhave, cittam. Tañca kho aagantukehi >> upakkilesehi upakkilitthanti." >> >> "Monks, this mind is radiant. And, that very mind is tarnished by >> guest blots." >> >> >> COMMENTARY PALI >> >> 49. Navame pabhassaranti pandaram parisuddham. >> Cittanti bhavangacittam. Kim pana cittassa vanno naama >> atth²ti? Natthi. Niilaadiinañhi aññataravannam vaa >> hotu >> avannam vaa yamkiñci parisuddhataaya "pabhassaran"ti >> vuccati. Idampi nirupakkilesataaya parisuddhanti >> pabhassaram. Tañca khoti tam bhavangacittam. >> >> Aagantukehiiti asahajaatehi pacchaa javanakkhane >> uppajjanakehi. Upakkilesehiiti raagaadiihi upakkilitthattaa >> upakkilittham naamaati vuccati. >> >> Katham? Yathaa hi siilavantaa aacaarasampannaa maataapitaro vaa >> aacariyupajjhaayaa vaa dussiilaanam duraacaaraanam >> avattasampannaanam puttaanañceva antevaasikasaddhivihaarikaanañca >> vasena "attano putte vaa antevaasikasaddhivihaarike vaa na >> tajjenti na sikkhaapenti na ovadanti naanusaasantii"ti avannam >> akittim labhanti, evamsampadamidam veditabbam. >> >> Aacaara-sampannaa maataapitaro viya ca aacariyupajjhaayaa >> viya ca bhavangacittam datthabbam, puttaadiinam vasena tesam >> akittilaabho viya javanakkhane rajjanadussanamuyhanasa >> bhaavaanam lobhasahagataadiinam cittaanam vasena uppannehi >> aagantukehi upakkilesehi pakatiparisuddhampi bhavangacittam >> upakkilittham naama hotiiti. >> >> >> >> COMMENTARY TRANSLATION >> >> 49. In the ninth statement, the term `radiant' signifies whiteness or >> purity, and means complete cleanness. The term `mind' refers to the >> life-cause consciousness. How is there such a thing as the color of >> the mind? There isn't. Whatever thing, be it with any color such as >> brown, or be it colorless, is said to be radiant, due to its complete >> cleanness. This mind, too, is said to be radiant because it is >> completely clean due to the absence of blots. The phrase `and that >> very mind' means `that life-cause consciousness.' >> >> The phrase `by guest' refers to the asynchronous mental events >> happening later at the moments of the rapid repeats. The phrase `by >> blots' means "by the mental events with lust and so on." The Buddha >> said the scenario of being tarnished due to the mind being tarnished >> by things such as lust. >> >> How so? Like the virtuous and refined parents or teachers and >> preceptors, - on account of the immoral, unrefined, undutiful sons or >> insider pupils and live-in pupils, - indeed received condemnation and >> notoriety as those who do not threaten, train, instruct, and steer >> one's own sons or insider pupils and live-in pupils, so this >> example's completeness should be noted. >> >> The life-cause consciousness should be seen as the refined parents or >> as the refined teachers and preceptors. And, like their earning of >> notoriety by means of sons and so on, the naturally pure life-cause >> consciousness comes to be tarnished by guest blots happening, at the >> moments of the rapid repeats, as the mental events co-arising with >> greed and so on having the instincts of lust, destructiveness, or >> foolishness. >> >> >> NOTES >> >> Aagantukehi - by guests >> >> Asahajaatehi uppajjanakehi - the asynchronous mental events >> >> Asahajaatehi – not happening together >> >> Uppajjanaka – Literally, those that happen >> >> Javanakkhane – the moments of the rapid repeats. Javana literally >> means rapidity. In the context of a cognitive series called viitthi, >> rapidity refers to the seven rapid repeats of the similar mental >> events. >> >> From the angle of the life-cause consciousness, the Buddha described >> the rapid repetitions as guests. It is simply a scenario of bhavanga >> cittas versus javana cittas. >> >> Pakatiparisuddham bhavangacittam - the naturally pure life-cause >> consciousness. Bhavanga cittam is a shorthand name for the sensuous >> healthy resultant mind (Kaamaavacara kusala vipaaka cittam). >> Therefore, the natural purity of bhavanga cittam does not extend >> beyond the meanings of the terms "kusala" and "vipaaka." Furthermore, >> it is continually conditioned and challenged by javana cittas. >> >Dear Suan, thank you very much for your translation and remarks. The last sentence is indeed challenging. May I try with an example? Angulimaala was born with three wholesome roots: alobha, adosa and pa~n~naa. Also all his bhavangacittas were accompanied by these three. Bhavangacittas are vipaka, produced by kamma. Bhavangacitta arises and then falls away completely. But when there is a condition for its arising, in deep sleep or between processes, kamma produces bhavangacitta, always the same type type, throughout life. That type cannot change. That citta is just vipaka, passive, it cannot act in a kusala or akusala way. The fact that it is accompanied by pa~n~naa (but pa~n~naa is vipaka in this case) shows us that he was born with a capability to develop during his life right understanding, even to the degree of enlightenment. Pa~n~naa is developed during the moments of javana. But his javana cittas were often of a strong degree of akusala, killing other people to have their fingers for his collection. Evenso, he attained arahatship. He met the Buddha and could after listening develop understanding of all realities of his life. He also saw that akusala citta is a conditioned reality, non-self, otherwise he could not have attained arahatship. The bhavangacittas are the good parents, but he was blamed because of the akusala javana cittas, the naughty children. Would his accumulated wisdom be the conqueror, or his new accumulations of all that akusala during javana? A challenge, and what will conquer? The opposite can also happen. We may be born with pa~n~naa but we waste the accumulated potentialities by our laziness, by forgetfulness of realities. When we see someone else we can never judge him by his deeds, we do not know what kind of accumulations he has. You say, bhavangacitta is conditioned by the javanacittas that arise. By what type of the twentyfour conditions? I was puzzled by this. Thank you and my best wishes for the new year, Nina. 10470 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Mon Dec 31, 2001 7:49am Subject: deceiving dhammas Dear Kom, you alluded to the vancaka dhammas, deceiving dhammas. Could you mention just a few that you find particularly helpful to consider in daily life? I find too that by hearing about more subtle defilements it helps at least on the level of pariyatti to notice them. On the other hand I was warned by A. Sujin: don't analyse, that is thinking again. I am inclined to analyse. Nina. 10471 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Mon Dec 31, 2001 7:49am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Gayan's translation > >> ********************* >> Extract from Gayan¹s post (8896): >> >> 2nd Gaddula sutta , khanda samyutta , S N >> >> " dittham vo bhikkhave caranam naama cittanti evam bhante. >> tampi kho bhikkhave caranam naama cittam citteneva cintitam tena pi kho >> bhikkhave >> caranena cittena cittanneca cittataram, >> tasmatiha bhikkhave abhikkhanam sakam cittam paccavekkhitabbam, >> diigharattam idam cittam samkilittham raagena , dosena , mohenati. >> citta samkileso bhikkhave satta samkilissamti cittavodana satta >> visujjhanti. >> naaham bhikkhave annam eka nikaayampi samanupassami evam cittam yathayidam >> bhikkhave >> tiracchanagataa paanaa te pi kho tiracchanagataa paanaa cittaneva cintitaa. >> tehipi kho bhikkhave tiracchanagatehi paanehi cittanneca cittataram. " >> >> >> monks , have you seen a 'drawing' called 'carana' ? ( citta -> citra ( >> sanskrit ) ) >> yes venerable sir. >> monks, even that 'carana' is thought by the citta ( mind ) >> monks , ( so) the mind is more >> 'versatile/interesting/diverse...'(creatively, beautifully displayed) than >> that carana ( which is also thought by the mind ) >> >> [ carana is said to be a kind of beautiful animation graphics type of a >> thing existed those days ] >> >> >> monks every moment you should observe the mind. >> for a long period this mind has been subjected to the dirt of raaga, dosa, >> moha. >> when citta is dirty, the beings become dirty >> when the mind is cleaned, the beings become cleaned. >> >> >> monks I cant see a more versatile/diverse(creatively, beautifully >> displayed) >> category of beings than this animal category, >> monks even those animals are thought by the mind itself. >> this mind is more versatile than the animal kingdom, >> so monks you should observe it every moment. >> >> >> -Dear Gayan, I compared this translation with my P.T.S, text. I have some problems with the grammar:cittanneca: that ending of eca? and then: citta samkileso: must this not be put together as one word, just like the following: cittavodaanaa? The ending of samkileso: I was puzzled by that, what case, nominative? But should it not be by...? By a defiled mind? then: tiracchanagataa paana: is this from paa.no, life? I looked at the footnote, which says that the varied nature of all these animals is due to kamma. Because citta is so varied, it performs different kammas that create different births. This fits the following of the sutta: kamma is like a painter. What is your opinion about this? Thank you for translating this, I read it with interest. Nina. 10472 From: Date: Mon Dec 31, 2001 4:00am Subject: Re: [dsg] The White Radiant Mind Hi, Rob and Suan - In a message dated 12/31/01 2:44:28 AM Eastern Standard Time, epsteinrob@Y... writes: > Dear Suan, > Thank you so much for the translation! > I am quite excited, especially after taking a first look... > > I will only make two preliminary comments tonight, and will then study > further. > Thanks again! > > comments below: > > --- abhidhammika wrote: > > > > Dear Dhamma Friends > > > > As some of you might remember, I posted Parinibbana Subcommentary > > (Part Two) awhile ago. In response, Robert Epstein and Upasaka Howard > > posted reply messages that seem to support a kind of consciousness > > surviving in parinibbaana after the death of an Arahant. Both of them > > also cited an Anguttra statement of the Buddha containing the > > description of the mind as being luminous in support of their > > survivalist view. > > Just want to mention, in my own defense, that the idea that there may be > some form > of awareness in parinibbana is not *necessarily* a survivalist view. If by > survivalist, you mean that an entity or identifiable being remains, as > would be > dependent on one or more of the five kandhas, then this is not what I have > in > mind. The awareness which I have in mind would be undifferentiated, > unformed and > unindividuated. While one can argue that even such a primordial, > unformative > awareness is a violation of one's reading of the definition of parinibbana, > I > don't think you can as easily accuse it of constituting an *entity* which > survives > the extinction of the kandhas. > > In both my view, and I believe Howard's, if there is any awareness that > survives > extinction of the kandhas, it would in fact *not* be an entity or being of > any > kind. --------------------------------------------------------------- Howard: Certainly not. In fact, even now, while there is awareness, there is no entity or being which is agent for it. Awareness, consciousness, or discernment is an impersonal event/function/operation. The thing is, normal discrnment is the discernment of a flow of sense objects, and the sequential nature makes it temporal. But the consciousness of nibbana (without remainder) is a consciousness of absence of objects (and without any defiling sense of subject either) and is timeless, and it is, thus, so radically DIFFERENT from anything we have experienced as to be literally unimaginable and incomparable for the worldling. But the idea that (the state of) parinibbana is literally *nothing* in every possible sense strikes me as at best very silly. It makes the goal of Buddhism no different from the goal of a suicidal materialist! (How would it differ?) ----------------------------------------------------------- What it would be has been discussed to some extent, but I will not go into> > > it now. > You are right, Suan, however, that to me the implication is that the > 'luminous > mind' suggests the possibility of this primordial pre-existent awareness > which is > then defiled by the concept of separate self-hood or entity, as well as > other > delusions which fetter it and cause suffering. > > [snip] > > > SUTTAM STATEMENT AND TRANSLATION > > > > 49. "Pabhassaramidam, Bhikkhave, cittam. Tañca kho aagantukehi > > upakkilesehi upakkilitthanti." > > > > "Monks, this mind is radiant. And, that very mind is tarnished by > > guest blots." > > This translation is quite revelatory on its face, and should cause everyone > who > has been interested in this sutta to pause and take a deep breath. > According to > your translation, Suan, the phrase 'that very mind' implies that the same > citta > that is radiant is the one that is tarnished by blots or defilements that > don't > belong there [my interpretation of 'guest' if that is a correct > interpretation]. > > I understand that this is not the interpretation of the commentaries, but > just > taking the Sutta on its own for a moment, it seems that the 'guest' status > of the > 'blots' suggests that it is not the natural state of the citta to be thus > blotted > or defiled. > ----------------------------------------------------------------- Howard: I agree except for your use of 'citta'. Certainly it is not the mindstate which is pure which is also defiled. I do believe that when the Buddha says "mind" here, he is speaking conventionally - as he usually does. He is talking about mental function in general, and is pointing out that it is not inherent that it should be defiled, but that defilements are adventitious (guests). If defilement were inherent, liberation would be an unattainable goal. ---------------------------------------------------------------- > > It is hard for me to see how the commentary's interpretation makes use of > the fact > that the phrase 'that very mind' seems to especially emphasize the fact > that > Buddha is referring to one and the same mind, not two different ones. It > doesn't > seem on the face of it that such a statement would refer to the complex > relationship of the bhavanga cittas being indirectly defiled by the javana > cittas > that arise at a different time. The statement appears to be much more > simple than > this, but I am very much looking forward to your subcommentary. ---------------------------------------------------------- Howard: I certainly agree with this assessment. ---------------------------------------------------------- > > I don't know if you plan to translate the full stanza of the original > sutta, but > if it were possible it would be great to see the whole verse. > > In any case, I thank you for this effort, which is already quite > provocative. > > Best, > Robert Ep. > ============================== With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 10473 From: Date: Mon Dec 31, 2001 4:42am Subject: Re: [dsg] abhidhamma Dear Nina: Thanks very much for your input and feedback :). _______________________ You said Abhidhamma is like a dry bone. Lodewijk said, tell him it is like the flesh and sinews of our life. _______________________ Num: I have to admit that I have a lot of appetite for Abhidhamma. I agree with Lodewijk that the bony part of the meat, esp. the rib, is my favorite part, yummy yummy. As I mentioned before the more I read (I haven't read a lot), the more I feel like all 3 pitaka keep talking and pointing to the same thing, DHAMMA. The 3 pitaka are mutually supportive. The terms and statements in Abhidhamma-pitaka were found all over in both vinaya and suttan-pitaka. In Abhidhamma-pitaka, names, places and persons were stripped out. So the bone can be obviously seen. In vinaya and suttanta the same things were talked in a more interactive manner, in different background, to different audiences, from the a wanderer to the great master of prominent philosophy school of thought. Let me share I personal impression, I read satipatthana-sutra, patikula puppa. It was so well said. In abhidhamma (as well as suttanta-) the same things were said on a basis of rupa, dhatu, ayatana and khandha. I feel like this is pretty straightforward. I read theri-katha, supajivakampavanika-therikatha, a man tried to say how much he admired supabhikhuni body appearance esp. her two dark, clear and very beautiful eyes. The theri finally pulled her eye out and gave to that man, which this time he no longer longed for the beauty of her eye. This is a wonderful sutra, I think. But when I see someone with beautiful eyes, I know what I feel. Kilesa is hard to see, reality is hard to discern, so subtle, well disguised. Even the Buddha said the same thing in another 100 aspects or levels, I do not sure that I can really see what exactly he very kindly tried to point at. ______________________ I agree that a Book like the Kathavatthu, Points of Controversy. is difficult reading. We do not have to study all details, it depends on the individual what he studies. In the Kathavatthu a question is asked in one way and then it is affirmed, and after that the same question is asked in another way and then it is refuted. It teaches us more precision. I find the "Guide through the Abhidhamma Pitaka" by Nyanatiloka, B.P.S. Kandy, very helpful to gradually get used to reading difficult passages, especially the Kathavatthu. For instance, Ch II, may someone by just repeating the word dukkha attain enlightenment. But this really happens, people are repeating words without understanding. Ch I: Is there in the absolute sense any personality to be found? These are questions people today also ask. ________________________ Num: I will try to check the Guide book out from the library. Thanks for this. I am not used to the mean that the same question were asked twice, but then the answers become totally opposite. I understand that my understanding is limited. I will try it later. My problem is I like bony stuff too much :). __________________________ Take the second Book of the Abhidhamma, the Vibhanga, Book of Analysis. The P.T.S. has edited this with a most helpful Intro by Iggleden. Here we see that also in the Abhidhamma there is Suttanta Method and Abhidhamma method. We should not separate these methods so much. In this book there are very vivid reminders of good and bad qualities occurring in daily life. Take conceit, that I quoted in my Cetasikas: ...pride of health, pride of youth, pride of life, pride of gain, pride of being honoured, pride of being respected, pride of prominence, pride of having adherence, pride of wealth, pride of appearance, pride of erudition, pride of intelligence, pride of being a knowledgeable authority.... This is not a list just to be remembered, or to debate about. It is a reminder to be aware when such forms of conceit occur, and they occur all the time, very treacherous. __________________________ Num: I have the Vibhanga by PTS. I've read some of it. I really admire the effort of the translator. It's not an easy task to translate. Even in Thai Vibhanga, a lot of Pali words were put in without any translation. I do enjoy Vibhanga, it reminds me of how reality can be seen at different levels and aspects. The conceit part in Vibhanga is well digested. ___________________________ Only through satipatthana can we fully appreciate the great value of the Abhidhamma. As I said, not everybody has to study all details, but understanding of the basic notions helps us to have more precision with regard to realities. It is important to know that there are four paramattha dhammas, that our life consists of citta, cetasika and rupa. If there is no basic knowledge one is hopelessly confused about the different realities that occur, one is confused about what is a concept and what a reality. But I am sure that you know all this. ___________________________ Num: Thanks a lot for this, I really appreciate. I always appreciate the reminder from Howard that text knowledge is not the same as panna or seeing reality here and now. One thing I know for sure is I know and see very little. Wish you and your family a Happy New Year. Num 10474 From: Kenneth Ong Date: Mon Dec 31, 2001 11:36am Subject: Re: [dsg] The White Radiant Mind Hi Mike, > In human beings, the aarammana of bhavanga is always a > pleasant object, as I understand it--the same object > as that of the patisandhi citta, the rebirth > consciousness--otherwise, no rebirth in manussa > bhumi--so, yes, always kusala vipaaka citta. k: How abt those who are reborn in lower realms. The aramana will be I believe akusala. I believe such these 3 initial bahavanga cittas would also apply to me. So do we still say in this context that bhavanga citta still luminious. k: Is that any commentaries that says that the nature of kusala cittas are also luminous. Kind regards Ken O 10475 From: robertkirkpatrick.rm Date: Mon Dec 31, 2001 0:26pm Subject: Re: [dsg] The White Radiant Mind --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., upasaka@a... wrote: > the consciousness of nibbana (without > remainder) is a consciousness of absence of objects (and without any defiling > sense of subject either) and is timeless, and it is, thus, so radically > DIFFERENT from anything we have experienced as to be literally unimaginable > and incomparable for the worldling. But the idea that (the state of) > parinibbana is literally *nothing* in every possible sense strikes me as at > best very silly. It makes the goal of Buddhism no different from the goal of > a suicidal materialist! (How would it differ?) > -----------------------------------------------------------Dear Howard, This 'consciousness of nibbana', does it exist after the death of an arahant? If so, what khanda (aggregate) is it, or is it something outside the khandas? A suicidal materialist beleives in a self, a self that will be extinguished at death. He thinks that by killing himself consciousness and the painful feelings that arise together with consciousness will then cease. However, this dependent origination that he takes to be "his" life cannot cease until the conditions for it have been uprooted. Physical death is just another moment like any other and the cycle continues on another plane somewhere. The death of an arahnat is different, there are no more conditions for this long, long cycle to continue. robert 10476 From: Date: Mon Dec 31, 2001 9:09am Subject: Re: [dsg] The White Radiant Mind Hi, Robert - In a message dated 12/31/01 3:27:36 PM Eastern Standard Time, robertkirkpatrick@r... writes: > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., upasaka@a... wrote: > > the consciousness of nibbana (without > > remainder) is a consciousness of absence of objects (and without > any defiling > > sense of subject either) and is timeless, and it is, thus, so > radically > > DIFFERENT from anything we have experienced as to be literally > unimaginable > > and incomparable for the worldling. But the idea that (the state > of) > > parinibbana is literally *nothing* in every possible sense strikes > me as at > > best very silly. It makes the goal of Buddhism no different from > the goal of > > a suicidal materialist! (How would it differ?) > > ----------------------------------------------------------- Dear > Howard, > This 'consciousness of nibbana', does it exist after the death of an > arahant? If so, what khanda (aggregate) is it, or is it something > outside the khandas? ------------------------------------------------------------------ Howard: Yes, "outside" the khandhas. It seems to me that the khandha of vi~n~nana is the aggregate of discernment of objects. Is an absence of objects another object? Nibbana is not a khandha nor any aspect of a khandha. But it *is* said to be nama! And there is no more reason to say that something is nama just because it isn't rupa than there is to say that something is rupa just because it isn't nama. Nibbana is not vi~n~nana, but it is nama. That makes it some other sort of discernment/awareness, it would seem to me, a discernment radically "other", radically different from all that we know. ---------------------------------------------------------- > A suicidal materialist beleives in a self, a self that will be > extinguished at death. He thinks that by killing himself > consciousness and the painful feelings that arise together with > consciousness will then cease. However, this dependent origination > that he takes to be "his" life cannot cease until the conditions for > it have been uprooted. Physical death is just another moment like any > other and the cycle continues on another plane somewhere. The death > of an arahnat is different, there are no more conditions for this > long, long cycle to continue. > -------------------------------------------------------- Howard: To me it sounds like the death of an arahant brings exactly the nothingness sought by those who erroneously believe that it can be achieved by physical death. Even someone who doesn't believe in a self, but, who, for example, lives in unbearable pain, desires an escape to nothingness. This may well be so even for stream enterers. Perhaps even for once returners. One thing the Buddha described as a defilement is desire for extinction. If nibbana is extinction, not just of defilements, and not even of discernment of objects, but a complete and utter extinction without exception, and if this is the goal, then ..., well, the syllogism is easy to complete. ;-) ----------------------------------------------------------- > robert > ============================== With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 10477 From: m. nease Date: Mon Dec 31, 2001 3:39pm Subject: Anusaya Question I ran across the following note to V. Thanissaro's translation of the Anusaya Sutta (Anguttara Nikaya VII.11) on Access to Insight. Just thought I'd post it here for comments from our Pali scholars. Thanks, mike ---------------------------------------------------------- Note 1. This term -- anusaya -- is usually translated as "underlying tendency" or "latent tendency." These translations are based on the etymology of the term, which literally means, "to lie down with." However, in actual usage, the related verb (anuseti) means to be obsessed with something, for one's thoughts to return and "lie down with it" over and over again. [Go back] ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Revised: Mon 10 September 2001 http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/anguttara/an07-011.html 10478 From: m. nease Date: Mon Dec 31, 2001 3:52pm Subject: Anusaya Question I ran across the following note to V. Thanissaro's translation of the Anusaya Sutta (Anguttara Nikaya VII.11) on Access to Insight. Just thought I'd post it here for comments from our Pali scholars. Thanks, mike ---------------------------------------------------------- Note 1. This term -- anusaya -- is usually translated as "underlying tendency" or "latent tendency." These translations are based on the etymology of the term, which literally means, "to lie down with." However, in actual usage, the related verb (anuseti) means to be obsessed with something, for one's thoughts to return and "lie down with it" over and over again. [Go back] ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Revised: Mon 10 September 2001 http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/anguttara/an07-011.html 10479 From: mlnease Date: Mon Dec 31, 2001 4:07pm Subject: Re: [dsg] The White Radiant Mind Hi Kenneth, --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Kenneth Ong wrote: > Hi Mike, > > > In human beings, the aarammana of bhavanga is always a > > pleasant object, as I understand it--the same object > > as that of the patisandhi citta, the rebirth > > consciousness--otherwise, no rebirth in manussa > > bhumi--so, yes, always kusala vipaaka citta. > > k: How abt those who are reborn in lower realms. The aramana will be I > believe akusala. I believe such these 3 initial bahavanga cittas would > also apply to me. I dunno! Better leave this one to one of the better-read members. > So do we still say in this context that bhavanga citta > still luminious. My guess is, no. This gets complicated--the words we've been using for both 'luminous' and 'pure' (sorry--I don't have the Pali handy) have different meanings in different contexts. For example, in some contexts all cittas are considered pure, and are only defiled by the cetasikas arising with them (as I understand it). This makes the most sense to me, as a general rule. 'Luminous' seems much more specific but, if I recall rightly, is always referred to thus because of its having come from bhavanga (the simile is that of a river and its tributaries). Don't know enough about all this to give you a really informed answer, though--sorry. > k: Is that any commentaries that says that the nature of kusala cittas > are also luminous. If I remember rightly from what we've read, no--pure, yes-- luminous, no. Corrections welcomed... Hope I haven't confused this issue more. mike 10480 From: Date: Mon Dec 31, 2001 11:24am Subject: An Addendum and a Msg to the List Re: [dsg] The White Radiant Mind Hi again, Robert - So as not to end the Gregorian-calendar year with a disagreement ;-)), let me add that whatever nibbana really is, and whatever our differing misguided notions of it may be ;-)), I know that we are in complete *agreement* in wishing for the other all and only what is good. May nibbana, the ultimate good, be yours (though there *is* no you! ;-), and soon! And may you, and *all* the loving and brilliant folks on DSG have a wonderful year, a year filled with santi, metta, and the sukkha of Dhamma - with peace, lovingkindness, and the joy of the Buddha's wonderful teaching! With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 10481 From: Kom Tukovinit Date: Mon Dec 31, 2001 9:41pm Subject: RE: [dsg] Contradiction (Views) Dear Wynn, If you think of Samma-ditthi as right views, and micha-ditthi as the wrong views, then you will get into quite a few discussions and possible contradictions about attachments to views, having views, and having no views. If you think of Samma-dithi as panna, a wisdom that co-arises with the mind whenever the mind cognize, co-arising with panna, realities as they are, when there is direct perception of true realities, then you will never run into problems with those discussions. Whenever there is an understanding of realities as they are, samma-ditthi co-arises with it. kom > -----Original Message----- > From: wynn [mailto:wewynal@t...] > Sent: Monday, December 31, 2001 5:06 AM > To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com > Subject: [dsg] Contradiction (Views) > > > Hi, > > The Buddha talk about Right View (samma ditthi). > > However, in Sutta Nipata verse 787, 800, 882, the > Buddha said or (more impersonally) the true sage, > has no views. > > How do you explain this contradiction? > > Thanks, > Wynn > > 10482 From: Kenneth Ong Date: Mon Dec 31, 2001 10:03pm Subject: Re: [dsg] The White Radiant Mind Hi Mike and (Suan), > My guess is, no. This gets complicated--the words we've been using for > both 'luminous' and 'pure' (sorry--I don't have the Pali handy) have > different meanings in different contexts. For example, in some contexts > all cittas are considered pure, and are only defiled by the cetasikas > arising with them (as I understand it). This makes the most sense to me, as a general rule. 'Luminous' seems much more specific but, if I recall rightly, is always referred to thus because of its having come from bhavanga (the simile is that of a river and its tributaries). Don't know enough about all this to give you a really informed answer, though--sorry. k: that is interesting all cittas are considered pure in some contexts. More evidence please. > > > k: Is that any commentaries that says that the nature of kusala > cittas > are also luminous. > > If I remember rightly from what we've read, no--pure, yes-- luminous, > no. Corrections welcomed... k: If then, kusala cittas should be luminious since Bhavanga cittas are vipaka kusala cittas in the context of humans. We could not at one hand said that it is luminous for vipaka kusala citta (bhavanga cittas) and than not for kusala citta. It sound contridictory. But I would like more commentary evidence on luminious portion of kusala cittas be it vipaka or not (for anyone in the list). Then another point, why shouldn't luminious mind be kusala cittas rather than bhavanga cittas and it still sounds correct in the sutta. Kind regards Ken O 10483 From: Robert Epstein Date: Mon Dec 31, 2001 10:53pm Subject: Re: [dsg] The White Radiant Mind --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Rob and Suan - > > In a message dated 12/31/01 2:44:28 AM Eastern Standard Time, > epsteinrob@Y... writes: > > > > Dear Suan, > > Thank you so much for the translation! > > I am quite excited, especially after taking a first look... > > > > I will only make two preliminary comments tonight, and will then study > > further. > > Thanks again! > > > > comments below: > > > > --- abhidhammika wrote: > > > > > > Dear Dhamma Friends > > > > > > As some of you might remember, I posted Parinibbana Subcommentary > > > (Part Two) awhile ago. In response, Robert Epstein and Upasaka Howard > > > posted reply messages that seem to support a kind of consciousness > > > surviving in parinibbaana after the death of an Arahant. Both of them > > > also cited an Anguttra statement of the Buddha containing the > > > description of the mind as being luminous in support of their > > > survivalist view. > > > > Just want to mention, in my own defense, that the idea that there may be > > some form > > of awareness in parinibbana is not *necessarily* a survivalist view. If by > > survivalist, you mean that an entity or identifiable being remains, as > > would be > > dependent on one or more of the five kandhas, then this is not what I have > > in > > mind. The awareness which I have in mind would be undifferentiated, > > unformed and > > unindividuated. While one can argue that even such a primordial, > > unformative > > awareness is a violation of one's reading of the definition of parinibbana, > > I > > don't think you can as easily accuse it of constituting an *entity* which > > survives > > the extinction of the kandhas. > > > > In both my view, and I believe Howard's, if there is any awareness that > > survives > > extinction of the kandhas, it would in fact *not* be an entity or being of > > any > > kind. > --------------------------------------------------------------- > Howard: > Certainly not. In fact, even now, while there is awareness, there is > no entity or being which is agent for it. Awareness, consciousness, or > discernment is an impersonal event/function/operation. The thing is, normal > discrnment is the discernment of a flow of sense objects, and the sequential > nature makes it temporal. But the consciousness of nibbana (without > remainder) is a consciousness of absence of objects (and without any defiling > sense of subject either) and is timeless, and it is, thus, so radically > DIFFERENT from anything we have experienced as to be literally unimaginable > and incomparable for the worldling. But the idea that (the state of) > parinibbana is literally *nothing* in every possible sense strikes me as at > best very silly. It makes the goal of Buddhism no different from the goal of > a suicidal materialist! (How would it differ?) > ----------------------------------------------------------- > > What it would be has been discussed to some extent, but I will not go into> > > > > it now. > > You are right, Suan, however, that to me the implication is that the > > 'luminous > > mind' suggests the possibility of this primordial pre-existent awareness > > which is > > then defiled by the concept of separate self-hood or entity, as well as > > other > > delusions which fetter it and cause suffering. > > > > [snip] > > > > > SUTTAM STATEMENT AND TRANSLATION > > > > > > 49. "Pabhassaramidam, Bhikkhave, cittam. Tañca kho aagantukehi > > > upakkilesehi upakkilitthanti." > > > > > > "Monks, this mind is radiant. And, that very mind is tarnished by > > > guest blots." > > > > This translation is quite revelatory on its face, and should cause everyone > > who > > has been interested in this sutta to pause and take a deep breath. > > According to > > your translation, Suan, the phrase 'that very mind' implies that the same > > citta > > that is radiant is the one that is tarnished by blots or defilements that > > don't > > belong there [my interpretation of 'guest' if that is a correct > > interpretation]. > > > > I understand that this is not the interpretation of the commentaries, but > > just > > taking the Sutta on its own for a moment, it seems that the 'guest' status > > of the > > 'blots' suggests that it is not the natural state of the citta to be thus > > blotted > > or defiled. > > > ----------------------------------------------------------------- > Howard: > I agree except for your use of 'citta'. Certainly it is not the > mindstate which is pure which is also defiled. I do believe that when the > Buddha says "mind" here, he is speaking conventionally - as he usually does. > He is talking about mental function in general, and is pointing out that it > is not inherent that it should be defiled, but that defilements are > adventitious (guests). Dear Howard, I think that's a good correction, and I agree with it. Thanks. It makes the sense of the statement easier to understand in fact. I agree with the rest of what you have said here as well. Robert PS. Happy New Year! ================== If defilement were inherent, liberation would be an > unattainable goal. > ---------------------------------------------------------------- > > > > > It is hard for me to see how the commentary's interpretation makes use of > > the fact > > that the phrase 'that very mind' seems to especially emphasize the fact > > that > > Buddha is referring to one and the same mind, not two different ones. It > > doesn't > > seem on the face of it that such a statement would refer to the complex > > relationship of the bhavanga cittas being indirectly defiled by the javana > > cittas > > that arise at a different time. The statement appears to be much more > > simple than > > this, but I am very much looking forward to your subcommentary. > ---------------------------------------------------------- > Howard: > I certainly agree with this assessment. > ---------------------------------------------------------- > > > > > I don't know if you plan to translate the full stanza of the original > > sutta, but > > if it were possible it would be great to see the whole verse. > > > > In any case, I thank you for this effort, which is already quite > > provocative. > > > > Best, > > Robert Ep. > > > ============================== > With metta, > Howard > 10484 From: Sarah Date: Tue Jan 1, 2002 0:55am Subject: Re: [dsg] The White Radiant Mind Dear Mike, Ken O (and others folowing the 'luminous' thread'), Just got back to Hong Kong...haven't unpacked or done any home chores, so I shouldn't be posting, but can't resist adding a note;-) As usual, Ken O, I'm impressed by your keen and pertinent questions. Mike, all the discussions together over the weekend were really great . Just to add a note to Mike's post and useful comments as we discussed this topic with K.Sujin, K.Supee, Jaran and others at the weekend: 1) Pabhassara.m (luminous) seems to refer to bhavanga cittas only in some contexts such as the sutta under discussion (AN 1,9 com): "Luminous is clear, pure (pabhassara.m). Citta is the life-continuum (bhavanga)." 2) In other contexts it refers to all kusala cittas as well as bhavanga cittas as you suggest : (AN 5,23com - Upakilesa Sutta (PTS trans: The Debasements): "Cittas that are defiled are not luminous (pabhassara.m). (Here) the cittas free from upakilesa refers to the kusala cittas in the 4 planes.." It doesn’t seem to refer to other vipaka cittas besides bhavanga cittas in any contexts so far (but you or Num may do a search on this) 3) Pandaram (purity) usually refers to all cittas and is another synonym for citta. We also looked at references in which it also refers to akusala cittas, but I can’t find my note or the Thai com notes (which Jon and Jaran translated for me on this). I understand the reason that all cittas are considered ‘pandaram’ is because they ‘spring’ from the bhavanga cittas....(It’s a little confusing because in both English and Thai ‘luminous’, ‘pure’ and the other translations sound very similar. In Pali, (I’m told) the meaning is quite different.) 4) Pandaram sometimes refers to bhavanga cittas and kusala citta only: In the Atthasalini reference given several times (Atth, 140,)where it says “cittas are pandara meaning pure. pandara refers to bhavanga cittas.....”, we found there was an extra line in the Thai translation not included in the PTS translation and this follows the Pali: “ ‘O Monks, cittas are pure, but they become tainted with upakilesa that come in, thus.’ Kusala cittas are pandara since they come from cittas (i.e. bhavanga cittas) like the Ganges river flows from the (source of) the Ganges river and the Godhaavarii river flows from the Godhaavarii river.” (Jaran’s transl.) This is a brief summary of what I understand. I may come across other notes in my bag or Jaran may add more. We raised the qustion of ‘why bother to find out anything about bhavanga cittas when they are not being experienced anyway, unlike attachment, aversion and so on. K.Sujin’s response was to the effect that if we don’t study the details or find out what kind of cittas arise in between the sense and mind processes, it will be taken for ‘self’. If there weren’t bhavanga cittas in between, there couldn’t be switching from eye-door to ear-door, for example. It may be (i.e. it is!) that bhavanga cittas are not as apparent or as easily observable as some other realities, but they can be known if there is right intellectual understanding first. It just depend on conditions and accumulations. One last point, Ken O, we are accepting what the commentary says about bhavanga cittas bcause a) we accept all the ancient commentaries and b) it makes sense to us. Also the reference to javana cittas makes sense because there cannot be ‘mind development’ of the bhavanga cittas, but there is ‘mind development’ when kusala cittas arise in the javana process as specified. Finally, Suan, many thanks for your very helpful translations and notes which I look forward to studying when I have a chance. I don’t have your post in front of me now which is why I haven’t referred to your translations. This is a really good and enjoyable team-work exercise I think. We even had the Pali experts at the Foundation pulling out Texts.and commentaries;-) If you have any comments on my notes above or anything to add, that’ll also be most helpful. We’re very fortunate to have some Pali expertise on list. Must start on some of those ‘return home chores’ We really had a super weekend seeing old friends (several from dsg) and meeting new ones like Mike and Christine (a real treat to spend ‘live’ time with them) and we had action-packed discussions with K.Sujin. Hopefully, we’ll add to other threads in due course. Sarah p.s ....and yes, Erik and his delightful and very sweet new bride joined us for the last discussion and the Satipatthana Sutta (“not the Samadhi Sutta”) was discussed at length. ======================================================= --- Kenneth Ong wrote: > Hi Mike and (Suan), > > > > My guess is, no. This gets complicated--the words we've been using > for > > both 'luminous' and 'pure' (sorry--I don't have the Pali handy) have > > different meanings in different contexts. For example, in some > contexts > > all cittas are considered pure, and are only defiled by the cetasikas > > arising with them (as I understand it). This makes the most sense to > me, as a general rule. 'Luminous' seems much more specific but, if I > recall rightly, is always referred to thus because of its having come > from bhavanga (the simile is that of a river and its tributaries). > Don't > know enough about all this to give you a really informed answer, > though--sorry. > > k: that is interesting all cittas are considered pure in some contexts. > More evidence please. > > > > > > > k: Is that any commentaries that says that the nature of kusala > > cittas > are also luminous. > > > > If I remember rightly from what we've read, no--pure, yes-- luminous, > > no. Corrections welcomed... > > k: If then, kusala cittas should be luminious since Bhavanga cittas are > vipaka kusala cittas in the context of humans. We could not at one hand > said that it is luminous for vipaka kusala citta (bhavanga cittas) and > than not for kusala citta. It sound contridictory. But I would like more > commentary evidence on luminious portion of kusala cittas be it vipaka > or > not (for anyone in the list). Then another point, why shouldn't > luminious > mind be kusala cittas rather than bhavanga cittas and it still sounds > correct in the sutta. .............................................................................................................. 10485 From: Kenneth Ong Date: Tue Jan 1, 2002 1:45am Subject: Re: [dsg] The White Radiant Mind Hi Sarah, Nice to hear from you again :). I like to point out something, > This is a brief summary of what I understand. I may come across other > notes in my bag or Jaran may add more. Your first point: > We raised the qustion of ‘why bother to find out anything about bhavanga > cittas when they are not being experienced anyway, unlike attachment, > aversion and so on. K.Sujin’s response was to the effect that if we > don’t study the details or find out what kind of cittas arise in between the sense and mind processes, it will be taken for ‘self’. If there weren’t bhavanga cittas in between, there couldn’t be switching from eye-door to> ear-door, for example. It may be (i.e. it is!) that bhavanga cittas are not as apparent or as easily observable as some other realities, but they can be known if there is right intellectual understanding first. It just depend on conditions and accumulations. Then you said > One last point, Ken O, we are accepting what the commentary says about > bhavanga cittas bcause a) we accept all the ancient commentaries and b) > it makes sense to us. Also the reference to javana cittas makes sense > because there cannot be ‘mind development’ of the bhavanga cittas, but there is ‘mind development’ when kusala cittas arise in the javana process as specified. Does it sound contridictory that when you said that abt accepting the commentary, then you said that A Sujin said that Bhavanga citta. "K.Sujin’s response was to the effect that if we don’t study the details or find out what kind of cittas arise in between the sense and mind processes, it will be taken for ‘self’." There is nothing wrong abt the commentary on developing the javana proccess bc it is a more impt process, imagine seven out of 17 cittas, that is a lot of cittas. I still find the commentary inconsistent on one hand saying abt bhavanga cittas then on the other hand saying that such development is for javana cittas process in this particular sutta. Don't sound right. It is a waste that I don't have the whole commentary. If from the onstart, it said that luminious mind is kusala cittas, that would have solved save us a lot of time discussing it :). By the way, do those bhavanga cittas of lower realms luminious or not since they should be akusala vipaka cittas. Kind regards Ken O P.S. Would you like to share any more interesting pointers other than Bhavanga cittas in your recent trip? I always sound greedy as usual :). 10486 From: Sarah Date: Tue Jan 1, 2002 5:09am Subject: Re: [dsg] The White Radiant Mind Hi Ken O, Great to see you so active and keen on the list....I also appreciate your ‘open book’ nature and sharing of the sad story about your sister to Purnomo. We can see how the Dhamma is really the only true refuge, I think. So many people on the list have experienced a lot of personal suffering and it’s wonderful that we can share useful reminders here. --- Kenneth Ong wrote: > > > Does it sound contridictory that when you said that abt accepting the > commentary, then you said that A Sujin said that Bhavanga citta. > "K.Sujin’s response was to the effect that if we don’t study the > details > or find out what kind of cittas arise in between the sense and mind > processes, it will be taken for ‘self’." Sorry, maybe it’s b.c I’m tired (or dense), but I’m not sure what the contradiction is. Pls explain. > There is nothing wrong abt the commentary on developing the javana > proccess bc it is a more impt process, imagine seven out of 17 cittas, > that is a lot of cittas. I still find the commentary inconsistent on > one > hand saying abt bhavanga cittas then on the other hand saying that such > development is for javana cittas process in this particular sutta. Don't > sound right. Not just in this sutta...development is in the javana process always, even when it’s not spelled out. We can’t just look at one sutta or one line, but need to look at the whole Tipitaka together to understand a sutta, I think. >It is a waste that I don't have the whole commentary. Well now, with the help of a few members like Suan and Nina we’re getting some of these commentaries and sub-commentaries translated to english for possibly the first time. In Thai (and probably Burmese and Singhalese) the commentaries are translated and included with the suttas. >If > from the onstart, it said that luminious mind is kusala cittas, that > would > have solved save us a lot of time discussing it :). But I thought you were enjoying the discussion:) Btw, when I wrote: 3) Pandaram (purity) usually refers to all cittas and is another synonym for citta, besides the discussion I mentioned about the Atthasalini passage, K.Sujin was also explaining that the reason it is also a synonym for citta is because, as Mike pointed out, cittas can be considered pure in the sense that they just experience their object and are defiled by the accompanying akusala cetasikas. > By the way, do those bhavanga cittas of lower realms luminious or not > since they should be akusala vipaka cittas. I’m sure you’re asking whether they’d be considered pabhassara.m (luminous) and not pandaram (pure). The quick answer is I’m not sure. Perhaps Mike can ask further about this. If I were to make a wild guess, I’d say they could be considered luminous because again they are vipaka (as you say), not accompanied or tainted by kilesa in the javana process. I’m not sure that being akusala vipaka (and having an unpleasant object) would make any difference to the argument. Even in lower realms, there are kusala and akusala cittas in the javana process and the same points would follow. Nina may be able to correct me. I’m a little puzzled (but not unduly concerned) as to why other vipaka cittas besides bhavangas are not considered pabhasara.m, but accept that’s just how it is. Again, all vipaka cittas, including those in lower planes can be considered pandaram (pure) in the sense explained above. This is all pretty new for me too, Ken O. As Mike said, the only real reason I think this discussion is of significance is because this one sutta and phrase is often quoted by people like yourself to support another interpretation of consciousness, awareness and parinibbana. I really appreciated Howard’s kind New Year message and would just like to also wish everyone here a year with significant growth of wisdom and plenty of kusala vipaka (good results of kamma). Sarah ====================================================== 10487 From: Sarah Date: Tue Jan 1, 2002 5:54am Subject: Re: [dsg] The White Radiant Mind Hi Ken O, A couple more references for you: 1) Dhammasangani 6 (PTS trans) “What on that occasion is thought (citta.m)? The thought which on that occasion is ideation, mind, heart, that which is clear (pa.n.dara ), ideation as the sphere of mind, the faculty of mind, intellection.......” i.e pa.n.dara as synonym for citta and mano 2)SN, V, Mahaavagga, 33(3) Corruptions (BB trans) “........S too, bhikkhus, there are these five corruptions of the mind, corrupted by which the mind is neither malleable nor wieldy nor radiant (pabbhasara ) but brittle and not rightly concentrated for the destruction of the taints. What five? Sensual desire is a corruption of the mind corrupted by which the mind is neither malleable nor wieldy nor radiant ..ill will.....” i.e. pabbhasara referring to kusala cittas Others may find other references... Sarah ======================================= --- Sarah wrote: K:> >If > > from the onstart, it said that luminious mind is kusala cittas, that > > would > > have solved save us a lot of time discussing it :). > S:> But I thought you were enjoying the discussion:) > > Btw, when I wrote: > 3) Pandaram (purity) usually refers to all cittas and is another synonym > for citta, besides the discussion I mentioned about the Atthasalini > passage, K.Sujin was also explaining that the reason it is also a > synonym > for citta is because, as Mike pointed out, cittas can be considered pure > in the sense that they just experience their object and are defiled by > the > accompanying akusala cetasikas. =============================================== 10488 From: Kenneth Ong Date: Tue Jan 1, 2002 6:16am Subject: Re: [dsg] The White Radiant Mind Hi Sarah > > > There is nothing wrong abt the commentary on developing the javana > > proccess bc it is a more impt process, imagine seven out of 17 cittas, > > that is a lot of cittas. I still find the commentary inconsistent on > > one > > hand saying abt bhavanga cittas then on the other hand saying that > such > > development is for javana cittas process in this particular sutta. > Don't sound right. > > Not just in this sutta...development is in the javana process always, > even when it’s not spelled out. We can’t just look at one sutta or one line,> but need to look at the whole Tipitaka together to understand a sutta, I think. k: This is always agreeable :). In fact, I am the same as you I believe in ancient accounts or commentaries as they are more reliable. Just that sometimes, I feel we should not take then as the "holy bible". To me if there is a need for discussion, I feel we should take a closer look. Eventually there is a need to stick to ancient context bc if we start painting our own picture, then in another one generation they paint again, then another, then another, that is how the sutta and commentaries get distorted. In ancient Chinese tradition of Buddhist Sutta, there is a rule I believe (once heard from a monk) no one suppose to change or add any word into it. But I believe such a tradition has been lost. This would mean eventually the Buddha's word will be corrupted. > >It is a waste that I don't have the whole commentary. > > Well now, with the help of a few members like Suan and Nina we’re > getting some of these commentaries and sub-commentaries translated to english for possibly the first time. In Thai (and probably Burmese and Singhalese) the commentaries are translated and included with the suttas. k: That will be great. > >If> from the onstart, it said that luminious mind is kusala cittas, that > > would > > have solved save us a lot of time discussing it :). > > But I thought you were enjoying the discussion:) k: Oh.. I always enjoy discussions. Just forgive me if I am sometime like to think things otherwise :). I just need to be more hardworking he he :). > > By the way, do those bhavanga cittas of lower realms luminious or not > > since they should be akusala vipaka cittas. > > I’m sure you’re asking whether they’d be considered pabhassara.m > (luminous) and not pandaram (pure). The quick answer is I’m not sure. > Perhaps Mike can ask further about this. k: My hunch is that they should not be luminious bc their would be akusala vipaka cittas and not kusala vipaka cittas in the case for human and above beings. Anyway the sutta is directed to humans hence in this context luminious is used is not wrong at all. > If I were to make a wild guess, I’d say they could be considered > luminous because again they are vipaka (as you say), not accompanied or tainted by kilesa in the javana process. I’m not sure that being akusala vipaka (and having an unpleasant object) would make any difference to the argument. Even in lower realms, there are kusala and akusala cittas in the javana process and the same points would follow. Nina may be able to correct me. > > I’m a little puzzled (but not unduly concerned) as to why other vipaka > cittas besides bhavangas are not considered pabhasara.m, but accept > that’s just how it is. Again, all vipaka cittas, including those in lower > planes can be considered pandaram (pure) in the sense explained above. > > This is all pretty new for me too, Ken O. As Mike said, the only real > reason I think this discussion is of significance is because this one > sutta and phrase is often quoted by people like yourself to support > another interpretation of consciousness, awareness and parinibbana. k: I think you have misunderstood me. I have not taken that to support another interpretation of consciouness or be it in parinibbana. To me I leave it to Buddha on such things like Unborn, Buddha Nature or PariNibbana. Too hard for me to think abt it and I let it be as it does not help presently in my mental development. Hence I prefer to leave PariNibbana as Undefined Reality and I am not going to pursue it. Kind regards Ken O 10489 From: rikpa21 Date: Tue Jan 1, 2002 6:17am Subject: Satipatthana and Practice --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Sarah wrote: > p.s > ....and yes, Erik and his delightful and very sweet new bride joined us > for the last discussion and the Satipatthana Sutta ("not the Samadhi > Sutta") was discussed at length. Eath was absolutely delighted to attend the Dhama discussion there yesterday, and in spite of not being able to completely follow the speed of our English, she recognized many of the Pali terms used, and we wound up having our own mini-discussion on some of the terms she did recognize from the discussion--pañña and sampajjana--sitting together under the Bo Tree (which she identified for me as a Bo tree--I'd never seen, or rather, recognized one, before, so that was kind of cool) outside the Foundation. Anyway the Samadhi Sutta is just as important (is one limb of the Noble Eightfold path "more or less" important than any other?), since concentration is inseparable from Right Mindfulness. Anything that serves as a basis for mindfulness and the final aim, the ending of the effluents, seems a pretty important teaching in my book. For example, the "Samadhi Sutta" notes: "And what is the development of concentration that, when developed & pursued, leads to mindfulness & alertness? There is the case where feelings are known to the monk as they arise, known as they persist, known as they subside. Perceptions are known to him as they arise, known as they persist, known as they subside. Thoughts are known to him as they arise, known as they persist, known as they subside. This is the development of concentration that, when developed & pursued, leads to mindfulness & alertness. http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/anguttara/an04-041.html "And what is the development of concentration that, when developed & pursued, leads to the ending of the effluents? There is the case where a monk remains focused on arising & falling away with reference to the five clinging-aggregates: 'Such is form, such its origination, such its passing away. Such is feeling, such its origination, such its passing away. Such is perception, such its origination, such its passing away. Such are fabrications, such their origination, such their passing away. Such is consciousness, such its origination, such its disappearance.' This is the development of concentration that, when developed & pursued, leads to the ending of the effluents." This sutta seems to imply that samadhi is an important piece of the entire puzzle. No metion is made of "satipatthana" here. This is, after all, the "Samadhi Sutta." The presence of samadhi and the type of concentration on five aggregates formulated exactly as found in the Satipatthana Sutta (not to mention that "remaining focused" on various objects is mentioned in nearly every stanza of the Satipatthana Sutta) may give a better clue as to how samma sati and samma samadhi fit together. Just considering my own experience (the only thing any of us can rely on when all is said and done), Right Mindfulness requires concentration as a basis, and the mind needs to be trained well enough by diligent practicing the the exercises found in the Satipatthana or Samadhi Suttas, such that Right Mindfulness can remain unbroken over long periods of time and deepen to the point that meaningful insights have a basis for arising. I particularly like this quote, though I don't know the actual source for it: "...when the vipassana meditator develops strength and skill in noting, his khanika concentration occurs uninterruptedly in a series without a break. This concentration, when it occurs from moment to moment without a break, becomes so powerful that it can overcome the five mental hindrances, thus bringing about purification of mind (citta visuddhi) which can enable a meditator to attain all the insight knowledges up to the level of arahatship. Pure vipassana yogis can appreciate and understand the power of khanika concentration. For when their noting gains momentum, they can see for themselves how the noting goes on by itself uninterruptedly without a break. The noting seems to run on its own steam without any need for the yogi to make any concerted or deliberate effort. Thus, it is not unusual for a yogi to be able to sit for an hour, and even several hours, absorbed in noting." http://www.quantrum.com.my/bwc/vtribune/vt4n2p14.html This indicates the need for development in concentration to the point that, whether one calls it "khanika" or otherwise, strengthens Right Mindfulness to where it is deep enough to lead to release. Not giving proper due to the repeated injunctions in the Satipatthan Sutta to train in "remaining focused", for example, ("[one] trains [one]self to breathe in calming bodily fabrication, and to breathe out calming bodily fabrication") in the Satipatthana Sutta, it seems one could easily get lost amidst the cacophony of sensory stimuli of merely noting eye-sense, ear-sense, etc., and without the solid basis in concentration suggested by "remaining focused" until the mind is well-trained, it is difficult for me to see how one can develop the sort of concentration that acts as a basis for Right Mindfulness, which in turn acts as a basis for the insight leading to emergence (vutthanagamini-vipassana-ñana--which for the technically inclined kicks over into anuloma, gotrabhu, and the lokuttara cittas of magga and phala). If khanika samadhi (momentary samadhi possessed of all sentient beings, even insects, according to K. Sujin's definition synonymous with the ekagatta-cetasika samadhi arising as a sabba-citta- sadharana-cetasika--a concomitant of all cittas), then it seems that the concentration aspect of bhavana is being glossed over if one reads the Satipatthana Sutta without an eye toward concentrating the mind on the objects of focus until it is well-trained enough to maintain mindfulness uninterrruptedly for (relatively) long periods of time. I have found, parctically speaking, that all these exercises help "tighten" concentration to the point it can remain focused for extended periods of time, to where one-pointedness becomes automatic. Lacking sufficient concentration, it would appear one would only be scratching the surface of what is entailed by Right Mindfulness. So in my opnion (and just looking at the difference between when I have practiced these exercises and haven't, in terms of remaining mindful and concentrated), without experience informed by diligent practice of the mind training indicated in the Satipatthana Sutta, the odds of ever directly penetrating the characteristics of dhammas seems pretty slim. There are savants (usually autistic) who can belt out Rachmaninov without a day of practice; there are Dhamma geniuses who terminate the fetters on hearing a single sutta, or merely pursue wise consideration (yoniso mansikara) on certain objects and realize the fruits thereby. But this is not at all true for most of us. Those of us not similarly gifted seem to need a fair deal of concerted practice if we wish the Dhamma equivalent of playing Carnegie Hall: the lokuttara ñanas. That is why I cannot help but return again and again to the question I feel is of utmost importance here: how does being aware, intellectually, of the truth of anatta, lead to the sort of insight needed to terminate the fetters? I'm not denying the importance of studying how all things lack self-nature, but question how this-- without diligently practicing ones' meditative "chops" until the mind is well-trained and can remain focused for long periods of time- -is enough to lead to the sole aim of the Dhamma: the termination of suffering. 10490 From: abhidhammika Date: Tue Jan 1, 2002 7:38am Subject: Re: Luminous Mind: To Nina, Mike, Robert Kirk, Sarah, Howard, Robert Ep Dear Nina How are you? Happy new year! You wrote: " You say, bhavangacitta is conditioned by the javanacittas that arise. By what type of the twentyfour conditions? I was puzzled by this." It is "KAMMAPACCAYO" that conditions bhavangacittam. The following qoute comes from Section 13, Paccayuddesa, Patthaana Pali, Vol.1. I copied and pasted from Chatthasangayana CD-ROM version 3. 13. "Kammapaccayoti– kusalaakusalam kammam (vipaakaanam khandhaanam, resultant mental aggregates) katattaa ca ruupaanam kammapaccayena paccayo." This Patthaana statement also shows that we cannot equate bhavanga cittam with nibbaana. You know very well why. With best wishes Suan http://www.bodhiology.org --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Nina van Gorkom wrote: > > > >> > >> > >> SUTTAM STATEMENT AND TRANSLATION > >> > >> 49. "Pabhassaramidam, Bhikkhave, cittam. Tañca kho aagantukehi > >> upakkilesehi upakkilitthanti." > >> > >> "Monks, this mind is radiant. And, that very mind is tarnished by > >> guest blots." > >> > >> > >> COMMENTARY PALI > >> > >> 49. Navame pabhassaranti pandaram parisuddham. > >> Cittanti bhavangacittam. Kim pana cittassa vanno naama > >> atth²ti? Natthi. Niilaadiinañhi aññataravannam vaa > >> hotu > >> avannam vaa yamkiñci parisuddhataaya "pabhassaran"ti > >> vuccati. Idampi nirupakkilesataaya parisuddhanti > >> pabhassaram. Tañca khoti tam bhavangacittam. > >> > >> Aagantukehiiti asahajaatehi pacchaa javanakkhane > >> uppajjanakehi. Upakkilesehiiti raagaadiihi upakkilitthattaa > >> upakkilittham naamaati vuccati. > >> > >> Katham? Yathaa hi siilavantaa aacaarasampannaa maataapitaro vaa > >> aacariyupajjhaayaa vaa dussiilaanam duraacaaraanam > >> avattasampannaanam puttaanañceva antevaasikasaddhivihaarikaanañca > >> vasena "attano putte vaa antevaasikasaddhivihaarike vaa na > >> tajjenti na sikkhaapenti na ovadanti naanusaasantii"ti avannam > >> akittim labhanti, evamsampadamidam veditabbam. > >> > >> Aacaara-sampannaa maataapitaro viya ca aacariyupajjhaayaa > >> viya ca bhavangacittam datthabbam, puttaadiinam vasena tesam > >> akittilaabho viya javanakkhane rajjanadussanamuyhanasa > >> bhaavaanam lobhasahagataadiinam cittaanam vasena uppannehi > >> aagantukehi upakkilesehi pakatiparisuddhampi bhavangacittam > >> upakkilittham naama hotiiti. > >> > >> > >> > >> COMMENTARY TRANSLATION > >> > >> 49. In the ninth statement, the term `radiant' signifies whiteness or > >> purity, and means complete cleanness. The term `mind' refers to the > >> life-cause consciousness. How is there such a thing as the color of > >> the mind? There isn't. Whatever thing, be it with any color such as > >> brown, or be it colorless, is said to be radiant, due to its complete > >> cleanness. This mind, too, is said to be radiant because it is > >> completely clean due to the absence of blots. The phrase `and that > >> very mind' means `that life-cause consciousness.' > >> > >> The phrase `by guest' refers to the asynchronous mental events > >> happening later at the moments of the rapid repeats. The phrase `by > >> blots' means "by the mental events with lust and so on." The Buddha > >> said the scenario of being tarnished due to the mind being tarnished > >> by things such as lust. > >> > >> How so? Like the virtuous and refined parents or teachers and > >> preceptors, - on account of the immoral, unrefined, undutiful sons or > >> insider pupils and live-in pupils, - indeed received condemnation and > >> notoriety as those who do not threaten, train, instruct, and steer > >> one's own sons or insider pupils and live-in pupils, so this > >> example's completeness should be noted. > >> > >> The life-cause consciousness should be seen as the refined parents or > >> as the refined teachers and preceptors. And, like their earning of > >> notoriety by means of sons and so on, the naturally pure life- cause > >> consciousness comes to be tarnished by guest blots happening, at the > >> moments of the rapid repeats, as the mental events co-arising with > >> greed and so on having the instincts of lust, destructiveness, or > >> foolishness. > >> > >> > >> NOTES > >> > >> Aagantukehi - by guests > >> > >> Asahajaatehi uppajjanakehi - the asynchronous mental events > >> > >> Asahajaatehi – not happening together > >> > >> Uppajjanaka – Literally, those that happen > >> > >> Javanakkhane – the moments of the rapid repeats. Javana literally > >> means rapidity. In the context of a cognitive series called viitthi, > >> rapidity refers to the seven rapid repeats of the similar mental > >> events. > >> > >> From the angle of the life-cause consciousness, the Buddha described > >> the rapid repetitions as guests. It is simply a scenario of bhavanga > >> cittas versus javana cittas. > >> > >> Pakatiparisuddham bhavangacittam - the naturally pure life-cause > >> consciousness. Bhavanga cittam is a shorthand name for the sensuous > >> healthy resultant mind (Kaamaavacara kusala vipaaka cittam). > >> Therefore, the natural purity of bhavanga cittam does not extend > >> beyond the meanings of the terms "kusala" and "vipaaka." Furthermore, > >> it is continually conditioned and challenged by javana cittas. > >> > >Dear Suan, thank you very much for your translation and remarks. The last > sentence is indeed challenging. May I try with an example? Angulimaala was > born with three wholesome roots: alobha, adosa and pa~n~naa. Also all his > bhavangacittas were accompanied by these three. Bhavangacittas are vipaka, > produced by kamma. Bhavangacitta arises and then falls away completely. But > when there is a condition for its arising, in deep sleep or between > processes, kamma produces bhavangacitta, always the same type type, > throughout life. That type cannot change. That citta is just vipaka, > passive, it cannot act in a kusala or akusala way. The fact that it is > accompanied by pa~n~naa (but pa~n~naa is vipaka in this case) shows us that > he was born with a capability to develop during his life right > understanding, even to the degree of enlightenment. Pa~n~naa is developed > during the moments of javana. But his javana cittas were often of a strong > degree of akusala, killing other people to have their fingers for his > collection. Evenso, he attained arahatship. He met the Buddha and could > after listening develop understanding of all realities of his life. He also > saw that akusala citta is a conditioned reality, non-self, otherwise he > could not have attained arahatship. > The bhavangacittas are the good parents, but he was blamed because of the > akusala javana cittas, the naughty children. Would his accumulated wisdom be > the conqueror, or his new accumulations of all that akusala during javana? A > challenge, and what will conquer? > The opposite can also happen. We may be born with pa~n~naa but we waste the > accumulated potentialities by our laziness, by forgetfulness of realities. > When we see someone else we can never judge him by his deeds, we do not know > what kind of accumulations he has. > You say, bhavangacitta is conditioned by the javanacittas that arise. By > what type of the twentyfour conditions? I was puzzled by this. > Thank you and my best wishes for the new year, Nina. 10491 From: Kom Tukovinit Date: Tue Jan 1, 2002 7:54am Subject: RE: [dsg] deceiving dhammas Dear Nina, Thanks for asking this question, as I got to review what are the vancaka dhammas. In general, I like hearing about some subtleties of the dhamma because I find that by knowing about them, I tend to pay attention toward the particular aspect (paying attention at pariyatti or direct level, or paying attention with panna are different stories). It is like opening up a new world previously unknown or only known through a veil. I think by being precise and detailed about the subtleties of the dhamma conceptually, panna (and all the associated nama) can develop to understand more detailed aspects of the dhammas. The other thing is, I don't see how one develops kusala and abandons akusala unless one understand in details the differences between them. It is so easy for me to mistake akusala as kusala. In retrospect, the mistakes are often (and continues to be!) not so subtle. It is amazing that it takes a person with panna to point out some of these big mistakes: avijja is so overwhelming. Before I mentioned the specific examples of the vancaka dhammas that apply to me (in another post), I have two more stories for you regarding the India trip that are somewhat related to this conversation. The first story is about what A. Supee said, and the other one a combination of what A. Supee and A. Sujin said. A. Supee mentioned that whenever you asked him questions (in India), he would like other people to hear the questions. He said you asked him very detaild questions, and it is rare to hear such questions, leaving alone good answers. One of the questions he mentioned was that when one runs into an unpleasant situation, one thinks(?) about something that on the surface sounds like panna. However, if one considers that more carefully, it appears that it is not panna that arises, but it is the lobha that chooses its object. This is generally exactly like the vancaka dhammas, and just like vancaka dhammas, it begs to be proven in daily life. There was another controversy that was discussed in India: how much detail does one study conceptually? On one side (A), it is said that one only needs to understand the basic concepts, and then after that, satipatthana should be the main way to develop panna. On the other side (B), it is necessary to know lots and lots of details. I understand (C) from A. Sujin and A. Supee(misunderstanding?) that one should study what one can understand, especially those that apply in daily life. I apply the above situations to the current particular situations as followed, which probably guarantee more controversies: (A): I already understand what Satipatthana is, why bother with hearing about vancaka dhammas, bhawangas, and conditionalities at all? I can learn the subtleties of the different dhammas through direct perception. (B): I need to know all the different aspects of vancaka dhammas, bhawangas, and conditionalities. I should be able to explain all dhammas in term of conditionalities, as that would give me all the different details about the dhammas. (C): One needs to listen a lot, and consider a lot, but one needs to know the limit of one's understanding. Remembering all the details about vancaka dhammas are not going to help in daily life, as not all the dhammas mentioned in the teaching would appear. Remembering all the details about conditionalities are not going to help, as the details of those don't appear to one anyway. It is important to learn enough to answer one's own (important) questions - to eliminate vicikiccha. For panna to know finer and more subtles dhammas (and panna must know, otherwise, how could it be [roo jang, roo tua] (penetration?, knowing all-around), then the conceptual understanding, through listening and consideration, must be equivallently well-refined. kom > -----Original Message----- > From: Nina van Gorkom [mailto:nilo@e...] > Sent: Monday, December 31, 2001 7:49 AM > To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com > Subject: [dsg] deceiving dhammas > > > Dear Kom, you alluded to the vancaka dhammas, > deceiving dhammas. Could you > mention just a few that you find particularly > helpful to consider in daily > life? I find too that by hearing about more > subtle defilements it helps at > least on the level of pariyatti to notice them. > On the other hand I was > warned by A. Sujin: don't analyse, that is > thinking again. I am inclined to > analyse. > Nina. 10492 From: fcckuan Date: Tue Jan 1, 2002 7:55am Subject: one limb of 8 fold path more important (was satipathana and practice) --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "rikpa21" wrote: > Anyway the Samadhi Sutta is just as important (is one limb of the > Noble Eightfold path "more or less" important than any other?), In the samyutta, the Buddha uses a simile. Just as dawn precedes sunrise, right view precedes the other factors of the 8fold noble path. This stands to reason. If one has keen right view, then with right view one can correct deficiencies in the other 7 factors. But if one is deficient in right view, deviant in view, lacking in right view, it's difficult if not impossible to correct or properly develop the other factors. The rest of Erik's post is interesting and I'd like to comment on it another time when I have more time :-) -fk > since concentration is inseparable from Right Mindfulness. Anything > that serves as a basis for mindfulness and the final aim, the ending > of the effluents, seems a pretty important teaching in my book. For > example, the "Samadhi Sutta" notes: > > "And what is the development of concentration that, when developed & > pursued, leads to mindfulness & alertness? There is the case where > feelings are known to the monk as they arise, known as they persist, > known as they subside. Perceptions are known to him as they arise, > known as they persist, known as they subside. Thoughts are known to > him as they arise, known as they persist, known as they subside. > This is the development of concentration that, when developed & > pursued, leads to mindfulness & alertness. > http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/anguttara/an04-041.html > > "And what is the development of concentration that, when developed & > pursued, leads to the ending of the effluents? There is the case > where a monk remains focused on arising & falling away with > reference to the five clinging-aggregates: 'Such is form, such its > origination, such its passing away. Such is feeling, such its > origination, such its passing away. Such is perception, such its > origination, such its passing away. Such are fabrications, such > their origination, such their passing away. Such is consciousness, > such its origination, such its disappearance.' This is the > development of concentration that, when developed & pursued, leads > to the ending of the effluents." > > This sutta seems to imply that samadhi is an important piece of the > entire puzzle. No metion is made of "satipatthana" here. This is, > after all, the "Samadhi Sutta." The presence of samadhi and the type > of concentration on five aggregates formulated exactly as found in > the Satipatthana Sutta (not to mention that "remaining focused" on > various objects is mentioned in nearly every stanza of the > Satipatthana Sutta) may give a better clue as to how samma sati and > samma samadhi fit together. > > Just considering my own experience (the only thing any of us can > rely on when all is said and done), Right Mindfulness requires > concentration as a basis, and the mind needs to be trained well > enough by diligent practicing the the exercises found in the > Satipatthana or Samadhi Suttas, such that Right Mindfulness can > remain unbroken over long periods of time and deepen to the point > that meaningful insights have a basis for arising. > > I particularly like this quote, though I don't know the actual > source for it: > > "...when the vipassana meditator develops strength and skill in > noting, his khanika concentration occurs uninterruptedly in a series > without a break. This concentration, when it occurs from moment to > moment without a break, becomes so powerful that it can overcome the > five mental hindrances, thus bringing about purification of mind > (citta visuddhi) which can enable a meditator to attain all the > insight knowledges up to the level of arahatship. Pure vipassana > yogis can appreciate and understand the power of khanika > concentration. For when their noting gains momentum, they can see > for themselves how the noting goes on by itself uninterruptedly > without a break. The noting seems to run on its own steam without > any need for the yogi to make any concerted or deliberate effort. > Thus, it is not unusual for a yogi to be able to sit for an hour, > and even several hours, absorbed in noting." > http://www.quantrum.com.my/bwc/vtribune/vt4n2p14.html > > This indicates the need for development in concentration to the > point that, whether one calls it "khanika" or otherwise, strengthens > Right Mindfulness to where it is deep enough to lead to release. > > Not giving proper due to the repeated injunctions in the Satipatthan > Sutta to train in "remaining focused", for example, ("[one] trains > [one]self to breathe in calming bodily fabrication, and to breathe > out calming bodily fabrication") in the Satipatthana Sutta, it seems > one could easily get lost amidst the cacophony of sensory stimuli of > merely noting eye-sense, ear-sense, etc., and without the solid > basis in concentration suggested by "remaining focused" until the > mind is well-trained, it is difficult for me to see how one can > develop the sort of concentration that acts as a basis for Right > Mindfulness, which in turn acts as a basis for the insight leading > to emergence (vutthanagamini-vipassana-ñana--which for the > technically inclined kicks over into anuloma, gotrabhu, and the > lokuttara cittas of magga and phala). > > If khanika samadhi (momentary samadhi possessed of all sentient > beings, even insects, according to K. Sujin's definition synonymous > with the ekagatta-cetasika samadhi arising as a sabba-citta- > sadharana-cetasika--a concomitant of all cittas), then it seems that > the concentration aspect of bhavana is being glossed over if one > reads the Satipatthana Sutta without an eye toward concentrating the > mind on the objects of focus until it is well-trained enough to > maintain mindfulness uninterrruptedly for (relatively) long periods > of time. > > I have found, parctically speaking, that all these exercises > help "tighten" concentration to the point it can remain focused for > extended periods of time, to where one-pointedness becomes > automatic. > > Lacking sufficient concentration, it would appear one would only be > scratching the surface of what is entailed by Right Mindfulness. So > in my opnion (and just looking at the difference between when I have > practiced these exercises and haven't, in terms of remaining > mindful and concentrated), without experience informed by diligent > practice of the mind training indicated in the Satipatthana Sutta, > the odds of ever directly penetrating the characteristics of > dhammas seems pretty slim. > > There are savants (usually autistic) who can belt out Rachmaninov > without a day of practice; there are Dhamma geniuses who terminate > the fetters on hearing a single sutta, or merely pursue wise > consideration (yoniso mansikara) on certain objects and realize the > fruits thereby. But this is not at all true for most of us. Those of > us not similarly gifted seem to need a fair deal of concerted > practice if we wish the Dhamma equivalent of playing Carnegie Hall: > the lokuttara ñanas. > > That is why I cannot help but return again and again to the question > I feel is of utmost importance here: how does being aware, > intellectually, of the truth of anatta, lead to the sort of insight > needed to terminate the fetters? I'm not denying the importance of > studying how all things lack self-nature, but question how this-- > without diligently practicing ones' meditative "chops" until the > mind is well-trained and can remain focused for long periods of time- > -is enough to lead to the sole aim of the Dhamma: the termination of > suffering. 10493 From: Kom Tukovinit Date: Tue Jan 1, 2002 8:27am Subject: RE: [dsg] deceiving dhammas Dear Nina, I forgot to mention in the previous post another story I remember. Regarding analysis, I think I like to do this too, even though it is impossible to do a proper analysis. In India, we discussed "identification" issues. She mentioned that unless one has reached a level of vipassana-nana (which one? nama-rupa?) it is really not possible to see clearly the difference between the different nama, e.g., lobha and dosa. Until one reaches the vipassana-nana, then the lakhana of the dhamma as being dhamma is not apparent, and therefore the differences (of the lakkhana) between the namas cannot be clearly seen. Hence, for those of us who likes to identify (in words or not), she mention that this is not fruitful (as it is impossible to clearly see). She said (or came close to saying) that instead of identification, seeing the lakhana of the nama that knows (the previous object?) would help with understandings more. Of course, unless one understands why identification (and analysis) is not as useful, or sees (perhaps) the lobha that comes with the identification/analysis, then one continues to analyze... kom > -----Original Message----- > From: Nina van Gorkom [mailto:nilo@e...] > Sent: Monday, December 31, 2001 7:49 AM > To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com > Subject: [dsg] deceiving dhammas > > > Dear Kom, you alluded to the vancaka dhammas, > deceiving dhammas. Could you > mention just a few that you find particularly > helpful to consider in daily > life? I find too that by hearing about more > subtle defilements it helps at > least on the level of pariyatti to notice them. > On the other hand I was > warned by A. Sujin: don't analyse, that is > thinking again. I am inclined to > analyse. > Nina. 10494 From: Date: Tue Jan 1, 2002 3:38am Subject: Re: [dsg] Satipatthana and Practice Hi, Erik - Thank you for this post! I just bookmarked the Samadhi Sutta for extended study. It looks like a real find to me. You may recall that in a recent post I briefly compared and contrasted the concentration of samatha bhavana and vipassana bhavana, indicating that while they differ, they may be comparably powerful. I suspect that the powerful moment-to-moment concentration on the flow of "paramattha dhammas" is at the very heart of vipassana bhavana (a concentration held in place by the vigilance of mindfulness, by the sati which "doesn't forget" to stay present.) With metta, Howard In a message dated 1/1/02 9:18:52 AM Eastern Standard Time, rikpa21@y... writes: > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Sarah wrote: > > > p.s > > ....and yes, Erik and his delightful and very sweet new bride > joined us > > for the last discussion and the Satipatthana Sutta ("not the > Samadhi > > Sutta") was discussed at length. > > Eath was absolutely delighted to attend the Dhama discussion there > yesterday, and in spite of not being able to completely follow the > speed of our English, she recognized many of the Pali terms used, > and we wound up having our own mini-discussion on some of the terms > she did recognize from the discussion--pañña and > sampajjana--sitting together under the Bo Tree (which she identified > for me as a Bo tree--I'd never seen, or rather, recognized one, > before, so that was kind of cool) outside the Foundation. > > Anyway the Samadhi Sutta is just as important (is one limb of the > Noble Eightfold path "more or less" important than any other?), > since concentration is inseparable from Right Mindfulness. Anything > that serves as a basis for mindfulness and the final aim, the ending > of the effluents, seems a pretty important teaching in my book. For > example, the "Samadhi Sutta" notes: > > "And what is the development of concentration that, when developed & > pursued, leads to mindfulness & alertness? There is the case where > feelings are known to the monk as they arise, known as they persist, > known as they subside. Perceptions are known to him as they arise, > known as they persist, known as they subside. Thoughts are known to > him as they arise, known as they persist, known as they subside. > This is the development of concentration that, when developed & > pursued, leads to mindfulness & alertness. > http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/anguttara/an04-041.html > > "And what is the development of concentration that, when developed & > pursued, leads to the ending of the effluents? There is the case > where a monk remains focused on arising & falling away with > reference to the five clinging-aggregates: 'Such is form, such its > origination, such its passing away. Such is feeling, such its > origination, such its passing away. Such is perception, such its > origination, such its passing away. Such are fabrications, such > their origination, such their passing away. Such is consciousness, > such its origination, such its disappearance.' This is the > development of concentration that, when developed & pursued, leads > to the ending of the effluents." > > This sutta seems to imply that samadhi is an important piece of the > entire puzzle. No metion is made of "satipatthana" here. This is, > after all, the "Samadhi Sutta." The presence of samadhi and the type > of concentration on five aggregates formulated exactly as found in > the Satipatthana Sutta (not to mention that "remaining focused" on > various objects is mentioned in nearly every stanza of the > Satipatthana Sutta) may give a better clue as to how samma sati and > samma samadhi fit together. > > Just considering my own experience (the only thing any of us can > rely on when all is said and done), Right Mindfulness requires > concentration as a basis, and the mind needs to be trained well > enough by diligent practicing the the exercises found in the > Satipatthana or Samadhi Suttas, such that Right Mindfulness can > remain unbroken over long periods of time and deepen to the point > that meaningful insights have a basis for arising. > > I particularly like this quote, though I don't know the actual > source for it: > > "...when the vipassana meditator develops strength and skill in > noting, his khanika concentration occurs uninterruptedly in a series > without a break. This concentration, when it occurs from moment to > moment without a break, becomes so powerful that it can overcome the > five mental hindrances, thus bringing about purification of mind > (citta visuddhi) which can enable a meditator to attain all the > insight knowledges up to the level of arahatship. Pure vipassana > yogis can appreciate and understand the power of khanika > concentration. For when their noting gains momentum, they can see > for themselves how the noting goes on by itself uninterruptedly > without a break. The noting seems to run on its own steam without > any need for the yogi to make any concerted or deliberate effort. > Thus, it is not unusual for a yogi to be able to sit for an hour, > and even several hours, absorbed in noting." > http://www.quantrum.com.my/bwc/vtribune/vt4n2p14.html > > This indicates the need for development in concentration to the > point that, whether one calls it "khanika" or otherwise, strengthens > Right Mindfulness to where it is deep enough to lead to release. > > Not giving proper due to the repeated injunctions in the Satipatthan > Sutta to train in "remaining focused", for example, ("[one] trains > [one]self to breathe in calming bodily fabrication, and to breathe > out calming bodily fabrication") in the Satipatthana Sutta, it seems > one could easily get lost amidst the cacophony of sensory stimuli of > merely noting eye-sense, ear-sense, etc., and without the solid > basis in concentration suggested by "remaining focused" until the > mind is well-trained, it is difficult for me to see how one can > develop the sort of concentration that acts as a basis for Right > Mindfulness, which in turn acts as a basis for the insight leading > to emergence (vutthanagamini-vipassana-ñana--which for the > technically inclined kicks over into anuloma, gotrabhu, and the > lokuttara cittas of magga and phala). > > If khanika samadhi (momentary samadhi possessed of all sentient > beings, even insects, according to K. Sujin's definition synonymous > with the ekagatta-cetasika samadhi arising as a sabba-citta- > sadharana-cetasika--a concomitant of all cittas), then it seems that > the concentration aspect of bhavana is being glossed over if one > reads the Satipatthana Sutta without an eye toward concentrating the > mind on the objects of focus until it is well-trained enough to > maintain mindfulness uninterrruptedly for (relatively) long periods > of time. > > I have found, parctically speaking, that all these exercises > help "tighten" concentration to the point it can remain focused for > extended periods of time, to where one-pointedness becomes > automatic. > > Lacking sufficient concentration, it would appear one would only be > scratching the surface of what is entailed by Right Mindfulness. So > in my opnion (and just looking at the difference between when I have > practiced these exercises and haven't, in terms of remaining > mindful and concentrated), without experience informed by diligent > practice of the mind training indicated in the Satipatthana Sutta, > the odds of ever directly penetrating the characteristics of > dhammas seems pretty slim. > > There are savants (usually autistic) who can belt out Rachmaninov > without a day of practice; there are Dhamma geniuses who terminate > the fetters on hearing a single sutta, or merely pursue wise > consideration (yoniso mansikara) on certain objects and realize the > fruits thereby. But this is not at all true for most of us. Those of > us not similarly gifted seem to need a fair deal of concerted > practice if we wish the Dhamma equivalent of playing Carnegie Hall: > the lokuttara ñanas. > > That is why I cannot help but return again and again to the question > I feel is of utmost importance here: how does being aware, > intellectually, of the truth of anatta, lead to the sort of insight > needed to terminate the fetters? I'm not denying the importance of > studying how all things lack self-nature, but question how this-- > without diligently practicing ones' meditative "chops" until the > mind is well-trained and can remain focused for long periods of time- > -is enough to lead to the sole aim of the Dhamma: the termination of > suffering. > /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 10495 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Tue Jan 1, 2002 10:04am Subject: Re: [dsg] defilements op 30-12-2001 16:34 schreef Kom Tukovinit op tikmok@y...: >>> >>> K. Jaran and A. Supi was discussing about >> Kilesa, and why >>> only 10 akusala cetasikas are kilesas, and the >> other 4 are >>> not. The answer, I think you also wrote in >> Cetasikas, is >>> each Kilesa defiles the mind, where as the >> other four defile >>> the mental factors. At that point, I was asking him >>> questions about the other groupings of >> defilements including >>> Asava, etc. >> >> Dear Kom, thank you for bringing up these points. >> As to the 10 kilesas, I >> leant that they defile the dhammas that are >> conascent with them. Thus, in >> the case of sloth that is listed but not torpor: >> when there is sloth, torpor >> is always conascent with it, it is defiled by it. >> Regret (not listed as >> kilesa) is defiled by dosa conascent with it and >> also by the other kilesas >> which (not all of them) are conascent with it. > >K: Thanks for explaining these points further. I would like to > confirm what I understand you to say. > 1) Torpor is defiled by sloth and other conascent kilesas? > 2) Regret is defiled by dosa and other conascent kilesas? > >N: I looked up my notes, A.Sujin dealt with them last time I was in Bgk. She said: <> As to the word follow, we do not think of time: this first, then that. The defilements that arise together with the other conascent cetasikas make them impure. Nina. > 10496 From: robertkirkpatrick.rm Date: Tue Jan 1, 2002 11:44am Subject: An Addendum and a Msg to the List Re: [dsg] The White Radiant Mind --- Thanks Howard, And thank you for being one of the main contributors to dsg, helping to make it the great place for the discussion of the Dhamma that it is. Had an interesting day yesterday: put a deposit on a small apartment in Auckland (for an investment), where I've been for the last week. Just before the agent arrived for the signing a woamn drove into a tree in front of me and was killed. I think we really live alone (no matter how many people we know) with kamma as our only possesion. robert In dhammastudygroup@y..., upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi again, Robert - > > So as not to end the Gregorian-calendar year with a disagreement ;-)), > let me add that whatever nibbana really is, and whatever our differing > misguided notions of it may be ;-)), I know that we are in complete > *agreement* in wishing for the other all and only what is good. May nibbana, > the ultimate good, be yours (though there *is* no you! ;-), and soon! And > may you, and *all* the loving and brilliant folks on DSG have a wonderful > year, a year filled with santi, metta, and the sukkha of Dhamma - with peace, > lovingkindness, and the joy of the Buddha's wonderful teaching! > > With metta, > Howard 10497 From: Date: Tue Jan 1, 2002 7:26am Subject: Re: An Addendum and a Msg to the List Re: [dsg] The White Radiant Mind Hi, Robert - In a message dated 1/1/02 2:47:02 PM Eastern Standard Time, robertkirkpatrick@r... writes: > Thanks Howard, > And thank you for being one of the main contributors to dsg, helping > to make it the great place for the discussion of the Dhamma that it > is. > ---------------------------------------------------- Howard: Thanks much, Robert! --------------------------------------------------- > Had an interesting day yesterday: put a deposit on a small apartment > in Auckland (for an investment), where I've been for the last week. > ---------------------------------------------------- Howard: Good luck with the investment. --------------------------------------------------- > > Just before the agent arrived for the signing a woamn drove into a > tree in front of me and was killed. > --------------------------------------------------- Howard: My god! (Hmm, yes ... interesting.) How awful! -------------------------------------------------- I think we really live alone (no > matter how many people we know) with > kamma as our only possesion. -------------------------------------------------- Howard: Yes. And there is much misery to go around. The year 2001 has been a difficult one for many people. On a personal note, there are many people, very close to us, who came down with rather serious cases of cancer during 2001. Frankly, I've never seen so much! I don't know whether the environment is "going to hell", or what. But it's been bad. And, of course, the various world events have affected many people quite personally. The only advantage to such tribulation, it seems, is the impetus it gives to spiritual practice (Buddhist practice in our case). ------------------------------------------------------- > robert > ============================== With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 10498 From: Sarah Date: Tue Jan 1, 2002 10:12pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Satipatthana and Practice Hi Erik, A quick correction and apology .., Sarah wrote: > > > p.s > > ....and yes, Erik and his delightful and very sweet new bride > joined us > > for the last discussion and the Satipatthana Sutta ("not the > Samadhi > > Sutta") was discussed at length. This should have read: for the last discussion and the Satipatthana Sutta(“not the Samadhipatthana Sutta”) was discussed at length. Sorry for the mistake. I certainly didn’t mean to suggest the Samadhi Sutta should not be studied or is not important. The point about Satipathana was that it is referring to the 4 Foundations of Mindfulness and not 4 Foundations of Samadhi here (or elsewhere). --- rikpa21 wrote: >> > Eath was absolutely delighted to attend the Dhama discussion there > yesterday, and in spite of not being able to completely follow the > speed of our English, she recognized many of the Pali terms used, > and we wound up having our own mini-discussion on some of the terms > she did recognize from the discussion--pañña and > sampajjana--sitting together under the Bo Tree (which she identified > for me as a Bo tree--I'd never seen, or rather, recognized one, > before, so that was kind of cool) outside the Foundation. I’m very glad to hear about Eath’s response....it’s not at all easy even for native English speakers to join these discussions in the beginning. Great seeing both of you and look f/w to hearing more discussion on your detailed post and reading it more carefully. Still catching up. Speak soon, best wishes to Eath, Sarah p.s ask Eath to keep up her good work of slowing your speech down;-)) ====================================================== 10499 From: Sarah Date: Tue Jan 1, 2002 10:51pm Subject: Re: [dsg] defilements Dear Nina & Kom. I asked a question on this topic following Kom's original post. K.Sujin repeated as you have written in these 2 notes below, Nina. She also used the word 'affected' in the sense that middha (torpor), kukkucca (regret,worry), machariya (stinginess) and issaa (jealousy) are all affected by the other akusala cetasikas; "you can have dosa (aversion) without machariya (stinginess), but not the other way round". Sarah --- Nina van Gorkom wrote: > >> Dear Kom, thank you for bringing up these points. > >> As to the 10 kilesas, I > >> leant that they defile the dhammas that are > >> conascent with them. Thus, in > >> the case of sloth that is listed but not torpor: > >> when there is sloth, torpor > >> is always conascent with it, it is defiled by it. > >> Regret (not listed as > >> kilesa) is defiled by dosa conascent with it and > >> also by the other kilesas > >> which (not all of them) are conascent with it. > > > >K: Thanks for explaining these points further. I would like to > > confirm what I understand you to say. > > 1) Torpor is defiled by sloth and other conascent kilesas? > > 2) Regret is defiled by dosa and other conascent kilesas? > > > >N: I looked up my notes, A.Sujin dealt with them last time I was in > Bgk. She > said: > < akusala to follow. Dosa is kilesa and it conditions other cetasikas, > such as > jealousy and avarice to follow. Sloth conditions torpor to follow it.>> > As to the word follow, we do not think of time: this first, then that. > The > defilements that arise together with the other conascent cetasikas make > them > impure. > Nina. 10500 From: Sarah Date: Wed Jan 2, 2002 0:25am Subject: Re: [dsg] The White Radiant Mind - annihilation view Dear Rob K and Howard, I had a few notes and references on the annihilation theme which I didn't have time to put together before my trip. Let me add them now after snipping from your interesting posts: Howard wrote: > > . But the idea that (the state > of) > > parinibbana is literally *nothing* in every possible sense strikes > me as at > > best very silly. It makes the goal of Buddhism no different from > the goal of > > a suicidal materialist! (How would it differ?) > > ----------------------------------------------------------- Rob K wrote: > A suicidal materialist believes in a self, a self that will be > extinguished at death. He thinks that by killing himself > consciousness and the painful feelings that arise together with > consciousness will then cease. However, this dependent origination > that he takes to be "his" life cannot cease until the conditions for > it have been uprooted. Physical death is just another moment like any > other and the cycle continues on another plane somewhere. The death > of an arahnat is different, there are no more conditions for this > long, long cycle to continue. ........................................................................................................ Sarah: There are some useful notes at the back of B.Bodhi’s translation of the Kaccaanagotta Sutta which I know is a favourite of Howard’s: ..... From the Sutta (SN 11, Nidaanavagga, 15(5) )we read: “This world, Kaccaana, for the most part depends upon a duality - upon the notion of existence and the notion of nonexistence “ (Dvayanissito khvaaya.m Kaccaana loko yebhuyyena atthita~n c’eva natthita~n ca.) ..... Com notes (Spk): “ ‘For the most part’ (yebhuyyena) means for the great multitude, with the exception of the noble individuals (ariyapuggala). The notion of existence (atthitaa) is eternalism (sassata); the notion of nonexistence (natthitaa) is annihilationism (uccheda).” ..... Com notes (Spk-p.t): “The notion of existence is eternalism because it maintains that the entire world (of personal existence) exists forever. The notion of nonexistence is annihilationism because it maintains that the entire world does not exist (forever) but is cut off.” ..... Back to the Sutta: “ But for one who sees the origin of the world as it really is with correct wisdom, there is no notion of nonexistence in regard to the world. And for one who sees the cessation of the world as it really is with correct wisdom, there is no notion of existence in regard to the world.” .... Com notes (Spk): “ ‘The origin of the world’: the production of the world of formations. ‘There is no notion of nonexistence in regard to the world’: there does not occur in him the annihilationist view that might arise in regard to phenomena produced and made manifest in the world of formations, holding ‘They do not exist.” ..... Com notes (Spk-p.t): “The annihilationist view might arise in regard to the world of formations thus: ‘On account of the annihilation and perishing of beings right where they are, there is no persisting being or phenomenon.’ It also includes the wrong view, having these formations as its object, which holds: ‘There are no beings who are reborn.’ That view does not occur in him; for one seeing with right understanding the production and origination of the world of formations in dependence on such diverse conditions as kamma, ignorance, craving, etc, that annihilationist view does not occur, since one sees the uninterrupted production of formations.” ..... Com notes (Spk): “ ‘The cessation of the world’: the dissolution (bhanga) of formations. ‘There is no notion of existence in regard to the world’; There does not occur in him the eternalist view which might arise in regard to phenomena produced and made manifest in the world of formations, holding ‘They exist’.” ..... Com notes (Spk-p.t): “The eternalist view mght arise in regard to the world of formations, taking it to exist at all times, owing to the apprehension of identity in the uninterrupted coninuum occurring in a cause-effect relationship. But that view ‘does not occur in him’; because he sees the cessation of the successively arisen phenomena and the arising of succesively new phenomena, the eternalist view does not occur.” ******* In other words, both views are inherently wrapped up in an idea of ‘self’ or identity in the ‘uninterrupted continuum’. While we cling to an idea of self, there is bound to be one of these views. In the Brahmajaala Sutta (and commentaries) we read in detail about all the possible wrong views including these. 7 kinds of annihilation view are mentioned in the sutta. I’ll just quote the first one: ..... (p.79 B.Bodhi trans.) “85. ‘Herein, bhikkhus, some recluse or brahmin asserts the following doctrine and view: ‘The self, good sir, has material form; it is composed of the four primary elements and originates from father and mother. Since this self, good sir, is annihilated and destroyed with the breakup of the body and does not exist after death, at this point the self is completely annihilated.’ In this way some proclaim the annihilation, destruction, and extermination of an existent being.’” ..... The other 6 kinds of annihilation view all end with the same last sentence about the belief of the ‘extermination of an existent being’. This idea of an ‘existent being’ is the real crux of the view. ..... In the sub-commentary notes (p.182), we read: “Since the destruction of the non-existent (asato) is impossible, the words ‘(annihilation) of an existent being’ are given signifying annihilation based on existence (atthibhaavanibandhano upacchedo).......” ..... A little later (p.183): “..For the assumption of a being arises when the compact of aggregates occurring in the form of a coninuum is not dissected (into its components). And since it is held that ‘the self exists so long as it is not annihilated,’ the assumption of annihilationism is based on the asumption of a being.’ “*** In summary, I don’t find any support for the idea that the cessation of all formations (i.e all phenomena including any experiencing of nibbana) at parinibbana has anything to do with an annihilation view Sarah ***For the non Pali-challenged: “Santaanavasena hi vattamaanesu khandhesu ghanavinibbhogaabhaavena sattagaaho, sattassa ca atthibhaavagaahanibandhano ucchedagaaho yaavaaya”m attaa na ucchijjati, taavaaya”m vijjati yevaa ti gaha.nto.” ====================================================== 10501 From: Sarah Date: Wed Jan 2, 2002 0:41am Subject: Re: An Addendum and a Msg to the List Re: [dsg] The White Radiant Mind Dear Howard, --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Howard: > Yes. And there is much misery to go around. The year 2001 has > been a > difficult one for many people. On a personal note, there are many > people, > very close to us, who came down with rather serious cases of cancer > during > 2001. Frankly, I've never seen so much! I don't know whether the > environment > is "going to hell", or what. But it's been bad. I'm very sorry to hear about these close friends (and relatives). We had a couple of years like that before and then 2001 was one of fine health for all those we 'hold dear'. We never know what conditions hold for us, but I sincerely hope you and your family and friends have a healthier and happier 2002. It's so very difficult, I find, when people are really sick to start considering Dhamma and kusala in general for the first time. Now we all have the chance. And, of course, the > various > world events have affected many people quite personally. The only > advantage > to such tribulation, it seems, is the impetus it gives to spiritual > practice > (Buddhist practice in our case). Yes, you've put it much better. As Nina and Num reminded us, we can put the loss or difficulties to good purpose if it encourages the development of all that is skilful and wise. Very best wishes to you and your family. Sarah p.s There are some really useful discussion groups on line (like this) for each kind of common and rare cancer which can be very useful for gaining information, accessing resources and offering support, just as we do with the dhamma. ------------------------------------------------------- 10502 From: wangchuk37 Date: Wed Jan 2, 2002 2:46am Subject: happy new year 2002 as my first gift to you for this new year you can still consult free of charge the full Buddhist bibliography at : http://www.cyberdistributeur.com/buddbib.html I am planning to launch a directory (list of links) to Buddhist web sites so if you wish to have your web site listed, please do let me know and i'll include it in the next update, for this please use the feedback form at : http://www.cyberdistributeur.com/feedback.htm Again of my best wishes for a prosperous happy new year, Roger 10503 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Wed Jan 2, 2002 5:22am Subject: Re: [dsg] defilements Nina, Kom, Sarah and others --- Nina van Gorkom wrote: > op 30-12-2001 16:34 schreef Kom Tukovinit op tikmok@y...: > >>> K. Jaran and A. Supi was discussing about > >> Kilesa, and why > >>> only 10 akusala cetasikas are kilesas, and the > >> other 4 are > >>> not. The answer, I think you also wrote in > >> Cetasikas, is > >>> each Kilesa defiles the mind, where as the > >> other four defile > >>> the mental factors. At that point, I was asking him > >>> questions about the other groupings of > >> defilements including > >>> Asava, etc. > >> > >> Dear Kom, thank you for bringing up these points. > >> As to the 10 kilesas, I > >> leant that they defile the dhammas that are > >> conascent with them. Thus, in > >> the case of sloth that is listed but not torpor: > >> when there is sloth, torpor > >> is always conascent with it, it is defiled by it. > >> Regret (not listed as > >> kilesa) is defiled by dosa conascent with it and > >> also by the other kilesas > >> which (not all of them) are conascent with it. > > > >K: Thanks for explaining these points further. I would like to > > confirm what I understand you to say. > > 1) Torpor is defiled by sloth and other conascent kilesas? > > 2) Regret is defiled by dosa and other conascent kilesas? > > > >N: I looked up my notes, A.Sujin dealt with them last time I was in > Bgk. She > said: > < akusala to follow. Dosa is kilesa and it conditions other cetasikas, > such as > jealousy and avarice to follow. Sloth conditions torpor to follow it.>> > As to the word follow, we do not think of time: this first, then that. > The > defilements that arise together with the other conascent cetasikas make > them > impure. > Nina. And see also the explanation given in the Visuddhimagga ("thus called because they are themselves defiled, and because they defile the mental factors associated with them"), quoted in 'Buddhist Dictionary', and also the other references given there, pasted below. Jon From 'Buddhist Dictionary': Kilesa: 'defilements', are mind-defiling, unwholesome qualities. Vis.M. XXII, 49, 65: "There are 10 defilements, thus called because they are themselves defiled, and because they defile the mental factors associated with them..." The ten are explained in Dhs. 1229f and enumerated in Vibh. XII. [ends] http://www.palikanon.com/english/wtb/dic3_k2.htm 10504 From: Date: Wed Jan 2, 2002 2:35am Subject: Re: An Addendum and a Msg to the List Re: [dsg] The White Radiant Mind Thank you, Sarah. With metta, Howard In a message dated 1/2/02 3:42:04 AM Eastern Standard Time, sarahdhhk@y... writes: > Dear Howard, > > --- upasaka@a... wrote: > > Howard: > > Yes. And there is much misery to go around. The year 2001 has > > been a > > difficult one for many people. On a personal note, there are many > > people, > > very close to us, who came down with rather serious cases of cancer > > during > > 2001. Frankly, I've never seen so much! I don't know whether the > > environment > > is "going to hell", or what. But it's been bad. > > I'm very sorry to hear about these close friends (and relatives). We had a > couple of years like that before and then 2001 was one of fine health for > all those we 'hold dear'. We never know what conditions hold for us, but I > sincerely hope you and your family and friends have a healthier and > happier 2002. It's so very difficult, I find, when people are really sick > to start considering Dhamma and kusala in general for the first time. Now > we all have the chance. > > And, of course, the > > various > > world events have affected many people quite personally. The only > > advantage > > to such tribulation, it seems, is the impetus it gives to spiritual > > practice > > (Buddhist practice in our case). > > Yes, you've put it much better. As Nina and Num reminded us, we can put > the loss or difficulties to good purpose if it encourages the development > of all that is skilful and wise. > > Very best wishes to you and your family. > > Sarah > > p.s There are some really useful discussion groups on line (like this) for > each kind of common and rare cancer which can be very useful for gaining > information, accessing resources and offering support, just as we do with > the dhamma. > ------------------------------------------------------- > > /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 10505 From: Kom Tukovinit Date: Wed Jan 2, 2002 8:14am Subject: RE: [dsg] defilements Dear Nina & Sarah & Jon: Sarah, thanks for confirming this with A. Sujin: it is so great to live in a time where a kalayanamitta can (sometimes) help you with your questions. Nina, thank you so much for the patience in looking through your note for this simple question. I think I will need to ask more questions as a result of this. If you haven't caught this discrepancy in what I wrote, I would have never caught this misunderstanding. Your book, Cetasikas, already addressed what I think you confirmed; I just didn't read it carefully enough. 1) They [kilesas] are dirty, unclean, impure; they defile or torment the mind. 2) From Visuddhimagga (XXII, 49): They are so called because they are themselves defiled and they defile the states [?: both citta and cetasikas???: Jon's reference said mental factors instead of states] associated with them. 3) Example: Shamelessness has no shame of akusala and recklessness does not fear its consequences. They arise with each akusala citta, they defile citta and the accompanying cetasikas. A. Sujin's explanation seems to link the two groups: kilesas, and the other akusala cetasikas: 4) they [kilesas] condition other types of akusala to follow 5) Example: Dosa is kilesa and it conditions other cetasikas, such as jealousy and avarice to follow. Sloth conditions torpor to follow it. 6) middha (torpor), kukkucca (regret,worry), machariya (stinginess) and issaa(jealousy) are all affected by the other [conascent] akusala cetasikas [kilesa] 7) Example: "you can have dosa (aversion) without machariya (stinginess), but not the other way round". The quoted references are: 1) Dhammasangani, 1229 2) Book of Analysis, Vibhanga 17, 966 [Jon said Vibh. XII: is this the same one?] 3) Visuddhimagga XXII, 49 > -----Original Message----- > From: Sarah [mailto:sarahdhhk@y...] > Sent: Tuesday, January 01, 2002 10:52 PM > To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com > Subject: Re: [dsg] defilements > > > Dear Nina & Kom. > > I asked a question on this topic following Kom's > original post. K.Sujin > repeated as you have written in these 2 notes > below, Nina. She also used > the word 'affected' in the sense that middha > (torpor), kukkucca > (regret,worry), machariya (stinginess) and issaa > (jealousy) are all > affected by the other akusala cetasikas; "you can > have dosa (aversion) > without machariya (stinginess), but not the other > way round". > > Sarah > > > --- Nina van Gorkom wrote: 10506 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Wed Jan 2, 2002 10:09am Subject: Re: [dsg] abhidhamma op 31-12-2001 18:42 schreef srnsk@a... op srnsk@a...: >Nina: You said Abhidhamma is like a dry > bone. Lodewijk said, tell him it is like the flesh and sinews of our life. > _______________________ > > Num: I have to admit that I have a lot of appetite for Abhidhamma. I agree > with Lodewijk that the bony part of the meat, esp. the rib, is my favorite > part, yummy yummy. Nina:Dear Num, thank you for your insightful and witty post. Lodewijk and I had to laugh about the rib being your favorite. Num: As I mentioned before the more I read (I haven't read a > lot), the more I feel like all 3 pitaka keep talking and pointing to the same > thing, DHAMMA. The 3 pitaka are mutually supportive. The terms and statements > in Abhidhamma-pitaka were found all over in both vinaya and suttan-pitaka. > In Abhidhamma-pitaka, names, places and persons were stripped out. So the > bone can be obviously seen. In vinaya and suttanta the same things were > talked in a more interactive manner, in different background, to different > audiences, from the a wanderer to the > great master of prominent philosophy school of thought. > Nina: I find the > "Guide through the Abhidhamma Pitaka" by Nyanatiloka, B.P.S. Kandy, very > helpful to gradually get used to reading difficult passages, especially the > Kathavatthu. For instance, Ch II, may someone by just repeating the word > dukkha attain enlightenment. But this really happens, people are repeating > words without understanding. Ch I: Is there in the absolute sense any > personality to be found? > These are questions people today also ask. > ________________________ > > Num: I will try to check the Guide book out from the library. Thanks for > this. I am not used to the mean that the same question were asked twice, but > then the answers become totally opposite. I understand that my understanding > is limited. I will try it later. My problem is I like bony stuff too much :). Nina: I admire your taste for study, and your energy in getting this book. > Best wishes, Nina. 10507 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Wed Jan 2, 2002 10:09am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Luminous Mind: op 01-01-2002 16:38 schreef abhidhammika op abhidhammika@y...: >>>> Nina wrote: > > " You say, bhavangacitta is conditioned by the javanacittas that > arise. By what type of the twentyfour conditions? I was puzzled by > this." > >Suan: It is "KAMMAPACCAYO" that conditions bhavangacittam. > > The following qoute comes from Section 13, Paccayuddesa, Patthaana > Pali, Vol.1. I copied and pasted from Chatthasangayana CD-ROM version > 3. > > 13. "Kammapaccayoti– kusalaakusalam kammam (vipaakaanam > khandhaanam, resultant mental aggregates) katattaa ca ruupaanam > kammapaccayena paccayo." > Dear Suan, yes, it is clear that kamma of the past produces the bhavangacitta that is vipakacitta. What I am puzzled about is that the javanacittas arising in processes can condition the bhavangacitta. I was wondering in what way they can do this, since the javana cittas arise in processes and the bhavangacitta is just in deep sleep so to say. Or did I misunderstand what you wrote? Best wishes from Nina. 10508 From: yuzhonghao Date: Wed Jan 2, 2002 2:04pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Concept Hello all, I posted the question in the previous message and it seems that there is no reponse so far. I am not sure if the question itself is not worth consideration and is best to be left unanswered with silence... So, I am posting the question again: How does a concept come to be? Thanks in advance. Regards, Victor --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "yuzhonghao" wrote: > Hello all, > > I have a question regarding the discussion on concept: > > How does a concept come to be? > > Regards, > Victor 10509 From: yuzhonghao Date: Wed Jan 2, 2002 2:42pm Subject: Re: Contradiction (Views) Hello Wynn, What contradiction are you talking about? Please refer to Anguttara Nikaya X.93, Ditthi Sutta, Views http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/anguttara/an10-093.html Especially, please consider the sort of view Anathapindika the householder has: "Whatever has been brought into being, is fabricated, willed, dependently originated, that is inconstant. Whatever is inconstant is stress. Whatever is stress is not me, is not what I am, is not my self. This is the sort of view I have." "So, householder, whatever has been brought into being, is fabricated, willed, dependently originated, that is inconstant. Whatever is inconstant is stress. You thus adhere to that very stress, submit yourself to that very stress." "Venerable sirs, whatever has been brought into being, is fabricated, willed, dependently originated, that is inconstant. Whatever is inconstant is stress. Whatever is stress is not me, is not what I am, is not my self. Having seen this well with right discernment as it actually is present, I also discern the higher escape from it as it actually is present." Right view leads to the cessation of the dukkha. Regards, Victor --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., wynn wrote: > Hi, > > The Buddha talk about Right View (samma ditthi). > > However, in Sutta Nipata verse 787, 800, 882, the Buddha said or (more impersonally) the true sage, has no views. > > How do you explain this contradiction? > > Thanks, > Wynn 10510 From: Sarah Date: Wed Jan 2, 2002 2:53pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Concept Hi Victor, --- yuzhonghao wrote: > Hello all, > > I posted the question in the previous message and it seems that there > is no reponse so far. I am not sure if the question itself is not > worth consideration and is best to be left unanswered with silence... Of course it's worth consideration..it's just that there's a lot of competition for consideration;-)) > So, I am posting the question again: > How does a concept come to be? Can we say that a 'concept comes to be' because of thinking? NO thinking means no concepts. As for what causes any particular thinking and set of concepts at any particular time, this depends on many different conditions intricately working together to form up this particulr kind of thinking and concept at this moment. we've discussed a lot about the important role sa~n~na (perception) plays, but other factors and conditions are also play crucial roles. Sorry, I have to go out now (7am), but someone else may be able to add more. Best wishes for your studies and understanding in the New Year. Speak soon. Sarah ================================================= 10511 From: yuzhonghao Date: Wed Jan 2, 2002 3:17pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Concept Hello Sarah, Thank you for tending to my question. Indeed, I think there is fierce competition for consideration (and attention, too!!) This is how I understand an important and valid point in what you wrote, namely: Concept is conditioned. Thank you and best wishes to you in the new year. Regards, Victor --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Sarah wrote: > Hi Victor, > > --- yuzhonghao wrote: > Hello all, > > > > I posted the question in the previous message and it seems that there > > is no reponse so far. I am not sure if the question itself is not > > worth consideration and is best to be left unanswered with silence... > > Of course it's worth consideration..it's just that there's a lot of > competition for consideration;-)) > > > So, I am posting the question again: > > How does a concept come to be? > > Can we say that a 'concept comes to be' because of thinking? NO thinking > means no concepts. As for what causes any particular thinking and set of > concepts at any particular time, this depends on many different conditions > intricately working together to form up this particulr kind of thinking > and concept at this moment. we've discussed a lot about the important role > sa~n~na (perception) plays, but other factors and conditions are also play > crucial roles. > > Sorry, I have to go out now (7am), but someone else may be able to add > more. > > Best wishes for your studies and understanding in the New Year. > > Speak soon. > > Sarah 10512 From: Sarah Date: Wed Jan 2, 2002 3:35pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Concept Hi Victor, --- yuzhonghao wrote: > Hello Sarah, > > Thank you for tending to my question. Indeed, I think there is > fierce competition for consideration (and attention, too!!) > > This is how I understand an important and valid point in what you > wrote, namely: > > Concept is conditioned. I think it's more accurate to say the thinking is conditioned and it depends on all the conditions as to what thinking arises and what it takes as object. A concept is not real, so we don't usually refer to it as being conditioned. This time I'm really leaving (late)..;-)) > Thank you and best wishes to you in the new year. Look forward to more discussions too. Sarah =================================================== 10513 From: christine_forsyth Date: Wed Jan 2, 2002 5:48pm Subject: Bangkok impressions 28/12/01-2/01/02 Dear All, Much to my surprise, my luggage and I arrived safely at the Hotel around midnight. Wonderful to find a message waiting from Sarah and to receive an early morning phone call. (English accent!) Meeting Sarah, Jon and Mike for a leisurely breakfast and discussion each morning was a much 'looked forward to' way to start the day.....on one enjoyable occasion we were also joined by Sukin and Balvindra, Ivan, and Jaran. Having only known people as marks on a computer screen, the sounds of voices made the most impact at first. (Australian, American, English, Indian, Thai, Thai/English accents.) Meeting everyone at the Foundation, and listening to Khun Sujin was the highlight.....her gentle patience with people of all levels of understanding, and seemingly inexhaustible energy, unattached to results, left an indelible memory. Khun Sujin clarified my dilemma about metta being 'other directed' not 'self directed', for which I'm grateful. I didn't end up 'enlightened' which my son claims as the minimum outcome he expected of me......I still don't understand Anatta, didn't eradicate self-view, and I found out about defilements (and they weren't even on my 'to learn' list). But I did learn the A,B,C stepwise technique of observing realities ....... [:-) only joking Sarah, settle down :-)]...... I still wish there was one...... A general warning to All:- Anyone contemplating a trip to Bangkok at the same time that Sarah and Jon are there - be careful of the breakfast gatherings......so friendly.....so relaxed..... such good conversation.....such a trap! :-) This only becomes apparent later in the day at the Foundation when either of this wonderful (but merciless) couple begins a sentence with "Khun Sujin, when I was talking with Christine earlier, she... (blah, blah, blah)....." Then you are under the search light of Khun Sujins' full attention, a microphone in your hands and not a thought in your empty head or a word in your mouth......All this after I found out that making deprecating remarks about your own lack of knowledge compared to everyone else is just mana. Why does it sound worse in Pali? And there must be a less harsh word than Defilements........... The REAL problem is that on the next morning you forget the consequences and the spell is woven again at breakfast....... NOTE: The defenses are 1. Keep your mouth full of food at breakfast and just nod and smile wisely. 2. At the Foundation, sit in the outer circle of chairs, close your eyes like Ivan and give the impression of profoundly contemplating the reality of sound appearing in the present moment. That IS what he does isn't it??? n.b. What is NOT considered acceptable when faced with unanswerable response from Khun Sujin is to look vague and after three or four seconds of silence say, 'Oh, and another thing I wanted to ask about was.......' or 'putting down the microphone'. Both of these manouevres will be greeted with laughter from the rest of the room, who will delight in pointing out that you are not getting off the hook so easily. I seem to have hook marks all over......But thanks to Amara, Betty, Sarah, Jon, Mike, Ivan, Ell, Sukin, Jaran, (and others whom I can clearly picture and fondly remember, but whom I don't wish to offend by a clumsy attempt at spelling their names) for helping me, and for the friendliness and good fellowship that seems to be a hallmark of a visit to the Foundation. note for Sukin - I have totally, absolutely forgiven you (almost) for bringing a digital camera and recording us for posterity on the same day my hair dryer died (r.i.p.) - henceforward to be known as Flat Hair Day. Other memories are of delightlful gifts from new friends, and books from the Foundation....feeding the fish (scores, as big as ironing boards!) near the Wat with Betty, Mike and Amara - Do you think fish are really that intelligent to know they are safe near a Wat? Are you sure it is not just that they know where half a ton of bread is going to be thrown in? (I am sure that's how much Amara had in the boot of the car). Lunch at the home of Khun Douangduan (?Sp) - delicious food in a lovely courtyard setting.....Sarah telling her dog-bite story........Betty telling her ?washing powder story (I will not type that word!).......lots of laughter..... Amaras' kindness and wonderful hospitality when she gave her time to take Mike and I around on New Years Day......Contrary to what you thought Jon, the traffic seemed to be horrendous, not light......I think 3 million of those 6 million didn't leave town for New Year, they seemed to be driving to the same places we were going!.......Thank goodness Amara is such an excellent driver (Rally Driver Extraordinaire).......though I think something...almost....happened because only once all day in awe- inspiring traffic did I hear her say 'Oooops!'. I tensed and tightly closed my eyes and practised a policy of 'don't ask and it didn't happen'.......and Mike didn't yell, but I think he sees Bangkok drivers as the norm now...... I really could write on and on, but may I just say one thing........the period I spent in Bangkok with the dsg-ers is a life changing experience and exceeded my expectations. I hope to go again. metta, Christine 10514 From: Date: Wed Jan 2, 2002 1:23pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Bangkok impressions 28/12/01-2/01/02 Dear Christine, Really nice to hear that you had a good time in BKK and met a group of very kind and nice persons. I really enjoy your explicit post :) Hope it is not to late to say welcome to Thailand. Let me ask you sth and I like to correct something as well. <<>> Could give more explicit detail about this? 10515 From: Date: Wed Jan 2, 2002 1:37pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Bangkok impressions 28/12/01-2/01/02 2nd part Sorry, I accidentally clicked Send by not finished writing my mail my yet. ------------------------------------------------------------- Part I, Dear Christine, Really nice to hear that you had a good time in BKK and met a group of very kind and nice persons. I really enjoy your explicit post :) Hope it is not to late to say welcome to Thailand. Let me ask you sth and I like to correct something as well. <<>> Could give more explicit detail about this? ----------------------------------------------- Here is what I about to put in, Part II: Myth :: <<<......Contrary to what you thought Jon, the traffic seemed to be horrendous, not light......I think 3 million of those 6 million didn't leave town for New Year, they seemed to be driving to the same places we were going!....... >>> Oh oh, this is probably 5 year ago census. I call this a book knowledge, not bases on reality here and now ;) (just kidding). By census, yes you are probably right 6 M. In reality is about 10 M, and in summer is probably 12 M. And you may be interested to know that nobody really know how many are the temporary workers (including child prostitutes) really there. Usually the government say NONE. Bangkok is a very interesting city. I better stop here. Num 10516 From: Sarah Date: Wed Jan 2, 2002 9:24pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Bangkok impressions 28/12/01-2/01/02 Hi Christine, I'm laughing out loud so much (with my English laugh) that I'm probably disturbing my neigbours;-) So very glad it was so worthwhile -- after all it's a long trip for a long weekend;-) It was a very intensive weekend of discussion and I was most impressed by your patience, stamina and keen interest. I heard on the news that flights into Sydney were being diverted because of the smoke from the fires, so I'm relieved to hear that somehow you got back to Queensland OK. It was really great having you in Bkk at the same time and at the same hotel.....I'm afraid I can't attempt to match your wit and style here;-) Just be very glad the sight-seeing tour wasn't on the day after New Year's Day, though! Speak very soon. I see Num has already put you back in the hot seat;-)) Looking forward to a repeat visit together and I'm already missing our breakfasts.....(lobha, lobha) Sarah ================================================= --- christine_forsyth wrote: > I really could write on and on, but may I just say one > thing........the period I spent in Bangkok with the dsg-ers is a life > changing experience and exceeded my expectations. I hope to go again. > > metta, > Christine > 10517 From: Kom Tukovinit Date: Wed Jan 2, 2002 9:25pm Subject: RE: [dsg] deceiving dhammas Dear Nina, Here's the second posting listing some of what "cheating" dhammas remind me of. When I think of kusala that was done in the past with somanassa, I would like to think that the thinking itself is kusala, but it is really (or all mixed-up) with mana. When I am discussing dhammas with a person, I would like to think the motivation is kusala. This is all mixed up with mana (I am discussing dhamma), and sometimes even some irritation when the result is not what I want, or the other person does not agree. The irritation is coarse but is often unnoticed, sometimes noticable by the voice being too loud (right, Num?), or the sentence being a little too terse and inconsiderate. When I am discussing dhamma with a person, I would like to think that it is for the useful benefit of others and myself. It is really, sometimes, to get acknowledgement, even a small one. When I see something desirable, I sometimes think of the patikula characteristics of the seen thing. It is really all with mixed-up with wanting to not having such strong lobha. Although this is not quite like "patikkulasanna pathirupena vyapado vancethi (2)", but this reminds me so. When I see giving, or seeing good vipakas of other people, I sometimes feel jealous, but sometimes followed by anumoddhana / mudita. Part of what I think is kusala, or all of it, is fake, wanting to have kusala instead of akusala, or just plainly not liking the domanassa vedana. When I study the dhamma (or discusses) dhammas, I sometimes feel peace. I would like to think it is the result of kaya-passadhi and citta-passadhi, but often, it is just plain Dheena-mitha. samadhimukhena thinamiddhang vangcethi (3) is exactly like that. When I considers the dhamma (or analyzes the dhamma) excessively, especially on the thing that cannot (yet) be truly known (like analyzing things via conditionalities), I would like to think I am developing conceptual understandings, but is really uddhaca (and becomes obvious toward the end). This is just like viriyarambhamukhena uddhaccang vangcethi (4). vimansa mukhena hetupatirupaka pariggahena miccaditthi vanceti (9). I don't know if this applies to myself, but I sometimes wonder if how I understand things just happens to be how I like it. Uddacha again. I say something decent/kind to other people. I would like to think of it is metta, but it is often mixed up with wanting to be liked. samvibhaga seelata patirupataya miccajivo vangceti (13), and piyavadita patirupataya catukammata vangceti (18) remind me of this. I am not very talkative person. I would like to think that it is not being mixed up something that is not useful. Sometimes, it is just plain laziness (dina-mitha, again), or because of not having metta for others. mitabhanata patirupataya asammodana seelata vangceti (19) is exactly like this. attadhipateyyata patirupataya garunam anusasaniya appadakkhinaggahita vangceti (32). I am often feel grateful for a few people in this group who see dhammas in other's sayings, even when in many (or most) cases, they don't agree with one another. I am inpired by Boddhisatta for seeing dhammas in sayings that are not intended to be dhamma. It requires such a long accumulation to be reminded of the true dhammas even when one hears what is not dhamma. mettayana mukhena raago vangceti (35): raga as the metta. Try metta with a pretty girl, eh, Num? Listing some lists like this - it may be only because I want to show off that I am aware of some of these akusalas! kom > -----Original Message----- > From: Nina van Gorkom [mailto:nilo@e...] > Sent: Monday, December 31, 2001 7:49 AM > To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com > Subject: [dsg] deceiving dhammas > > > Dear Kom, you alluded to the vancaka dhammas, > deceiving dhammas. Could you > mention just a few that you find particularly > helpful to consider in daily > life? I find too that by hearing about more > subtle defilements it helps at > least on the level of pariyatti to notice them. > On the other hand I was > warned by A. Sujin: don't analyse, that is > thinking again. I am inclined to > analyse. > Nina. > 10518 From: jaranoh Date: Wed Jan 2, 2002 10:13pm Subject: Re: [dsg] deceiving dhammas Hi Kom and Nina: Thanks for the post(s). It is so helpful to see examples of akusala dhammas in disguise. All this doubt of whether they are kusalas or otherwise can only be eliminated when one is true (honest) to oneself. ('phu-trong' which itself is hard to realize.) Also, a lot of akusala dhammas can be mistakely taken as 'phu-trong'. I guess that's why the path to true understanding of realities is sooo long and bumpy. Nina, when you say 'analyse', what do you mean exactly? I would love to hear your chronical explanation (narration) from the moment a reality impings on the door ways to the moment of 'analysis'. I hope this makes some sense. If not, please forgive me. All the best, jaran PS. Give my regards to people I know in the bayarea, kom. --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Kom Tukovinit wrote: > Dear Nina, > > Here's the second posting listing some of what "cheating" > dhammas remind me of. > > On the other hand I was > > warned by A. Sujin: don't analyse, that is > > thinking again. I am inclined to > > analyse. > > Nina. > > 10519 From: Kom Tukovinit Date: Wed Jan 2, 2002 11:04pm Subject: RE: [dsg] deceiving dhammas Dear K. Jaran, Thanks for the reminder that Vichikicca is also another cheating dhamma. > -----Original Message----- > From: jaranoh [mailto:jaranoh@y...] > PS. Give my regards to people I know in the bayarea, kom. Perhaps you would come back (maybe in October?) and tell us many things you learned at the foundations... Many people have mentioned that they have missed your presence. kom 10520 From: christine_forsyth Date: Thu Jan 3, 2002 2:51am Subject: Re: Bangkok impressions 28/12/01-2/01/02 2nd part Dear Num, Thank-you for your welcome :-) I am back home in Brisbane now - I left the Hotel at 2 p.m. on the 2nd, the flight left Bangkok at about 5.00 p.m., and after changing planes in Sydney I landed in Brisbane at 9.00 a.m. on the 3rd. Finally home at 10.30 a.m. Unfortunately, a tiny ill baby cried all night from Bangkok to Sydney, so a very weary group left the plane. Yes, I agree that Bangkok is a very interesting and complex city. I hope to be able to learn more about it first hand.....not book knowledge :-) - Sorry for the delay in replying.....I slept all afternoon after my post to dsg, and a couple of personal ones. Regarding the mention of metta, I am not sure if you read the previous thread http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/ I actually came in late on an already existing thread started by Ranil in post No. 9276 of 13/11/01; my first post is No. 9347 of 18 November, 2001 and is followed by a discussion I closely followed from other members of the list. Later, I reintroduced the topic on 5 December, 2001, in message 9818 (actually with what I incorrectly thought was a trump card) - followed by a shorter discussion. Much thought and heat and desperate turmoil has gone into this topic within my own mind. I strongly resisted anything that seemed to contradict what I wanted metta to be........what I needed it to be for me.......what I felt (if the world were fair) it should be for all those damaged by abuse in early childhood at critical periods of development. So, I read all the posts, I read the Useful Posts section on dsg, I used Google to search the Net for ammunition, I contacted previous teachers, I posted to other groups. I contacted esteemed individuals in various fields :-)....... In the end, the vast majority of sitting meditators were on one side of a line drawn in the sand, directing metta to oneself (as well as others).........and the minority who stated that metta can only be directed outwards to others, and that it was difficult to be certain it was really Metta anyway, were on the other side of the line. Even though the thread ran its course and ceased to be discussed, it still simmered away within me....like a soup, on the back hotplate, with all the flavours intermixing...... So, when I came to Bangkok and the subject was raised in the meeting with Khun Sujin at the Foundation, changes had already taken place in my understanding. I listened intently. There was quite a long discussion by different members of the group, and I am not sure that any startling new points were raised. The understanding I derived from what Khun Sujin said is approximately as follows, and is MY understanding, not necessarily what she may have hoped I would understand: Anyone else whether present or not, please feel free to join in if I go off the tracks......... I started out by saying that because of my work I often came home depleted and needed a moment when I could recharge myself with metta (as per my post 9347), but Khun Sujin told us that metta like all brahma vihara (metta, karuna, mudita and upekkha) has to have an entity, therefore a concept, as the object. To step outside myself in order to radiate metta to myself, I would still need another person to be the object of my metta, it can't perform a u-turn and head back to 'me'. Usually we love ourselves best of all, and we even love others because of the feelings they cause in 'us'. Most often we have lots of lobha for ourselves, and radiating metta for ourselves would be increasing the attachment, more and more. As I understand, KS said metta can be developed in daily life, when we meet someone or anyone for whom we feel friendliness and no wish to harm in anyway, and we look after their well being and happiness without the least thought of ourselves or how we might benefit from the situation, even from familiarity or friendly feelings in return. So we need not be alone in a dark room to feel friendship or 'loving kindness' towards any entity, it can arise at any moment and accumulate our own kusala citta. In the end, all metta would automatically accumulate in the citta, regardless of where we direct it. But if one has lobha for metta, the desire for it would impede its occurrence. Num, this is as far as I can go with this at the moment, but I would welcome anything you or anyone else may care to add or comment. metta, Christine --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., srnsk@a... wrote: > Sorry, I accidentally clicked Send by not finished writing my mail my yet. > > ------------------------------------------------------------- > Part I, > > Dear Christine, > > Really nice to hear that you had a good time in BKK and met a group of very > kind and nice persons. I really enjoy your explicit post :) Hope it is not > to late to say welcome to Thailand. > > Let me ask you sth and I like to correct something as well. > > << about metta being 'other directed' not 'self directed', for which I'm > grateful.>>> > > Could give more explicit detail about this? > ----------------------------------------------- > > Here is what I about to put in, > > Part II: > > Myth :: <<<......Contrary to what you > thought Jon, the traffic seemed to be horrendous, not light......I > think 3 million of those 6 million didn't leave town for New Year, > they seemed to be driving to the same places we were > going!....... > >>> > > Oh oh, this is probably 5 year ago census. I call this a book knowledge, not > bases on reality here and now ;) (just kidding). By census, yes you are > probably right 6 M. In reality is about 10 M, and in summer is probably 12 M. > And you may be interested to know that nobody really know how many are the > temporary workers (including child prostitutes) really there. Usually the > government say NONE. Bangkok is a very interesting city. I better stop here. > > > Num 10521 From: abhidhammika Date: Thu Jan 3, 2002 3:24am Subject: Re: luminous mind: To Nina And Kom On Kamma Modifying Bhavanga Cittam Dear Nina And Kom How are you? You wrote: " Dear Suan, yes, it is clear that kamma of the past produces the bhavangacitta that is vipakacitta. What I am puzzled about is that the javanacittas arising in processes can condition the bhavangacitta. I was wondering in what way they can do this, since the javana cittas arise in processes and the bhavangacitta is just in deep sleep so to say. Or did I misunderstand what you wrote? Best wishes from Nina." This problem has been raised by both of you (Kom off-list) previously many months before. I was occupied with many other matters which prevented me from solving this problem promptly. Not only that, I wanted to discuss this matter properly. And, even now, I won't be able to discuss this issue as much as I like. Sorry about this short reply. However, as you raised this question again, I will give you, as a quick answer, Buddhaghosa's statement on how javana cittas can condition bhavangacitta. The answer to this problem is to do with the timing and quality of javana cittas. When javana citta has the strength of a janaka kamma, it can modify bhavangacitta. In fact, it can cause new kinds of bhavangacitta to arise. The following Pali quote comes from Section 687, Kankhavitaranavisuddhi niddesa, Visuddhimaggo, Vol.2. 687. .....Tattha janakam naama kusalampi hoti akusalampi. Tam patisandhiyampi pavattepi ruupaaruuupavipaakakkhandhe janeti. "...There, janakam is either healthy or unhealthy action. It (janaka kamma) can cause resultant physical and mental aggegates to arise either at the moment of linking consciousness (conception) or during the current lifetime." Please kindly note that the resultant mental aggregates (aruupa vipaaka khandhaa) during the current lifetime refer to bhavanga cittas. You wrote: "Or did I misunderstand what you wrote?" I don't think you misunderstood what I wrote. Perhaps, you did not see a connection between what I wrote and what Buddhaghosa wrote. Having said that, Buddhaghosa wrote a disclaimer as well further down the paragraph to the effect that full understanding of how kamma and vipaaka works is the domain only of the Buddhas, not that of us. Hope this message solves your puzzle! With best wishes, Suan http://www.bodhiology.org --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Nina van Gorkom wrote: > op 01-01-2002 16:38 schreef abhidhammika op abhidhammika@y...: > > >>>> Nina wrote: > > > > " You say, bhavangacitta is conditioned by the javanacittas that > > arise. By what type of the twentyfour conditions? I was puzzled by > > this." > > > >Suan: It is "KAMMAPACCAYO" that conditions bhavangacittam. > > > > The following qoute comes from Section 13, Paccayuddesa, Patthaana > > Pali, Vol.1. I copied and pasted from Chatthasangayana CD-ROM version > > 3. > > > > 13. "Kammapaccayoti– kusalaakusalam kammam (vipaakaanam > > khandhaanam, resultant mental aggregates) katattaa ca ruupaanam > > kammapaccayena paccayo." > > > Dear Suan, yes, it is clear that kamma of the past produces the > bhavangacitta that is vipakacitta. What I am puzzled about is that the > javanacittas arising in processes can condition the bhavangacitta. I was > wondering in what way they can do this, since the javana cittas arise in > processes and the bhavangacitta is just in deep sleep so to say. Or did I > misunderstand what you wrote? Best wishes from Nina. 10522 From: Kenneth Ong Date: Thu Jan 3, 2002 4:43am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: luminous mind: To Nina And Kom On Kamma Modifying Bhavanga Cittam Hi Suan, That is interesting. "When javana citta has the strength of a janaka kamma, it can modify bhavangacitta. In fact, it can cause new kinds of bhavangacitta to arise. Could you kindly explained the sentence "new kinds of bhavangacittas". Secondly since the objects of bhavangacittas are the same throughout one's life, will that mean that these new kinds of bhavangacittas have different objects. Do you know of any commentaries that mention the objects of bhavangcittas. Sometimes I wondering why the objects are a mystery, since bhanvagacittas are conditioned by the rebirth citta which are in turn conditioned by last citta, then in turn by the last javana cittas of the last series of citta process. Since the last series process of cittas objects are known then why when it reach bhavanga citta, its object is not known. Kind regards Ken O --- abhidhammika wrote: > > > > Dear Nina And Kom > > How are you? > > You wrote: > > " Dear Suan, yes, it is clear that kamma of the past produces the > bhavangacitta that is vipakacitta. What I am puzzled about is that > the javanacittas arising in processes can condition the > bhavangacitta. I was wondering in what way they can do this, since > the javana cittas arise in processes and the bhavangacitta is just in > deep sleep so to say. Or did I misunderstand what you wrote? Best > wishes from Nina." > > This problem has been raised by both of you (Kom off-list) previously > many months before. I was occupied with many other matters which > prevented me from solving this problem promptly. Not only that, I > wanted to discuss this matter properly. And, even now, I won't be > able to discuss this issue as much as I like. > > Sorry about this short reply. > > However, as you raised this question again, I will give you, as a > quick answer, Buddhaghosa's statement on how javana cittas can > condition bhavangacitta. > > The answer to this problem is to do with the timing and quality of > javana cittas. > > When javana citta has the strength of a janaka kamma, it can modify > bhavangacitta. In fact, it can cause new kinds of bhavangacitta to > arise. > > The following Pali quote comes from Section 687, > Kankhavitaranavisuddhi niddesa, Visuddhimaggo, Vol.2. > > 687. .....Tattha janakam naama kusalampi hoti akusalampi. Tam > patisandhiyampi pavattepi ruupaaruuupavipaakakkhandhe janeti. > > "...There, janakam is either healthy or unhealthy action. It (janaka > kamma) can cause resultant physical and mental aggegates to arise > either at the moment of linking consciousness (conception) or during > the current lifetime." > > Please kindly note that the resultant mental aggregates (aruupa > vipaaka khandhaa) during the current lifetime refer to bhavanga > cittas. > > > You wrote: > > "Or did I misunderstand what you wrote?" > > I don't think you misunderstood what I wrote. Perhaps, you did not > see a connection between what I wrote and what Buddhaghosa wrote. > > Having said that, Buddhaghosa wrote a disclaimer as well further down > the paragraph to the effect that full understanding of how kamma and > vipaaka works is the domain only of the Buddhas, not that of us. > > Hope this message solves your puzzle! > > > With best wishes, > > > Suan > > http://www.bodhiology.org 10523 From: ashkenn Date: Thu Jan 3, 2002 4:55am Subject: Re: [dsg] The White Radiant Mind Hi Sarah, Mike said that our cittas are pure and bc of akusala cetasikas they become "not pure". Second look of this statement left with a reservation with this explanation. This would mean our underlying cittas are pure, this support an inherent implication of pureness in turn will support the notion that our underlying nature is pure. this raise more questions than answers. Kind regards Ken O --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Sarah wrote: > Hi Ken O, > > A couple more references for you: > > 1) Dhammasangani 6 (PTS trans) > > "What on that occasion is thought (citta.m)? > > The thought which on that occasion is ideation, mind, heart, that which is > clear (pa.n.dara ), ideation as the sphere of mind, the faculty > of mind, intellection......." > > i.e pa.n.dara as synonym for citta and mano > > 2)SN, V, Mahaavagga, 33(3) Corruptions (BB trans) > > "........S too, bhikkhus, there are these five corruptions of the mind, > corrupted by which the mind is neither malleable nor wieldy nor radiant > (pabbhasara ) but brittle and not rightly concentrated for the > destruction of the taints. What five? Sensual desire is a corruption of > the mind corrupted by which the mind is neither malleable nor wieldy nor > radiant ..ill will....." > > i.e. pabbhasara referring to kusala cittas > > Others may find other references... > > Sarah > ======================================= > 10524 From: Sarah Date: Thu Jan 3, 2002 6:07am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Bangkok impressions 28/12/01-2/01/02 2nd part Dear Christine, This is a really good summary......I'm so impressed that you can recall the details, especially just after such a long trip home and crying baby on flight as well;-) Impressed! Sarah --- christine_forsyth wrote: > The understanding I derived from what Khun Sujin said is > approximately as follows, and is MY understanding, not necessarily > what she may have hoped I would understand: Anyone else whether > present or not, please feel free to join in if I go off the > tracks......... I started out by saying that because of my work I > often came home depleted and needed a moment when I could recharge > myself with metta (as per my post 9347), but Khun Sujin told us that > metta like all brahma vihara (metta, karuna, mudita and upekkha) has > to have an entity, therefore a concept, as the object. To step > outside myself in order to radiate metta to myself, I would still > need another person to be the object of my metta, it can't perform a > u-turn and head back to 'me'. Usually we love ourselves best of all, > and we even love others because of the feelings they cause in 'us'. > Most often we have lots of lobha for ourselves, and radiating metta > for ourselves would be increasing the attachment, more and more. > As I understand, KS said metta can be developed in daily life, when > we meet someone or anyone for whom we feel friendliness and no wish > to harm in anyway, and we look after their well being and happiness > without the least thought of ourselves or how we might benefit from > the situation, even from familiarity or friendly feelings in return. > > So we need not be alone in a dark room to feel friendship or 'loving > kindness' towards any entity, it can arise at any moment and > accumulate our own kusala citta. In the end, all metta would > automatically accumulate in the citta, regardless of where we direct > it. But if one has lobha for metta, the desire for it would impede > its occurrence. Num, this is as far as I can go with this at the > moment, but I would welcome anything you or anyone else may care to > add or comment. 10525 From: Sarah Date: Thu Jan 3, 2002 6:23am Subject: RE: [dsg] deceiving dhammas Dear Kom, I found these comments really great as well....and I think this is really the 'development' when 'one' begins to see all the akusala coming in at any time. --- Kom Tukovinit wrote: > Dear Nina, > > Here's the second posting listing some of what "cheating" > dhammas remind me of. > > When I think of kusala that was done in the past with > somanassa, I would like to think that the thinking itself is > kusala, but it is really (or all mixed-up) with mana. > > When I am discussing dhammas with a person, I would like to > think the motivation is kusala. This is all mixed up with > mana (I am discussing dhamma), and sometimes even some > irritation when the result is not what I want, or the other > person does not agree. The irritation is coarse but is > often unnoticed, sometimes noticable by the voice being too > loud (right, Num?), or the sentence being a little too terse > and inconsiderate. This is interesting. Funnily enough, in the middle of a dhamma discussion, such as the recent ones at the Foundation, I notice the akusala (unwholesome) states almost more than at any other time, even when I'm just sitting quietly there. Like you say, so many opportunities for mana (conceit), irritation, attachment and sometimes I find myself lost in some papanca (proliferations) and quite lose the thread of what is being said. Then, as you describe, when speaking, there is so much attachment and so on mixed with the few really kusala (wholesome) states.....and of course, it's all just the same here too;-) > When I am discussing dhamma with a person, I would like to > think that it is for the useful benefit of others and > myself. It is really, sometimes, to get acknowledgement, > even a small one. Oh well, I've given you an acknowledgement;-) But, I really know how you feel. Your other points are all so good too. Btw, I think 'patikula' as in the para. below refers to the 'loathsome qualities'.. correct me if this is wrong (too lazy to check). Thanks, Sarah p.s. NUM- dragged Jon off to see Harry Potter (movie) after work- now I say it was because my students gave me this task for homework and they're all going to check when they start returning on Saturday, but really it was all just a good excuse for the lobha;-) =================================================== Kom> When I see something desirable, I sometimes think of the > patikula characteristics of the seen thing. It is really > all with mixed-up with wanting to not having such strong > lobha. Although this is not quite like "patikkulasanna > pathirupena vyapado vancethi (2)", but this reminds me so. > > When I see giving, or seeing good vipakas of other people, I > sometimes feel jealous, but sometimes followed by > anumoddhana / mudita. Part of what I think is kusala, or > all of it, is fake, wanting to have kusala instead of > akusala, or just plainly not liking the domanassa vedana. > > When I study the dhamma (or discusses) dhammas, I sometimes > feel peace. I would like to think it is the result of > kaya-passadhi and citta-passadhi, but often, it is just > plain Dheena-mitha. samadhimukhena thinamiddhang vangcethi > (3) is exactly like that. > > When I considers the dhamma (or analyzes the dhamma) > excessively, especially on the thing that cannot (yet) be > truly known (like analyzing things via conditionalities), I > would like to think I am developing conceptual > understandings, but is really uddhaca (and becomes obvious > toward the end). This is just like viriyarambhamukhena > uddhaccang vangcethi (4). > > vimansa mukhena hetupatirupaka pariggahena miccaditthi > vanceti (9). I don't know if this applies to myself, but I > sometimes wonder if how I understand things just happens to > be how I like it. Uddacha again. > > I say something decent/kind to other people. I would like > to think of it is metta, but it is often mixed up with > wanting to be liked. samvibhaga seelata patirupataya > miccajivo vangceti (13), and piyavadita patirupataya > catukammata vangceti > (18) remind me of this. > > I am not very talkative person. I would like to think that > it is not being mixed up something that is not useful. > Sometimes, it is just plain laziness (dina-mitha, again), or > because of not having metta for others. mitabhanata > patirupataya asammodana seelata vangceti (19) is exactly > like this. > > attadhipateyyata patirupataya garunam anusasaniya > appadakkhinaggahita > vangceti (32). I am often feel grateful for a few people in > this group who see dhammas in other's sayings, even when in > many (or most) cases, they don't agree with one another. I > am inpired by Boddhisatta for seeing dhammas in sayings that > are not intended to be dhamma. It requires such a long > accumulation to be reminded of the true dhammas even when > one hears what is not dhamma. > > mettayana mukhena raago vangceti (35): raga as the metta. > Try metta with a pretty girl, eh, Num? > > Listing some lists like this - it may be only because I want > to show off that I am aware of some of these akusalas! > 10526 From: Kom Tukovinit Date: Thu Jan 3, 2002 8:49am Subject: RE: [dsg] The White Radiant Mind Dear Ken, I have a question for you. > -----Original Message----- > From: ashkenn [mailto:ashkenn@y...] > > Mike said that our cittas are pure and bc of > akusala cetasikas they > become "not pure". Second look of this statement > left with a > reservation with this explanation. This would > mean our underlying > cittas are pure, this support an inherent > implication of pureness in > turn will support the notion that our underlying > nature is pure. > this raise more questions than answers. I don't understand how the statement that the citta (without defilment) is pure supports the notion that our underlying "nature" is pure. Would you explain what you mean by "our nature"? kom 10527 From: Date: Thu Jan 3, 2002 4:32am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Bangkok impressions 28/12/01-2/01/02 2nd part Dear Christine, I am very impressed by your insight :) Oh, I see you had to fly down to Sydney first and then back up to Brisbane. Wish you have a good rest and a quick recover from a long trip. Yes, I have been following the thread. But let me take the topic a little further, OK. > The understanding I derived from what Khun Sujin said is > approximately as follows, and is MY understanding, not necessarily > what she may have hoped I would understand: Anyone else whether > present or not, please feel free to join in if I go off the > tracks......... I started out by saying that because of my work I > often came home depleted and needed a moment when I could recharge > myself with metta (as per my post 9347), but Khun Sujin told us that > metta like all brahma vihara (metta, karuna, mudita and upekkha) has > to have an entity, therefore a concept, as the object. To step > outside myself in order to radiate metta to myself, I would still > need another person to be the object of my metta, it can't perform a > u-turn and head back to 'me'. Usually we love ourselves best of all, > and we even love others because of the feelings they cause in 'us'. > Most often we have lots of lobha for ourselves, and radiating metta > for ourselves would be increasing the attachment, more and more. > As I understand, KS said metta can be developed in daily life, when > we meet someone or anyone for whom we feel friendliness and no wish > to harm in anyway, and we look after their well being and happiness > without the least thought of ourselves or how we might benefit from > the situation, even from familiarity or friendly feelings in return. > So then why in Visuddhimagga mentioned couple times that one shall start to practice metta toward oneself first and then directed outward? What do you think it meant by that? I completely agree with your points above but I'd like to see the subject in various perspectives. Another point I'd like to add is bhramavihara also can be taken as an object (arammana) for every aspect of akusala (asava, ogha, yogha, gantha, upadhana, nivorana, anusaya,samyojana, and kilesa) as well. Your mail yesterday made me laugh :) Best wishes, Num 10528 From: Date: Thu Jan 3, 2002 4:47am Subject: Re: [dsg] deceiving dhammas Hi Kom, Nina, Sarah, Jaran and everyone. I'd like to express that I really appreciate this particular thread. Kom let me anomodhana in your kusala moment again and again. After I read your posts, I thought that is how parami developed in daily life, little by little. I do not know how long is the path but I know for sure that if one just want or attach to the idea or mental image of the path or goal without making just a step here and now, one will be swept away by the flow (may I call it asava or ogha). All parami are mutually supportive. Kanthi and sacca needs panna and vice versa. Let me try some pali: pannasattha, pannaaloko, pannaobhaso, pannapajjoto, pannaratano, amoho, dhammvicayo, samadhitthi and finally natthi panna sama abha, nothing is as illuminating as panna. Best wishes and always appreciate. Num 10529 From: christine_forsyth Date: Thu Jan 3, 2002 0:14pm Subject: Understanding Metta (was [dsg] Re: Bangkok impressions 28/12/01-2/01/02) Dear Sarah, Thank you, but I would be a fraud if I allowed you to think there had been such an increase in my understanding and recall. I never rely on memory especially with all that Pali flying around. I owe much to writing a diary after the sessions, but most particularly from being able to discuss things and correspond with K. Amara. I think I owe her a post for DL on this subject as well....... metta, Christine --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Sarah wrote: > Dear Christine, > > This is a really good summary......I'm so impressed that you can recall > the details, especially just after such a long trip home and crying baby > on flight as well;-) > > Impressed! > Sarah > > --- christine_forsyth wrote: > > > The understanding I derived from what Khun Sujin said is > > approximately as follows, and is MY understanding, not necessarily > > what she may have hoped I would understand: Anyone else whether > > present or not, please feel free to join in if I go off the > > tracks......... I started out by saying that because of my work I > > often came home depleted and needed a moment when I could recharge > > myself with metta (as per my post 9347), but Khun Sujin told us that > > metta like all brahma vihara (metta, karuna, mudita and upekkha) has > > to have an entity, therefore a concept, as the object. To step > > outside myself in order to radiate metta to myself, I would still > > need another person to be the object of my metta, it can't perform a > > u-turn and head back to 'me'. Usually we love ourselves best of all, > > and we even love others because of the feelings they cause in 'us'. > > Most often we have lots of lobha for ourselves, and radiating metta > > for ourselves would be increasing the attachment, more and more. > > As I understand, KS said metta can be developed in daily life, when > > we meet someone or anyone for whom we feel friendliness and no wish > > to harm in anyway, and we look after their well being and happiness > > without the least thought of ourselves or how we might benefit from > > the situation, even from familiarity or friendly feelings in return. > > > > So we need not be alone in a dark room to feel friendship or 'loving > > kindness' towards any entity, it can arise at any moment and > > accumulate our own kusala citta. In the end, all metta would > > automatically accumulate in the citta, regardless of where we direct > > it. But if one has lobha for metta, the desire for it would impede > > its occurrence. Num, this is as far as I can go with this at the > > moment, but I would welcome anything you or anyone else may care to > > add or comment. > > > 10530 From: yuzhonghao Date: Thu Jan 3, 2002 1:06pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Concept Hello Sarah, You questioned that "Can we say that a concept comes to be because of thinking?" What do you think? Can we? You wrote that no thinking means no concepts. From what you wrote, it seems to me that you mean that concept is dependent on thinking. This is how I understand the word "concept" from the online dictionary in http://www.webster.com: A concept means something conceived in the mind, a thought, a notion. It also means an abstract or generic idea generalized from particular instances. The synonym to the word "concept" is the word "idea." I agree with you that thinking is conditioned. Regards, Victor --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Sarah wrote: > Hi Victor, > > --- yuzhonghao wrote: > Hello Sarah, > > > > Thank you for tending to my question. Indeed, I think there is > > fierce competition for consideration (and attention, too!!) > > > > This is how I understand an important and valid point in what you > > wrote, namely: > > > > Concept is conditioned. > > I think it's more accurate to say the thinking is conditioned and it > depends on all the conditions as to what thinking arises and what it takes > as object. A concept is not real, so we don't usually refer to it as being > conditioned. > > This time I'm really leaving (late)..;-)) > > > Thank you and best wishes to you in the new year. > > Look forward to more discussions too. > > Sarah 10531 From: m. nease Date: Thu Jan 3, 2002 3:20pm Subject: Re: [dsg] The White Radiant Mind Hi Kenneth, Hope you didn't take my attempt at answering too seriously--it's sure to be incomplete at best. --- ashkenn wrote: > Mike said that our cittas are pure and bc of akusala > cetasikas they > become "not pure". Second look of this statement > left with a > reservation with this explanation. This would mean > our underlying > cittas are pure, What 'underlying cittas'? mike 10532 From: m. nease Date: Thu Jan 3, 2002 3:44pm Subject: RE: [dsg] deceiving dhammas Dear Kom (and Num), Just want to take a moment to say how much I appreciate this thread. This is just the way I see it, almost all akusala almost all the time, and often taken for 'practice', 'insight' (conceptual, of course!), etc. Sorry I can't match your detail, this is very valuable I think--but don't have the time to get very specific. It reminds me of Jon's 'fire extinguisher' practice--constantly 'putting out fires' of supposed dosa. Of course this is really conditioned by the desire to be free from domanassa etc., and, when it 'works', gives the impression of 'successful practice'. Just substituting a pleasant object for an unpleasant one usually, I think--all conditioned by aversion (to unhappiness) and desire (for happiness) and ignorance (of the nature of both). So many different forms of this same unfortunate process (in my experience), some identified with 'Dhamma' and some not. It's relentless, conditioned no doubt by so many countless javanas and extremely hard to break--impossible, I think, by this kind of 'effort'. I sometimes find this thought discouraging. I certainly hope that some small degree of awareness of these moments of 'self'-deception will someday loosen their grip--but there I go again. mike --- Kom Tukovinit wrote: > Dear Nina, > > Here's the second posting listing some of what > "cheating" > dhammas remind me of. > > When I think of kusala that was done in the past > with > somanassa, I would like to think that the thinking > itself is > kusala, but it is really (or all mixed-up) with > mana. > > When I am discussing dhammas with a person, I would > like to > think the motivation is kusala. This is all mixed > up with > mana (I am discussing dhamma), and sometimes even > some > irritation when the result is not what I want, or > the other > person does not agree. The irritation is coarse but > is > often unnoticed, sometimes noticable by the voice > being too > loud (right, Num?), or the sentence being a little > too terse > and inconsiderate. > > When I am discussing dhamma with a person, I would > like to > think that it is for the useful benefit of others > and > myself. It is really, sometimes, to get > acknowledgement, > even a small one. > > When I see something desirable, I sometimes think of > the > patikula characteristics of the seen thing. It is > really > all with mixed-up with wanting to not having such > strong > lobha. Although this is not quite like > "patikkulasanna > pathirupena vyapado vancethi (2)", but this reminds > me so. > > When I see giving, or seeing good vipakas of other > people, I > sometimes feel jealous, but sometimes followed by > anumoddhana / mudita. Part of what I think is > kusala, or > all of it, is fake, wanting to have kusala instead > of > akusala, or just plainly not liking the domanassa > vedana. > > When I study the dhamma (or discusses) dhammas, I > sometimes > feel peace. I would like to think it is the result > of > kaya-passadhi and citta-passadhi, but often, it is > just > plain Dheena-mitha. samadhimukhena thinamiddhang > vangcethi > (3) is exactly like that. > > When I considers the dhamma (or analyzes the dhamma) > excessively, especially on the thing that cannot > (yet) be > truly known (like analyzing things via > conditionalities), I > would like to think I am developing conceptual > understandings, but is really uddhaca (and becomes > obvious > toward the end). This is just like > viriyarambhamukhena > uddhaccang vangcethi (4). > > vimansa mukhena hetupatirupaka pariggahena > miccaditthi > vanceti (9). I don't know if this applies to > myself, but I > sometimes wonder if how I understand things just > happens to > be how I like it. Uddacha again. > > I say something decent/kind to other people. I > would like > to think of it is metta, but it is often mixed up > with > wanting to be liked. samvibhaga seelata > patirupataya > miccajivo vangceti (13), and piyavadita patirupataya > catukammata vangceti > (18) remind me of this. > > I am not very talkative person. I would like to > think that > it is not being mixed up something that is not > useful. > Sometimes, it is just plain laziness (dina-mitha, > again), or > because of not having metta for others. mitabhanata > patirupataya asammodana seelata vangceti (19) is > exactly > like this. > > attadhipateyyata patirupataya garunam anusasaniya > appadakkhinaggahita > vangceti (32). I am often feel grateful for a few > people in > this group who see dhammas in other's sayings, even > when in > many (or most) cases, they don't agree with one > another. I > am inpired by Boddhisatta for seeing dhammas in > sayings that > are not intended to be dhamma. It requires such a > long > accumulation to be reminded of the true dhammas even > when > one hears what is not dhamma. > > mettayana mukhena raago vangceti (35): raga as the > metta. > Try metta with a pretty girl, eh, Num? > > Listing some lists like this - it may be only > because I want > to show off that I am aware of some of these > akusalas! > > kom > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: Nina van Gorkom [mailto:nilo@e...] > > Sent: Monday, December 31, 2001 7:49 AM > > To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com > > Subject: [dsg] deceiving dhammas > > > > > > Dear Kom, you alluded to the vancaka dhammas, > > deceiving dhammas. Could you > > mention just a few that you find particularly > > helpful to consider in daily > > life? I find too that by hearing about more > > subtle defilements it helps at > > least on the level of pariyatti to notice them. > > On the other hand I was > > warned by A. Sujin: don't analyse, that is > > thinking again. I am inclined to > > analyse. > > Nina. 10533 From: christine_forsyth Date: Thu Jan 3, 2002 9:13pm Subject: Undertanding Metta - was([dsg] Re: Bangkok impressions 28/12/01-2/01/02) Dear Num, and All, Num, Thank you for your kind remarks, - as I said to Sarah I am indebted to on and off-list discussions with dhamma friends, as well as a little note taking. When once I have understood and agreed with explanations and teachings, some of this becomes re-presented...... I call this 'parrot' dhamma :)) You say: "So then why in Visuddhimagga mentioned couple times that one shall start to practice metta toward oneself first and then directed outward? What do you think it meant by that? " I have had a look back at the Visuddhi Magga Chapter IX Description of Concentration - The Divine Abidings verses 8-10 and 92 mentioned in the previous thread. I think what is meant is that I should use 'myself' as an example to bring to mind that other beings feel emotional, psychological and physical pain just as 'I' do. I was watching a one year old toddler at the Shopping Mall this morning. She had pulled the legs off her doll when a tiny puppy came close; she picked it up and seemed to be trying to do the same to the puppy, with no understanding that it could feel pain or fear, anymore than the doll could. Her mother quickly removed the puppy and said "How would you like it if I pulled your legs off?' .... giving a sharp tug on the childs' legs. Quite clearly from the yell of protest, she wouldn't have liked it at all..... I know none of us are quite like that, and that it is just a developmental stage. But some adults (maybe all of us to a smaller or greater degree) can grow indifferent, or a little callous about the suffering of others, or see it as 'their own fault' 'kamma' 'not as bad as someone else's suffering' - or just not notice it in the busyness of our day. I think practising Metta initially as an exercise towards oneself is a gentler Adults Only version of the above. It is sort of an initial sensitising, training activity - a reminder to be un-self- ish, but it is not meant as a supportive, self-loving or consoling 'stand alone' practice. What do you think? You say: "Another point I'd like to add is bhramavihara also can be taken as an object (arammana) for every aspect of akusala (asava, ogha, yogha, gantha, upadhana, nivorana, anusaya,samyojana, and kilesa) as well." I didn't know this - do you have any references where I can read about it? metta, Christine --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., srnsk@a... wrote: > Dear Christine, > > > I am very impressed by your insight :) Oh, I see you had to fly down to > Sydney first and then back up to Brisbane. Wish you have a good rest and a > quick recover from a long trip. > > > Yes, I have been following the thread. But let me take the topic a little > further, OK. > > > > The understanding I derived from what Khun Sujin said is > > approximately as follows, and is MY understanding, not necessarily > > what she may have hoped I would understand: Anyone else whether > > present or not, please feel free to join in if I go off the > > tracks......... I started out by saying that because of my work I > > often came home depleted and needed a moment when I could recharge > > myself with metta (as per my post 9347), but Khun Sujin told us that > > metta like all brahma vihara (metta, karuna, mudita and upekkha) has > > to have an entity, therefore a concept, as the object. To step > > outside myself in order to radiate metta to myself, I would still > > need another person to be the object of my metta, it can't perform a > > u-turn and head back to 'me'. Usually we love ourselves best of all, > > and we even love others because of the feelings they cause in 'us'. > > Most often we have lots of lobha for ourselves, and radiating metta > > for ourselves would be increasing the attachment, more and more. > > As I understand, KS said metta can be developed in daily life, when > > we meet someone or anyone for whom we feel friendliness and no wish > > to harm in anyway, and we look after their well being and happiness > > without the least thought of ourselves or how we might benefit from > > the situation, even from familiarity or friendly feelings in return. > > > > So then why in Visuddhimagga mentioned couple times that one shall start to > practice metta toward oneself first and then directed outward? What do you > think it meant by that? I completely agree with your points above but I'd > like to see the subject in various perspectives. > > Another point I'd like to add is bhramavihara also can be taken as an object > (arammana) for every aspect of akusala (asava, ogha, yogha, gantha, upadhana, > nivorana, anusaya,samyojana, and kilesa) as well. > > Your mail yesterday made me laugh :) > > Best wishes, > > Num > > 10534 From: Sarah Date: Thu Jan 3, 2002 9:16pm Subject: Re: [dsg] deceiving dhammas Hi Num, --- srnsk@a... wrote: > > Let me try some pali: pannasattha, pannaaloko, pannaobhaso, > pannapajjoto, > pannaratano, amoho, dhammvicayo, samadhitthi and finally natthi panna > sama > abha, nothing is as illuminating as panna. > Hmmm....Are you sure you translated it all? For the 95% of members who are pali challenged (inc.me), could you add a little more translation and explanation of your words of wisdom? Thanks, Sarah ================================================ 10535 From: Robert Epstein Date: Thu Jan 3, 2002 9:54pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Bangkok impressions 28/12/01-2/01/02 Dear Christine, What a lovely, humorous and evocative account of your trip and the meeting with dsg'ers and others. If you decide to write a travel book, I'm ready to fill out the order form any time. Thanks for bringing the event to life. Now on to more important matters: Sukin, are you going to post the photos???? Best Regards, Robert Ep. ========================= --- christine_forsyth wrote: > Dear All, > > Much to my surprise, my luggage and I arrived safely at the Hotel > around midnight. Wonderful to find a message waiting from Sarah and > to receive an early morning phone call. (English accent!) Meeting > Sarah, Jon and Mike for a leisurely breakfast and discussion each > morning was a much 'looked forward to' way to start the day.....on > one enjoyable occasion we were also joined by Sukin and Balvindra, > Ivan, and Jaran. > Having only known people as marks on a computer screen, the sounds of > voices made the most impact at first. (Australian, American, English, > Indian, Thai, Thai/English accents.) > Meeting everyone at the Foundation, and listening to Khun Sujin was > the highlight.....her gentle patience with people of all levels of > understanding, and seemingly inexhaustible energy, unattached to > results, left an indelible memory. Khun Sujin clarified my dilemma > about metta being 'other directed' not 'self directed', for which I'm > grateful. > I didn't end up 'enlightened' which my son claims as the minimum > outcome he expected of me......I still don't understand Anatta, > didn't eradicate self-view, and I found out about defilements (and > they weren't even on my 'to learn' list). > But I did learn the A,B,C stepwise technique of observing > realities ....... [:-) only joking Sarah, settle down :-)]...... I > still wish there was one...... > A general warning to All:- Anyone contemplating a trip to Bangkok at > the same time that Sarah and Jon are there - be careful of the > breakfast gatherings......so friendly.....so relaxed..... such good > conversation.....such a trap! :-) > This only becomes apparent later in the day at the Foundation when > either of this wonderful (but merciless) couple begins a sentence > with "Khun Sujin, when I was talking with Christine earlier, she... > (blah, blah, blah)....." Then you are under the search light of Khun > Sujins' full attention, a microphone in your hands and not a thought > in your empty head or a word in your mouth......All this after I > found out that making deprecating remarks about your own lack of > knowledge compared to everyone else is just mana. Why does it sound > worse in Pali? And there must be a less harsh word than > Defilements........... > > The REAL problem is that on the next morning you forget the > consequences and the spell is woven again at breakfast....... > NOTE: > The defenses are 1. Keep your mouth full of food at breakfast and > just nod and smile wisely. > 2. At the Foundation, sit in the outer > circle of chairs, close your eyes like Ivan and give the impression > of profoundly contemplating the reality of sound appearing in the > present moment. That IS what he does isn't it??? > n.b. What is NOT considered acceptable when faced with unanswerable > response from Khun Sujin is to look vague and after three or four > seconds of silence say, 'Oh, and another thing I wanted to ask about > was.......' or 'putting down the microphone'. Both of these > manouevres will be greeted with laughter from the rest of the room, > who will delight in pointing out that you are not getting off the > hook so easily. I seem to have hook marks all over......But thanks > to Amara, Betty, Sarah, Jon, Mike, Ivan, Ell, Sukin, Jaran, (and > others whom I can clearly picture and fondly remember, but whom I > don't wish to offend by a clumsy attempt at spelling their names) for > helping me, and for the friendliness and good fellowship that seems > to be a hallmark of a visit to the Foundation. > > note for Sukin - I have totally, absolutely forgiven you (almost) for > bringing a digital camera and recording us for posterity on the same > day my hair dryer died (r.i.p.) - henceforward to be known as Flat > Hair Day. > > Other memories are of delightlful gifts from new friends, and books > from the Foundation....feeding the fish (scores, as big as ironing > boards!) near the Wat with Betty, Mike and Amara - Do you think fish > are really that intelligent to know they are safe near a Wat? Are > you sure it is not just that they know where half a ton of bread is > going to be thrown in? (I am sure that's how much Amara had in the > boot of the car). > > Lunch at the home of Khun Douangduan (?Sp) - delicious food in a > lovely courtyard setting.....Sarah telling her dog-bite > story........Betty telling her ?washing powder story (I will not type > that word!).......lots of laughter..... > > Amaras' kindness and wonderful hospitality when she gave her time to > take Mike and I around on New Years Day......Contrary to what you > thought Jon, the traffic seemed to be horrendous, not light......I > think 3 million of those 6 million didn't leave town for New Year, > they seemed to be driving to the same places we were > going!.......Thank goodness Amara is such an excellent driver (Rally > Driver Extraordinaire).......though I think > something...almost....happened because only once all day in awe- > inspiring traffic did I hear her say 'Oooops!'. I tensed and tightly > closed my eyes and practised a policy of 'don't ask and it didn't > happen'.......and Mike didn't yell, but I think he sees Bangkok > drivers as the norm now...... > > I really could write on and on, but may I just say one > thing........the period I spent in Bangkok with the dsg-ers is a life > changing experience and exceeded my expectations. I hope to go again. > > metta, > Christine 10536 From: Kenneth Ong Date: Thu Jan 3, 2002 10:02pm Subject: RE: [dsg] The White Radiant Mind Hi Kom, I was using a hypothetical situation. Imagine all cittas that arise without any cetasikas, since cittas are pure as described, then our series of cittas will be pure. This would infer a underlying nature of "pure" in that sense. That is how I got my inference. Was it this hypothetical situation used to justify pureness or Absolute Nature. Kind regards Ken O --- Kom Tukovinit wrote: > Dear Ken, > > I have a question for you. > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: ashkenn [mailto:ashkenn@y...] > > > > > Mike said that our cittas are pure and bc of > > akusala cetasikas they > > become "not pure". Second look of this statement > > left with a > > reservation with this explanation. This would > > mean our underlying > > cittas are pure, this support an inherent > > implication of pureness in > > turn will support the notion that our underlying > > nature is pure. > > this raise more questions than answers. > > I don't understand how the statement that the citta (without > defilment) is pure supports the notion that our underlying > "nature" is pure. Would you explain what you mean by "our > nature"? > > kom 10537 From: christine_forsyth Date: Thu Jan 3, 2002 10:08pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Bangkok impressions 28/12/01-2/01/02 Dear Rob Ep, Thank you for your kind words......Maybe we'll all get there together sometime....We missed Robert K by a week or so......Trouble is with you and Howard there, who else would get a word in? :-) Would I be persona non grata on the List if I slightly threatened Sujin....only a tiny little bit? Like getting Balvindra on our side somehow....... I feel the women in the photo should have the right to accept, or reject, or select, the photo (especially that poor one with flat hair). Or even wait 'til next year...... metta, Christine --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Robert Epstein wrote: > Dear Christine, > What a lovely, humorous and evocative account of your trip and the meeting with > dsg'ers and others. If you decide to write a travel book, I'm ready to fill out > the order form any time. > > Thanks for bringing the event to life. > > Now on to more important matters: Sukin, are you going to post the photos???? > > > Best Regards, > Robert Ep. > > ========================= > > --- christine_forsyth wrote: > > Dear All, > > > > Much to my surprise, my luggage and I arrived safely at the Hotel > > around midnight. Wonderful to find a message waiting from Sarah and > > to receive an early morning phone call. (English accent!) Meeting > > Sarah, Jon and Mike for a leisurely breakfast and discussion each > > morning was a much 'looked forward to' way to start the day.....on > > one enjoyable occasion we were also joined by Sukin and Balvindra, > > Ivan, and Jaran. > > Having only known people as marks on a computer screen, the sounds of > > voices made the most impact at first. (Australian, American, English, > > Indian, Thai, Thai/English accents.) > > Meeting everyone at the Foundation, and listening to Khun Sujin was > > the highlight.....her gentle patience with people of all levels of > > understanding, and seemingly inexhaustible energy, unattached to > > results, left an indelible memory. Khun Sujin clarified my dilemma > > about metta being 'other directed' not 'self directed', for which I'm > > grateful. > > I didn't end up 'enlightened' which my son claims as the minimum > > outcome he expected of me......I still don't understand Anatta, > > didn't eradicate self-view, and I found out about defilements (and > > they weren't even on my 'to learn' list). > > But I did learn the A,B,C stepwise technique of observing > > realities ....... [:-) only joking Sarah, settle down :- )]...... I > > still wish there was one...... > > A general warning to All:- Anyone contemplating a trip to Bangkok at > > the same time that Sarah and Jon are there - be careful of the > > breakfast gatherings......so friendly.....so relaxed..... such good > > conversation.....such a trap! :-) > > This only becomes apparent later in the day at the Foundation when > > either of this wonderful (but merciless) couple begins a sentence > > with "Khun Sujin, when I was talking with Christine earlier, she... > > (blah, blah, blah)....." Then you are under the search light of Khun > > Sujins' full attention, a microphone in your hands and not a thought > > in your empty head or a word in your mouth......All this after I > > found out that making deprecating remarks about your own lack of > > knowledge compared to everyone else is just mana. Why does it sound > > worse in Pali? And there must be a less harsh word than > > Defilements........... > > > > The REAL problem is that on the next morning you forget the > > consequences and the spell is woven again at breakfast....... > > NOTE: > > The defenses are 1. Keep your mouth full of food at breakfast and > > just nod and smile wisely. > > 2. At the Foundation, sit in the outer > > circle of chairs, close your eyes like Ivan and give the impression > > of profoundly contemplating the reality of sound appearing in the > > present moment. That IS what he does isn't it??? > > n.b. What is NOT considered acceptable when faced with unanswerable > > response from Khun Sujin is to look vague and after three or four > > seconds of silence say, 'Oh, and another thing I wanted to ask about > > was.......' or 'putting down the microphone'. Both of these > > manouevres will be greeted with laughter from the rest of the room, > > who will delight in pointing out that you are not getting off the > > hook so easily. I seem to have hook marks all over......But thanks > > to Amara, Betty, Sarah, Jon, Mike, Ivan, Ell, Sukin, Jaran, (and > > others whom I can clearly picture and fondly remember, but whom I > > don't wish to offend by a clumsy attempt at spelling their names) for > > helping me, and for the friendliness and good fellowship that seems > > to be a hallmark of a visit to the Foundation. > > > > note for Sukin - I have totally, absolutely forgiven you (almost) for > > bringing a digital camera and recording us for posterity on the same > > day my hair dryer died (r.i.p.) - henceforward to be known as Flat > > Hair Day. > > > > Other memories are of delightlful gifts from new friends, and books > > from the Foundation....feeding the fish (scores, as big as ironing > > boards!) near the Wat with Betty, Mike and Amara - Do you think fish > > are really that intelligent to know they are safe near a Wat? Are > > you sure it is not just that they know where half a ton of bread is > > going to be thrown in? (I am sure that's how much Amara had in the > > boot of the car). > > > > Lunch at the home of Khun Douangduan (?Sp) - delicious food in a > > lovely courtyard setting.....Sarah telling her dog-bite > > story........Betty telling her ?washing powder story (I will not type > > that word!).......lots of laughter..... > > > > Amaras' kindness and wonderful hospitality when she gave her time to > > take Mike and I around on New Years Day......Contrary to what you > > thought Jon, the traffic seemed to be horrendous, not light......I > > think 3 million of those 6 million didn't leave town for New Year, > > they seemed to be driving to the same places we were > > going!.......Thank goodness Amara is such an excellent driver (Rally > > Driver Extraordinaire).......though I think > > something...almost....happened because only once all day in awe- > > inspiring traffic did I hear her say 'Oooops!'. I tensed and tightly > > closed my eyes and practised a policy of 'don't ask and it didn't > > happen'.......and Mike didn't yell, but I think he sees Bangkok > > drivers as the norm now...... > > > > I really could write on and on, but may I just say one > > thing........the period I spent in Bangkok with the dsg-ers is a life > > changing experience and exceeded my expectations. I hope to go again. > > > > metta, > > Christine 10538 From: Sarah Date: Thu Jan 3, 2002 10:54pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Bangkok impressions 28/12/01-2/01/02 Dear Christine, --- christine_forsyth wrote: > Dear Rob Ep, > > Thank you for your kind words......Maybe we'll all get there together > sometime....We missed Robert K by a week or so......Trouble is with > you and Howard there, who else would get a word in? :-) ;-)) > Would I be persona non grata on the List if I slightly threatened > Sujin....only a tiny little bit? Like getting Balvindra on our side > somehow....... I think you may be getting Sujin and Sukin mixed up here...I'm sure it's Sukin you'd like to threaten;-) Yes, why not ask Balvindra (Sukin's wife) to check whether your hair looks flat first? (..I'm so glad mine is too short to worry about..) > I feel the women in the photo should have the right to accept, or > reject, or select, the photo (especially that poor one with flat > hair). Or even wait 'til next year...... Yes, I think so too....don't worry....In any case, Sukin was not sure his digital camera was up to doing whatever it's meant to do, so maybe your hair will be safe and it'll be an extra incentive for others to join us next year;-) Back to testing metta with my students tomorrow...still it's been a good break from the 'little darlings';-) Sarah =========================================== 10539 From: christine_forsyth Date: Thu Jan 3, 2002 11:04pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Bangkok impressions 28/12/01-2/01/02 Dear Sarah, Thanks for the correction, my apologies to all. Hmmmmm! interesting about Sukins' camera..... :-) metta, Christine --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Sarah wrote: > Dear Christine, > > --- christine_forsyth wrote: > Dear Rob Ep, > > > > Thank you for your kind words......Maybe we'll all get there together > > sometime....We missed Robert K by a week or so......Trouble is with > > you and Howard there, who else would get a word in? :-) > > ;-)) > > > Would I be persona non grata on the List if I slightly threatened > > Sujin....only a tiny little bit? Like getting Balvindra on our side > > somehow....... > > I think you may be getting Sujin and Sukin mixed up here...I'm sure it's > Sukin you'd like to threaten;-) Yes, why not ask Balvindra (Sukin's wife) > to check whether your hair looks flat first? (..I'm so glad mine is too > short to worry about..) > > > I feel the women in the photo should have the right to accept, or > > reject, or select, the photo (especially that poor one with flat > > hair). Or even wait 'til next year...... > > Yes, I think so too....don't worry....In any case, Sukin was not sure his > digital camera was up to doing whatever it's meant to do, so maybe your > hair will be safe and it'll be an extra incentive for others to join us > next year;-) > > Back to testing metta with my students tomorrow...still it's been a good > break from the 'little darlings';-) > > Sarah > =========================================== > > 10540 From: Sukinderpal Narula Date: Thu Jan 3, 2002 11:13pm Subject: RE: [dsg] Bangkok impressions 28/12/01-2/01/02 Dear Robert, You asked: Now on to more important matters: Sukin, are you going to post the photos???? Now since Christine has forgiven me for choosing a bad day for taking her picture, I think she doesn't mind me sending it to you. Actually I don't know what she meant by 'flat hair', I just looked at the picture and found that she was really looking very nice that morning. You'll have to wait though since I took the picture in high resolution, I need to figure out a way to reduce their size before I can send them to you or anyone else who might be interested. There is also a group picture with Jon, Sarah, K. Sujin, Betty, Christine, Mike and myself. Best wishes, Sukin. ps: Sorry if multiple copies of this post has been sent. I am new to Microsoft Outlook and am having difficulty handling it. 10541 From: Sarah Date: Thu Jan 3, 2002 11:36pm Subject: Re: [dsg] luminous mind Hi Anders, Hope you’re still around and on holiday/vacation still. --- Anders Honore wrote: A:> Personally, I > don't > >believe the commentaries at face value, and I believe > >> that Bikkhu Bodhi has more or less skilfully > >> pointed that they are sometimes even dead-wrong as they contradict > some > >> suttas. S:> >This is interesting. B.Bodhi is certainly a lot, lot, lot more familiar > with > >the suttas and commentaries than I am, but I have yet to come across > such a > >contradiction and would be happy to have any (contradictions) pointed > out >hurry> Sometimes it just depends on how one understands both (as with > the > >'luminous' sutta discussion). A:> He made some comments in his notes (or was it his introduction?) to his > translation of the Samyutta Nikaya. I can't > remember where it is (and there's quite few pages to skim through) > though, so it may be a while before I can be more > specific about this. S: OK, I’m looking at his notes in the intro to SN as I write. The relevant passage, I think, is on p.16 . He starts off by saying “that the commentaries explain the suttas as they were understood sometime around the first century C.E. at the latest, at which time the old commentaries drawn upon by Buddhaghosa were closed to further additions.” Later he says “The fact that I cite the commentaries so often in the notes does not necessarily mean that I always agree with them, though where I interpret a passage differently I generally say so.” Does this mean that he concludes they are sometimes ‘dead wrong’? Maybe. Does it mean they really are sometimes ‘dead wrong’? Perhaps it means our understanding of the Teachings might sometimes be ‘dead wrong’. Anyway, I’m not at all sure I share his sentiments and would be happy to discuss any specific examples. Does this mean we should blindly believe and have faith in everything we read in the Tipitaka (inc. commentaries)? Not at all. It needs to be considered and considered and tested and proven according to experience in daily life. I find the more is tested out and proved, the more confidence tends to grow in other aspects not yet directly experienced, but these aspects are still intellectual understanding or pariyatti only. A:> Btw, did I mention that I now have his full translations of the Digha, > Majhima and Samyutta Nikayas? A friendly soul sent > them to me for free shortly after I I took a break from dsg. S:This is really great news. I know you’ll make very good use of them. Anumodana indeed to the ‘friendly soul’. S:> >You may find it interesting to read back over the series of posts I've > been > >doing on a weekly basis from 'Intro to Vinaya'. These are the areas I'm > >considering in them. A:> I'll go and have a look in the archives. S:You may find the last paragraph of the last one (6) of personal interest. I’m giving everyone a break this week and will consider whether to continue next week. (They've all been saved together as a set under Vinaya- Introduction to in 'useful posts') http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/files/Useful_Posts A: > I should add that I don't neccesarily believe that all the suttas are > the quoted words of the Buddha either. When you have > thousands of them such as you have in the Pali Canon and you wait a few > hundreds before recording them in writing, > there's bound to be some minor errors or fabrications. S: I think that what is amazing (thanks to the arahats at the 1st council and so on) is just how cohesive and how few errors (if any?) there are.... A:> Perhaps I should clarify my own relationship with the commentaries. I > evaluate them in the context of the suttas > themselves. If I find that there isn't any valid basis for what the > commentaries propose in the suttas themselves, then I > don't buy it. It doesn't mean that I reject it as untrue or anything, > because quite frankly I don't bother myself with having to > label things as being "untrue" or "true". It just means that I don't > find them relevant for me. S:I think this is a pretty healthy approach to the entire Tipitaka, Anders. If we’re reading something which is not relevant to us at the time, no need to ‘buy it’. No need to reject it either (as you say) and who knows what will be relevant later. My approach is pretty close to this, I think. There are many parts of the Tipitaka now which I consider (not having found them relevant before). There are many other parts I just leave. A:> Now, eveluating in the context of the suttas is a highly subjective > matter of course, and the suttas themselves I interpret in > the light of two things: Faith and practise. Things that I don't have > any direct experience of myself from my practise (such > as the jhanas, supernatural powers etc.) I can only take on faith. Since > faith is a rather uncertain thing, I am wary of > maintaining any positions on these matters. They are pointers for > practitioners on higher stages than me, and so are not > things I need concern myself with at the moment. > When the suttas deal with things that I have direct experience of in my > own practise, I tend to lend authority to my practise > over my intellect, as it is the practise that it skilfully removing > clinging, and not the intellect and I think the Buddha was > quite aware of that. I agree that it is the testing, proving and direct experience right now that counts. On the other hand, wrong view and wrong practise always thinks it’s right, so it’s very useful indeed to continually consider, check and question what the Tipitaka itself says. For example, many people think they have attained jhanas, but when they read the texts in detail and consider carefully, they find that they are mistaken. The same applies to other insights and levels of bhavana (mental development). That’s why the intellectual and direct understanding work together in a kind of spiral (as Rob K once described). Many thanks for clarifying your position with regard to the Suttas and Commentaries which I certainly respect. Good to have you back for however long it is. Sarah ====================================================== 10542 From: Sarah Date: Thu Jan 3, 2002 11:41pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Concept Hello Victor, --- yuzhonghao wrote: > Hello Sarah, > > You questioned that "Can we say that a concept comes to be because of > thinking?" What do you think? Can we? Well, it was a question for you, but yes, I think we can;-) You wrote that no thinking > means no concepts. From what you wrote, it seems to me that you mean > that concept is dependent on thinking. This is how I understand the > word "concept" from the online dictionary in http://www.webster.com: > A concept means something conceived in the mind, a thought, a > notion. It also means an abstract or generic idea generalized from > particular instances. The synonym to the word "concept" is the > word "idea." I agree with you that thinking is conditioned. ..and I fully agree with all your comments here, Victor ;-)) Maybe a 'first'! Did you ever tell us where you live? I'd be interested to know a little more about where you are and your study and interest in dhamma, now we're in such agreement for a pleasant change;-) Sarah ================================================ 10543 From: Kom Tukovinit Date: Thu Jan 3, 2002 11:50pm Subject: RE: [dsg] The White Radiant Mind Dear Kenneth, > -----Original Message----- > From: Kenneth Ong [mailto:ashkenn@y...] > > Hi Kom, > > I was using a hypothetical situation. Imagine > all cittas that arise > without any cetasikas, since cittas are pure as > described, then our series > of cittas will be pure. This would infer a > underlying nature of "pure" in > that sense. We know in some situations that the citta, with the cetasikas, are described as pure. So far, we hear from people the following theories: 1) Bhawanga is pure, as the commentaries have described it. However, I haven't seen the details if this is inclusive of all bhawanga, or does it just include the bhawangas with 2-hetu/3-hetus. How about the other sobhana vipakas? 2) Some have alluded to that all sobhana cittas are all pure, so this includes all vipaka/kusala/and kiriya with 2-hetu/3-hetu. 3) Some think the citta itself [maybe this is what you are talking about?], even with the cetasikas, is itself pure. This theory says all cittas (kusala/akusala/the rest) are pure. This perhaps may be due to the fact that cittas are said to see all the details of the object (although it doesn't penetrate the true characteristics), and that citta is defiled by kilesa (cetasikas), and not the other way around. Do you think the Buddha maybe describing one of the above situations, or do you think he is describing a pure consciousness that transcends all conditioned realities? kom 10544 From: Sarah Date: Thu Jan 3, 2002 11:52pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Concept Dear Rob Ep, --- Robert Epstein wrote: > Dear Sarah, > Thanks for your note! > If you could define micha/ditthi for me I would be much appreciative! Sorry, I think I overlooked this before i went away. Micha ditthi refers to 'wrong view'....Christine will say that 'wrong view' sounds so harsh and black, but then wrong view is the most harmful cetasika (mental factor). Please read more details about it (including the quote from the Nyantiloka dictionary) under 'Wrong View' in "useful Posts': http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/files/Useful_Posts Let me know if there was anything else (not that I can be at all sure of knowing the answer;-) Sarah R:> > >but a citta that mistakes a concept for a reality -- > > > that > > > thinks the 'Universe' is a real object, not a concept -- occurs with > moha, > > > and is > > > a 'deluded' citta. Is this correct? S:> > Certainly there is moha at these moments. When there is the ‘deluded’ > citta > > which wrongly takes concept for reality, there is also (micha) ditthi > at these > > moments. This is why we can consider ditthi as the most ‘dangerous’ > cetasika > > (to quote K.Sujin) and the first one that has to be eradicated. > > > > I think you’re getting ‘very warm’ indeed, > > > > Speak soon, > > Sarah > > ========== 10545 From: Sarah Date: Fri Jan 4, 2002 0:01am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: grandma Dear Yulia, I was very glad to hear from you and to read your nice post to Purnomo below. I liked the story about your friend's book and the custom of remembering the good someone has done. When Jon gave a eulogy at his father's funeral a couple of years ago, it was really a reflection on his good qualities and deeds which I think is helpful for everyone. Hope you're enjoying the other posts on the lists and finding some of value. Hope to hear more from you too;-) Sarah p.s I just forget, did you tell us where you live? (Sorry if you did and I've forgotten) ================================================ --- yklimov wrote: > Dear Purnomo, > > I would like to say I am very sorry for your loss. I have never > lost anyone yet, but I've lost a friend and I've seen my friends lost > their daughter. Be supportive to your Mom or Dad, whoever Mother > passed away. > The freind of mine, when she was little, her grandma passed away, > then when all her relatieves got together, father got a book and > asked everyone to tell something good about grandma, then he wrote it > into this book. She cherished this book all her life, and now gave it > to her teenager son, I feel it's a great way to be close to you > ancestors. Today we have camcorders, you can just kind of tape > everyone saying something good about her. In my country it's a custom > when someone dies, tell whatever good he's done, so he won't forget, > leaving us. > > Love, > Yulia > > PS Congratulation on finishing your study! ..................................................................................................... 10546 From: Sarah Date: Fri Jan 4, 2002 0:10am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The noble nine fold path - Erik & Joe Dear Joe, --- lpjoe wrote: > Dear Sarah > > I'm back home in Chiang Mai after a month in Mexico, and some time > spent in Nepal and Laos, mostly promoting Buddhist Stupas in Asia: The > Shape of Perfection, at your favorite bookstore now ... I knew some exotic travels would be involved;-) I'll certainly look out for the book with interest. Quite a change from writing travel books, I'd think. (I'm sure you'll have noted our other budding travel writer on list;-) > > How do you understand this phrase, Joe? Does it suggest any idea of > self and > > control and `should do' to you? Is this how you understand the > Satipathana > > Sutta? I'm not trying to be tricky, I am sincerely interested to hear > more > > about your considered understanding. > > I take it in Ven. Buddhadasa's Thai sense of phaasaa tham rather than > phaasaa khon, that is the dhamma interpretation of 'we' rather than the > conventional 'people' one. Just for others: phaasaa tham= dhamma language (absolute realities?) phaasaa khon= people language (conventional language) Just as when 'you' use 'I' or 'you' or 'we' > in > this discussion group. But I'm no authority, and ultimately the way I > interpret it, or you interpret it, is going to be conditioned by what > we've > read elsewhere, what our teacher(s) have taught us, etc. Quite so and agreed. Sometimes we need to hear someone speaking quite a lot to really know what their understanding is too. Very glad that you're still keeping an eye on us and always glad to hear from you and hope you're enjoying the cool weather in Chengmai. Best wishes, Sarah =================================================== 10547 From: Sarah Date: Fri Jan 4, 2002 0:16am Subject: Re: [dsg] one limb of 8 fold path more important (was satipathana and practice) Dear Frank, --- fcckuan wrote: > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "rikpa21" wrote: > > > Anyway the Samadhi Sutta is just as important (is one limb of the > > Noble Eightfold path "more or less" important than any other?), > > In the samyutta, the Buddha uses a simile. Just as dawn precedes > sunrise, right view precedes the other factors of the 8fold noble > path. This stands to reason. If one has keen right view, then with > right view one can correct deficiencies in the other 7 factors. But > if one is deficient in right view, deviant in view, lacking in right > view, it's difficult if not impossible to correct or properly develop > the other factors. This is a great little summary on the importance of samma ditthi (rt view) which also helps to explain the danger of micha ditthi (wrong view) as I just mentioned to Rob Ep. > The rest of Erik's post is interesting and I'd like to comment on > it another time when I have more time :-) Yes, Erik's post was very well-written and presented and I'm sure we'd all be very glad to hear your further comments. Sarah ==================================================== 10548 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Fri Jan 4, 2002 1:22am Subject: Re: [dsg] deceiving dhammas op 01-01-2002 16:54 schreef Kom Tukovinit op tikmok@y...: N: I could not send this yesterday, so I try again. See addition on sevitabba. I got to review what are > the vancaka dhammas. In general, I like hearing about some > subtleties of the dhamma because I find that by knowing > about them, I tend to pay attention toward the particular > aspect (paying attention at pariyatti or direct level, or > paying attention with panna are different stories). It is > like opening up a new world previously unknown or only known > through a veil. I think by being precise and detailed about > the subtleties of the dhamma conceptually, panna (and all > the associated nama) can develop to understand more detailed > aspects of the dhammas. > > The other thing is, I don't see how one develops kusala and > abandons akusala unless one understand in details the > differences between them. It is so easy for me to mistake > akusala as kusala. In retrospect, the mistakes are often > (and continues to be!) not so subtle. It is amazing that it > takes a person with panna to point out some of these big > mistakes: avijja is so overwhelming. Nina: I find it useful that you mention this, we all have this experience. I also need a good friend in Dhamma to point this out. It is just as you say: avijja is overwhelming, a good reminder. > K: Before I mentioned the specific examples of the vancaka > dhammas that apply to me (in another post), I have two more > stories for you regarding the India trip that are somewhat > related to this conversation. The first story is about what > A. Supee said, and the other one a combination of what A. > Supee and A. Sujin said. > > A. Supee mentioned that whenever you asked him questions (in > India), he would like other people to hear the questions. > He said you asked him very detaild questions, and it is rare > to hear such questions, leaving alone good answers. One of > the questions he mentioned was that when one runs into an > unpleasant situation, one thinks(?) about something that on > the surface sounds like panna. However, if one considers > that more carefully, it appears that it is not panna that > arises, but it is the lobha that chooses its object. This > is generally exactly like the vancaka dhammas, and just like > vancaka dhammas, it begs to be proven in daily life. > N: I like your observations about the subtlety of Dhamma. I had exhilarating conversations with A. Supee about many topics and some I shall write about in my India impressions. Those conversations just came up when there was an opportunity. I had jotted down questions when in Holland. He is very kind and he has considered the Dhamma deeply. About the above incident, taking lobha for pa~n~naa: I had aversion about something at the moment that we were about to go around the Sarnath stupa. I felt unpleasant. Then I remembered some conversation with Ivan about akusala citta at the holy places. He said that we believe we should only have kusala cittas at the holy places, but that this is not realistic. When I remembered this I did not mind anymore having dosa, but A. Sujin said that there may be an idea of self who does not mind. Not pa~n~naa, as we may think (vancaka dhamma) but lobha chooses its object. I answered that I need a good friend who points this out, by oneself it is not easy to find out. Although A. Sujin says that the teachings are the good friend and pa~n~naa can find out all such moments. K: There was another controversy that was discussed in India: > how much detail does one study conceptually? On one side > (A), it is said that one only needs to understand the basic > concepts, and then after that, satipatthana should be the > main way to develop panna. On the other side (B), it is > necessary to know lots and lots of details. I understand > (C) from A. Sujin and A. Supee(misunderstanding?) that one > should study what one can understand, especially those that > apply in daily life. > > I apply the above situations to the current particular > situations as followed, which probably guarantee more > controversies: > (A): I already understand what Satipatthana is, why bother > with hearing about vancaka dhammas, bhawangas, and > conditionalities at all? I can learn the subtleties of the > different dhammas through direct perception. N: How much detail should we study? No rule, it depends on a person's inclinations . Also understanding on the level of pa~n~natti should, I believe, be developed naturally, at ease, and with pleasure. The purpose is, as A. Sujin stresses: understanding of this moment in your life, thus, what you learn should be applied to your life. How many details you study: it depends on your liking and also another condition: how much free time does one have. You cannot choose that, it is also dependent on conditions. K: (B): I need to know all the different aspects of vancaka > dhammas, bhawangas, and conditionalities. I should be able > to explain all dhammas in term of conditionalities, as that > would give me all the different details about the dhammas. N: Again, it depends on your inclination, not: you have to know. Then there can be the lobha which wants to know a lot so that there is a good foundation for the level of patipatti. Everything that is forced is, I personally think, no good. K: (C): One needs to listen a lot, and consider a lot, but one > needs to know the limit of one's understanding. Remembering > all the details about vancaka dhammas are not going to help > in daily life, as not all the dhammas mentioned in the > teaching would appear. Remembering all the details about > conditionalities are not going to help, as the details of > those don't appear to one anyway. It is important to learn > enough to answer one's own (important) questions - to > eliminate vicikiccha. N: That is what A. Sujin said in Cambodia: know the limit of what you can understand. (in another post I shall give more examples) K: For panna to know finer and more > subtles dhammas (and panna must know, otherwise, how could > it be [roo jang, roo tua] (penetration?, knowing > all-around), then the conceptual understanding, through > listening and consideration, must be equivallently > well-refined. N: I am not sure about this. Pa~n~naa of the level of patipatti is much more subtle than theoretical understanding. One may have studied only a few basic details, but one may have considered these deeply in one's life. Then there are conditions for the development of pa~n~naa of the level of patipatti, and this kind of pa~n~naa is much keener and sharper than just theoretical knowledge. It can know all dhammas that appear thoroughly, but this again depends on one's accumulations. One may have listened, considered and developed pa~n~naa in former lives. You remember the example of the person who could not remember any stanza, but received a cloth that he had to rub on his finger, to remove dirt. He saw his own defilements and attained enlightenment. (Visuddhimagga). Again, pa~n~naa works its way. I keep in mind A. Supee's reminder you wrote about that if sammasati, direct awareness, and understanding do not arise, there is not enough firm foundation of theoretical understanding. This helps us to see how much this depends on conditions. It is reassuring, we are not forcing ourselves to hurry, learning many details. A condition to remember this is the fact that you brought this up! It impressed me suddenly so much. There are basic things we have to know, for example, that pleasant feeling can arise with kusala citta but also with lobha, otherwise we are misled all the time, we mistake akusala for kusala, and as you said, such mistakes are not so subtle. Vancaka dhamma coming in again. Some details do not seem to relate to daily life, but when someone else mentions them or asks a question about them, there are conditions to study them, consider them more, and then we see: they do relate to daily life. At first we find them "dry bones" but then we start to take an interest in them, yes, we begin to like them. Robert K. mentioned the "Guide", Netti, and referred to: lobha that should be pursued (sevitabba) and that should not be pursued. This is not abstract, it relates to our life. I kn ow this was dealt with before, pertaining to someone who is about to attain arahatship and longs for this beforehand. But I found interesting what A. Supee said about the lower levels, for us. A. Supee explained: when you cook or you apply yourself to your profession, there are conditions for the arising of lobha. This is not akusala kamma, it does not lead to an unhappy rebirth. It is not wrong practice that hinders the development of panna. He mentioned examples of wrong practice: you visit the holy sites and pay respect to the relics because you want to induce sati. Thus the kind of lobha that can be pursued is not lobha with wrong view. Sevitabba does not mean: we should pursue it, but, it has conditions for its arising. It can be object of pa~n~naa. Later on I shall give more examples of studying details, and starting to like them, to find them relevant, but this post gets too long. In a few moments I have to pursue the lobha that can be pursued, while cooking. Best wishes from Nina. 10549 From: rikpa21 Date: Fri Jan 4, 2002 5:26am Subject: Re: [dsg] one limb of 8 fold path more important (was satipathana and practice) --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Sarah wrote: > Dear Frank, > > --- fcckuan wrote: > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., > "rikpa21" wrote: > > > > > Anyway the Samadhi Sutta is just as important (is one limb of the > > > Noble Eightfold path "more or less" important than any other?), > > > > In the samyutta, the Buddha uses a simile. Just as dawn precedes > > sunrise, right view precedes the other factors of the 8fold noble > > path. This stands to reason. If one has keen right view, then with > > right view one can correct deficiencies in the other 7 factors. But > > if one is deficient in right view, deviant in view, lacking in right > > view, it's difficult if not impossible to correct or properly develop > > the other factors. > > This is a great little summary on the importance of samma ditthi (rt view) > which also helps to explain the danger of micha ditthi (wrong view) as I > just mentioned to Rob Ep. I agree completely the "Right View" is the forerunner, but Right View in what sense, mundane, suparmundane? "Right View" in the mundane sense only takes one so far. If kamma and paticca samuppada and anatta are explained well they are not unduly difficult to grasp intellectually. What is much harder is getting rid of the views part and coming to supramundane Right View, which it tanamount to abandoning "views" (read, speculation) altogether. Similarly, one needs hold no "belief" (ditthi) regarding the taste of a ripe mango if one has actually tasted a ripe mango, though one may hold beliefs about its flavor as "sweet, delicious, etc." prior to actually tasting it. Once tasted, there is no longer any need for any "view" of a mango's taste, hence there is nothing to associate with view or speculation regarding its flavor and texture. But, absent this taste, there has to be some way to acquire a mango for the tasting! :) So my question, from the other day and again is, "Now what"? Intellectual analysis can only take one so far. It is possible to beak down the body into a bunch of functions and dis-identify them with an "I" intellectually. But this can never substitute for directly seeing this reality with supramundane panna, which is unmediated by conceptual elaborations. The means to tasting this ripe mango I'm familiar with (the one outlined by the Buddha in the Satipatthana Sutta and the Samadhi Sutta and many other places) demands a lot more than merely understanding intellectually (lokiya samma ditthi) that all things are anatta, or that we all heirs to our own kamma, or believing that there is no "driver" or "I" behind everything in the ultimate sense. According to my understanding, the panna that cuts the defilements takes unbroken mindfulness brought about by persistence and effort (viriya) training in mindfulness and concentration, (sati and samadhi), applying that to the direct investigation (dhamma-vicaya) into the charactetristics of dhammas arising and passing away in terms of noting their inconstancy, combined with other factors (piti, passadhi, upekkha), which, when brought to their culmination in the proper balance, lead to the insight that terminates the fetters and brings to fruition the sole aim of the Dhamma: final release from identification with the imputed "self," the "I, me, mine," which lies at the root of suffering. So there are many factors involved, and what I've found most helpful is to reflect on what the Buddha actually taught regarding the cause- and-effect relationships that lead from suffering sentient being to final release. For example, if the hindrances are present, can any of the enlightenment factors like piti, passadhi, upekkha, or sati arise? What about samadhi? Without these factors, is there any hope of release? So based on my understanding, it's a matter of working with these cause-and-effect relationships in the approriate order, knowing, for example, that without pacifying the hindrances, the seven factors of enlightenment have no basis for arising, not to mention enlightenment and final release. Not only that, but among all these factors there needs to be the appropriate balance. To veer too far in any direction is to depart from the Middle Way, to miss the "sweet spot" as in the "lute-string" simile, and to miss the mark entirely. http://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/modern/wings/2g.html 10550 From: abhidhammika Date: Fri Jan 4, 2002 5:58am Subject: [dsg] Re: luminous mind: To Kenneth Ong Dear Ken How are you? Thank you for your keen interest and questions. However, I may not have enough time to answer all your questions. As you might know, I am about to post Subcommentary On The White Radiant Mind. I need to rewrite the Pali passage from CD-ROM into the Yahoo text format. I can't post the Pali passage with correct fonts to this list. I also need to write notes on technical details that are, by the way, more numerous than those in the commentary. You asked: "Could you kindly explained the sentence "new kinds of bhavangacittas"." Well, you first had the given bhavangacittas from birth. During your current lifetime, you happened to perform janaka kamma. Suppose that the effect of javana kamma did not wait till your next conception, and needed to appear during your currect lifetime. And, suppose also that the effect was the resultant mental aggregate (aruupa vipaaka khandhaa), then you got different kind of bhavangacitta. As simple as that. You also asked: "Secondly since the objects of bhavangacittas are the same throughout one's life, will that mean that these new kinds of bhavangacittas have different objects." Yes, of course. You also asked: "Do you know of any commentaries that mention the objects of bhavangcittas." Yes, I have read some. You may need to wait for exact references, though. And, by the way, why are you obsessed by the objects of bhavangacittas? With best wishes, Suan http://www.bodhiology.org --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Kenneth Ong wrote: > Hi Suan, > > That is interesting. > > "When javana citta has the strength of a janaka kamma, it can modify > bhavangacitta. In fact, it can cause new kinds of bhavangacitta to arise. > > Could you kindly explained the sentence "new kinds of bhavangacittas". > Secondly since the objects of bhavangacittas are the same throughout one's > life, will that mean that these new kinds of bhavangacittas have different > objects. Do you know of any commentaries that mention the objects of > bhavangcittas. > > Sometimes I wondering why the objects are a mystery, since bhanvagacittas > are conditioned by the rebirth citta which are in turn conditioned by last > citta, then in turn by the last javana cittas of the last series of citta > process. Since the last series process of cittas objects are known then > why when it reach bhavanga citta, its object is not known. > > > Kind regards > Ken O > > > > --- abhidhammika wrote: > > > > > > > Dear Nina And Kom > > > > How are you? > > > > You wrote: > > > > " Dear Suan, yes, it is clear that kamma of the past produces the > > bhavangacitta that is vipakacitta. What I am puzzled about is that > > the javanacittas arising in processes can condition the > > bhavangacitta. I was wondering in what way they can do this, since > > the javana cittas arise in processes and the bhavangacitta is just in > > deep sleep so to say. Or did I misunderstand what you wrote? Best > > wishes from Nina." > > > > This problem has been raised by both of you (Kom off-list) previously > > many months before. I was occupied with many other matters which > > prevented me from solving this problem promptly. Not only that, I > > wanted to discuss this matter properly. And, even now, I won't be > > able to discuss this issue as much as I like. > > > > Sorry about this short reply. > > > > However, as you raised this question again, I will give you, as a > > quick answer, Buddhaghosa's statement on how javana cittas can > > condition bhavangacitta. > > > > The answer to this problem is to do with the timing and quality of > > javana cittas. > > > > When javana citta has the strength of a janaka kamma, it can modify > > bhavangacitta. In fact, it can cause new kinds of bhavangacitta to > > arise. > > > > The following Pali quote comes from Section 687, > > Kankhavitaranavisuddhi niddesa, Visuddhimaggo, Vol.2. > > > > 687. .....Tattha janakam naama kusalampi hoti akusalampi. Tam > > patisandhiyampi pavattepi ruupaaruuupavipaakakkhandhe janeti. > > > > "...There, janakam is either healthy or unhealthy action. It (janaka > > kamma) can cause resultant physical and mental aggegates to arise > > either at the moment of linking consciousness (conception) or during > > the current lifetime." > > > > Please kindly note that the resultant mental aggregates (aruupa > > vipaaka khandhaa) during the current lifetime refer to bhavanga > > cittas. > > > > > > You wrote: > > > > "Or did I misunderstand what you wrote?" > > > > I don't think you misunderstood what I wrote. Perhaps, you did not > > see a connection between what I wrote and what Buddhaghosa wrote. > > > > Having said that, Buddhaghosa wrote a disclaimer as well further down > > the paragraph to the effect that full understanding of how kamma and > > vipaaka works is the domain only of the Buddhas, not that of us. > > > > Hope this message solves your puzzle! > > > > > > With best wishes, > > > > > > Suan > > > > http://www.bodhiology.org > > 10551 From: Robert Epstein Date: Fri Jan 4, 2002 6:34am Subject: Re: Undertanding Metta - was([dsg] Re: Bangkok impressions 28/12/01-2/01/02) --- christine_forsyth wrote: > I was watching a one year old toddler at the Shopping Mall this > morning. She had pulled the legs off her doll when a tiny puppy came > close; she picked it up and seemed to be trying to do the same to the > puppy, with no understanding that it could feel pain or fear, anymore > than the doll could. Her mother quickly removed the puppy and > said "How would you like it if I pulled your legs off?' .... giving a > sharp tug on the childs' legs. Quite clearly from the yell of > protest, she wouldn't have liked it at all..... I know none of us > are quite like that, and that it is just a developmental stage. But > some adults (maybe all of us to a smaller or greater degree) can grow > indifferent, or a little callous about the suffering of others... Hi Christine, This is just a side-note to your interesting message, but I wanted to focus on this little event, since I am the father of a three-year-old girl. I often make little threats that she will be put in her room or take things away from her when she is stubborn about doing things that are destructive to objects or that are harmful to herself, but it occurs to me that this can sometimes have the opposite effect. In your example, the mother pulled sharply on the child's legs to give her the idea. If indeed the child really didn't understand this seems like a rather harsh way of making the point. In my mind, the child would feel just like the puppy in a sense: unfairly attacked, and would not understand why she was being physically hurt. This would cause more anger/resentment and lead to greater violence in the future. In other words, the wrong antidote produces more causes, more kammas, and eventually will yield akusula fruit. This is my view anyway. It is exceedingly difficult to maintain the balance between stopping akusala results and creating more, which is why the cycle of attachment, birth and death is so incredibly hard to break. This brings out another aspect of metta, which I think is interesting to contemplate. How could the mother in that example make the point to the child that she must not harm other beings while expressing metta to her at the same time? How could she treat the child with lovingkindness and still stop her from further 'assaults'? It seems to me that the principle of ahimsa, harmlessness, goes hand in hand with metta, that one who wants to stop harm must also be harmless. I believe that the mother could have grabbed the child's attention, really described to her what the puppy might feel if its legs were pulled and allow the child to develop understanding and empathy. To pull the child's legs seems to bypass a more mindful process. Anyway, when my child won't listen I can be pretty gruff. I raise my intensity level in direct proportion to her resistance -- most of the time, I hope, and try to remain calm even while setting boundaries. I hope that I can teach her to grow in the right direction without sowing seeds of fear and anger at the same time. Best, Robert Ep. ================= 10552 From: Robert Epstein Date: Fri Jan 4, 2002 6:41am Subject: Re: [dsg] Bangkok impressions 28/12/01-2/01/02 --- christine_forsyth wrote: > Dear Rob Ep, > > Thank you for your kind words......Maybe we'll all get there together > sometime....We missed Robert K by a week or so......Trouble is with > you and Howard there, who else would get a word in? :-) ha ha, I'd be happy to take a vow of silence if it gains me admittance! > Would I be persona non grata on the List if I slightly threatened > Sujin....only a tiny little bit? Like getting Balvindra on our side > somehow....... > I feel the women in the photo should have the right to accept, or > reject, or select, the photo (especially that poor one with flat > hair). Or even wait 'til next year...... Well, it was the flat hair that particularly intrigued me, but I understand your feelings about it. My wife regularly de-selects photos that I think are perfectly nice, and files them in the 'garbage file'. Sometimes we are forced to cut parts of pictures out for my mother, meaning the part with her in it, leading to a collection of odd-sized photos. Perhaps Sukin can selectively crop the photos and only post ones that have permission. I guess that would be fair, as long as you allow one of you to come through so that those unlucky enough to be absent we can identify you as well as the others! I would be happy to crop and post them myself if Sukin is too busy and want to just email them to me. That's something that I can do pretty quickly. In any case, I am sorry that I took your revelation of the photos to put you on the spot. That is a little bit mean, and I have some regret about that.........but I'm just curious to see everyone that I've been talking to [or at!] here on dsg. In exchange, maybe I'll find a bad photo of myself and put it in the dsg files. Regards to you, Robert Ep. =========== > metta, > Christine > > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Robert Epstein wrote: > > Dear Christine, > > What a lovely, humorous and evocative account of your trip and the > meeting with > > dsg'ers and others. If you decide to write a travel book, I'm > ready to fill out > > the order form any time. > > > > Thanks for bringing the event to life. > > > > Now on to more important matters: Sukin, are you going to post the > photos???? > > > > > > Best Regards, > > Robert Ep. > > > > ========================= > > > > --- christine_forsyth wrote: 10553 From: Robert Epstein Date: Fri Jan 4, 2002 6:44am Subject: RE: [dsg] Bangkok impressions 28/12/01-2/01/02 Dear Sukin, That would be great if you have the chance to send the photos. I have a simple Application, Adobe Photodeluxe, which will reduce the resolution of the pictures, once in the computer, to 72 dpi and will then convert them to jpeg files. It does so in a matter of seconds. If you want to send me the 'big picture files' and have me do the reduction, I will be happy to do it. If they're too big to send, a good photo app, perhaps one that comes with the camera's software?, should have a component to do what I have described. Best, Robert Ep. ============= --- Sukinderpal Narula wrote: > Dear Robert, > You asked: > > Now on to more important matters: Sukin, are you going to post the > photos???? > > > Now since Christine has forgiven me for choosing a bad day for taking her > picture, > I think she doesn't mind me sending it to you. Actually I don't know what > she meant > by 'flat hair', I just looked at the picture and found that she was really > looking > very nice that morning. > You'll have to wait though since I took the picture in high resolution, I > need to > figure out a way to reduce their size before I can send them to you or > anyone else > who might be interested. There is also a group picture with Jon, Sarah, K. > Sujin, > Betty, Christine, Mike and myself. > > Best wishes, > Sukin. > > ps: Sorry if multiple copies of this post has been sent. I am new to > Microsoft Outlook > and am having difficulty handling it. 10554 From: Robert Epstein Date: Fri Jan 4, 2002 6:49am Subject: Re: [dsg] Concept Thanks, Sarah! Rob Ep. ==== --- Sarah wrote: > Dear Rob Ep, > > --- Robert Epstein wrote: > Dear Sarah, > > Thanks for your note! > > If you could define micha/ditthi for me I would be much appreciative! > > Sorry, I think I overlooked this before i went away. Micha ditthi refers > to 'wrong view'....Christine will say that 'wrong view' sounds so harsh > and black, but then wrong view is the most harmful cetasika (mental > factor). > > Please read more details about it (including the quote from the Nyantiloka > dictionary) under 'Wrong View' in "useful Posts': > http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/files/Useful_Posts > > Let me know if there was anything else (not that I can be at all sure of > knowing the answer;-) > > Sarah 10555 From: yklimov Date: Fri Jan 4, 2002 7:28am Subject: [dsg] Re: grandma / to Sarah Dear Sarah Thank you for your nice letter. I usally don't talk here much, because basically I have nothing to say :). I am a beginner to Buddhism, this group was recommended by Robert to me, I am very grateful to him for that. I am native Russian, immigrated to USA in 1995, still trying to "fit". I live in South Florida, in Hollywood. I enjoy very much this group, even sometimes I don't really understand what people are telling here. Thank you again for giving some attention to me :) Yulia --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Sarah wrote: > Dear Yulia, > > I was very glad to hear from you and to read your nice post to Purnomo > below. I liked the story about your friend's book and the custom of > remembering the good someone has done. When Jon gave a eulogy at his > father's funeral a couple of years ago, it was really a reflection on his > good qualities and deeds which I think is helpful for everyone. > > Hope you're enjoying the other posts on the lists and finding some of > value. Hope to hear more from you too;-) > > Sarah > > p.s I just forget, did you tell us where you live? (Sorry if you did and > I've forgotten) > ================================================ > > --- yklimov wrote: > Dear Purnomo, > > > > I would like to say I am very sorry for your loss. I have never > > lost anyone yet, but I've lost a friend and I've seen my friends lost > > their daughter. Be supportive to your Mom or Dad, whoever Mother > > passed away. > > The freind of mine, when she was little, her grandma passed away, > > then when all her relatieves got together, father got a book and > > asked everyone to tell something good about grandma, then he wrote it > > into this book. She cherished this book all her life, and now gave it > > to her teenager son, I feel it's a great way to be close to you > > ancestors. Today we have camcorders, you can just kind of tape > > everyone saying something good about her. In my country it's a custom > > when someone dies, tell whatever good he's done, so he won't forget, > > leaving us. > > > > Love, > > Yulia > > > > PS Congratulation on finishing your study! 10556 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Fri Jan 4, 2002 10:00am Subject: bhavangacitta, to Suan. Dear Suan, thank you for your patience in answering our questions and providing us with the Pali. I find the subject more and more complicated and I know you give this subject much thought. With appreciation, Nina. 10557 From: Date: Fri Jan 4, 2002 6:10am Subject: Re: Undertanding Metta - was([dsg] Re: Bangkok impressions 28/12/01-2/01/02) Dear Christine : > I think what is meant is that I should use 'myself' as an example to > bring to mind that other beings feel emotional, psychological and > physical pain just as 'I' do. > I am very delighted with your explanation above. Anyhow, let me digest it further and I'd like to put your analogy up-side-down to see the other side of the coin a little bit. After I read your post, this is what I can extract. Panna and sati are there in metta development. Panna is at least in a level to understand and see that one can get hurt, to a level to see and recognize disadvantages of dosa, and to a level to recognize the difference between lobha and metta(adosa to entity). Sati is definitely always be there at that moment with panna. I think this is what I got from your message. So if this what you meant to say, metta is not just sitting and trying to meditate or radiate metta power onto every being on every possible plane. I meant it can be to that degree but it has to start with right understanding of what really is metta. Metta again, can be start here and now in daily life (meditation on metta can also be daily life for someone who have inclination to do that as well). <<< I was watching a one year old toddler at the Shopping Mall this morning. She had pulled the legs off her doll when a tiny puppy came close; she picked it up and seemed to be trying to do the same to the puppy, with no understanding that it could feel pain or fear, anymore than the doll could. Her mother quickly removed the puppy and said "How would you like it if I pulled your legs off?' .... giving a sharp tug on the childs' legs. Quite clearly from the yell of protest, she wouldn't have liked it at all..... >>> Let me be mean a little this time. OK, I'd like to change a puppy into a little 1 y/o girl, change the girl into a mean criminal street drug user guy. Yes, he is trying to pull the lovely little girl's leg (can be a symbol for her physical health, mental health or spiritual health). For me I definitely love cute little girl, wish her no harm and pain. If she cry for food I will always attend her. It's very easy for me to do that. Is that metta? Come back to the analogy, what about the guy, can I still be kind and practice metta to him. Sound much harder. Let me put the analogy further, if the street guy is someone we love and know as well, let say the girl's father, brother, relative or someone we love. Where will we put ourselves. Everyone will probably has his/her version of answer. But real life is the best test. Test what ground we stand on, how firm is our kindness, how firm is our wisdom (panna). I do not want to be mean, take it as a food of thought, OK :) <<< You say: "Another point I'd like to add is bhramavihara also can be taken as an object (arammana) for every aspect of akusala (asava, ogha, yogha, gantha, upadhana, nivorana, anusaya,samyojana, and kilesa) as well." I didn't know this - do you have any references where I can read about it? >>> The reason I mentioned this b/c I'd like to share that metta in itself is a very good deed, but kusla (except lokuttara level and nibbana) can be taken as an object for akusala citta. This is my metta, I give him metta why he is still mean to me, good feeling that come along with metta can also be addicted, etc...... I got this from question-answer part in Dhammasangani. I haven't looked in Atthasalini in detail but it might be some explanation in there. Best wishes, Num 10558 From: Date: Fri Jan 4, 2002 6:36am Subject: Re: [dsg] deceiving dhammas Hi Sarah, > > Let me try some pali: pannasattha, pannaaloko, pannaobhaso, > > pannapajjoto, > > pannaratano, amoho, dhammvicayo, samadhitthi and finally natthi panna > > sama > > abha, nothing is as illuminating as panna. > > > > Hmmm....Are you sure you translated it all? For the 95% of members who are > pali challenged (inc.me), could you add a little more translation and > explanation of your words of wisdom? Ohoh ;P , this is not my words of wisdom, sorry I just parroted them. Are you sure you like to see my translation, I am a pali babble? Jargoning is probably the right word to call my pali. Since you have asked, I will try my best. But take it with caution, OK. pannasattha: panna is like a weapon (addendum: piercing through reality, akusala, kusala and/or neutral) pannaaloko: panna is like a radiant light pannaobhaso: panna is illuminating pannapajjoto: panna is like a lamp pannaratano: panna is like a precious gem amoho: amoha: panna dhammvicayo: analyzing or knowing dhamma clearly samaditthi : panna natthi panna sama abha: nothing is as illuminating as panna. Ohoh, I have pali dyslexic syndrome. Num 10559 From: christine_forsyth Date: Fri Jan 4, 2002 2:33pm Subject: Undertanding Metta - was([dsg] Re: Bangkok impressions 28/12/01-2/01/02) Dear Rob Ep, You say: " the wrong antidote produces more causes, more kammas,and eventually will yield akusula fruit" I absolutely agree with you. The incident happened in much less time than it took to write about, and it was completely out of my control (that word again)..... I have to say on a more serious occasion at a shopping mall I did intervene, but this particular incident was in the 'don't interfere' category.......maybe I would have had MY legs pulled if I had. :-) :-) I always tried to use distraction, or if that didn't work, restraint, when my son and daughter were very young. ? part of skilful means of parenthood. (And maybe the mother in my post does also, and she was just tired and stressed on this occasion.) metta, Christine --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Robert Epstein wrote: > > --- christine_forsyth wrote: > > > I was watching a one year old toddler at the Shopping Mall this > > morning. She had pulled the legs off her doll when a tiny puppy came > > close; she picked it up and seemed to be trying to do the same to the > > puppy, with no understanding that it could feel pain or fear, anymore > > than the doll could. Her mother quickly removed the puppy and > > said "How would you like it if I pulled your legs off?' .... giving a > > sharp tug on the childs' legs. Quite clearly from the yell of > > protest, she wouldn't have liked it at all..... I know none of us > > are quite like that, and that it is just a developmental stage. But > > some adults (maybe all of us to a smaller or greater degree) can grow > > indifferent, or a little callous about the suffering of others... > > Hi Christine, > This is just a side-note to your interesting message, but I wanted to focus on > this little event, since I am the father of a three-year-old girl. I often make > little threats that she will be put in her room or take things away from her when > she is stubborn about doing things that are destructive to objects or that are > harmful to herself, but it occurs to me that this can sometimes have the opposite > effect. > > In your example, the mother pulled sharply on the child's legs to give her the > idea. If indeed the child really didn't understand this seems like a rather harsh > way of making the point. In my mind, the child would feel just like the puppy in > a sense: unfairly attacked, and would not understand why she was being physically > hurt. This would cause more anger/resentment and lead to greater violence in the > future. In other words, the wrong antidote produces more causes, more kammas, and > eventually will yield akusula fruit. This is my view anyway. It is exceedingly > difficult to maintain the balance between stopping akusala results and creating > more, which is why the cycle of attachment, birth and death is so incredibly hard > to break. > > This brings out another aspect of metta, which I think is interesting to > contemplate. How could the mother in that example make the point to the child > that she must not harm other beings while expressing metta to her at the same > time? How could she treat the child with lovingkindness and still stop her from > further 'assaults'? It seems to me that the principle of ahimsa, harmlessness, > goes hand in hand with metta, that one who wants to stop harm must also be > harmless. > > I believe that the mother could have grabbed the child's attention, really > described to her what the puppy might feel if its legs were pulled and allow the > child to develop understanding and empathy. To pull the child's legs seems to > bypass a more mindful process. > > Anyway, when my child won't listen I can be pretty gruff. I raise my intensity > level in direct proportion to her resistance -- most of the time, I hope, and try > to remain calm even while setting boundaries. I hope that I can teach her to grow > in the right direction without sowing seeds of fear and anger at the same time. > > Best, > Robert Ep. > > ================= > > 10560 From: christine_forsyth Date: Fri Jan 4, 2002 2:47pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Bangkok impressions 28/12/01-2/01/02 Dear Rob Ep, You say: "My wife regularly de-selects photos that I think are perfectly nice, and files them in the 'garbage file'. Sometimes we are forced to cut parts of pictures out for my mother, meaning the part with her in it, leading to a collection of odd-sized photos." **I believe this is a genetic trait 100% inherited down the female line.:-) You say: "In any case, I am sorry that I took your revelation of the photos to put you on the spot. That is a little bit mean, and I have some regret about that.........but I'm just curious to see everyone that I've been talking to [or at!] here on dsg." **Rob - I have two brothers (of the blood, so to speak) so teasing from dhamma brothers needs no apology, and certainly isn't seen by me as mean. The only difference is - I can't throw a cushion at you via the computer. :-) Though I really wouldn't like Sukin to put them in the Files......just send via email to those who request them. Is that possible, ... by email, I mean? metta, Christine --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Robert Epstein wrote: > > --- christine_forsyth wrote: > > Dear Rob Ep, > > > > Thank you for your kind words......Maybe we'll all get there together > > sometime....We missed Robert K by a week or so......Trouble is with > > you and Howard there, who else would get a word in? :-) > > ha ha, I'd be happy to take a vow of silence if it gains me admittance! > > > Would I be persona non grata on the List if I slightly threatened > > Sujin....only a tiny little bit? Like getting Balvindra on our side > > somehow....... > > I feel the women in the photo should have the right to accept, or > > reject, or select, the photo (especially that poor one with flat > > hair). Or even wait 'til next year...... > > Well, it was the flat hair that particularly intrigued me, but I understand your > feelings about it. My wife regularly de-selects photos that I think are perfectly > nice, and files them in the 'garbage file'. Sometimes we are forced to cut parts > of pictures out for my mother, meaning the part with her in it, leading to a > collection of odd-sized photos. Perhaps Sukin can selectively crop the photos and > only post ones that have permission. I guess that would be fair, as long as you > allow one of you to come through so that those unlucky enough to be absent we can > identify you as well as the others! > > I would be happy to crop and post them myself if Sukin is too busy and want to > just email them to me. That's something that I can do pretty quickly. > > In any case, I am sorry that I took your revelation of the photos to put you on > the spot. That is a little bit mean, and I have some regret about > that.........but I'm just curious to see everyone that I've been talking to [or > at!] here on dsg. > > In exchange, maybe I'll find a bad photo of myself and put it in the dsg files. > > Regards to you, > Robert Ep. > > =========== 10561 From: m. nease Date: Fri Jan 4, 2002 3:33pm Subject: FYI Just to let you all know, The combination of the recent cut-back in my internet access and the extreme unreliability of this connection, I'll most likely be out of touch most of the time from now on. I'll drop into an internet shop, as Sarah suggested, when that's possible. Just didn't want anyone to take personally any posts left unanswered. See you when I see you, mike 10562 From: christine_forsyth Date: Fri Jan 4, 2002 3:53pm Subject: Undertanding Metta - was([dsg] Re: Bangkok impressions 28/12/01-2/01/02) Dear Num, and All, Yes, I agree, Num, that right understanding of what metta really is, is crucial. And wrong understanding is so difficult to see when you are in the middle of it...Mainly because you don't want to see it, or it doesn't occur to you that "your" method could be wrong, it's "everyone else" who is wrong :-).... Interesting to change the 'actors' in the girl/puppy story....those who pose no threat to us are alway easier to like in the conventional sense (maybe this is why babies are born able to engage others with their cuteness and helplessnss). In the safety of 'the dark room', I could radiate metta to anyone.....people who have been violent in the past, those in the here-and-now whom I am not particularly 'in tune' with. .....as You say: "But real life is the best test. Test what ground we stand on, how firm is our kindness, how firm is our wisdom (panna). I do not want to be mean, take it as a food of thought, OK :)" Not mean, Num....very helpful, and I do take it as food for thought. You say: "The reason I mentioned this b/c I'd like to share that metta in itself is a very good deed, but kusla (except lokuttara level and nibbana) can be taken as an object for akusala citta. This is my metta, I give him metta why he is still mean to me, good feeling that come along with metta can also be addicted, etc...... I got this from question-answer part in Dhammasangani. I haven't looked in Atthasalini in detail but it might be some explanation in there." Yes, this 'pollution' of kusala by being taken as an object for akusala citta, is becoming clearer to me. Mixed motives for 'good' acts......e.g. Before I went to Bangkok I needed to call a Locksmith to my home to open a jammed garage door. He brought his tiny daughter with him, perhaps two or three years old. She was so good and patient waiting for Daddy to do his work, and I wanted to give her something as a reward. I had a new doll, and gave it to her. Her father and she were delighted and thought I was very nice. But, what they didn't know (and I don't think it was clear to me until now) is that first of all, my mind ranged over the facts: I didn't want the doll; it hadn't cost me anything; my youngest niece already had a similar doll; it was only gathering dust in my house; and wouldn't they like me for giving it to her...a little embarrassing really when you think of it.... Your mention of the Dhammasangani and Atthasalini raise a difficulty I am having.... Does anyone know how I can obtain copies of Dhamma literature more quickly than my current method? Presently, I order books through either Amazon.com or Adyar Bookshop down in Sydney. Unless Adyar have the text in stock (and they sell all sorts of Metaphysical books as well) they will order it, and usually it takes a minimum of four months for the copy to arrive. Needless to say, interest has often 'gone off the boil' by that stage. Thanks for all you help, Num. metta, Christine 10563 From: fcckuan Date: Fri Jan 4, 2002 6:27pm Subject: Re: [dsg] one limb of 8 fold path more important (was satipathana and practice) Hi Erik and Sarah, [thread on one limb to rule them all, i.e. is one limb of the 8fold path more important?] > I agree completely the "Right View" is the forerunner, but Right > View in what sense, mundane, suparmundane? That's a good question. Let's perform a thought experiment. Say someone has high intellect, impeccably developed discerment/wisdom factors at the mundane level at least, well refined ethical conduct, well developed concentration factors, but still finds oneself cursing at people when traffic is bad, lust arising when they drive past sexy bill boards on the freeway. This cultivator is able to enter deep levels of concentration and feels both mental and physical pleasure while in meditation, but is not yet able to carry it through to non- meditation times. So what's going on here? My unenlightened diagnosis: There isn't any deficiency in the mundane aspect of right view, or the factor of concentration, but probably insufficient mindfulness. Mindfulness brought to fruition would apply discernment factors and good-enough-concentration factors to every moment of waking consciousness, deepening and continually directly penetrating the 3 signata at the experiential level until at some fruitful moment there is complete penetration of the 4 noble truths, destruction of the taints, full enlightenment. So one could argue that for such a cultivator, the 8fold factor of mindfulness was the bottleneck or crucial limb. However, wasn't it mundane right view/discernment/wisdom that made the diagnosis that led to the fix? In my mind, that still makes right view, even at the mundane level, the most important factor, even though in this case it was indirect. > > "Right View" in the mundane sense only takes one so far. If kamma > and paticca samuppada and anatta are explained well they are not > unduly difficult to grasp intellectually. What is much harder is > getting rid of the views part and coming to supramundane Right View, > which it tanamount to abandoning "views" (read, speculation) > altogether. Agreed, but once again, it could be argued that mundane right view had a key supporting role in abandoning views leading to higher attainments. > > Similarly, one needs hold no "belief" (ditthi) regarding the taste > of a ripe mango if one has actually tasted a ripe mango, though one > may hold beliefs about its flavor as "sweet, delicious, etc." prior > to actually tasting it. Once tasted, there is no longer any need for > any "view" of a mango's taste, hence there is nothing to associate > with view or speculation regarding its flavor and texture. That's a good analogy, but here's a similar analogy that's based on a personal true story. I used to hate papayas. The reason is the first few papayas I ate as a child were overripe, underripe, or just not that sweet. It was only after I tasted a good papaya years later that I fully understood what was gratifying about a papaya. So the moral of the story: Without mundane right view guiding me with the view that it is possible that a tastier worthy papaya exists, I might have stuck with my original assessment of papayas and never discovered the truth. Translating the analogy to spiritual practice. Suppose your initial introduction to Buddhism is through a charismatic cultlike buddhist leader. You gain some legitimate attainments, but along with that you also have accumulated wrong views, corrupt views, corrupt practices. You have not yet acquired supramundane right view, so all you have is mundane intellectual discerment to guide you out of the mess. On the rest of Erik's post: Great stuff. I'm in full agreement, and have nothing to add. While I agree that mundane right view alone can't take you all the way to full liberation, it plays an important supporting role nonetheless :-) -fk (the rest of Erik's post is worth re-reading again) > > But, absent this taste, there has to be some way to acquire a mango > for the tasting! :) > > So my question, from the other day and again is, "Now what"? > Intellectual analysis can only take one so far. It is possible to > beak down the body into a bunch of functions and dis-identify them > with an "I" intellectually. But this can never substitute for > directly seeing this reality with supramundane panna, which is > unmediated by conceptual elaborations. > > The means to tasting this ripe mango I'm familiar with (the one > outlined by the Buddha in the Satipatthana Sutta and the Samadhi > Sutta and many other places) demands a lot more than merely > understanding intellectually (lokiya samma ditthi) that all things > are anatta, or that we all heirs to our own kamma, or believing that > there is no "driver" or "I" behind everything in the ultimate sense. > > According to my understanding, the panna that cuts the defilements > takes unbroken mindfulness brought about by persistence and effort > (viriya) training in mindfulness and concentration, (sati and > samadhi), applying that to the direct investigation (dhamma-vicaya) > into the charactetristics of dhammas arising and passing away in > terms of noting their inconstancy, combined with other factors > (piti, passadhi, upekkha), which, when brought to their culmination > in the proper balance, lead to the insight that terminates the > fetters and brings to fruition the sole aim of the Dhamma: final > release from identification with the imputed "self," the "I, me, > mine," which lies at the root of suffering. > > So there are many factors involved, and what I've found most helpful > is to reflect on what the Buddha actually taught regarding the cause- > and-effect relationships that lead from suffering sentient being to > final release. For example, if the hindrances are present, can any > of the enlightenment factors like piti, passadhi, upekkha, or sati > arise? What about samadhi? Without these factors, is there any hope > of release? > > So based on my understanding, it's a matter of working with these > cause-and-effect relationships in the approriate order, knowing, for > example, that without pacifying the hindrances, the seven factors of > enlightenment have no basis for arising, not to mention > enlightenment and final release. Not only that, but among all these > factors there needs to be the appropriate balance. To veer too far > in any direction is to depart from the Middle Way, to miss > the "sweet spot" as in the "lute-string" simile, and to miss the > mark entirely. > > http://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/modern/wings/2g.html 10564 From: Robert Epstein Date: Fri Jan 4, 2002 9:24pm Subject: Re: Undertanding Metta - was([dsg] Re: Bangkok impressions 28/12/01-2/01/02) --- christine_forsyth wrote: > Dear Rob Ep, > > You say: " the wrong antidote produces more causes, more kammas,and > eventually will yield akusula fruit" > > I absolutely agree with you. The incident happened in much less time > than it took to write about, and it was completely out of my control > (that word again)..... I have to say on a more serious occasion at a > shopping mall I did intervene, but this particular incident was in > the 'don't interfere' category.......maybe I would have had MY legs > pulled if I had. :-) :-) > I always tried to use distraction, or if that didn't work, restraint, > when my son and daughter were very young. ? part of skilful means of > parenthood. (And maybe the mother in my post does also, and she > was just tired and stressed on this occasion.) > > metta, > Christine Well we all lose it a little bit on occasion. When I do, I apologize to my child, so she's knows what I think is 'okay' and not. I also would not intervene with another parent unless it was a clear case of abuse. For better or worse, parents have the right to pull their kids' legs, at least up to a point. When I did see a mother in two cases and a big mean-looking dad in another case hit their kids hard enough to cause damage, I spontaneously intervened, and I think prevented more damage for the moment. It is quite horrifying to see this, especially with really young children. With the big guy, he was angry at first, but when I expressed concern for the child and didn't try to give him a lecture, he softened and I was able to get the message across to him that he was hitting his boy 'too hard' and that he might really hurt him. I didn't try to convince him not to use physical discipline, just to make sure the boy didn't get serious damage. Anyway, I noticed in these incidents that if I let myself get enraged at the parents [which I did sometimes] it added more intensity, but when I stayed detached I was much more effective. Wonder about the relation between detachment and metta, perhaps one helps create the other. Robert Ep. ============================= > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Robert Epstein wrote: > > > > --- christine_forsyth wrote: 10565 From: Robert Epstein Date: Fri Jan 4, 2002 9:29pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Bangkok impressions 28/12/01-2/01/02 --- christine_forsyth wrote: > Dear Rob Ep, > > You say: "My wife regularly de-selects photos that I think are > perfectly nice, and files them in the 'garbage file'. Sometimes we > are forced to cut parts of pictures out for my mother, meaning the > part with her in it, leading to a collection of odd-sized photos." > > **I believe this is a genetic trait 100% inherited down the female > line.:-) > > You say: "In any case, I am sorry that I took your revelation of the > photos to put you on the spot. That is a little bit mean, and I have > some regret about that.........but I'm just curious to see everyone > that I've been talking to [or at!] here on dsg." > > **Rob - I have two brothers (of the blood, so to speak) so teasing > from dhamma brothers needs no apology, and certainly isn't seen by me > as mean. The only difference is - I can't throw a cushion at you via > the computer. :-) Though I really wouldn't like Sukin to put them in > the Files......just send via email to those who request them. Is > that possible, ... by email, I mean? > > metta, > Christine Dear Christine, Yes, the photos should be able to be sent privately via email as attachments. That is fair enough not to have them in the files. Thanks for being a good sport, and....consider me cyber-cushioned. I have torn up a few photos myself that showed me [throug some lie of the camera] to have a little more of a pot belly than I give myself credit for. I won't put up with visual lies about myself, so I understand. Robert Ep. =============================== 10567 From: Purnomo . Date: Fri Jan 4, 2002 9:54pm Subject: grandma again dear all, thank for you support to me. I will forget my grandma slowly. I so love her. If I chanting for my grandma, do she hear my chanting? How do process it? metta, purnomo 10568 From: Kenneth Ong Date: Fri Jan 4, 2002 10:57pm Subject: RE: [dsg] The White Radiant Mind Hi Kom > > We know in some situations that the citta, with the > cetasikas, are described as pure. So far, we hear from > people the following theories: > 1) Bhawanga is pure, as the commentaries have described it. > However, I haven't seen the details if this is inclusive of > all bhawanga, or does it just include the bhawangas with > 2-hetu/3-hetus. How about the other sobhana vipakas? > 2) Some have alluded to that all sobhana cittas are all > pure, so this includes all vipaka/kusala/and kiriya with > 2-hetu/3-hetu. > 3) Some think the citta itself [maybe this is what you are > talking about?], even with the cetasikas, is itself pure. > This theory says all cittas (kusala/akusala/the rest) are > pure. This perhaps may be due to the fact that cittas are > said to see all the details of the object (although it > doesn't penetrate the true characteristics), and that citta > is defiled by kilesa (cetasikas), and not the other way > around. > > Do you think the Buddha maybe describing one of the above > situations, or do you think he is describing a pure > consciousness that transcends all conditioned realities? > > kom I don't think Buddha would describe there is a pure consciouness that transcends all conditioned realities. This would imply an underlying nature. The problem with the reason that all cittas are pure are weak bc a. Firstly all cittas need at least two hetu as paccaya and the likelihood of aksuala hetu is more common for those who are not Arahant b. Secondly, all cittas has latent defilements. Even bhavanga citta have latency and also hetu paccaya, how could it be pure. Luminious yes but not pure. c. Pure could only be ascribed to when we are able to eradicate latent tendency which means a fully enlighted Arahant. This is probably why we mixed up those who are not enlightend and those who are when we describe cittas are pure. Kind regards Ken O 10569 From: Kenneth Ong Date: Fri Jan 4, 2002 11:11pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: luminous mind: To Kenneth Ong Hi Suan > You asked: > > "Could you kindly explained the sentence "new kinds of > bhavangacittas"." > > Well, you first had the given bhavangacittas from birth. During your > current lifetime, you happened to perform janaka kamma. Suppose that > the effect of javana kamma did not wait till your next conception, > and needed to appear during your currect lifetime. And, suppose also > that the effect was the resultant mental aggregate (aruupa vipaaka > khandhaa), then you got different kind of bhavangacitta. As simple as > that. k: I thought in this list, the assumption was that bhavanga cittas could not be change throughout ones life. Do you have commentary texts to substantiate your point. > You also asked: > > "Secondly since the objects of bhavangacittas are the same throughout > one's life, will that mean that these new kinds of bhavangacittas > have different objects." > > Yes, of course. > > You also asked: > > "Do you know of any commentaries that mention the objects of > bhavangcittas." > > Yes, I have read some. You may need to wait for exact references, > though. > > And, by the way, why are you obsessed by the objects of > bhavangacittas? k: Oh, bc it is a subject that there is little information and too much mystery :). Kind regards Ken O 10570 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Sat Jan 5, 2002 0:26am Subject: Re: [dsg] Three Rounds Nina (and Num) --- Nina van Gorkom wrote: > Dear Num, Thank you for your further info. In the Co to the > Dhammacakkhapavattana Sutta the three ~naa.nas are dealt with > expressively. > Now another text: Debates Commentary,( to Kathavatthu, I also have the > Thai), Ch 20, VI, Some thought that all the twelve constituent parts > were > lokuttara, but this has been refuted. Here the English translation is > not > clear: the diversity of insight as to nature: sacca, the need to do, > kicca, > and the being done, kata, respecting each truth. > I looked at my India notes: I understood from A. Sujin: there is even > kata > ~naa.na at the first stage of vipassana ~naa.na, but not fulfilled. The > nature of dukkha is penetrated more when there is mahaavipassana > ~naa.na, > when the arising and falling away of dhammas has been realized. We can > say, > when realities are seen as just elements, dhatus, at the first vipassana > ~naa.na, there is some fruit of the development, something has baan > done, > kata, but the development has to go on and on. > Best wishes, I am glad you can play tennis again, Nina. We had some discussion with A. sujin on this topic. My understanding from those discussions is as follows: - sacca-nana is correct conceptual understanding about the 4 Noble Truths - kicca-nana is any moment of direct understanding of the true nature of a reality (mundane or lokuttara) - kata-nana is mentioned in the texts in the context of lokuttara citta, but A. Sujin takes this to be a case of 'only the highest being mentioned', and accordingly kata-nana includes the realisation of attainment of any of the stages of vipassana nana. Nina, I hope this covers the points on which you were looking for clarification. The 3 rounds are of course to be understood in the dynamic sense in which you mentioned in an earlier post. Please let me know if there was anything else you were hoping to have covered. Jon PS A. sujin made a point of mentioning that her interpretation on kata-nana had not been formally considered by the teachers' committee at the Foundation. 10571 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Sat Jan 5, 2002 0:30am Subject: Re: An Addendum and a Msg to the List Re: [dsg] The White Radiant Mind Howard --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi again, Robert - > > So as not to end the Gregorian-calendar year with a disagreement > ;-)), > let me add that whatever nibbana really is, and whatever our differing > misguided notions of it may be ;-)), I know that we are in complete > *agreement* in wishing for the other all and only what is good. May > nibbana, > the ultimate good, be yours (though there *is* no you! ;-), and soon! > And > may you, and *all* the loving and brilliant folks on DSG have a > wonderful > year, a year filled with santi, metta, and the sukkha of Dhamma - with > peace, > lovingkindness, and the joy of the Buddha's wonderful teaching! I second all you've said here! And I thank you for your significant contribution to the discussion on the list. Jon 10572 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Sat Jan 5, 2002 0:32am Subject: Re: [dsg] Bangkok impressions 28/12/01-2/01/02 Christine Thanks for the amusing yet perceptive report of your visit. It was a delight to meet you. I'm glad you did not find everythiing too overwhelming, as can happen with new ideas and new people in new (exotic) places. You handled it all very well, a testament I think to your confidence and understanding in the teachings. --- christine_forsyth wrote: > Dear Rob Ep, > > Thank you for your kind words......Maybe we'll all get there together > sometime.... Good thinking! Maybe we should pencil in Bangkok for next Christmas/New Year (dsg jamboree?). Jon 10573 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Sat Jan 5, 2002 0:33am Subject: Re: [dsg] FYI Mike I enjoyed very much meeting you in Bangkok over the New Year. The breakfast chats were a great start to the day, and I also appreciated your useful contribution to the discussions. --- "m. nease" wrote: > Just to let you all know, > > The combination of the recent cut-back in my internet > access and the extreme unreliability of this > connection, I'll most likely be out of touch most of > the time from now on. > > I'll drop into an internet shop, as Sarah suggested, > when that's possible. Just didn't want anyone to take > personally any posts left unanswered. I was sorry to learn about the loss of internet access, particularly as I had been appreciating your recent posts. I do hope you'll be able to find a workaround that will allow you to remain active on the list. I hope things work out for the rest of the period until you are able to get into WPN. Jon 10574 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Sat Jan 5, 2002 0:39am Subject: Re: [dsg] Ultimate realities (and khandhas) Rob Ep --- Robert Epstein wrote: > Dear Jon, > Due to pleasantly synchronistic conditions arising, your answer to > Herman here has > answered the question I just asked in my last post to you. The rupa is > experienced directly by the citta and it doesn't matter whether it's an > 'accurate' > reflection of a 'real external object' [probably because there's no such > things -- > just momentary rupas arising]. What matters is that the rupa will be > shaped by > the kammic predispositions of the sense-door moment, and this is all > that is > necessary to get one's *real rupa* in the moment. It is not *the* rupa, > it is the > appropriate rupa for that citta in that moment. I couldn't have put it better myself. (You have quite a way when it comes to stating these propositions/concepts -- I'm most envious of this ability!) Jon 10575 From: christine_forsyth Date: Sat Jan 5, 2002 2:00am Subject: Re: grandma again Dear Purnomo, I will leave it to others to write about the chanting. I am very sorry you are hurting, the story of your loss and the grief you feel for your Grandma is heart rending, as are all such losses that occur, and have occurred, to members of this group. You are not alone. We understand. If you are able, try to stay aware of the mind and body conditions in the present moment. You may feel some of the following feelings - sadness, anger, guilt, anxiety, loneliness, shock, yearning, numbness, helplessness. Physically you may feel fatigue, tightness in the chest, a dry mouth, a hollow feeling in the stomach, tightness in the throat. You may also feel like crying all the time, not wanting to see your friends, being unable to sleep properly. This will pass away in time - though not as soon as most people predict. And, even after grief fades, it will occasionally come back to visit you at the most unexpected of times. But through all of this, remember one thing, you will be happy again. Be kind to yourself, and find a person to whom you can talk (maybe over and over again) about your Grandma, how she died, your memories of her, how much you love her and how you are feeling.....a person who will keep what you tell them confidential. It is often hard to talk with close family because they are trying to bear the same loss, and you need to talk to someone who isn't in pain, as you are. Once upon a time, when I felt great grief, I found out that even those, like Vasetthi, who were very nearly Arahants didn't escape this dukkha. Knowing this didn't stop my pain, but it helped, somehow. Vasetthi was born in Vesali and was happily married to a man whom she bore a son. When her child died, she went mad and ran away from home.... Eventually, she came to Mithila, encountered the Buddha and regained her sanity. Then Vasetthi joined the nuns' sangha and later became an arahant. Grief-stricken for my son, mad-minded, out of my senses, I was naked with wild hair and I wandered anywhere. I lived on trash heaps, in a graveyard, and by the highways. Three years' wandering, starved and thirsty. Then in the city of Mithila I saw the one who tames what is untamed and goes his way in happiness, enlightened, unafraid. I came to my senses paid homage, and sat down. Out of compassion, Guatama (Buddha) taught me the way. When I heard his words I set out into homelessness. By putting his teachings into practice, I realized great joy. My grief is cut out, finished, ended, for I have understood the ground from which all grief comes. May you soon be peaceful and happy, Purnomo May you understand the ground from which all grief comes May you live with ease and well being. metta, Christine --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "Purnomo ." wrote: > dear all, > > thank for you support to me. I will forget my grandma slowly. I so love her. > If I chanting for my grandma, do she hear my chanting? How do process it? > > metta, > > purnomo > > > 10576 From: Ong Teng Kee Date: Sat Jan 5, 2002 3:33am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: luminous mind: To Nina And Kom On Kamma Modifying Bhavanga Cittam Dear Mr.Suan, I think buddhaghosa would say you are having crazy idea about bhavanga.He would say you are just a non theravadin.Read ch.20 in Visuddhimagga for kamma produce material,bhavanga citta produce material during life time.You cannot say during life time we produce kamma call janaka kamma because those are supplanmanting kamma etc.Janaka kamma cannot be change after rebirth citta.janaka kamma basically means our life time span produce from previous life.Are you saying that we can change from among 4 kinds of two roots to 4 kinds of three roots or from ahetu to two roots.We are still not enter into bhavanga citta of brahma when we attain jhana as a human because we are merely attain into form/formless javana.Do not be overclever. >From: "abhidhammika" >Reply-To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com >To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com >Subject: [dsg] Re: luminous mind: To Nina And Kom On Kamma Modifying >Bhavanga Cittam >Date: Thu, 03 Jan 2002 11:24:13 -0000 > > > > >Dear Nina And Kom > >How are you? > >You wrote: > >" Dear Suan, yes, it is clear that kamma of the past produces the >bhavangacitta that is vipakacitta. What I am puzzled about is that >the javanacittas arising in processes can condition the >bhavangacitta. I was wondering in what way they can do this, since >the javana cittas arise in processes and the bhavangacitta is just in >deep sleep so to say. Or did I misunderstand what you wrote? Best >wishes from Nina." > >This problem has been raised by both of you (Kom off-list) previously >many months before. I was occupied with many other matters which >prevented me from solving this problem promptly. Not only that, I >wanted to discuss this matter properly. And, even now, I won't be >able to discuss this issue as much as I like. > >Sorry about this short reply. > >However, as you raised this question again, I will give you, as a >quick answer, Buddhaghosa's statement on how javana cittas can >condition bhavangacitta. > >The answer to this problem is to do with the timing and quality of >javana cittas. > >When javana citta has the strength of a janaka kamma, it can modify >bhavangacitta. In fact, it can cause new kinds of bhavangacitta to >arise. > >The following Pali quote comes from Section 687, >Kankhavitaranavisuddhi niddesa, Visuddhimaggo, Vol.2. > > 687. .....Tattha janakam naama kusalampi hoti akusalampi. Tam >patisandhiyampi pavattepi ruupaaruuupavipaakakkhandhe janeti. > >"...There, janakam is either healthy or unhealthy action. It (janaka >kamma) can cause resultant physical and mental aggegates to arise >either at the moment of linking consciousness (conception) or during >the current lifetime." > >Please kindly note that the resultant mental aggregates (aruupa >vipaaka khandhaa) during the current lifetime refer to bhavanga >cittas. > > >You wrote: > >"Or did I misunderstand what you wrote?" > >I don't think you misunderstood what I wrote. Perhaps, you did not >see a connection between what I wrote and what Buddhaghosa wrote. > >Having said that, Buddhaghosa wrote a disclaimer as well further down >the paragraph to the effect that full understanding of how kamma and >vipaaka works is the domain only of the Buddhas, not that of us. > >Hope this message solves your puzzle! > > >With best wishes, > > >Suan > >http://www.bodhiology.org > > > > > >--- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Nina van Gorkom wrote: > > op 01-01-2002 16:38 schreef abhidhammika op abhidhammika@y...: 10577 From: abhidhammika Date: Sat Jan 5, 2002 6:24am Subject: Re: bhavangacitta, to Suan. To Nina Dear Nina How are you? Just to say "You are welcome". With regards, Suan --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Nina van Gorkom wrote: > Dear Suan, thank you for your patience in answering our questions and > providing us with the Pali. I find the subject more and more complicated and > I know you give this subject much thought. With appreciation, Nina. 10578 From: abhidhammika Date: Sat Jan 5, 2002 6:46am Subject: [dsg] Re: luminous mind: To Kenneth Ong Dear Ken How are you? You wrote and asked: "k: I thought in this list, the assumption was that bhavanga cittas could not be change throughout ones life. Do you have commentary texts to substantiate your point." Yes, I have already provided the commentary Pali reference and translation in my post 10521. In fact, you asked me questions by reading what I wrote and what I quote in that post. Perhaps, you had been incoherent and forgot things too soon. So, please kindly read the post 10521 again to read the commentary Pali and its translation which had been provided for the sole purpose of substantiating my very point. With best wishes, Suan http://www.bodhiology.org --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Kenneth Ong wrote: > Hi Suan > > > > You asked: > > > > "Could you kindly explained the sentence "new kinds of > > bhavangacittas"." > > > > Well, you first had the given bhavangacittas from birth. During your > > current lifetime, you happened to perform janaka kamma. Suppose that > > the effect of javana kamma did not wait till your next conception, > > and needed to appear during your currect lifetime. And, suppose also > > that the effect was the resultant mental aggregate (aruupa vipaaka > > khandhaa), then you got different kind of bhavangacitta. As simple as > > that. > > k: I thought in this list, the assumption was that bhavanga cittas could > not be change throughout ones life. Do you have commentary texts to > substantiate your point. > > > > You also asked: > > > > "Secondly since the objects of bhavangacittas are the same throughout > > one's life, will that mean that these new kinds of bhavangacittas > > have different objects." > > > > Yes, of course. > > > > You also asked: > > > > "Do you know of any commentaries that mention the objects of > > bhavangcittas." > > > > Yes, I have read some. You may need to wait for exact references, > > though. > > > > And, by the way, why are you obsessed by the objects of > > bhavangacittas? > > k: Oh, bc it is a subject that there is little information and too much > mystery :). > > > Kind regards > Ken O 10579 From: abhidhammika Date: Sat Jan 5, 2002 7:21am Subject: Re: luminous mind: To Ong Teng Kee Dear Ong Teng Kee How are you? I am afraid I don't think I understand your message. Did you carefully read my post 10521 that you were complaining about? I provided Buddhaghosa's own statement on the matter both in Pali and its translation. Not only that. I also mentioned Buddhaghosa's disclaimer regarding the matter. If you read Pali language, I could analyse the Pali quote word for word, if necessary. If you do not read Pali, well, I am afraid I could not help you in that way. And, as I do not understand your message properly, I may not be able to answer your questions, either. I do not find your post very coherent, I am afraid. I am really sorry about my failure to resolve your complaints on this occasion. Of course, you may attempt to clarify your complaints after having carefully read my post 10521. It is a Buddhist virtue to remove someone's ignorance (my failure to understand your message, in this case)! Thank you for your attempt to make sense of my post and respond to it. With kind regards, Suan http://www.bodhiology.org --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "Ong Teng Kee" wrote: > Dear Mr.Suan, > I think buddhaghosa would say you are having crazy idea about bhavanga.He > would say you are just a non theravadin.Read ch.20 in Visuddhimagga for > kamma produce material,bhavanga citta produce material during life time.You > cannot say during life time we produce kamma call janaka kamma because those > are supplanmanting kamma etc.Janaka kamma cannot be change after rebirth > citta.janaka kamma basically means our life time span produce from previous > life.Are you saying that we can change from among 4 kinds of two roots to 4 > kinds of three roots or from ahetu to two roots.We are still not enter into > bhavanga citta of brahma when we attain jhana as a human because we are > merely attain into form/formless javana.Do not be overclever. > > > 10580 From: Mom Bongkojpriya (Betty) Yugala Date: Sat Jan 5, 2002 8:29am Subject: Deceiving dhammas Dear Kom and everyone on the list, First, a very happy new year to you all, and especially anomodhana to everyone for providing wonderful opportunities for contemplation, sati and understanding to arise, as conditioned by the insightful discussions here. There has been much discussion of "cheating" dhammas, and we tend to think that just because akusala cittas/cetasikas arose just after the kusala, that somehow the kusala has thus been "tainted" to some extent. But, I'd like to think that just being able to recognize both the kusala and the akusala that arose is an excellent indication that sati, and perhaps understanding, has arisen. So, as long as sati has arisen too, "progress" can be "seen.". Let me relate a personal experience that just occurred just before new years, and which Sarah asked me to write about. After our wonderful discussions here in Bkk last Saturday and Sunday (I couldn't make it on Monday), enhanced by the visit of Sarah, Jon, Jaran and Christine, we had gone to feed the fish. I went on home and discovered that my good, dress watch must have slipped off my wrist somewhere between the fish and home. It was lost, and yet I felt no regret, no attachment to it (ubekha-kusala=anatta). But then, right after that a feeling of pride arose: great, I'm proud of myself for not getting upset over the loss of the watch (mana-akusala=self concept). Then, more akusala arose, because the thought arose that the ubekha had been "cancelled out" by the akusala (dosa). Later still, it was realized that being able just to "follow" the process of the arising of these cittas and cetasikas was sati itself, and it was ok. Looking forward to seeing you all making it to Bkk in the near, and not too distant, future. with metta, Betty _______________________ Mom Bongkojpriya Yugala 38 Soi 41 Phaholyothin Road Bangkok 10900, Thailand tel: 662-579-1050; 661-826-7160 e-mail: beyugala@k... 10581 From: Kom Tukovinit Date: Sat Jan 5, 2002 8:38am Subject: RE: [dsg] The White Radiant Mind Dear Ken O, > -----Original Message----- > From: Kenneth Ong [mailto:ashkenn@y...] > > We know in some situations that the citta, with the > > cetasikas, are described as pure. So far, we hear from > > people the following theories: > > 1) Bhawanga is pure, as the commentaries have > described it. > > However, I haven't seen the details if this is > inclusive of > > all bhawanga, or does it just include the bhawangas with > > 2-hetu/3-hetus. How about the other sobhana vipakas? > > 2) Some have alluded to that all sobhana cittas are all > > pure, so this includes all vipaka/kusala/and kiriya with > > 2-hetu/3-hetu. > > 3) Some think the citta itself [maybe this is > what you are > > talking about?], even with the cetasikas, is > itself pure. > > This theory says all cittas (kusala/akusala/the > rest) are > > pure. This perhaps may be due to the fact that > cittas are > > said to see all the details of the object (although it > > doesn't penetrate the true characteristics), > and that citta > > is defiled by kilesa (cetasikas), and not the other way > > around. > > > > Do you think the Buddha maybe describing one of > the above > > situations, or do you think he is describing a pure > > consciousness that transcends all conditioned realities? > > > > kom > > > I don't think Buddha would describe there is a > pure consciouness that > transcends all conditioned realities. This would > imply an underlying > nature. The problem with the reason that all > cittas are pure are weak bc > > a. Firstly all cittas need at least two hetu as > paccaya and the > likelihood of aksuala hetu is more common for > those who are not Arahant > > b. Secondly, all cittas has latent defilements. > Even bhavanga citta have > latency and also hetu paccaya, how could it be > pure. Luminious yes but not > pure. > > c. Pure could only be ascribed to when we are > able to eradicate latent > tendency which means a fully enlighted Arahant. > This is probably why we > mixed up those who are not enlightend and those > who are when we describe > cittas are pure. You have no disagreements from me in any of these 3 points. I think I was using the two words somewhat interchangeably, but I like your distinction between luminous and pure better. So, what is your theory about the luminous citta? One of 1 to 3 above? None of the above? Why? I know you didn't quite like the commentaries' explanations well enough. kom 10582 From: yuzhonghao Date: Sat Jan 5, 2002 8:41am Subject: Re: [dsg] Concept Hello Sarah, I posted a message on the list before saying where I lived. At that time I was in Philadelphia. Now I am in the Washington, D. C. metro area. For past three year or so, discourses from the Pali Canon have been a major source from which I learn what the Buddha taught. Regards, Victor --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Sarah wrote: > Hello Victor, > > --- yuzhonghao wrote: > Hello Sarah, > > > > You questioned that "Can we say that a concept comes to be because of > > thinking?" What do you think? Can we? > > Well, it was a question for you, but yes, I think we can;-) > > You wrote that no thinking > > means no concepts. From what you wrote, it seems to me that you mean > > that concept is dependent on thinking. This is how I understand the > > word "concept" from the online dictionary in http://www.webster.com: > > A concept means something conceived in the mind, a thought, a > > notion. It also means an abstract or generic idea generalized from > > particular instances. The synonym to the word "concept" is the > > word "idea." I agree with you that thinking is conditioned. > > ..and I fully agree with all your comments here, Victor ;-)) Maybe a > 'first'! > > Did you ever tell us where you live? I'd be interested to know a little > more about where you are and your study and interest in dhamma, now we're > in such agreement for a pleasant change;-) > > Sarah 10583 From: Date: Sat Jan 5, 2002 4:02am Subject: please discontinue... i have been studing buddhism for only 3 months & seem to be at a loss trying to "keep up" with your site's postings. thank you for being there , but please discontinue my subscription. 10584 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Sat Jan 5, 2002 9:55am Subject: Re: [dsg] deceiving dhammas op 03-01-2002 06:25 schreef Kom Tukovinit op tikmok@y...: > > Here's the second posting listing some of what "cheating" > dhammas remind me of. > > When I think of kusala that was done in the past with > somanassa, I would like to think that the thinking itself is > kusala, but it is really (or all mixed-up) with mana. > > When I am discussing dhammas with a person, I would like to > think the motivation is kusala. This is all mixed up with > mana (I am discussing dhamma), and sometimes even some > irritation when the result is not what I want, or the other > person does not agree. The irritation is coarse but is > often unnoticed, sometimes noticable by the voice being too > loud (right, Num?), or the sentence being a little too terse > and inconsiderate. > > When I am discussing dhamma with a person, I would like to > think that it is for the useful benefit of others and > myself. It is really, sometimes, to get acknowledgement, > even a small one. > > When I see something desirable, I sometimes think of the > patikula characteristics of the seen thing. It is really > all with mixed-up with wanting to not having such strong > lobha. Although this is not quite like "patikkulasanna > pathirupena vyapado vancethi (2)", but this reminds me so. > > When I see giving, or seeing good vipakas of other people, I > sometimes feel jealous, but sometimes followed by > anumoddhana / mudita. Part of what I think is kusala, or > all of it, is fake, wanting to have kusala instead of > akusala, or just plainly not liking the domanassa vedana. > > When I study the dhamma (or discusses) dhammas, I sometimes > feel peace. I would like to think it is the result of > kaya-passadhi and citta-passadhi, but often, it is just > plain Dheena-mitha. samadhimukhena thinamiddhang vangcethi > (3) is exactly like that. > > When I considers the dhamma (or analyzes the dhamma) > excessively, especially on the thing that cannot (yet) be > truly known (like analyzing things via conditionalities), I > would like to think I am developing conceptual > understandings, but is really uddhaca (and becomes obvious > toward the end). This is just like viriyarambhamukhena > uddhaccang vangcethi (4). > > vimansa mukhena hetupatirupaka pariggahena miccaditthi > vanceti (9). I don't know if this applies to myself, but I > sometimes wonder if how I understand things just happens to > be how I like it. Uddacha again. > > I say something decent/kind to other people. I would like > to think of it is metta, but it is often mixed up with > wanting to be liked. samvibhaga seelata patirupataya > miccajivo vangceti (13), and piyavadita patirupataya > catukammata vangceti > (18) remind me of this. > > I am not very talkative person. I would like to think that > it is not being mixed up something that is not useful. > Sometimes, it is just plain laziness (dina-mitha, again), or > because of not having metta for others. mitabhanata > patirupataya asammodana seelata vangceti (19) is exactly > like this. > > attadhipateyyata patirupataya garunam anusasaniya > appadakkhinaggahita > vangceti (32). I am often feel grateful for a few people in > this group who see dhammas in other's sayings, even when in > many (or most) cases, they don't agree with one another. I > am inpired by Boddhisatta for seeing dhammas in sayings that > are not intended to be dhamma. It requires such a long > accumulation to be reminded of the true dhammas even when > one hears what is not dhamma. > > mettayana mukhena raago vangceti (35): raga as the metta. > Try metta with a pretty girl, eh, Num? > > Listing some lists like this - it may be only because I want > to show off that I am aware of some of these akusalas! > Dear Kom, thank you for these excellent reminders, I am glad I asked you. We are such a mixture of kusala and akusala, mostly akusala. Sometimes we think: we cannot do anything anymore, it is only akusala. Mike felt discouraged, we all have such moments of discouragement. Where is the cheerfulness of Dhamma? We should be glad to know. It is good to just know and understand that there are many ways by which we are deceived by our akusala, but not try to catch such moments the whole day. I had such feeling when discussing conceit, mana in India: mana the whole day: whenever there is the other person and myself. Or even not comparing, still mana. As you also mentioned, thinking and analysing too much. A. Supee kept on saying: lobha is so natural, normal (thammada, thammada). I lost the pali text and translation of these deceivers, and could not make out some of the Pali: seelata (13) must be siilata? And the Pali of 32 I could not make out. As promised, another example of studying details, as to Condiitons. I was impressed by the Thai tapes of A. Sujin on conditions, so much related to daily life. I decided to write my Intro to Conditions. I read in Guide to Conditional Relations, U Narada, about many details, finding the numbers of common conditions, the enumerations. I tried a few but then found that it did not help me personally, that it was above me, so I left that. It depends on one's personal inclination again how many details are helpful. I paste your other remark about analysing: K: Regarding analysis, I think I like to do this too, even though it is impossible to do a proper analysis. In India, we discussed "identification" issues. She mentioned that unless one has reached a level of vipassana-nana (which one? nama-rupa?) it is really not possible to see clearly the difference between the different nama, e.g., lobha and dosa. Until one reaches the vipassana-nana, then the lakhana of the dhamma as being dhamma is not apparent, and therefore the differences (of the lakkhana) between the namas cannot be clearly seen. N: When one has reached the first vipassana nana (nama-rupa) the different akusala dhammas are seen as only elements, nama dhammas. Dosa and lobha have different characteristics, we notice them, but they are not yet seen as just namas. We think of them and we begin to be aware of them. Hence, for those of us who likes to identify (in words or not), she mention that this is not fruitful (as it is impossible to clearly see). She said (or came close to saying) that instead of identification, seeing the lakhana of the nama that knows (the previous object?) would help with understandings more. Of course, unless one understands why identification (and analysis) is not as useful, or sees (perhaps) the lobha that comes with the identification/analysis, then one continues to analyze... It is more useful to be aware of what appears, thus, we should not neglect visible object, seeing, sound, etc. It depends on condiitons, sometimes there are conditions to think a lot, but this is not I who thinks. We do not think of whether it is a previous object, that is again thinking. But again, we are likely to think more often than being aware. It is natural. Best wishes, Nina. 10585 From: 123Signup Date: Sat Jan 5, 2002 11:44am Subject: Subject: Re: [dsg] deceiving dhammas Dear Nina, Thank you for the encouragement to be cheerful in dhamma. >op 03-01-2002 06:25 schreef Kom Tukovinit op tikmok@y...: >I lost the pali text and translation of these deceivers, and could not make >out some of the Pali: seelata (13) must be siilata? And the Pali of 32 I >could not make out. I am not sure if the following would be helpful or not, but these were Gayan's original posts: (if prompted for passwords, enter "dsgarchives", password "metta". http://www.escribe.com/religion/dhammastudygroup/m117.html http://www.escribe.com/religion/dhammastudygroup/m118.html http://www.escribe.com/religion/dhammastudygroup/m119.html >As promised, another example of studying details, as to Condiitons. I was >impressed by the Thai tapes of A. Sujin on conditions, so much related to >daily life. I decided to write my Intro to Conditions. I read in Guide to >Conditional Relations, U Narada, about many details, finding the numbers of >common conditions, the enumerations. I tried a few but then found that it >did not help me personally, that it was above me, so I left that. It depends >on one's personal inclination again how many details are helpful. Thank you for this nice example. kom 10586 From: m. nease Date: Sat Jan 5, 2002 3:23pm Subject: Re: [dsg] FYI Jon, --- Jonothan Abbott wrote: > I enjoyed very much meeting you in Bangkok over the > New Year. Ditto--it was great meeting you both and being moderated in person...! > --- "m. nease" wrote: > I was sorry to learn about the loss of internet > access, particularly as I > had been appreciating your recent posts. I do hope > you'll be able to find > a workaround that will allow you to remain active on > the list. Thanks, I'll do what I can. This shouldn't be impossible--just a matter of re-writing my work schedule to fit in daily trips to an ISP. Good to begin the weaning process now anyway as I'll be off altogether before long. > I hope things work out for the rest of the period > until you are able to > get into WPN. Thanks again. I should hear back soon re. my request to move up my departure date--I'll keep you posted. I meet today with the Wat Mahatat monks for a formal apology(!) for not having moved in there and taken up their unusual meditation practice after my return from Laos. It'll be a relief to have that over with, at least. mike 10587 From: m. nease Date: Sat Jan 5, 2002 3:42pm Subject: Re: [dsg] deceiving dhammas Dear Nina, --- Nina van Gorkom wrote: > Robert K. > mentioned the "Guide", Netti, > and referred to: lobha that should be pursued > (sevitabba) and that should > not be pursued. ... > Later on I shall give more examples of studying > details, and starting to > like them, to find them relevant, but this post gets > too long I'd certainly like (!) to hear more about this and to be reminded of Robert K's citation. Liking and disliking seem to me to be so central to dukkha in everyday life. mike 10588 From: sukinderpal Date: Sat Jan 5, 2002 7:29pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Bangkok impressions 28/12/01-2/01/02 Dear Robert, The pictures are 400KB each and already in jpg format, I think that it would be better that I reduce the size myself before sending them to you. My last attempt with an earlier version of Micrografx Picture Publisher produced bad quality pictures. I will try to use some other program, perhaps Photoshop, and see what happens. Best wishes, Sukin. --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Robert Epstein wrote: > Dear Sukin, > That would be great if you have the chance to send the photos. I have a simple > Application, Adobe Photodeluxe, which will reduce the resolution of the pictures, > once in the computer, to 72 dpi and will then convert them to jpeg files. It does > so in a matter of seconds. > > If you want to send me the 'big picture files' and have me do the reduction, I > will be happy to do it. If they're too big to send, a good photo app, perhaps one > that comes with the camera's software?, should have a component to do what I have > described. > > Best, > Robert Ep. > > ============= > > --- Sukinderpal Narula wrote: > > Dear Robert, > > You asked: > > > > Now on to more important matters: Sukin, are you going to post the > > photos???? > > > > > > Now since Christine has forgiven me for choosing a bad day for taking her > > picture, > > I think she doesn't mind me sending it to you. Actually I don't know what > > she meant > > by 'flat hair', I just looked at the picture and found that she was really > > looking > > very nice that morning. > > You'll have to wait though since I took the picture in high resolution, I > > need to > > figure out a way to reduce their size before I can send them to you or > > anyone else > > who might be interested. There is also a group picture with Jon, Sarah, K. > > Sujin, > > Betty, Christine, Mike and myself. > > > > Best wishes, > > Sukin. > > > > ps: Sorry if multiple copies of this post has been sent. I am new to > > Microsoft Outlook > > and am having difficulty handling it. > 10589 From: Robert Epstein Date: Sat Jan 5, 2002 10:07pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Ultimate realities (and khandhas) --- Jonothan Abbott wrote: > Rob Ep > > --- Robert Epstein wrote: > Dear Jon, > > Due to pleasantly synchronistic conditions arising, your answer to > > Herman here has > > answered the question I just asked in my last post to you. The rupa is > > experienced directly by the citta and it doesn't matter whether it's an > > 'accurate' > > reflection of a 'real external object' [probably because there's no such > > things -- > > just momentary rupas arising]. What matters is that the rupa will be > > shaped by > > the kammic predispositions of the sense-door moment, and this is all > > that is > > necessary to get one's *real rupa* in the moment. It is not *the* rupa, > > it is the > > appropriate rupa for that citta in that moment. > > I couldn't have put it better myself. (You have quite a way when it comes > to stating these propositions/concepts -- I'm most envious of this > ability!) > > Jon Thank you, Jon, and especially for your help in partially clearing up my understanding of this. I'm still struggling with the relation of namas and rupas and have appreciated all your input. When I first heard about namas and rupas I thought they sounded kind of obvious. Now I say: 'ha!' to that. Best, Robert Ep. 10590 From: Robert Epstein Date: Sat Jan 5, 2002 10:16pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Bangkok impressions 28/12/01-2/01/02 That would be great, Sukin. I will wait to hear from you, and thanks! Best, Robert Ep. ===== --- sukinderpal wrote: > Dear Robert, > The pictures are 400KB each and already in jpg format, I think that > it would be better that I reduce the size myself before sending them > to you. My last attempt with an earlier version of Micrografx > Picture Publisher produced bad quality pictures. I will try to use > some other program, perhaps Photoshop, and see what happens. > Best wishes, > Sukin. > 10591 From: rikpa21 Date: Sun Jan 6, 2002 0:25am Subject: Re: [dsg] FYI --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "m. nease" wrote: > Thanks again. I should hear back soon re. my request > to move up my departure date--I'll keep you posted. I > meet today with the Wat Mahatat monks for a formal > apology(!) for not having moved in there and taken up > their unusual meditation practice after my return from > Laos. It'll be a relief to have that over with, at > least. Hi Mike, I find this statement curious, given everything I've been taught there I have found to be in perfect accord with the actual instructions outlined by the Buddha in the Satipatthana Sutta (any teacher, as one of mine did, who begins a teaching with the simile of the raft, has my rapt attention!). I have furthermore found that what I have been taught does not diverge one iota from what the Buddha actually taught in lpaes like the Satipatthana Sutta, for example. The methods I've learned there are about as mainstream Buddhist (whether Theravada or Mahayana) as they come. I would be very interested in hearing specifically what you find "unusual" about the practices there (such as anapanasati or for some, the Mahasi Sayadaw method of focus on the rising and falling of the abdomen), or, for example, regarding specific methods of training in mindfulness such as: "when walking, the monk discerns that he is walking. When standing, he discerns that he is standing. When sitting, he discerns that he is sitting. When lying down, he discerns that he is lying down. Or however his body is disposed, that is how he discerns it." I was reminded of this consonance in theory and praxis between what I've learned from the many teachers there (as well as from my Tibetan teachers) even more after a long conversation I had with a monk in a small village wat in Laos a few weeks ago. He is a Lao (US Citizen now) monk who's lived in American 28 years who'd ordianed in a small village wat a ways outside Vientiane. After a "coincidental" and fortuitous meeting, we would up having a wonderfully detailed conversation for a few hours on the Dhamma and meditation in specific, which merely confirmed for me the universality of the methods taught at mainstream places like Wat Mahatat that adhere to the teachings in the Satipatthana Sutta, given he has been taught and practies in exactlty the same way as is taught at mainstream places like Wat Mahatat. But that discussion wasn't even necessary to ascertain the viability of those methods in my own case--merely the direct application of those methods in my own limited experience proved almost instantly that these "pure vipassana" approaches definitely work, and act as powerful conditions for Right Mindfulness and Right Concentration, even setting aside for a moment that I've been trained in methods that emphasize cultivating jhana combined with vipassana (also what the Buddha specifically taught in the Suttas). That said, I have encountered other other approaches that sounded superficially OK at first, but when I examined them with great care, they appeared to diverge significantly from what the Buddha actually taught in places like the Satipatthan Sutta and elsewhere. I have found such apparently divergent approaches raise far more questions than they answer for me--especially in terms of how one can apply them to get from point A (suffering sentient being) to point B (liberated by direct insight). Just by way of anectdote, it took me less than two hours of practicing the methods of "training" and "remaining focused" using the methods outlined by my teachers at places like Wat Mahatat (not to mention they accord perfectly with what I've been taught by my Tibetan teachers) to engender significantly increased mindfulness. And again, this from a totally different tradition than the one I've been trained in! Conversely, other approaches, even after serious, and what I believe to be dispassionate analysis (after all my primary training has been in the Tibetan Geluk-pa system, yet I actively seek out teachings from Theravada teachers with the eye to comparing, constrasting, and most imoprtant, integrating those teachings into my own practice), combined with long and deliberate consideration, discussion, and analysis, I have found neither clear precedent for such approaches in the Suttas, nor have I found them conducive to the sort of mindfulness I have come to associate with Right Mindfulness and Right Concentration in my own limited experiences. What I can say is that there is a difference as great as night and day between the approaches I've found have led to increased sati and samadhi, vs. those that provide too little "traction" to lead someone with my accumulations to true samma sati and samma samadhi. One rule of thumb I find helpful in discerning what is and is not effective "method" is if it really engenders the results the Buddha detailed. For example, how well doeas any given approach help engender unbroken focus, clear comprehension, and concentration over long peiods of time? Taking what the Buddha taught in the Anapanasati Sutta: http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/majjhima/mn118.html "And how are the four frames of reference developed & pursued so as to bring the seven factors of awakening to their culmination?" [Note again this is specifically what the Buddha taught as the factors leading to release: the seven factors of enlightenment, the bojjhangas] "[1] On whatever occasion the monk remains focused on the body in & of itself -- ardent, alert, & mindful -- putting aside greed & distress with reference to the world, on that occasion his mindfulness is steady & without lapse. When his mindfulness is steady & without lapse, then mindfulness as a factor of awakening becomes aroused. He develops it, and for him it goes to the culmination of its development." I find it beneficial to pay particular attention to the instruction that says: "When his mindfulness is ***steady & without lapse*** [emphasis mine], then mindfulness as a factor of awakening becomes aroused. He develops it, and for him it goes to the culmination of its development." Since few Buddhists would argue against the crititical position the bojjhangas play in awakening and final release, then unless one has unbroken mindfulness (which carries with it the implication of highly developed concentration as well), then there is not the development of samma sati that leads to release, not to mention the other factors: "[2] Remaining mindful in this way, he examines, analyzes, & comes to a comprehension of that quality with discernment. When he remains mindful in this way, examining, analyzing, & coming to a comprehension of that quality with discernment, then analysis of qualities as a factor of awakening becomes aroused. He develops it, and for him it goes to the culmination of its development. "[3] In one who examines, analyzes, & comes to a comprehension of that quality with discernment, unflagging persistence is aroused. When unflagging persistence is aroused in one who examines, analyzes, & comes to a comprehension of that quality with discernment, then persistence as a factor of awakening becomes aroused. He develops it, and for him it goes to the culmination of its development. "[4] In one whose persistence is aroused, a rapture not-of-the-flesh arises. When a rapture not-of-the-flesh arises in one whose persistence is aroused, then rapture as a factor of awakening becomes aroused. He develops it, and for him it goes to the culmination of its development. "[5] For one who is enraptured, the body grows calm and the mind grows calm. When the body & mind of an enraptured monk grow calm, then serenity as a factor of awakening becomes aroused. He develops it, and for him it goes to the culmination of its development. "[6] For one who is at ease -- his body calmed -- the mind becomes concentrated. When the mind of one who is at ease -- his body calmed -- becomes concentrated, then concentration as a factor of awakening becomes aroused. He develops it, and for him it goes to the culmination of its development. "[7] He oversees the mind thus concentrated with equanimity. When he oversees the mind thus concentrated with equanimity, equanimity as a factor of awakening becomes aroused. He develops it, and for him it goes to the culmination of its development. [Similarly with the other three frames of reference: feelings, mind, & mental qualities.] "This is how the four frames of reference are developed & pursued so as to bring the seven factors of awakening to their culmination. (Clear Knowing & Release) "And how are the seven factors of awakening developed & pursued so as to bring clear knowing & release to their culmination? There is the case where a monk develops mindfulness as a factor of awakening dependent on seclusion... dispassion... cessation, resulting in relinquishment. He develops analysis of qualities as a factor of awakening... persistence as a factor of awakening... rapture as a factor of awakening... serenity as a factor of awakening... concentration as a factor of awakening... equanimity as a factor of awakening dependent on seclusion... dispassion... cessation, resulting in relinquishment. "This is how the seven factors of awakening, when developed & pursued, bring clear knowing & release to their culmination." So what to make of all this? I think any teaching that does NOT emphasize all of these factors in the appropriate degree and balance, or any teaching that does not lead to the sort of mindfulness ("steady and without lapse") that serves as the foundation for the remaining bojjhanagas, that release would be something extremely difficult to come by. What are your thoughts on all of this, Mike? *** May all beings have happinhess and cause of happiness. May all beings be free from suffering and the cause of suffering. May all beings never be separated from perfect joy. May all beings abide in equanimity, undefiled by the taints of the Eight Worldly Concenrns. 10592 From: Sarah Date: Sun Jan 6, 2002 0:26am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: luminous mind: To Kenneth Ong Dear Suan, Many thanks for your efforts to answer so many difficult questions. --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "abhidhammika" wrote: > However, as you raised this question again, I will give you, as a > quick answer, Buddhaghosa's statement on how javana cittas can > condition bhavangacitta. > > The answer to this problem is to do with the timing and quality of > javana cittas. > > When javana citta has the strength of a janaka kamma, it can modify > bhavangacitta. In fact, it can cause new kinds of bhavangacitta to > arise. > > The following Pali quote comes from Section 687, > Kankhavitaranavisuddhi niddesa, Visuddhimaggo, Vol.2. > > 687. .....Tattha janakam naama kusalampi hoti akusalampi. Tam > patisandhiyampi pavattepi ruupaaruuupavipaakakkhandhe janeti. > > "...There, janakam is either healthy or unhealthy action. It (janaka > kamma) can cause resultant physical and mental aggegates to arise > either at the moment of linking consciousness (conception) or during > the current lifetime." > > Please kindly note that the resultant mental aggregates (aruupa > vipaaka khandhaa) during the current lifetime refer to bhavanga > cittas. > I’m looking at Nanamoli’s English translation of Vism, chXX11because I believe the Pali section 687 falls here under the English sections 79, 80. but I can’t find your exact quote and in the index there is no reference to bhavanga in this section. (It is well-worth reading however as there is a useful discussion about latent tendencies, accumulations, kamma and time sequence which may be of interest to Howard in particular). If you can give me a further reference to Nanamoli’s translation, that would be useful, in order to read the surrounding section too. I’m. sorry to ask this. In the same text, Vism X1V, 114, (458 in the Pali) we read specifically about bhavanga cittas: “When the rebirth-linking consciousness has ceased, then following on whatever kind of rebirth-linking it may be, the same kinds, being the result of that same kamma whatever it may be, occur as life continuum consciousness with the same object; and again those same kinds. And as long as there is no other kind of arising of consciousness to interrupt the continuity, they also go on occurring endlessly in periods of dreamless sleep, etc., like the current of a river.” It continues to discuss how the bhavanga cittas are interrupted by processed through the sense doors and mind door. There is no suggestion that I’ve read either of the bhavanga cittas or objects changing/being affected by javana cittas in this lifetime. Thanks again for the interesting points, Sarah ====================================================== 10593 From: Sarah Date: Sun Jan 6, 2002 0:57am Subject: Teng Kee's comments Dear Teng Kee, It’s good to hear from you after a long break! I think I share the same understanding on these points as you (of course my understanding is still kindergartedn technical knowledge unlike your detailed Pali expertise;-) Now I think I’m looking in the wrong section for Suan’s Pali quote. I’m hoping for a redirection. As you suggest, it seems the reference would be to rebirth in other planes (as a result of javana processes in this lifetime) rather than any change of bhavanga cittas in this lifetime. Back to old discussion topics, I’m wondering if you ever read my post addressed to you and others: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/message/8750 This was on the subject of types/characters and carita and followed on from some discussion you were having on this topic with Rob K and others before and reference to difficulties you mentioned then in the Satipatthana Sutta. I had discussed the points further with K.Sujin, but as Christine would say, the post reflects my understanding of this tricky subject quite a while later. I’d be interested to hear any further comments from you or Nina or anyone else. Best wishes, Sarah p.s Suan, we all find Teng Kee’s posts to be a bit of a maze in which we often get pretty lost. Also his bark (like Erik’s) is definitely worse than his bite;-)) ====================================================== --- Ong Teng Kee wrote: > Dear Mr.Suan, > I think buddhaghosa would say you are having crazy idea about > bhavanga.He > would say you are just a non theravadin.Read ch.20 in Visuddhimagga for > kamma produce material,bhavanga citta produce material during life > time.You > cannot say during life time we produce kamma call janaka kamma because > those > are supplanmanting kamma etc.Janaka kamma cannot be change after rebirth > > citta.janaka kamma basically means our life time span produce from > previous > life.Are you saying that we can change from among 4 kinds of two roots > to 4 > kinds of three roots or from ahetu to two roots.We are still not enter > into > bhavanga citta of brahma when we attain jhana as a human because we are > merely attain into form/formless javana.Do not be overclever. > --- Ong Teng Kee wrote: > Dear Mr.Suan, > I think buddhaghosa would say you are having crazy idea about > bhavanga.He > would say you are just a non theravadin.Read ch.20 in Visuddhimagga for > kamma produce material,bhavanga citta produce material during life > time.You > cannot say during life time we produce kamma call janaka kamma because > those > are supplanmanting kamma etc.Janaka kamma cannot be change after rebirth > > citta.janaka kamma basically means our life time span produce from > previous > life.Are you saying that we can change from among 4 kinds of two roots > to 4 > kinds of three roots or from ahetu to two roots.We are still not enter > into > bhavanga citta of brahma when we attain jhana as a human because we are > merely attain into form/formless javana.Do not be overclever. > ................................................................................................................ 10594 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Sun Jan 6, 2002 1:17am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The Two Truths (for Howard) Rob Ep --- Robert Epstein wrote: > Dear Jon, > I understand your statement that both arising and conceptual wrong > understanding > can be an obstacle. But this leaves me a little confused about what you > meant in > your original statement by: 'The root cause of our problems in not our > wrong > conceptual grasp of things...' Could you say a word about that? I > understand > the second part of the sentence, but I don't understand how wrong > conceptual grasp > is not a root cause, yet our 'general accumulated wrong view' about > realities is. > I don't quite have the distinction between those two..... > > Best, > Robert Ep. I'm a little confused myself, Rob, since I've lost track of the original thread. However, let me try to restate what I might have had in mind. Wrong conceptual understanding is based on wrong understanding of realities (dhammas); it is the latter that is the cause of the former and not the other way around. To give an example from our discussion, our conceptual idea of 'hardness' is bound to be inaccurate as long as direct understanding of the reality that is hardness has not been fully developed. No amount of 'correcting' our conceptual misunderstanding can bring any meaningful progress along the path. Another example. An idea of 'self' arises because realities have not been directly seen with panna as having the characteristic of 'not-self'. Even though we may have accepted as correct at an intellectual level the teaching on no self, the concept of self is still there and will arise, because of the lack of understanding of realities. I hope this is clearer. Jon 10595 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Sun Jan 6, 2002 1:23am Subject: Re: [dsg] Ultimate realities (and khandhas) Howard --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Jon - > > Thank you for the following informative post. > At one point you ask, with regard to the possibility of concepts > being > among the objects discussed in the 4th foundation of mindfulness: "So > even on > your own interpretation, Howard, wouldn't that leave the Four Noble > Truths as > the only possible 'concept' anyway?" With regard to this, I would say > that, > yes, these seem to be the only concepts dealt with there. But I > certainly do > see them as concepts. The Four Noble Truths are fully realised at the moment of arahantship, at which moment the object of the citta is nibbana, a reality. So I think that for the arahant it can be said that the Four Noble Truths are not a concept but an aspect of reality. In the course of the development of the path to enlightenment, the Four Noble Truths are progressively realised. To those of us who are far from enlightenment, they are a mere concept. I don’t know if this agrees with your take on the subject? Jon 10596 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Sun Jan 6, 2002 1:28am Subject: Re: [dsg] Memory, Objects, and Continuity Num, Mike --- srnsk@a... wrote: > Hi Jon, > > > Do you have any references on the 4 manifestations of sanna that you > > mention --'registration (marking), retention, retrieval and recall'? > I > > would be interested to know where I can read more about this. > > > > > The bottom-line of how I came up with those descriptions is from > multiple > sources. Hmm, let me tell you how I came up. > > I have been reading lakkhanaticcatuka, (four characters: > {characteristics > (lakkhanam: specific or generic attribute) function (rasa: function or > achievement), manifestation (paccupat-thana: manifestation, appearance > or > effect) and proximate cause (padatthanam) }), from various sources, > English, > Pali and couple of different translations of these 4 characteristics in > Thai, > from Milindapanha, a little bit from my tipitaka online search. And I > have to > admit that I also reflect about it from my background, my training and > practice at work. I was interested to read Mike's post on this subject (thanks, Mike), which quotes the following passage from 'Survey' > 3. Remembrance or perception, sa~n~naa cetasika, > "marks" the object so that it can be recognized. > Sa~n~naa cetasika remembers each object which appears; > it remembers the different objects appearing one after > the other as a "whole", as a story, a concept of > beings and people. Sa~n~naa remembers pleasant > feeling, unpleasant feeling, bodily pleasant and > painful feeling and indifferent feeling with regard to > each object which appears. Sa~n~naa cetasika is an > important condition inciting to attachment and > clinging in life. > > from > Survey of Paramattha Dhammas > Sujin Boriharnwanaket > Translated by Nina van Gorkom It seems to me, on the basis of the textual references, that the function of sanna is to mark the object of the citta at, say, the moment of experiencing an object through one of the sense doors and then in subsequent mind moments to play a part in enabling us to relate that object to objects previously experienced. Any thoughts/comments on this hypothesis? Jon 10597 From: Sarah Date: Sun Jan 6, 2002 1:34am Subject: Re: [dsg] one limb of 8 fold path more important (was satipathana and practice) Dear Erik (and Frank), Further to Frank’s helpful comments, I’d just like to add a couple more points: --- rikpa21 wrote: > > I agree completely the "Right View" is the forerunner, but Right > View in what sense, mundane, suparmundane? > > "Right View" in the mundane sense only takes one so far. If kamma > and paticca samuppada and anatta are explained well they are not > unduly difficult to grasp intellectually. What is much harder is > getting rid of the views part and coming to supramundane Right View, > which it tanamount to abandoning "views" (read, speculation) > altogether. When we talk (or rather the Buddha talks) about mundane right view or pa~n~na, this is not merely intellectual right view but direct understanding of realities at this moment. It is by beginning to develop pa~n~na little by little of paramatha dhammas that wrong views and speculations are gradually abandoned. This is the path which will eventually result in supramundane panna. One step at a time. Each moment of panna erodes ignorance and wrong view just a little more as in the often quoted axe-handle verse. > > Similarly, one needs hold no "belief" (ditthi) regarding the taste > of a ripe mango if one has actually tasted a ripe mango, though one > may hold beliefs about its flavor as "sweet, delicious, etc." prior > to actually tasting it. Once tasted, there is no longer any need for > any "view" of a mango's taste, hence there is nothing to associate > with view or speculation regarding its flavor and texture. > > But, absent this taste, there has to be some way to acquire a mango > for the tasting! :) I liked Frank’s papaya story very much;-) Right intellectual understanding and direct understanding work together. Without hearing and considering that the mango tastes so delicious on the inside, would one even open it to check out? > So my question, from the other day and again is, "Now what"? > Intellectual analysis can only take one so far. It is possible to > beak down the body into a bunch of functions and dis-identify them > with an "I" intellectually. But this can never substitute for > directly seeing this reality with supramundane panna, which is > unmediated by conceptual elaborations. As for “now what?”, let’s not be concerned about supramundane panna, because now there is no supramundane panna. So what is there now? Sense door activity and objects, thinking, the ‘cheating’ dhammas being discussed and so on. It’s not just a question of thinking and breaking down and dis-identifying these realities but seeing that right now there is no other world other than that of seeing, hearing and so on. In other words, instead of selecting or focussing, there can be direct understanding of whatever reality appears for an instant. If we wish for more moments of panna or of lasting moments of panna, it shows the attachment and clinging to self again. > The means to tasting this ripe mango I'm familiar with (the one > outlined by the Buddha in the Satipatthana Sutta and the Samadhi > Sutta and many other places) demands a lot more than merely > understanding intellectually (lokiya samma ditthi) that all things > are anatta, or that we all heirs to our own kamma, or believing that > there is no "driver" or "I" behind everything in the ultimate sense. When we read about (lokiya) samma ditthi (rt understanding), I don’t understand it to be intellectual understanding. > According to my understanding, the panna that cuts the defilements > takes unbroken mindfulness brought about by persistence and effort > (viriya) training in mindfulness and concentration, (sati and > samadhi), applying that to the direct investigation (dhamma-vicaya) > into the charactetristics of dhammas arising and passing away in > terms of noting their inconstancy, combined with other factors > (piti, passadhi, upekkha), which, when brought to their culmination > in the proper balance, lead to the insight that terminates the > fetters and brings to fruition the sole aim of the Dhamma: final > release from identification with the imputed "self," the "I, me, > mine," which lies at the root of suffering. I think we need to start at the beginning. One moment of satipatthana is very precious (‘one finger-snap’..). > So there are many factors involved, and what I've found most helpful > is to reflect on what the Buddha actually taught regarding the cause- > and-effect relationships that lead from suffering sentient being to > final release. For example, if the hindrances are present, can any > of the enlightenment factors like piti, passadhi, upekkha, or sati > arise? What about samadhi? Without these factors, is there any hope > of release? Certainly, if panna and the other wholesome mental factors are not highly developed, there is no chance of enlightenment factors. The way they will be highly developed, however, is not by imagining what they must be like but by directly understanding the characteristics of skilful and unskilful states and other realities appearing now. > So based on my understanding, it's a matter of working with these > cause-and-effect relationships in the approriate order, knowing, for > example, that without pacifying the hindrances, the seven factors of > enlightenment have no basis for arising, not to mention > enlightenment and final release. Not only that, but among all these > factors there needs to be the appropriate balance. To veer too far > in any direction is to depart from the Middle Way, to miss > the "sweet spot" as in the "lute-string" simile, and to miss the > mark entirely. Erik, as I’ve mentioned, I’ve appreciated the pleasant tone in your recent messages and well-considered points and quotes. I also appreciated the same in the live discussion;-)) May I suggest, though, that there is still an idea of ‘control’ in what you write above. Instead of considering the ‘Middle Way’ as not veering too much in one direction and missing your “sweet-spot”, can we see it as a moment of understanding? At a moment of panna, there is no eternalist or annihilation belief, there is no wrong view or ignorance. It understands the visible object, sound, feeling or other reality and at that moment. It is accompanied by right awareness, concentration and effort already. This is why, as Frank pointed out with the helpful quote, right understanding is the forerunner or dawn. Sarah ====================================================== 10598 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Sun Jan 6, 2002 1:35am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: What is Concentration Actually? Howard --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Erik - ........... > I've had a drop of experience in samatha bhavana, involving > concentration practice focusing the mind on a single meditation subject, > and > also some practice in vipassana bhavana, involving what is sometimes > called > moment-to-moment concentration practice. In my experience these types of > > concentration are different, but, in their different ways, equally > powerful. > In either of these cases, the concentration is, as you say, radically > different from "the normal sort of samadhi that (may) arise in > day-to-day > life through concentrating on random object arising through thes > sense-doors". > The point of my post, however, was to inquire into the technical > question of what is actually occurring, at a microscopic level of > detail, > when concentration has increased. My conjecture was that the switching > back > and forth among various (instances of) objects from citta to citta to > citta > typical of ordinary experience is reduced, in the extreme case to a > single > object (or near-replicates identified as "the same object") which is the > > arammana in mental process after mental process. Now, it seems almost > certain > to me that such a curtailing of the diversity of objects of awareness, > such > focusing and stabilization, is due to some functional characteristic or > cetasika within each mindstate becoming strengthened, in which case that > > cetasika, itself, might be called "concentration". I am asking those who > are > well versed in Abhidhamma what their understanding of the Abhidhamma > "take" > is on this subject. I have sought the views of some persons well-versed in Abhidhamma, and would like to attempt an answer to your question. You are wondering what is the factor in samatha bhavana that allows successive cittas to take the same object (i.e., the 'meditation subject'). I would agree that, conventionally speaking, we could call this 'concentration'. However, there is already a 'concentration' cetasika -- ekaggataa cetasika -- whose function is somewhat different, namely, to concentrate the citta on its present object, whatever that object might be (and regardless of whether it is the same object as the object the preceding citta). Being one of the 'universals', ekaggataa cetasika does of course arise at moments of samatha bhavana where it performs exactly this function. The answer to your question is I think found in Ch. 8 of Nina's 'Cetasikas'. There it is explained that it is the function of vitakka cetasika to strike or hit upon the object of the citta, and that in samatha bhavana, vitakka "thinks of" or "touches" the meditation subject again and again. Vitakka is the first of the jhana factors. Both ekaggataa cetasika and vitakka cetasika are also present at moments of vipassana and enlightenment. Indeed, in this context they are path factors -- ekaggataa cetasika is the path factor that is 'right concentration/samma samadhi', and vitakka cetasika is the path factor that is 'right thinking/samma-vayama'. Confusingly, the term 'samadhi' is sometimes used in the texts to refer to samatha bhavana and sometimes to ekagatta cetasika. I have set out below some relevant terms (as I understand them). Jon Samatha -- 'Calmness' or 'tranquillity'. An attribute of all kusala cittas, in the sense of being calm or tranquil from akusala. Samatha bhavana -- The development of certain kinds of kusala that are particularly conducive to calmness, accompanied by panna (wisdom), to the level of jhana. Ekagatta cetasika -- The cetasika (mental factor) that is 'concentration'. It concentrates the citta on its object. Is a 'universal' (i.e., arises with every citta) and so may be kusala or akusala depending on the citta it accompanies Passaddhi -- The cetasika (mental factor) that is calmness or tranquillity It arises with each moment of kusala citta. Vitakka -- The cetasika that that strikes or hits upon the object of the citta. In samatha bhavana, it causes/allows the citta to take the same object on successive moments. Samadhi -- 'Concentration'. A term whose meaning rather depends on the context. Sometimes used as a synonym for ekagatta cetasika, sometimes for samatha/samatha bhavana (and sometimes something else). 10599 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Sun Jan 6, 2002 1:39am Subject: Re: [dsg] Concept Victor --- yuzhonghao wrote: > Hello Sarah, > > You questioned that "Can we say that a concept comes to be because of > thinking?" What do you think? Can we? You wrote that no thinking > means no concepts. From what you wrote, it seems to me that you mean > that concept is dependent on thinking. This is how I understand the > word "concept" from the online dictionary in http://www.webster.com: > A concept means something conceived in the mind, a thought, a > notion. It also means an abstract or generic idea generalized from > particular instances. The synonym to the word "concept" is the > word "idea." I agree with you that thinking is conditioned. I had planned to give a reply to your original question (> How does a concept come to be?), but had not got around to it by the time you sent your follow-up. A you rightly point out, a concept is a mere creation of the mind, a notion. The importance of this from our point of view is that a concept has no 'existence' independently of the citta that 'creates' it. The abhidhamma makes a distinction between concepts and realities (dhammas). Realities have an essential nature that can be experienced by sati/panna, while concepts do not. Concepts are undoubtedly conditioned, in the sense that, as you say, they are dependent on thinking, which is itself conditioned. But whereas the thinking is a reality that has an individual nature capable of being experienced by panna, a concept has no such individual nature, according to the abhidhamma. Jon 10600 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Sun Jan 6, 2002 1:44am Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts) Victor --- yuzhonghao wrote: > Hello Jon, > > The truths taught by the Buddha are to be understood and not to be > misunderstood as they are. Again, we are in agreement here, Victor. But simply saying this doesn't take us very far, wouldn't you agree? What we need to know is how this understanding is to be developed. So let me ask, what is the means by which one may come to see that conditioned phenomena are impermanent, unsatisfactory and not-self? For example, what is meant here by 'conditioned phenomena', in your view? Enjoying your posts lately. Jon > > Regards, > Victor > > > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Jonothan Abbott wrote: > > Victor > > > > --- yuzhonghao wrote: > Hello Jon, > > > > > > It is good that you understand that: > > > Conditioned phenomenon is impermanent. > > > Conditioned phenomenon is unsatisfactory/dukkha. > > > Conditioned phenomenon is to be seen as it actually is with right > > > discernment thus: "This is not mine. This I am not. This is not > my > > > self." 10601 From: Sarah Date: Sun Jan 6, 2002 1:47am Subject: New Members- settling in on dsg Dear New Members, --- alunsiwolf@a... wrote: > i have been studing buddhism for only 3 months & seem to be at a loss > trying > to "keep up" with your site's postings. In addition to the note I sent to this person off-list, I'd like to remind others that it's easy to change the setting from receiving 'individual mail' to reading it 'at the website only' or receiving mail in a 'digest form'. To change these options, please follow the directions on the homepage: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup More detail is also given about the options in the files section: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/files/ Finally, there are a few posts which are particularly helpful for newbies under 'New to the list and new to Buddhism' in Useful Posts: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/files/Useful_Posts Please send us a post here to tell us about your interest in Buddhism and any questions or comments(however basic) to make the list relevant to your interest! Sarah ===================================================== 10602 From: Ong Teng Kee Date: Sun Jan 6, 2002 3:33am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: luminous mind: To Ong Teng Kee Dear suan I have no time to read your old post yet but can you give me one burmese sayadaw saying that we can change our bhavanga at will in one life.I have read more pali than you but i still haven't seen buddhaghosa ,sumangala ,dhammapala,buddhadatta or ananda said we can have 4 or more bhavanga in one life.There are possible for all kinds of kusala/akusala javana regardless of bhavanga we are having.Just give me the sayadaw name /book in burmese because i do read burmese. >From: "abhidhammika" >Reply-To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com >To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com >Subject: [dsg] Re: luminous mind: To Ong Teng Kee >Date: Sat, 05 Jan 2002 15:21:15 -0000 > > > > > > >Dear Ong Teng Kee > >How are you? > >I am afraid I don't think I understand your message. Did you >carefully read my post 10521 that you were complaining about? > >I provided Buddhaghosa's own statement on the matter both in Pali and >its translation. Not only that. I also mentioned Buddhaghosa's >disclaimer regarding the matter. > >If you read Pali language, I could analyse the Pali quote word for >word, if necessary. If you do not read Pali, well, I am afraid I >could not help you in that way. > >And, as I do not understand your message properly, I may not be able >to answer your questions, either. I do not find your post very >coherent, I am afraid. I am really sorry about my failure to resolve >your complaints on this occasion. > >Of course, you may attempt to clarify your complaints after having >carefully read my post 10521. > >It is a Buddhist virtue to remove someone's ignorance (my failure to >understand your message, in this case)! > >Thank you for your attempt to make sense of my post and respond to it. > > >With kind regards, > >Suan > >http://www.bodhiology.org > 10603 From: Lucy Date: Sun Jan 6, 2002 5:52am Subject: Re: [dsg] New Members- settling in ? Hello ! I'm one of those new members, though I recognise quite a few names from the other lists I subscribe to, the 'new' is only relative. My sympathies to those who can't keep up - I'm one of them - so many messages, so many topics each bringing new questions, subtopics and infra-topics. And more come up before one has had time to formulate the question...I keep on moving mails to a 'To Read Later' folder---but it's bursting at the seams!!! I'll just have to concentrate on the topics that concern me for now and start deleting the others. Sorry, no offence intended. Your index of useful topics is invaluable (it's in the Files section of the Yahoo web site for those who haven't seen it). Thanks for taking the trouble! By way of introduction: I'm of the 'M' persuasion (another reason to maintain respectful silence), took Refuge Vows with a Tibetan sect and Precepts with a Soto Zen sect, technically I belong to both, but now practice on my own as there is no group in this (rather backwater) area where I'd feel comfortable practising. My first contact with Buddhism years ago was through the Pali Tipitaka, for the past year I've gone back to studying it and trying to practice more in accordance with it. My interest was re-kindled by studying some works by Vasubandhu and realising that I still had a lot to learn from both the Suttanta and the Abidhamma. There are no Theravada groups nearby, though my house is open to anyone who wants to pop in for a chat with tea, oat cakes and meditation. Back to read last week's mails. Be well ! Lucy 10604 From: rikpa21 Date: Sun Jan 6, 2002 6:06am Subject: Re: [dsg] one limb of 8 fold path more important (was satipathana and practice) --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Sarah wrote: > Dear Erik (and Frank), Hi Sarah, > When we talk (or rather the Buddha talks) about mundane right view or > pa~n~na, this is not merely intellectual right view but direct > understanding of realities at this moment. It sounds as though there's some confusion in terminology between mundane vs. supramundae right view here. Mundane Right View includes understanding kamma and its result, for example, among other variations. Only supramundane Right View discerns things as they truly are: devoid of entity, impermanent, and painful. > It is by beginning to develop > pa~n~na little by little of paramatha dhammas that wrong views and > speculations are gradually abandoned. This is the path which will > eventually result in supramundane panna. By way of clarification, the closest the Buddha comes to "paramattha dhammas" (other than those classified as cetasika, but that's not what you've mentioned, rather, "paramattha dhammas" "hearing, visible object, hardness," etc.") in the Satipatthana Suttas regards: "Furthermore... just as a skilled butcher or his apprentice, having killed a cow, would sit at a crossroads cutting it up into pieces, the monk contemplates this very body -- however it stands, however it is disposed -- in terms of properties: 'In this body there is the earth property, the liquid property, the fire property, & the wind property.'" In my reading this passage carefully, through, I see no reference to "paramattha dhammas" ("absolute" realities--whatever is taken for "absolute"--which is an extremely problematic term in its own right) except in the abstract. What the Buddha says explicitly is to be mindful that the body is composed of the Four Great Elements. I am not sure how this is "paramattha" in any way. This is a purely conceptual mode of understanding. Also, there is no mention here of discerning the qualities of "hardness" via the sense-bases, for example, but, rather, on understanding that this body, like all phenomena, is a composed entity, using the Four Great Elements as a means of deconstructing the idea thaere is a persistent entity hinding someplace inside. This makes perfect sense to me taken in light of the other meditations in deconstructing the body into its various body parts, such as hair, phlegm, bile, etc.--none of which to my understanding represent "paramattha dhammas." So I don't see support for observing "paramattha dhammas" via the sense-bases (ayatanas) as a means to ending speculation in places like the Satipatthana Sutta(s). What the Buddha mentions expliticly and repeatedly, in each case (kaya, vedana, citta, and dhamma nupassana) is discerning either the composed nature of things (the khandas for example), and more often, the "origination & passing away" of the various objects of investigation suggesetd in the Satipatthana Sutta(s). For another sutta that mentions only the impermanence aspect, please see the "The Kimsuka Sutta": http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/samyutta/sn35-204.html. Regarding "paramattaha dhammas" and their apparance through the six sense-bases, I see no explicit mention of "paramattha dhammas" in the Sutta. What is mentioned exlpicitly are the FETTERS that arise dependent on the six sense-bases. Again, no mention is made of "hardness" or "visual object," but on the fetters that arise in dependence on sights, sounds, tastes, smells, feeeling, AND INTELLECT (concepts!): "And how does [one] remain focused on mental qualities in & of themselves with reference to the sixfold internal & external sense media? There is the case where [one] discerns the eye, [one] discerns forms, [one] discerns the fetter that arises dependent on both. [One] discerns how there is the arising of an unarisen fetter. And [one] discerns how there is the abandoning of a fetter once it has arisen. And [one] discerns how there is no further appearance in the future of a fetter that has been abandoned." To read further, in the other case where the sense-bases are discussed (when one contemplates the Four Noble Truths in terms of dhamamanupassana), they are spoken of in the same manner. Instead of talking about "paramattha dhammas" such as "visible object, hearing, hardness, " etc., again, the Buddha explicitly lists in what way we should be aware of the sense-bases in terms of suffering, its origination, and its passing away: "And what is the noble truth of the origination of stress? The craving that makes for further becoming -- accompanied by passion & delight, relishing now here & now there -- i.e., craving for sensuality, craving for becoming, craving for non-becoming. "And where does this craving, when arising, arise? And where, when dwelling, does it dwell? Whatever is endearing & alluring in terms of the world: that is where this craving, when arising, arises. That is where, when dwelling, it dwells. "And what is endearing & alluring in terms of the world? The eye is endearing & alluring in terms of the world. That is where this craving, when arising, arises. That is where, when dwelling, it dwells." This goes all the way up to though (concepts again, not "paramattha dhammas"!): "Thought directed at forms... Thought directed at sounds... Thought directed at smells... Thought directed at tastes... Thought directed at tactile sensations... Thought directed at ideas..." So it appears then, on a careful reading the Satipatthana Sutta(s), that the key aspects of mindfulness outlined by the Buddha emphasize training (the Buddha does, after all, use the term "training") to discern the composed nature of all conditioned phenomena by way of deconstructing them into their constituents, or by training to discern their transience and impermanence (which are really two sides of the same coin) by thorough investigation into their characteristics, namely, their impermanence, or their lack of entity, or their unsatisfactoriness. So on careful examination of just the Satipatthana Sutta, since most people here seem to refer to it as canonical (we can set aside the "Samadhi Sutta" for a moment here--and as an aside, perhaps I am mistaken, but the other day, I got the impression there were some who weren't aware of the existence of that particular Sutta :), there is no reference there I can find that I would associate with what I understand you to mean by the term "paramattha dhamma." What I see instead is that the Buddha suggested a wide range of physical AND CONCEPTUAL objects to observe as a part of training the mind in Right Mindfulness. Even the body, which one would think that of all objects of discernment, should lend itself to the notion of "paramattha dhammas", The Buddha instead instructs us to analyze it first by way of concepts and categories. In terms of feelings, to note pleasant, unpleasant, or the origination and passing away of said feelings (if cetasikas are "paramattha" by your definition then I could see an argument, but you've been speaking about "paramattha dhammas" arising via the sense-bases, not cetasikas). In terms of mind, whether it is with aversion, lust, constricted or expansive, released or unreleased, in terms of arising and passing away, again. In terms of dhammas, the Buddha mentions objects like the "five hindrances" (nivaranas), etc. None of these, excepting the aforementioned cetasikas, to my understanding, are "paramattha dhammas" that arises through the sense-bases--which is the sens in which you have explained being aware of them. Are the "the seven factors of awakening" (bojjhangas), the "Four Noble Truths" (ariya sacca), which are ALL conceptual in the way they're described in the Satipatthana Sutta, though contemplating them conceptually will eventually lead one into deeper insights if the mind is appropriately trained, freed from the hindrances, and able to discern appropriately (from the Anapanasati Sutta): "[1] On whatever occasion the monk remains focused on the body in & of itself -- ardent, alert, & mindful -- putting aside greed & distress with reference to the world, on that occasion his mindfulness is steady & without lapse. When his mindfulness is steady & without lapse, then mindfulness as a factor of awakening becomes aroused. He develops it, and for him it goes to the culmination of its development. "[2] Remaining mindful in this way, he examines, analyzes, & comes to a comprehension of that quality with discernment. When he remains mindful in this way, examining, analyzing, & coming to a comprehension of that quality with discernment, then analysis of qualities as a factor of awakening becomes aroused. He develops it, and for him it goes to the culmination of its development." So if one accepts that the Satipatthana Sutta details the "direct way" to overcoming the defilements permanently, then it would seem prudent--to me anyway--to try to rightly understand the specifics here, and to work with the FULL range of objects suggested by the Buddha (it is after all the FOUR Foundations of Mindfulness, not THE Foundation of Mindfulness!). Generally speaking, what I take from the sutta is that there are three approaches the Buddha suggested working with: the fact that all things are lack entity, or core (anatta--using things like the elements or deconstructing the body into its constituents), the fact that all things are impermanent (anicca--discerning the arising and passing away of the fetters, etc.), and by way of this reality all things, due to our clinging to them as real, inherently existent, are suffering (dukkha--the Truth of the Origin of Suffering, etc.). Each facet of this practice (anicca, dukkha, anatta) reflects the whole: to recognize the composed nature of all phenomena is to simultaneously recognize their impermanence, and by implication, their unsatisfactoriness. And all of this is of course in perfect accord with the "three gateways" through which supramundane insight is said to arise (in dependence on the favored approach of the meditator: naicca, dukkha, anatta). Through apprehending reality as it is via the gateways of either anatta, anicca, or dukkha (this obviously requires extremely deep insight developed through intensive training such that panna becomes powerful enough to directly penetrate the characteristics of dhammas), supramundane insight has basis to arise and resolves into the simultaneous and direct knowledge of all three aspects of the tilakkhana (three marks of existence), unmediated by any conceptual fabrication. Oh, and by way of side note here related to last Monday's discussion where the training I mentioned regarding "eating meditation" I was taught at Wat Mahatat elicited a few chuckles from some of the participants (who were perhaps not familiar with the many variations on developing mindfulness found in the Maha-Satipatthana Sutta), the Maha-Satipatthana Sutta notes: "Furthermore, when going forward & returning, he makes himself fully alert; when looking toward & looking away... when bending & extending his limbs... when carrying his outer cloak, his upper robe & his bowl... when eating, drinking, chewing, & savoring... when urinating & defecating... when walking, standing, sitting, falling asleep, waking up, talking, & remaining silent, he makes himself fully alert." So next time anyone has to take a shit, perhaps this is a good time to consider the development of Satipatthana (wasn't there an arahat who terminated the effluents sitting on the loo? I think I recall hearing something about that recently), anyway, not to get scatalogical...) > I liked Frank's papaya story very much;-) Right intellectual understanding > and direct understanding work together. Without hearing and considering > that the mango tastes so delicious on the inside, would one even open it > to check out? No, but, given the nature of the participants in both this forum and at the discussion, permit me to speculate just a bit and say I think there's enough intellectual understanding of concepts regarding anatta, anicca, and so forth. Which leads me, again, to the question, "what now"? > As for "now what?", let's not be concerned about supramundane panna, I think we should be very concerned with supramundane panna! Specifically, the method, the path, the techniques, the strategies, by which one goes about developing mundane panna to the point all the appropriate conditions are present for the arising of supramundane panna! It was important enough for the Buddha to formulate the Truth of the Path, after all! > because now there is no supramundane panna. So what is there now? Sense > door activity and objects, thinking, the `cheating' dhammas being > discussed and so on. It's not just a question of thinking and breaking > down and dis-identifying these realities but seeing that right now there > is no other world other than that of seeing, hearing and so on. I'm not sure if I can agree with this. I think there are many, many other objects worthy of investigation, specifically those listed in great number in the Satipatthana Sutta(s)! > In other > words, instead of selecting or focussing, there can be direct > understanding of whatever reality appears for an instant. "Direct understanding" to me would imply that one DIRECTLY knows the characteristics of what is appearing via the faculty of supramundane insight. Any other "nana" is going to be lokiya, by definition. > If we wish for > more moments of panna or of lasting moments of panna, it shows the > attachment and clinging to self again. So wishing to end suffering and desiring enlightenment is clinging to "self"? Do you have anything you can show me in the Suttas that describes wishing to be free from suffering and the wish to "achieve" enlightenment to be problematic? For example, what do you make of the sort of wholseome chanda (desire!) that is integral to the Four Right Exertions (sammapadana)? To return to Monday's discussion, I see no great problem whatsoever with wishing to reach enlightenment. The greater the desire to do so, the better the odds one will engage in the very activites that lead thataway, even if "imperfect" (which they will be by definition). Even poor kusula is a hell of a lot better than most mind-moments arising, filled as they are by lust, ill-will, conceit, etc. Anything that helps bring about greater kusala can only be a good thing in my book (and in the Triptika, for that matter). I do see a real danger in becoming overly obsessed with avoiding such wholeseome desires out of fear of things like "self view" (which is by definition present until sotapatti-magga-nana at any rate, and the moha of "I, me, mine" is still an anusaya tendency for all but arahants), or worrying unduly about "near enemies" and the like, to the point one dies of analysis paralysis! So I see nothing at all wrong with wholseome desire, effort (or even more shockingly, adfmitting that there is the REALITY of the imputed self we have no choice but to work with if we're rigorously self- honest--those of us not arahats, at any rate!). In fact, according to the Buddha, it's necessary to fully develop the path in terms of Right Effort ("Generating DESIRE, arousing PERSISTENCE, ENDEAVOURING, upholding and EXERTING one's INTENT...)! What to make of THAT! :) And so what if metta falls prey to lobha now and again, as it is guaranteed to do for all not free from their anusaya tendencies toward lust (and ill-will)? Again, we can't deny our tendencies away, pretend they don't exist. We can only work with them as skillfully as possible, with as much awareness as possible, without WORRYING all the time (kukucca!). So it's much better, I think, to practice dana or metta with unavoidable lobha mixed in, because it WILL lead to the accumulation of far greater kusala tendencies than worrying so much about it we do nothing at all! :) Kusala is so hard to come by every little bit helps, no matter how imperfect, that we should strivde o dvelop as much as possible as often as possible! > > So based on my understanding, it's a matter of working with these > > cause-and-effect relationships in the approriate order, knowing, for > > example, that without pacifying the hindrances, the seven factors of > > enlightenment have no basis for arising, not to mention > > enlightenment and final release. Not only that, but among all these > > factors there needs to be the appropriate balance. To veer too far > > in any direction is to depart from the Middle Way, to miss > > the "sweet spot" as in the "lute-string" simile, and to miss the > > mark entirely. > > Erik, as I've mentioned, I've appreciated the pleasant tone in your recent > messages and well-considered points and quotes. Enjoy it while it lasts, because I can assure you it won't (and I mean that in the nicest possible way)! :) > I also appreciated the > same in the live discussion;-)) May I suggest, though, that there is still > an idea of `control' in what you write above. You may want to take this issue up with he Tathagata regarding "controlling", then, since I am merely paraphrasing his words of instruction. > Instead of considering the > `Middle Way' as not veering too much in one direction and missing your > "sweet-spot", can we see it as a moment of understanding? At a moment of > panna, there is no eternalist or annihilation belief, there is no wrong > view or ignorance. It understands the visible object, sound, feeling or > other reality and at that moment. It is accompanied by right awareness, > concentration and effort already. This is why, as Frank pointed out with > the helpful quote, right understanding is the forerunner or dawn. Let's be very specific here Sarah :). It's lokuttara panna that rightly discerns, without ignorance. Let me ask a question. Does lokuttara panna, the only panna that rightly comprehends, take "visible object" as arammana? If not, what is the arammana of the panna that rightly discerns things as they are and destroys the fetters? 10605 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Sun Jan 6, 2002 7:08am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: luminous mind: To Suan op 06-01-2002 09:26 schreef Sarah op sarahdhhk@y...: > > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "abhidhammika" wrote: >> However, as you raised this question again, I will give you, as a >> quick answer, Buddhaghosa's statement on how javana cittas can >> condition bhavangacitta. >> >> The answer to this problem is to do with the timing and quality of >> javana cittas. >> >> When javana citta has the strength of a janaka kamma, it can modify >> bhavangacitta. In fact, it can cause new kinds of bhavangacitta to >> arise. >> >> The following Pali quote comes from Section 687, >> Kankhavitaranavisuddhi niddesa, Visuddhimaggo, Vol.2. >> >> 687. .....Tattha janakam naama kusalampi hoti akusalampi. Tam >> patisandhiyampi pavattepi ruupaaruuupavipaakakkhandhe janeti. >> >> "...There, janakam is either healthy or unhealthy action. It (janaka >> kamma) can cause resultant physical and mental aggegates to arise >> either at the moment of linking consciousness (conception) or during >> the current lifetime." >> >> Please kindly note that the resultant mental aggregates (aruupa >> vipaaka khandhaa) during the current lifetime refer to bhavanga >> cittas. >> > Sarah wrote: > In the same text, Vism X1V, 114, (458 in the Pali) we read specifically > about bhavanga cittas: > > “When the rebirth-linking consciousness has ceased, > then following on whatever kind of rebirth-linking it may be, the same > kinds, being the result of that same kamma whatever it may be, occur as > life continuum consciousness with the same object; and > again those same kinds. And as long as there is no other kind of arising > of consciousness to interrupt the continuity, they also go on occurring > endlessly in periods of dreamless sleep, etc., like the current of a > river.” > Dear Suan and Sarah, I found the text in Nanamoli Vis: XIX, 16, p. 698. Janaka kamma is translated as productive kamma. Janaka is producing. I thought that the vipaka produced by kamma during life were not only bhavangacittas but also seeing, hearing and other sense-cognitions. Or is it not janaka kamma that produces seeing, etc? As Suan reminded us, kamma is the domain of the Buddhas. We cannot understand all. Then, is the janaka kamma producing bhavanga not the same kamma that produced rebirth-consciousness, throughout life? Then seeing etc. can be produced by other kammas. But now we should first listen to you, Suan, because you have other commentarial texts. We should also study the footnotes here, from the co. to the Visuddhimagga. With appreciation of your kindness, consideration and patience, Nina. 10606 From: abhidhammika Date: Sun Jan 6, 2002 7:47am Subject: [dsg] Re: luminous mind: To Ong Teng Kee Dear Ong Teng Kee How are you? You said: "I have read more pali than you,..." I am very glad to hear that you read both Pali and Burmese as well. So I could analyse the Buddhaghosa's statement bit by bit for you. I have been away from Myanmar over 20 years. I have no contact with our revered Myanmar Sayadaws. I am a lone researcher in Canberra with Pali Chatthasangayana CD-ROM and dictionaries. Therefore, I am unable to give you the names of the Sayadaws or their books. All I can do is read the Pali passages deeply and interpret them using whatever knowledge I have of Pali grammar and dictionaries. But, before I analyse Buddhaghosa's statement in Pali, I strongly advise you to read my translation of the Pali statemnt. That way, you can even correct my translation if you found it incorrect. When you read my analysis, you will come to understand why I wrote what I wrote. I wrote what I wrote from the strength of reading Pali statements deeply, and analysing them. When you have read my post (10521), please let me know either on-list oroff-list. Then I will analyse the Pali statement bit bit for you. With best wishes, Suan http://www.bodhiology.org --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "Ong Teng Kee" wrote: > Dear suan > I have no time to read your old post yet but can you give me one burmese > sayadaw saying that we can change our bhavanga at will in one life.I have > read more pali than you but i still haven't seen buddhaghosa ,sumangala > ,dhammapala,buddhadatta or ananda said we can have 4 or more bhavanga in one > life.There are possible for all kinds of kusala/akusala javana regardless of > bhavanga we are having.Just give me the sayadaw name /book in burmese > because i do read burmese. > > > > > > >From: "abhidhammika" > >Reply-To: dhammastudygroup@y... > >To: dhammastudygroup@y... > >Subject: [dsg] Re: luminous mind: To Ong Teng Kee > >Date: Sat, 05 Jan 2002 15:21:15 -0000 > > > > > > > > > > > > > >Dear Ong Teng Kee > > > >How are you? > > > >I am afraid I don't think I understand your message. Did you > >carefully read my post 10521 that you were complaining about? > > > >I provided Buddhaghosa's own statement on the matter both in Pali and > >its translation. Not only that. I also mentioned Buddhaghosa's > >disclaimer regarding the matter. > > > >If you read Pali language, I could analyse the Pali quote word for > >word, if necessary. If you do not read Pali, well, I am afraid I > >could not help you in that way. > > > >And, as I do not understand your message properly, I may not be able > >to answer your questions, either. I do not find your post very > >coherent, I am afraid. I am really sorry about my failure to resolve > >your complaints on this occasion. > > > >Of course, you may attempt to clarify your complaints after having > >carefully read my post 10521. > > > >It is a Buddhist virtue to remove someone's ignorance (my failure to > >understand your message, in this case)! > > > >Thank you for your attempt to make sense of my post and respond to it. > > > > > >With kind regards, > > > >Suan > > > >http://www.bodhiology.org 10607 From: abhidhammika Date: Sun Jan 6, 2002 8:03am Subject: [dsg] Re: luminous mind: To Nina And Sarah Dear Nina How are you? You wrote: "I thought that the vipaka produced by kamma during life were not only bhavangacittas but also seeing, hearing and other sense-cognitions." You are spot-on, Nina. Buddhaghosa used the expression "ruupaaruupa vipaaka khandhe, the resultant physical and mental aggregates". And the resultant mental aggregate include all the five sensory consciousnesses as well as bhavanga cittas. And, to Sarah, As Nina has found the janaka kamma passage in the Visuddhimaggo translation, I won't be replying to you on this matter, Okay. And, thank you, Nina, for helping Sarah out. With best wishes, Suan http://www.bodhiology.org --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Nina van Gorkom wrote: > op 06-01-2002 09:26 schreef Sarah op sarahdhhk@y...: > > > > > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "abhidhammika" wrote: > >> However, as you raised this question again, I will give you, as a > >> quick answer, Buddhaghosa's statement on how javana cittas can > >> condition bhavangacitta. > >> > >> The answer to this problem is to do with the timing and quality of > >> javana cittas. > >> > >> When javana citta has the strength of a janaka kamma, it can modify > >> bhavangacitta. In fact, it can cause new kinds of bhavangacitta to > >> arise. > >> > >> The following Pali quote comes from Section 687, > >> Kankhavitaranavisuddhi niddesa, Visuddhimaggo, Vol.2. > >> > >> 687. .....Tattha janakam naama kusalampi hoti akusalampi. Tam > >> patisandhiyampi pavattepi ruupaaruuupavipaakakkhandhe janeti. > >> > >> "...There, janakam is either healthy or unhealthy action. It (janaka > >> kamma) can cause resultant physical and mental aggegates to arise > >> either at the moment of linking consciousness (conception) or during > >> the current lifetime." > >> > >> Please kindly note that the resultant mental aggregates (aruupa > >> vipaaka khandhaa) during the current lifetime refer to bhavanga > >> cittas. > >> > > Sarah wrote: > > In the same text, Vism X1V, 114, (458 in the Pali) we read specifically > > about bhavanga cittas: > > > > "When the rebirth-linking consciousness has ceased, > > then following on whatever kind of rebirth-linking it may be, the same > > kinds, being the result of that same kamma whatever it may be, occur as > > life continuum consciousness with the same object; and > > again those same kinds. And as long as there is no other kind of arising > > of consciousness to interrupt the continuity, they also go on occurring > > endlessly in periods of dreamless sleep, etc., like the current of a > > river." > > > Dear Suan and Sarah, I found the text in Nanamoli Vis: XIX, 16, p. 698. > Janaka kamma is translated as productive kamma. Janaka is producing. I > thought that the vipaka produced by kamma during life were not only > bhavangacittas but also seeing, hearing and other sense-cognitions. Or is it > not janaka kamma that produces seeing, etc? As Suan reminded us, kamma is > the domain of the Buddhas. We cannot understand all. Then, is the janaka > kamma producing bhavanga not the same kamma that produced > rebirth-consciousness, throughout life? Then seeing etc. can be produced by > other kammas. > But now we should first listen to you, Suan, because you have other > commentarial texts. We should also study the footnotes here, from the co. to > the Visuddhimagga. > With appreciation of your kindness, consideration and patience, Nina. 10608 From: Date: Sun Jan 6, 2002 3:16am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: What is Concentration Actually? Hi, Jon - Thank you for the following. Vitakka, as defined near the end of your post below, is *exactly* what I was looking for! However, I have questions with regard to the notion of 'ekagatta' discussed by you as follows: "However, there is already a 'concentration' cetasika -- ekaggataa cetasika -- whose function is somewhat different, namely, to concentrate the citta on its present object, whatever that object might be (and regardless of whether it is the same object as the object the preceding citta)." Inasmuch as there is always only one object of discernment at any time, what extra thing does that one-pointedness do? How can there ever *not* be one-pointedness given that there is always only one object? When and how is a citta *not* concentrated on its present object? What exactly would that mean? With metta, Howard In a message dated 1/6/02 4:36:02 AM Eastern Standard Time, jonoabb@y... writes: > Howard > > --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Erik - > ........... > > I've had a drop of experience in samatha bhavana, involving > > concentration practice focusing the mind on a single meditation subject, > > and > > also some practice in vipassana bhavana, involving what is sometimes > > called > > moment-to-moment concentration practice. In my experience these types of > > > > concentration are different, but, in their different ways, equally > > powerful. > > In either of these cases, the concentration is, as you say, radically > > different from "the normal sort of samadhi that (may) arise in > > day-to-day > > life through concentrating on random object arising through thes > > sense-doors". > > The point of my post, however, was to inquire into the technical > > question of what is actually occurring, at a microscopic level of > > detail, > > when concentration has increased. My conjecture was that the switching > > back > > and forth among various (instances of) objects from citta to citta to > > citta > > typical of ordinary experience is reduced, in the extreme case to a > > single > > object (or near-replicates identified as "the same object") which is the > > > > arammana in mental process after mental process. Now, it seems almost > > certain > > to me that such a curtailing of the diversity of objects of awareness, > > such > > focusing and stabilization, is due to some functional characteristic or > > cetasika within each mindstate becoming strengthened, in which case that > > > > cetasika, itself, might be called "concentration". I am asking those who > > are > > well versed in Abhidhamma what their understanding of the Abhidhamma > > "take" > > is on this subject. > > I have sought the views of some persons well-versed in Abhidhamma, and > would like to attempt an answer to your question. > > You are wondering what is the factor in samatha bhavana that allows > successive cittas to take the same object (i.e., the 'meditation > subject'). > > I would agree that, conventionally speaking, we could call this > 'concentration'. However, there is already a 'concentration' cetasika -- > ekaggataa cetasika -- whose function is somewhat different, namely, to > concentrate the citta on its present object, whatever that object might be > (and regardless of whether it is the same object as the object the > preceding citta). Being one of the 'universals', ekaggataa cetasika does > of course arise at moments of samatha bhavana where it performs exactly > this function. > > The answer to your question is I think found in Ch. 8 of Nina's > 'Cetasikas'. There it is explained that it is the function of vitakka > cetasika to strike or hit upon the object of the citta, and that in > samatha bhavana, vitakka "thinks of" or "touches" the meditation subject > again and again. Vitakka is the first of the jhana factors. > > Both ekaggataa cetasika and vitakka cetasika are also present at moments > of vipassana and enlightenment. Indeed, in this context they are path > factors -- ekaggataa cetasika is the path factor that is 'right > concentration/samma samadhi', and vitakka cetasika is the path factor that > is 'right thinking/samma-vayama'. > > Confusingly, the term 'samadhi' is sometimes used in the texts to refer to > samatha bhavana and sometimes to ekagatta cetasika. > > I have set out below some relevant terms (as I understand them). > > Jon > > Samatha -- 'Calmness' or 'tranquillity'. An attribute of all kusala > cittas, in the sense of being calm or tranquil from akusala. > Samatha bhavana -- The development of certain kinds of kusala that are > particularly conducive to calmness, accompanied by panna (wisdom), to the > level of jhana. > Ekagatta cetasika -- The cetasika (mental factor) that is 'concentration'. > It concentrates the citta on its object. Is a 'universal' (i.e., arises > with every citta) and so may be kusala or akusala depending on the citta > it accompanies > Passaddhi -- The cetasika (mental factor) that is calmness or tranquillity > It arises with each moment of kusala citta. > Vitakka -- The cetasika that that strikes or hits upon the object of the > citta. In samatha bhavana, it causes/allows the citta to take the same > object on successive moments. > Samadhi -- 'Concentration'. A term whose meaning rather depends on the > context. Sometimes used as a synonym for ekagatta cetasika, sometimes for > samatha/samatha bhavana (and sometimes something else). > > /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 10609 From: yuzhonghao Date: Sun Jan 6, 2002 8:23am Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts) Hello Jon, You asked how understanding things as they actually are is developed. Concentration (samadhi). Concentration (samadhi) is the condition, the prerequisite for understanding things as they actually are (yathabhutañanadassana). Samyutta Nikaya XXXV.99, Samadhi Sutta, Concentration http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/samyutta/sn35-099.html What is the condition, the prerequisite for concentration (samadhi)? Happiness (sukha). Happiness (sukha) is the condition, the prerequisite for concentration (samadhi). What is the condition, the prerequisite for happiness (sukha)? Tranquillity (passaddhi). Tranquillity (passaddhi) is the condition, the prerequisite for happiness (sukha). What is the condition, the prerequisite for tranquillity (passaddhi)? Rapture (piti). Rapture (piti) is the condition, the prerequisite for tranquillity (passaddhi). What is the condition, the prerequisite for rapture (piti)? Joy (pamojja). Joy (pamojja) is the condition, the prerequisite for rapture (piti). What is the condition, the prerequisite for joy (pamojja)? Faith (saddha). Faith (saddha) is the condition, the prerequisite for joy (pamojja). What is the condition, the prerequisite for faith (saddha)? Suffering (dukkha). Suffering (dukkha) is the condition, the prerequisite for faith (saddha). Samyutta Nikaya XII.23, Upanisa Sutta, Discourse on Supporting Conditions http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/samyutta/sn12-023.html (Christine, thank you for providing the reference to Transcendental Dependent Arising, A Translation and Exposition of the Upanisa Sutta, by Bhikkhu Bodhi http://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/bps/wheels/wheel277.html back in last October in dhamma-list.) With faith (saddha) in the Buddha, the Dhamma, the Sangha, one starts to observe the Five Precepts (pañca-sila). The reward and blessing of wholesome morality is freedom from remorse. The reward and blessing of freedom from remorse is joy. The reward and blessing of joy is rapture. The reward and blessing of rapture is tranquility. The reward and blessing of tranquility is happiness. The reward and blessing of happiness is concentration. The reward and blessing of concentration is vision and knowledge of things as they actually are. (Please refer to AN X.1) Conditioned phenomena is what is dependently co-arising with condition. Please refer to Samyutta Nikaya XII.2, Paticca-samuppada-vibhanga Sutta, Analysis of Dependent Co-arising http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/samyutta/sn12-002.html Please also refer to Samyutta Nikaya IV.92-93. I hope I have provided satisfactory answer and references to your questions. Regards, Victor --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Jonothan Abbott wrote: > Victor > > --- yuzhonghao wrote: > Hello Jon, > > > > The truths taught by the Buddha are to be understood and not to be > > misunderstood as they are. > > Again, we are in agreement here, Victor. But simply saying this doesn't > take us very far, wouldn't you agree? What we need to know is how this > understanding is to be developed. > > So let me ask, what is the means by which one may come to see that > conditioned phenomena are impermanent, unsatisfactory and not- self? For > example, what is meant here by 'conditioned phenomena', in your view? > > Enjoying your posts lately. > > Jon > 10610 From: yuzhonghao Date: Sun Jan 6, 2002 9:13am Subject: Re: [dsg] Concept Hello Jon, It seems that we understand that a concept is conditioned. As I understand from Sarah's message, a concept is dependent on thinking, has thinking as its condition, comes to be because of thinking. And as I understand from your message, a concept is dependent on mind, has mind as its condition, comes to be because of mind. What exactly is condition for concept, I think, is another topic for discussion. However, at this point, it seems that we have come to understand that a concept is conditioned, dependently arising. Regards, Victor --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Jonothan Abbott wrote: > Victor > > --- yuzhonghao wrote: > Hello Sarah, > > > > You questioned that "Can we say that a concept comes to be because of > > thinking?" What do you think? Can we? You wrote that no thinking > > means no concepts. From what you wrote, it seems to me that you mean > > that concept is dependent on thinking. This is how I understand the > > word "concept" from the online dictionary in http://www.webster.com: > > A concept means something conceived in the mind, a thought, a > > notion. It also means an abstract or generic idea generalized from > > particular instances. The synonym to the word "concept" is the > > word "idea." I agree with you that thinking is conditioned. > > I had planned to give a reply to your original question (> How does a > concept come to be?), but had not got around to it by the time you sent > your follow-up. > > A you rightly point out, a concept is a mere creation of the mind, a > notion. The importance of this from our point of view is that a concept > has no 'existence' independently of the citta that 'creates' it. > > The abhidhamma makes a distinction between concepts and realities > (dhammas). Realities have an essential nature that can be experienced by > sati/panna, while concepts do not. > > Concepts are undoubtedly conditioned, in the sense that, as you say, they > are dependent on thinking, which is itself conditioned. But whereas the > thinking is a reality that has an individual nature capable of being > experienced by panna, a concept has no such individual nature, according > to the abhidhamma. > > Jon 10611 From: Date: Sun Jan 6, 2002 5:18am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: What is Concentration Actually? Hi again, Jon - In a message dated 1/6/02 11:16:42 AM Eastern Standard Time, upasaka@a... writes: > Inasmuch as there > is always only one object of discernment at any time, what extra thing does > > that one-pointedness do? How can there ever *not* be one-pointedness given > that there is always only one object? When and how is a citta *not* > concentrated on its present object? What exactly would that mean? > =========================== I note that the definition of ekagatta at the end of your post points out that it is universal, accompanying every act of discernment. Does this mean that this cetasika is nothing more than the fact of there being only one arammana at a time? How is this possible when one-pointedness is, for example, a jhana factor to be *developed*? Also, ekagatta as the mere property of one object per mindstate doesn't strike me as a function/operation, but merely as a *characteristic* of vi~n~nana. Does this also mean that there are no *degrees* of one-pointedness? If there *are* degrees of one-pointedness, then one-pointedn ess must refer to something besides one arammana per citta. Informally, 'one-pointedness' means "focus", with the object of attention being restricted/delimited. An example of this is being one-pointed on a kasina, with focus restricted to it and ignoring the surrounding visual field. But this is at the conventional level of "object". From the Abhidhamma perspective, this kind of focus goes beyond individual cittas. Is it not possible that in the suttas, 'ekagatta' does not carry the same meaning as in the Abhidhamma. It seems so to me. With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 10612 From: Date: Sun Jan 6, 2002 7:42am Subject: Re: [dsg] abhidhamma Dear Nina, I got the Guide through Abhidhamma-pitaka by Nyanatoloka. I scanned through it once before. I looked at Katthavatthu section in more detail this time. YES, it's helpful. The library at my Univ. has a very good collections of Buddhism text both in Pali, Sansakrit and English. Num 10613 From: Date: Sun Jan 6, 2002 7:51am Subject: Re: [dsg] Three Rounds Thanks a lot Jon, I really appreciate that you mentioned A. Sujin's remark that her point is not formally considered by a teacher committee at the foundation. Remind of some books I have read, atthakathacara(the writer) at times put in points of controversy and his own remark and clearly cited that this is from tipitaka, this is what he thinks and this is what other think. I am looking forward to meeting and learning from her more sometime in the future. (sound like a lobha to me :) ) Num 10614 From: Date: Sun Jan 6, 2002 8:03am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: luminous mind <<<<<<<<< "Could you kindly explained the sentence "new kinds of bhavangacittas"." Well, you first had the given bhavangacittas from birth. During your current lifetime, you happened to perform janaka kamma. Suppose that the effect of javana kamma did not wait till your next conception, and needed to appear during your currect lifetime. And, suppose also that the effect was the resultant mental aggregate (aruupa vipaaka khandhaa), then you got different kind of bhavangacitta. As simple as that. >>>>>>>>>> Dear Suan, Nina, Sarah, Otengee and everyone, First of all sorry for my limit and poor pali, I rewrite some of the words from Thai-pali into Roman Pali on my own. It may look somewhat funny. Always a good reminder about 4 achintai( 4 unthinkable) : nature of the buddha, nature of jhana, vipaka of kamma, and the (origin) of the world. (achintitasutra, Ang. Catuka-nibhat). As many have mentioned, it's hard not to think or analyze. I thought there should be some reasons these 4 achintai was mentioned in a sutra. Let me share, kind of parroting, what I have read about the bavanga, kamma and vipaka so far, mainly from Abhidammatthasagaha (Narada Thera, A.Somporn and Mahamakutarajavyalai) and some from Visuddhimagga (Thai and PTS) Agantuka bavanga & kammacatukka, Agantuka bavanga: the bevanga that can be different in the case for example if one born with somanasa patisandhi, bavanga will also be in the vedana-jati, somanasa. In case of if there is domanasa java-vithi, it said that somanasa-bavanga cannot immedaitely follow domanasa-jati javana, so agantuga bavanga occurs in upekka-jati before the congenital somanasa bhavaga citta. So vedana-jati of bavanga citta in the same lifetime can be different. Only in Narada version mentions that the even the vedana-jati of bavanga is different but the aramana is still the same. Kammacatukka, 4 of the fourfold of kamma 1. With respect of function (janakatikicca) 1.1 Janaka-kamma (reproductive kamma) in patisandhi-kala cause vipaka(patisandhi) and also kammajarupa. In pavatti-kala causes vipakacitta, kammajarupa( eg.pasadarupa) as well as vimana(mansion) of angels or bhrama. 1.2 Upatthambakamma : supportive kamma 1.3 Upapilakamma : obstructive kamma 1.4 Upaghatakamma :destructive kamma 2. with respect of severity (pakadana) 2.1 garukamma (weightly kamma) 2.2 2.2 asannakamma (proximate kamma) 2.3 2.3 acinnakamma (habitual kamma) 2.4 2.4 katattakamma (reserve kamma) 3. with respect of chronology (pakakala) 3.1 ditthadhamma vedaniyakamma : giving effect in this current lifetime. Mean for cetana cetasika in the first jananacitta. Result will be ahetuka kamavacara-vipaka 3.2 upapajja vedaniyakamma: giving effect in next lifetime. Mean for cetana-cetasika the seventh javana. Result in patisandhi and vipaka-citta in next lifetime 3.3 aparapariya vedaniyakamma: in the 3rd lifetime and so on. 2th-5th javanacitta. 3.4 ahosikamma: defunct kamma 4.with respect of place in which effect takes place (pakatthana). Mean for various of cetana cetasika that can cause vipaka. 4.1 akusulakamma : akusalacitta 12 4.2 kamavacara-kusulakamma: maha-kusalacitta 8 4.3 rupavacara-kusalakamma 4.4 arupavacara-kusalakamma. From what I read so far, all these 5 books say the same thing that patisandhi, bavanga and cuti citta in the same lifetime has the same aramana. Some of the books refer and quote paragraph from katha and tika(both in Thai and Pali). I have not had time to look up in Tipitaka or atthakatha yet. Just like to share what I have read. Thanks for an interesting topic. I will try to consider the issue more wisely and attentively in the future if conditions permit. Appreciate in your energy, your kindness and this is a good opportunity for me to learn and read more. Looking forward to more translation. Best wishes, Num 10615 From: Date: Sun Jan 6, 2002 10:18am Subject: One Further Thought on One-Pointedness Hi, Jon (and anyone else interested) - One more thought: Perhaps one-pointedness is actually the tendency or disposition or sankhara for an object to continue in consciousness - kind of a "mental momentum" cetasika. If that is so, then there *could* be degrees of one-pointedness. The greater the degree of one-pointedness, the less arammana changing there would be, the greater the "mental stability". The less the degree of one-pointedness, the less stable would "concentration" be and the greater the instability and "distraction". Moreover, it would make sense for vitakka and vicara to foster ekagatta. This is a notion which makes sense to me. Does it have any basis in the Abhidhamma Pitaka? With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 10616 From: manji Date: Sun Jan 6, 2002 4:08pm Subject: On Lobha/Dosa and Vedana Originally I had asked Sarah if there could be the arising of domanassa (unpleasant feeling) without dosa (aversion). Sarah asked to open this into the group... I post the following for debate... Lobha-mula-citta can only be accompanied by somanassa or uppekha. There may be somanassa or uppekha without lobha-mula-citta. Dosa-mula-citta can only be accompanied by domanassa. There may be domanassa without dosa-mula-citta. If it is true that domanassa is always accompanied by dosa-mula-citta, then the there is no cessation of suffering, there is no path, there is no buddha, and there is no sangha. If it is true that domanassa is never accompanied by dosa-mula-citta, then there is no suffering, there is no cause of suffering, there is no cessation of suffering, there is no path, there is no buddha, and there is no sangha. If it is true that domanassa may be unaccompanied by dosa-mula-citta, then this accounts for the suffering, the cause of suffering, the cessation of suffering, the path, the buddha, and the sangha. =============== manji www.shugyokai.org 10617 From: Robert Epstein Date: Sun Jan 6, 2002 7:02pm Subject: Re: [dsg] FYI Dear Erik, I just wanted to say how interesting and useful I found your post, particularly your discussion of the Satipatthana Sutta, Vipassana, and the jhanas and bojjhangas. You provided a good context for the basic teaching of the Buddha, one that may engender some debate, but which seems to have a lot of integrity in its own right. Thanks for sharing the fruits of your years of effort in study and meditation. Your posts are always illuminating, and I personally appreciate your contribution. Best, Robert Ep. ============= --- rikpa21 wrote: > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "m. nease" wrote: > > > Thanks again. I should hear back soon re. my request > > to move up my departure date--I'll keep you posted. I > > meet today with the Wat Mahatat monks for a formal > > apology(!) for not having moved in there and taken up > > their unusual meditation practice after my return from > > Laos. It'll be a relief to have that over with, at > > least. > > Hi Mike, > > I find this statement curious, given everything I've been taught > there I have found to be in perfect accord with the actual > instructions outlined by the Buddha in the Satipatthana Sutta (any > teacher, as one of mine did, who begins a teaching with the simile > of the raft, has my rapt attention!). I have furthermore found that > what I have been taught does not diverge one iota from what the > Buddha actually taught in lpaes like the Satipatthana Sutta, for > example. The methods I've learned there are about as mainstream > Buddhist (whether Theravada or Mahayana) as they come. > > I would be very interested in hearing specifically what you > find "unusual" about the practices there (such as anapanasati or for > some, the Mahasi Sayadaw method of focus on the rising and falling > of the abdomen), or, for example, regarding specific methods of > training in mindfulness such as: "when walking, the monk discerns > that he is walking. When standing, he discerns that he is standing. > When sitting, he discerns that he is sitting. When lying down, he > discerns that he is lying down. Or however his body is disposed, > that is how he discerns it." > > I was reminded of this consonance in theory and praxis between what > I've learned from the many teachers there (as well as from my > Tibetan teachers) even more after a long conversation I had with a > monk in a small village wat in Laos a few weeks ago. He is a Lao (US > Citizen now) monk who's lived in American 28 years who'd ordianed in > a small village wat a ways outside Vientiane. > > After a "coincidental" and fortuitous meeting, we would up having a > wonderfully detailed conversation for a few hours on the Dhamma and > meditation in specific, which merely confirmed for me the > universality of the methods taught at mainstream places like Wat > Mahatat that adhere to the teachings in the Satipatthana Sutta, > given he has been taught and practies in exactlty the same way as is > taught at mainstream places like Wat Mahatat. > > But that discussion wasn't even necessary to ascertain the viability > of those methods in my own case--merely the direct application of > those methods in my own limited experience proved almost instantly > that these "pure vipassana" approaches definitely work, and act as > powerful conditions for Right Mindfulness and Right Concentration, > even setting aside for a moment that I've been trained in methods > that emphasize cultivating jhana combined with vipassana (also what > the Buddha specifically taught in the Suttas). > > That said, I have encountered other other approaches that sounded > superficially OK at first, but when I examined them with great care, > they appeared to diverge significantly from what the Buddha actually > taught in places like the Satipatthan Sutta and elsewhere. I have > found such apparently divergent approaches raise far more questions > than they answer for me--especially in terms of how one can apply > them to get from point A (suffering sentient being) to point B > (liberated by direct insight). > > Just by way of anectdote, it took me less than two hours of > practicing the methods of "training" and "remaining > focused" using the methods outlined by my teachers at places like > Wat Mahatat (not to mention they accord perfectly with what I've > been taught by my Tibetan teachers) to engender significantly > increased mindfulness. And again, this from a totally different > tradition than the one I've been trained in! > > Conversely, other approaches, even after serious, and what I believe > to be dispassionate analysis (after all my primary training has been > in the Tibetan Geluk-pa system, yet I actively seek out teachings > from Theravada teachers with the eye to comparing, constrasting, and > most imoprtant, integrating those teachings into my own practice), > combined with long and deliberate consideration, discussion, and > analysis, I have found neither clear precedent for such approaches > in the Suttas, nor have I found them conducive to the sort of > mindfulness I have come to associate with Right Mindfulness and > Right Concentration in my own limited experiences. What I can say is > that there is a difference as great as night and day between the > approaches I've found have led to increased sati and samadhi, vs. > those that provide too little "traction" to lead someone with my > accumulations to true samma sati and samma samadhi. > > One rule of thumb I find helpful in discerning what is and is not > effective "method" is if it really engenders the results the Buddha > detailed. For example, how well doeas any given approach help > engender unbroken focus, clear comprehension, and concentration over > long peiods of time? Taking what the Buddha taught in the > Anapanasati Sutta: > http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/majjhima/mn118.html > > "And how are the four frames of reference developed & pursued so as > to bring the seven factors of awakening to their culmination?" > > [Note again this is specifically what the Buddha taught as the > factors leading to release: the seven factors of enlightenment, the > bojjhangas] > > "[1] On whatever occasion the monk remains focused on the body in & > of itself -- ardent, alert, & mindful -- putting aside greed & > distress with reference to the world, on that occasion his > mindfulness is steady & without lapse. When his mindfulness is > steady & without lapse, then mindfulness as a factor of awakening > becomes aroused. He develops it, and for him it goes to the > culmination of its development." > > I find it beneficial to pay particular attention to the instruction > that says: "When his mindfulness is ***steady & without lapse*** > [emphasis mine], then mindfulness as a factor of awakening becomes > aroused. He develops it, and for him it goes to the culmination of > its development." > > Since few Buddhists would argue against the crititical position the > bojjhangas play in awakening and final release, then unless one has > unbroken mindfulness (which carries with it the implication of > highly developed concentration as well), then there is not the > development of samma sati that leads to release, not to mention the > other factors: > > "[2] Remaining mindful in this way, he examines, analyzes, & comes > to a comprehension of that quality with discernment. When he remains > mindful in this way, examining, analyzing, & coming to a > comprehension of that quality with discernment, then analysis of > qualities as a factor of awakening becomes aroused. He develops it, > and for him it goes to the culmination of its development. > > "[3] In one who examines, analyzes, & comes to a comprehension of > that quality with discernment, unflagging persistence is aroused. > When unflagging persistence is aroused in one who examines, > analyzes, & comes to a comprehension of that quality with > discernment, then persistence as a factor of awakening becomes > aroused. He develops it, and for him it goes to the culmination of > its development. > > "[4] In one whose persistence is aroused, a rapture not-of-the-flesh > arises. When a rapture not-of-the-flesh arises in one whose > persistence is aroused, then rapture as a factor of awakening > becomes aroused. He develops it, and for him it goes to the > culmination of its development. > > "[5] For one who is enraptured, the body grows calm and the mind > grows calm. When the body & mind of an enraptured monk grow calm, > then serenity as a factor of awakening becomes aroused. He develops > it, and for him it goes to the culmination of its development. > > "[6] For one who is at ease -- his body calmed -- the mind becomes > concentrated. When the mind of one who is at ease -- his body > calmed -- becomes concentrated, then concentration as a factor of > awakening becomes aroused. He develops it, and for him it goes to > the culmination of its development. > > "[7] He oversees the mind thus concentrated with equanimity. When he > oversees the mind thus concentrated with equanimity, equanimity as a > factor of awakening becomes aroused. He develops it, and for him it > goes to the culmination of its development. > > [Similarly with the other three frames of reference: feelings, mind, > & mental qualities.] > > "This is how the four frames of reference are developed & pursued so > as to bring the seven factors of awakening to their culmination. > > (Clear Knowing & Release) > "And how are the seven factors of awakening developed & pursued so > as to bring clear knowing & release to their culmination? There is > the case where a monk develops mindfulness as a factor of awakening > dependent on seclusion... dispassion... cessation, resulting in > relinquishment. He develops analysis of qualities as a factor of > awakening... persistence as a factor of awakening... rapture as a > factor of awakening... serenity as a factor of awakening... > concentration as a factor of awakening... equanimity as a factor of > awakening dependent on seclusion... dispassion... cessation, > resulting in relinquishment. > > "This is how the seven factors of awakening, when developed & > pursued, bring clear knowing & release to their culmination." > > So what to make of all this? I think any teaching that does NOT > emphasize all of these factors in the appropriate degree and > balance, or any teaching that does not lead to the sort of > mindfulness ("steady and without lapse") that serves as the > foundation for the remaining bojjhanagas, that release would be > something extremely difficult to come by. > > What are your thoughts on all of this, Mike? > > *** > > May all beings have happinhess and cause of happiness. > May all beings be free from suffering and the cause of suffering. > May all beings never be separated from perfect joy. > May all beings abide in equanimity, undefiled by the taints of the > Eight Worldly Concenrns. 10618 From: Robert Epstein Date: Sun Jan 6, 2002 7:07pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The Two Truths (for Howard) Thanks Jon. That's actually perfectly clear and I appreciate it. It is actually a very good point: the effort to correct wrong concepts is like yelling at the wind. It is the direct discernment or lack thereof of what is actual upon which 'useful' or 'frivolous' concepts can be formed. If we know that a concept is a concept but that it is referring to a reality, that may be a useful way of organizing our activity. But if the concept is floating around in the conceptual world, with no reference to what is real or unreal, then we are really lost. Thanks for the good point, which is another pointer in the right direction: towards direct knowledge of rupas and namas. Best, Robert Ep. ================ --- Jonothan Abbott wrote: > Rob Ep > > --- Robert Epstein wrote: > > Dear Jon, > > I understand your statement that both arising and conceptual wrong > > understanding > > can be an obstacle. But this leaves me a little confused about what you > > meant in > > your original statement by: 'The root cause of our problems in not our > > wrong > > conceptual grasp of things...' Could you say a word about that? I > > understand > > the second part of the sentence, but I don't understand how wrong > > conceptual grasp > > is not a root cause, yet our 'general accumulated wrong view' about > > realities is. > > I don't quite have the distinction between those two..... > > > > Best, > > Robert Ep. > > I'm a little confused myself, Rob, since I've lost track of the original > thread. However, let me try to restate what I might have had in mind. > > Wrong conceptual understanding is based on wrong understanding of > realities (dhammas); it is the latter that is the cause of the former and > not the other way around. > > To give an example from our discussion, our conceptual idea of 'hardness' > is bound to be inaccurate as long as direct understanding of the reality > that is hardness has not been fully developed. No amount of 'correcting' > our conceptual misunderstanding can bring any meaningful progress along > the path. > > Another example. An idea of 'self' arises because realities have not been > directly seen with panna as having the characteristic of 'not-self'. Even > though we may have accepted as correct at an intellectual level the > teaching on no self, the concept of self is still there and will arise, > because of the lack of understanding of realities. > > I hope this is clearer. > > Jon 10619 From: Sarah Date: Sun Jan 6, 2002 9:40pm Subject: Re: [dsg] New Members- settling in ? Dear Lucy, --- Lucy wrote: > Hello ! > > I'm one of those new members, though I recognise quite a few names > from the other lists I subscribe to, the 'new' is only relative. Welcome here and I’m glad that you’ve ‘broken the ice’ on dsg. > My sympathies to those who can't keep up - I'm one of them - so many > messages, so many topics each bringing new questions, subtopics and > infra-topics. And more come up before one has had time to formulate > the question...I keep on moving mails to a 'To Read Later' > folder---but it's bursting at the seams!!! I'll just have to > concentrate on the topics that concern me for now and start deleting > the others. Sorry, no offence intended. I see you share Christine’s witty style...Yes, we all having trouble keeping up. I have a folder of posts I’d like to reply to, but ever so often, I just have to empty it and start again. I think your plan of concentrating on those of special concern makes sense. Perhaps you can come back to others later;-) > Your index of useful topics is invaluable (it's in the Files section > of the Yahoo web site for those who haven't seen it). Thanks for > taking the trouble! Thanks for taking a look/reading these. Actually it’s a very biased selection;-) Please feel free to bring up any old topics or posts anytime. > By way of introduction: I'm of the 'M' persuasion (another reason to > maintain respectful silence), took Refuge Vows with a Tibetan sect and > Precepts with a Soto Zen sect, technically I belong to both, but now > practice on my own as there is no group in this (rather backwater) > area where I'd feel comfortable practising. Well we have quite a few “M’ members or originally ‘M’ members who, like you, are interested to learn more from the pali Tipitaka as well. I wonder if your backwater is in England as I note you are using a UK server? If so, may I ask where? I’m English too but I've lived overseas for 20yrs. > My first contact with Buddhism years ago was through the Pali > Tipitaka, for the past year I've gone back to studying it and trying > to practice more in accordance with it. My interest was re-kindled by > studying some works by Vasubandhu and realising that I still had a lot > to learn from both the Suttanta and the Abidhamma. As you said, ‘new’ is a relative term and we look forward to hearing more from you. You’ve obviously considered/studied/practised a lot. > There are no Theravada groups nearby, though my house is open to > anyone who wants to pop in for a chat with tea, oat cakes and > meditation. Sounds very inviting.....Last summer I met a few dsg friends for tea and cakes and chat in Sussex. In the meantime, I look forward to chatting with you here;-) Best regards, Sarah ====================================================== 10620 From: Sarah Date: Sun Jan 6, 2002 11:52pm Subject: Re: [dsg] one limb of 8 fold path more important (was satipathana and practice) Hi Erik, I can see you’re back in form. If you don’t mind, I won’t attempt to reply in context, otherwise I fear we may have a book on our hands which might only be of interest to you and me;-) Perhaps I’ll just try to summarise a few areas in which we have different understandings from the texts: 1)Paramattha dhammas (‘ultimate’ truths) There has been a lot of discussion on dsg about the difference between conventional and ultimate truths. When I read any of the suttas, including the Satipatthana Sutta, I understand the Buddha to be talking about paramattha truths, whatever the terms and language used to express these. There are a number of very helpful posts (imho) saved under ‘Concepts and Realities’ in Useful Posts: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/files/Useful_Posts May I particularly draw your attention to one by Rob Ed on ‘paramattha dhammas’ in the Suttas and one by Howard on the Buddha’s use of conventional terminology: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/message/9847 http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/message/10026 2)Focus and ‘unbroken mindfulness’ You often quote a translation using ‘focus’ in the Satipatthana Sutta. From the translation by Soma Thera we read: “And how, O bhikkhus, does a bhikkhu live contemplating consciousness in conciousness?” “ Here, o bhikkhus, a bhikkhu understands the consciousness with lust; the conciousness without lust, as without lust; the consciousness with hate, as with hate............” By contemplating consciousness (cittanupassanaa) is meant sati (awareness) of the cittas discussed. As we know from our abhidhamma studies, sati is not unbroken or continuous but is a skilful mental state arising momentarily with a specific citta (consciousnes) in the javana (‘running-through’) process. It is mindful or any reality appearingas discussed in this sutta and all other suttas. 3) Mundane and Supramundane Understanding. We read in the Visuddhimagga in detail about the vipassana ~nanas. These are all mundane understandings of highly developed panna which knows paramattha dhammas more and more precisely and in depth. The first stage is clearly understanding the difference between namas and rupas (mental and physical phenomena= 5 khandhas=paramattha dhammas). At this level, the highly developed wisdom of the sotapanna that clearly understands the tri-lakhana (anicca, dukkha and anatta) as characteristics of each reality has not yet been realized. Yet long before the first vipassana nana, panna has to begin to directly understand characteristics about many different paramattha dhammas. 4) Wishing While it’s true that chanda (zeal) arises with wholesome cittas, it also arises with all kinds of attachment and some kinds of aversion too (as well as some vipaka cittas) now. We’d like to think that everytime we consider nibbana and supramundane consciousness that this is skilful ‘wishing’, but for most of us, these are good opportunities for the deceiving dhammas to play their tricks again. Most of this wishing is merely more attachment. Only sati can know for each of us, I realise. 5) Numbers game As we know, very few people, including Theravada practitioners, have any interest in Abhidhamma and few people consider the Suttas in depth. Does this make the Abhidhamma or Sutta depth-consideration less precious? I don’t think so. In the decline of the Sasana, a day will come when there may only be one human left considering the Teachings at all. The value remains however. 6) Rt Effort. Our understanding of rt effort will depend on our understanding of anatta and of concepts and realities. While we cling to an idea of self there is bound to be an idea of control and of self making an effort rather than an understanding of paramattha dhammas. Plenty has been written on this topic under the same heading in Useful Posts. 7) Metta and lobha (attachment) As you say, there is bound to be lobha in between the moments of metta. This is natural and like any other unwholesome states can be the object of awareness. When we wish to have more metta or try to follow a practise to have metta, these are good opportunities to understand the attachment to self better, I believe. 8) The ‘quick fix’ You mention that you can get a result and increased mindfulnes in less than two hours following a particular method. Of course it’s natural to want to find a quick method or short-cut, but I question whether the profound Teachings and intricacies and subtleties of understanding the present reality can be reduced to such a method. I don’t doubt at all that results are achieved from practices and methods (and know this is true), but I question whether the result is awareness and understanding of the paramattha dhammas which I believe the Buddha to have taught throughout all parts of the Tipitaka. Without clear intellectual understanding initially as to what paramattha dhammas are, I would even venture to say that this is impossible. ********** Erik, I lost this post to you (1st draft) on a frozen screen and so this has been a test of patience to re-write it in an abbreviated form. It never works quite the same on re-writing and I apologise if any impatience with my computer is showing through;-) I know you’ll let me know if I haven’t addressed all your points and I also realize that your pleasant tone which I’m very attached to is impermanent;-)) Sarah p.s Best wishes to Eath from the one in the photo in your living room with the ‘white hair’;-) ====================================================== 10621 From: christine_forsyth Date: Mon Jan 7, 2002 0:03am Subject: Elementary questions Dear All, I am reading elementary articles on Abhidhamma and have a few questions. This article is 'Introduction to the Dhamma' by Jill Jordan and Richard Giles. http://www.abhidhamma.org/Introduction.html 1. Could anyone give me the reference in the Tipitaka or elsewhere to where "The Buddha also taught the Abhidhamma to Sariputta, one of his chief disciples and the man renowned as the second only to the Buddha. Sariputta in turn taught the Abhidhamma to the monks under his instruction, whose role it was to memorize and master it. In this way the seven books of the Abhidhamma have come down to us intact." 2. About rupa - it says that there are 16 classified as subtle and 12 classified as gross. And that there are four great elements....earth(solidity), water (cohesion), fire(temperature), and wind(motion). Are these four great elements part of the 28 classes of rupa? 3. The ten immoral or unskillful actions - those listed as 8 (covetousness), 9 (ill will), and 10 (wrong view) dont't seem like 'actions' to me. 'Intention' seems to be involved in things like killing, stealing, sexual misconduct, lying etc. (although I suppose some may be attributed to 'impulse'?). Covetousness and ill will, seem much less the result of 'deliberate intention' , they seem to 'just happen'.... And would anyone 'intend/plan/deliberately want', to have wrong view? 4.The realm of unhappy ghosts.....part of the description includes the words "and dependent upon those humans who remember them for food and drink". This is confusing.....how are they to eat any food left out, what happens if no food is left out. Certainly none of my deceased relatives/friends have had this hospitality extended to them, and neither have the hundreds of millions who have died in Christian countries over the centuries. metta, Christine 10622 From: robertkirkpatrick.rm Date: Mon Jan 7, 2002 0:30am Subject: Re: Elementary questions --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "christine_forsyth" wrote: > Dear All, > > I am reading elementary articles on Abhidhamma and have a few > questions. This article is 'Introduction to the Dhamma' by Jill > Jordan and Richard Giles. > http://www.abhidhamma.org/Introduction.html > > 1. Could anyone give me the reference in the Tipitaka or elsewhere > to where "The Buddha also taught the Abhidhamma to Sariputta, one of > his chief disciples and the man renowned as the second only to the > Buddha. Sariputta in turn taught the Abhidhamma to the monks under > his instruction, whose role it was to memorize and master it. In > this way the seven books of the Abhidhamma have come down to us > intact." +++++++++++++ This is explained in detail in the first part of the Atthasalini (PTS). All 500 of these students became arahants. ++++++++++ > > 2. About rupa - it says that there are 16 classified as subtle and > 12 classified as gross. And that there are four great > elements....earth(solidity), water (cohesion), fire(temperature), and > wind(motion). Are these four great elements part of the 28 classes > of rupa? +++++++++ Yes, they are also four of the eight inseparable rupas that arise together in every kalapa. +++++++++ > > 3. The ten immoral or unskillful actions - those listed as 8 > (covetousness), 9 (ill will), and 10 (wrong view) dont't seem > like 'actions' to me. 'Intention' seems to be involved in things > like killing, stealing, sexual misconduct, lying etc. (although I > suppose some may be attributed to 'impulse'?). Covetousness and ill > will, seem much less the result of 'deliberate intention' , they seem > to 'just happen'.... And would anyone 'intend/plan/deliberately > want', to have wrong view? +++++++++ Cetana (translated as intention) comes in different intensities and its characteristic is hard to know. What we take to be intention is usually a mix of thinking, chanda, cetana, vitakka, vicara,manisikara, ekagatta etc. When there is wrong view there is always lobha(attachment) as well that makes one think they see things correctly. You can recognise how much cetana is there when it is very obvious. Take, for instance, the case of a visiting jehovah witness: they will talk and talk with great enthusiasm and confidence = it is wrongview and cetana is assisting to display it to the world. Even when wrongview is not shown to others cetana is there underlying the thinking and encouraging and supporting the associated factors. Useful to repeatedly investigate this as then it can be known, little by little, even when there is thinking with wrong view, that it is just various conditioned factors. This can be direct knowledge of the characteristic of wrong view (ditthi) or of lobha or other factors. This is breaking down the 'whole', It is an aspect of seeing anatta ++++++++++++++ > > 4.The realm of unhappy ghosts.....part of the description includes > the words "and dependent upon those humans who remember them for food > and drink". This is confusing.....how are they to eat any food left > out, what happens if no food is left out. Certainly none of my > deceased relatives/friends have had this hospitality extended to > them, and neither have the hundreds of millions who have died in > Christian countries over the centuries. ++++++ This is dependent on them forming kusala cittas based on hearing merit done in their name. best wishes robert > 10623 From: Sarah Date: Mon Jan 7, 2002 0:52am Subject: Re: Undertanding Metta - was([dsg] Re: Bangkok impressions 28/12/01-2/01/02) Hi Num, --- srnsk@a... wrote: > So then why in Visuddhimagga mentioned couple times that one shall start > to > practice metta toward oneself first and then directed outward? What do > you > think it meant by that? I completely agree with your points above but > I'd > like to see the subject in various perspectives. Christine replied with helped comments and examples.Rob K and I also discussed the Vism references in this post; http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/message/9461 I’d be interested to hear if you have any further comments. > Another point I'd like to add is bhramavihara also can be taken as an > object > (arammana) for every aspect of akusala (asava, ogha, yogha, gantha, > upadhana, > nivorana, anusaya,samyojana, and kilesa) as well. Good points as you elaborate later....also for (micha) ditthi...taking them for self. Of course they can also, like any other paramattha dhammas as I just discussed with Erik, be objects of satipatthana which of course, is the most useful of all. Appreciating all your other detailed posts, Sarah p.s. You can forward your photo requests to Sukin now;-) ==================================================== 10624 From: m. nease Date: Mon Jan 7, 2002 1:24am Subject: Re: [dsg] FYI Hi Erik, --- rikpa21 wrote: > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "m. nease" > wrote: > I > > meet today with the Wat Mahatat monks for a formal > > apology(!) for not having moved in there and taken > up > > their unusual meditation practice after my return > from > > Laos. It'll be a relief to have that over with, > at > > least. > > Hi Mike, > > I find this statement curious, given everything I've > been taught > there I have found to be in perfect accord with the > actual > instructions outlined by the Buddha in the > Satipatthana Sutta (any > teacher, as one of mine did, who begins a teaching > with the simile > of the raft, has my rapt attention!). Thanks for pointing out the way this message came across. It sounds (to me) like I was disparaging these really nice monks and their practice. That was not my intention at all--just looking forward to getting my (entirely necessary) apology over with. Thanks also for your snippets from the Anapanasati sutta. > What are your thoughts on all of this, Mike? Nothing original or worth posting here. Apologies all around again for the way my message came off. mike 10625 From: Ong Teng Kee Date: Mon Jan 7, 2002 3:23am Subject: Visuddhimagga page 514 Dear Suan, For sure you cannot find any burmese sayadaw to support you.If you publish your view with the title -changing bhvanga within one life in burma.You will find yourself in big trouble. Read Nyanamoli visuddhimagga eng.page 514-our present bhavanga citta are taking past life gati or kamma nimmita as sign but not other objects during present life.Tran in that page--when the rebirth citta has ceased,then,following on whatever kind of rebirth citta it may be,the same kinds,being the result of same kamma it may be,occurs as bhavanga citta with that same object;and again those same kinds.,,,,,bhavanga is passive like river,,,,, All these points by buddhaghosa is enough to prove that bhvanga is the same kamma/gati nimita sign until we die.I do not care you still hold the wrong view. If you want to tran tika on anguttara nikaya ,you must go home (yangon)to get original tika by dhammapala in leaf(not sariputta).But anyway i think you will further mislead people for that translation. >From: "abhidhammika" >Reply-To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com >To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com >Subject: [dsg] Re: luminous mind: To Ong Teng Kee >Date: Sun, 06 Jan 2002 15:47:15 -0000 > > > > >Dear Ong Teng Kee > >How are you? > >You said: > >"I have read more pali than you,..." > >I am very glad to hear that you read both Pali and Burmese as well. >So I could analyse the Buddhaghosa's statement bit by bit for you. > >I have been away from Myanmar over 20 years. I have no contact with >our revered Myanmar Sayadaws. I am a lone researcher in Canberra with >Pali Chatthasangayana CD-ROM and dictionaries. > >Therefore, I am unable to give you the names of the Sayadaws or their >books. > >All I can do is read the Pali passages deeply and interpret them >using whatever knowledge I have of Pali grammar and dictionaries. > >But, before I analyse Buddhaghosa's statement in Pali, I strongly >advise you to read my translation of the Pali statemnt. That way, >you can even correct my translation if you found it incorrect. > >When you read my analysis, you will come to understand why I wrote >what I wrote. > >I wrote what I wrote from the strength of reading Pali statements >deeply, and analysing them. > >When you have read my post (10521), please let me know either on-list >oroff-list. Then I will analyse the Pali statement bit bit for you. > >With best wishes, > >Suan > >http://www.bodhiology.org > > >--- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "Ong Teng Kee" wrote: > > Dear suan > > I have no time to read your old post yet but can you give me one >burmese > > sayadaw saying that we can change our bhavanga at will in one >life.I have > > read more pali than you but i still haven't seen >buddhaghosa ,sumangala > > ,dhammapala,buddhadatta or ananda said we can have 4 or more >bhavanga in one > > life.There are possible for all kinds of kusala/akusala javana >regardless of > > bhavanga we are having.Just give me the sayadaw name /book in >burmese > > because i do read burmese. > > 10626 From: Kenneth Ong Date: Mon Jan 7, 2002 5:12am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: luminous mind: To Kenneth Ong Hi Suan > Dear Ken > > How are you? k: Well and happy :) Since u have asked me a few times, I think its impolite not to reply you. Cheers :). > You wrote and asked: > > "k: I thought in this list, the assumption was that bhavanga cittas > could not be change throughout ones life. Do you have commentary > texts to substantiate your point." > > Yes, I have already provided the commentary Pali reference and > translation in my post 10521. > > In fact, you asked me questions by reading what I wrote and what I > quote in that post. Perhaps, you had been incoherent and forgot > things too soon. k: Oh, my friend always say I am like an old man, very forgetfull. I got another question. Since bhavanga cittas changes, then why do the objects do not change. Any reason for that? > So, please kindly read the post 10521 again to read the commentary > Pali and its translation which had been provided for the sole purpose > of substantiating my very point. k: The way you talk reminds of Wee in DL list ;-) Cheers and best regards Ken O 10627 From: Kenneth Ong Date: Mon Jan 7, 2002 5:21am Subject: RE: [dsg] The White Radiant Mind Hi Kom > > You have no disagreements from me in any of these 3 points. > I think I was using the two words somewhat interchangeably, > but I like your distinction between luminous and pure > better. So, what is your theory about the luminous citta? > One of 1 to 3 above? None of the above? Why? I know you > didn't quite like the commentaries' explanations well > enough. > > kom KO: I think there should be a distinction between luminous and pure. But I do not know how to describe it. We could have something bright that does not mean it has to be pure. Something like a pond of slit filled water does shine during moonlight even it looks with a dark background. KO: Abt luminous sutta. There are two possiblities either bhavanga cittas or kusala cittas. Actually I have to stand on commentary ground bc it is said by someone who has more panna than me. Even though there is inconsistency in its textual explanation between defining bhavanga citta and later on development of javana citta rather than bhavanga, I have to accept it bc it is from someone who is enlighted. Kind regards Ken O 10628 From: Kenneth Ong Date: Mon Jan 7, 2002 5:35am Subject: Re: [dsg] deceiving dhammas Hi Nina > It is more useful to be aware of what appears, thus, we should not > neglect visible object, seeing, sound, etc. It depends on condiitons, sometimes there are conditions to think a lot, but this is not I who thinks. k: I think this goes a bit too far from anatta principle. By denying there is no existence of I to an extreme is like stepping into another deep pit while trying not to fall into another from atman. It is my intuition, I could not explain it. kind regards Ken O 10629 From: Chen Hsiongcai Date: Mon Jan 7, 2002 6:02am Subject: Invitation to join "Dhamma Times" E-Newsletter Dear Friends in Dhamma, The Dhamma Times Newsletter is a non-profit Dhamma sharing project brought to you by Panna Youth Centre's Cyber Ministry, our wish is to bring the latest buddhist news to your mailbox effectively through the internet highway as that the flow of awareness of Buddhist happenings all around the world will be at your hands. The Dhamma Times Editorial Group would like to take this chance to invite fellow Venerables, Buddhist Organisations, Fellow Dhamma friends to subscribe to our Dhamma Times Newsletter as to recieve the latest Buddhist News at your mailbox. To subscribe, simply send an email to DhammaTimes-subscribe@yahoogroups.com May the Buddha-Dhamma spread far and wide ! Yours in Dhamma, Dhamma Times Editor " See the Truth & you will see Me" Buddha Visit http://www.prajna.cjb.net --------------------------------- Do You Yahoo!? Send FREE video emails in Yahoo! Mail. 10630 From: Chen Hsiongcai Date: Mon Jan 7, 2002 6:11am Subject: Harvest E-Zine - 2002 January Edition The Monthly Harvest International Buddhist E-Zine H A R V E S T I N G SPIRITUAL SEEDS OF GROWTH |2002 January Edition| Issue #23 - Black & White |Panna Youth Centre,Singapore | Promoting Buddhism Amongst Youths | Happy New Year 2002 | P r a i s e t h e L o r d ! 1.0 From the Editor’s Desk 2.0 Feature: White & Black 3.0 Inspiration: Love is a wonderful thing 4.0 Sharing: From a Christian to a Buddhist 5.0 Sayings of the Buddha 6.0 Intercession & Prayer Requests 7.0 P.Y.C Announcements & Feature News 8.0 Quotable Quotes 9.0 About Harvest E-Zine -[ F R O M T H E E D I T O R ] Friends, if your Faith is stronger than the hundredfold in the past one year, then don't stop there ! I pray that Lord Buddha INCREASE YOU A THOUSAND TIMES and bless you in the coming year 2002 ! There you are - Lord Buddha offers great increase, according to your own faith level that goes along with your practice. "According to your faith, be it unto you". But are there any conditions? Of course there are. We have to have faith - that's obvious. We have to believe totally that we will receive what we ask for, but let him ask in faith, with no doubting, for he who doubts is like a wave driven and tossed by the wind…let not that man suppose he will receive anything from the Lord, however Lord Buddha always gave the chance and freewill of enquiry as described in the discourse of the Kalamas and that his His challenge to those who doubts his teachings. We also have to cultivate the seed we have sown in faith and put it into practise. Just as the farmer does when he sows his natural seed, we have to tend our newly planted Bodhi seed. We have to nurture it, fertilise it, and water it before it can germinate, grow and return to us a plentiful harvest. How do we water a spiritual seed? By prayer - and in particular, I believe, by praying with Faith, Compassion and Aspiration. When we pray "rivers of living Dhamma" flow out of us. This, I believe, is the very "living Dhamma" we need for watering the seeds that we have sown. Pray as much as you can, and watch it water, nurture, and cultivate that precious seed you have sacrificed so much to plant It is my personal belief that The Monthly Harvest operated by our Panna Youth Centre, led and inspired by our own "world-shaking and history-making" leaders, Our dedicated Editors and supporters, is one of the most powerful and effective forces for the growth and spread of the wonderful Buddha-Dhamma online in this technology highway. It is my absolute conviction that we are publishing much more than just a electronic magazine! We are all part of building something that will have wisdom, that will send out a resounding clarion call to the nations and be a crucial part of taking the Teachings of Lord Buddha to all the world as a witness to all the nations thorugh the internet medium. Be anxious for nothing, but in everything by prayer and supplication, with thanksgiving, let you requests be made known to Lord Buddha; and the peace of Lord Buddha, which surpasses all understanding, will guard your hearts and minds through the teachings he left for us more than 2500 year ago. Wishing all a Happy, Joyous & Blessed New Year in 2002 ..... May our Harvest accompany you to march into another year with Love & Hope. Your Editor, Pst. Gerald Chen Hsiongcai Feature: -[White & Black] Imagine you need $200 to buy a new handphone. It is something that you wanted very much and you have at least 5 good reasons why you need one. Then one day you found a wallet in an empty fast food table in Orchard Road. There are $200 in the wallet. Here is the opportunity to get that handphone you wanted so badly. You are very tempted to take it but deep inside, you know you shouldn't. The right thing to do is to give it to the sales people behind the counter so that the owner can have a chance to recover it. You figured that you should allow the owner to have the opportunity to have it back because if that person is as poor as you, you are sure the $200 is a big deal to him. But you took a peek inside the wallet and found a gold credit card. You then figured that he is probably a well-to-do person, so $200 is not going to matter much to him. You conclude that it is then OK to take it. Is this the right thing to do? Why is it wrong to take the money if the person who lost it is poor but okay if the person is rich? Most people use situational ethics to make a decision of what is right and what is wrong. This is, of course, not correct - our law does not discriminate against certain group of people. It is very tempting to justify doing something that we know is wrong based on our own sense of justice. Like if someone hurt us, we may want to take it out on his family members to hurt that person. Or we may think it is OK to take home stationery from office because the company is big and rich. We may allow ourselves to illegally use softwares at home because the company who owns it is already earning too much money. And maybe it is OK to hurt someone because he has a reputation for being an exploitative person. This kind of reasoning and skewed sense of justice will lead to all sorts of trouble and tragedy, the worst in recent time being the tragedy that happened in September 11. In this world, we have all kind of war, tragedy, revolution and violence created by human people in the name of all sorts of reasons. We think we are getting more civilised and have learned from the mistakes of our past. But recent times have shown that we are not getting much progress in this aspect. The world may be too big for us to change and the human genome too complex to alter but we can decide not to be the one to start the madness. We can choose to see black as black and white as white - which is something we all have the capability to do. therefore, Lord Buddha help us if we decide to be more human and not behave like wild animals or be creatures without conscience.That is the Buddhist spirit of Love, Peace, Hope, Compassion and Aspiration we should all learn. [ Inspirational Story ] - Love is a wonderful thing The other day I had a Parent-Teacher Meeting with a mother of one of my students to discuss about her daughter's general progress. As the conversation progressed, she began to reveal how she discovered a change in her daughter. That the child was becoming more verbose, how peer pressure had turned her into… well, a teenager. One filled with teen angst.I have seen this happen a thousand times. Parents come up to me to moan about how they "do not understand their kids", how their kids had turned "from bad to worse" etc. If there were any angst, I would say it came from the parents themselves! On this occasion, however, this mother was not feeling angst. Instead, what aroused was love. Immense motherly love that was displayed in a parent who, though bewildered at her daughter's hormonal change, was still filled with immense motherly love for her. As she spoke about her daughter's whims, tears flowed down her cheeks. Lest you think it was pure frustration, you are wrong. Sitting across her, I could feel warmth. This mother was crying tears of joy at her daughter's obstinacy, her eccentricity and temperance! This mother truly loved her child unconditionally. This is not some Chicken Soup for Teenager's Soul episode. It is true. The thing is, in our Asian society, it is never easy to display positive emotions. Our forefathers were the pillars of our present success. Their strength lay in their austerity. This was passed on to their descendants and hence, laid the foundation for a typical Asian tradition. My parents were never allowed to be emotional because their parents never told them they loved them; neither did they hug and kiss my mum and dad. Instead, what my parents I must admit that I do possess some restrained emotional behaviour as well. For example, after being pushed away by my mother for holding her hand in public (I was 21 then), I have come to realise that public display of emotions is frowned upon. My parents never kissed me good night; in fact, as much as I can remember, they never kissed me - not even a peck on the cheek. My father did not even carry me when I was a baby. Fortunately, I did not turn out to be a screw-up kid, with pent-up feelings of neglect. On the contrary, I was able to see through this 'wall' that my generation of parents created with their children. I recognised love in perhaps, the most restricted form. Not that I am happy with it. There are occasions when I wish my parents were more expressive. But society is constantly evolving. I believe that my generation, when we become parents, it will be a whole new world. Because we have learnt it the hard way. Through numerous rebellious experiences, I have come to appreciate what my parents have done. At the same time, I have seen how my parents' way doesn't necessarily work. Teenagers and children nowadays complain about how their parents don't understand them. The term "generation gap" is an overexposed lexicon. But this gap is two-way. While you are busy lamenting about your parents, stop and think what you have been doing for them. A workshop I attended some time ago made me realise how arrogant I had been towards my parents. All this while I had been feeling sorry for myself about how they had never loved me. It was self-pity on my part. In so doing, I had failed to realise that I was the product of their love. Without them, what would I be today?So, the next time, you grumble about the naggings of your long-winded mother or the obstinacy of your stern father, accept it as their way of showing their love for you. No parent ever truly hated their kids. The words may not come out articulately. But actions do speak louder than words. Love is a wonderful thing - and it shows up in the most irrational form. Recognised as love was material - provision and support for the family. Because of this, my mum and dad, having grown up this way, believed that this was the best possible way to bring up their children. Buddha Bless all .... [ Sharing ]- From a Christian to a Buddhist Contributed by: Huang Weiwen (PYC Youth Ministry) Born in a family with Christian background, I was a pious Christian by then. I was often found involved in my church's activities and was sent by my parents to a Christian Centre to learn more about Jesus and Christianity. Even though I was enrolled into a Buddhist School later in life, my idea of Buddhism is just like many others: a Chinese Oriental religion filled with idols and supersititions. Chanting and prayers are part and parcel of my school life but I simply do it because I feel that I have to do it since this is a Buddhist School without really seeing the need. It is also through Lord Buddha's blessings that I got my first Buddhist Book from my teacher and I begun to read the book just like any other books and get to know most of the stories. My understanding of Lord Buddha is improving each day as I flip through the pages. However, becoming a Buddhist was not on my mind at that time partly because of several warnings given to me for becoming one. Before I came to know about Buddhism, I had a very hot temper and show little interest in my studies. I also don’t find the need to maintain a good relationship with my parents as well as my relatives. Misunderstandings and unhappiness strained our ties and I just cannot be bothered to apologise to them or acknowledging my mistakes. After my PSLE, I entered a non-Buddhist school. All the previous Buddhist influences seemed to subside. For the first time, I feel that I am being abandoned. Despite my ample Chirstian knowledge, I just cannot find answers to my questions concerning life and whenever I flip the Bible, but Lord Buddha spoke to me in a very personal way and I can feel His presence encouraging me. I begin to know some Buddhist classmates in my later years in the school and we meet up for some activities. I lied to them that I am a Buddhist because I fear that they might try to persuade me to become a Buddhist but the irony is that I really enjoy reading the Buddhist Teachings and praying together with them. One day, a Buddhist Youth member came to join our group to give us some Dhamma studies and as far as I remember the topic that day was ‘Put your Faith in the Buddha’. A strong sense of conviction feels my heart and I told myself, ‘I have found Him.’ I recognise that Lord Buddha is no longer a fable character to me but He has become real in my broken life. That evening, I prayed a simple prayer and received Lord Buddha into my life as my Teacher and Saviour. I kept this decision a ‘Top Secret’ because from my experience, to believe in Buddha is to seek trouble as far as my family is concerned. I started as an ‘underground’ Buddhist and have to pray in silence and read the my Buddhist Scriptures using textbooks as camouflage. An incident happened, when my aunt saw a Buddhist bookmark in one of my books and it is how the news that I became a Buddhist spread across my whole family. Serious objection begin by throwing away most of my Buddhist books and articles, questioning me of my new faith and also imposed curfew on me for fear that I might join a Buddhist Group.. Going out on weekends were extremely difficult at that time. My family kept on reminding me that I was Baptised by the holy trinity when I was barely an infant and also of the fact that I am the only male child of my parents. The ideas that Buddhists burning papers and participate in idol worship were the two main reasons for their strong opposition. Despite under persecution, I pressed on and asked Lord Buddha to deliver me from this horrible situation and continue to put my faith in Him. After I became a Buddhist, my family notices the change in my behaviour and views about life. From one equivalent to delinquent to one who easily loves and forgives. I used to scold vulgarities but now I have the help and strength from Lord Buddha to stop doing so. My studies improved tremendously and I am in favour with all of my teachers due to my exemplary behaviour and academic results. I used to fear death, hell and evil spirits but now all this fears are being removed and I have Lord Buddha's blessings with me and nothing can be aganist me ! Buddhist life for me is not a bed of roses. From the day I received Lord Buddha up till today, He has in place for me several tests of faith and I confessed that I did not pass most of them mainly due to my pride and unbelief. I seek Lord Buddha in prayer but find myself in doubt and I often ask Lord Buddha to revive me and to take away my doubts. Taking refuge in the Buddha, Dhamma & Sangha to me is one Great leap of faith and I would want to continue my walk with Him in obedience and gratitude as I can recall how He has sought for me. Thank You Lord Buddha & all PYC for giving me this chance to share my testimony. -[ Sayings of the Buddha ]- Hate brings great misfortune,hate churns up and harms the mind; this fearful danger deep within most people do not understand. Thus spoilt one cannot know the good,cannot see things as they are.Only blindness and gloom prevail when one is overwhelmed by hate.But he who both day and night takes delight in harmlessness sharing love with all that live,finds enmity with none.When one with a mind of love feels compassion for all the worlds above, below and across,unlimited everywhere.Filled with infinite kindness,complete and well-developed, any limited actions one may have done do not remain lingering in one's mind. - The Buddha -[ Intercession ] Dear Lord Buddha, Thank you for the message which tell us that we need to have faith in you, especially in this coming new year. I take everyday as a new challenge for myself, I take every opportunity to praise your name, to honour you and to be bring Glory to you ! You are indeed my Lord, my Saviour & my refuge ! I know that my faith is always strong, and I pray that you will help me and bless me to share your word with others, especially those who has never heard of your name. In this new year, I pray for all my relatives, my friends, all those whom I have came across and those whom I do not know come to thine Glory. Lord, grant these people your Blessings, your guidance, Love them as much as you have loved me. You are worthy of my praise and refuge, you are strongly anchored deep within my heart ! Yes, nothing can shake me, not even the mountains and the rivers ... I pray for harvesting of your word to the nations, may your teachings pervade and flourish across the word surpassing all nations, races, cultural difference that everyone may come before you ! Lord Buddha, I pray that I will be dilligent in practising your teachings, to be pro-active in sharing your teachings with others, I wish you a Happy New Year even though you have reached the state of unsurpassed that no amount of years nor time can condition you. I pray for the welfare and happiness of all sentient beings, all living creature and everyone in the past, present and future. May my friends and enemies come before you and gain enlightenment as you had. In your Mighty name, I pray. Sadhu ! Prayer Requests - You can count on Panna Youth Centre's wishes all subscribers of Harvest E-Zine a Happy New Year 2002 Panna Youth Centre & it's management committee dedicates a goodwill prayer to our Youth Ministry Assistant Leader - Bro Kelvin Tan Song Hee for the passing away of his beloved grandmother, pray for Confidence, Healing and Reconcillation. Winston Wang dedicates a prayer for his brother under treatment, pray for healing. Kenneth Yong Wing Kay prays for his wife who is pregnant, pray for blessings to both mother,son and blessed birth. Juay Kwang, Lo Ngai Ping, Peter Quek and Emily Chew dedicates a prayer for Revival in spreading the teachings of Lord Buddha amongst Youths, pray for blessings. Tan Hau Ting of Malaysia prays to excels in his studies and walk firmly on the Buddhist Path in year 2002. PYC Youth Ministry members -Edwin Teo, Mervin Lau, Richard Seah, Doric Ang, Tan Kok Chye & David Wibobo dedicates a prayer of gratitude to Lord Buddha and all PYC members for the Love, care and concern for the past one year. Chew Hong Beng dedicates a new year prayer for all Raymond Bryan dedicates a prayer for strength and revival to spread and harvest the Buddha's teachings in year 2002. -[ PYC Annoucenments ] PYC’s Adult Ministry will hold fellowship sessions every Friday to discuss and share the Dhamma, if you are interested to join in, please call Sis Simin @ 96424123 or e-mail to pyc@s... for registration/enquiries. PYC’s Youth Ministry will hold Dhamma sharing sessions, Q & A sessions in coordination with our Band Ministry, if you are interested/enquiries, please contact Bro Zhihua at 97333406 or Bro Zhixian at 90058252 or e-mail to mengtat@h... / trygettngme@y... We welcome you to be our member ! Visit The Dhamma Times Daily Newsletter to look at latest Buddhist News all around the world @ http://www.groups.yahoo.com/group/DhammaTimes - Another Dhamma Project by PYC's Cyber Ministry. Are you in need of help? Do you need someone to comfort you and pray for you? "The Monthly Harvest" has a column for special prayer requests for our members, absolutely free! If you need us pray for you and your family, relatives or friends, just let us know by sending an email to pyc@s... We will be glad to offer you our help and assistance in your times of need, let us pray together. Recommended links : http://www.code4.org.sg & http://www.prajna.cjb.net Panna Youth Centre being a non-profit Buddhist Youth organisation greatly depends on the support of many, if you would like to make a pledge or donation to us, please kindly email to hsiongcai@y... for more information. For Singporean Subscribers, to recieve a weekly SMS Buddhist Quote on your handphone, please email to pyc@s... your number. Feature News from PYC Panna Youth Centre's Internal mailing list is at http://www.groups.yahoo.com/group/pannayouthcentre <-Click here to join us and be our member ! Why not make your IE.5 browser start at http://www.prajna.cjb.net ? Click Internet Options under Tools, followed by Use Current and Apply with OK. Try it out- just click on the Home button anytime you want! [ Q U O T A B L E Q U O T E S ] A Leader is one who knows the way; goes the way and shows the way. - John Maxwell -[ A B O U T H A R V E S T E - Z I N E ]- "The Monthly Harvest" is a free international Buddhist-inspired E-Zine service hosted by Singapore’s Panna Youth Centre. Our subscribers receive an email with our articles, intercession; Dhamma quotes from the scripture, inspirational stories and PYC latest activities. To subscribe, simply send an email to: prajna-subscribe@yahoogroups.com You are also welcomed to view our Archives at: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/prajna/messages --------------------------------- Please forward your "Harvest" to your friends and relatives and let the Grace of Lord Buddha touch their lives today! --------------------------------- Copyrights @ 2001 Panna Youth Centre, Singapore. Jurong Point Post Office PO Box 15 (S) 916401 " See the Truth & you will see Me" Buddha Visit http://www.prajna.cjb.net --------------------------------- Do You Yahoo!? Send FREE video emails in Yahoo! Mail. 10631 From: Chen Hsiongcai Date: Mon Jan 7, 2002 6:08am Subject: Invitation to join "The Monthly Harvest" Buddhist E-Zine Dear friends in Dhamma, "The Monthly Harvest" is a Buddhist-inspired free international E-Zine service hosted by Singapore's Panna Youth Centre. It serves as a fascinating and appealing way to reach out to the Buddhists living all around the world. We attempt to provide a monthly dosage of the Buddha-Dhamma through e-mails with Buddhist articles, inspirational stories, scripture quotations, prayer requests and the latest happenings & activities in Panna Youth Centre. Don't hesistate, get connected to us now and share this Good News with your friends today! To subscribe, simply send an e-mail to prajna-subscribe@yahoogroups.com Our wish is to spread the Buddha-Dhamma far & wide all across the lands ! Yours in Noble Dhamma, Panna Youth Centre Cyber Ministry Harvest Electronic Magazine 2002 " See the Truth & you will see Me" Buddha Visit http://www.prajna.cjb.net --------------------------------- Do You Yahoo!? Send FREE video emails in Yahoo! Mail. 10632 From: Yulia Klimov Date: Mon Jan 7, 2002 6:34am Subject: Children and Parents Hello, Everyone I would like to know your opinion about one question I have. Life of our children depends on us. Does it mean, that we build their Karma? Are we responsible for their Karma? I have an example from my own life. I have divorced my husband, life with whom was hard for me. My son, who loves his father very much, suffers because of this. This brings my question, should I sacrifice my life to make my kid happier? Was my Karma escaping stupid life with my husband bringing suffering to my kid? Also, can parents somehow ease children's Karma? I mean, myself for example, after my practicing, I brought much mindfulness into my life (and to my children's life), it seems that they become different too. Or giving parents are the Karma of kids? And giving children are the Karma of parents? Thank you, Yulia 10633 From: Kenneth Ong Date: Mon Jan 7, 2002 6:29am Subject: Re: [dsg] deceiving dhammas Hi Nina > Hence, for those of us who likes to identify (in words or > not), she mention that this is not fruitful (as it is > impossible to clearly see). She said (or came close to > saying) that instead of identification, seeing the lakhana > of the nama that knows (the previous object?) would help > with understandings more. Of course, unless one understands > why identification (and analysis) is not as useful, or sees > (perhaps) the lobha that comes with the > identification/analysis, then one continues to analyze... k: How do we define identifying. For eg. An unpleasant feeling arise. a. Does she (as you mention above) say that identifying means there arise a thought "I have an unpleasant feeling". b. Or does she mean "there arise an unpleasant feeling" without an I. To me there is nothing wrong with identifying as long as one does not falls into a. As describe in Satipatthana sutta "there arise an unpleasant feelings" as said in b, to me that sounds a kind of identification. Even being aware, there is already a presence of identification. Even studying it with wise reflecion, there already an identification just that the identification is not geared to a self or I. I think we cannot start investigation or reflection without idenfication to meanings even to the paramatha level (there is still identification). kind regards Ken O 10634 From: abhidhammika Date: Mon Jan 7, 2002 7:09am Subject: Re: luminous mind: To Kenneth Ong Dear Ken How are you? You asked: "Since bhavanga cittas changes, then why do the objects do not change. Any reason for that?" I am afraid the objects might also change. The objects are simply those associated with what we do. If what we do caused the resultant mental aggregates to change as Buddhaghosa stated, those new mental aggregates would have at least what we did as their new objects. Please keep in mind firmly that bhavanga cittas are only the products of our actions, and impermanent and conditioned. Nothing mysterious involved here. With best wishes, Suan http://www.bodhiology.org --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Kenneth Ong wrote: > Hi Suan > > > Dear Ken > > > > How are you? > > k: Well and happy :) Since u have asked me a few times, I think its > impolite not to reply you. Cheers :). > > > > You wrote and asked: > > > > "k: I thought in this list, the assumption was that bhavanga cittas > > could not be change throughout ones life. Do you have commentary > > texts to substantiate your point." > > > > Yes, I have already provided the commentary Pali reference and > > translation in my post 10521. > > > > In fact, you asked me questions by reading what I wrote and what I > > quote in that post. Perhaps, you had been incoherent and forgot > > things too soon. > > k: Oh, my friend always say I am like an old man, very forgetfull. I got > another question. Since bhavanga cittas changes, then why do the objects > do not change. Any reason for that? > > > > So, please kindly read the post 10521 again to read the commentary > > Pali and its translation which had been provided for the sole purpose > > of substantiating my very point. > > k: The way you talk reminds of Wee in DL list ;-) > > > > > Cheers and best regards > Ken O > > 10635 From: abhidhammika Date: Mon Jan 7, 2002 7:46am Subject: Re: Visuddhimagga page 514 Dear U Ong Teng Kee How are you? You wrote: "I do not care you still hold the wrong view. If you want to tran tika on anguttara nikaya ,you must go home (yangon)to get original tika by dhammapala in leaf(not sariputta).But anyway i think you will further mislead people for that translation." I am afraid you seemed to be worried too much by my posts and translations. If translating Buddhaghosa's own statements amounted to holding the wrong view, so be it. For your information and dhamma friends on this list, I have already translated Anguttara Tiikaa on Statement 49 on 27 December 2001. Now I nearly finished writing sub-subcommentary (Anutiikaa) on that Tiikaa. I will be able to post Tiikaa translation and my new Anutiikaa very soon. As I have Chatthasangayana Pali CD-ROM, I do not have to get another Tika original copy from Myanmar. I believe that the writers of Chatthasangayana Pali CD-ROM include many Myanmar Sayadaws. I try my best to learn from the Buddha, the commentators and the subcommentators, and share what I learnt with dhamma friends. And dhamma friends who read my works are mature thinkers and practitioners of dhamma themselves. And I do not think I can mislead them. And there is no good reason for me to mislead them, either. While I have sympthy for your desire to give the readers the right view and prevent them from getting the wrong views from my posts, the show must go on. Nothing can silence my voice now. With best wishes, Suan http://www.bodhiology.org --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "Ong Teng Kee" wrote: > Dear Suan, > For sure you cannot find any burmese sayadaw to support you.If you publish > your view with the title -changing bhvanga within one life in burma.You > will find yourself in big trouble. > Read Nyanamoli visuddhimagga eng.page 514-our present bhavanga citta are > taking past life gati or kamma nimmita as sign but not other objects during > present life.Tran in that page--when the rebirth citta has > ceased,then,following on whatever kind of rebirth citta it may be,the same > kinds,being the result of same kamma it may be,occurs as bhavanga citta with > that same object;and again those same kinds.,,,,,bhavanga is passive like > river,,,,, > All these points by buddhaghosa is enough to prove that bhvanga is the same > kamma/gati nimita sign until we die.I do not care you still hold the wrong > view. > If you want to tran tika on anguttara nikaya ,you must go home (yangon)to > get original tika by dhammapala in leaf(not sariputta).But anyway i think > you will further mislead people for that translation. > > > > > > >From: "abhidhammika" > >Reply-To: dhammastudygroup@y... > >To: dhammastudygroup@y... > >Subject: [dsg] Re: luminous mind: To Ong Teng Kee > >Date: Sun, 06 Jan 2002 15:47:15 -0000 > > > > > > > > > >Dear Ong Teng Kee > > > >How are you? > > > >You said: > > > >"I have read more pali than you,..." > > > >I am very glad to hear that you read both Pali and Burmese as well. > >So I could analyse the Buddhaghosa's statement bit by bit for you. > > > >I have been away from Myanmar over 20 years. I have no contact with > >our revered Myanmar Sayadaws. I am a lone researcher in Canberra with > >Pali Chatthasangayana CD-ROM and dictionaries. > > > >Therefore, I am unable to give you the names of the Sayadaws or their > >books. > > > >All I can do is read the Pali passages deeply and interpret them > >using whatever knowledge I have of Pali grammar and dictionaries. > > > >But, before I analyse Buddhaghosa's statement in Pali, I strongly > >advise you to read my translation of the Pali statemnt. That way, > >you can even correct my translation if you found it incorrect. > > > >When you read my analysis, you will come to understand why I wrote > >what I wrote. > > > >I wrote what I wrote from the strength of reading Pali statements > >deeply, and analysing them. > > > >When you have read my post (10521), please let me know either on- list > >oroff-list. Then I will analyse the Pali statement bit bit for you. > > > >With best wishes, > > > >Suan > > > >http://www.bodhiology.org > > > > > >--- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "Ong Teng Kee" wrote: > > > Dear suan > > > I have no time to read your old post yet but can you give me one > >burmese > > > sayadaw saying that we can change our bhavanga at will in one > >life.I have > > > read more pali than you but i still haven't seen > >buddhaghosa ,sumangala > > > ,dhammapala,buddhadatta or ananda said we can have 4 or more > >bhavanga in one > > > life.There are possible for all kinds of kusala/akusala javana > >regardless of > > > bhavanga we are having.Just give me the sayadaw name /book in > >burmese > > > because i do read burmese. > > > > 10636 From: yuzhonghao Date: Mon Jan 7, 2002 9:44am Subject: Re: non-self, to Victor. Hello all, I am interested to know if anyone can find a specific reference from the discourses in the Pali Canon in which the Buddha taught "there is no self who can do anything." Thank you. Regards, Victor --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "yuzhonghao" wrote: > Hello Nina, > > Thank you replying. > > Please consider very carefully about whether the Buddha taught "there > is no self who can do anything." Also, I would be very interested to > learn about some specific reference, if there is any, from the > discourse that would support view "there is no self who can do > anything." > > Regards, > Victor 10637 From: rikpa21 Date: Mon Jan 7, 2002 10:49am Subject: Re: [dsg] one limb of 8 fold path more important (was satipathana and practice) --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Sarah wrote: > Hi Erik, Hi Sarah, > I can see you're back in form. I'd actually prefer the "formless" (or even better, the total cessation of the effluents), but I guess I'll have to settle for rupa at the moment :) > When I read any of the suttas, including > the Satipatthana Sutta, I understand the Buddha to be talking about > paramattha truths, whatever the terms and language used to express these. That is an interpretation I find difficult to reconcile with a very careful reading of the Satipatthana Sutta, unless considering only the paramattha dhamma of cetasika. I think it would be very helpful to provide specific instances of the objects of investigation you believe to refer to "paramattha dhammas" (in terms of "visible object," "hardness", etc.) arising through the five sense-bases, among the objects listed in the Satipatthana Sutta, and why you interpret them to refer to "paramattha dhammas." > There are a number of very helpful posts (imho) saved under `Concepts and > Realities' in Useful Posts: > http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/files/Useful_Posts Just taking this quote from Jon (at your sugestion on reading the "Useful Posts" section): Jon writes: "Concepts are dhammas in the sense that they are the object of cittas. But they can not be object of satipatthana since they are not sabhaava (`having an individual essence/extrinsic nature), and the function of panna is to penetrate the individual essence of realities." If you agree with this, then it appears we are at loggerheads in our understanding of what constitute valid objects of sati. How do you explain the Buddha's meditations on objects like the following in terms of "paramattha dhammas" (in the examples you've given so far such as "visible object," "hearing", "touching")? I do not see how the following reflects "paramattha dhammas", e.g. experiencing the "rupa" of blood, bile, phlegm, or shit, for example: "...A monk reflects on this very body from the soles of the feet on up, from the crown of the head on down, surrounded by skin and full of various kinds of unclean things: 'In this body there are head hairs, body hairs, nails, teeth, skin, flesh, tendons, bones, bone marrow, kidneys, heart, liver, pleura, spleen, lungs, large intestines, small intestines, gorge, feces, bile, phlegm, pus, blood, sweat, fat, tears, skin-oil, saliva, mucus, fluid in the joints, urine." Either the objects of discernment here are "paramattha dhammass" in the sense you've indicated ("visible object," etc.) or they are not. I cannot see how contemplating the fact that one is composed of all these constituents is a direct apprehension of "ultimate realities". What the Buddha seems to be suggesting above perfectly accords with the methods of breaking things down into their constituents as a way of training to see how none of these things are "self." I see no need whatsoever to discuss "paramattha dhammas" at this level of analysis, just as the Buddha never discussed "ultimate realities" when using the analogy of the chariot, for example. > 2)Focus and `unbroken mindfulness' > > You often quote a translation using `focus' in the Satipatthana Sutta. Yep, not only due to the language of the translation, but also because in my own limited experience of the practice of sati, I've found that focus is a requisite condition for samma sati. Without focus, there is no development of mindfulness of what is present as it is actually present, since the untrained monkey-mind habitually scatters to the ten directions lacking an object of focus- -at least until the mind is well-trained. Note that I am not arguing against the idea that accomplished meditators possess the ability to note whatever arises. But that is one whose mindfulness is thoroughly enough established it remains undistracted even for a moment, and can observe with mindfulness and clear comprehension anything that arises through any of the sense (or mind) doors. > From the translation by Soma Thera we read: > > "And how, O bhikkhus, does a bhikkhu live contemplating consciousness in > conciousness?" > " Here, o bhikkhus, a bhikkhu understands the consciousness with lust; the > conciousness without lust, as without lust; the consciousness with hate, > as > with hate............" > > By contemplating consciousness (cittanupassanaa) is meant sati (awareness) Since we're nitpicking on linguistic definitions here, why not expand it a bit with the thesaurus definition of "contemplation"? "To have in mind as a goal or purpose: aim, design, intend, mean, plan, project, propose, purpose, target." Whoops! There seems to be an awful lot of "self" in these definitions, the notion of controlling! Better set that one aside, lest we fall into the trap of thinking we can have a goal, or purpose, plan, or target! :) > of > the cittas discussed. As we know from our abhidhamma studies, sati is not > unbroken or continuous but is a skilful mental state arising momentarily > with a specific citta (consciousnes) in the javana (`running- through') > process. Then why does this seem to directly contradict the Buddha's teaching on Right Mindfulness (from the Anapanasati Sutta): "On whatever occasion the monk remains focused on the body in & of itself -- ardent, alert, & mindful -- putting aside greed & distress with reference to the world, on that occasion his mindfulness is steady & without lapse." How do you regard what the Buddha says here about mindfulness as a factor of awakening being "steady and without lapse", compared to sati merely being "a skilful mental state arising momentarily with a specific citta"? By way of personal preference, I prefer the direct words of the Buddha over other interpretations, since some appear to directly contradict the words of the Buddha regarding mindfulness as an enlightenment factor: "When his mindfulness is steady & without lapse, then mindfulness as a factor of awakening becomes aroused. He develops it, and for him it goes to the culmination of its development. This is, after all, where the proverbial rubber meets the road, as the seven bojjhangas (sati is being discussed in terms of the factors leading to enlightenment here) are indispensible prerequisites for awakening. > 4) Wishing > > While it's true that chanda (zeal) arises with wholesome cittas, it also > arises with all kinds of attachment and some kinds of aversion too (as > well as some vipaka cittas) now. We'd like to think that everytime we > consider nibbana and supramundane consciousness that this is skilful > `wishing', but for most of us, these are good opportunities for the > deceiving dhammas to play their tricks again. Most of this wishing is > merely more attachment. Only sati can know for each of us, I realise. Again, my point was that we can either attempt to cultivate kusala, no matter how imperfect it's guaranteed to be, or die from analysis paralysis--specifically failing to act out of obsessive fear of acting with the horrifying taints of self view or lobha (or dosa)! Again, since kusala arises so rarely in the first place, my contention is better to give it the best go we can, no matter how imperfect it is, than sit on our behinds out of excessive fear of "near enemies" and "deceiving dhammas" and so on. > 6) Rt Effort. > > Our understanding of rt effort will depend on our understanding of anatta > and of concepts and realities. My understanding of Right Effort comes from the Buddha, beginning at the simplest level of abandoning the unskillful and taking up the skillful: "And what, monks, is right effort? [1] "There is the case where a monk generates desire, endeavors, activates persistence, upholds & exerts his intent for the sake of the non-arising of evil, unskillful qualities that have not yet arisen. [2] "He generates desire, endeavors, activates persistence, upholds & exerts his intent for the sake of the abandonment of evil, unskillful qualities that have arisen. [3] "He generates desire, endeavors, activates persistence, upholds & exerts his intent for the sake of the arising of skillful qualities that have not yet arisen. [4] "He generates desire, endeavors, activates persistence, upholds & exerts his intent for the maintenance, non-confusion, increase, plenitude, development, & culmination of skillful qualities that have arisen: This, monks, is called right effort." This is a pretty simple formula, that when applied correctly, leads to all the other good stuff, like Right View. Even the Kalamas were suited for this sort of instruction--and no mention of anatta anywhere to be found! None of this is rocket science. Just applied good sense. Besides, deeper right view (of the sort that understands anatta) can't arise in the presence of coarse obscurations to begin with. > While we cling to an idea of self there is > bound to be an idea of control and of self making an effort rather than an > understanding of paramattha dhammas. Plenty has been written on this topic > under the same heading in Useful Posts. Not to be snide, but I have found the "useful posts section to reflect too little diversity to consider useful for my own purposes), but the teachings of the Buddha from the Suttas I have been able to test and verify in my own experience, as well as the similarly verified teachings tauight to me by my own teachers. All I can say is that simply based on my own testing I have found no benefit in discussing the Dharma using the terms of nama and rupa, paramatha dhamma, and the like. > 8) The `quick fix' > > You mention that you can get a result and increased mindfulnes in less > than two hours following a particular method. Of course it's natural to > want to find a quick method or short-cut, I believe you are attributing something on to my words I never said or suggested. I simply said that I noticed a drastic increase in sati, verified in my own experience, using the very simple method outlined by one of my teachers at Wat Mahatat. I said nothing to suggest anything resembling a "quick fix," only that it took me less than two hours of pratice to verify, conclusively, that the methods outlined do in fact work in helping establish samma sati, and extremely well at at that. Other methods I've been exposed top have failed to yiled similar results. Is it all in the accumulations, or is there more to it than that? > but I question whether the > profound Teachings and intricacies and subtleties of understanding the > present reality can be reduced to such a method. No one is suggesting such a thing. My training emphasizes the jhanas, practices like like metta bhavana, and intensive meditation on emptiness. > I don't doubt at all that > results are achieved from practices and methods (and know this is true), Indeed it is true. And the power of sati & sampajjana are not to be underestimated. So anything that aids the development of Right Mindfulness and unbroken concentration (as the Buddha recommended regarding sati as a factor of enlightenment) can only be a good thing. > but I question whether the result is awareness and understanding of the > paramattha dhammas which I believe the Buddha to have taught throughout > all parts of the Tipitaka. > Without clear intellectual understanding > initially as to what paramattha dhammas are, I would even venture to say > that this is impossible. You are of course entitled to your opinion. Of course where the rubber meets the rioad in this game is whether or not an approach leads to the permanent termination of suffering. This cannot be a matter of speculation, but must be verified directly in our own experience. May all beings be blessed with the great fortune of seeing things as theyu truly are! :) E. 10638 From: Lucy Date: Mon Jan 7, 2002 0:32pm Subject: Re: [dsg] New Members- settling in ? Dear Sarah Thank you for the warm welcome ! > I wonder > if your backwater is in England as I note you are using a UK server? If > so, may I ask where? I'm English too but I've lived overseas for 20yrs. North Wales actually, about 6 miles from the edge of Snowdonia NP. Best wishes Lucy 10639 From: christine_forsyth Date: Mon Jan 7, 2002 0:48pm Subject: Re: [dsg] New Members- settling in ? Welcome Lucy! Oh! how fortunate, living in the land of crisp and the cool! And I bet you've had rain. Swap you 35C, bushfires, flies, cockroaches and mosquitos for some cold and wet wet wet weather. I've had the airconditioning on full blast all night, it's just after 6.00 a.m., the cicadas are singing, the tank water is low and the dog is panting already..... metta, Christine --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "Lucy" wrote: > Dear Sarah > > Thank you for the warm welcome ! > > > I wonder > > if your backwater is in England as I note you are using a UK server? > If > > so, may I ask where? I'm English too but I've lived overseas for > 20yrs. > > North Wales actually, about 6 miles from the edge of Snowdonia NP. > > Best wishes > > Lucy 10640 From: Date: Mon Jan 7, 2002 8:10am Subject: Re: [dsg] Elementary questions <<<<<<<< Ø 3. The ten immoral or unskillful actions - those listed as 8 > (covetousness), 9 (ill will), and 10 (wrong view) dont't seem > like 'actions' to me. 'Intention' seems to be involved in things > like killing, stealing, sexual misconduct, lying etc. (although I > suppose some may be attributed to 'impulse'?). Covetousness and ill > will, seem much less the result of 'deliberate intention' , they seem > to 'just happen'.... And would anyone 'intend/plan/deliberately > want', to have wrong view? +++++++++ Cetana (translated as intention) comes in different intensities and its characteristic is hard to know. What we take to be intention is usually a mix of thinking, chanda, cetana, vitakka, vicara,manisikara, ekagatta etc. When there is wrong view there is always lobha(attachment) as well that makes one think they see things correctly. You can recognise how much cetana is there when it is very obvious. Take, for instance, the case of a visiting jehovah witness: they will talk and talk with great enthusiasm and confidence = it is wrongview and cetana is assisting to display it to the world. Even when wrongview is not shown to others cetana is there underlying the thinking and encouraging and supporting the associated factors. Useful to repeatedly investigate this as then it can be known, little by little, even when there is thinking with wrong view, that it is just various conditioned factors. This can be direct knowledge of the characteristic of wrong view (ditthi) or of lobha or other factors. This is breaking down the 'whole', It is an aspect of seeing anatta >>>>>>>>>>> Dear Chirstine, Hope you do not mind me putting two mails together in one post. About where to get dhamma books. I usually check them out from my university library. If you can get to any library websites, at my univ. they also link out to many libraries. Search functions on some website is very good, you can go by keyword of the name or author name. I do not know you can do this or not. This way you can the book pretty quick. They also can do inter-library loan for me as well. I usually try to read some part of it first before I decide which one I'd like to buy it into my collection. Another website in the US that have good dhamma books is http://www.pariyatti.com/ If I remember it right, it's located somewhere on the west coast, I think Seattle. Both English and Roman Pali version are available. Sarah gave me a site in the UK but I do not have it on hand. Let me emphasis just on how severe and pervasive of the wrong view, miccha ditthi. As Nina mentioned that everyone still can have potential to be subjected to wrong view except an ariya person, start with the stream enter, sotapana. Wrong view is a conditional dhamma, arises, sustains and ceases by conditions. I mentioned about garukamma in another post. Let me put some more detail about garukamma here, by Ven Narada Thera. ___________________________ 34. Garuka - which means either weighty or serious, may be either good or bad. It produces its results in this life, or in the next for certain. If good, it is purely mental as in the case of the jhánas. Otherwise it is verbal or bodily. The five kinds of immoral Weighty Kamma according to their gravity are: - (i) the creation of a schism in the Sangha, (ii) the wounding of a Buddha, (iii) the murder of an Arahat, (iv) matricide, and (v) parricide. These are also known as Ánantariya Kamma because they definitely produce their effects in the subsequent life. Permanent Skepticism (niyata miccháditthi) is also termed one of the Weighty Kammas. If, for instance, any person were to develop the jhánas and later were to commit one of these heinous crimes, his good Kamma would be obliterated by the powerful evil Kamma. His subsequent birth would be conditioned by the evil Kamma in spite of his having gained the jhánas earlier. Devadatta lost his psychic powers and was born in an evil state, because he wounded the Buddha and caused a schism in the Sangha. King Ajátasattu would have attained the first stage of sainthood if he had not committed parricide. In this case the powerful evil Kamma acted as an obstacle to his gaining sainthood. ------------------------------------------------ Garukakamma can be akusala or kusala. 1. Niyata michadithi means view that definitely gives result, predictably and certainly. As Robert mentioned this refers to wrong view, which always co-occurs with lobha. This view includes: 1.1 natthikaditthi, believing that there is no result., 1.2 ahetuka ditthi, believing that there is no cause. 1.3 akiriya ditthi do not believe in both cause and result. (In brief, lobhamulacitta ditthikatasampayutta 4 citta). 2. Anatariyakamma. Which is part of dosamulacitta 2 citta, citta that root in aversion as mentioned above. 3. Jhanacitta 9 citta. As mention about jhana above. Lokuttara kusala not included here b/c they lead to cessation of birth and dukkha (by seeing the ultimate truth, 4 ariyasacca. Anantariyakamma, even though it is very severe but it will come to the end one day. Contrast to wrong view because it is so subtle and pervasive, it can tie, divert and allure us indefinitely away from sammamagga and nibbhana. Again this what I got from what I have read. If you let me ask you for one thing : Do not take it without careful and wise consideration (yonisomanasikara). Best wishes, Num 10641 From: Lucy Date: Mon Jan 7, 2002 1:18pm Subject: Re: [dsg] New Members- settling in ? Thanks, Christine Yes, you can have all of this wonderful wet wet wet , and the cold, the wind and the dark winter days. All yours! (but it's not crisp, more like...soggy) My cat has lived under the duvet the past 2 months, maybe your dog wants to trade places too? Lucy 10642 From: christine_forsyth Date: Mon Jan 7, 2002 1:37pm Subject: Re: [dsg] New Members- settling in ? Having consulted the dog, he's decided to stay home - hates water, hard to even catch him for a bath. :-) Is it part of the human condition to always think the grass is greener elsewhere? Hope to see more posts from you, Christine --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "Lucy" wrote: > Thanks, Christine > > Yes, you can have all of this wonderful wet wet wet , and the cold, > the wind and the dark winter days. All yours! (but it's not crisp, > more like...soggy) > > My cat has lived under the duvet the past 2 months, maybe your dog > wants to trade places too? > > Lucy 10643 From: christine_forsyth Date: Mon Jan 7, 2002 1:39pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Elementary questions Thanks Num - have to leave for work now, so I'll print your post off and read it at lunch time. metta, Christine --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., srnsk@a... wrote: > <<<<<<<< > > Ø 3. The ten immoral or unskillful actions - those listed as 8 > > (covetousness), 9 (ill will), and 10 (wrong view) dont't seem > > like 'actions' to me. 'Intention' seems to be involved in things > > like killing, stealing, sexual misconduct, lying etc. (although I > > suppose some may be attributed to 'impulse'?). Covetousness and > ill > > will, seem much less the result of 'deliberate intention' , they > seem > > to 'just happen'.... And would anyone 'intend/plan/deliberately > > want', to have wrong view? > +++++++++ > Cetana (translated as intention) comes in different intensities and > its characteristic is hard to know. What we take to be intention is > usually a mix of thinking, chanda, cetana, vitakka, > vicara,manisikara, ekagatta etc. When there is wrong view there is > always lobha(attachment) as well that makes one think they see > things correctly. You can recognise how much cetana is there when it > is very obvious. Take, for instance, the case of a visiting jehovah > witness: they will talk and talk with great enthusiasm and > confidence = it is wrongview and cetana is assisting to display it > to the world. Even when wrongview is not shown to others cetana is > there underlying the thinking and encouraging and supporting the > associated factors. > Useful to repeatedly investigate this as then it can be known, > little by little, even when there is thinking with wrong view, that > it is just various conditioned factors. This can be direct knowledge > of the characteristic of wrong view (ditthi) or of lobha or other > factors. This is breaking down the 'whole', It is an aspect of > seeing anatta > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > Dear Chirstine, > > Hope you do not mind me putting two mails together in one post. > > About where to get dhamma books. I usually check them out from my university > library. If you can get to any library websites, at my univ. they also link > out to many libraries. Search functions on some website is very good, you can > go by keyword of the name or author name. I do not know you can do this or > not. This way you can the book pretty quick. They also can do inter-library > loan for me as well. I usually try to read some part of it first before I > decide which one I'd like to buy it into my collection. > > Another website in the US that have good dhamma books is > http://www.pariyatti.com/ > If I remember it right, it's located somewhere on the west coast, I think > Seattle. Both English and Roman Pali version are available. Sarah gave me a > site in the UK but I do not have it on hand. > > Let me emphasis just on how severe and pervasive of the wrong view, miccha > ditthi. As Nina mentioned that everyone still can have potential to be > subjected to wrong view except an ariya person, start with the stream enter, > sotapana. Wrong view is a conditional dhamma, arises, sustains and ceases by > conditions. > > I mentioned about garukamma in another post. Let me put some more detail > about garukamma here, by Ven Narada Thera. > > ___________________________ > > 34. Garuka - which means either weighty or serious, may be either good or > bad. It produces its results in this life, or in the next for certain. If > good, it is purely mental as in the case of the jhánas. Otherwise it is > verbal or bodily. The five kinds of immoral Weighty Kamma according to their > gravity are: - (i) the creation of a schism in the Sangha, (ii) the wounding > of a Buddha, (iii) the murder of an Arahat, (iv) matricide, and (v) > parricide. > These are also known as Ánantariya Kamma because they definitely produce > their effects in the subsequent life. Permanent Skepticism (niyata > miccháditthi) is also termed one of the Weighty Kammas. > If, for instance, any person were to develop the jhánas and later were to > commit one of these heinous crimes, his good Kamma would be obliterated by > the powerful evil Kamma. His subsequent birth would be conditioned by the > evil Kamma in spite of his having gained the jhánas earlier. Devadatta lost > his psychic powers and was born in an evil state, because he wounded the > Buddha and caused a schism in the Sangha. > King Ajátasattu would have attained the first stage of sainthood if he had > not committed parricide. In this case the powerful evil Kamma acted as an > obstacle to his gaining sainthood. > ------------------------------------------------ > > Garukakamma can be akusala or kusala. > > 1. Niyata michadithi means view that definitely gives result, predictably > and certainly. As Robert mentioned this refers to wrong view, which always > co-occurs with lobha. This view includes: 1.1 natthikaditthi, believing that > there is no result., 1.2 ahetuka ditthi, believing that there is no cause. > 1.3 akiriya ditthi do not believe in both cause and result. (In brief, > lobhamulacitta ditthikatasampayutta 4 citta). > 2. Anatariyakamma. Which is part of dosamulacitta 2 citta, citta that root > in aversion as mentioned above. > 3. Jhanacitta 9 citta. As mention about jhana above. > > Lokuttara kusala not included here b/c they lead to cessation of birth and > dukkha (by seeing the ultimate truth, 4 ariyasacca. > > Anantariyakamma, even though it is very severe but it will come to the end > one day. Contrast to wrong view because it is so subtle and pervasive, it can > tie, divert and allure us indefinitely away from sammamagga and nibbhana. > > Again this what I got from what I have read. If you let me ask you for one > thing : Do not take it without careful and wise consideration > (yonisomanasikara). > > Best wishes, > > Num 10644 From: Jaran Jai-nhuknan Date: Mon Jan 7, 2002 4:13pm Subject: What I learn in BKK about three rounds.... Hi All: Happy new year to all of you. For those I don't know my name is Jaran a real beginner. I have just spent my best new year holidays when I went back to Bangkok and listened to dhamma from many people in this group. One interesting subject I got out of this is how ~naana develops from sacca ~naana to kata ~naana. Please see if my understanding makes some sense. If not, here is your chance to do a very good deed: giving right understand as dhamma dana. What I also like to hear more is how nirodha kicca ~naana develops. Comments anyone? Good day from Singapore, jaran Three rounds of ~naana as I understand them: sacca~naana: understands the following: 1. Dhukkha (unsatisfactory, suffering) is to realize. Dhukkhas, all sa.mkharadhammas, are arising and falling away right now. There are to be 'studied', and there characteristics are to be realized. The sacca~naana develops as one listens to dhamma respectfully (attentively), considers dhamma and reflects on dhamma (that is, the study in the level of pariyatti). All these happen automatically as no one with right understanding can cause them to happen. The understanding of dhamma is not necessarily directly proportional to how much one has heard or read dhamma. Rather, it is due to accumulation and how much one can understand what one listens and read. The more sacca~naana develops, the firmer the understanding of dhamma. This intellectual RIGHT understanding automatically conditions one to study the actual realities appearing right now. As sati-sa.mpaja~n~na (right awareness and right view at the moment of satipatthana) arise to study characteristics of realities (the study in the level of patipatti), the kicca~naana begins to develop. The realization of the characteristics of realities that one has heard from a long time in turn makes dhukkha sacca ~naana -- the belief of the fact that there is actually dhamma to be directly experienced -- further developed. The more sacca ~naana strengthens, the more kicca ~naana develops. These two enhance each other as the degrees of understanding in both levels grow. We might say that the sacca ~naana is the direct result of pariyatti study, and the kicca ~naana is the results of patipatti study. We can also think of kicca ~naana as the result of sacca ~naana since there cannot be a direct understanding of realities with out intellectual understanding of dhamma. Similarly, vipassana ~naana(s) are results of both pariyatti and patipatti studies. The kata ~naana (literally meaning what to be done has be achieved) is also the result of the first two levels of ~naana. The same as the interconnected sacca ~naana and kicca ~naana, kata ~naana conditions both level of ~naana to progress. As each level of vipassana ~naana is reached, kata ~naana (along with the other two) little by little develops. And finally they are all perfected at the sotapattimagga vithi. Here kata ~naana is the result of pativeda study. Although there is room for debate here whether vipassana ~naana are considered kata ~naana since there is no direct evidence in the Tipitaka saying that, I would not worry about it too much. Because kata ~naana is a direct result of sacca ~naana and kicca ~naana and if the first two are correct, they will lead the right kata ~naana where ever it is which is conditioned by the understanding of the dhukkha appearing at this moment anyway.... And when that happens, it will be obvious to the developed wisdom. That completes the first (of four) three rounds of dhukkha sacca ~naana. 2. samudaya (attachment, cause of suffering) to be eradicate. The intellectual knowledge of the fact that all dhukkha arise from craving both directly and indirectly. Since the craving is cause of all this, the only way to stop the circle of arising and falling away of dhamma is to eradicate the craving and eventually the attachment. This is the samudaya sacca ~naana. This understanding actually can lessen the attachment at a very very minuscule level. As sati-patthana develops, samudaya kicca ~naana also develops causing the attachment to be chipped away little by little. One becomes less and less attached to both paramatha dhamma (and sa.mmutti dhamma) as sacca, kicca and kata ~naanas develop at each level of vipassana ~naana. The attachment to the idea of self (along with miccha tit.thi and the doubts in dhamma) is completely eradicated by samudaya kata ~naana at the sotapatti magga vithi. That is the first three round of samudaya ~naana. 3. nirodha (cessation of dhukkha) to make known. The cessation of dhukkha is deu to realization of Nibbana, an asa.mkhata dhamma. Don't quite understand how nirodha kicca ~naana develops, but I assume the kata ~naana is when the wisdom realizes the characteristics of Nibbana. 4. magga (path to eradicaton of dhukkha) to develop. Development towards cessation of dhukkha is to develop the 8-fold path. The path begins to develop at the moment one understand dhamma intellectually (when sa.mma ti.tthi, panna, a long with vitaka, viriya, sati and samadhi -- altogether only five). This is magga sacca ~naana. Again at the moment of satipa.t.thana all the five arise to perform their function at the level of kicca ~naana. At the each level of vipassana ~naana, all three ~naanas develop, and the strength of these five (always arise together) + 3 viratii cetasikas which never arise all three together (and other beautiful cetasika such as sadhaa, metta, karuna etc) also develop. They reach the highest degrees at the sotapattimagga vithii where all eight cetasikas coarise with Nibbana as the object. That the first three-round of magga ~naana. 10645 From: Jaran Jai-nhuknan Date: Mon Jan 7, 2002 4:35pm Subject: My understanding of (and approach to) luminous mind: what I just learned from BKK discussion over new year holidays Hi all: Below is another bits and pieces I was able to put together from the conversations in BKK regarding luminous mind. Please forgive me if my roman pali are not correct. According to a pali expert and A. Sujin, the word 'luminous' (in thai "bo-ri-suth") is from two different pali words: pandara and pabhassara. Pandara is refers to all cittas, wholesome, unwholesome, vipaka, bhavanga, kiriya because it is another name (of 11 or 13 names) of citta. Citta has many names because it can be consider in many different ways (aspects or nayas). Cittas are pandara because they are intrinsically pure (compared other dhammas such as cetasikas). Pabhassara refers to purity of citta because it is purified (from uppakilesa) as suppose to just its intrinsic purity. Below are some (probably incomplete) passages that bring about this conclusion. Each point begins with reference, then the rough translation, finally my understanding. 1. From Commentary dhamasa.mga.niiva.n.nanaa cittuppaataka.n.thava.n.nanaa, it says: In nittesavara, cakkhuvi~n~naana is said to be pandara because of its base, kusala citta is pandara because itself is pure, akusala citta is pandara because it 'flows' (comes) from bhavanga citta (which is pure, in the human realm), and all vipaka cittas are pure because of their bases (like that of cakkhuvi~n~naana). Here pandara refers to all cittas because pandara is one of more than 10 _definitions_ of citta. Above only emphasizes that cittas are pure (compared to cetasikas) in many different ways, and akusala cittas are pure because they come from pure bhavanga cittas. 2. From Commentary dhamasa.mga.niiva.n.nanaa cittuppaataka.n.thava.n.nanaa earlier on (before the above passage), it says: (The pali is the same as that provide by Suan.) Citta is called pandara meaning pure. Here pandara refers to bhavanga citta as in the passage: 'O monks cittas are intrinsically pure (*paphassara*), but they become defiled by upakilesa that come in.' Also, *kusala citta* are *pandara* because the come from the pure citta like Gangi river flows from Gangi river--meaning good water flows from good source. Here I think it is refering to pure bhavanga citta mention earlier in the same paragraph. Interpretation? : here pandara refers to only bhavanga and kusala cittas since no akusala and vipaka cittas are explicitly mentioned. Pandara refers loosely to only kusala citta but in the same way it refers to a kusala citta in # 1. 3. From Commentary manorathapura.nii angguttaranikaya ekanipatava.n.nanaa (book of one), it says: (The pali also provided by Suan.) navame paphassaranti pandara parisutdhi = paphassara means white meaning pure. cittanti bhavangacitta.m = citta here refers to only bhavanga citta Here it says that paphassara.m refers to only bhavanga. 4. Finally and most importanly, from uppakilesa sutta, anguttaranikaya pa~ncakanipatava.n.nanaa (book of five), the sutta talks about how *NOT* paphassara.m is like and why. I am sure Suan can provide pali for this. It says in summary, cittas become impure because of uppakilesa like gold is impured by other metals. This makes gold become unusable. To be useable all impurity must be removed. What are impurities of the cittas? kamachanta, phayapata, thiinamitdha, utdhaccakukkucca and vicikiccha. na ca paphassara.m = not 'luminous' papha.mgu ca = decaying cittassa = kusala citta in the 4 realms. Here it simply says that cittassa (cittas, purified from uppakilesa) are kusala cittas in four realms. What are the four? You all know that. What is the definite conclusion, then? We try very hard to interprete all the passages in this 84000 verses so that they are ALL in 100 % agreement. A. Sujin always says that it is almost impossible to do unless the reader understands what's the purpose of the passage and to whom it was intended, and it is impossible to know all that. Therefore, she said never take one passage (or part of it) and interprete it litterally and hold on to that interpetation. More importantly, she said one should know one's own limit of understanding. Here we are talking about bhavanga cittas which I doubt that will arise to be an object of satipatthana for one of us. Although citta is one of dhukkhas to be studied and known in the Four Noble Truths, there are other dhammas to be directly experience before bhavanga citta. Study concepts of dhamma is fun, challenging, and fulfilling, but don't forget that we are studying concepts of dhammas (this is probably different from what you have raised, Victor) so that we can experience them directly. As A. Sujin always says, study what you can understand [its characteristics]. This does not mean one should be selective of what to study, but it reminds all of us to look back and ask ourselves "can I understand this? Do I really, truely understand this? Does it help me study realities appearing right now? Do the realities appearing right now agree with what I just learned?". And when one succeeds in answering these questions honestly (being a phu-trong), one will gain real benefit from studying dhamma. She often ends the conversation regarding this topic by saying 'and one should be a phu-trong when it comes to the purpose of studying dhamma'. My point is...study what you can understand. The more you learn, the more confused and worried you are, then you are probably doing something wrong (hopefully not from the begining!). This mail is getting too long. Let's stop here. May wisdom grow upon you all. Jaran 10646 From: robertkirkpatrick.rm Date: Mon Jan 7, 2002 4:38pm Subject: Re: Children and Parents Dear Yulia, Truly each person has their own, individual kamma. Why were our children born to us, in this country etc? It was kamma that conditioned the birth. If they had not being born to us they would have been born elsewhere in a suitable plane to receive the results of the kamma they have done, good and bad When we help our children this can be giving - if it is not done purely with attachment - and we make new kamma, our own, that will bring its good results in time (to us, not our children). If you give a lot to your children this can certainly be good kamma - and by learning more about Dhamma it will be even easier to make sacrifices because you know that life is short and that it is wise to give up what you have and instead accumulate merit and understanding. The children will thus benefit from your developing confidence, but it is limited too by their kamma. Maybe you want to give more but reach the limit of your abilities whereas if they were had the kamma to be born in a deva world, for example, they can experience much greater pleasures. Then there are so many ways to help. Even smiling on them while they play means they receive pleasnnt object through the eyedoor for those moments... I think its very helpful to consider the kamma we are making now with our children. If we see the dangers of attachment then we are prepared when things go wrong and can help with less expectations. In the Buddha's time there were children who were born to ood and bad parents, just like now. One boy was born to a prostitute and since she had no use for a son he was discarded at a cemetary. He was found and eventually became adopted by a prince and later became enlightened. (I may have mixed some details here as there are several children like this with slightly different lives). Why such changes? Because of different kammas. best wishes robert In dhammastudygroup@y..., "Yulia Klimov" wrote: > Hello, Everyone > > I would like to know your opinion about one question I have. > > Life of our children depends on us. Does it mean, that we build their > Karma? Are we responsible for their Karma? I have an example from my own > life. I have divorced my husband, life with whom was hard for me. My son, > who loves his father very much, suffers because of this. This brings my > question, should I sacrifice my life to make my kid happier? Was my Karma > escaping stupid life with my husband bringing suffering to my kid? Also, can > parents somehow ease children's Karma? I mean, myself for example, after my > practicing, I brought much mindfulness into my life (and to my children's > life), it seems that they become different too. Or giving parents are the > Karma of kids? And giving children are the Karma of parents? > > Thank you, > Yulia 10647 From: robertkirkpatrick.rm Date: Mon Jan 7, 2002 9:54pm Subject: Re: What I learn in BKK about three rounds.... --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Jaran Jai-nhuknan wrote: > Hi All: > > Happy new year to all of you. For those I don't know my name is Jaran a > real beginner. I have just spent my best new year holidays when I went > back to Bangkok and listened to dhamma from many people in this group. > > > Good day from Singapore, > jaran +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ Dear Jaran, Very nice posts. Any chance of coming back to bangkok this weekend? I arrive on friday night and leave monday night. robert 10648 From: Sarah Date: Mon Jan 7, 2002 10:02pm Subject: Re: [dsg] one limb of 8 fold path more important (was satipathana and practice) Hi Erik, Many thanks for your posts and careful attention;-) As I have limited time (and very limited wisdom;-), I hope you won’t mind if I quote from other posts as I address the first discussion on paramattha dhammas (absolute realities) in the Satipatthana Sutta: --- rikpa21 wrote: >> S: > > When I read any of the suttas, including > > the Satipatthana Sutta, I understand the Buddha to be talking about > > paramattha truths, whatever the terms and language used to express > these. > E: > That is an interpretation I find difficult to reconcile with > a very careful reading of the Satipatthana Sutta, unless > considering only the paramattha dhamma of cetasika. I think > it would be very helpful to provide specific instances of the > objects of investigation you believe to refer to "paramattha > dhammas" (in terms of "visible object," "hardness", etc.) arising > through the five sense-bases, among the objects listed in the > Satipatthana Sutta, and why you interpret them to refer to > "paramattha dhammas." Let’s see how far we can agree here: ***** 1. Concepts are used for convenience in the Suttas: “The majority of Sutta texts, however, use the conventional language, as appropriate in a practical or ethical context, because it "would not be right to say that 'the groups' (khandha) feel shame, etc." “ (Nyantiloka dict) ***** 2. Only with an understanding of paramattha dhammas (ultimate realities) can the distinction between these and conventional realities be known: “The two truths - ultimate and conventional - appear in that form only in the commentaries, but are implied in a sutta-distinction of 'explicit (or direct) meaning' (nítattha, q.v.) and 'implicit meaning (to be inferred)' (neyyattha). Further, the Buddha repeatedly mentioned his reservations when using conventional speech, e.g. in D. 9: "These are merely names, expressions, turns of speech, designations in common use in the world, which the Perfect Qne (Tathágata) uses without misapprehending them." See also S. I. 25.” (Nyantiloka dict.) ***** 3. This is no simple matter: “Ultimate realities are so subtle and profound that an ordinary person cannot see them. His mind is obscured by concepts. Only by means of wise attention to things (yoniso manasikara) can one see beyond the concepts.” (Abhidamattha Sangaha) From Rob K’s post 7436: Rob K: “In the 'Discourse to Vacchagotta on Fire' (Aggi- Vacchagotta-sutta, Majjhima Nikaya II, Paribbajaka-vagga)the Buddha said to Vacchagotta: "".. this dhamma is deep, difficult to see, difficult to understand, peaceful, excellent, beyond dialectic, subtle, intelligible to the wise;.."" The Atthasalini refers to (translated as the Expositor p31)those monks who know sutta but don't know Abhidhamma "the bhikkhu who is ill-trained in the Suttas gets a wrong idea, ..consequently he arrives at wrong view" It notes that this is because the suttas use conventional language. If one doesn't have clear understanding of the difference between conventional truth and paramattha dhammas this is bound to happen.” ***** 4..Not only are we shown specifically in the Abhidhamma what paramattha dhammas are that should be known, but also repeatedly in the Suttas: '"One speaks of 'the world,' Lord. In how far is there are world or the designation 'world'?" "When there is the eye and visible forms, visual consciousness and things cognizable by visual consciousness; when there is the ear and sounds...; nose and smells...; tongue and flavours...; body and tangibles...; mind and ideas, mind- consciousness and things cognizable by mind-consciousness--then there is a world and the designation 'world'."'[SN 35:68] '"'All' will I show you, O monks. And what is 'all'? The eye and visible forms, ear and sounds, nose and smells, tongue and flavors, mind and ideas--this, O monks, is what is called 'all'."' [SN35:22]" ***** 5. These realities can only be known through the development of wisdom and Satipatthana The Satipatthana Sutta should be understood with all these points in mind: Extract from Jon’s post 10011: Jon: “The objects of awareness under the Satipatthana Sutta are dhammas (realities), not concepts. The consciousness/mind section refers to the dhamma that is the moment of consciousness. The mind objects/mental objects section refers to the dhammas (realities) that can be the object of a moment of consciousness, and this in turn means any and all realities (including those covered by the other 3 sections of the sutta). To give an example. At a moment of seeing there is contact between the consciousness that sees and visible object. That visible object is a reality and also, at that precise moment, a mind object (it is the object of seeing consciousness). So the visible object at that moment falls under both the ‘rupas’ section and the ‘mind object’ section of the 4 satipatthanas. This helps remind us that the 4 sections in the sutta are merely ways of classifying realities and are not in themselves absolutes. Only dhammas (realties) can be the object of satipatthana, because only something that has its own characteristic that is capable of being experienced is considered to be a ‘dhamma’; anything that does not, is not. In the Satipatthana Sutta itself, the 'eligible' mind-objects are described in different ways. One of these ways is as the 5 khandhas (Aggregates), and these 5 khandhas encompass all dhammas (other than Nibbana). “ ***** 6. The section on kaayaanupassanaa (mindfulness of body) only refers to rupas as objects of sati. May I just stress that walking, eating, defacating, sleeping are merely concepts which do not refer to realities which can be known. While, walking, eating and so on, there are, however, realities to be known: Extract from Rob K’s post 7436: Rob K: “Now about the meaning of 'Body' in the satipatthana sutta quoted above and what awareness of the 'body' means. Here is a section from the attahakatha to the satipatthana sutta . """"The Buddha, after dealing in the aforesaid manner with body- contemplation in the form of respiration-meditation, in detail, said: "And further," in order to deal exhaustively with body- contemplation, here, according to the meditation on the modes of deportment [iriyapatha]. Gacchanto va gacchamiti pajanati = "When he is going (a bhikkhu) understands: 'I am going.'" In this matter of going, readily do dogs, jackals and the like, know when they move on that they are moving. But this instruction on the modes of deportment was not given concerning similar awareness, because awareness of that sort belonging to animals does not shed the belief in a living being, does not knock out the percept of a soul, and neither becomes a subject of meditation nor the development of the Arousing of Mindfulness. Going. The term is applicable both to the awareness of the fact of moving on and to the knowledge of the (true) characteristic qualities of moving on. The terms sitting, standing and lying down, too, are applicable in the general sense of awareness and in the particular sense of knowledge of the (true) characteristic qualities. Here (in this discourse) the particular and not the general sense of awareness is to be taken. "" " ***** 7. The reason that we read about the different postures and activities is to emphasise how it is not a matter of a special time and place, but that in fact satipatthana can develop at any time and in any position if there is the correct intellectual understanding first: Extract from Jon’s post 7429: Jon: “In fact, although the section on contemplation on the body in the sutta talks in term of different bodily postures, activities, cemetery contemplations etc (ie. in terms of conventional situations), the underlying meaning according to the commentary is all rupa-dhammas, the dhammas that comprise the first khandha. Indeed, the 4 Foundations between them refer to all the 5 khandhas (ie all paramattha dhammas that are subject to clinging). The commentary says on this (p. 119) -- "In the contemplation on the body, the laying hold of the aggregate of corporeality or materiality was spoken of by the Master; in the contemplation on feeling, the laying hold of the aggregate of feeling; in the contemplation on mind, the laying hold of the aggregate of consciousness; and now [ie. in the contemplation on mental objects] … the laying hold of the aggregates of perception and formations, …". The rupa-kkhandha includes of course not only the rupas that we take for our own body, but all rupas that are experienced through the various doorways. Most importantly, it refers to realities that are arising at the present moment, not at any other time. It is not necessary to 'choose' one or other of the 4 Foundations as the focus for contemplation. If there is awareness of any reality appearing at the present moment, that awareness is a moment of the development of (one or other of) the 4 Foundations of Mindfulness as taught in the Satipatthana Sutta. I hope this has given some idea of how careful we should be in taking parts of suttas at their face value, without reference to the whole sutta and its commentaries.” ***** 8. Finally, a summary of satipatthana and its prerequisites for development: Extract from Jon’s post 5718 Jon: "Satipatthana is the development of awareness/mindfulness of a reality appearing at the present moment. The prerequisites for the arising of awareness are: - having met the dhamma, listened to it and considered it at length - having understood correctly what awareness is, its function and characteristic and what can be the object of awareness - applying what one has heard and correctly understood. The main obstacle to the arising of awareness is not recognising one’s wrong view about its development." ***************** Erik, I think your other points will have to wait for a rainy day and I may add that here in Hong Kong, we’re having beautiful cool, sunny, crisp days;-)) Thanks again for all your other careful considerations and comments. I've found it helpful to spend another lunch-hour talking to you and hope you find some comments or quotes of value. Sarah ====================================================== 10649 From: Sarah Date: Mon Jan 7, 2002 11:54pm Subject: Re: [dsg] On Lobha/Dosa and Vedana Dear Manji, --- manji wrote: > Originally I had asked Sarah if there could be the arising of domanassa > (unpleasant feeling) without dosa (aversion). > > Sarah asked to open this into the group... I post the following for > debate... Thanks, Manji. Good to hear from you. I've been receiving quite a few questions, comments and articles off-list and I would just like to encourage everyone to send them here unless there is anything especially personal or confidential;-) > Lobha-mula-citta can only be accompanied by somanassa or uppekha. > There may be somanassa or uppekha without lobha-mula-citta. > > Dosa-mula-citta can only be accompanied by domanassa. OK so far;-) > There may be domanassa without dosa-mula-citta. Whenever there is domanassa (unhappy feeling) there is bound to be dosa (aversion). They always arise together and are hard to distinguish. > If it is true that domanassa is always accompanied by dosa-mula-citta, > then the there is no cessation of suffering, there is no path, there is > no buddha, and there is no sangha. I'd put it the other way round and say that dosa-mula-citta (i.e. consciousness rooted in aversion) is always accompanied by domanassa (unhappy feeling). To be more specific, there are two kinds of dosa-mula-cittas. Both kinds are accompanied by domanassa and arise with patigha (anger). One kind is prompted and the other kind is unprompted. I don't see how the rest of your sentence follows. > If it is true that domanassa is never accompanied by dosa-mula-citta, > then there is no suffering, there is no cause of suffering, there is no > cessation of suffering, there is no path, there is no buddha, and there > is no sangha. > > If it is true that domanassa may be unaccompanied by dosa-mula-citta, > then this accounts for the suffering, the cause of suffering, the > cessation of suffering, the path, the buddha, and the sangha. So dosa and domanassa arise together. There are different meanings of suffering. In the 4NT it refers to the impermanent nature of all realities which are ultimately unsatisfactory. I think you need to explain more as I may be missing your point. =============== Just to summarise the five kinds of feeling; a) pleasant bodily feeling (sukha) b) painful bodily feeling (dukkha) c) happy feeling (somanassa) d) unhappy feeling (domanassa) e) indifferent feeling (upekkha) When there is kaya-vinnana (body-consciousness), this is kusala or akusala vipaka (wholesome or unwholesome result of kamma) and it is accompanied by either sukha or dukkha respectively. There is no lobha or dosa at these moments of pleasant or painful bodily feeling. The kaya-vinnana is very short - just a moment of vipaka only. This citta may, however, be followed by kusala or akusala cittas (wholesome or unwholesome consciousness) and these will be accompanied by somanassa, domanassa or upekkha. More details can be found in 'Abhidhamma in Daily Life' and in 'Cetasikas', both by Nina and to be found on these websites: http://www.abhidhamma.org/ http://www.dhammastudy.com/ When I read the messages about the weather I was reminded of a quote from the Atthasalini which Nina uses in 'Cetasikas'. She's writing about how dosa (and therefore domanassa too) arises 'on account of any object experienced through one of the six doors.' she continues: 'One may even be cross with the rain, the sun or the wind. We read in the Atthasalini (11, Book 11, Part 11, summary, Ch 11, 367): ..."Or when vexation (springs up) groundlessly" means anger without reason; for example, someone gets angry saying "it rains too much", "it does not rain", "the sun shines too much", "it does not shine"; gets angry when the wind blows, when it does not blow, gets angry at being unable to sweep away the Bodhi leaves, at being unable to put on his robe; he gets angry with the wind, in slipping he gets angry with a tree-stump..." ***** This may ring a few bells;-) Best regards, Sarah =============================================== 10650 From: christine_forsyth Date: Tue Jan 8, 2002 2:28am Subject: Re: Elementary questions Thanks for your reply Robert. Just a question about 'characteristics'. You mention that characteristic of cetana is hard to know, and that there can be direct knowledge of the characteristic of wrong view (ditthi) or of lobha. Are these 'characteristics' listed, taught or discussed anywhere that I can learn more about them? And I think I need to read a little about 'merit done in their name' - it is an idea that is unfamiliar and strange to me. Both Num and you mentioned Wrong View, so I had another look at the Sammaditthi Sutta, Majjhima Nikaya http://www.sacred-texts.com/bud/maj/mn9.htm 'The Discourse on Right View' - it seems more complex than my first reading, packed with several layers of meaning...... I have heard about 'mundane' and 'supramundane' right view. This Sutta doesn't seem to mention them directly (?), though the repetition of the term 'Noble disciple" seems to imply someone with more understanding than the average, ordinary person. A few questions on verses 3 - 7 The Wholesome and the Unwholesome Killing living beings is unwholesome - what would be the difference between say, regularly buying meat at the shop where the animal/fish/fowl was not specifically killed for you, and using a surface spray that may kill cockroaches who wander by days/weeks later. Are the cockroaches deaths 'killing' or 'death by misadventure'? Misconduct in sensual pleasures is unwholesome - The morals and mores of societies and cultures differ and also change with the passing of time. 'Misconduct' appears a very broad and vague term...not like, for instance, the explicit prohibition 'Thou shalt not commit adultery' of the Christian ten commandments. How are we to conduct our lives without more clarity and guidance on what are wholesome/unwholesome actions in this regard? Wouldn't the same 'rules' have to apply through the ages for Kamma to be 'fair'. Taking what is not given is unwholesome. How far does 'taking what is not given' extend? I read somewhere recently that 'taking what is not given' could be extended to mean even things like - unless the hen brought an egg to you and bowed and presented you with it, then you were 'taking what was not given' if you kept hens for the purpose of obtaining eggs. I expect this could also be extended to milk and honey and all animal life..... I realise that the form the Sutta takes is due to its being passed down in an oral tradition. Still, somehow, a feeling of comfortable and caring friendship seems to pervade this Sutta. As a child, I had an uncle who would tell my cousins and I stories - we would be hanging off every word and he would stop at critical points in the narration - we'd all say '...and what happened then Uncle....did you ever find the way out?' etc. Uncle would way 'Well, I might have....' and take a sip of tea or a puff of his pipe before going on with the story. Sariputta's teaching style reminds me of my Uncle - keeping them interested and wanting to hear more - not continuing until asked. They ask: "But friend, might there be another way in which a noble disciple is one of right view, whose view is straight who has perfect confidence in the Dhamma, and has arrived at this true Dhamma." And Sariputta replies: "There might be" At the end it says "That is what the Venerable Sariputta said. The bhikkhus were satisfied and delighted in the Venerable Saritputta's words." ....... And so was I. metta, Christine --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "robertkirkpatrick.rm" wrote: > > > > 3. The ten immoral or unskillful actions - those listed as 8 > > (covetousness), 9 (ill will), and 10 (wrong view) dont't seem > > like 'actions' to me. 'Intention' seems to be involved in things > > like killing, stealing, sexual misconduct, lying etc. (although I > > suppose some may be attributed to 'impulse'?). Covetousness and > ill > > will, seem much less the result of 'deliberate intention' , they > seem > > to 'just happen'.... And would anyone 'intend/plan/deliberately > > want', to have wrong view? > +++++++++ > Cetana (translated as intention) comes in different intensities and > its characteristic is hard to know. What we take to be intention is > usually a mix of thinking, chanda, cetana, vitakka, > vicara,manisikara, ekagatta etc. When there is wrong view there is > always lobha(attachment) as well that makes one think they see > things correctly. You can recognise how much cetana is there when it > is very obvious. Take, for instance, the case of a visiting jehovah > witness: they will talk and talk with great enthusiasm and > confidence = it is wrongview and cetana is assisting to display it > to the world. Even when wrongview is not shown to others cetana is > there underlying the thinking and encouraging and supporting the > associated factors. > Useful to repeatedly investigate this as then it can be known, > little by little, even when there is thinking with wrong view, that > it is just various conditioned factors. This can be direct knowledge > of the characteristic of wrong view (ditthi) or of lobha or other > factors. This is breaking down the 'whole', It is an aspect of > seeing anatta > ++++++++++++++ > > > > 4.The realm of unhappy ghosts.....part of the description includes > > the words "and dependent upon those humans who remember them for > food > > and drink". This is confusing.....how are they to eat any food > left > > out, what happens if no food is left out. Certainly none of my > > deceased relatives/friends have had this hospitality extended to > > them, and neither have the hundreds of millions who have died in > > Christian countries over the centuries. > ++++++ > This is dependent on them forming kusala cittas based on hearing > merit done in their name. > best wishes > robert > > 10651 From: christine_forsyth Date: Tue Jan 8, 2002 2:31am Subject: Re: [dsg] Elementary questions Dear Num, Thanks for the ideas about the books. I'll look into them. Only one of the Universities in South East Queensland offers any Buddhism subjects at all - and that consists of Introductory and Advanced Pali, Introductory and Advanced Sanscrit, A General Buddhism subject, and a Meditation subject. So I'm not hopeful, but I'll try Government Libraries as well. The main problem is my lack of patience..... I have no idea why after ordering books delivery takes so long..... Yes, I do take notice of what you emphasise - that wrong view is severe and pervasive. The posts from RobertK and yourself led me to search for more information on miccha ditthi in the Sammaditthi Sutta (as mentioned in my post to Robert), and I came across an extract from Ch. 16 of Cetasikas http://www.zolag.co.uk/wroa.html "What is Wrong View (Ditthi)" which states that wrong view should be regarded as the 'highest fault', and that it is dangerous because it can lead to many kinds of evil. Thanks for more information about garukamma - I saw your first post mentioning it, I am VERY slow with Pali, but I struggle through. I have ordered a pali/english dictionary from Amazon......I know there are several easily accessible on the Net, but often I need one when I am not at my computer. I guess Pali is an acquired taste - but Buddhists are not going to stop using it just because I find it daunting. :-) Thanks for your help, metta, Christine --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., srnsk@a... wrote: > <<<<<<<< > Dear Chirstine, > > Hope you do not mind me putting two mails together in one post. > > About where to get dhamma books. I usually check them out from my university > library. If you can get to any library websites, at my univ. they also link > out to many libraries. Search functions on some website is very good, you can > go by keyword of the name or author name. I do not know you can do this or > not. This way you can the book pretty quick. They also can do inter-library > loan for me as well. I usually try to read some part of it first before I > decide which one I'd like to buy it into my collection. > > Another website in the US that have good dhamma books is > http://www.pariyatti.com/ > If I remember it right, it's located somewhere on the west coast, I think > Seattle. Both English and Roman Pali version are available. Sarah gave me a > site in the UK but I do not have it on hand. > > Let me emphasis just on how severe and pervasive of the wrong view, miccha > ditthi. As Nina mentioned that everyone still can have potential to be > subjected to wrong view except an ariya person, start with the stream enter, > sotapana. Wrong view is a conditional dhamma, arises, sustains and ceases by > conditions. > > I mentioned about garukamma in another post. Let me put some more detail > about garukamma here, by Ven Narada Thera. > > ___________________________ > > 34. Garuka - which means either weighty or serious, may be either good or > bad. It produces its results in this life, or in the next for certain. If > good, it is purely mental as in the case of the jhánas. Otherwise it is > verbal or bodily. The five kinds of immoral Weighty Kamma according to their > gravity are: - (i) the creation of a schism in the Sangha, (ii) the wounding > of a Buddha, (iii) the murder of an Arahat, (iv) matricide, and (v) > parricide. > These are also known as Ánantariya Kamma because they definitely produce > their effects in the subsequent life. Permanent Skepticism (niyata > miccháditthi) is also termed one of the Weighty Kammas. > If, for instance, any person were to develop the jhánas and later were to > commit one of these heinous crimes, his good Kamma would be obliterated by > the powerful evil Kamma. His subsequent birth would be conditioned by the > evil Kamma in spite of his having gained the jhánas earlier. Devadatta lost > his psychic powers and was born in an evil state, because he wounded the > Buddha and caused a schism in the Sangha. > King Ajátasattu would have attained the first stage of sainthood if he had > not committed parricide. In this case the powerful evil Kamma acted as an > obstacle to his gaining sainthood. > ------------------------------------------------ > > Garukakamma can be akusala or kusala. > > 1. Niyata michadithi means view that definitely gives result, predictably > and certainly. As Robert mentioned this refers to wrong view, which always > co-occurs with lobha. This view includes: 1.1 natthikaditthi, believing that > there is no result., 1.2 ahetuka ditthi, believing that there is no cause. > 1.3 akiriya ditthi do not believe in both cause and result. (In brief, > lobhamulacitta ditthikatasampayutta 4 citta). > 2. Anatariyakamma. Which is part of dosamulacitta 2 citta, citta that root > in aversion as mentioned above. > 3. Jhanacitta 9 citta. As mention about jhana above. > > Lokuttara kusala not included here b/c they lead to cessation of birth and > dukkha (by seeing the ultimate truth, 4 ariyasacca. > > Anantariyakamma, even though it is very severe but it will come to the end > one day. Contrast to wrong view because it is so subtle and pervasive, it can > tie, divert and allure us indefinitely away from sammamagga and nibbhana. > > Again this what I got from what I have read. If you let me ask you for one > thing : Do not take it without careful and wise consideration > (yonisomanasikara). > > Best wishes, > > Num 10652 From: Ong Teng Kee Date: Tue Jan 8, 2002 3:17am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Visuddhimagga page 514 Suan , Again you show your poor knowledge about pali.The original tika on angutara by dhammapala have one copy only in burmese script in first 3 nipata only.It is not edited into book but in leaves.The india chattasanagayana cdrom do not have variant readings in the original book for com and subcom.Myanmar have their own cdrom with all variant readings on it.The books is still a must.See PTS anguttara tika which have more readings than the myanmar one.You do not dare to mention your wrong view about bhavanga.It this your pride problem??? Teng Kee >From: "abhidhammika" >Reply-To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com >To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com >Subject: [dsg] Re: Visuddhimagga page 514 >Date: Mon, 07 Jan 2002 15:46:55 -0000 > > > >Dear U Ong Teng Kee > >How are you? > >You wrote: > >"I do not care you still hold the wrong view. If you want to tran >tika on anguttara nikaya ,you must go home (yangon)to get original >tika by dhammapala in leaf(not sariputta).But anyway i think you will >further mislead people for that translation." > >I am afraid you seemed to be worried too much by my posts and >translations. > >If translating Buddhaghosa's own statements amounted to holding the >wrong view, so be it. > >For your information and dhamma friends on this list, I have already >translated Anguttara Tiikaa on Statement 49 on 27 December 2001. Now >I nearly finished writing sub-subcommentary (Anutiikaa) on that >Tiikaa. I will be able to post Tiikaa translation and my new >Anutiikaa very soon. > >As I have Chatthasangayana Pali CD-ROM, I do not have to get another >Tika original copy from Myanmar. I believe that the writers of >Chatthasangayana Pali CD-ROM include many Myanmar Sayadaws. > >I try my best to learn from the Buddha, the commentators and the >subcommentators, and share what I learnt with dhamma friends. And >dhamma friends who read my works are mature thinkers and >practitioners of dhamma themselves. And I do not think I can mislead >them. And there is no good reason for me to mislead them, either. > >While I have sympthy for your desire to give the readers the right >view and prevent them from getting the wrong views from my posts, the >show must go on. Nothing can silence my voice now. > > >With best wishes, > >Suan > >http://www.bodhiology.org > 10653 From: Sarah Date: Tue Jan 8, 2002 3:29am Subject: Re: [dsg] Elementary questions Dear Christine, --- christine_forsyth wrote: > Dear Num, > > Thanks for the ideas about the books. I'll look into them. If you decide to buy any of the books, you may try the following which we use: Pali Text Society (PTS) texts direct from PTS.....catalogue on webpage. If you become a member, you get a discount and free book. Buddhist Publication Society (BPS) direct (can be v.slow or out of print) or some of the texts are available from: Amazon Books.....very fast and efficient (different categories of posting for the patient and impatient) Wisdom Books...similar, but I think we've only used Amazon All the urls can be found in the bookmarks on the dsg homepage: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/links Sorry to be a little vague. If you're putting in an order at Wisdom Books (maybe Amazon too?), I highly recommend Nina VG's 'Buddhism in Daily Life'. (We were looking for a copy at the Foundation for you but they were out of stock there). Hope you liked the Atth quote in my post to Manji.....we can see how universal and timeless the Teachings are.....when I talked to my mother on the phone at the weekend, almost half the conversation was about the weather.....but then we are English;-) Good to see all your interesting questions to Rob K Sarah =================================================== 10654 From: Ong Teng Kee Date: Tue Jan 8, 2002 3:29am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: luminous mind: To Kenneth Ong Dear Ken, It is up to you to follow suan 's view that we are having changing bhavanga or follow the tradisional text book by buddhaghosa.Use you wisdom to think. >From: "abhidhammika" >Reply-To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com >To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com >Subject: [dsg] Re: luminous mind: To Kenneth Ong >Date: Mon, 07 Jan 2002 15:09:14 -0000 > > > >Dear Ken > >How are you? > >You asked: > >"Since bhavanga cittas changes, then why do the objects >do not change. Any reason for that?" > >I am afraid the objects might also change. > >The objects are simply those associated with what we do. If what we >do caused the resultant mental aggregates to change as Buddhaghosa >stated, those new mental aggregates would have at least what we did >as their new objects. > >Please keep in mind firmly that bhavanga cittas are only the products >of our actions, and impermanent and conditioned. > >Nothing mysterious involved here. > >With best wishes, > >Suan > >http://www.bodhiology.org > > > > >--- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Kenneth Ong wrote: > > Hi Suan > > > > > Dear Ken > > > > > > How are you? > > > > k: Well and happy :) Since u have asked me a few times, I think >its > > impolite not to reply you. Cheers :). > > > > > > > You wrote and asked: > > > > > > "k: I thought in this list, the assumption was that bhavanga >cittas > > > could not be change throughout ones life. Do you have commentary > > > texts to substantiate your point." > > > > > > Yes, I have already provided the commentary Pali reference and > > > translation in my post 10521. > > > > > > In fact, you asked me questions by reading what I wrote and what >I > > > quote in that post. Perhaps, you had been incoherent and forgot > > > things too soon. > > > > k: Oh, my friend always say I am like an old man, very >forgetfull. I got > > another question. Since bhavanga cittas changes, then why do the >objects > > do not change. Any reason for that? > > > > > > > So, please kindly read the post 10521 again to read the >commentary > > > Pali and its translation which had been provided for the sole >purpose > > > of substantiating my very point. > > > > k: The way you talk reminds of Wee in DL list ;-) > > > > > > > > > > Cheers and best regards > > Ken O 10655 From: Kom Tukovinit Date: Tue Jan 8, 2002 4:31am Subject: RE: [dsg] Re: luminous mind: To Nina And Kom On Kamma Modifying Bhavanga Cittam Dear Suan, Nina, Ken O, Sarah, and Num, I believe this passage can also be read from B. Nanamoli's Path to Purification, under Purification by Overcoming Doubt, XIX, 18, page 621, passage 16. I will quote the entire passage below: [16] Another fourfold classification of kamma is this: productive, consolidating, frustrating, and supplanting. Herein, (ix) what is called productive is both profitable and unprofitable. It produces the material and immaterial aggregates both at rebirth linking and during the course of an existence. (x) Consolidating kamma cannot produce result, but when result has already been produced in the provision of rebirth-linking by other kamma, it consolidates the pleasure or pain that arises and makes it last. (xi) and when result has already been produced in the provision of rebirth-linking by other kamma, frustrating kamma frustrates and obstructs the pleasure or pain that arises and does not allow it to last. (xii) Supplanting kamma is itself both profitable and unprofitable; and it supplants other, weaker kamma, prevents it resulting and usurps that kamma's opportunity in order to cause it own result. But when the opportunity has thus been furnished by the [other] kamma, it is that [supplanting kamma's] result that is called arisen. There are two notes associated with this section that might be of interests: [4] '"Productive" kamma is what produces resultant continuity by providing rebirth-linking and so on. "Consolidating" kamma prolongs the occurence of the continuity of pleasure or pain, or the endurance of materiality. "Frustrating" kamma slowly diminishes the endurance of pleasure or pain when they occur. It cuts off the result of other kamma without giving any result of its own. "Supplanting" kamma, however, cuts off weak kamma and makes its own result arise. This is their difference' (Pm. 771). [5] See the various meanings of 'arising' given in Ch. XXII, 81f 'Another method is this: when some kamma has been done and there is, either in rebirth-linking or in the course of existence, the arising of material instances due to the result of kamma performed, that kamma is "productive". When some kamma has been performed and the desirable or undesirable fruit generated by other kamma has its production facilitated and its endurance aided and lengthened by the suppression of conditions that would interfere with it and by the arousing of conditions that would strengthen it, that kamma is "supporting". Whe some kamma has been performed and profitable fruit or unprofitable fruit generated by productive kamma is obstructed by it respectively in the form of sickeness or of disquieting of elements, that is "frustrating" kamma. But when some kamma has been done by which the fruit of other kamma is ruined and cut off by being supplanted by what cuts it off although it was fit for longer endurance because of the efficacy of the kamma tha was producing it, that kamma is "supplanting"' (Pm. 772) kom > -----Original Message----- > From: abhidhammika [mailto:abhidhammika@y...] > Sent: Thursday, January 03, 2002 3:24 AM > 687. .....Tattha janakam naama kusalampi hoti > akusalampi. Tam > patisandhiyampi pavattepi > ruupaaruuupavipaakakkhandhe janeti. > > "...There, janakam is either healthy or unhealthy > action. It (janaka > kamma) can cause resultant physical and mental > aggegates to arise > either at the moment of linking consciousness > (conception) or during > the current lifetime." 10656 From: Kom Tukovinit Date: Tue Jan 8, 2002 4:42am Subject: RE: [dsg] Memory, Objects, and Continuity Dear Jonothan, > -----Original Message----- > From: Jonothan Abbott [mailto:jonoabb@y...] > > > I have been reading lakkhanaticcatuka, (four characters: > > {characteristics > > (lakkhanam: specific or generic attribute) function (rasa: function or > > achievement), manifestation (paccupat-thana: manifestation, appearance > > or > > effect) and proximate cause (padatthanam) }), from various sources, > > English, > > Pali and couple of different translations of these 4 characteristics in > > Thai, > > from Milindapanha, a little bit from my tipitaka online search. And I > > have to > > admit that I also reflect about it from my background, my training and > > practice at work. > > I was interested to read Mike's post on this subject (thanks, Mike), which > quotes the following passage from 'Survey' > > > 3. Remembrance or perception, sa~n~naa cetasika, > > "marks" the object so that it can be recognized. > > Sa~n~naa cetasika remembers each object which appears; > > it remembers the different objects appearing one after > > the other as a "whole", as a story, a concept of > > beings and people. Sa~n~naa remembers pleasant > > feeling, unpleasant feeling, bodily pleasant and > > painful feeling and indifferent feeling with regard to > > each object which appears. Sa~n~naa cetasika is an > > important condition inciting to attachment and > > clinging in life. > > > > from > > Survey of Paramattha Dhammas > > Sujin Boriharnwanaket > > Translated by Nina van Gorkom > > It seems to me, on the basis of the textual references, that the function > of sanna is to mark the object of the citta at, say, the moment of > experiencing an object through one of the sense doors and then in > subsequent mind moments to play a part in enabling us to relate that > object to objects previously experienced. > > Any thoughts/comments on this hypothesis? > > Jon This hypothesis sounds pretty good to me. We have been discussing the function of sanna at length and I think we agree that sanna marks the object. However, there doesn't seem to be an agreement of how sanna plays a part in recollecting the object, except that we think it must play a part somehow. (Besides, the recollection indicates that there was a remembrance). I think the reason why it is so hard to think about how sanna recollects the object is that, it is equally valid to say that, we don't remember something because the vitakka is not fixed on the object that we want to remember, even though there must be sanna arising at all time. In general, sometimes it is hard to pin down the specific functions of the different realities in a particular situation. For example, when we say there is khanti now, is it a function of adosa only? Since khanti means "endurance" to both something pleasant and unpleasant, then it must mean at least both adosa and alobha. Nama must work in concerts to achieve a particular function, and to say exactly how they interact with one another in the most exact detail may be in the realm of the Buddha and the Great Disciples only. kom 10657 From: manji Date: Tue Jan 8, 2002 6:34am Subject: RE: [dsg] On Lobha/Dosa and Vedana I think the answer is in many sutta... And there was presented from Cetasikas an answer, so I am thinking, yes... With dosa, there is always unpleasant feeling arising, but when there is unpleasant feeling, dosa does not always arise. It is the same as... A square is always a rectangle, but a rectangle is not always a square. Below I am pointing it out... The reason I presented this is because I think it is most important to be knowing dosa and dukkha. Knowing that dukkha does not always imply dosa. > -----Original Message----- > From: Sarah [mailto:sarahdhhk@y...] > Sent: Tuesday, January 08, 2002 2:55 AM > To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com > Subject: Re: [dsg] On Lobha/Dosa and Vedana > > > Dear Manji, > > --- manji wrote: > Originally I had > asked Sarah if there could be the arising of domanassa > > (unpleasant feeling) without dosa (aversion). > > > > Sarah asked to open this into the group... I post the following for > > debate... > > Thanks, Manji. Good to hear from you. I've been receiving > quite a few questions, comments and articles off-list and I > would just like to encourage everyone to send them here > unless there is anything especially personal or confidential;-) > > > Lobha-mula-citta can only be accompanied by somanassa or uppekha. > > There may be somanassa or uppekha without lobha-mula-citta. > > > > Dosa-mula-citta can only be accompanied by domanassa. > > OK so far;-) > > > There may be domanassa without dosa-mula-citta. > > Whenever there is domanassa (unhappy feeling) there is bound > to be dosa (aversion). They always arise together and are > hard to distinguish. You are saying, "bound to be dosa...". So maybe these are not in the same moments, which is talked about below. These moments are very much different. So I am speaking of them stretched out, not so much squishing together eh? I think there can be very strong conditioning factors that allow for dosa, but I am thinking that a very noble and upright "knower of the dhamma" can be seeing this dukkha without dosa. > > > If it is true that domanassa is always accompanied by > dosa-mula-citta, > > then the there is no cessation of suffering, there is no > path, there > > is no buddha, and there is no sangha. > > I'd put it the other way round and say that dosa-mula-citta > (i.e. consciousness rooted in aversion) is always accompanied > by domanassa (unhappy feeling). > > To be more specific, there are two kinds of dosa-mula-cittas. > Both kinds are accompanied by domanassa and arise with > patigha (anger). One kind is prompted and the other kind is > unprompted. > > I don't see how the rest of your sentence follows. > > > If it is true that domanassa is never accompanied by > dosa-mula-citta, > > then there is no suffering, there is no cause of suffering, > there is > > no cessation of suffering, there is no path, there is no > buddha, and > > there is no sangha. > > > > If it is true that domanassa may be unaccompanied by > dosa-mula-citta, > > then this accounts for the suffering, the cause of suffering, the > > cessation of suffering, the path, the buddha, and the sangha. > > So dosa and domanassa arise together. There are different > meanings of suffering. In the 4NT it refers to the > impermanent nature of all realities which are ultimately > unsatisfactory. I think you need to explain more as I may be > missing your point. Remembering the dhamma, one is knowing dukkha only when there is dukkha. If there is this dukkha dhamma... There at that moment there is knowing dukkha. I am thinking that knowing dukkha with Anicca, Anatta, and Sunyata, in this there is no dosa. And eventually no dukkha. > > =============== > > Just to summarise the five kinds of feeling; > > a) pleasant bodily feeling (sukha) > b) painful bodily feeling (dukkha) > c) happy feeling (somanassa) > d) unhappy feeling (domanassa) > e) indifferent feeling (upekkha) > > When there is kaya-vinnana (body-consciousness), this is > kusala or akusala vipaka (wholesome or unwholesome result of > kamma) and it is accompanied by either sukha or dukkha > respectively. There is no lobha or dosa at these moments of > pleasant or painful bodily feeling. The kaya-vinnana is very > short - just a moment of vipaka only. This citta may, > however, be followed by kusala or akusala cittas (wholesome > or unwholesome consciousness) and these will be accompanied > by somanassa, domanassa or upekkha. Right there presents the case, "There is no lobha or dosa at these moments of pleasant or painful bodily feeling". Followed later by... "This citta, may, however, be followed by kusala or akusala cittas... And these will be accompanied by somanassa, domanassa or upekkha." So in the cultivation of wisdom, one is knowing the vedana as they really are... With kusala cittas. Maybe this is leading to somanassa or upekkha... :) But then again, also maybe with akusala cittas, there can be some domanassa. > More details can be found in 'Abhidhamma in Daily Life' and > in 'Cetasikas', both by Nina and to be found on these > websites: http://www.abhidhamma.org/ http://www.dhammastudy.com/ > > When I read the messages about the weather I was reminded of > a quote from the Atthasalini which Nina uses in 'Cetasikas'. > She's writing about how dosa (and therefore domanassa too) > arises 'on account of any object experienced through one of > the six doors.' she continues: > > 'One may even be cross with the rain, the sun or the wind. > We read in the Atthasalini (11, Book 11, Part 11, summary, Ch > 11, 367): > > ..."Or when vexation (springs up) groundlessly" means anger > without reason; for example, someone gets angry saying "it > rains too much", "it does not rain", "the sun shines too > much", "it does not shine"; gets angry when the wind blows, > when it does not blow, gets angry at being unable to sweep > away the Bodhi leaves, at being unable to put on his robe; > he gets angry with the wind, in slipping he gets angry with a > tree-stump..." > ***** Well this is demonstrating dosa, and the mental factors related. Yet someone may come along who is feeling unpleasant with the rain, but there are no mental reactions of this vexation. Maybe an unpleasant feeling, and this unpleasant feeling... Dukkha. So maybe first you see dukkha... Without dosa... Then developing wisdom. Then see dukkha as it really is... Then maybe understanding suffering without dosa... I think this is most amazing. So all these are referring to right now dhammas, not mere conceptual thought. ;) Be well, manji 10658 From: abhidhammika Date: Tue Jan 8, 2002 6:55am Subject: [dsg] Re: Visuddhimagga page 514: To Ong Teng Kee Dear U Ong Teng Kee How are you? Thank you for your information about Anguttara Tiikaa versions. For the time being, I believe I could get by the version in the Chatthasangayana Pali CD-ROM (VRI Edition). You wrote: "You do not dare to mention your wrong view about bhavanga.It this your pride problem???" Not at all, Sir. Far from it. I have no conceit in these dhamma matters. The reason I do not mention my WRONG VIEW about bhavanga is that I do not want to hurt the pride of anybody else. As I mentioned in one of the previous posts, I am a deep reader as well as an academic writer. I have thoroughly studied about bhavanga and written about it comprehensively by having thoroughly done research into Atthasalini, Visuddhimagga, and Visuddhimagga Maha Tiikaa. As I come from the scientific background, I write on the subject of bhavanga like a science writer. So you wont' find the type of treatment on the subject anywhere else in the world. I can be called a scientist doubling as a Pali scholar. By the way, I am still waiting for your response to my translation of Buddhaghosa's statement on "janaka kamma". My offer to analyse it word for word for you still stands. You will also have a chance to read my translation of Anguttara Tiikaa on Ekakanipata statement 49. And my English language "Anutiikaa" on the Pali Tiikaa is also coming soon. You rightly wrote: "Again you show your poor knowledge about pali." I totally agree with you, Sir. I must confess that I haven't done any research into Pali literature. So I do not know whether there is Anguttara Anutiikaa available in Pali. Please kindly let me know if there was such a text. As I do not find Anguttara Anutiikaa Pali on the Chatthasangayana CD- ROM version 3, I have undertaken to write English language Anguttara Anutiikaa for the convenience of the dhamma friends who would read my translation. I have been always looking forward to meeting the Pali scholars who are better than me in all aspects. That way, I could learn from them and improve my understanding far quicker than learning everything from scratch on my own. So, when you found any mistakes in my translations, please do not hesitate to correct them. With best wishes, Suan http://www.bodhiology.org --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "Ong Teng Kee" wrote: > Suan , > > Again you show your poor knowledge about pali.The original tika on angutara > by dhammapala have one copy only in burmese script in first 3 nipata only.It > is not edited into book but in leaves.The india chattasanagayana cdrom do > not have variant readings in the original book for com and subcom.Myanmar > have their own cdrom with all variant readings on it.The books is still a > must.See PTS anguttara tika which have more readings than the myanmar > one.You do not dare to mention your wrong view about bhavanga.It this your > pride problem??? > Teng Kee > > >From: "abhidhammika" > >Reply-To: dhammastudygroup@y... > >To: dhammastudygroup@y... > >Subject: [dsg] Re: Visuddhimagga page 514 > >Date: Mon, 07 Jan 2002 15:46:55 -0000 > > > > > > > >Dear U Ong Teng Kee > > > >How are you? > > > >You wrote: > > > >"I do not care you still hold the wrong view. If you want to tran > >tika on anguttara nikaya ,you must go home (yangon)to get original > >tika by dhammapala in leaf(not sariputta).But anyway i think you will > >further mislead people for that translation." > > > >I am afraid you seemed to be worried too much by my posts and > >translations. > > > >If translating Buddhaghosa's own statements amounted to holding the > >wrong view, so be it. > > > >For your information and dhamma friends on this list, I have already > >translated Anguttara Tiikaa on Statement 49 on 27 December 2001. Now > >I nearly finished writing sub-subcommentary (Anutiikaa) on that > >Tiikaa. I will be able to post Tiikaa translation and my new > >Anutiikaa very soon. > > > >As I have Chatthasangayana Pali CD-ROM, I do not have to get another > >Tika original copy from Myanmar. I believe that the writers of > >Chatthasangayana Pali CD-ROM include many Myanmar Sayadaws. > > > >I try my best to learn from the Buddha, the commentators and the > >subcommentators, and share what I learnt with dhamma friends. And > >dhamma friends who read my works are mature thinkers and > >practitioners of dhamma themselves. And I do not think I can mislead > >them. And there is no good reason for me to mislead them, either. > > > >While I have sympthy for your desire to give the readers the right > >view and prevent them from getting the wrong views from my posts, the > >show must go on. Nothing can silence my voice now. > > > > > >With best wishes, > > > >Suan > > > >http://www.bodhiology.org > > 10659 From: manji Date: Tue Jan 8, 2002 7:12am Subject: RE: [dsg] On Lobha/Dosa and Vedana Oops, I think that something should be clarified :) > Well this is demonstrating dosa, and the mental factors > related. Yet someone may come along who is feeling unpleasant > with the rain, but there are no mental reactions of this > vexation. Maybe an unpleasant feeling, and this unpleasant > feeling... Dukkha. Not really feeling unpleasant with the rain, this is not so much knowing... Hehehe... There just is a moment of unpleasant feeling in the body, maybe cold and damp, because of the vipaka cittas. The results of previous karma. Living out the results of previous karma, not karma making, knowing the dukkha as a result of past karma. This though, is elementary intellectual understanding. Later just knowing dukkha without dosa. :) An enlightened individual still living from previous karma. ;) -manji- 10660 From: rikpa21 Date: Tue Jan 8, 2002 7:23am Subject:?Re: Elementary questions --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "christine_forsyth" wrote: > Thanks for your reply Robert. Just a question > about 'characteristics'. You mention that characteristic of cetana > is hard to know, and that there can be direct knowledge of the > characteristic of wrong view (ditthi) or of lobha. Are > these 'characteristics' listed, taught or discussed anywhere that I > can learn more about them? Hi Christine (Nice meeting yuo the other day, BTW), The "Sabbasava Sutta" lists a number of characteristics of thing that are wholesome and unwholesome, things to be considered and things to be set aside: http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/majjhima/mn002.html > Both Num and you mentioned Wrong View, so I had another look at the > Sammaditthi Sutta, Majjhima Nikaya > http://www.sacred-texts.com/bud/maj/mn9.htm 'The Discourse on Right > View' - it seems more complex than my first reading, packed with > several layers of meaning...... Indeed, as it lists sixteen ways by which one may be said to possess Right View. http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/majjhima/mn009.html > I have heard about 'mundane' and 'supramundane' right view. This > Sutta doesn't seem to mention them directly (?), though the > repetition of the term 'Noble disciple" seems to imply someone with > more understanding than the average, ordinary person. The technical definition of "Noble Disciple" refers to the ariyan disciple--one who has directly realized the Four Noble Truths and thus "entered the stream" (this consists of sotapannas, or "stream- enterers"; sakadagamis, or "once returners"; anagamis, or "non- returners"; and arahats--who are fully enlightened and permanently free from suffering). For example: "When, friends, a noble disciple understands the unwholesome, the root of the unwholesome, the wholesome, and the root of the wholesome, in that way he is one of right view, whose view is straight, who has perfect confidence in the Dhamma, and has arrived at this true Dhamma." In my reading of this Sutta, it is speaking of the supramundane Right View of an ariyan disciple, though not exclusively the ariyan disciple permanently freed from the effluents and suffering, the arahat. I base this interpretation on the following passage, just from the language therein, which suggests that this is an initial understanding eventually leading to final liberation: "When a noble disciple has thus understood the unwholesome, the root of the unwholesome, the wholesome, and the root of the wholesome, he entirely abandons the underlying tendency to lust, he abolishes the underlying tendency to aversion, he extirpates the underlying tendency to the view and conceit 'I am,' and by abandoning ignorance and arousing true knowledge he here and now makes an end of suffering. In that way too a noble disciple is one of right view, whose view is straight, who has perfect confidence in the Dhamma and has arrived at this true Dhamma." Note specifically this does not say (s)he has already entirely abandoned those tendencies, but abandons them (suggesting this is a part of an ongoing process, and not a fait accompli)..."and in that way too [constrasted with the initial stanza], a noble disciple is one of Right View". I think these are important points to bear in mind on reading this sutta: 1. that the first stanza refers to those who have supramundane Right view but are still "trainers", and the last stanza of each passage refers to the arahat, one permenently freed from suffering. In this way this sutta refers to all eight types of noble disciples. > Misconduct in sensual pleasures is unwholesome - The morals and mores > of societies and cultures differ and also change with the passing of > time. 'Misconduct' appears a very broad and vague term...not like, > for instance, the explicit prohibition 'Thou shalt not commit > adultery' of the Christian ten commandments. You raise a very valid and extremely relevant point here, because it touches on in important point regarding the meaning and intent of the precepts. Why did the Buddha suggest taking up certain actions and abandoning others, for example? Based on my understanding, the precepts serve as guidelines of behavior associated with the abandonment of unwholesome qualities and with the increase of wholesome qualities. As you suggest, societal mores are inconstant, fabricated, dependent on time and circumstance, whereas the precepts do not share this fickle basis. The way I view the precepts takes at least two primary factors into acccount: does a though, word, or deed serve to increase unskillful qualities in my own (or another's) mind? If yes, then that thought, word, or deed, is unskillful, to be put down. Conversely, does a given though, word, or deed, lead to an increase in skillful qualities? If yes, this a quality to be taken up. But first, it is helpful to clearly understand what qualities are skillful and what qualities are unskillful. Any qualities that lead to increased attachment, to aversion, or to ignorance (in both myself or in another), are unskillful, to be abandoned. Any qualities which lead to non-attachment, to non- aversion, to understanding (again, in both myself or in another), are to be developed. Note well these factors are true regardless of prevailing mores, and entirely dependent on the nature of the type of mind arising with the thought, word, or deed (though it is still wise to take into consideration the prevailing attitudes of those who do not yet understand this, and who may become upset even by wholesomely motivated words or deeds--so it's not a simlpe matter of thinking "I have a good intention" and can therfore act in any old way I see fit so long as I believe I am acting with the proper motivation). > How are we to conduct our lives without more clarity and guidance on > what are wholesome/unwholesome actions in this regard? Wouldn't the > same 'rules' have to apply through the ages for Kamma to be 'fair'. I believe taking the above factors into consideration addresses the question. None of these factors have anything to do with the prevailing mores of a given society ultimately--which depend on things like culture, geography, and accident, as much as unexamined prejudices and popular trends of the day. So simply kowtowing to "rules" or mores imposed by a given society has nothing to do with the inner meaning and intent of the precepts. In fact, slavish adherence to precepts for their own sake (as mere outer rules without any consideratiuon of their inner meaning or intent) is a form of "silabbataparamasa"--one of the fetters abandoned at stream-entry, though I am in no way suggesting that one dispense with training in precepts like the patimokkha, the vinaya, or otherwise, which I believe are critical aspects of moral training (sila) that eventually lead to the direct understanding of the spirit, rather than the letter, of the Law, becauase they help engender at least absetntion of verbal and bodily misconduct, though what goes on in the mind is another matter entirely :) > Taking what is not given is unwholesome. How far does 'taking what > is not given' extend? I read somewhere recently that 'taking what is > not given' could be extended to mean even things like - unless the > hen brought an egg to you and bowed and presented you with it, then > you were 'taking what was not given' if you kept hens for the purpose > of obtaining eggs. I expect this could also be extended to milk and > honey and all animal life..... Some interpret it this way (this is prevalent among many Chinese Mahayanins, for example), and some don't. The question boils down to, again, motivation. Is there the wish, out of attachment (or aversion) present in the act of taking a hen's egg, for example? What about killing life-threatening baceria with antibiotics, or a mosquitoes that carries a fatal (to a human) form of Dengue fever, for example? Or in taking a hen's egg for food, without aversion to said hen, or covetousness, but simply as a requisite for bodily survival. It this "taking what is not given"? I am not going to make any judgment here; I believe it is incumbent on us to discern if such activity is skillful or unskillful. There is even likely to be significant disagreement among many on points such as these, as I'ev seen within the Buddhist community! Again, I think the salient question here is what is motivating the thought, deed, or word? This is where the kamma is created, as a function of volitional intention (cetana). If the motivation behind any thought, word, or deed, is truly pure (meaning alobha, adosa, amoha), than by any definition that cannot ever yield an unwholesome result, karmically spekaing--even though a wholesomely motivaetd word or deed may piss a few people off temporarily--even one is confident it will brings them lasting benefit (which is why it I believe it wise to consider the effect one's words and deeds have on others, even though one may choose in spite of risking someone's temporary discontent if it serves a bigger-picture wholesome agenda). Another thing I think valuable to consider is the fact the Buddha taught the Middle Way. For example, even the Buddha did not eschew eating meat, and the vinaya is explicit that monks accept all alms given them, whether meat or not, and eat accordingly, without either attachment or aversion to what has been offered. Constrast the Buddha's Middle Way with that of the Buddha's cousin Devadatta, who not only attempted to create a schism in the Sangha by attempting to divide the Sangha along the lines of extremely restrictive precepts including refraining from meat-eating, but also attempted, out of a fit of jealous rage, to murder the Buddha! I don't now if you've found this beneficial of not, Christine. In the ultimate sense, all of these things are entirely up to us to come to discern for uorselves anyway, in dependence on our accumulated wisdom. I only hope that you have found these points have helped to clarify rather than to confuse. :) 10661 From: abhidhammika Date: Tue Jan 8, 2002 7:33am Subject: [dsg] Re: luminous mind: To Nina And Kom On Kamma Modifying Bhavanga Cittam Dear Kom How are you? Thank you for your kind sharing of B. Nanamoli's translation on janaka kamma. I quoted part of your post: "It produces the material and immaterial aggregates both at rebirth linking and during the course of an existence. It is interesting that Bhikkhu Nanamoli has left the term "vipaaka" untranslated in his translation. And his translation of the particle "api" as "both ..and" is rather strong at best and is misleading at worst because it could mean that janaka kamma first produced its result at rebirth linking, and then later produced its results again during the current lifetime. I prefer to translate "api" in this context as "either ..or". Janaka kamma could produce its result at the moment of linking consciousness. If not, it could produce its result during the current lifetime. Similarly, his translation "what is called productive is both profitable and unprofitable." is rather misleading. He could have translated the expression "kusalampi hoti akusalampi" as either profitable or unprofitable". With kind regards, Suan http://www.bodhiology.org --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Kom Tukovinit wrote: > Dear Suan, Nina, Ken O, Sarah, and Num, > > I believe this passage can also be read from B. Nanamoli's > Path to Purification, under Purification by Overcoming > Doubt, XIX, 18, page 621, passage 16. I will quote the > entire passage below: > > [16] Another fourfold classification of kamma is this: > productive, consolidating, frustrating, and supplanting. > Herein, (ix) what is called productive is both profitable > and unprofitable. It produces the material and immaterial > aggregates both at rebirth linking and during the course of > an existence. (x) Consolidating kamma cannot produce > result, but when result has already been produced in the > provision of rebirth-linking by other kamma, it consolidates > the pleasure or pain that arises and makes it last. (xi) > and when result has already been produced in the provision > of rebirth-linking by other kamma, frustrating kamma > frustrates and obstructs the pleasure or pain that arises > and does not allow it to last. (xii) Supplanting kamma is > itself both profitable and unprofitable; and it supplants > other, weaker kamma, prevents it resulting and usurps that > kamma's opportunity in order to cause it own result. But > when the opportunity has thus been furnished by the [other] > kamma, it is that [supplanting kamma's] result that is > called arisen. > > There are two notes associated with this section that might > be of interests: > > [4] '"Productive" kamma is what produces resultant > continuity by providing rebirth-linking and so on. > "Consolidating" kamma prolongs the occurence of the > continuity of pleasure or pain, or the endurance of > materiality. "Frustrating" kamma slowly diminishes the > endurance of pleasure or pain when they occur. It cuts off > the result of other kamma without giving any result of its > own. "Supplanting" kamma, however, cuts off weak kamma and > makes its own result arise. This is their difference' (Pm. > 771). > > [5] See the various meanings of 'arising' given in Ch. > XXII, 81f > 'Another method is this: when some kamma has been done and > there is, either in rebirth-linking or in the course of > existence, the arising of material instances due to the > result of kamma performed, that kamma is "productive". When > some kamma has been performed and the desirable or > undesirable fruit generated by other kamma has its > production facilitated and its endurance aided and > lengthened by the suppression of conditions that would > interfere with it and by the arousing of conditions that > would strengthen it, that kamma is "supporting". Whe some > kamma has been performed and profitable fruit or > unprofitable fruit generated by productive kamma is > obstructed by it respectively in the form of sickeness or of > disquieting of elements, that is "frustrating" kamma. But > when some kamma has been done by which the fruit of other > kamma is ruined and cut off by being supplanted by what cuts > it off although it was fit for longer endurance because of > the efficacy of the kamma tha was producing it, that kamma > is "supplanting"' (Pm. 772) > > kom > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: abhidhammika [mailto:abhidhammika@y...] > > Sent: Thursday, January 03, 2002 3:24 AM > > 687. .....Tattha janakam naama kusalampi hoti > > akusalampi. Tam > > patisandhiyampi pavattepi > > ruupaaruuupavipaakakkhandhe janeti. > > > > "...There, janakam is either healthy or unhealthy > > action. It (janaka > > kamma) can cause resultant physical and mental > > aggegates to arise > > either at the moment of linking consciousness > > (conception) or during > > the current lifetime." 10662 From: Date: Tue Jan 8, 2002 3:55am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: luminous mind: To Nina And Kom On Kamma Modifying Bhavanga Cittam Hi Kom, Thanks for the quote. The Vism I have is translated by Pe Maung Tin, PTS 1975. His translation is very consistent with the Thai Vism I have. I will type down the same paragraph translated by him then. > from B. Nanamoli's > Path to Purification, under Purification by Overcoming > Doubt, XIX, 18, page 621, passage 16. I will quote the > entire passage below: > > [16] Another fourfold classification of kamma is this: > productive, consolidating, frustrating, and supplanting. > Herein, (ix) what is called productive is both profitable > and unprofitable. It produces the material and immaterial > aggregates both at rebirth linking and during the course of > an existence. (x) Consolidating kamma cannot produce > result, but when result has already been produced in the > provision of rebirth-linking by other kamma, it consolidates > the pleasure or pain that arises and makes it last. (xi) > and when result has already been produced in the provision > of rebirth-linking by other kamma, frustrating kamma > frustrates and obstructs the pleasure or pain that arises > and does not allow it to last. (xii) Supplanting kamma is > itself both profitable and unprofitable; and it supplants > other, weaker kamma, prevents it resulting and usurps that > kamma's opportunity in order to cause it own result. But > when the opportunity has thus been furnished by the [other] > kamma, it is that [supplanting kamma's] result that is > called arisen. > P.725 XIX.-Exposition of Transcending of Doubt, Pe Muang Tin, the Path of Purity. PTS, London 1975. _____________________________ Again, there are four kinds of karma: reproductive karma, maintaining karma, unfavorable karma, destructive karma. Of them, reproductive karma is both moral and immoral, and reproduces the resultant aggregates of mind and matter at rebirth and at procedure. The maintaining karma is unable to reproduce a result. It maintains and prolongs the happiness or ill, which arises when rebirth has been granted, and a result yield by another karma. The unfavorable karma oppresses, afflicts and gives no opportunity of long life to the happiness or ill, which arises when rebirth has been granted, and a result yield by another karma. The destructive karma, though itself moral and immoral, [602] kills some other karma which is weak, inhibits its result and makes room for its own results. That result, which is due to the opportunity thus given by karma, is called uprisen result. _______________________________ I think these two translations are pretty consistent. I enjoy reading from various sources. Man, my panna is a long way to go, hope reading, listening and investigating more will condition right understanding. I was impressed from listening to A.Sujin dhamma discussion CD, "Fruit (result) is easy, the right path is not. If one is on the right path, fruit will just happen". (my own translation) Appreciate. Num 10663 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Tue Jan 8, 2002 10:02am Subject: Re: [dsg] Deceiving dhammas, to Betty op 05-01-2002 17:29 schreef Mom Bongkojpriya (Betty) Yugala op beyugala@k...: > There has been much discussion of "cheating" dhammas, and we tend to think > that just because akusala cittas/cetasikas arose just after the kusala, that > somehow the kusala has thus been "tainted" to some extent. But, I'd like to > think that just being able to recognize both the kusala and the akusala that > arose is an excellent indication that sati, and perhaps understanding, has > arisen. So, as long as sati has arisen too, "progress" can be "seen.". > Let me relate a personal experience that just occurred just before new years, > and which Sarah asked me to write about. After our wonderful discussions here > in Bkk last Saturday and Sunday (I couldn't make it on Monday), enhanced by > the visit of Sarah, Jon, Jaran and Christine, we had gone to feed the fish. I > went on home and discovered that my good, dress watch must have slipped off my > wrist somewhere between the fish and home. It was lost, and yet I felt no > regret, no attachment to it (ubekha-kusala=anatta). But then, right after that > a feeling of pride arose: great, I'm proud of myself for not getting upset > over the loss of the watch (mana-akusala=self concept). Then, more akusala > arose, because the thought arose that the ubekha had been "cancelled out" by > the akusala (dosa). Later still, it was realized that being able just to > "follow" the process of the arising of these cittas and cetasikas was sati > itself, and it was ok. Dear Betty, Your observations about different moments of citta, "spoiling our kusala" by akusala, were a good reminder. It seems to happen all the time. If we had never heard the Buddha's teachings we would not know. I like Acharn Sujin's reminder: "It is still self who is thinking". I heard this often. What else can we expect? Thinking in the right way with kusala citta, accompanied by a level of sati, is bound to alternate with clinging to an idea of self who thinks, my thinking, cittas are so fast. I find it difficult to know the difference between sati that accompanies thinking in the right way of realities and sati that is directly aware of realities. In India Acharn spoke about sati of the level of listening, of the thinking level, and sati of satipatthåna, but I can never hear enough about this. With best wishes, Nina. 10664 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Tue Jan 8, 2002 10:03am Subject: Re: [dsg] thinking about realities. op 07-01-2002 15:29 schreef Kenneth Ong op ashkenn@y...: > Hi Nina > >> Hence, for those of us who likes to identify (in words or >> not), she mention that this is not fruitful (as it is >> impossible to clearly see). She said (or came close to >> saying) that instead of identification, seeing the lakhana >> of the nama that knows (the previous object?) would help >> with understandings more. Of course, unless one understands >> why identification (and analysis) is not as useful, or sees >> (perhaps) the lobha that comes with the >> identification/analysis, then one continues to analyze... > > k: How do we define identifying. For eg. An unpleasant feeling arise. > > a. Does she (as you mention above) say that identifying means there arise > a thought "I have an unpleasant feeling". > > b. Or does she mean "there arise an unpleasant feeling" without an I. > > To me there is nothing wrong with identifying as long as one does not > falls into a. As describe in Satipatthana sutta "there arise an > unpleasant feelings" as said in b, to me that sounds a kind of > identification. Even being aware, there is already a presence of > identification. Even studying it with wise reflecion, there already an > identification just that the identification is not geared to a self or I. > I think we cannot start investigation or reflection without idenfication > to meanings even to the paramatha level (there is still identification). > >Dear Ken O, you are quite right, when we think in the right way about paramattha dhammas, while learning, investigating, there are sati and panna of the level of intellectual understanding. The point raised above is: direct awareness and understanding is of a higher level. Then there is no need to name realities. Their characteristics appear and are understood. There is bound to be thinking, but that can also be directly understood as a condiitoned nama, non-self. Your other question: >N: > It is more useful to be aware of what appears, thus, we should not >> neglect visible object, seeing, sound, etc. It depends on condiitons, > sometimes there are conditions to think a lot, but this is not I who > thinks. > > k: I think this goes a bit too far from anatta principle. By denying > there is no existence of I to an extreme is like stepping into another > deep pit while trying not to fall into another from atman. It is my > intuition, I could not explain it. N: It is not self, but a nåma that thinks. I cannot reply now long, I have a lot of work. But I quote: >Sarah wrote to Eric: >1)Paramattha dhammas (‘ultimate’ truths) There has been a lot of discussion on dsg about the difference between conventional and ultimate truths. When I read any of the suttas, including the Satipatthana Sutta, I understand the Buddha to be talking about paramattha truths, whatever the terms and language used to express these. There are a number of very helpful posts (imho) saved under ‘Concepts and Realities’ in Useful Posts:(sorry these links are not alive, I am clumsy with these things): http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/files/Useful_Posts May I particularly draw your attention to one by Rob Ed on ‘paramattha dhammas’ in the Suttas and one by Howard on the Buddha’s use of conventional terminology: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/message/9847 http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/message/10026 >Jon wrote to Rob Ep: is bound to be inaccurate as long as direct understanding of the reality > that is hardness has not been fully developed. No amount of 'correcting' > our conceptual misunderstanding can bring any meaningful progress along > the path. > > Another example. An idea of 'self' arises because realities have not been > directly seen with panna as having the characteristic of 'not-self'. Even > though we may have accepted as correct at an intellectual level the > teaching on no self, the concept of self is still there and will arise, > because of the lack of understanding of realities.> End quotes. >Jon has explained in many excellent posts about right effort and intention not being self, etc. Best wishes, Nina. 10665 From: rikpa21 Date: Tue Jan 8, 2002 11:14am Subject: Re: [dsg] one limb of 8 fold path more important (was satipathana and practice) --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Sarah wrote: > Hi Erik, > > Many thanks for your posts and careful attention;-) As I have limited time > (and very limited wisdom;-), I hope you won't mind if I quote from other > posts as I address the first discussion on paramattha dhammas (absolute > realities) in the Satipatthana Sutta: Likewise, I hope you don't mind if I quote from accomplished and widely respected meditation masters on these very points! :) I find Ajahan Chah's teaching to summarize far better than I am able my own understanding of the process of meditation: http://www.forestsangha.org/chah1.htm To keep this brief (it is late, after all), I'll just leave it at that--Right Mindfulness in terms of praxis. Cheers, Erik 10666 From: Kom Tukovinit Date: Tue Jan 8, 2002 11:43am Subject: RE: [dsg] Re: luminous mind: To Nina And Kom On Kamma Modifying Bhavanga Cittam Dear Suan, Thanks for your kind comment. Do you have any additional pointer on the phrase: "or during the current lifetime?" The other translations I saw didn't phrase it that way and they don't offer additional notes. kom > -----Original Message----- > From: abhidhammika [mailto:abhidhammika@y...] > Sent: Tuesday, January 08, 2002 7:33 AM > To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com > Subject: [dsg] Re: luminous mind: To Nina And Kom > On Kamma Modifying > Bhavanga Cittam > > > > > Dear Kom > > How are you? > > Thank you for your kind sharing of B. Nanamoli's > translation on > janaka kamma. > > I quoted part of your post: > > "It produces the material and immaterial > aggregates both at rebirth > linking and during the course of an existence. > > It is interesting that Bhikkhu Nanamoli has left > the term "vipaaka" > untranslated in his translation. > > And his translation of the particle "api" as > "both ..and" is rather > strong at best and is misleading at worst because > it could mean that > janaka kamma first produced its result at rebirth > linking, and then > later produced its results again during the > current lifetime. > > I prefer to translate "api" in this context as > "either ..or". Janaka > kamma could produce its result at the moment of linking > consciousness. If not, it could produce its > result during the current > lifetime. > > Similarly, his translation "what is called > productive is both > profitable and unprofitable." is rather > misleading. He could have > translated the expression "kusalampi hoti > akusalampi" as either > profitable or unprofitable". > > > With kind regards, > > Suan > > http://www.bodhiology.org > > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Kom Tukovinit > wrote: > > Dear Suan, Nina, Ken O, Sarah, and Num, > > > > I believe this passage can also be read from B. > Nanamoli's > > Path to Purification, under Purification by Overcoming > > Doubt, XIX, 18, page 621, passage 16. I will quote the > > entire passage below: > > > > [16] Another fourfold classification of > kamma is this: > > productive, consolidating, frustrating, and supplanting. > > Herein, (ix) what is called productive is > both profitable > > and unprofitable. It produces the material and > immaterial > > aggregates both at rebirth linking and during > the course of > > an existence. (x) Consolidating kamma cannot produce > > result, but when result has already been produced in the > > provision of rebirth-linking by other kamma, it > consolidates > > the pleasure or pain that arises and makes it > last. (xi) > > and when result has already been produced in > the provision > > of rebirth-linking by other kamma, frustrating kamma > > frustrates and obstructs the pleasure or pain > that arises > > and does not allow it to last. (xii) > Supplanting kamma is > > itself both profitable and unprofitable; and it > supplants > > other, weaker kamma, prevents it resulting and > usurps that > > kamma's opportunity in order to cause it own result. But > > when the opportunity has thus been furnished by > the [other] > > kamma, it is that [supplanting kamma's] result that is > > called arisen. > > > > There are two notes associated with this > section that might > > be of interests: > > > > [4] '"Productive" kamma is what produces resultant > > continuity by providing rebirth-linking and so on. > > "Consolidating" kamma prolongs the occurence of the > > continuity of pleasure or pain, or the endurance of > > materiality. "Frustrating" kamma slowly diminishes the > > endurance of pleasure or pain when they occur. > It cuts off > > the result of other kamma without giving any > result of its > > own. "Supplanting" kamma, however, cuts off > weak kamma and > > makes its own result arise. This is their > difference' (Pm. > > 771). > > > > [5] See the various meanings of > 'arising' given in Ch. > > XXII, 81f > > 'Another method is this: when some kamma > has been done and > > there is, either in rebirth-linking or in the course of > > existence, the arising of material instances due to the > > result of kamma performed, that kamma is > "productive". When > > some kamma has been performed and the desirable or > > undesirable fruit generated by other kamma has its > > production facilitated and its endurance aided and > > lengthened by the suppression of conditions that would > > interfere with it and by the arousing of conditions that > > would strengthen it, that kamma is > "supporting". Whe some > > kamma has been performed and profitable fruit or > > unprofitable fruit generated by productive kamma is > > obstructed by it respectively in the form of > sickeness or of > > disquieting of elements, that is "frustrating" > kamma. But > > when some kamma has been done by which the > fruit of other > > kamma is ruined and cut off by being supplanted > by what cuts > > it off although it was fit for longer endurance > because of > > the efficacy of the kamma tha was producing it, > that kamma > > is "supplanting"' (Pm. 772) > > > > kom > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > From: abhidhammika [mailto:abhidhammika@y...] > > > Sent: Thursday, January 03, 2002 3:24 AM > > > 687. .....Tattha janakam naama kusalampi hoti > > > akusalampi. Tam > > > patisandhiyampi pavattepi > > > ruupaaruuupavipaakakkhandhe janeti. > > > > > > "...There, janakam is either healthy or unhealthy > > > action. It (janaka > > > kamma) can cause resultant physical and mental > > > aggegates to arise > > > either at the moment of linking consciousness > > > (conception) or during > > > the current lifetime." 10667 From: Robert Kirkpatrick Date: Tue Jan 8, 2002 0:16pm Subject: Characteristics (Christine) "christine_forsyth" wrote: > Just a question > about 'characteristics'. You mention that characteristic of cetana is hard to know, and that there can be direct knowledge of the characteristic of wrong view (ditthi) or of lobha. Are > these 'characteristics' listed, taught or discussed anywhere that I can learn more about them? ++++++++++++++ Nina van Gorkom's book 'Cetasikas' available at www.amazon.co.uk (not in USA) has many references and great explanations on all of these . Ditthi, cetana and lobha are mental phenomena (nama) and are entirely different from rupa (material phenomena) . The path of practice discerns the differences. In the mulapariyaya sutta (see bodhi "root of existence") the Buddha explains that 'the uninstructed worldling perceives earth as earth......and he perceives the seen as the seen ..the heard as he heard...the sensed as the sensed..the cognised as the cognised..Having perceieved the cognised as the cognised he conceives himself as the cognised..in the cognised...apart from the cognised..the cognised is mine..What is the reason? Because it has not being fully understood." Just some quotes from the commentary and tika to this sutta: p39 "they bear their own characteristics, thus they are dhammas: This is said for the purpose of showing that these are mere dhammas endowed with the specific natures deviod of such attributions as that of 'being' etc... These dhammas are discovered as ultimately real actualities. And although there is no disctinction between these dhammas and their characteristics the exposition makes a distinction as a mere metaphorical device. Also they are borne, or they are discerned, known, according to their specific nature, thus tey are dhammas."endquote The uninstructed worldling knows dhammas, he knows when he craves or feels angry. He can experience all types of subtle vibrations and hardness and coldness etc. But he conceives them wrongly as being me or mine etc.. The enligthened one experiences all these same dhammas but with the eye of wisdom. The "uninstructed worldling" p40 "needs to be taught, because he possesses neither learning(agama) nor achievement. For he who possesses neither the learning running counter to the activity of conceiving because he has neglected to study, question, and discriminate the aggregates, elements, sense bases (ayatanas) truths, law of conditionality and foundations of mindfulness etc , nor spiritual achievement because he has failed to achieve what should be achived by practice is said to be 'uninstructed'. end qoute Between the enlightened ones and the 'uninstructed worldling' there is the "good worldling' who is learning and developing correctly: p41 "The Buddha, the kinsman of the sun, speaks of the worldling in a twofold way. One is the worldling blinded by darkness and the other is the worldling noble and good"endquote Some more quotes about earth: p47. "What friends is this internal earth element? That which is internal..hard, solid. this is characteristic earth" p51 "One who attains jhana through the earth element may adhere to the object perceived in his meditation as a self or he may take that as a sign of his superiority. Thus he conceives "I am earth'..earth is mine" p57. "Therein what is full understanding of the known? he fully understands the earth element thus: This is the internal earth elemnt, this the external. This is its characteristic, this its function, manifestation and proximate cause" Earth is given as an example and the commentary notes that the same can be said of all elements (namas and rupas)p60. "when one idea is mentioned all ideas of like characteristic are mentioned too". Bhikkhu Bodhi notes in his introduction p14 That "in the stage of full understanding of the known, the gross object is analysed into its constituent dhammas and each dhamma is delimited in its distinct characteristic, function, manifestation, and proximate cause. This procedure rectifies the common sense assumption of simple substantial unites, disclosing in its place a world of composite wholes brought tempoarraily together through a concatenation of conditions" enquote. It can't be stressed enough that this procedure is not limited to thinking about these matters but that it is by the direct insight into these dhammas as they arise in the present moment that is true insight. If this is properly done then gradually, over a very long time, wisdom will develop and result in enlightenment. The enlightened one then p33,34 "directly knows earth as earth..he does not conceive himself as earth..he does not conceive himself apart from earth..he does not conceive earth is mine..he does not delight in earth" best wishes robert 10668 From: Kom Tukovinit Date: Tue Jan 8, 2002 1:14pm Subject: RE: [dsg] Deceiving dhammas Dear Suan, Thanks for your kind comment. Do you have any additional pointer on the phrase: "or during the current lifetime?" The other translations I saw didn't shed lights on this phrasing. kom > -----Original Message----- > From: Mom Bongkojpriya (Betty) Yugala > [mailto:beyugala@k...] > Sent: Saturday, January 05, 2002 8:29 AM > To: dhamma study group > Subject: [dsg] Deceiving dhammas > > > Dear Kom and everyone on the list, > First, a very happy new year to you all, and > especially anomodhana to everyone for providing > wonderful opportunities for contemplation, sati > and understanding to arise, as conditioned by the > insightful discussions here. > 10669 From: Robert Epstein Date: Tue Jan 8, 2002 1:45pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Harvest E-Zine - 2002 January Edition I would like to ask the moderators if this does not qualify as spam. It seems to be a form of recruitment rather than a consideration of the Buddha's teachings, and is certainly proslytizing heavily. As far as I know, Buddha never advocated prayer, nor did he ask to be treated as a god that can dispense favors to those who worship him with faith. This sounds more like a hybrid form of Christianity with Buddha in the role of Christ. What's the policy with something like this? Best, Robert Ep. ============ --- Chen Hsiongcai wrote: > The Monthly Harvest International Buddhist E-Zine > H A R V E S T I N G SPIRITUAL SEEDS OF GROWTH |2002 January Edition| > Issue #23 - Black & White |Panna Youth Centre,Singapore | Promoting Buddhism > Amongst Youths | Happy New Year 2002 | > > P r a i s e t h e L o r d ! > > 1.0 From the Editor’s Desk > 2.0 Feature: White & Black > 3.0 Inspiration: Love is a wonderful thing > 4.0 Sharing: From a Christian to a Buddhist > 5.0 Sayings of the Buddha > 6.0 Intercession & Prayer Requests > 7.0 P.Y.C Announcements & Feature News > 8.0 Quotable Quotes > 9.0 About Harvest E-Zine > -[ F R O M T H E E D I T O R ] > Friends, if your Faith is stronger than the hundredfold in the past one year, > then don't stop there ! I pray that Lord Buddha INCREASE YOU A THOUSAND TIMES > and bless you in the coming year 2002 ! > > There you are - Lord Buddha offers great increase, according to your own faith > level that goes along with your practice. "According to your faith, be it unto > you". But are there any conditions? Of course there are. > > We have to have faith - that's obvious. We have to believe totally that we will > receive what we ask for, but let him ask in faith, with no doubting, for he who > doubts is like a wave driven and tossed by the wind…let not that man suppose he > will receive anything from the Lord, however Lord Buddha always gave the chance > and freewill of enquiry as described in the discourse of the Kalamas and that > his His challenge to those who doubts his teachings. > > We also have to cultivate the seed we have sown in faith and put it into > practise. Just as the farmer does when he sows his natural seed, we have to tend > our newly planted Bodhi seed. We have to nurture it, fertilise it, and water it > before it can germinate, grow and return to us a plentiful harvest. > > How do we water a spiritual seed? By prayer - and in particular, I believe, by > praying with Faith, Compassion and Aspiration. .... 10670 From: Kom Tukovinit Date: Tue Jan 8, 2002 2:01pm Subject: RE: [dsg] Elementary questions Dear Christine, Not sure if this would help or not... > -----Original Message----- > From: christine_forsyth [mailto:cforsyth@v...] > > 1. Could anyone give me the reference in the Tipitaka or elsewhere > to where "The Buddha also taught the Abhidhamma to Sariputta, one of > his chief disciples and the man renowned as the second only to the > Buddha. Sariputta in turn taught the Abhidhamma to the monks under > his instruction, whose role it was to memorize and master it. In > this way the seven books of the Abhidhamma have come down to us > intact." The beginning of Dhammasangani in the Abhidhamma pitaka mentions this. I didn't find any translation on the web, so if you have access to the tipitaka, you may be able to look that up. > > 2. About rupa - it says that there are 16 classified as subtle and > 12 classified as gross. And that there are four great > elements....earth(solidity), water (cohesion), fire(temperature), and > wind(motion). Are these four great elements part of the 28 classes > of rupa? Yes, the four great elements are part of the 28. There are only 28 types of rupa: there are no others. > > 3. The ten immoral or unskillful actions - those listed as 8 > (covetousness), 9 (ill will), and 10 (wrong view) dont't seem > like 'actions' to me. 'Intention' seems to be involved in things > like killing, stealing, sexual misconduct, lying etc. (although I > suppose some may be attributed to 'impulse'?). Covetousness and ill > will, seem much less the result of 'deliberate intention' , they seem > to 'just happen'.... And would anyone 'intend/plan/deliberately > want', to have wrong view? Just like all dhammas, intention (cetana cetasika) arises when there are conditions for it to arise. Do we agree that we don't like the unpleasant feelings that come with anger? Yet, we continue to have episodes of anger, some mild and some stronger. The intention (kamma) is said to produce results of different degrees. Some, when the factors of becoming kammapada are fulfilled, can cause rebirth. Others can cause different kinds of results (there are some references going on now in the thread 'Luminous Mind'). We all have the common wrong view of self, and some (if not most!) also have other kinds of wrong views. Wrong views easily come when we have associations with people with wrong views. There are at least a couple of suttas where the Buddha taught dhamma to a layperson who took Nigantha as the teacher and he became a sotapanna after listening to the sermon. (Migara, Visakha's father-in-law, was a Nigantha disciple who became an ariyan). Even somebody who have accumulated enough to become an ariyan still has the wrong views in the lifetime that they become an ariyan! > 4.The realm of unhappy ghosts.....part of the description includes > the words "and dependent upon those humans who remember them for food > and drink". This is confusing.....how are they to eat any food left > out, what happens if no food is left out. Certainly none of my > deceased relatives/friends have had this hospitality extended to > them, and neither have the hundreds of millions who have died in > Christian countries over the centuries. > The ghosts being dependent in this context may refer to being dependent on getting dedication of merits. When we commit kusala kamma, we (should) dedicate the merit to those who can know about the merit so they can rejoice (anumoddhana) of that kusala kamma. For transfer of merit, see: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/message/5313 Some ghosts get foods/shelters/clothings through anumoddhana of merits dedicated to them. kom 10671 From: Sarah Date: Tue Jan 8, 2002 2:02pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Harvest E-Zine - 2002 January Edition Hi Rob Ep, We already wrote to the sender to explain why these posts were inappropriate for dsg and the sender was put under moderation as soon as we saw them. Any further comments on this or other 'mod' issues off-list to us, thanks. S. --- Robert Epstein wrote: > I would like to ask the moderators if this does not qualify as spam. > It seems to be a form of recruitment rather than a consideration of the > Buddha's > teachings, and is certainly proslytizing heavily. > > As far as I know, Buddha never advocated prayer, nor did he ask to be > treated as a > god that can dispense favors to those who worship him with faith. This > sounds > more like a hybrid form of Christianity with Buddha in the role of > Christ. > > What's the policy with something like this? > > Best, > Robert Ep. > > ============ > > --- Chen Hsiongcai wrote: > > The Monthly Harvest International Buddhist E-Zine > > H A R V E S T I N G SPIRITUAL SEEDS OF GROWTH |2002 January > Edition| > > Issue #23 - Black & White |Panna Youth Centre,Singapore | Promoting > Buddhism > > Amongst Youths | Happy New Year 2002 | > > > > P r a i s e t h e L o r d ! > > > > 1.0 From the Editor’s Desk > > 2.0 Feature: White & Black > > 3.0 Inspiration: Love is a wonderful thing > > 4.0 Sharing: From a Christian to a Buddhist > > 5.0 Sayings of the Buddha > > 6.0 Intercession & Prayer Requests > > 7.0 P.Y.C Announcements & Feature News > > 8.0 Quotable Quotes > > 9.0 About Harvest E-Zine > > -[ F R O M T H E E D I T O R ] > > Friends, if your Faith is stronger than the hundredfold in the past > one year, > > then don't stop there ! I pray that Lord Buddha INCREASE YOU A > THOUSAND TIMES > > and bless you in the coming year 2002 ! > > > > There you are - Lord Buddha offers great increase, according to your > own faith > > level that goes along with your practice. "According to your faith, be > it unto > > you". But are there any conditions? Of course there are. > > > > We have to have faith - that's obvious. We have to believe totally > that we will > > receive what we ask for, but let him ask in faith, with no doubting, > for he who > > doubts is like a wave driven and tossed by the wind…let not that man > suppose he > > will receive anything from the Lord, however Lord Buddha always gave > the chance > > and freewill of enquiry as described in the discourse of the Kalamas > and that > > his His challenge to those who doubts his teachings. > > > > We also have to cultivate the seed we have sown in faith and put it > into > > practise. Just as the farmer does when he sows his natural seed, we > have to tend > > our newly planted Bodhi seed. We have to nurture it, fertilise it, and > water it > > before it can germinate, grow and return to us a plentiful harvest. > > > > How do we water a spiritual seed? By prayer - and in particular, I > believe, by > > praying with Faith, Compassion and Aspiration. > > .... 10672 From: frank kuan Date: Tue Jan 8, 2002 5:12pm Subject: sloth/torpor mental or physical? I read recently (mindfulness in plain english I believe, or maybe wings to awakening?) that sloth/torpor as one of the 5 hindrances is a purely mental phenomena. I'm not sure I buy into that or at least I'm misunderstanding something. For example, I can respond with a dull, somewhat oblivious state of mind whether there is a physiological basis (drowsiness, etc.) or listening to a boring professor with a monotone voice. In BOTH cases, that state of mind appears the same to me, but in one of them there seems to be a physical cause (drowsiness), whereas the other case not. So if I understand the correct Buddhist definition of sloth/torpor, am I to label one mental state as sloth/torpor if it does not have drowsiness as a cause, and the other state as drowsiness instead of sloth/torpor, even though both states of mind appear to be the same to me? -fk 10673 From: wynn Date: Tue Jan 8, 2002 5:26pm Subject: Seeing more than meets eye Hi, What do you think? Do you think it will affect (negatively) Buddhism and meditation? http://chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/chi-0201010170jan01.story Seeing more than meets eye Science finding hallucinations may be reflection of brain pathways By Ronald Kotulak Tribune science reporter Published January 1, 2002 Near-death experiences, in which people believe they see the bright light of heaven at the end of a tunnel, may be nothing more than the brain cells that process vision lighting up in such a way so as to reveal the circular pattern of how they are wired together. New research also indicates that prehistoric cave and rock art depicting spirals, zigzags and other geometric forms may have been done by artists experiencing the same kind of drug-induced hallucinations that people today have when they take LSD, mescaline, Ecstasy and other psychedelic compounds. A visual hallucination is defined as seeing something that's not there. They are relatively common, and almost all cultures from prehistoric times on have used drugs to induce hallucinations for religious, healing and artistic purposes. But science now suggests that near-death images and other hallucinations involving geometric patterns are really there-- on the inside of the brain. Inducing creative mood People like Arthur Conan Doyle, Aldous Huxley, Cary Grant, Allen Ginsberg, Tallulah Bankhead, the Beatles, Charles Dickens, Timothy Leary and Salvador Dali, who used hallucinogens in the hopes of inducing a creative mood, were actually lighting up their brain wiring. "[It] surged upon me an uninterrupted stream of fantastic [kaleidoscopic-like] images of extraordinary plasticity and vividness," is how Albert Hoffman, the brilliant Swiss chemist, described his first experience with LSD, a compound he had synthesized in 1938. Hallucinations can also be caused by anesthetics, fatigue, hunger, stress, alcohol, fever, adverse drug reactions, sleep deprivation, bright flickering lights and even pressure on the eyeballs. Normally, the 100 million neurons of the credit-card size visual cortex at the back of the head convert what our eyes see into edges color, depth and other features, and then reassemble the pieces into recognizable scenes of the outside world. The process works fast. About 40 milliseconds after seeing an object, edge detectors are activated and in another 40 milliseconds the edges become pieced together into contours and the beginnings of surfaces. This information goes to other parts of the brain to be compared with stored memories. In far less than a second you've basically solved the problem of vision, of remembering, recognizing and sorting out what the object is. In the case of a hallucination, this does not happen. Through the action of drugs or other influences, the edge detectors become disengaged from the rest of the network and begin firing on their own. The resulting hallucination reflects the pinwheel pattern of brain cells that process lines, curves and other geometric shapes, providing a remarkable view of the physical architecture of the visual cortex, according to recently published findings by Jack Cowan of the University of Chicago and Paul Bressloff of the University of Utah. "It's almost like seeing your own brain through a mirror," Cowan said. "You're basically seeing patterns that your own brain is making." 4 basic groups Cowan, who is a mathematician and a neurologist, has been studying hallucinations for 20 years. He was intrigued by the work of another U. of C. scientist, Heinrich Kluver, who in the 1920s and 1930s classified the drawings of people experiencing drug-induced hallucinations into four basic categories--tunnels and funnels; spirals; lattices; and cobwebs. Based on new findings from optical imaging, in which scientists can actually see which neurons light up in the visual cortex of cats and monkeys when they view different lines and contours, Cowan, Bressloff and their colleagues developed a mathematical model that can accurately predict the shapes of different hallucinations. "We calculated that given the kinds of anatomy in the visual cortex, there are only four kinds of patterns it will make when it goes unstable," Cowan said. "It turns out that those four kinds of patterns we get from the math correspond exactly to the four classes of patterns that Kluver ended up with based on his looking at the drawings." Terry Sejnowski, director of the Salk Institute's Computational Neurobiology Laboratory, said the work of Cowan and Bressloff could have wide application in the areas of artificial intelligence and artificial vision. "They have created a mathematical model which replicates surprisingly well the states that the brain gets into when it's having visual hallucinations," he said. "These hallucinatory states are really abnormal conditions. Sometimes you learn a lot about a complex system from the conditions which occur when it breaks down or when it's not operating under normal conditions." The mathematical study of vision is also helping to explain near-death experiences. Essentially they are physical representations of striplike columns of neurons in the visual cortex that form a tunnel pattern. "What actually happens when somebody takes a drug is the first thing they experience is a very bright light in the center of the visual field, which is very reminiscent of this sort of light in the tunnel when people think they see heaven beckoning in the distance," Bressloff said. "What seems to happen is that this bright light spreads across the visual field and from that state then this structure emerges which is the seed for the hallucination pattern," he said. Drug-induced drawings Since spirals, tunnels, zigzags and other hallucinatory patterns can be found in the art of almost all cultures and go back more than 30,000 years, many anthropologists speculate that they were done under the influence of hallucinogenic drugs or self-induced trances, and that these experiences served as the origin of abstract art. The foremost masters of hallucinogenic experiences are shamans, ritual practitioners in hunting-and-gathering societies who enter altered states of consciousness to achieve a variety of ends that include healing the sick, foretelling the future, meeting spirit-animals, changing the weather and controlling animals by supernatural means, according to Jean Clottes, scientific adviser to the French ministry on prehistoric art, and David Lewis-Williams, professor of cognitive archeology at the University of Witwatersrand in Johannesburg, South Africa. In their study of shamans, religious mystics and visionaries around the world, Clottes and Lewis-Williams found that while drugs are widely used to induce hallucinations, trances are also used to produce unusual mental imagery. Trances can be induced through sensory deprivation, prolonged social isolation, intense pain, vigorous dancing and insistent, rhythmic sound, such as drumming and chanting. 3 stages of trances In their book, "The Shamans of Prehistory: Trance and Magic in the Painted Caves," Clottes and Lewis-Williams outline three stages of trance. In the first stage trance, people "see" geometric forms, such as dots, zigzags, grids, parallel lines, nested curves and meandering lines. In the second stage, subjects try to make better sense out of the geometric imagery by illusioning them into objects of religious or emotional significance, such as construing a zigzag line into a snake. The third stage is reached via a vortex or tunnel, at the end of which is a bright light. When people emerge from the tunnel they find themselves in a bizarre world where geometric patterns become mixed with monsters, people and settings. It is in this stage where the drawings of humans with animal features occur. Clottes and Lewis-Williams concluded: "We emphasize that these three stages are universal and wired into the human nervous system, though the meanings given to the geometrics of Stage 1, the objects into which they are illusioned in Stage 2, and the hallucinations of Stage 3 are all culture-specific, at least in some measure, people hallucinate what they expect to hallucinate." Copyright © 2002, Chicago Tribune 10674 From: robertkirkpatrick.rm Date: Tue Jan 8, 2002 5:52pm Subject: Re: sloth/torpor mental or physical? --- A good topic Frank. Just to note as an intro. that rupa (material phenomena) conditions nama (mentality) and vice versa by several different paccaya (conditions) explained in exhaustive detail in the patthana. These can be known directly to whatever degree wisdom has been accumulated to know this - at any time they are present. Arahants have neither sloth nor torpor but still sleep. I'm sure others will add more. best wishes robert In dhammastudygroup@y..., frank kuan wrote: > I read recently (mindfulness in plain english I > believe, or maybe wings to awakening?) that > sloth/torpor as one of the 5 hindrances is a purely > mental phenomena. I'm not sure I buy into that or at > least I'm misunderstanding something. > > For example, I can respond with a dull, somewhat > oblivious state of mind whether there is a > physiological basis (drowsiness, etc.) or listening to > a boring professor with a monotone voice. In BOTH > cases, that state of mind appears the same to me, but > in one of them there seems to be a physical cause > (drowsiness), whereas the other case not. So if I > understand the correct Buddhist definition of > sloth/torpor, am I to label one mental state as > sloth/torpor if it does not have drowsiness as a > cause, and the other state as drowsiness instead of > sloth/torpor, even though both states of mind appear > to be the same to me? > > -fk 10675 From: manji Date: Tue Jan 8, 2002 5:52pm Subject: RE: [dsg] On Lobha/Dosa and Vedana After consideration I am now thinking that maybe a little bit confusing Dukkha and Domanassa. So it is dukkha that arises without dosa, since it only arises with the kaya-vinnana which is akusala vipaka. This life being the result of akusala kamma. However, domanassa only arises with two citta... Prompted and unprompted. This is making sense ;) So still the buddha can be free of dosa, lobha, and moha and still suffer the pains of the body until parinibbana. There still is dukkha, yet it is limited to only the body consciousness. The mental consciousness does not fall into unpleasant feeling. This is most fortunate to be discovering, Thanks. -manji- 10676 From: manji Date: Tue Jan 8, 2002 5:54pm Subject: RE: [dsg] Seeing more than meets eye How so with the understanding of sunyata? :) > -----Original Message----- > From: wynn [mailto:wewynal@t...] > Sent: Tuesday, January 08, 2002 8:26 PM > To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com > Subject: [dsg] Seeing more than meets eye > > > Hi, > > What do you think? Do you think it will affect (negatively) > Buddhism and meditation? > > http://chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/chi-0201010170jan01.story > > Seeing more than meets eye > > Science finding hallucinations may be reflection of brain pathways > > By Ronald Kotulak > Tribune science reporter > Published January 1, 2002 > > Near-death experiences, in which people believe they see the > bright light of heaven at the end of a tunnel, may be nothing > more than the brain cells that process vision lighting up in > such a way so as to reveal the circular pattern of how they > are wired together. > > New research also indicates that prehistoric cave and rock > art depicting spirals, zigzags and other geometric forms may > have been done by artists experiencing the same kind of > drug-induced hallucinations that people today have when they > take LSD, mescaline, Ecstasy and other psychedelic compounds. > > A visual hallucination is defined as seeing something that's > not there. They are relatively common, and almost all > cultures from prehistoric times on have used drugs to induce > hallucinations for religious, healing and artistic purposes. > > But science now suggests that near-death images and other > hallucinations involving geometric patterns are really > there-- on the inside of the brain. > > Inducing creative mood > > People like Arthur Conan Doyle, Aldous Huxley, Cary Grant, > Allen Ginsberg, Tallulah Bankhead, the Beatles, Charles > Dickens, Timothy Leary and Salvador Dali, who used > hallucinogens in the hopes of inducing a creative mood, were > actually lighting up their brain wiring. > > "[It] surged upon me an uninterrupted stream of fantastic > [kaleidoscopic-like] images of extraordinary plasticity and > vividness," is how Albert Hoffman, the brilliant Swiss > chemist, described his first experience with LSD, a compound > he had synthesized in 1938. > > Hallucinations can also be caused by anesthetics, fatigue, > hunger, stress, alcohol, fever, adverse drug reactions, sleep > deprivation, bright flickering lights and even pressure on > the eyeballs. > > Normally, the 100 million neurons of the credit-card size > visual cortex at the back of the head convert what our eyes > see into edges color, depth and other features, and then > reassemble the pieces into recognizable scenes of the outside world. > > The process works fast. About 40 milliseconds after seeing an > object, edge detectors are activated and in another 40 > milliseconds the edges become pieced together into contours > and the beginnings of surfaces. This information goes to > other parts of the brain to be compared with stored memories. > > In far less than a second you've basically solved the problem > of vision, of remembering, recognizing and sorting out what > the object is. > > In the case of a hallucination, this does not happen. Through > the action of drugs or other influences, the edge detectors > become disengaged from the rest of the network and begin > firing on their own. > > The resulting hallucination reflects the pinwheel pattern of > brain cells that process lines, curves and other geometric > shapes, providing a remarkable view of the physical > architecture of the visual cortex, according to recently > published findings by Jack Cowan of the University of Chicago > and Paul Bressloff of the University of Utah. > > "It's almost like seeing your own brain through a mirror," > Cowan said. "You're basically seeing patterns that your own > brain is making." > > 4 basic groups > > Cowan, who is a mathematician and a neurologist, has been > studying hallucinations for 20 years. He was intrigued by the > work of another U. of C. scientist, Heinrich Kluver, who in > the 1920s and 1930s classified the drawings of people > experiencing drug-induced hallucinations into four basic > categories--tunnels and funnels; spirals; lattices; and cobwebs. > > Based on new findings from optical imaging, in which > scientists can actually see which neurons light up in the > visual cortex of cats and monkeys when they view different > lines and contours, Cowan, Bressloff and their colleagues > developed a mathematical model that can accurately predict > the shapes of different hallucinations. > > "We calculated that given the kinds of anatomy in the visual > cortex, there are only four kinds of patterns it will make > when it goes unstable," Cowan said. "It turns out that those > four kinds of patterns we get from the math correspond > exactly to the four classes of patterns that Kluver ended up > with based on his looking at the drawings." > > Terry Sejnowski, director of the Salk Institute's > Computational Neurobiology Laboratory, said the work of Cowan > and Bressloff could have wide application in the areas of > artificial intelligence and artificial vision. > > "They have created a mathematical model which replicates > surprisingly well the states that the brain gets into when > it's having visual hallucinations," he said. "These > hallucinatory states are really abnormal conditions. > Sometimes you learn a lot about a complex system from the > conditions which occur when it breaks down or when it's not > operating under normal conditions." > > The mathematical study of vision is also helping to explain > near-death experiences. Essentially they are physical > representations of striplike columns of neurons in the visual > cortex that form a tunnel pattern. > > "What actually happens when somebody takes a drug is the > first thing they experience is a very bright light in the > center of the visual field, which is very reminiscent of this > sort of light in the tunnel when people think they see heaven > beckoning in the distance," Bressloff said. > > "What seems to happen is that this bright light spreads > across the visual field and from that state then this > structure emerges which is the seed for the hallucination > pattern," he said. > > Drug-induced drawings > > Since spirals, tunnels, zigzags and other hallucinatory > patterns can be found in the art of almost all cultures and > go back more than 30,000 years, many anthropologists > speculate that they were done under the influence of > hallucinogenic drugs or self-induced trances, and that these > experiences served as the origin of abstract art. > > The foremost masters of hallucinogenic experiences are > shamans, ritual practitioners in hunting-and-gathering > societies who enter altered states of consciousness to > achieve a variety of ends that include healing the sick, > foretelling the future, meeting spirit-animals, changing the > weather and controlling animals by supernatural means, > according to Jean Clottes, scientific adviser to the French > ministry on prehistoric art, and David Lewis-Williams, > professor of cognitive archeology at the University of > Witwatersrand in Johannesburg, South Africa. > > In their study of shamans, religious mystics and visionaries > around the world, Clottes and Lewis-Williams found that while > drugs are widely used to induce hallucinations, trances are > also used to produce unusual mental imagery. Trances can be > induced through sensory deprivation, prolonged social > isolation, intense pain, vigorous dancing and insistent, > rhythmic sound, such as drumming and chanting. > > 3 stages of trances > > In their book, "The Shamans of Prehistory: Trance and Magic > in the Painted Caves," Clottes and Lewis-Williams outline > three stages of trance. > > In the first stage trance, people "see" geometric forms, such > as dots, zigzags, grids, parallel lines, nested curves and > meandering lines. In the second stage, subjects try to make > better sense out of the geometric imagery by illusioning them > into objects of religious or emotional significance, such as > construing a zigzag line into a snake. The third stage is > reached via a vortex or tunnel, at the end of which is a > bright light. When people emerge from the tunnel they find > themselves in a bizarre world where geometric patterns become > mixed with monsters, people and settings. It is in this stage > where the drawings of humans with animal features occur. > > Clottes and Lewis-Williams concluded: "We emphasize that > these three stages are universal and wired into the human > nervous system, though the meanings given to the geometrics > of Stage 1, the objects into which they are illusioned in > Stage 2, and the hallucinations of Stage 3 are all > culture-specific, at least in some measure, people > hallucinate what they expect to hallucinate." > > > Copyright C 2002, Chicago Tribune 10677 From: robertkirkpatrick.rm Date: Tue Jan 8, 2002 6:01pm Subject: Re: [dsg] On Lobha/Dosa and Vedana --- Good to see this example of wise considering (prompted by your own questions). The unpleasant feeling through the bodysense does not arise with dosa or domanasa. And the following metal processes may be with patience or insight and so be kusala (wholesome ) with neutral or pleasant feeling. However, all these are still dukkha because they are subject to rise and fall. (there are three kinds of dukkha) best wishes robert In dhammastudygroup@y..., "manji" wrote: > After consideration I am now thinking that maybe a little bit confusing > Dukkha and Domanassa. > > So it is dukkha that arises without dosa, since it only arises with the > kaya-vinnana which is akusala vipaka. This life being the result of > akusala kamma. > > However, domanassa only arises with two citta... Prompted and > unprompted. This is making sense ;) > > So still the buddha can be free of dosa, lobha, and moha and still > suffer the pains of the body until parinibbana. There still is dukkha, > yet it is limited to only the body consciousness. The mental > consciousness does not fall into unpleasant feeling. > > This is most fortunate to be discovering, > Thanks. > -manji- 10678 From: wynn Date: Tue Jan 8, 2002 6:10pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Seeing more than meets eye Hi, I don't understand what you mean? ----- Original Message ----- From: manji To: Sent: Wednesday, January 09, 2002 9:54 AM Subject: RE: [dsg] Seeing more than meets eye > How so with the understanding of sunyata? :) > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: wynn [mailto:wewynal@t...] > > Sent: Tuesday, January 08, 2002 8:26 PM > > To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com > > Subject: [dsg] Seeing more than meets eye > > > > > > Hi, > > > > What do you think? Do you think it will affect (negatively) > > Buddhism and meditation? > > > > http://chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/chi-0201010170jan01.story > > > > Seeing more than meets eye > > > > Science finding hallucinations may be reflection of brain pathways > > > > By Ronald Kotulak > > Tribune science reporter > > Published January 1, 2002 > > > > Near-death experiences, in which people believe they see the > > bright light of heaven at the end of a tunnel, may be nothing > > more than the brain cells that process vision lighting up in > > such a way so as to reveal the circular pattern of how they > > are wired together. > > > > New research also indicates that prehistoric cave and rock > > art depicting spirals, zigzags and other geometric forms may > > have been done by artists experiencing the same kind of > > drug-induced hallucinations that people today have when they > > take LSD, mescaline, Ecstasy and other psychedelic compounds. > > > > A visual hallucination is defined as seeing something that's > > not there. They are relatively common, and almost all > > cultures from prehistoric times on have used drugs to induce > > hallucinations for religious, healing and artistic purposes. > > > > But science now suggests that near-death images and other > > hallucinations involving geometric patterns are really > > there-- on the inside of the brain. > > > > Inducing creative mood > > > > People like Arthur Conan Doyle, Aldous Huxley, Cary Grant, > > Allen Ginsberg, Tallulah Bankhead, the Beatles, Charles > > Dickens, Timothy Leary and Salvador Dali, who used > > hallucinogens in the hopes of inducing a creative mood, were > > actually lighting up their brain wiring. > > > > "[It] surged upon me an uninterrupted stream of fantastic > > [kaleidoscopic-like] images of extraordinary plasticity and > > vividness," is how Albert Hoffman, the brilliant Swiss > > chemist, described his first experience with LSD, a compound > > he had synthesized in 1938. > > > > Hallucinations can also be caused by anesthetics, fatigue, > > hunger, stress, alcohol, fever, adverse drug reactions, sleep > > deprivation, bright flickering lights and even pressure on > > the eyeballs. > > > > Normally, the 100 million neurons of the credit-card size > > visual cortex at the back of the head convert what our eyes > > see into edges color, depth and other features, and then > > reassemble the pieces into recognizable scenes of the outside world. > > > > The process works fast. About 40 milliseconds after seeing an > > object, edge detectors are activated and in another 40 > > milliseconds the edges become pieced together into contours > > and the beginnings of surfaces. This information goes to > > other parts of the brain to be compared with stored memories. > > > > In far less than a second you've basically solved the problem > > of vision, of remembering, recognizing and sorting out what > > the object is. > > > > In the case of a hallucination, this does not happen. Through > > the action of drugs or other influences, the edge detectors > > become disengaged from the rest of the network and begin > > firing on their own. > > > > The resulting hallucination reflects the pinwheel pattern of > > brain cells that process lines, curves and other geometric > > shapes, providing a remarkable view of the physical > > architecture of the visual cortex, according to recently > > published findings by Jack Cowan of the University of Chicago > > and Paul Bressloff of the University of Utah. > > > > "It's almost like seeing your own brain through a mirror," > > Cowan said. "You're basically seeing patterns that your own > > brain is making." > > > > 4 basic groups > > > > Cowan, who is a mathematician and a neurologist, has been > > studying hallucinations for 20 years. He was intrigued by the > > work of another U. of C. scientist, Heinrich Kluver, who in > > the 1920s and 1930s classified the drawings of people > > experiencing drug-induced hallucinations into four basic > > categories--tunnels and funnels; spirals; lattices; and cobwebs. > > > > Based on new findings from optical imaging, in which > > scientists can actually see which neurons light up in the > > visual cortex of cats and monkeys when they view different > > lines and contours, Cowan, Bressloff and their colleagues > > developed a mathematical model that can accurately predict > > the shapes of different hallucinations. > > > > "We calculated that given the kinds of anatomy in the visual > > cortex, there are only four kinds of patterns it will make > > when it goes unstable," Cowan said. "It turns out that those > > four kinds of patterns we get from the math correspond > > exactly to the four classes of patterns that Kluver ended up > > with based on his looking at the drawings." > > > > Terry Sejnowski, director of the Salk Institute's > > Computational Neurobiology Laboratory, said the work of Cowan > > and Bressloff could have wide application in the areas of > > artificial intelligence and artificial vision. > > > > "They have created a mathematical model which replicates > > surprisingly well the states that the brain gets into when > > it's having visual hallucinations," he said. "These > > hallucinatory states are really abnormal conditions. > > Sometimes you learn a lot about a complex system from the > > conditions which occur when it breaks down or when it's not > > operating under normal conditions." > > > > The mathematical study of vision is also helping to explain > > near-death experiences. Essentially they are physical > > representations of striplike columns of neurons in the visual > > cortex that form a tunnel pattern. > > > > "What actually happens when somebody takes a drug is the > > first thing they experience is a very bright light in the > > center of the visual field, which is very reminiscent of this > > sort of light in the tunnel when people think they see heaven > > beckoning in the distance," Bressloff said. > > > > "What seems to happen is that this bright light spreads > > across the visual field and from that state then this > > structure emerges which is the seed for the hallucination > > pattern," he said. > > > > Drug-induced drawings > > > > Since spirals, tunnels, zigzags and other hallucinatory > > patterns can be found in the art of almost all cultures and > > go back more than 30,000 years, many anthropologists > > speculate that they were done under the influence of > > hallucinogenic drugs or self-induced trances, and that these > > experiences served as the origin of abstract art. > > > > The foremost masters of hallucinogenic experiences are > > shamans, ritual practitioners in hunting-and-gathering > > societies who enter altered states of consciousness to > > achieve a variety of ends that include healing the sick, > > foretelling the future, meeting spirit-animals, changing the > > weather and controlling animals by supernatural means, > > according to Jean Clottes, scientific adviser to the French > > ministry on prehistoric art, and David Lewis-Williams, > > professor of cognitive archeology at the University of > > Witwatersrand in Johannesburg, South Africa. > > > > In their study of shamans, religious mystics and visionaries > > around the world, Clottes and Lewis-Williams found that while > > drugs are widely used to induce hallucinations, trances are > > also used to produce unusual mental imagery. Trances can be > > induced through sensory deprivation, prolonged social > > isolation, intense pain, vigorous dancing and insistent, > > rhythmic sound, such as drumming and chanting. > > > > 3 stages of trances > > > > In their book, "The Shamans of Prehistory: Trance and Magic > > in the Painted Caves," Clottes and Lewis-Williams outline > > three stages of trance. > > > > In the first stage trance, people "see" geometric forms, such > > as dots, zigzags, grids, parallel lines, nested curves and > > meandering lines. In the second stage, subjects try to make > > better sense out of the geometric imagery by illusioning them > > into objects of religious or emotional significance, such as > > construing a zigzag line into a snake. The third stage is > > reached via a vortex or tunnel, at the end of which is a > > bright light. When people emerge from the tunnel they find > > themselves in a bizarre world where geometric patterns become > > mixed with monsters, people and settings. It is in this stage > > where the drawings of humans with animal features occur. > > > > Clottes and Lewis-Williams concluded: "We emphasize that > > these three stages are universal and wired into the human > > nervous system, though the meanings given to the geometrics > > of Stage 1, the objects into which they are illusioned in > > Stage 2, and the hallucinations of Stage 3 are all > > culture-specific, at least in some measure, people > > hallucinate what they expect to hallucinate." > > > > > > Copyright C 2002, Chicago Tribune 10679 From: Mom Bongkojpriya (Betty) Yugala Date: Tue Jan 8, 2002 7:42pm Subject: Re: [dsg] "right" thinking and satipatthana Dear Nina, As usual, you have "hit the nail on the head", so to speak, and came straight to the point, helping to clarify the problem for me. Anomodhana for that. __________________________ .Nina: I like Acharn Sujin's reminder: "It is still self who is thinking". I heard this > often. What else can we expect? Thinking in the right way with kusala citta, > accompanied by a level of sati, is bound to alternate with clinging to an > idea of self who thinks, my thinking, cittas are so fast. __________________________ Absolutely: Achaan usually reminds us with the same thought in the form of a question: Who is doing the thinking, being angry, or whatever action "one" says s/he "is doing"? This is an excellent thought to "test" ourselves and bring focus on the realities. If only this thought would arise as many times as possible during the course of a day. (But, the longing for such a thought to arise is lobha, and thus being akusala, will inhibit kusala to arise). Its a vicious cycle, isn't it? __________________________ Nina: I find it difficult to know the difference between sati that accompanies thinking in > the right way of realities and sati that is directly aware of realities. In > India Acharn spoke about sati of the level of listening, of the thinking > level, and sati of satipatthåna, but I can never hear enough about this. __________________________ This is the main problem for "me" as well. But as I continued to read further down below, the answer came, but as a thought, not as a deep understanding on the level of satipatthana. __________________________ > > >Jon wrote to Rob Ep: > > is bound to be inaccurate as long as direct understanding of the reality > > that is hardness has not been fully developed. No amount of 'correcting' > > our conceptual misunderstanding can bring any meaningful progress along > > the path. > > > > Another example. An idea of 'self' arises because realities have not been > > directly seen with panna as having the characteristic of 'not-self'. Even > > though we may have accepted as correct at an intellectual level the > > teaching on no self, the concept of self is still there and will arise, > > because of the lack of understanding of realities.> End quotes. _____________________________ And herein lies the difference between "right" thinking about realities, and the actual experience of the deep understanding that comes with satipatthana. "Right" thinking, like any kind of thinking, is merely a thought that arises and falls away. But when satipattana arises, the understanding is deep, an insight, no thinking is required. But panna just knows the particular reality that arose and knows it is anatta at the same time, all on a very deep, profound level. Panna too, like any reality, rises and then falls away, but what was understood is "accumulated" by panna forever. Each time this happens ("we" never know when it's going to happen) a tiny erosion in our "self" concept occurs, slightly (verrrryyy slightly) reducing it a bit. Along with this a somanassa feeling arises, a feeling of great calm and liberation. At least, on the rare occasions (verrrryyyy rare) that this has arisen for "me", it was like that. And thank you, dear Nina, for being the "paccaya", in a sense, to cause this thinking to arise for "me", > anomodhana, Betty> 10680 From: Robert Epstein Date: Tue Jan 8, 2002 10:29pm Subject: Re: [dsg] New Members- settling in ? Dear Christine and Lucy, Here's one of my favorite zen koans for the occasion. Perhaps the dog and cat will find it interesting. Monk: When heat and cold come, how can we avoid them? Master: Why don't you go to the place where there is no cold or heat? Monk: Where is the place where there is no cold or heat? Master: When it's hot the heat kills you, when it's cold the cold kills you. Best, Robert Ep. ============= --- christine_forsyth wrote: > Having consulted the dog, he's decided to stay home - hates water, > hard to even catch him for a bath. :-) > > Is it part of the human condition to always think the grass is > greener elsewhere? > > Hope to see more posts from you, > Christine > > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "Lucy" wrote: > > Thanks, Christine > > > > Yes, you can have all of this wonderful wet wet wet , and the cold, > > the wind and the dark winter days. All yours! (but it's not crisp, > > more like...soggy) > > > > My cat has lived under the duvet the past 2 months, maybe your dog > > wants to trade places too? > > > > Lucy 10681 From: Sarah Date: Wed Jan 9, 2002 0:45am Subject: Re: [dsg] one limb of 8 fold path more important (was satipathana and practice) Dear Erik, I’d like to consider some of your other points and quotes on ‘focus’ and ‘without lapse’, but this is not so simple at all, I find;-) I’m quoting extracts from more than one of your posts..pls excuse the ‘cut and paste’ job. ***** > 2)Focus and `unbroken mindfulness' > Sarah: >....... As we know from our abhidhamma studies, sati is not > unbroken or continuous but is a skilful mental state arising momentarily > with a specific citta (consciousnes) in the javana (`running- through') > process. ***** Erik: Then why does this seem to directly contradict the Buddha's teaching on Right Mindfulness (from the Anapanasati Sutta): "On whatever occasion the monk remains focused on the body in & of itself -- ardent, alert, & mindful -- putting aside greed & distress with reference to the world, on that occasion his mindfulness is steady & without lapse." ***** Sarah: Like Num, I find it helpful to look at different translations; B.Bodhi’s translation Anapanasati Sutta, in MN p945: “That is why on that occasion a bhikkhu abides contemplating the body as a body, ardent, fully aware and mindful, having put away covetousnes and grief for the world.” The same translation is used later. Covetousness and grief refer to lobha (attachment) and dosa (aversion) as I understand. He doesn’t refer to ‘focus’ or ‘without lapse’, though I agree with your comments about the limitations of ‘contemplating’...I’d prefer ‘being aware’ perhaps. Erik, may I just point out a few dificulties which I find when we read suttas such as this one: 1.For most of us we depend on translations and our very limited understanding. 2. Translations can vary a lot and inevitably reflect the understanding of the translator. Studying the Pali itself will reflect our own undestanding and be limited in this regard also. 3. Sometimes the references are to jhana attainment and sometimes to satipatthana. We need to carefully distinguish. For example, in the paragraph following the one quoted here, we read “I shall breathe in experiencing rapture”. ‘Rapture’ can refer to the state attained in the jhanas and also be an object of insight. ‘Concentrating the mind’ sometimes refers to concentration pertaining to jhanas and sometimes to momentary concentration arising with insight and so on. ***** Erik: How do you regard what the Buddha says here about mindfulness as a factor of awakening being "steady and without lapse", compared to sati merely being "a skilful mental state arising momentarily with a specific citta"? By way of personal preference, I prefer the direct words of the Buddha over other interpretations, since some appear to directly contradict the words of the Buddha regarding mindfulness as an enlightenment factor: "When his mindfulness is steady & without lapse, then mindfulness as a factor of awakening becomes aroused. He develops it, and for him it goes to the culmination of its development. ***** Sarah: Ok I’m checking BB’s translation for this quote, p946 : “Bhikkhus, on whatever occasion a bhikkhu abides contemplating the body a a body, ardent, fully aware, and mindul, having put away covetousness and grief for the world - on that occasion unremitting mindfulness is established in him. On whatever occasion unremitting mindfulness is established in a bhikkhu - on that occasion the mindfulness enlightenment factor is aroused in him, and he develops it, and by development, it comes to fulfilment in him. “Abiding thus mindful, he investigates and examines that state with wisdom and embarks upon a full inquiry into it....with wisdom...” ..... This continues for all the other foundations of mindfulness. A few points to consider: 1. The enlightenment factors arise momentarily with ‘pure’ cittas 2. The enlightenment factors only arise with highly developed panna. Only when wisdom has developed to the extent that it can realize the Noble Truths is it accompanied by the 7 bojjhangas (enlightenment factors) i.e. not before experiencing th e vipassana nanas. 3. Objects of awareness pertain to realities appearing now.as we read in other suttas, these include the hindrances, the sense objects, experiencing through different doorways and so on. 4. In the beginning, sati will not be powerful or an enlightenment factor or unremitting in any sense of the word. 5. The aim should not be to copy the arahat or one for whom lobha and dosa have been ‘put away’, but to develop awareness of realities as they are. 6. If the enlightenment factors or ‘limbs of wisdom’ (as they are sometimes referred to, I recall) are experienced, it isnatural that these can be objects of awareness amongst the rupas, vedana, cittas and other dhammas. ..... Erik, I don’t pretend to have all the answers and I’m merely sharing a few reflections. Without sati and panna there will be no knowing when concentration or any other factor is skilful or unskilful. This is why, even when we read suttas specifically about concentration, energy, metta, dana or other mental states, the emphasis is still on understanding and being aware of these dhammas as not self and not worth being attached to. ..... We read: AN. I, v (48): "Nothing, O monks, do I know that changes so rapidly as consciousness. Scarcely anything may be found that could be compared with this so rapidly changing consciousness." ...... The aim of panna and sati is not to change cittas (consciousness) or to slowthem down or to only have one kind of reality appering, but to understand more and more about those realities appering now. What is truly extraordinary is that panna and sati can and will develop with sufficient right conditions. ***** Erik: That is why I cannot help but return again and again to the question I feel is of utmost importance here: how does being aware, intellectually, of the truth of anatta, lead to the sort of insight needed to terminate the fetters? I'm not denying the importance of studying how all things lack self-nature, but question how this-- without diligently practicing ones' meditative "chops" until the mind is well-trained and can remain focused for long periods of time- -is enough to lead to the sole aim of the Dhamma: the termination of suffering. ***** Sarah: When we talk about ‘all things lack self-nature’, we have to know very precisely what ‘all things’ are. All things are paramattha dhammas (absolute realities) which can be directly known and experienced. If we have the idea that sati should be and be aware of concepts such as walking, eating and body, then this isn’t the intellectual understanding, let alone the direct understanding of anatta. So first, we really have to hear and consider over and over again and test out directly what these realities are. As Num paraphrased in a recent post, ‘the fruit is the easy part’. In other words, with clear intellectual right understanding and sacca nana (as Jaran described so well), the rest takes care of itself..... Just a few reflections for the 4th lunch-hour (a late one today) running. Hope there is something of use;-) Sarah p.s Btw, Much appreciated your kind and helpful comments and response in the recent post to Christine ====================================================== 10682 From: Sarah Date: Wed Jan 9, 2002 0:58am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: grandma again Dear Christine & Purnomo, I really appreciated your kind post a lot, Christine. You gave a lot of helpul and sensible advice and the story of Vasetthi is always a good reminder of how anyone of us can go 'mad' at anytime and yet, with the right tendencies and opportunities for developing wisdom, it is possible to follow the 'path'. She even became foremost in the vinaya amongst the nuns as I recall. Many thanks. May I also say that you have a real skill like your uncle and Sariputta for telling stories.....you have me wanting to ask 'and then..?' or 'what next....' and then 'Ohhhh..;-(' when you end;-) Sarah ================================================== --- christine_forsyth wrote: > Once upon a time, when I felt great grief, I found out that even > those, like Vasetthi, who were very nearly Arahants didn't escape > this dukkha. Knowing this didn't stop my pain, but it helped, > somehow. > > Vasetthi was born in Vesali and was happily married to a man whom she > bore a son. When her child died, she went mad and ran away from > home.... Eventually, she came to Mithila, encountered the Buddha and > regained her sanity. Then Vasetthi joined the nuns' sangha and later > became an arahant. > > > Grief-stricken for my son, > mad-minded, out of my senses, > I was naked with wild hair > and I wandered anywhere. > > I lived on trash heaps, > in a graveyard, > and by the highways. > Three years' wandering, > starved and thirsty. > > Then in the city of Mithila > I saw the one who tames > what is untamed > and goes his way in happiness, > enlightened, unafraid. > > I came to my senses > paid homage, > and sat down. > > Out of compassion, > Guatama (Buddha) taught me the way. > When I heard his words > I set out into homelessness. > By putting his teachings into practice, > I realized great joy. > > My grief is cut out, > finished, ended, > for I have understood the ground > from which all grief comes. > > May you soon be peaceful and happy, Purnomo > > May you understand the ground from which all grief comes > > May you live with ease and well being. ........................................ 10683 From: christine_forsyth Date: Wed Jan 9, 2002 1:25am Subject: Re: [dsg] New Members- settling in ? Dear Robert Ep, I thank you, and my dog thanks you too.... actually we both believe he's always been more skillful than I at solving Koans:-) I think it is because dogs don't get headaches...... After all, he knew the answer to the question "What is the sound of one hand clapping?" well before I did...... "A dog wagging its tail in the breeze." metta, Christine --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Robert Epstein wrote: > Dear Christine and Lucy, > Here's one of my favorite zen koans for the occasion. Perhaps the dog and cat > will find it interesting. > > Monk: When heat and cold come, how can we avoid them? > Master: Why don't you go to the place where there is no cold or heat? > Monk: Where is the place where there is no cold or heat? > Master: When it's hot the heat kills you, when it's cold the cold kills you. > > Best, > Robert Ep. > > ============= > > > --- christine_forsyth wrote: > > Having consulted the dog, he's decided to stay home - hates water, > > hard to even catch him for a bath. :-) > > > > Is it part of the human condition to always think the grass is > > greener elsewhere? > > > > Hope to see more posts from you, > > Christine > > 10684 From: Sarah Date: Wed Jan 9, 2002 1:40am Subject: RE: [dsg] On Lobha/Dosa and Vedana Dear Manji, As Rob K said, it's good to see all your own wise reflection. It can be quite a confusing area and yet very important in daily life. Like you mentioned in the earlier post, there is unpleasant bodily feeling (dukkha) when we feel too hot or cold, but this is just vipaka, the result of kamma. There isn't any dosa. It doesn't hurt or harm us or accumulate any dosa for the future or create new kamma. It is the dosa (and domanassa) on account of this bodily feeling subsequently that causes the trouble so to speak. Hence we can see the importance of understanding the distinction between vipaka cittas and cittas accompanied by lobha or dosa. The same of course applies to experiences and accompanying feelings through the eyes, ears, nose and tongue, followed inevitably by the unwholesome accumulations. --- manji wrote: > After consideration I am now thinking that maybe a little bit confusing > Dukkha and Domanassa. > > So it is dukkha that arises without dosa, since it only arises with the > kaya-vinnana which is akusala vipaka. This life being the result of > akusala kamma. > > However, domanassa only arises with two citta... Prompted and > unprompted. This is making sense ;) > > So still the buddha can be free of dosa, lobha, and moha and still > suffer the pains of the body until parinibbana. There still is dukkha, > yet it is limited to only the body consciousness. The mental > consciousness does not fall into unpleasant feeling. Yes, for the arahats there are no more conditions for kilesa to arise. Vipakka is still experienced for the rest of the life. bodily feeling is always pleasant (sukkha) or unpleasant (dukkha). You can find more discussion on the different meanings of dukkha under this heading in useful posts; http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/files/Useful_Posts > This is most fortunate to be discovering, Manji, I feel the same and I'm so glad you've prompted more consideration...you've raised very helpful points and i appreciate your interest. Look forward to hearing any more of your reflections. Sarah p.s Rob K- good to see you around;-) Have a good trip to Bkk this weekend. ==================================================== 10685 From: jaranoh Date: Wed Jan 9, 2002 3:25am Subject: Re: What I learn in BKK about three rounds.... Robert: Thanks for asking. I remember Mike was saying that you were coming to BKK. I wish I had time to join you. Have fun, and wish A. Sujin 'Happy Birthday' for me. Maybe we can meet next time, around Chinese new year? Regards, jaran > +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > Dear Jaran, > Very nice posts. Any chance of coming back to bangkok this weekend? > I arrive on friday night and leave monday night. > robert 10686 From: jaranoh Date: Wed Jan 9, 2002 3:36am Subject: [dsg] Re: grandma again Hi Christine and Sarah: May I say I agree with Sarah completely. I am glad you made it home OK. I enjoyed meeting you in BKK. It was a lot of fun. What's more fun is your account of the trip. I just recovered from a few days of laughing. ;-) You know, Christine I myself am quite embarrased to ask questions, so I am so glad you are here asking all these critical and helpful questions. Please continue for me. :-) See you soon, jaran, wandering, independent spirit --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Sarah wrote: 10687 From: jaranoh Date: Wed Jan 9, 2002 3:50am Subject: Re: [dsg] Elementary questions ... about ghosts ;-) Kom and Christine: Well said Kom. May I also add a minor detail here that by dedicating the merits to these ghosts, one (who does it) does not lose the merits one performs. Instead, another kind of merits (kusala) has arisen from the generous act. Regards, jaran > > 4.The realm of unhappy ghosts.....part of the description > includes > > the words "and dependent upon those humans who remember > them for food > > and drink". This is confusing.....how are they to eat any > food left > > out, what happens if no food is left out. Certainly none > of my > > deceased relatives/friends have had this hospitality > extended to > > them, and neither have the hundreds of millions who have > died in > > Christian countries over the centuries. > > > > The ghosts being dependent in this context may refer to > being dependent on getting dedication of merits. When we > commit kusala kamma, we (should) dedicate the merit to those > who can know about the merit so they can rejoice > (anumoddhana) of that kusala kamma. For transfer of merit, > see: > http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/message/5313 > > Some ghosts get foods/shelters/clothings through anumoddhana > of merits dedicated to them. > > kom 10688 From: christine_forsyth Date: Wed Jan 9, 2002 5:07am Subject: Re: Elementary questions Dear Eric, nice meeting you and Eath too :-), Much gratitude for your clearly written and knowledgeable post. I appreciate your clarifying 'mundane' and 'supramundane', as well as describing the primary factors you take into account when considering the Precepts. It certainly takes them out of the historical context and shows they are true in any time period or place. One small point about the precept against killing ...... doesn't this refer to sentient beings or potential sentient beings only, and in that case, would not refer to bacteria or plants or unfertilised eggs? I found the Sabbasava Sutta 'All the Fermentations' very interesting. (In my copy by Bhikkhu Nanamoli and Bhikkhu Bodhi it is called 'All the Taints') Are fermentations, defilements, taints and fetters different words for the same things.......or are my problems bigger than I first thought? And are there any more categories I have yet to hear of? In this sutta, where it says " And what are the fermentations to be abandoned by developing? There is the case where a monk, reflecting appropriately, develops mindfulness as a factor of awakening dependent on seclusion...dispassion...cessation, resulting in letting go. He develops analysis of qualities as a factor of awakening...persistence as a factor of awakening...rapture as a factor of awakening...serenity as a factor of awakening...concentration as a factor of awakening...equanimity as a factor of awakening dependent on seclusion...dispassion...cessation, resulting in letting go. The fermentations, vexation, or fever that would arise if he were not to develop these qualities do not arise for him when he develops them. These are called the fermentations to be abandoned by developing." A little confusing for me here ...... rapture and serenity are definitely factors of awakening? Mandatory to achieve? or one possible way, among others, to go? metta, Christine --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "rikpa21" wrote: > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "christine_forsyth" > wrote: > > Thanks for your reply Robert. Just a question > > about 'characteristics'. You mention that characteristic of > cetana > > is hard to know, and that there can be direct knowledge of the > > characteristic of wrong view (ditthi) or of lobha. Are > > these 'characteristics' listed, taught or discussed anywhere that > I > > can learn more about them? > > Hi Christine (Nice meeting yuo the other day, BTW), > > The "Sabbasava Sutta" lists a number of characteristics of thing > that are wholesome and unwholesome, things to be considered and > things to be set aside: > http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/majjhima/mn002.html > > > Both Num and you mentioned Wrong View, so I had another look at > the > > Sammaditthi Sutta, Majjhima Nikaya > > http://www.sacred-texts.com/bud/maj/mn9.htm 'The Discourse on > Right > > View' - it seems more complex than my first reading, packed with > > several layers of meaning...... > > Indeed, as it lists sixteen ways by which one may be said to possess > Right View. > > http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/majjhima/mn009.html > > > I have heard about 'mundane' and 'supramundane' right view. This > > Sutta doesn't seem to mention them directly (?), though the > > repetition of the term 'Noble disciple" seems to imply someone > with > > more understanding than the average, ordinary person. > > The technical definition of "Noble Disciple" refers to the ariyan > disciple--one who has directly realized the Four Noble Truths and > thus "entered the stream" (this consists of sotapannas, or "stream- > enterers"; sakadagamis, or "once returners"; anagamis, or "non- > returners"; and arahats--who are fully enlightened and permanently > free from suffering). > > For example: "When, friends, a noble disciple understands the > unwholesome, the root of the unwholesome, the wholesome, and the > root of the wholesome, in that way he is one of right view, whose > view is straight, who has perfect confidence in the Dhamma, and has > arrived at this true Dhamma." > > In my reading of this Sutta, it is speaking of the supramundane > Right View of an ariyan disciple, though not exclusively the > ariyan disciple permanently freed from the effluents and suffering, > the arahat. I base this interpretation on the following passage, > just from the language therein, which suggests that this is an > initial understanding eventually leading to final liberation: > > "When a noble disciple has thus understood the unwholesome, the root > of the unwholesome, the wholesome, and the root of the wholesome, he > entirely abandons the underlying tendency to lust, he abolishes the > underlying tendency to aversion, he extirpates the underlying > tendency to the view and conceit 'I am,' and by abandoning ignorance > and arousing true knowledge he here and now makes an end of > suffering. In that way too a noble disciple is one of right view, > whose view is straight, who has perfect confidence in the Dhamma and > has arrived at this true Dhamma." > > Note specifically this does not say (s)he has already entirely > abandoned those tendencies, but abandons them (suggesting this is a > part of an ongoing process, and not a fait accompli)..."and in that > way too [constrasted with the initial stanza], a noble disciple is > one of Right View". > > I think these are important points to bear in mind on reading this > sutta: 1. that the first stanza refers to those who have > supramundane Right view but are still "trainers", and the > last stanza of each passage refers to the arahat, one permenently > freed from suffering. In this way this sutta refers to all eight > types of noble disciples. > > > Misconduct in sensual pleasures is unwholesome - The morals and > mores > > of societies and cultures differ and also change with the passing > of > > time. 'Misconduct' appears a very broad and vague term...not > like, > > for instance, the explicit prohibition 'Thou shalt not commit > > adultery' of the Christian ten commandments. > > You raise a very valid and extremely relevant point here, because it > touches on in important point regarding the meaning and intent of > the precepts. > > Why did the Buddha suggest taking up certain actions and abandoning > others, for example? Based on my understanding, the precepts serve > as guidelines of behavior associated with the abandonment of > unwholesome qualities and with the increase of wholesome qualities. > > As you suggest, societal mores are inconstant, fabricated, dependent > on time and circumstance, whereas the precepts do not share this > fickle basis. > > The way I view the precepts takes at least two primary factors into > acccount: does a though, word, or deed serve to increase unskillful > qualities in my own (or another's) mind? If yes, then that thought, > word, or deed, is unskillful, to be put down. Conversely, does a > given though, word, or deed, lead to an increase in skillful > qualities? If yes, this a quality to be taken up. But first, it is > helpful to clearly understand what qualities are skillful and what > qualities are unskillful. > > Any qualities that lead to increased attachment, to aversion, or to > ignorance (in both myself or in another), are unskillful, to be > abandoned. Any qualities which lead to non-attachment, to non- > aversion, to understanding (again, in both myself or in another), > are to be developed. > > Note well these factors are true regardless of prevailing mores, and > entirely dependent on the nature of the type of mind arising with > the thought, word, or deed (though it is still wise to take into > consideration the prevailing attitudes of those who do not yet > understand this, and who may become upset even by wholesomely > motivated words or deeds--so it's not a simlpe matter of thinking "I > have a good intention" and can therfore act in any old way I see fit > so long as I believe I am acting with the proper motivation). > > > How are we to conduct our lives without more clarity and guidance > on > > what are wholesome/unwholesome actions in this regard? Wouldn't > the > > same 'rules' have to apply through the ages for Kamma to be 'fair'. > > I believe taking the above factors into consideration addresses the > question. None of these factors have anything to do with the > prevailing mores of a given society ultimately--which depend on > things like culture, geography, and accident, as much as unexamined > prejudices and popular trends of the day. So simply kowtowing > to "rules" or mores imposed by a given society has nothing to do > with the inner meaning and intent of the precepts. > > In fact, slavish adherence to precepts for their own sake (as mere > outer rules without any consideratiuon of their inner meaning or > intent) is a form of "silabbataparamasa"--one of the fetters > abandoned at stream-entry, though I am in no way suggesting that one > dispense with training in precepts like the patimokkha, the vinaya, > or otherwise, which I believe are critical aspects of moral training > (sila) that eventually lead to the direct understanding of the > spirit, rather than the letter, of the Law, becauase they help > engender at least absetntion of verbal and bodily misconduct, though > what goes on in the mind is another matter entirely :) > > > Taking what is not given is unwholesome. How far does 'taking > what > > is not given' extend? I read somewhere recently that 'taking what > is > > not given' could be extended to mean even things like - unless the > > hen brought an egg to you and bowed and presented you with it, > then > > you were 'taking what was not given' if you kept hens for the > purpose > > of obtaining eggs. I expect this could also be extended to milk > and > > honey and all animal life..... > > Some interpret it this way (this is prevalent among many Chinese > Mahayanins, for example), and some don't. The question boils down > to, again, motivation. Is there the wish, out of attachment (or > aversion) present in the act of taking a hen's egg, for example? > > What about killing life-threatening baceria with antibiotics, or a > mosquitoes that carries a fatal (to a human) form of Dengue fever, > for example? Or in taking a hen's egg for food, without aversion to > said hen, or covetousness, but simply as a requisite for bodily > survival. It this "taking what is not given"? I am not going to make > any judgment here; I believe it is incumbent on us to discern if > such activity is skillful or unskillful. There is even likely to be > significant disagreement among many on points such as these, as I'ev > seen within the Buddhist community! > > Again, I think the salient question here is what is motivating the > thought, deed, or word? This is where the kamma is created, as a > function of volitional intention (cetana). > > If the motivation behind any thought, word, or deed, is truly pure > (meaning alobha, adosa, amoha), than by any definition that cannot > ever yield an unwholesome result, karmically spekaing--even though a > wholesomely motivaetd word or deed may piss a few people off > temporarily--even one is confident it will brings them lasting > benefit (which is why it I believe it wise to consider the effect > one's words and deeds have on others, even though one may choose in > spite of risking someone's temporary discontent if it serves a > bigger-picture wholesome agenda). > > Another thing I think valuable to consider is the fact the Buddha > taught the Middle Way. For example, even the Buddha did not eschew > eating meat, and the vinaya is explicit that monks accept all alms > given them, whether meat or not, and eat accordingly, without either > attachment or aversion to what has been offered. > > Constrast the Buddha's Middle Way with that of the Buddha's cousin > Devadatta, who not only attempted to create a schism in the Sangha > by attempting to divide the Sangha along the lines of extremely > restrictive precepts including refraining from meat-eating, but also > attempted, out of a fit of jealous rage, to murder the Buddha! > > I don't now if you've found this beneficial of not, Christine. In > the ultimate sense, all of these things are entirely up to us to > come to discern for uorselves anyway, in dependence on our > accumulated wisdom. I only hope that you have found these points > have helped to clarify rather than to confuse. :) 10689 From: christine_forsyth Date: Wed Jan 9, 2002 5:10am Subject: Re: Characteristics (Christine) Dear Robert, I was glad of the link to Amazon in the U.K. I wasn't previously aware of it, and have ordered 'Cetasikas' and 'Atthalasini' that is so often quoted from. Until I increase the number of books I have access to (very few), I'll have to depend on quotes from others - such as those you give in your post. Thanks. I especially liked the 'good worldling' references. Before seeing those it seemed to me that one was either enlightened or nothing. Nice to know there is a level between the two extremes. Though how to know if you are 'learning and developing correctly'? Sometimes seems a little hit and miss to me....... The Mulapariyaya Sutta "The Root of All things" on first reading looks quite difficult to understand ...... perhaps it's worth my getting The Discourse on the Root of Existence? metta, Christine --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Robert Kirkpatrick wrote: > "christine_forsyth" wrote: > > Just a question > > about 'characteristics'. You mention that characteristic of > cetana is hard to know, and that there can be direct knowledge > of the characteristic of wrong view (ditthi) or of lobha. Are > > these 'characteristics' listed, taught or discussed anywhere > that I can learn more about them? > ++++++++++++++ > Nina van Gorkom's book 'Cetasikas' available at www.amazon.co.uk > (not in USA) has many references and great explanations on all > of these . Ditthi, cetana and lobha are mental phenomena (nama) > and are entirely different from rupa (material phenomena) . The > path of practice discerns the differences. > In the mulapariyaya sutta (see bodhi "root of existence") the > Buddha explains that 'the uninstructed worldling perceives earth > as earth......and he perceives the seen as the seen ..the heard > as he heard...the sensed as the sensed..the cognised as the > cognised..Having perceieved the cognised as the cognised he > conceives himself as the cognised..in the cognised...apart from > the cognised..the cognised is mine..What is the reason? Because > it has not being fully understood." > Just some quotes from the commentary and tika to this sutta: p39 > "they bear their own characteristics, thus they are dhammas: > This is said for the purpose of showing that these are mere > dhammas endowed with the specific natures deviod of such > attributions as that of 'being' etc... These dhammas are > discovered as ultimately real actualities. And although there is > no disctinction between these dhammas and their characteristics > the exposition makes a distinction as a mere metaphorical > device. Also they are borne, or they are discerned, known, > according to their specific nature, thus tey are > dhammas."endquote > > The uninstructed worldling knows dhammas, he knows when he > craves or feels angry. He can experience all types of subtle > vibrations and hardness and coldness etc. But he conceives them > wrongly as being me or mine etc.. The enligthened one > experiences all these same dhammas but with the eye of wisdom. > The "uninstructed worldling" p40 > "needs to be taught, because he possesses neither > learning(agama) nor achievement. For he who possesses neither > the learning running counter to the activity of conceiving > because he has neglected to study, question, and discriminate > the aggregates, elements, sense bases (ayatanas) truths, law of > conditionality and foundations of mindfulness etc , nor > spiritual achievement because he has failed to achieve what > should be achived by practice is said to be 'uninstructed'. end > qoute > Between the enlightened ones and the 'uninstructed worldling' > there is the "good worldling' who is learning and developing > correctly: > p41 "The Buddha, the kinsman of the sun, speaks of the worldling > in a twofold way. One is the worldling blinded by darkness and > the other is the worldling noble and good"endquote > > Some more quotes about earth: p47. "What friends is this > internal earth element? That which is internal..hard, solid. > this is characteristic earth" > p51 "One who attains jhana through the earth element may adhere > to the object perceived in his meditation as a self or he may > take that as a sign of his superiority. Thus he conceives "I am > earth'..earth is mine" > p57. "Therein what is full understanding of the known? he fully > understands the earth element thus: This is the internal earth > elemnt, this the external. This is its characteristic, this its > function, manifestation and proximate cause" > Earth is given as an example and the commentary notes that the